Enlightened Sirens: Naples and Music

    1.

    Opera arrived in Naples twice, first among the contortions of myth and then in an unlikely twist of history. The myth is an extravagantly famous one about someone who survives hearing some singing that should destroy him.

    Homer barely describes the Sirens, but their high voices float all the more forcefully out of the Odyssey as a result. The heaps of bones surrounding them on their island are described, but Odysseus has been told what to do to avoid being pulled by their singing to shipwreck and destruction. So he fills the ears of his oarsmen with beeswax, a material that echoes the honey of the voices that it must exclude, and he gets them to bind him to the mast so that he can listen and yet voyage onwards. No one had ever done so, and no one was meant to do so. We are invited to imagine his cries to be released, so that he could shatter himself in the ecstasy of listening, mingling with the singing of the Sirens. The beeswax was there to keep this out, too. Homer’s poem follows the Greek hero to his next adventures, of course, so it is elsewhere that we learn that the singers were so appalled by his escape that they drowned themselves in the Tyrrhenian Sea. You could call this an atonement for their failure, or conclude that they somehow sacrificed themselves so that Odysseus could survive. One of their corpses washed ashore in what would become the bay of Naples, and her name, Parthenope, was originally given to this city that would become the capital of the singing voice, and of the liquid pull of opera.

    Its second arrival waited for modern history. We find the latter starting as it meant to go on, in a mood of fragility, doubt, and bravado. The year is 1650 and the great, sad, violent empire of the Spanish Habsburgs has spent the last three decades throwing enough conflict across Europe, not without help from others, to persuade later historians to invent something called the Thirty Years War; and now, as is the habit of empires, it needs funds. Naples, a seething port with a grand past and a vast population that makes it heave with both wealth and poverty, is one of the oddest and most constitutionally anomalous points within the whole frenzied tapestry that made up Habsburg power. Genoese bankers, Spanish politicians, and Calabrian landowners mix there with hyperactive teams of builders and rivalrous religious orders, and with phalanxes of entrepreneurs on every scale, from ambitious maritime speculators to the most scabrous smugglers. Modern cities are places of layers and knots and tangles, and Naples grasped and was hit by modernity early. The more deliriously modern cities become, the more raw and unresolved the voices with which the past speaks in them are forced or allowed to be.

    Naples loved spectacle, and three years earlier a sharply charismatic fisherman and smuggler in his early twenties known as Masaniello had exploited a day of public festivities and war games to turn what had been tremors of inchoate discontent at Spanish taxes into an outright revolt. One especially unpopular tax targeted fruit; a contemporary chronicle reports with dry outrage that it extended to lupins and both red and white mulberries. The Habsburg Viceroy was forced to hole up with a rump of troops in the Castel Nuovo with its access to the sea, and this insurgent conducted the city’s affairs from the door of his meager house, wearing his tattered fishing clothes. His uprising was energetic but its aims were opaque and improvisatory, and it proliferated confusing protagonists, such as the radical and brilliant priest and lawyer Gennaro Genoino, who was a longstanding agitator against Spain, or the rather tremulous current incarnation of the Duc de Guise, who came adventuring down carrying suggestions of French help and dreams of a kingdom of his own. 

    At one point something called a republican monarchy was declared, as if all that these rebels could do was to throw words into the void that they were uncovering at the heart of power. After Spanish rule had grindingly reasserted itself, the Viceroy knew that this void called for some new version of spectacle, whether to articulate it or to cover it up. Opera had been surging forwards in Italy during the recent strife because of the mixtures of festive splendor with vivid uncertainty that make up its very substance, and so it was to opera’s new-fangled and acute glamour that he turned. A wheeling producer from the Veneto called Curzio Manara was available to bring a troupe, partly because not long before he had been forced out of a similar undertaking in Paris, under suspicion of passing on sensitive city plans to the French. 

    Thus did a Neapolitan fisherman conspire with continental unrest to set going the processes that would eventually bring something called classical music to creation. And so, in 1650, Naples staged its first opera, Francesco Cavalli’s La Didone. The piece tells its story with a ragged opulence that must have matched the mood in the hectically festooned pavilion in the Viceroy’s palace where it was put on, as the Carthaginian queen Dido takes in and is betrayed by the refugee Trojan hero Aeneas, whose vast destiny of founding Rome precludes her. Reports from Neapolitan newspapers tellingly shift its title to emphasize the sack of the city of Troy, which only begins the narrative; its own recent fits of violence and instability must have made the city’s first operagoers feel as if political reality itself was singing within Cavalli’s music, and much of his most torrid expressiveness does indeed come as the opening act tears nimbly through Troy’s destruction. Ecuba and Cassandra sing with mixtures of excruciating plaintiveness and dire moral menace that preempt, at least as much as they prefigure, the later laments of Dido herself as the future of the world leaves her behind.

    Lament thus pervades Cavalli’s opera, but it suddenly departs just where Dido’s story should bring it to its height. While Aeneas finally steers away towards Italy like Odysseus slipping away from the Sirens, her voice has begun gathering together all the opera’s vistas of loss when the tale twists. A local king called Iarbas has been providing dramatic complexity and vocal variety by rivalling Aeneas’ claim on Dido’s heart, and he bursts on stage to turn her imminent suicide into the lieto fine, the happy ending, to which opera seria would often seem wedded. Still, innumerable later settings of her story in Naples across the eighteenth century would prove sonorously sure that they should end with her suffering. But right at the wobbly start of Neapolitan opera, we find this odd clue to what would keep making vocal style there so fluid, dynamic, and restless: the great collision at the heart of the local form. Drives of lament and all the violence and wounds of history collide within the city’s music with comedy, pleasure, and the delirium of form as it keeps limiting and freeing itself.

    One argument of this essay is that opera was ultimately a less important musical phenomenon than the aria itself. The claim is complicated, though, because the coming of opera with all its quantities of prestige, investment, and collaboration, all its heightenings of desire and pleasure, did pump new, richly unsteady momentum into the already vibrant world of Neapolitan vocal music across the second half of the eighteenth century. Venice was the undisputed champion, around 1650, of opera in Italy and so across Europe. La Didone is indeed almost exaggeratedly exemplary of the aspect of ambitious seventeenth-century opera that the coming of the new versions of Neapolitan vocal style would overturn, because recitative passages feature so much of its most wrenching, probing music. In Naples the aria became the wings, the flesh, the very psyche of opera, and one consequence of this was the teeming density of interaction between operas and all the other versions of vocal music that arias sing in. 

    As Europe went about seeking an enlightened entrance into modern history, it was Naples’ version of vocal style that became the crucial artistic vector and analysis of the culture’s minds and bodies, and it did so by concentrating with spiraling relentlessness and finesse on defining and extending how arias worked. Because change and dispute and divergency made up so much of the city’s political and civic substance, it needed an artistic form capable of great flexibility and nimbleness, one filled at once with a teeming simplicity and a sort of tough abundance. It would turn out in fact that arias can only get defined by being extended, because nothing in the world of the aria has any inside except by expanding vociferously outwards. The name of the composer who did most to achieve all this was Alessandro Scarlatti, and the da capo aria, the one that starts again from its beginning and to our ears sounds like a hoary cliché, was the form that he turned into the crucial stylistic driver of the movement to modernize music.

    The Scarlattis were a powerful musical clan from Sicily, but the vast reputation that brought Alessandro Scarlatti as a very young man to Naples was made in Rome, where he was the prodigious favorite of that splendid and difficult exile from the wreckage of the Thirty Years War, Christina, the former queen of Sweden. He was just eighteen when he composed the first of his crowds of operas, and Gli Equivoci nel Sembiante repaid the confidence that this exotic tyro evidently inspired in himself as well as others, becoming such a heady success when it was first privately performed in the winter early in 1679 that Christina briskly arranged for it to be put on again for a larger audience. She also immediately made Scarlatti her maestro di cappella despite not having a chapel or anything much else for him to be master of, and a small riot ensued at the opera’s second venue among those pushing to get in. The buzz of controversy continued as more of the city’s movers wanted to see the thing; no one wanted to miss out, so it continued to be performed despite the tendrils of the Pope’s official desire to suppress opera. Bologna’s hunger for aesthetic novelty meant that later that same year it became the first of many cities, around Italy and up to Vienna, to put the opera on. As early as 1680 the work hit Naples, trailing glamorous combinations of prestige and scandal.

    Gli Equivoci nel Sembiante is indeed a deliciously unnerving work in its compounds of formulaic efficiency and raking, torrid, creative willfulness. The cascades of excitement that it set off among the day’s cultural grandees are oddly, loopily mirrored in the congested mirrors and loops of desire that its drama sets out. Yet Another Comedy of Even More Errors would be one title for it in English, though the Italian gleams with the suggestive idea that resemblance itself is what is confusing. So two eventual pairs of lovers find themselves driven through a gyrating machinery of misapprehensions and mishaps, their moods and interactions spiraling with such crackling speed and density that the pastoral backdrop feels at points like a sort of hothouse for expressive fervor. At other stages, it starts to feel like the sort of wasteland that such fervor leaves behind; the compounds of giddiness and obsession that make up the inner life of expression in modern culture all the way through to Breton’s surrealism are already present as Scarlatti’s career ignites. 

    Almost grim in the relentlessness with which it pulls these characters through desire, confusion, and reconciliation, the little opera triumphs because of the stunning stylistic variety with which Scarlatti both offsets and exploits its conventionality. The arias are generally far from the da capo shapes that he would soon start specializing in, and they sometimes nearly choke on everything that he has started asking them to do. Scarlatti’s music languishes and then snarls, and then swaggers into abrasive little bursts of harmonic wit, leaping between moods with a rapidity that keeps threatening to turn cursory. At the same time, though, the recitative passages that carry the actual narrative developments in Baroque opera are still far more prominent and distinctive here than they would remain. But all this is of course the point. As it presses its own forms and rhythms and timbres for their every momentary juice of expressive color and purpose, the opera becomes a sort of manifesto for the world of arias that was looming.

    Naples became the place for Scarlatti to expand in because it was large but inchoate, because it was swarmingly copious and various, because it was uncertainly suspended between drives of civilizational uplift and a sort of sheer agglomerative mayhem. It was, in other words, a place markedly like this brilliant, driven, convulsive young man who was now spinning with both worldly success and cultural afflatus. Opera in Baroque Rome was too institutionally embattled and commercially stifled, while other centers offered less room to maneuver than this overpopulated city with its complex governmental structure and its notorious diversity of festive occasions and institutional bodies. The field of action in Naples was remarkably free and abuzz with potential a few decades after opera had been thrown into its extravagant mix of musical and theatrical traditions, and Scarlatti travelled there with an operatic troupe himself in 1683 at a happy moment. Early in 1684 the viceregal maestro di cappella died after only a handful of years in position, and the young man was there on the spot, with his mixture of energetic freshness, expansive reputation, and Roman authority and sleekness.

    Viceroys in Naples acted fast when it came to music. Within days Scarlatti got the job, in a hurry that reflects the keenness on some parts to grab him, but also the amounts of distrust that needed bypassing. The hugely talented, hugely spiky figure of the composer Francesco Provenzale was the local favorite, and he had been holding grudges already since being passed over for the post those few years earlier. At the same time Scarlatti’s sister had thrown herself into show business in Naples alongside him, and lurid rumors surrounded her from the start that were both viciously misogynistic and probably fairly well-founded. But then for Scarlatti Naples was always a dazzling problem, a mutating provocation that made him become a master of fluency and flexibility. Constant tensions between the Viceroy’s court and the city’s ecclesiastical leadership typified the political multifariousness that reigned in the place, and would have made themselves felt for someone with his job in the most intimate details of style, of his moment by moment compositional choices. 

    One of his first major pieces in his new position in Naples was the Passio Secundum Johannem, which he composed in 1685 as a setting of the Easter story, and it is almost vehement in its insistence on the adaptability of his style for such purposes. He deploys his feel for melodic charm in riveting bursts and touches to point up the largely austere sound world; elsewhere, sweeps of harmonic openness spread a keening pathos over crucial but crucially brief passages. The listening priests may have felt reassured by the combinations of tense spiritual pathos with angular stylistic vim, or they may have felt upbraided. Versatility and metamorphosis would be vital to everything that Scarlatti bequeathed to music and so to modern culture. But his versions of them would feed on how endlessly he was also committed to analysis and simplification, and a certain stately curtness.

    2.

    Inventing the da capo aria is no longer, thankfully, the sort of achievement that music histories tend to confer on someone like Scarlatti merely because he composed so many fine ones that they have survived in teeming numbers. His oeuvre even so has been preserved too patchily and performed far too sporadically for accounts of his development to be very confident, and it was surrounded by misty, colorful seas of vocal music that it now offers us slippery and prismatic ways of listening in on. Using an artistic form strongly enough makes a paradigm of it — and then that paradigm gets cast back onto the blanks of the past and interpreted as a matter of invention. As Scarlatti took up his career in Naples, the da capo aria was probably already turning itself slowly but fiercely into the chief shape available for vocal music. The composer died in 1725, just as the era of the great poet and librettist Pietro Metastasio began to gel, based as it was on an often extremely rigorous alternation of da capo arias with sparsely set recitative passages. Did Scarlatti do more than anyone to make this happen? No one did more to show what the da capo aria could do, to interpret the potential statements within this avid little vessel about what language, expression, and action were becoming.

    The da capo term is a simple one, and the shape that it names can sound more like a sort of show-business ruse than like one of the technically rigorous forms that Scarlatti’s epoch of fugues and courtly dances exalted. A da capo aria is simply one that at a certain point starts again from the beginning; it tells its performers to go back to the head or to take it from the top. But no one wanted arias that looped on endlessly, so the idea was not to sing again everything that had come before the da capo instruction, but just to repeat the first of two increasingly rigorously distinct initial sections. Overall the result was thus a ternary form in which the third section repeated the first, and the second was left as a sort of floating pivot that was at once enclosed and richly undefined. The geometry is all the more pliable, expansive, and even rampant for having such basic foundations. One of the stylistic and indeed existential phenomena that the da capo aria keeps under constant, fluid examination is repetition itself. Not even repetition is ever the same thing twice, after all, and a form based on repeating and reversing is an ideal means by which a social world beset by change and obsessed with innovation can try to keep track of itself.

    The genius of the da capo aria is to find in this single formal gesture routes to both definition and multiplicity. At the heart of the form was the demand that the repeated section be sung with extensive, often voluble extra layers of decoration and flourish. It is a perpetually weird and thrilling moment: right at the point when the aria has said the two things that it has to say, the thing that everyone has really been waiting for unleashes itself and the singing voice pours out its abundance. Composing vocal music was less a matter of telling the voice what to do than giving it a pliant, suggestive batch of materials to go to work on. Scarlatti’s acute analytical mind must have found this a perpetually equivocal process, one that hands over the keys to arias to their singers and lets them decide whether expressive elucidation or gorgeous obliteration should prevail. Descartes himself had been Christina’s crucial favorite earlier in her hungry cultural progress, and it seems clear that the composer either shared or had taken on some geometrical passion for clarity and the identification of a thing’s essential engines. The da capo aria is the point in the emergence of modern Europe where Descartes and show business meet and conjoin, as singing digs deep into the essence of its resources and turns them into panache and impact.

    Is the point of art to discover essence and bedrock, or do we want change and flux and new vistas? Scarlatti had arrived in Naples as a very young man who was both a vastly admired phenomenon and a much distrusted outsider; he had to be zanily productive both to keep the status and to maintain the sheer momentum of his artistic growth, and his every move was sharply scrutinized. Naples itself becomes a sort of constant, noisy, plangent collaborator in these arias as they go on opening themselves to their singers’ voices and the hungry ears of their listeners. Whenever a da capo aria returns to its beginning, the composer’s notes let their authority flow out into the performer’s decisions, the passions and powers of the performative moment that streams between a voice and an audience within the heady or gaudy or stifling atmosphere of this or that dramatic occasion. The aria loops backwards and pulls the character and the singer alike ever further into its present tense of expression, but then reveals deep within itself the audience’s teeming pleasures and demands. Because its machinery of reiteration can so easily seem formulaic but is in fact so filled with potential, the da capo aria offers itself as a state of endless exposure to the judgments of tiers and worlds of others.

    Urban life itself is thus in a way the major driver of Neapolitan vocal music, the great song within all its shapes and ecstasies. The city grew and grew through the seventeenth century as a result of deliberate policies and the lure of imperial wealth, but also because controls were lax and the levers of policy slippery and haphazard, and because imperial economics had brought atrophy to the surrounding regions. Scarlatti arrived right during the pivotal passages when this seething, uncertain place began to assert its distinctive claims and logics, began indeed to try to grasp its own breaks with the past and its need to make its own present. Roiling debates about the nature of newness itself and the relationship between ancient and modern styles of art and learning characterized the early enlightenment years across Europe, and in Naples during the 1680s they reached a distinctive pitch. 

    Giuseppe Valletta was the great businessman, lawyer, and bibliophile who gave crucial direction to the city’s burgeoning enlightenment scene by making his vast and impressively radical library available to arrays of readers and thinkers. He was a promoter of Epicureanism at a time when its strains of atomistic materialism were controversial to the point of danger, and he pushed the new scientific theories that were both promising and threatening a changed world, as they threw their innovations up into the decreasingly heavenly spheres and down into the workings of everyone’s flesh. The hectic flash of presentness itself as incarnated in his rapid, heady brushstrokes was the great Luca Giordano’s constant subject and draw as he became decisive amongst the city’s painters; his sobriquet was “fa presto” because of how fast he worked. As Naples finally pulled its visual culture free of Caravaggio’s shocking impact there early in the seventeenth century, Francesco Solimena became the city’s next great painter, and his work has qualities of intellectual thrust and scrupulous vim that partly explain how he became Scarlatti’s close ally and almost married his daughter.

    Naples itself could have been called an Accademia degli Investiganti, the name that belonged to the tangled gang of Cartesians and reformers and sceptics gathered around Valletta. Within music itself, the place was charged with performative life craving compositional shape. Carlo Cailò was establishing a piquant local version of the widely accelerating styles of solo violin playing, setting up symbioses between the instrument and the city’s vocal traditions that would bear complex fruit with Tartini decades later. Matteo Sassano, known as Matteuccio, was by 1690 establishing himself as a vital early megastar in the city’s great, weird, and notorious line of castrato singers. The flesh of the likes of Matteuccio or “the nightingale of Naples,” carried especially livid reminders of how much performance meant in this world: Losing so much makes someone need to be special, and want to use the intensity of the present tense to chase the past from sight. But then the century’s last decade saw the arrival and the graduation in law of Pietro Giannone, the pioneer of secular historiography who by the early 1720s embodied the city’s drives of change and consciousness ever more fractiously, and whose destiny of flight and imprisonment rancidly darkened the enlightenment in Naples. The power of Scarlatti’s vocal style comes not from any simply glamorous opening up of performance and delight, but from fusing such energies with taut and angular sorts of shapeliness, scrutiny, and restraint. It is this fusion that makes him the great pivot, far more influential at least in the short term than those anomalous monsters of drastic technique and pulverizing brio Bach and Handel, between the innovations in musical modernity brought by Monteverdi around 1600 and their culmination towards and around 1800 in Vienna.

    The composer and violinist Gian Carlo Cailò arrived in Naples from Rome at around the same time as Scarlatti, and may well have gone as part of his circle. Sassano’s deep and enduring connections with Scarlatti are vastly attested, but only amount to one vista onto the blaze of links, collaborations, affiliations, inheritances, rivalries, and disputes that drove Neapolitan music rapidly forwards as the turn of the century approached. During these decades the city’s famed systems of musical pedagogy began to reach full acceleration, involving not just its seethingly energetic conservatories but drives towards whole new educational methods based in repetitious drilling and the simplification of compositional units. Urbanization and music were pretty much the same thing in Naples, and Scarlatti’s place at the peak of the city’s central musical hierarchy only exposed him to how voraciously other versions of authority and power were proliferating. The noble classes were squeezed between the centralizing pulls of Spanish rule and the city’s dense forests of civic governance, but shinily expensive musical entertainments were forums that they could excel in. In Naples, religion and the throng of urban life flowed together turbulently like two seas on top of each other, as the church gorged on the zeal of local cults and the excitements of festive cycles — and all this needed musical expression, too. Splintering religious meaning and practices filled the city with rivalrous churches or pushy fraternities keen to commission their own masterpieces of sacred uplift. The crisply bountiful Stabat Mater drawn from Scarlatti by one such commission was the precedent for the imperishable setting by Giovanni Battista Pergolesi a handful of decades later, which would become the flagship for Neapolitan vocal style in the twentieth century. Proliferation and simplification were indeed the artistic drives that Scarlatti wielded in answer to the churning commissions, requests, and opportunities thrown his way; proliferation and simplification are the da capo aria’s deep vectors.

    It must have sometimes felt like being a city himself. Scarlatti seems to have combined imperiousness and charm in his character as well as his music; a kick of excitement and prestige tends to surround his name when contemporaries mention him, however patchily. But he needed a vehicle as nimble and steely as the da capo aria to negotiate the sheer ferocity with which he was being asked to absorb and to manipulate a vast and mutating cultural world. He sets high spiritual meditations and great Biblical stories, poignant or prim pastoral verses and mighty or obscure passages from ancient or medieval history, severe set pieces of tragic pathos or cleverly caustic blasts of satire. His oratorios on Scriptural stories may have more weaving narrative dash than any of his operas, and among the latter his comic intermezzos have a stunningly sturdy waggishness. But Scarlatti’s most fully achieved body of work may well be his musical monologues — dramatic or chamber cantatas, shorter pieces often full of fragile intellectual verve as they typically alternate a couple of arias with recitative passages, and designed for one singer to perform privately with very limited accompaniment. Their introverted dramas and rarified audiences encourage artistic ambitions that are almost esoterically strenuous, as their recitativi pour speech rhythms and states of high psychic tension down through often extravagantly open musical textures. Paradoxically, the tense expressive momentum that thus feeds into the arias themselves lets Scarlatti turn them into a sort of cumulative laboratory for his love of compression and coolly shaped wit. His chamber cantatas become a massive, ongoing experiment not just in the inner structures by which arias function, but in the shifting and volatile levels of mobility and autonomy with which they do and do not belong to their surrounding works.

    One such aria has proved so adventitiously detachable that it has ended up existing as a freestanding little masterpiece, either severed from a cantata or possibly composed in quirky isolation in the first place. It is known as “Sconsolato rusignolo,” from the disconsolate nightingale that its first line addresses, and the neatly silvery sort of soprano voice which suggests that the nightingale of Naples himself may have been the intended singer. But the key word in the first of the aria’s two tercets, and hence the centerpiece of the decorations when that tercet is repeated, is the injunction “rispondi,” “respond,” with which the singer implores the bird to make its song into an iteration of his own. Distinctive scoring deepens the aria’s enigmas and its exquisite sonorousness alike; Scarlatti gives what was already an expanded accompanimental group of instruments a final kick of almost excessively sweet piquancy by adding a very independent part for an instrument that he labels a flautino, and that was probably an especially high recorder. Scarlatti loved playfully literal types of descriptive instrumental writing, and of course this obbligato part is there to draw the nightingale right into the aria’s notes. But who is responding to what here, really? The fiction of address set up by the text is deliciously collapsed in advance by giving the nightingale an instrumental voice that makes it playfully integral to the aria’s musical machinery from the outset. By the point of the da capo section and the singer’s even more expansive pleas for an avian response, it has become an aria with no outside, one that has pulled its own drama inward into how giddily and yet rigorously the music explores and answers itself. Sparse but sturdy sorts of archness and wit bespray the violin writing too, and across the aria overall a certain twitching playfulness emerges from within the poignancy, turning it lustrous.

    Across the whole high period of Neapolitan vocal style, zeniths of expression are indeed things that undo or contradict themselves. Richly expressed pains and losses yield pleasure and release, thereby turning themselves into triumphs. Joy and reconciliation reveal again and again their inner loads of fragility and pathos. It is one reason why the famous Affektenlehre or theory of the affects that was so influential then (and remains a favorite recourse for music historians) is mainly unhelpful: the da capo aria is indeed a machine for squeezing the juices out of any given emotion, but it is also a microscope ratcheted up to reveal teeming levels of diversity and ambiguity within every drop of each juice. The two high vowel sounds that surround the lower central one in the word rispondi turn it in this aria into a skittish little effigy of the da capo shape itself, and the decorations that the aria suggests are similarly diagrammatic matters of shifting pitches and intervallic stretches, rather than the sort of engorged melismatic runs that Neapolitan vocal music would increasingly specialize in. 

    Scarlatti’s background in Christina’s Rome had suffused his youth in the Arcadian ethos that would define the modernizing sides of Italian literature well into the eighteenth century, and reverence for Descartes was indeed compatible to the point of symbiosis with the urges towards order and refinement that powered the Arcadian movement, which set out to rid Italian poetry of its Baroque flamboyance and adopt a more classical and pastoral simplicity of taste. Pastoral itself becomes Cartesian in an aria such as this one, as sheer intensity of artifice exhibits its own structures with a frenzy so polished that it comes across as calmness itself, and a wit so lucid that it can claim those structures as facts of the natural world. The aria can be fairly securely dated to early 1701. Right at the beginning of the eighteenth century, delight itself had to be fierce.

    3.

    The arc of European history across that century was driven by a sort of frenzy within sovereignty itself, one that led to the flash of the guillotine. Among Neapolitan wags the running joke around its start was to ask whether justice would be done tomorrow. Would the next day bring the widely expected upheavals that would cast judgment on the city and its affairs, and finally reveal where its future led? But the question was also a playfully practical one of whether the chaotic, splintering legal system could function at all for another day. The death of Charles II of Spain in 1700 with no obvious successor laid bare Naples’ pervasive, multifarious uncertainty about who it wanted to belong to or where legitimacy lay or how coherent its constitution was. It took a while for the question of the Spanish succession to swell fully into the jerky, tenebrous war that scrambled territorial holdings across the continent.

    Amid swarms of more or less edible smaller players, the Habsburgs and the Bourbons were the grand predators whose vast proclamations of righteous supremacy were matched by the endless, malicious opportunism of their maneuvers. Swagger and panic made up the inner life of their political visions, and they can be heard across much of the period’s music, as the vocal lines of the arias that its regimes loved continue simultaneously to gleam with formal verve and to cascade with often raucous nervous charge. Matteo Sassano himself had been summoned to the Spanish court to see if his singing could assuage the crippling gloom of the emperor’s last years, in a twist that could have been designed to allegorize the tight relationships between high vocal style and the debility of power. Sassano’s greatest successor amongst Neapolitan castratos replicated the allegory a few decades later when the imperious Farinelli went there to sing to another sad monarch. In fact Farinelli became a real political player at the court, as well as an ally of none other than Alessandro’s son Domenico Scarlatti.

    Rumors surrounding Charles’ decline and what would follow his death had for years suffused civic life in Naples, endowing the city with the type of cryptic energy that is inseparable from ricocheting doubt. His demise operated like a sort of slow spasm releasing political confusion into the place from long before and until long after the little physical event itself, and seemingly issuing to about equal degrees in mordancy, doomsaying, and plots. The Macchia conspiracy of 1701 to decouple the Neapolitan monarchy from Spain in favor of the Austrian branch of the swaying Habsburg tree must have been lengthily premeditated, to judge by how quickly it got going after Charles’ death. Named after one of the grand but ill-fated aristocrats behind the attempt, the plot dissipated quickly too. It was the lack of hard military backing that doomed it, and the coming of outright war eventually doomed the Spanish themselves, so that by the middle of the 1710s the city’s viceroys were indeed being sent from Vienna. But the transfer of sovereignty only slowly became official, and power in Naples continued to be frayed by the knowledge of its own unsteadiness and fungibility, and by the split allegiances and fallback plans cultivated by any number of its sharper citizens. 

    Since the Austrian regime only lasted until 1734, when a fairly small Bourbon invasion finally dispatched it, it is important to remember that the political atmosphere of these years was filled with a tenuousness so complex and enfolded as to support plenty of fantasies and indeed fears of durability. It is often noted that early eighteenth-century opera was enmeshed with state power, but less often how rife with such fantasies and fears such power typically was, how giddy with the excitement and bravado of its own improvisatory innovativeness. During these drifting, treacherous crises, Naples was a sea of disparate buildings and jerky projects that did not so much give the lie to Baroque fantasies of the muscular choreography of urban power as reveal their teetering restlessness.

    Composers and musicians felt all this with special nervous, and indeed financial, directness because their lives were at once hemmed in and explosively driven by high political affairs. In Naples the commissioning classes were diverse, insecure, and rivalrous, and its music made its styles as much out of these forces as out of the same classes’ drives of aggrandizement and pleasure. The basic terms of engagement changed so often and so vastly that musical stardom must have felt like a special sort of vulnerability. So in 1701 this place that was becoming the pumping heart of European vocal music got an edict briefly banning singing altogether from the stage! Scarlatti and his collaborators devised an outrageously crude workaround whereby puppets enacted the visible drama while behind the scenes the singers carried on. 

    Understandably, he spent much of the first decade of the new century travelling in ardent search of openings elsewhere. He was increasingly preoccupied by the fate of his prodigious son Domenico, whose posthumous fame has often all but submerged his father’s. As posterity very richly knows, the younger Scarlatti was really a keyboard specialist, and Naples was not the place for his fullest impact. But by the time the new regime was sufficiently settled in Naples to be disappointing those who had vested hopes of regeneration in it, his father had settled himself more fully back there in a spirit of productive resignation to compose through his later years. The Austrians were impressively keen to have him back in his old job, and he did not need to be nearly as productive this time around.

    Naples was full of people switching codes, hedging bets, and biding blurry amounts of time over these years. Scarlatti’s reputation and the odd mixtures of haughtiness and flexibility that made up his charisma allowed him to get by on alternations of opaque calm with fits of entrepreneurial energy. The early enlightenment in Naples was a time in which buffoons, tricksters, and high idealists constantly join hands or switch places, in patterns of combination that become crazily familiar later in the writings of such as Diderot. In Andrea Perrucci, a deracinated Sicilian nobleman who wrote a major early treatise on the aesthetics of improvisation right around the turn of the century, Naples had its first great librettist; having failed in elaborate attempts to prove that he had been deprived of his inheritance on his home island, he ended up practicing law in the city while in effect incarnating some thesis about how losing the past drives cultural invention. 

    There was also the picaresque, erratic aristocrat Emanuele d’Astorga, one more figure to combine Sicilian roots with Neapolitan culture like Scarlatti and Perrucci, a zesty composer who skipped across Italy and far beyond over the early eighteenth century after political shenanigans and familial violence forced him from the island. He wanderingly teamed up with a brilliant, shady Neapolitan poet called Sebastiano Biancardi, who is better known to posterity as Domenico Lalli. The name ostensibly came from the craze for sonorous aliases within the Arcadian movement, but he was something of a con man as well as an entrepreneur of taste and uplift; the two friends were then themselves devastatingly robbed by their own servant in Genoa. Aristocratic titles were handed out over these years with nearly satirical keenness, and lives were filled with departures and reversals, lurches from high to low fortune or status and from episodes of needy sycophancy to ones of bristling showmanship. Names were changed for fun or because of clerical changes across borders, because of debts or as part of some vicious scheme, or as part of a cultural scene where pseudonyms reflected a cult of metamorphosis pervaded with hints of political caution.

    Eighteenth-century music is driven by this cultural and political churn. Far from the neatly arranged and stably absolutist jigsaw of courts and territories that its rulers wanted to add up to, and that music historians persist in crediting, the political culture of the first half of the century was volatile, cunning, fitful, inventive to the point of hallucination, anxious to the point of fervor, lurchingly violent. It went on commissioning works of opera seria because it wanted to seem confident, wealthy, radiant. But relentlessly opera seria is a genre where the holes and the wishfulness show through, filled with quantities of lustrous but often spreadeagled extravagance at the levels of music and overall spectacle but also with weird and often stultifying freights of dramatic incoherence or narrative monomania. The aria could absorb all the grandeur of the operas that it lived in, and all the desires that they instilled, while insisting on being mobile, changeable, fluid, on operating as an ongoing bejewelled switching point between lucidity and disorder. Along with the da capo aria itself, the grand innovation associated with Scarlatti is the strict, streamlined alternation between relatively dry recitative passages setting out the opera’s action and the arias that carry the real charge. 

    Deeply controversial throughout its reign, the operatic system thus created can seem so stiff that the overt rebellions against it that set in around 1750 have ended up defining its reputation far too thoroughly. In fact a flux of reform and rejigging constantly characterized the spread of opera seria. But its results were constantly incomplete, not least because the sharper, quicker voice of the zest for change and innovation was the aria itself. Its fusions of hard definition and streaming potential sent the da capo aria across Europe in a sort of fervor of transmission, as an icon and a prophecy of mobility and possibility; operas kept turning cumbersome or glib in their dramatic workings partly because the real action was in the limber detachability of these gleaming animals. Power in rapidly modernizing societies is always both deficient and excessive; around 1700 Europe’s courts could do far less than they wanted, but they were also filled with drives and capacities that they could not grasp or guide. Opera seria is the lurching aesthetic form in which this deficiency and this excess collide, a vessel of grand ambitions that is also an endlessly haphazard patchwork. But the aria is the sound of the truth of this world’s desire.

    Opera has always grown most voraciously as an art when ruling elites and high versions of culture have come into precipitous contact with dense popular energies and with the widest cosmopolitan vistas. The great generation of Neapolitan composers, including Leonardo Vinci and Leonardo Leo and Pergolesi himself, which emerged on either side of 1730 during the later Austrian years, fed their artistry by pressing opera seria and its associated styles into ever more porous contact with the city’s love of comedy, pantomime, and satire. The Bourbon regime was in place to associate itself with the city’s musical pre-eminence as it became increasingly obvious across Europe towards the middle of the century, and deserves credit for building the vast San Carlo opera house, whose opening in 1737 sumptuously announced what was happening. But all the key elements were in place well before the nicely oiled Bourbon invasion in 1734, and most of the most original music had been composed. And in the end no credit should be given to the finally hapless Austrian regime either. Its years in diffuse charge became a crucible in which the city’s writhing relationships to, and revisions of, power were illuminated and summarized. The restlessness of modern culture and the uncanniness of power make the melismas of Neapolitan vocal style ripple and snake. Unmatched amongst the day’s opera houses for its sheer scale, the Teatro San Carlo epitomized the city’s decades of liquid experiment in architecture and theatricality, in institutional life and relationships between classes, and in the routes and folds of space itself.

    His intellectually austere, stylistically erudite sides make it possible to forget what a nimble comedian Scarlatti was. His great breakthrough had been with a comedy, but it was not until 1718 that he would compose his one major comic opera set in the sort of satirically realistic urban milieu that commercial Neapolitan audiences wanted. Il Trionfo dell’onore is indeed one of the great revelations of the veering, critical flexibility at the heart of Scarlatti’s aesthetic vision; in fact its own flexibility drives many of that opera’s jokes. The opera’s action scampers about with a brisk combination of carelessness and intricacy between several possible or disputed pairs of lovers, after the caddish young soldier Riccardo arrives in the Pisan household of his rich uncle. Scarlatti gets maximal comic juices out of the ways in which the work’s flailing, largely ignoble characters are mismatched with its conventional and even fulsome aria shapes, and then he gets more comedy and further revelations from how intricately they also turn out to match them after all. Maybe the great man felt resentfully obliged to indulge the growing Neapolitan demand for streetwise comedy, and he may then have taken waspish pleasure in showing how richly his characteristic idioms yielded such deeply light results. 

    An exuberant anomaly within Scarlatti’s oeuvre that also reveals the pluralism packed into it from his first triumph, Il Trionfo dell’onore is at the same time an acute homage to the sheer multifariousness of its Neapolitan moment. Its characters are so riven with neediness, plangency, or sheer lust that the drives of excess within their expansive arias become astute — severely funny sorts of psychological description. The result is a dramatic world filled with people bamboozled as to what sort of drama they are in, stuck with the emotional intensity that their arias pour out while the plot’s farcical remorselessness churns on, chasing grand prototypes of character or expression that they can no more feel confident of than the citizens in the audience could feel sure of the historical ground beneath the theater. Serious opera in Naples was often oddly light, sprightly, and untragic, while comic opera was often brooding and interrogative. Lurking behind this interchange is the depth with which they share a basic dramatic addiction to moving characters between couples or groups or alignments, removing disguises or revealing origins, unmaking or reconfiguring the orderliness of social surfaces. All the recapitulatory, agile adaptability of Scarlatti’s music amounts finally to a syntax for this vision of social life as a thing of skips and surprises, a substance constantly piecing itself together out of losses and changes and fraying codes.

    In 1720 the viceregal court treated itself to a brilliant, lithe entertainment that announced the next expansive phases of Neapolitan vocal style. Nicola Porpora had emerged as an invigorating young composer simultaneously with the coming of the Austrians, and had been cultivating links to Vienna far more energetically than Scarlatti. He also grasped more deeply than anyone the essential fact that Neapolitan vocal music was indeed an art of the voice, and had been merging his compositional practice with an increasing dedication to training and honing the city’s next singers. But Porpora’s feel for talent and indeed for the future did not stop with the voice, and it was his collaboration with a young poet and librettist named Pietro Metastasio that created the dramatic serenata L’Angelica out of a story from Ariosto for performance amid the city’s displaced and attenuated version of the Habsburg court. 

    Metastasio had recently arrived as another graduate of Rome’s grandest cultural circles, and his surname was another of the Arcadian aliases that such gangs loved. The Roman Arcadians included plenty of flaky idealists and grandiose hacks, but also the occasional really fine mind such as the great jurist Gian Lorenzo Gravina, who indeed fell out with most of the others. Gravina became the major booster during the 1710s of the vastly talented teenaged Metastasio, and he happened to be from Naples. Gravina’s death brought the poet an inheritance which he quickly spent, and Naples was where he took himself around the age of twenty. The legal strand is vital; its divagatory institutional life made the city a hive for lawyers and a hotbed of legal thought. The philosopher Giambattista Vico had to become a professor of law rather than his preferred subject of rhetoric, but he was about to emerge from wrestling in the caves of Neapolitan jurisprudence as the greatest mind of eighteenth-century Italy, while the operatic scene was awash with men who were also or had been or had meant to be lawyers. It is as if music was vying with law to define the European future.

    The young Metastasio turned up with the intention of adding himself to the city’s buzz of aesthete lawyers. Instead he became something like the legislator of vast territories of eighteenth-century culture, the librettist who sculpted and polished the aria form to a zenith of nearly icy, nearly fatal perfection. If the enlightenment was the time of the ruses of reason and the trickery of progress, Metastasio’s whole career was a sort of grand and productive ruse exerted against his own values. He was the finest and most stubborn representative of the brilliant aesthetic misunderstanding that was on its slow and controversial way out, in which presenting the dramatic text was the fundamental business of opera, and all the music just a more or less apt and splendid means for doing so. At the same time this meant that he was producing the stanzas whose glistening meters, succulent vowel sounds, and array of consonantal snaps made them irresistible invitations to musical and vocal exploration. The love triangle at the core of L’Angelica between the titular heroine and the great opposing warriors Medoro and Orlando becomes indeed a sort of glintingly unsteady portal into what were already the central drives of Metastasio’s aesthetic on the brink of his takeover of the Neapolitan epoch. His whole art across work after work lived by maintaining a protracted equivocation in the face of authority and power, a sort of double consciousness that asserts itself here in the nearly chilly, nearly satirical exaggerations of languor and idyll as these erotic passions tear away at the heroic world of duty and battle. Emotional expression sounds like an obvious task for an aria and an obvious center for Metastasio’s aesthetic, but it is a sleekly ambiguous undertaking in his vision, something endlessly suspended between the most fastidiously lucid hedonism and a nearly demented turbulence. Opera itself has inhabited this doubleness ever since. So in some ways have we all.

    Metastasio was as suited to the da capo aria as a dove is to blue winds. Medoro indeed soaringly likens himself to a lonely dove a few numbers into the serenata as his love for Angelica clarifies, in maybe the first of the many great simile arias penned by the librettist, in which the psychic lives of characters come neatly or grandly alive in expansively stylized comparisons from within a fairly limited repertoire. The lean rhythms and repetitive rhymes of his verses give them a continual sense of rapid, willowy steadiness, and this base is what lets them and the voices that they were made for explore the vast reaches of assonance and meaning opened up by words like tortorella or paterno or agitata with a sort of explosive deftness. Language is simultaneously exalted and pummelled.

    It may seem paradoxical that the most official version of opera seria emerged in Naples in the 1720s just as the comic genres that challenged, parodied, and ransacked the seria world were gathering power. But the paradox is really a clue to the paradoxes and doubts afloat within the seria vision. Around this time, the odd, sinuous practice solidified of interspersing the scenes of what therefore became known as a comic intermezzo between the three acts of a seria opera; La Serva Padrona by Pergolesi was the greatest of all such works, and would be the piece to carry the fullest and most delirious impact of Neapolitan vocal music into the heart of the enlightenment, when it became not just a hit but an intellectual craze in Diderot’s circles in Paris decades later. Neapolitan vocal styles leapt between modes or fused discordant attitudes as readily as the same arias could turn up in different operas, or as the same opera could use settings by different composers of different parts of the text and action. Neapolitan vocal music should perhaps not be conceived as the usual sort of sequence of composers, styles, and masterpieces at all. Let us picture instead one brightly churning wave of drives and factors and desires, throwing sirens and their listeners ceaselessly together.

    4.

    “Galant” style is the idea that gets attached to composers such as Porpora who moved in Scarlatti’s wake towards simplified structures and limpid textures, towards melodic charm and rhythmic swing, who learnt from him how to shimmy away from polyphonic complexity or highly geared counterpoint in favor of quick splashes of harmonic drama and color. A sort of loose and light ethos of venturesome, cosmopolitan, and insouciant hedonism holds the category together better than any strict set of technical changes: galant music is the early enlightenment made audible, turned into sound and its pleasures, and into what those pleasures do to meaning. The seething, shape-shifting reductionism of Diderot’s furthest reaches of materialism can be heard waiting within it. But so can the values of sociable practicality and serviceable craftsmanship that his circles of Encyclopédistes would espouse. Composite and pluriform as it shifts between rhapsody and diagram, the version of Neapolitan vocal style that would triumph in the course of the 1720s carried at its throbbing, artful heart a prophecy about the ambiguities of the whole enlightenment movement.

    It was in 1725 that Giambattista Vico’s great, jagged masterpiece known as the New Science made the first of its shifting appearances in the world under the title of Princìpi di una Scienza Nuova, as its author neared the age of sixty. Commentators have argued ever since as to whether he was one of the great Enlightenment thinkers or the movement’s grandest foe, because what they miss is the density with which he really summarizes Enlightenment ambiguity itself. Newness is as vital to his opus as the title suggests, but this newness is packed tight with myths and history as he re-narrates the basic cycles of civilizational progress and decline, crammed with reanimations of past modes of thought and consciousness. Is the book a prophecy of disenchantment or an effigy of mythomania? Since Vico, too, had been living through the zany and dangerous gyrations of the past decades of Neapolitan politics, his arguments filled with intricate, gnarly flexibility. His new science gravitates alongside opera seria itself towards the points of twisting transition between myth and history. Likewise, an enriched idea of creative and political making constitutes his exit from Cartesian doubt, but it is richly unclear whether this move goes in the direction of further intellectual progress or back towards visions that Descartes had meant to leave behind. The book’s combinations of systematic thrust with hectic zigzags of assemblage, as it spins down into the inner workings of historical change, match the spiraling sleekness of Neapolitan vocal music with an apt sort of cryptic rigor.

    Newness was vital in the 1720s in Naples, but Scarlatti was no longer new. Maybe this is why Rome was the destination of what has become the very last to survive of his scores of operas; maybe he wanted to plunge back towards the sense of glamour and potential that had accompanied his emergence there decades earlier. But then La Griselda is itself preoccupied with matters of survival and endurance, and much of its fierce, eccentric greatness is in how tightly its own writhingly extreme energies of innovation combine with a certain gritty stylistic aloofness from any full embrace of the gallant. The ordeals by which her royal husband determines to prove Griselda’s virtue make for a work so lavishly harrowing that it can seem determined to show how grotesquely serious opera seria could be. At the same time its story thus pulls the work away from the cruel machinations of authority and politics, and throws an intense spotlight of artistic pressure on the richly desolate, finally triumphant figure of the queen herself. Her arias are the things that the opera must use if it is to turn its own refractory cragginess into a vision of the weird intractability of emotion and expression themselves, and Scarlatti indeed makes them outrageously singular distillations of what his art had become.

    As the full impact of Griselda’s situation lands towards the end of the first act, her aria ‘Di’, che sogno o che deliro’ turns the shattering of her reality into a sound world so agitated and angular that it feels at once sparse and superabundant. Starkly skittish rhythms and tight bursts of songfulness that can never quite become melodies render the impact on a vivid mind of a world that is somehow both overwhelming and dissolvent; of course, da capo repetition might as well have been invented to intensify this doubleness. But at the very start of the second act ‘Mi rivedi, o selva ombrosa’ instead surrounds her with a deceptively supportive brand of accompanimental lavishness as she returns to the rural obscurity from which her grand marriage had plucked her. Vastly more variegated string lines are joined by a deliciously figurative role for two flutes, but as so often with Scarlatti the da capo structure makes us linger on an emotional scene that is itself one of return just long enough for unease to enter in. His addiction to pastoral was often addled and always complex, and there is something hectic and anguished here about the very fulsomeness of the musical means, as if the aria knows how complicit nostalgia can be with maltreatment and disaster.

    But it is Griselda’s great, bizarre, spiraling third-act aria ‘Se il mio dolor t’offende’ that ends up giving a sort of sharply complex analysis of the meaning of stylistic abundance itself. Griselda has just been told that she must hide any pain at her own sufferings, and this extra twist of anguish brings her to a brief passage of something like musical vertigo that is also replete with stylistic and indeed psychic potential. Her aria begins with a couple of bars in which she sings with almost no accompaniment, as the very word dolor, or pain, rasps and dilates, trying to figure out where it is leading. A jerky rush of accompaniment then arrives, and indeed rapidly intensifies further as her reply grows. If the king is offended by her sadness, so Griselda continues as the aria gyrates, he will instead see joy and smiling. The aria becomes a virtuosic exercise in what might be called reverse anguish: our exhilaration at Griselda’s nerve and resilience is held in cascading check by the pain that is utterly unhidden by her mimicry of joy. But might there not be here one further reversal in the end? Within the anguished, caustic imitation of exultancy given here by the composer to his character, do we not hear a deeper exultancy nearly break through the opera’s surface? Griselda’s suffering inhabits her pretended levity and joy, but a joyful creative levity inhabits Neapolitan vocal style. The great, weird drives within eighteenth century culture towards happiness and happy endings get their richest account in the city’s music, on their way to issuing eventually in the fierce comic exuberance of the classical Viennese symphony and of Hegel’s interpretation of history.

    Imagine some vast throat pouring out notes into and across cities and palaces and chambers in all directions, pitching lines of music into churches and inns and spa resorts. Eighteenth-century Europe became more and more such a culture of the throat. Of course, it thought that it was a culture of the classical word and of didactic clarity, of reason. But reason itself would prove to be liquid, voracious, and turbulent as the century continued, a thing made of dispute and mutation. As Kant ended up nearly putting it, the substance of the Enlightenment may have been knowledge, but audacity was its form and its ethos. And the da capo aria was a sort of lustrous compromise, whose repetitions could seem to the partisans of the word to be ways of heightening literary meanings while in fact they were melting words down into syllables and sounds, flinging them into the throat’s pleasures and powers. Voices became hungry laboratories in which the culture’s highest words and meanings were torn apart and examined and remade, and similarly lacerating and joyful processes of scrutiny and recomposition were what the Enlightenment movement lived for and by, too.

    It would appear, then, that Adorno and Horkheimer were wrong. Their great, bracing, stifling book Dialectic of Enlightenment turns Homer’s poem into a precocious parable of the bourgeois mind in which Odysseus’ evasion of the Sirens exemplifies the crushing erasures essential to reason. But the myth of the founding of Naples by Parthenope suggests a different interpretation, one in which such voices cannot be outmaneuvered and do not die. Instead they turn into cities. An expanded vision of the enlightenment still awaits within all this music, one more holistic and more alive to its own riptides. Metastasio made his debut in 1724 as a full operatic librettist for the main court theater, and chose the story of the desolate queen Dido, who is such a profuse sister of the Sirens. Neapolitan vocal style carried on drenching itself in her story for decades thereafter: as it went on piecing together ways of turning loss into construction, it kept staring at the sea. Scarlatti’s last cantata was probably Là dove e Mergellina, which does indeed date to the year of his death, and its text audaciously and movingly locates its richly conventional Arcadian imagery in the real pleasures of the world surrounding the composer by this use of a place name from the Neapolitan coast. Its music is full of restrained turbulence as the cantata pursues yet another of its relentless composer’s visions of emotional questioning and ambiguity.

    But let us sail forwards five years, to the emergence in 1730 of perhaps the greatest of all Neapolitan da capo arias at the end of the opening act of Metastasio’s Artaserse in Leonardo Vinci’s crisply tumultuous setting. In ‘Vo solcando un mar crudele’, the image of plowing a cruel sea becomes indeed the vehicle for turning personal catastrophe into expressive power. The story is a fierce fever dream of court violence and internecine intrigues, and the first act finishes with the central character of Arbace accused of a regicide that is known only by him to have been committed by his father. Narrative development was never meant to be pushed forwards within an aria like this one, but what Vinci achieves is the transformation of this basic aesthetic condition into an engine of complex drama and insight. Arbace is stuck in an impossible situation, his very innocence part of his disaster, since proving it would inculpate his father; he is as incapable of propelling the narrative as his aria is, and Metastasio’s lyric gives him only its own almost brutally rich elegance and shapeliness. But that is enough for Vinci’s wildly incisive feel for the strengths within galant simplicity to kick in, and the aria’s closed shapes and tight textures turn its exploration of paralysis into a way of converting it into vigor and expansion. 

    All the turbulent mixtures of triumph and catastrophe that coursed through Vinci’s own life can be heard in the invincible agitation of this music; his death at around the age of forty in the same year may well have been murder, after a life beset by his own torrid rivalrousness as well as by convulsive gambling. The composer does not contradict this text’s visions of misfortune and shipwreck, but transfigures them with a rigorous glee that turns reiteration into refreshment. Sequences of scrambled, rampant triplets for the violins imitate the frenzy of the sea with a pithiness that turns it into an accompanimental basis for vocal ardor and psychic strength. Within the machinery of the da capo structure itself Vinci mines deep possibilities of change and uplift, of survival itself. The game of modernity is one that is won by whoever can drink in the largest quantities of reality and
    keep creating.

    The Brutal Masterworks of Saadat Hasan Manto

    In January 1948, four months after the traumatic partition of the Indian subcontinent, the Urdu writer Saadat Hasan Manto boarded a ship to Karachi from Bombay. He was moving to Lahore, where his wife, Safia, and daughter, Nighat, had travelled the previous year to attend a wedding, but after yet another British colony was split up along sectarian lines in August, and refugees began to trickle into both sides of the border with tales of arson, murder, and rape, Safia had decided not to return. At twenty-two, Manto had briefly worked for a newspaper in colonial Lahore, and later, after his literary career took off, he often came back to defend his stories against multiple charges of obscenity filed in the city’s courts. But now Lahore was in Pakistan, a new nation that had been carved out overnight as a homeland for the region’s ethnically diverse Muslims, a country to which Manto had abruptly decided to migrate one morning in Bombay in the wake of endless riots and killings everywhere. And yet, as he wrote later, “I found it impossible to decide which of the two countries was now my homeland — India or Pakistan.”

    He could not return to his ancestral home in Amritsar, to the house where he grew up and learned to write, since back in March, before a decision had been made on whether Amritsar would belong to India or Pakistan, rioting mobs had torched down and destroyed every last brick in the neighborhood. (A visiting friend would later write that Manto’s old neighborhood “looked like a replica of Berlin after the Second World War.”) He could have stayed put in Bombay, except that his wife was now pregnant with their second daughter in another country. In Bombay, he had earned his living for years from film studios, writing screenplays, dialogues, and songs for early Bollywood musicals.

    On August 15, the day of India’s independence, he started a new screenwriting gig at Bombay Talkies, having been persuaded to join by Ashok Kumar, then the country’s biggest movie star. One evening, Kumar was dropping off Manto after work when his car was stopped by a wedding party in a Muslim neighborhood. Manto was horrified. “We were in an area that no Hindu would dare enter,” he wrote. “And the whole world knew Ashok was a Hindu, a very prominent Hindu at that, whose murder would create shockwaves.” But nothing happened. The wedding party was just starstruck by Kumar and kept chanting his name. Two men helpfully gave him directions. “Ashok bhai,” they said, adding an honorific word to his name, “this street will lead you nowhere. It is best to turn into this side lane.” Later, after Manto had decided to move, he recalled these lines: “I said to myself, ‘Manto bhai, this street will lead you nowhere. It is best to turn into this side lane.’ And so I took the side lane that brought me to Pakistan.”

    In Pakistan, however, Manto didn’t survive for long. His stories were again tried for obscenity; he was convicted twice, though he managed to avoid jail time on both occasions by paying a fine. His books ended up being pirated in both countries even as he struggled to make ends meet. He produced two films in Lahore — Pakistan’s film industry was still nascent — but they flopped at the box office. Fellow left-leaning Urdu writers and editors effectively blacklisted him for trying to start a new magazine with a conservative literary critic. He could no longer publish his work in prominent journals and newspapers, which meant that his freelancing income also dried up. The very stories that had been lauded earlier by his peers as iconoclastic masterpieces were now deemed “reactionary” and not “progressive” enough. Faiz Ahmad Faiz, perhaps Pakistan’s most famous poet, was once summoned as a witness when Manto was on trial for a story called “Colder Than Ice.” Faiz testified in court that the story was not obscene. “However,” he added, “the story does not measure up to a high standard of literature either, for it does not satisfactorily analyze the basic problems of life.”

    With peers like these, Manto didn’t need enemies. In desperation, he wrote to his old friends in Bombay, wondering if a studio there would hire him back. “Do something,” he implored the novelist Ismat Chughtai, “and call me back to Hindustan.” He had always liked drinking whisky in the evenings: as a teenager in Amritsar, he used to hide his stash in a shelf above his father’s portrait. But now he woke up every morning and finished bottles of deadlier bootlegged stuff. The one rehab clinic in Lahore was located in those days inside the Punjab Mental Hospital’s “anti-alcoholic” ward. Manto checked himself into the hospital twice for treatment. These stints prompted a popular myth, which endures even today, that in his last years he became mentally ill and was institutionalized twice. Condemned by courts, by his contemporaries, and by his family for his drinking, and disparaged by progressives, right-wing zealots, and even himself as a “fraud,” Manto died at the age of forty-two, seven years after leaving Bombay.

    It would not be inaccurate to say that Manto was “cancelled” shortly after moving to Lahore. But he also wrote prolifically throughout that dark period, churning out stories, sketches, editorials, personal essays about his time in Bollywood — anything that would pay for his next drink. Between 1948 and 1951, he published seven collections of short stories. He was among South Asia’s pre-eminent modernists, casually inventive about literary forms: a writer named Manto was popping up in his Bombay stories, for instance, decades before the French writer Serge Doubrovsky came up with the word “autofiction.” Just before his death, Manto wrote a series of impishly mordant letters addressed to “Uncle Sam,” where he turned out to be prophetic about the disastrous consequences of a military alliance between the United States and Pakistan. Seventy-five years after India’s and Pakistan’s independence, his work remains synonymous with the specter of the Partition, but in his writings he also captured Bombay’s grit, and foresaw in many ways the ongoing dissolution of Indian secularism into majoritarian Hindu nationalism and hinted at the doomed fate of Pakistan as an Islamic republic.

    His early life was marked by yet another colonial catastrophe. On the afternoon of April 13, 1919, one month before Manto’s seventh birthday, fifty British soldiers secured the only exit of the Jallianwala Bagh square at Amritsar and unloaded over fifteen hundred rounds of bullets at a gathering of over ten thousand people, many of them rural farmers who had travelled with their families to celebrate the local spring festival and were almost certainly unaware of a recent embargo on public assemblies in the city. The scale of this infamous massacre feels unfathomable, even today. British officials estimated the death count to be less than four hundred, but survivors and eyewitnesses recount grisly scenes of at least a thousand bodies piled one on top of another, and of truckloads of corpses still being whisked away for burial twenty-four hours after the carnage in the park. In Manto’s first published story, a child named Khalid hears the gunfire from his home on the fateful afternoon and naively wonders if fireworks are going off in a carnival somewhere nearby. Peering out of a window into the street, Khalid sees a boy limping alone, blood trickling out of his leg. The shops in the street are all shuttered because of the curfew. Khalid can make out the sounds of people shrieking in the distance. The injured boy falls face down in the middle of the empty road. Khalid dashes back inside and tells his father who comes to the window to look. But the father is too scared to step out.

    Manto’s own father was a more imposing presence: a stern-faced Kashmiri lawyer who dabbled in Islamic theology in his spare time and lived with two wives in the same house. Ghulam Hasan had married Sardar Begum late, almost out of pity — she had been married off once earlier, after her parents’ death, at the age of nine. Sardar lived with her two children, Nasira and Saadat, relatively cut off from the rest of the family, including Ghulam’s first wife and nine other children, in a smaller section of the house. Childhood was a hapless affair. Manto suffered from chronic chest pain, which fuelled his teenage drinking habit. He failed his school exams three times; the fourth time around he flunked in Urdu, the language in which he would go on to write his stories. Ghulam wanted his youngest son to be a lawyer, much like the other men in the family, though he didn’t invest equitably in his education: Manto’s stepbrothers were sent to college in England. He died when Manto was nineteen, before reconciling himself to his son’s “useless pastimes” — the fleeting interest in the occult and in photography, the daydreams about becoming an anti-colonial revolutionary, the Marlene Dietrich poster pinned next to Ghulam’s portrait. Much of his later literary pluck was a defense against a simpler wound: Manto could never please his father.

    But it was another man who set the young writer on his path. Abdul Bari Alig was a journalist, a historian, an editor, a binge-drinker extraordinaire, a foolhardy Quixote in mid-1930s Amritsar. Bari Sahib, as he was called, introduced Manto to Russian and French literature — Maupassant, Chekhov, Gorky, Hugo, Dostoyevsky — and let him write a film column in a magazine that he was editing at the time. He encouraged Manto to translate Hugo’s The Last Day of a Condemned Man into Urdu, and also published his first short story, which was set in the afternoon of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. With his tall tales and anti-imperial zeal, Bari Sahib helped spur a twentysomething’s imagination: how could a boy who had grown up fantasizing about running away to Moscow not be taken in by this peculiar soul who thought that Hugo was the greatest novelist in the world and went on and on about Hegel and Marx? On a couple of occasions the police came knocking on Manto’s door, having been apprised that Bari and his cohort were putting on agitprop plays and promulgating “seditious content,” but Bari would by then have conveniently disappeared from the city. In a later essay, Manto wrote that Bari was a rather timid activist, one of those reluctant organizers who typically go missing in action, which was all too well, because otherwise “I would be lying in an unmarked grave or serving a long prison sentence . . .”

    Apart from Bari, there was Bombay, where Manto ended up in 1936, when he was hired as an editor for an Urdu film magazine in the city. He wasn’t paid enough — the owner of the magazine deducted a fixed amount from his pay because he bunked alone at the office the first few months — and he soon began moonlighting for film studios. Bollywood had just started making talkies around then, and egotistical studio heads and directors needed scribes to churn out screen treatments of brainstorms they might have in the afternoons, as well as to extemporize dialogues for the day’s shooting scenes. As employers, they were erratic and exploitative — Manto’s stories are littered with teenage actresses who are coerced to sleep with older male leads and producers, writers who are lured into a new film with a good advance but then spend years chasing up their dues. Manto didn’t harbor any artistic pretensions as a screenwriter. “Serve literature,” he counselled a younger writer years later, “and make money from films.”

    The advice was, of course, ironic, coming from a writer who famously struggled to stay solvent all his life. In Bombay, he moved from the magazine office to a room in an overcrowded two-story tenement, where forty tenants shared two bathrooms among themselves. The bathrooms had doors, he later recalled, although “nobody knew when the latches went missing.” His mother fixed up his marriage with Safia, a Kashmiri woman who grew up in Zanzibar and had recently moved with her family to the city. For a year after the wedding, Manto didn’t have money to move out of the tenement and Safia continued to live apart in her parents’ flat. His steadiest job was probably during the Second World War, when he wrote radio plays supporting the British war effort for India’s public broadcasting service in Delhi. But then he lost his infant son to pneumonia, and a year or so later he was back in Bombay.

    He was happiest in the city’s countless dingy bars (renamed “permit rooms” during prohibition) and Persian restaurants, abandoning one for another once he racked up too many unpaid bills. Where else but in Bombay could he commute to work in a congested train to the studios in the suburbs and end up being driven home by the country’s biggest superstar? Where else would he see homeless men fall asleep on pavements night after night in the alleys between Art Deco buildings and opulent hotels? Like the millions who still move to Mumbai every year, he discovered that the city was its own autonomous republic, full of ambitious characters at every turn. At any moment you could run into gangsters, sex workers, businessmen, politicians, the elderly Goan Catholic woman who lives alone with her cat in your neighborhood, the weird guy who asks if he can give you a head massage while you are strolling around a promenade. In Bombay, Manto could be rich one day and penniless the next. No one seemed to particularly care.

    I read Manto when I was a child. His stories about the Partition were still lauded as cautionary tales in India at the turn of the millennium. The renowned story “Toba Tek Singh,” the legend of a mentally ill man bewildered by this business of having to decide which country is home, was a staple of school textbooks and regularly performed as a play outdoors. I remember a classmate once summed up the plot of “Colder Than Ice” during recess and everyone was stunned by the image of a man nearly raping a corpse during a riot. We imagined these characters as safely in the past, both in their violence and their delirium. As children, we were aware that sometime in the winter of 1992 a mob of Hindu supremacists had stormed into the Babri mosque, a Mughal-era monument in northern India, and razed the entire thing to the ground. In 2002, we skimmed through newspaper headlines of Muslim homes and neighbourhoods being mercilessly attacked over three months in the western state of Gujarat. (Narendra Modi, then the chief minister of Gujarat, was later refused a U.S. visa for allegedly inciting these riots.) But we perceived those events as anomalies, a few aberrant footnotes in the fairytale of Indian democracy and diversity, ongoing now for six decades. There was a moment in the mid-oughts when our president was a Muslim scientist and our prime minister a Sikh bureaucrat. The top three male actors in Bollywood had the same Muslim last name: Khan. We swayed to MP3 tracks by Pakistani bands and solo artists at parties.

    At thirteen, heedless of history and convinced of the solidity of Indian pluralism, Manto’s stories seemed to me didactic and puritanical. I would come across a grim one every now and again, be taken in by its simple Manichean morality, then look around and wonder where is the hate. Sometimes I felt that Manto was gratuitously adding to the despair and the shame of Partition another tale of the despair and shame of the period. In “Open It!,” a Muslim father looking for his lost daughter in a refugee camp finds that his worst nightmare has come to pass. In “The Assignment,” a Sikh man horribly betrays his father’s friend. My grandparents on both sides were displaced by the Partition. Decades earlier they had made the treacherous journey — via road, water, and forests — from Sylhet in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to Assam. But they were all dead by the time I was five, and I was left with my parents’ second-hand accounts of terrifying bloodbaths and exoduses, of multiple relatives being preyed upon by tigers during the trek across the border — accounts that felt just as forbidding as Manto’s stories. Whenever we were told in a classroom that Manto was an “eyewitness to history,” I used to wonder whether I was born too late, or eyewitnesses were indeed fated to become irrelevant over time. Either way, the dust of the Partition was invisible on the surface and the past felt like another country, grisly and remote.

    I enrolled in a college in Bombay, ostensibly to study film. There, in the cramped insomniac streets that Manto had left behind sixty years ago, he still seemed miraculously present. I lived on Lamington Road, just a block away from Arab Galli, the side lane on which Manto had once lived in a boxy tenement and shared two bathrooms with forty other tenants. On my way home from the Grant Road train station, I would walk past Kennedy Bridge, where groups of older men lined up after midnight to study the idle sex workers leaning out of the windows of a nearby brothel. If you descend the bridge from a staircase at the top, you come to Congress House and Jinnah Hall, two adjoining buildings named respectively for the Indian National Congress, the political party instrumental in securing India’s independence, and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan. In one of Manto’s stories, a character visits a public toilet around the corner from these iconic buildings and is repelled by both the stench and the competing nationalistic graffiti on its walls. All along stretched the ruins of pre-1947 Bombay: the old British-era theaters that now exclusively screened B movies, the packed commuter trains that still shuttled to and fro from the suburbs every five minutes, the Irani cafes where Manto’s characters sometimes met up and reflected on the distances that they had travelled from their hometowns. On Sunday evenings, I would start walking along the southern seafront, where Manto often sat alone and compulsively smoked his preferred Craven A cigarettes, then stop for a dinner of keema and bread buns at a restaurant somewhere on Grant Road, before resuming my weekly pilgrimage to Adelphi Chambers on Clare Road, the apartment building into which Manto and Safia moved in a year after their marriage.

    In Bombay, it was possible to read Manto as a writer imaginatively absorbed by the city’s charms, and not as an anguished witness to history. There is a lightness to his early stories about the city that stays with you despite their illustrative intent. “Barren,” for instance, is ostensibly about the ways in which both writers and readers delude themselves with tall tales, but halfway through the story the narrator is sitting alone on a bench near the Gateway of India monument, when he overhears two men chattering away in Gujarati, each with a different accent: “When they both talked rapidly at the same time, it sounded as if a parrot and a mynah were having a duel.” In “Mammad Bhai,” the protagonist is a dagger-wielding city gangster — you could call him the Al Capone of Arab Galli — who is persuaded into believing that a judge might go easy on a murder case if he were to shave off his moustache. Halfway through “Babu Gopi Nath,” an aging businessman tells the narrator, also named Manto, that he doesn’t mind being cheated of his wealth:

    Once he said to me, “Manto sahib, in my entire life, I have never rejected advice. Whenever someone offers it to me, I accept it with gratitude. Perhaps they consider me a fool, but I value their wisdom. Look at it like this. They have the wisdom to see that I am the sort of man who can be made a fool of.”

    Gopi Nath, the gullible businessman, has moved to Bombay from Lahore on a peculiar quest: he wants his youngish mistress, a fickle courtesan named Zeenat, to find another rich man. “I don’t have long to go,” he tells Manto, “my money has almost run out. I don’t want her life to go to waste after I am gone.” He buys Zeenat a car and a flat and observes her having a sequence of affairs with caddish men closer to her age. After every breakup Zeenat copes with trust issues, and often, with some missing jewellery from her flat; but Gopi Nath also seems visibly hurt. When Zeenat runs out of cash, he goes back to Lahore to sell off some family property. Sometime later he pays for her wedding and tears up on seeing her dressed as a bride. With every passing year, he becomes more of a father to his lover.

    So many of Manto’s stories conclude with the protagonist’s eyes welling up, be it the eponymous gangster in “Mammad Bhai” crying over his moustache, or Gopi Nath sniffling softly at Zeenat’s wedding. The frequency of tears points to an unabashedly operatic view of the world, probably carried over from Manto’s work in Hindi films. The women in his Bombay stories are mostly sex workers and actresses, doomed to a melancholy lot because of their choices. They are carefully observed but appear curiously withdrawn: his lusty male protagonists seem perpetually surprised that women want it, too. The bluntness and the lack of technical finesse makes for a raunchy combination. In “Smell,” Randheer is married to the “daughter of a distinguished magistrate, with a bachelor’s degree, the heartthrob of countless boys at her college,” but in bed he keeps obsessing about an old encounter with a free-spirited working-class woman he picked up in the street, the “warmth of her naked, unwashed body.” In “Women,” Ashok is wracked with guilt after making his genteel wife watch a porn film, but then he comes home one evening to find her watching the same movie in the dark with her siblings and friends.

    Manto once blurbed his own collection of stories thus: “Manto writes rubbish. People say that Manto is obscene, but if you start reading Manto you cannot leave the story unfinished.” A writer accused of obscenity multiple times throughout his career might indeed brandish the accusation with a bit of pride. Later academic readings, by contrast, end up conflating his artless style with honesty. After all, you cannot fault a traumatized witness to South Asian history for being messy because what he was saying was not meant to be articulated in the first place. The truth, as usual, lies somewhere in between. Manto’s characters seem to know about love only through its absence: he was, in the truest sense, the bard of lovelessness. If Randheer in “Smell” can’t get over the memory of his old flame Paro, an actress in “Scissors from Meerut” tries to seduce a male lead but anoints him her brother when he refuses her advances. In “Barren,” a male writer owns up to his lack of experience at one point: “I’ve known very few women in my life. The stories I wrote about women were either because of a particular need or just to indulge in mental gratification of the senses.” 

    In Manto’s nonfiction you come across a quieter, more languorous writer, someone with more affinities than distastes. Susan Sontag once wrote that “a poet’s prose is the autobiography of ardor,” and it is in his essays that Manto seems most passionate. There is the piece on the matinee idol Ashok Kumar, which starts out as an oral history of the Bombay film industry and goes on to record Manto’s eventual disillusionment with the city. In “Krishna’s Flute,” an ode to Manto’s best friend Shyam Chadha, also a movie star, we discover his love for the slapdash argot of Hindi, Urdu, Marathi, and Konkani that is still spoken in Bombay’s streets. If you read another essay, “Bari Sahib,” in the Urdu original, you will notice that a word Manto employs twice to describe his mentor — posheeda, meaning “furtive” — could just as well describe the shadowy stance of the autofictional narrators in his own stories. Halfway through “The Ladies’ Man,” supposedly about the Bollywood music composer Rafiq Ghaznavi, Manto realizes that he has rambled on too long about his youth in Amritsar:

    I have begun to reminisce about things that happened a long time ago and I find myself getting carried away. I had begun writing about Rafiq and I went into unrelated things, though the truth is that it is these unrelated things which I like. Isn’t life itself the sum total of unrelated happenings and people?

    It is perhaps a testament to Manto’s literary range that his essays and sketches feel less polemical than his celebrated fiction. Rare is the Manto story that doesn’t end on a morose note, but he allowed himself to be more digressive elsewhere, to go off on tangents about “unrelated things.” One moment he can be acerbic (“But the special gift that Rafiq possessed in my view was his utter lack of honour and shame”) only to turn elegiac a few pages on (“And so I took the side lane that brought me to Pakistan . . .”) He can recount his childhood dreams of escaping to the Soviet Union, dish out gossip about an actress who was later accused of spying for Pakistan, and also laud the pluck of Sitara Devi, a legendary dancer and friend: “In my book, she walks tall. I do not know what she thinks of me but I have always thought of her as a woman who is born once in a hundred years.” These portraits appear all the more impressive when you learn that Manto wrote them during his last years in Lahore, more or less at the same time that he was finishing up his hallowed Partition stories. In their waywardness, they read like a cathartic counterpart to his tormented tales. For once, Manto seems romantic, an artist pursuing his own fancies and whims, free of the inordinate responsibilities of history.

    I have never quite forgotten the desultory way in which Manto recalls the turbulence of the Partition in one of his stories:

    One Sunday morning, I was at home reading the paper. The sports page showed the tally of cricket scores while the front page gave the number of Hindus and Muslims killed in the riots.

    Not long after Narendra Modi was elected India’s prime minister in 2014, reports of riots and sectarian killings began to dominate the front pages again. There was the hideous mob lynching of Mohammad Akhlaq, a Muslim farm worker murdered by his fellow Hindu villagers over suspicion of storing and eating beef. (Many Hindus consider the cow sacred.) Then the news about Junaid Khan, a fifteen-year-old kid stabbed to death by a group of Hindu men on a train. In the southern state of Karnataka, Muslim girls were unceremoniously stopped outside college campuses and forbidden from wearing headscarves in classrooms. Videos of Muslims being harassed and assaulted on streets continue to clog our social media feeds every week. Mosques are regularly attacked and vandalized by Hindu zealots. In August 2019, Modi sent in thousands of troops to India’s only Muslim-majority state, Jammu and Kashmir, annulled the state’s special autonomous status under the Indian federation, and forced a long communication blackout on its residents. Days later, millions of religious and linguistic minorities were stripped of their citizenship in Assam after a four-year-long mass profiling exercise reminiscent of Nazi Germany. 

    To read the daily papers in Modi’s India is to re-live the same shockwaves of majoritarian psychosis that had once engulfed the subcontinent during Partition — I say re-live because many of us born decades later had soaked in the atmosphere of the period from Manto’s stories in school. His didacticism doesn’t rankle as much now: even his most overly solemn of fictions seem germane at a time when, in the words of an Indian political columnist, “we are passing through the most difficult phase for Muslims in independent India.” Over the course of his life, Manto went from thinking about his work in impulsive ways — “I write because I am addicted to writing, just as I’m addicted to wine” — to something more purposive and utilitarian: “Literature is a thermometer that reads the temperature of one’s country and people.” His own trials, coupled with those of the twin republics of India and Pakistan, probably made him less playful. If his stories became more illustrative after he moved to Lahore, how else could he have written in the wake of a violent cataclysm? I remember feeling embarrassed once by the uniformly tragic fates of his characters. It is only in recent years that I have come to appreciate that the embarrassment I feel on his behalf is the embarrassment of finding one’s baser self reflected in fiction. 

    In an essay on Manto, his friend and fellow writer Krishan Chander recalled his contrarian personality:

    If you praise Dostoevsky, he will eulogize Somerset Maugham. If you commend something about Bombay, he will go into raptures about Amritsar. . . . If you express a wish to get married, he will insist that you remain a bachelor. . . . If you abuse him, you will discover that he has been going around looking for a job for you.

    This chronic volatility did not win Manto many friends, but it also temperamentally disposed him to register the seismic shifts of the Partition. After a point he couldn’t go on writing about the gangsters and film stars whom he had known in Bombay, and yet I cannot imagine him feeling vindicated by the choices that he made after 1947. His notion of a “fraud” was pretty capacious and suggestive of his rabble-rousing affinities: a defective telephone receiver in his father’s Amritsar house could be a “fraud.” At one point in “Babu Gopinath,” the narrator finds the idea of a courtesan being grandly married off fraudulent. In a caustic piece about his literary career, Manto even dubbed himself “a first-class fraud.” 

    What did he mean by that? Perhaps that the act of putting down words on a page can feel inherently deceptive. But underlying the self-criticism is also the conviction that our dislikes reveal more than our affinities. The narrator of “Constipation,” a magazine editor and scriptwriter, brags about being “an expert when it comes to hate”:

    You may well ask why hate requires expertise, and I will tell you that every task has its protocols. Hate requires fervour, and therefore, a skilled practitioner. In comparison, love is a pedestrian sentiment. Through the ages . . . humans have practiced love, but very few have understood the protocols of hate, which has an acuity more pleasurable than love.

    Manto cherished acuity as a writer, which is impossible to sustain after a certain length. No wonder he wrote only one novel. His grasp of the “protocols of hate” chimes with his obsession with the loveless days of the Partition, the accounts of displacement and bloodshed that he skillfully evoked in his fiction. In an era when we are careening past mean hateful streets again, in India and elsewhere in the world, Manto’s rattling voice rings out from the side lanes of South Asia’s tumultuous past.

    For Names I Will Not Name

    God, bless the lowborn and the shy of luck,
    Those rubbing nickels, hoping for a spark,
    The tweakers, boozers, losers, and the fucked
    Who breed like cats behind the mobile park.
    And bless them even when they’re screwing up,
    Or shooting up, or burgling something sad,
    Or fishing for old cig butts in that cup
    That’s sat on each back porch they’ve ever had.
    You’ll know them by their teeth and by their rage,
    And by the way they’ll give you their last dime,
    And how their faces never match their age,
    And by how slow they are to judge a crime.
    God, bless the misfits, midwits, whores, and flameouts too.
    For they are lowest who live most near you.

    Notes For a Poem (To a Dead Friend)

    Have I been faithless to your memory,
    Who died before our beards had come full in?
    We who’d buzzed our hair short in the yard,
    And punched each other’s arms until they bruised?
    Our falling out was from a dozen things.
    You mocked me secretly to the wrong friend,
    I thought myself the better of the pair,
    And on. So, years went by until the call
    In which somebody told me you were sick,
    And wished for visitors. I never went.
    We buried you behind the white board church.
    Your mother too, a few years afterward.
    There was a rusting fence. A walnut tree.
    There was you underground, and there was me.

    This poem appears concurrently in Paul’s new collection from Wiseblood Books, The Locust Years

    The Oracle

    She always speaks too little or too late.
    Never has lied, but always puts the truth
    So on the lean that touch it and it tips.
    She wears a blindfold as she paints her lips.

    You go to her when desperate and alone.
    Up from her navel comes the platinum word
    That cleaves you like a plum clean to the middle.
    You see your pit reflected in her riddle.

    Of course you wish to read these wracking limbs,
    Find sense among the entrails of your life.
    But you will be bad burned by each bright spark.
    Some lights are falser than an honest dark.

    The demon speaks. You offer nuts and dimes.
    The smoke goes up. You leave. The statue grins.
    And you will come again. You will forget.
    Because you do not trust the silence yet. 

    This poem appears concurrently in Paul’s new collection from Wiseblood Books, The Locust Years

    Hunting

    “A white doe in the green grass of a glade
    Appeared to me with two horns made of gold . . .”

    —Petrarch

    All joy, being considered in its truth,
    Has in it both the terrible and good.
    You will not know the beauty of the deer
    Until you’ve lain her low within the wood.

    All joy, being rejected for its pain,
    Has in it both the brutal and the kind.
    You will not know the virtuous or wise
    Until you purge perfection from your mind.

    This poem appears concurrently in Paul’s new collection from Wiseblood Books, The Locust Years

    Of a Hermit Thrush

    Her whistle is climbing its spiral stair
    And loathe are my evenings, loathe of bone,
    And fir trees are steeples in the air,
    And every confession is told alone.

    The little lung beats the feathered snare,
    And fair is my sunset, fair of light,
    And here bend the proverbs, the tricky prayer,
    And I sit and I know the quieting night.

    This poem appears concurrently in Paul’s new collection from Wiseblood Books, The Locust Years

    The Ps, the Qs, and the War

    1.

    In 1979, in an article entitled “What Is Wrong with Slavery,” the British philosopher R. M. Hare wrote: “Nearly everybody would agree that slavery is wrong; and I can say this perhaps with greater feeling than most, having in a manner of speaking been a slave.” The first time I read this I was incredulous: how could a comfortable Oxford don, in our day and age, dare to claim that he had been enslaved? Was he talking about some run-of-the-mill hazing ritual to which he had been subjected in his student days? Was he talking about the burdens placed on him by his family? 

    No, of course not. I had somehow forgotten all about World War II. Hare, it turns out, was a prisoner of war held by the Japanese from the fall of Singapore in 1942 until the end of the conflict three years later. He was forced to perform hard labor in the construction of the Burma Railway during a good portion of that time. Throughout his enslavement, he kept a notebook hidden on his person, and jotted down observations about fundamental ethical questions, notably the matter of how to lead a meaningful life under extreme duress. Biding his time, he also learned Italian and Persian. Upon release, he was, as those of his generation were expected to be, generally silent about his wartime experiences. So silent, in fact, that when decades later he would casually mention his time as a slave in a scholarly article, this seemed entirely incongruous with everything we thought we knew of him as a quiet academic leading an uneventful life.

    This observation may be extended to account for the style of mid-century British philosophers in general: the war significantly shaped the lives and destinies of most of the prominent figures of that generation, yet we find scarcely any mention of it in their written works. The war is thus a conspicuous absence, a black hole of unreason, unpredictability, and, yes, trauma, at the heart of the lives of the men (mostly) who would work so hard to cultivate a public image of themselves as ideal embodiments of the paired philosophical virtues of rigor and wit.

    Why does Hare’s avowal come as such a surprise to a reader like me, who of course knows full well that terrible things happened between 1939 and 1945? In part it may be that we have been conditioned in recent years to think of “slavery” as something approaching a proper noun, referring unless otherwise specified to the trans-Atlantic chattel slavery conducted by Europeans and Americans and inflicted upon Africans. I suspect Hare himself was playing on this presumption, in order to deliver this deadpan account of his own horrific experience in a register somewhere close to that of a joke. In this, Hare is exemplifying one of the two key virtues I have just identified in twentieth-century analytic philosophy — not laugh-out-loud wit, but the wit that is imparted with a sly and subtle Shaftesburian grin; and to do so he momentarily slips out of character, violating a key rule that prevailed among his peers: that you must never make it about yourself, that your background motivations, your childhood dreams, or your earlier life as a POW, must never come through to the surface as an explicit part of the account of why you believe what you believe. 

    When on other occasions analytic philosophers speak freely about the life experiences that shaped their thought, they often go out of their way to make clear that this is the sort of thing they only do on their “down time.” For an analytic philosopher, life itself is extracurricular. Thus John Rawls, in an autobiographical note, reflects on his adolescent experience working in a doughnut factory in Baltimore in the 1930s (his father would send a driver to drop him off and pick him up), watching the owner struggling to keep his bills paid through constant toil. He observes that seeing this example of the disparate economic plights of different members of society may have played a role in his “original position” thought-experiment. But there is nothing uniquely compelling about this reflection; after all, what human being, other than perhaps the young Siddhartha Gautama, has not witnessed economic inequality? 

    The autobiographies of the analytic philosophers often come across to the discerning reader as exercises in vanity. (Nicholas Rescher was so impressed with his own career that he made time to write two autobiographies.) One exception may be W. V. O. Quine’s somewhat eccentric memoir, The Time of My Life, which appeared in 1985: we may credit it, at least, for revealing to us just how happy Quine was to build his personhood up entirely out of rigor and wit. Anything that might trigger the rumbling within him of any more surprising sort of interiority is something he explicitly portrays as in need of avoidance. “I am deeply moved by occasional passages of poetry,” Quine writes, “and so, characteristically, I read little of it.” Hare briefly violates this rule about avoiding your own passions, but only so as to reconfirm the sharpness of his wit. Later in the article he affirms the idea, which Quine would share, that any conviction that comes to us laden with emotion is worthy of grave suspicion. Indeed, in the very next sentence, having just acknowledged his own time as a slave, Hare immediately corrects course and returns us to the familiar rigorous detachment of his tradition: “However, there are dangers in just taking for granted that something is wrong.” 

    Such detachment from one’s own passions obviously has its virtues. Analytic philosophy made wonderful progress in several areas of logic and the philosophy of language, and has even succeeded in dissolving some nasty paradoxes that had been weighing us down and making us look bad since antiquity. But such dispassionate focus also, quite obviously, has its limits, and in an era in which the most effective engine of dispassionate inquiry is the computer, analytic philosophy as conducted by humans runs the risk of degenerating into a faint imitation by human beings of what in any case the machines will always do better. 

    Under the label of “wit,” in a broad sense, we must surely include the performative dismissiveness that was once so common in seminar settings. More than once in graduate school I had professors, trained up broadly on the Oxbridge model, who delighted in raising an eyebrow as an anxious graduate student struggled to express a half-formed thought, only to scoff at the end of the student’s failed effort: “I haven’t the slightest idea what that is supposed to mean.” Rather than taking the charitable approach of a philosopher such as Leibniz, who was convinced that everyone is always speaking the truth, albeit with greater and lesser degrees of clarity, and that it is the purpose of philosophical dialogue to draw out the latent truth that we all already possess, the analytic philosopher instead attempts to convince an “adversary” that what has just come out of his or her mouth is complete nonsense. Of course, asymmetrical power relations and the broader pragmatic context of a seminar effectively ensure that when a professor says to a graduate student that what has just come out of that student’s mouth is complete nonsense, it is effectively guaranteed that whatever the student has just said, it will indeed sound stupid — somewhat as in a book review, if the reviewer writes that “this book contains such awful sentences as the following,” it is safe to predict that whatever that sentence says, the reader will be primed to agree that it is indeed awful. The haughtiness of many analytical philosophers would be hard to exaggerate. 

    It is of course an irony that even in a seminar studying questions of pragmatics through the lens of philosophy of language, the pragmatics of what is happening then and there, in its time and in its place, remain off-limits, beyond the bounds of legitimate consideration. To acknowledge that a power differential could in part shape the perception of the truth-value or meaningfulness of the claims of the different parties to the dialogue would be to abandon the project of philosophy itself, and to lapse into something approaching “critique” in the spirit of, say, Michel Foucault. The almost phobic avoidance of such a turn has resulted, for analytic philosophers, in a variety of inquiry utterly under-resourced for resolving the questions it has set for itself. In early analytic philosophy, these questions were almost exclusively within the subfields of logic, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science. In more recent decades, there is no particular limit to the range of questions that analytic philosophers may choose to address, and today some of the most prominent analytic philosophers work primarily on such things as microaggressions committed by hospital nursing staff or the social construction of medical obesity. It is not so much the focus that warrants the appellation “analytic” but the style, and to some extent the methodology: to be precise, a total absence of any awareness of rootedness in humanistic tradition, and a fairly thorough STEMification of the tools and the resources deployed for thinking about the human good — that is, a tendency to prefer citing the latest poll results about Shakespeare or Cicero, and an almost childlike unawareness of the inescapably tragic dimensions of human existence.

    2.

    One significant development in the thirty years that I have spent in philosophy is the sharp rise in course offerings focused on the history of analytic philosophy. Back in the 1990s, the party line, often implicit but sometimes also explicit (as when Gilbert Harman posted a note on his Princeton office door warning against any mention of works that dated back more than ten years), held that analytic philosophy simply has no history, or at least that there is nothing an analytic philosopher might gain by attention to its historical development. Philosophy was thus conceived much as physics or cosmology is: if you are a working cosmologist, you are perfectly free, in your own time, to look into Aristotle’s theory of the motion of the heavens, but this can be no part of your professional duties strictly speaking. 

    By now things have loosened up a bit. Today analytic philosophy largely accepts that it has a historical life to it, that it is one tradition alongside others. This amounts to a significant retreat from the aspiration to scientificity of much analytic philosophy throughout the twentieth century. Nikhil Krishnan’s recent book, A Terribly Serious Affair: Philosophy and War at Oxford, 1900–1960, skillfully reflects this latter shift. Krishnan’s work may be described, without too much stretching, as a form of ethnographic participant-observation. He is both an insider and an outsider, able to look at the supreme values of the Oxford philosophers, the rigor and the wit, with both admiration and bemused detachment. And this detachment is grounded in a familiarity with other traditions, notably those emerging in Indian history, that have the power to satisfy their adepts’ intellectual, spiritual, and social needs in a way analytic philosophy never could. 

    I have been focusing so far primarily on British philosophers, but have also drawn at will on examples from their American counterparts. If this can be justified, it would be by appeal to the fact that in the twentieth century analytic philosophy departments in the United States were one of the few pockets of American life in which ties to the former imperial occupier, of the sort that Ralph Waldo Emerson had sought to break already in the early nineteenth century, remained strong. In other words, the philosophical declaration of independence that was announced already in Emerson’s sermons was effectively rescinded by the mid-twentieth century, when, for better or worse, an influx of brain power from Central Europe into the Anglosphere brought about, once again, a new period of trans-Channel and trans-Atlantic hybridity.

    Throughout the 1990s it remained nearly impossible to come up through an American Ph.D. program in philosophy without becoming, or pretending to become, a proper Anglophile. You had to be able to order a “pint” without appearing flustered; you had to be able to speak competently of soccer — excuse me, football; you had, under threat of ostracism, to express your appreciation for John Cleese’s comedy sketches exploring the quirks of Ludwig Wittgenstein, or at the very least Monty Python’s far more famous sketch about the football match of the philosophers. Sooner or later, almost all American philosophers made some sort of pilgrimage through the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, finagled invitations as guests at high table, and commonly described this experience in terms familiar from the believer’s description of a visit to the Holy Land. Many of the most elite American philosophers stayed on longer at those venerable old institutions, for doctoral research, post-docs, lectureships, or the rare coveted professorial chair. The pay was significantly below what one might expect in an elite American institution, but the prestige remained enormous, and irreducible to any dollar amount.

    Yet by the time I arrived in England, in the early 2000s, one already had a distinct sense of nostalgia for a lost golden age. In the same motion by which American philosophy curricula have begun to cast analytic philosophy as a historical phenomenon, so, too, at high table there was by now a sense that whatever had been great about the generation of British wartime philosophers had not managed to survive into the present. The stories related to a guest generally sounded, even to a first-time visitor, like stories that had been told before. Much of the talk was literally small — I can recall one elderly fellow next to me complaining that back when he first dined there in 1956, they offered two savories before they brought the concluding sweet. When conversation turned to philosophy, as with culinary matters, the general refrain was one of decline: back in the good old days, when the great masters of the twentieth century were still alive, my, how uncompromising, sharp, and again, how rigorous, the disputes could be! No one pulled any punches! You should have seen it! There was never any accounting for why these old veterans could not simply demonstrate that lost rigor themselves rather than bemoan its loss, but the message was clear enough: in the old days, we were man enough to accept that philosophy is, in its essence, a combat sport, a sort of sublimation of war, in which the faculty of reason is more a blunt weapon than an inner power that might facilitate our individual happiness, thriving, or liberation.

    War, as we have already been seeing, shaped twentieth-century Anglophone philosophy in at least two respects. First, most philosophers of the right age were in the war, even if their experiences were not generally as arduous as Hare’s. Second, regardless of any individual philosopher’s experience, the war, and the global post-war order that it helped to shape, did much also to determine the cultural values and political imperatives that these philosophers would largely take for granted as the default setting of human existence. In other words, British philosophy in the twentieth century was philosophy pursued at a highly peculiar and special moment in history, even if its practitioners for the most part engaged in their inquiries as if the contingencies of their historical moment had no role in shaping the style and the aims of their thinking. Though we are often loath to admit it, philosophy has always been found downstream from culture: the dominant classes determine what sort of things should be said, and the philosophers, for the most part (always with at least some dissenters), articulate the reasons why this is so. Sore thumbs such as Marx or Nietzsche have thus been in a position to complain, with some legitimacy, that the prevailing schools of philosophy are only the intellectual laundering of ideology, or that the canonical texts of mainstream moral theory are really only etiquette manuals for the bourgeoisie. 

    At the very least, we may agree with the counterfactual: if World War II had not happened, twentieth-century philosophy would have been very different. For one thing, the English-speaking world would not have benefitted from the massive continental brain-drain triggered by the rise of fascism in Europe. For another, it was largely the great leap forward triggered by the war, in the technologies of cryptography, intelligence, and computing, that would end up shaping the priorities of research in philosophy, and in particular the overwhelming focus on logic, decision theory, game theory, and related fields. Ultimately, in the post-war period this focus made it possible to conceive of philosophy largely as a politically neutral endeavor, as a technical field rather than a critical one. This argument is familiar from George A. Reisch’s important book, How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic. Reisch argues that the early Cold War era brought about, first and foremost, a de-politicization of philosophy. This was somewhat reversed by John Rawls in 1971 with A Theory of Justice, his epoch-making work of liberal political philosophy. But even here the theory remained so abstract, or so “ideal,” as to seem to many to have very little to say about actual human society and about what the real challenges are for those who would improve it. 

    And twentieth-century analytic philosophy was shaped by war in another sense, too: it was conceived by its participants as a variety of dialogical combat. Though the idea of “interpretive charity,” stemming from the work of Donald Davidson, often came up in the conversations of the old-guard analytic philosophers, they were frequently anything but charitable in their interpretations of what their juniors, or those less quick-witted than they, were trying to say. It is hard in fact to imagine that anyone who had not been socialized exactly as they had been might be perceived by them as appropriate partners in dialogue. What they were missing, then, was any sense whatsoever of the ethnological dimensions of the human encounter — sometimes we argue with our peers, and we can indeed learn something from that experience, but sometimes we might want to learn, too, from people who are not our peers. To attempt to do so involves a particular set of challenges, since non-peers will not have been socialized in the same way, will perhaps have a very different sense of what counts as quick wit or decisive refutation. Yet as long as philosophers only talk to other philosophers, or even more narrowly to other philosophers working in the same tradition, in the same language, with the same points of reference and more or less the same values and background presuppositions, while they may be preserving for themselves the satisfaction of a fair fight with a suitable adversary, they are also preserving themselves from the vast majority of human minds, and choosing instead to remain in the comfort zone of high table and all the other rituals that perpetually reconfirm for them who exactly belongs, and who can be safely ignored. 

    None of this is to say that analytic philosophers, even if their methods have been gladiatorial, have been particularly bellicose or inegalitarian in their actual political commitments. There is, happily, no particular political litmus test for membership in this tradition, and I would say that overall the political opinions of academic philosophers are generally downstream of culture, or at least the urban and educated culture, as a whole. Around 2020, academic philosophy veered sharply to the left, or at least to the peculiar strain of left politics that was being called “progressivism.” But this was not the result of any internal developments, let alone any of new conceptual innovations or unprecedently persuasive arguments — it was just a matter of watching which way the wind was blowing. In this, the philosophers of the early twenty-first century demonstrated that they were no longer operating as the “handmaidens of science,” as many analytic philosophers a century before imagined philosophy ought to do, let alone as the handmaidens of theology, to invoke the formula often used in the Middle Ages, but had now become the handmaidens of the university HR department. 

    Analytic philosophers, again, are generally good center-left social democrats, who are ready to make room for Marxists in their midst, as well as some anarchists, and at least a few full-blooded conservatives. Quine was famously of a generally right-wing disposition. (The most offensively reactionary statement that I have seen from him was also undeniably funny: he said of lotteries that they are a “subsidy for smart people.”) This does not seem to have shaped any of his explicit commitments in the domain of philosophy to which he limited himself — indeed, the conclusions he came to about, say, the indeterminacy of translation parallel in interesting ways the work of the doubt-mongering continental postmodernists, who generally sought to position themselves, sincerely or not, somewhere on the far left. In terms of political orientation, we find a great outlier in the philosopher of language Scott Soames, author of the magisterial two-volume history of analytic philosophy, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, and, more recently, an ardent Trump supporter. In his illustrious career at Princeton and at the University of Southern California, Soames has trained up numerous graduate students in his field, who have largely been more in line with the prevailing political sympathies of their community, have been proud feminists, Democrats, centrists, and progressives. None, as far as I know, has ever reported any sense of incompatibility with their advisor on the basis of political differences. 

    The cases of Quine and Soames are instructive. It is difficult or impossible to imagine a continental philosopher whose political commitments do not significantly shape their philosophical commitments. This is not to say there are no productive left/right crossovers or collaborations; indeed, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that most post-war European philosophy has been devoted to finding ways to make the lucubrations of a certain prominent Nazi thinker palatable on the left. But the great difference is that this effort constituted the project of philosophy itself, as the continental philosophers conceived it: not so much to extract from Martin Heidegger what little may still be used once the Nazism is subtracted, but rather, much more ambitiously, to engage with the problem of his Nazism in order to understand critically how this ideology could have become so central to the history of Western metaphysics and its “overcoming.” By marked contrast, no disciple of Soames will feel compelled to engage with his Trumpism in any way. There is no need. In analytic philosophy, your political commitments are extracurricular, even if, at certain moments, as for conservatives in the post-2020 era, or for communists in the McCarthy era, it can be difficult for a political black sheep to feel at home within the broader sociology of academia.

    The surface neutrality of analytic philosophy, however, is undergirded by a deeper sort of conservatism. What has enabled analytic philosophy to present itself as not having a political valence has been precisely its ability to distinguish sharply and confidently between what belongs to the sphere of philosophy and what lies beyond it, while continental philosophy typically sees all domains of culture — not just politics but also the arts, entertainment, fashion, to some extent science, and, most important of all, history — not just as potential source material for philosophical reflection, but as directly constituting the discipline’s subject matter. Analytic philosophy can accommodate viewpoint diversity about politics — easily placing, say, Scott Soames in a seminar room alongside liberals and socialists — but only at the cost of suppressing any viewpoint diversity about what philosophy itself is. 

    It is unlikely that, if the United States or Britain were today to enter full-scale war with China or Russia, academic philosophers would have much of a presence among the people these countries might tap for heading up their intelligence operations. I myself speak Russian, and probably know what they are currently saying in Russian state media as well as any intelligence officer, but I am quite certain no intelligence agency will ever hope to get anything useful out of me. I am probably an outlier here in my public attitudes towards the sort of power that intelligence agencies represent, having spent many years now insisting, like Diogenes of Sinope, that to be a philosopher necessarily involves stepping away from all the endless contests over earthly dominion — to telling even Alexander the Great, should he come and offer his patronage, to stand the hell out of our light. Most of my philosophy colleagues would likely sit out any future war less for reasons of principle than simply because our particular set of competences no longer seems suitable for substantially contributing to any war effort, such as these are fought in the twenty-first century.

    To some extent, we may see a figure such as J. L. Austin, whose military and philosophical careers are exhaustively recounted in M. W. Rowe’s magisterial biography, J. L. Austin: Philosopher and D-Day Intelligence Officer, as arriving at the end of a long lineage of polymathic thinkers and doers, extending back to the likes of Leibniz in the seventeenth century, who was at once a metaphysician, a mathematician, a cryptographer, and a diplomat. Austin’s contemporaries who best fit this polymathic model, notably Alan Turing and Norbert Wiener, have not gone down in history first and foremost as philosophers. But that is definitely how they would have been identified had they been born a few centuries earlier, and in this regard they remind us that throughout the World War II era, probing into the fundamental nature of reality was still often held to be of a pair with the project of shaping reality: theoria cum praxi, to cite Leibniz’s favorite motto. But again, whether Leibniz was seeking to reunite the main camps of post-Reformation Christianity, or to convince Louis XIV to invade Egypt, or to work out the relationship between the Slavic languages and ancient Scythian, he was always motivated by a unifying philosophical vision, that of “unity compensated by diversity,” which he saw as furnishing the basic truths both for understanding fundamental metaphysical questions about the nature of reality, as well as the concrete social and political questions that arise in diplomacy or ecclesiology. By the time Austin, Turing, Wiener, and others signed up for the war effort, such a unity was no longer so clear: they are simply adaptable intelligent men, with background competence in thinking about questions that prove to be relevant to wartime intelligence efforts. 

    Rowe describes Austin’s intelligence career in vivid detail, and one comes away from his excellent work fairly convinced that Austin’s contributions to military history are even greater than his contributions to philosophy. For one thing, he played an indispensable role in planning the Allied invasion of Normandy, as well as several other key offensives. As with Hare, we also see in Austin an extraordinary fatalism, an ability to accept the twists and turns of life in a turbulent world without complaint. One remarkable scene recounted by Rowe takes place during a Luftwaffe bombing of London in April, 1941. Rather than retreating to a basement, Austin and his wife did what many Londoners had taken to doing on such occasions: they went up to the roof to watch the incendiary spectacle, only both to be injured, he superficially, his wife rather gravely. And, like Hare, Austin spoke little of it after the war and allowed his experiences in it no evident role in the shaping of his great innovations in ordinary-language philosophy in the 1950s. 

    Here, indeed, being disciplinarily outside of philosophy narrowly conceived may have enabled other thinkers who played a role in the war to arrive at more comprehensive reflections on the relationship between their wartime duties and their postwar academic interests. The American cybernetician Wiener, who made crucial contributions to developing new anti-aircraft technologies during the war, would go on to offer profound reflections on the inextricable links between information theory, the progress of technology, the interests of state, and the new threats of global conflict. In this respect Wiener, more than the philosophers narrowly conceived, was following much more closely in the footsteps of Leibniz, and if this is what caused him to have gone down in history as something other than a philosopher, we may have here a clear measure of just how much the scope of philosophy had been reduced between the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries.

    3.

    What are the broader cultural and historical forces that led to this reduction? On Griesch’s account, postwar philosophy in the United States was both narrowed and depoliticized by a complex system of application of top-down pressure, shaping the way different grant applications were prioritized, and the way hiring decisions were made. This effectively ensured the long reign of a radically austere conception of philosophy that had already been articulated before the war, according to which this discipline’s exclusive concern is with analyzing the logic and the language of the claims of the natural sciences and mathematics. These claims, it was maintained by A. J. Ayer and others already in the 1930s, are meaningful only to the extent that they are susceptible to being proven false, and therefore the only true claims there are, while the claims of aesthetics, moral theory, and metaphysics, not to mention substantive political claims about the human and social good, are quite literally “nonsense.” 

    For Griesch, then, the apolitical character of postwar philosophy was but the superficial reflection of a cultural and institutional shift that was political through and through. In the United States and Great Britain in the postwar period, it was crucial that the project of philosophy be separated from the project of critique, that is, the project of exposing the pathologies inherent in the present organization of society as a first step towards remedying them. Philosophy had to be updated to a point where Marx’s admonition to philosophers a century earlier — that the time had come for them not just to seek to understand the world, but to change it — would now appear, even though it mentioned philosophers by name, to be describing a very different discipline than our own.

    The opposite of critique, in this sense, is analysis: the project of attending to claims that are already circulating out there in the world, and taking them apart in the same way one might take apart an engine in order to learn how it works. Sometimes the philosophers, on this conception of their project, will end up putting their engines back together again, but they will seldom take the newly disconnected parts and try to use them to build another more powerful engine than the one they started with.

    Of course, in spite of the extreme austerity of Ayer’s generation, analytic philosophy eventually did make room for the return of political and moral theory, aesthetics, and other species of alleged nonsense. But even these were reintroduced in a way that ensured their exponents would mostly be shooting blanks. In perhaps the most extreme example of this, the new field of analytic “metaethics” presupposed that the most productive engagement with ethical questions was the one that moves up a level, so to speak. Rather than asking whether some given x is “good,” metaethics instead analyzes the logical structure of claims of the form “x is good.” Whatever the results of such inquiries were, they seemed little likely to change the world, or even the personal behavior of anybody who was exposed to them. 

    Eventually, substantive claims would also return in moral and political philosophy, notably, as we have already mentioned, in the work of Rawls, who continues to represent the high-water mark of analytic political philosophy. But here, even if we cannot accuse Rawls of insisting on remaining “meta” — for he does make weighty claims about, among other things, what justice is, rather than simply analyzing what other people mean when they say things like “justice is x” — there has been a further persistent concern that in order for the Rawlsian liberal project to work, it must remain at the level of “ideal theory,” proceeding through thought-experiments so abstract and detached from lived experience as to reveal next to nothing about that experience. In recent decades, proponents of “non-ideal theory,” notably Charles W. Mills, have sought variously to supplement or to break down the Rawlsian program by insisting that in fact we experience no “original position” in human life, that we are “always already” (to speak with the continentals) in the world as members of particular groups defined by class, gender, ethnicity, and so on, and that this brute fact has very real consequences for how the members of various social identities will tend to understand what is at stake in the “original position” experiment. 

    Undoubtedly the most significant English-language work in moral philosophy of the postwar era was done by Derek Parfit, whose two milestone contributions in this field are Reasons and Persons, from 1984, followed by On What Matters in 2011. Parfit was a moral realist, whose singular obsession over much of his adult life was to discover the nature of moral truth in an age when this could no longer be referred back to a transcendent cause of the sort that religion had long provided. Although David Edmonds has recently written a fine biography of him, Parfit: A Philosopher and His Mission to Save Morality, Parfit’s life is not terribly interesting. He was born in China to doctor parents in 1942, but he returned to England in his first year and stayed in Oxford more or less continuously, sticking to a raw-food diet, until his death in 2017. His widow, the philosopher Janet Radcliffe Richards, has suggested that he suffered from, or perhaps thrived from, an undiagnosed case of Asperger’s syndrome. 

    It would be a bit of an exaggeration to say that postwar analytic philosophy amounted to a jobs program for Aspies, but there is no denying that Parfit’s particular set of personal traits served him well in the field: a singular and downright obsessive dedication to following every detail of arguments through to their end, and a monumental faith in the power of reason to solve, potentially without limit, humanity’s problems. As Edmonds tells us in one particularly sad passage, Parfit never celebrated his own birthday, since he could find no rational ground for taking that single day as more meaningful than any other. Nor did he celebrate other people’s birthdays, nor even did he give his wife a card or a gift when her birthday came. Birthdays were not among the things that “mattered.” You can see here, I believe, what happens when substantive questions, such as “What matters?” or “What is good?” are reintroduced into philosophy after some decades of banishment, but where the people who take up the task of answering these questions remain largely shaped by the earlier generation of philosophers dedicated to pure analysis and the pathological avoidance of “nonsense”: you get people asking big questions, whose minds and reading habits and manners of inquiry are ideally shaped for the asking of small ones; you get highly abstract answers to questions, about the nature of goodness for example, from people unable to see concrete instances of goodness — the celebration of your loved one’s birthday, for example — right before their noses. 

    The landscape of post-war analytic philosophy, to be fair, is somewhat more diverse than I have so far acknowledged. As Benjamin J. B. Lipscomb’s collective intellectual biography, The Women Are Up to Something: How Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch Revolutionized Ethics, reminds us, it was largely the women philosophers at Oxford in the World War II era and after who kept alive alternative philosophical styles, and kept their colleagues at least minimally aware of the existence of other ways of doing things. Midgley and Murdoch in particular were gifted essayists who reflected in their writing a surprising vulnerability, and even a willingness to appear foolish. Anscombe was one of the key disciples and Anglicizers of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, for better or worse, and she was at least as defiantly eccentric as the peculiar Austrian she worked so hard to promote. A devout if idiosyncratic Catholic, Anscombe argued against birth control and had an unusually large brood of her own. She chain-smoked and was known to eat baked beans straight from the can during her lectures. Her greatest contribution to philosophy was made in the field of virtue ethics, which involved an innovative and original transformation of Aristotle’s account of virtue into a substantive position in moral philosophy known as “virtue theory.” She also made significant contributions to the philosophy of action, a field in which Wittgenstein’s influence on her is particularly evident.

    Midgley found that she was unable to commit to Christianity, but her work is shot through with theological reflections and attests to an enduring preoccupation with matters of faith. She is also singularly preoccupied with the question of animals and their moral status, something that could hardly hold the attention of her most prominent male colleagues for long. In the 1980s she went and picked a battle with Richard Dawkins, characterizing his version of evolutionary theory as akin to religious faith. Seldom have two people so different, yet so alike in their utter willingness to risk looking foolish in public, faced off so dazzlingly. Midgley remains, like Anscombe, committed to a view of the project of philosophy along basically Wittgensteinian lines, in which it is best understood on analogy to plumbing: philosophy is for solving problems, and you tend not even to notice it unless something is not working as it should. This is “WASP philosophy” at its most minimalist, which essentially rehashes an old familiar bit of folk wisdom — “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” — and it does so at the same moment in history when a French philosopher such as Gilles Deleuze could articulate a far bolder conception of what philosophy aims to do, asserting that to be a philosopher is intrinsically to be in the business of “concept creation.”

    Philippa Foot is perhaps best known for releasing the famous “trolley problem” into the world, in an important article in 1967 on abortion and the doctrine of double effect, thus giving rise, eventually, to the proliferation of memes we now see on social media offering up humorous variations on the basic problem that she sought to address: whether it is “good” or “bad” to push someone (a “fat man” in the original version) in front of a trolley in order to prevent five people tied further down the tracks from being run over. (Some of the memes by now feature Trump, or overweight cats, variously eliciting unexpected moral intuitions, or just making us laugh.) The more serious side of “trolleyology,” such as it has developed in recent years, seems as if custom-made not just for social-media memetics but also for what is now deceptively called “tech ethics” or “AI ethics,” as for example the problems that programmers face when trying to “teach” a self-driving car to run over, say, two old men rather than a baby and its mother, when no third option is available. It is, in other words, the kind of “moral” reasoning even a machine can engage in, and it is a very worrisome sign of the times that so many people, inside philosophy and out, now take for granted that trolley-problem-style thought-experiments are basically all it takes to cultivate moral personhood. 

    The women who were, in Lipscomb’s phrase, “up to something,” were in some respects idiosyncratic, but in other respects very much of the same time and place as their male counterparts. One striking difference between them and most of their male counterparts was their openness to the world, their sharp reception of the tragedies of history. Whereas Hare, who endured World War II in the most grueling way possible, scarcely found fit to mention it in his later career, these four women were profoundly affected — emotionally and intellectually — by newsreel footage from the concentration camps. As Clare MacCumhaill and Rachel Wiseman show in their excellent book Metaphysical Animals: How Four Women Brought Philosophy Back to Life, they seem to have been triggered into probing the depths of ethical theory by this incontestable documentary proof of man’s lupinity towards man. 

    These women’s singular character as thinkers may result in part from a form of selection bias: you had to be a bold person at the outset to enter as a woman into a field that was presumed male by default. In this light very little seems to have changed since the seventeenth century, when women philosophers such as Anne Conway, Margaret Cavendish, and Damaris Masham, excluded from all official positions at Cambridge, ended up playing a vital and unique role in the extramural circle of the Cambridge Platonists, as, in some regards, freer and less guarded thinkers than the men who frequented them when they were not busy in their official roles at the university. 

    Today, in whatever chapter of the history of philosophy this is, we generally have a sense that the golden age of Anglophile analysis is over. The career of Kwame Anthony Appiah is perhaps most instructive in this regard. Having completed a Ph.D. on conditionals — that is, propositions that have the logical form of “if . . . then” — at Cambridge in 1982, Appiah went on to a distinguished academic career, making contributions in several subfields of philosophy. In recent years he has been racking up prizes like a Brezhnevite general racks up medals (to paraphrase Perry Anderson on Jürgen Habermas), even as he has become best known for his work as the author of “The Ethicist” column in The New York Times, that is, as a provider of agony-aunt-like etiquette advice to the bourgeoisie, answering letters from the newspaper’s readers, as hungry for exposure as they are for absolution, regarding such things as whether it’s okay to conceal your deceased parents’ long-ago infidelities from your clueless adult siblings. Not the sort of thing that Quine or Strawson or Ayer would have done. In many respects analytic philosophers are far freer today to pursue the range of things that interest them. There are blogs out there on which analytic philosophers share their parenting tips, or their exercise routines, or their strategies for pursuing “ethical non-monogamy.” And all of these activities are expected to count at least for something in their tenure and promotion dossiers. The problem is not that analytic philosophers should not turn their attention to whatever interests them. The problem is that after a century of rupture with humanistic tradition, what interests them tends not to be all that interesting.

    Even if the stranglehold of Anglophile rigor and wit has loosened, in my own native country there has been no return of any Emersonian spirit, no American Renaissance. Nor, perhaps, in the present chapter of the history of the United States, could there be. We are generally happy, or we generally understand the importance of pretending that we are happy, that Anglophone academic philosophy no longer aspires to the status of a combat sport, but rather to supportiveness and inclusion, and to the highlighting of previously marginalized voices. The old habit of relentlessly rigorous argumentation and witty dismissiveness is now largely seen as masculine-coded and exclusionary, notwithstanding the fact that it was so often exemplified by philosophers who were, in their extramural lives, committed liberals and socialists. Thus Martha Nussbaum reminds us of the time at Harvard when, asking why there was no faculty women’s restroom close to the seminar room in Emerson Hall, Rawls casually invited her to go use the students’ toilets.

    These changes surely are for the better, overall, no matter how wistfully nostalgic they may have left some elderly men still lingering, like ghosts, at high table. That said, both of these tendencies — both the late British imperial style in philosophy and the late American imperial one, both the exclusionary and the inclusionary, both the bellicose and the irenic, will from a global comparative perspective turn out to have been mere blips in the history of all the different things philosophy has been and might yet be. In early modern Europe, though we choose not to remember this, the primary sense of “philosophy” had to do with such natural curiosities as the use of quicklime to make transportable cooling devices, or the effects of burning coal on the quality of the air of London. Thus in the Fumifugium of 1661, John Evelyn wrote of “these unwholsome vapours, that distempered the Aer, to the very raising of Storms and tempests; upon which a Philosopher might amply discourse.”

    Today there is what we might call a “global style” in philosophy. It is dictated by what happens in the United States, and to some extent in the lands of its close allies and Anglophone cousins. But it is not “American philosophy” in any meaningful sense; it does not concern itself with the “American spirit” or the “American character” in the way Emerson imagined American philosophy ought to do. It is imperial rather than republican, which is another way of saying it has the luxury of taking itself for granted. Meanwhile, in most of the developing world, philosophers are split between two models of what philosophy might be: they can join up with the global style, or they can seek to embody a style that is held to suit their national character and that draws on homegrown traditions and luminaries for its primary inspiration. The former sort of philosophy is certain to open up more opportunities for grants, fellowships, and other markers of international prominence. The latter sort comes with its own more local advantages. In spite of their verbal enthusiasm for “inclusivity,” the mainstream of Anglophone philosophers today remains largely dismissive of the aspirations of, say, a penniless young Ethiopian or Ukrainian student of philosophy concerned to articulate what a philosophy fit for Ethiopia or Ukraine might be. 

    Despite its pretension to having successfully transcended worldly pressures and considerations, its presumption of perfect analytical insularity, analytic philosophy has always, and usually unconsciously, been intimately wrapped up with the cultures that surround it, as well as with history and geopolitics. What gets to count as philosophy, perhaps with a few decades of lag time, has always been determined in part by who is in power. In this light, we may venture that philosophy in its current post-analytic or quasi-analytic or “open-armed analytic” phase is in a holding pattern, an interregnum, and it is very unlikely that anyone will look back on its current productions and figures as representing anything like a golden age.

    Fitzgerald’s Follies

    In The Praise of Folly, in 1509, Desiderius Erasmus personified folly as a goddess. She develops the thesis that folly is good and that it is deserving of praise. Folly remarks on her own ubiquity — since we all, the wise and the unwise, live in folly’s grip. “Fortune herself,” Folly tells us, “the directrix of human affairs, is so thoroughly of a mind with me that she always has been most hostile to the wise.” Socrates figures repeatedly in The Praise of Folly, his life a spectacle of wisdom turned to folly. Socrates is the wisest man in a city said to favor wisdom, and after being put on trial for no actual crime he is compelled to commit suicide. This exemplary teacher is executed — absurdly — for corrupting the morals of the young. His gift for wisdom had been a death sentence.

    To make her case, Folly must go beyond the claim that folly is inescapable. She offers two separate explanations for its intrinsic worth. She contrasts “the mischief of wisdom” to “the enchantment of folly,” an enchantment that can resemble delirium — “for I fill the mind with a sort of perpetual drunkenness; I glut it with joys [and] dear delights.” In the end, folly is an incitement more to art than to inebriation. Poets are “of my faction,” Folly observes; “destroy the illusion and any play is ruined.” Illusion is art and art illusion, a fortunate state of affairs, for from art comes folly’s sweetness and its ability to enchant.

    At the highest reaches of folly there is love. Though Erasmus pokes fun at the self-importance and the pieties of theologians and clerics, he emphatically does not equate folly with nihilism or wisdom with hypocrisy. “The attribute of wisdom is meet for God alone,” Folly concludes. Always at hand, undivine human folly merits forgiveness. Folly is “so acceptable to the heavenly powers that forgiveness of its errors is assured, whereas nothing is forgiven to wisdom.” Folly furnishes the reason and the motive for love, and “he who loves intensely no longer lives in himself but in whatever he loves.” Folly is divinely generous. The more one “can depart from himself and enter into the other [through the folly of love], the happier [one] is.”

    Folly has a unique purchase on F. Scott Fitzgerald’s biography and a unique purchase on his literature. Fitzgerald is the most foolish of American writers. He was foolish in his successes, throwing away his time and talent on short-lived celebrity and on lucrative ephemera, chasing the dollar and compromising his immense talent. He was not less foolish in his many failures. His two finest novels, The Great Gatsby and Tender Is the Night, were commercial flops. He himself fell into penury in the 1930s, his wife Zelda having descended into madness. Fitzgerald overdid something to which Erasmus’ Folly admits — that she had been raised up and nourished by Bacchus. Fitzgerald’s alcoholism constrained his literary output and led to his premature death at the age of forty-five. The adult Fitzgerald could not take care of himself.

    We do not associate Fitzgerald with anything like wisdom literature. He never wore a beard, that “ensign of wisdom,” according to Erasmus’ Folly. He could not be confused with Tolstoy, who did have a beard and who broached the biggest and the best questions, boldly titling a novel War and Peace. (Fitzgerald’s first novel was This Side of Paradise, in which this side of paradise — a phrase from a poem by Rupert Brooke — is more or less a brilliant undergraduate career at Princeton University.) Fitzgerald did not even write novels of ideas. He was no Thomas Mann, no communicant with the philosophical heavyweights, no worldly interpreter of high politics. Until his death, Fitzgerald agonized about not being sufficiently educated or well read. He never graduated from Princeton, and it bothered him. 

    In The Great Gatsby, the book that will always define him, Fitzgerald expends marvelous prose on a small and insignificant man. It is a perfect novella to depict the dreams, the extravagance, the alleged greatness of a bootlegger whose golden girl got away. Gatsby lacks any guiding wisdom. He lacks gravitas. The incognito protagonist, he lacks a real profile even in his eponymous novel. He is an empty vessel of social climbing and romantic longing who embraces the folly-filled tawdriness of his cultural moment. Gatsby is the boy who never outgrew high school, not to mention college (which he falsely claims to have attended). His shallowness and frivolity would have made him a bit player in War and Peace, a petty officer. Or Tolstoy would have chosen to transform Jay Gatsby, to reform him, leading him through a moral awakening. Tolstoy would not have left Gatsby’s folly intact, as Fitzgerald is very willing to do.

    According to Edmund Wilson, Fitzgerald’s friend and later his literary executor, Edna St. Vincent Millay compared Fitzgerald to “a stupid old woman with whom someone has left a diamond.” A similar image occurred to John Dos Passos: “when he talked about writing his mind, which seemed to be full of preposterous notions about most things, became clear and hard as diamond.” Fitzgerald fretted about wasting his diamond-like literary talent on the literature of immaturity, or he was sensitive to the accusation of doing this. In 1934, in an unpublished preface to Gatsby, he wrote of being “kidded half haywire by critics who felt that my material was such as to preclude all dealing with mature persons in a mature world. But, my God! It was my material, and it was all I had to deal with.”

    Without cultivating an aura of wisdom, however, the beardless Fitzgerald did write wisdom literature. He wrote it not by denigrating folly, not by dismissing it, and not by treating folly as peripheral to wisdom. Folly and wisdom must be twinned: “one never attains to that renowned wisdom,” Folly stipulates in The Praise of Folly, “which the wise themselves call the citadel of happiness, except by taking Folly as guide.” Folly and wisdom conjoin, and, as Erasmus shows, proximity to folly can be the same as proximity to poetry, to the poetic impulse that silhouettes Fitzgerald’s better writing. Folly is also (as already noted) the path to love, the stimulus to love, and on love Fitzgerald could be austerely wise, as he is in The Great Gatsby. Gatsby is a virtuoso of the counterfeit, a cipher almost, who loves Daisy with a shocking sincerity and force. The heartless, loveless souls around him have wealth and a solid social position, and little else. 

    Fitzgerald’s wisdom literature took some time to materialize. First he had to live through different seasons of folly; he had to assimilate a poet’s rigor as a stylist; and he had to reflect on wisdom as such, which he did most cogently in the letters that he wrote to his daughter from 1933 to 1940. An intimate of folly, an intimate of wisdom, Fitzgerald slowly figured out how to translate the spiritual possibilities of folly into enduring art. Published in 1925, The Great Gatsby was a feint in this direction, but the full translation came almost a decade later in Tender Is the Night. It recounts the mistakes of a man who travels from emotional abundance and professional distinction to the purgatory of self-defeat and loss. The novel’s wisdom resides not in the tale it tells; the tale is too edged with folly for it to impart wisdom directly. The novel’s wisdom resides instead in the novel’s style, in its manner of telling the tale. Foolish protagonist, foolish life, wise narrative, wise novel. Not by accident does this saddened novel abound in love and poetry. These are the bequests of folly, which demand a measure of wisdom to be perceived, internalized and cherished.

    Scott Fitzgerald was an imperfect father. Often absent, he was self-absorbed even by the standards of ambitious writers, and his alcoholism affected his daughter directly. It damaged her father’s health and must have been terrifying to behold. Already in the 1920s alcoholism accrued to the Fitzgerald myth, a myth that lived in the public domain, and by the 1930s this myth dovetailed with another myth — of Fitzgerald’s diminishment, of his loss of stamina, of his fading from the scene and not writing. It was his destiny to have become a relic of the Jazz Age. In Fitzgerald’s biography, the motif of squandering is omnipresent — squandered youth, squandered literary potential, squandered time. Fitzgerald embeds this motif in his fiction, though in his letters to his daughter he consciously inverts the motif of squandering that haunts so many of his novels and short stories. With acuity of expression and without rhetoric, Fitzgerald tries to get his daughter not to squander her life.

    The biographical dimension to these letters is only minimally interesting. Fitzgerald was a worried, moralistic, and sometimes preachy father, one of millions. The literary dimension to these letters is far more enriching, for they document his preoccupation with wisdom. His paternal persona was conservative yet un-Victorian. Fitzgerald, who did not want conventional domesticity for his daughter, wanted her to feel the impress of duty, a prerequisite for feeling the impress of art. “All I believe in in life is the rewards for virtue (according to your talents) and the punishments for not fulfilling your duties, which are doubly costly,” he informed his daughter. Wisdom proceeds from virtue, and wisdom takes on two separate guises in these letters: the willingness to work hard and the achievement of a writing style. (Fitzgerald’s daughter was an aspiring writer in the 1930s, when he wrote his letters to her.) Style symbolizes something so consequential for Fitzgerald that it could be a cognate for grace. It is achieved not by transcending error but by leaving oneself susceptible to feeling.

    Throughout his letters, Fitzgerald implies a complicity between his daughter and himself. Both of them are foolish. Touching on some minor point, he notes that “like me you will be something of a fool in that regard all our life.” Painfully, Fitzgerald places his daughter within a fallen family. He and her mother should never have married. “I knew she [Zelda] was spoiled and meant no good to me,” he confesses. “I was sorry immediately I had married her . . . . The mistake I made was in marrying her.” He criticizes Zelda for “trying to solve all ethical and moral problems on her own, without benefit of the thousands dead.” Fair or unfair, this criticism reveals the door to wisdom in Fitzgerald’s eyes, which was the vocation of art and the vocation of reading. One enters it through an ambitious apprenticeship to “the thousands dead,” to the books they wrote for us. Put in academic terms, one enters it through the humanities.

    Time and again, Fitzgerald pleads with his daughter to love labor. “Please work — work with your best hours,” he exhorts. Reflecting on work, he writes that “wiser people seem to manage to pile up a reserve,” their wisdom being their foresight and their work. These injunctions take Fitzgerald to an arresting bit of self-criticism, and they encapsulate the strenuous wisdom he is trying to defend: “What little I have accomplished has been by the most laborious and uphill work, and I wish now I’d never relaxed or looked back — but said at the end of The Great Gatsby: ‘I’ve found my line — from now on this comes first. This is my immediate duty — without this I am nothing.’ ” The this here is the accomplishment. By “line” he means the choice to write real literature rather than to write for commercial reward. The this repeated three times is also — and more fundamentally — the work itself, the sitting at the desk, which (because true art is at issue) cannot be other than laborious and uphill.

    The work Fitzgerald praises in these letters is not tied to marriage or money or status, preoccupied as Fitzgerald could be with each of those subjects. He grudgingly argues for “some calculated path . . . to find your way through the bourgeois maze.” He then hastens to add, “if you feel it [your way] is worth finding.” It may not be. The bourgeois maze is hazardous. Echoing Thoreau, Fitzgerald outlines the precarity of wisdom in a society bent to industry: “Once one is caught up in the material world one person in ten thousand finds the time to form literary taste, to examine the validity of philosophic conceptions of himself, or to know what, for lack of a better phrase, I might call the wise and tragic sense of life.” One does not labor for the bourgeois maze and the burdensome material world. They are obstacles to the formation of literary taste, to the philosophical reckoning with self and, by extension, to a life wisely lived.

    Folly and wisdom mingle in these phrases and in these letters. By the wise and tragic sense of life Fitzgerald meant “the thing that lies behind all great careers . . . the sense that life is essentially a cheat and its conditions are those of defeat, and the redeeming things are not ‘happiness and pleasure,’ but the deeper satisfactions that come out of struggle.” Fitzgerald refers here to Shakespeare and to Lincoln. We are cheated by our mortality, by the obtuseness and malice of others and by our own foolishness. “To say ‘I will do valuable and indispensable work,’ ” and to do so against the grain, “is the part of wisdom and courage.” The work that is indispensable is more than the mere effort to write or to be an artist. It culminates in the painstaking acquisition of a style, not a pose and not a trademark but an internally excellent prose style. Work yields a style that wells up from within. “What you thought and felt,” Fitzgerald tells his daughter about the movement from living to writing, “will, by itself, invent a new style.”

    Fitzgerald was born with a gift for prose. In and after college, possessed of his gift, he gained a keen understanding of the literary marketplace. He had gone to college across the river from the center of American publishing. The Fitzgerald legend of the 1920s, of the man about town, arose because he was shrewd enough to construct it. Its constituent elements were: easy, accessible prose; well-made novels and short stories that had a flavor-of-the-month aspect to them, dispatches from a new generation; staged photographs and news stories that asked readers to associate the elegance of the author and of his wife Zelda with his fiction. This is the recipe of American celebrity more typical (with a few twists) of Hollywood. It is not atypical of American fiction — face, reputation, personalized relationship between the public and the famous individual. (It became more typical of writers under the impact of Fitzgerald’s legend.) In the 1930s, Fitzgerald’s friend and rival Hemingway would eclipse him by using the same tools of celebrity. Fitzgerald was at home in the Jazz Age, when conspicuous consumption and hedonistic excess were more in vogue than political zeal, self-styled manliness, or personal sacrifice. He was temperamentally too well suited for frivolity.

    Fortuitously, Fitzgerald never gave up on folly. One could imagine an alternative biography for him. He could have jettisoned his earlier self. He could have bid farewell to dissipation, a favorite word of his, and embarked on the journey of a wise man. Perhaps he could have evolved into an engagé writer of the 1930s, another Steinbeck documenting in bleak, hardened prose the travails of the Great Depression. Or he could have elaborated a “late style,” going where the wisdom-loving Tolstoy eventually went — away from illusions and away altogether from the gamesmanship of fiction. When he graduated from writing literature, Tolstoy mostly authored pamphlets and tracts on the moral and social improvement of society. Fitzgerald could have headed back to the Catholicism of his youth. Like Graham Greene or Flannery O’Connor, he could have woven Catholic notions of good and evil into his novels and short stories, and after the parties and the drinking and the meandering this could have been his badge of maturity. Yet Fitzgerald, who had so many ways to become older and wiser, seemed only to grow older.

    Skirting the pretense of wisdom, Fitzgerald the writer also had to escape the glibness of his early books and short stories. This was the laborious and uphill work that he mentioned to his daughter. His non-glib literary style would incorporate the antipodes of wisdom and folly — simultaneously lush, seductive, stylish and sober, subdued, meditative, moral. The style itself had three layers. First was an expository prose that channels poetry, that in its cadences comes quite close to being poetry. Second was the incorporation of literary modernism, which ennobles contradiction, tying contradiction to beauty. Third, Fitzgerald borrowed a narrative device from Joseph Conrad. This was to run a story through a narrator, to hold it at arm’s length and to orient it through a retrospective gaze, as Conrad had done in Lord Jim and Heart of Darkness. Thus could folly, the story, be regarded by wisdom, the narrative voice, an encounter that mandates a prose style as amenable to folly as it is to wisdom. It mandates a prose style of intricacy and complexity.

    In his letters to his daughter, Fitzgerald brings up Shakespeare and Ecclesiastes as poetry that she should read. Most of all, Fitzgerald writes to her about Keats. He conjures himself as a reader studying Keats’ “Ode to a Grecian Urn” until he “caught the chime in it and the exquisite mechanics.” Chime is a musical reference, and this word signifies an essential element of Fitzgerald’s prose style, its undergirding of poetry. (“Tender is the night” is a quotation from Keats.) From Keats and many others, Fitzgerald adopted his preoccupation with the sound and rhythm of words and with their coloration, a musicality of the word. The result is a prose style that is fabulously suggestive, with little intellection in it and without anything point blank — prose melodies drawn from the lyrical description of people and places. The chime that Fitzgerald heard in Keats is not there on the silent page. It sounds in the reader, awakening the reader to a private and subjective performance of feeling and meaning.

    Poetry instills music in prose, and as a model Keatsian poetry is minimalist. The words chosen — the machinery assembled by the poet/mechanic — have a delicate economy. Prose can wander if it is left to its own devices; it can pile up; and no author knows this better than the one who is paid by the word, as Fitzgerald often was. Dostoevsky wrote long novels in part out of financial need, and formidable as Dostoevsky the novelist is, he is not a first-rate prose stylist. He, like Fitzgerald, could churn it out. In his best writing, however, Fitzgerald was highly deliberate about his words — a kind of deliberativeness, of carefully chosen diction, that one associates with Keats. Imitation of poetry gave him the power to fold diverging moods into a phrase, an image, a word. Only the mechanics of poetry could generate a prose style that tolerates the diverging moods of folly and wisdom.

    Keats died in 1821, more than sixty years before Fitzgerald was born. Bits and pieces of the Romantic era entered into the Fitzgerald myth — Fitzgerald as the Byronic hero whose heart was tortured by love and who died before he should have; but in his prose style Fitzgerald was not a throwback. Rather than reviving Romanticism, he immersed himself in modernism. Though he never wore the mantle of an avant-garde experimentalist, he nonetheless extracted his stylistic tools from modernism: the evocation of a surreal world shaped and shadowed by the human psyche, and the eagerness to convey all that is discordant in the modern city and in the modern person. The tension and the energy of Fitzgerald’s prose style arise from his aesthetic of juxtaposition. Strange as it is for Gatsby to be trivial and great at the same time, a prose style attuned to the irreconcilable can express contradictions with clarity, and it can make them real. A modernist style freed from rationality brought Fitzgerald to the heart of the (not especially rational) interaction between folly and wisdom.

    Joseph Conrad inspired Nick Carroway, The Great Gatsby’s narrator. Without Nick, The Great Gatsby would have been a society novel like the ones that Fitzgerald had already published, This Side of Paradise and The Beautiful and the Damned. With Nick, The Great Gatsby becomes the mirror and the image in the mirror, the story and the memory of the story, the thing and its opposite. Nick’s sobriety and moralism are modified by Gatsby’s recklessness and shameless self-creation. Old at heart, Nick is a cautious Midwesterner who cannot condone the Eastern luxuries. Described by Nick, these luxuries are the novel’s archetypal attributes, the reason so many bars and clubs have been named after Gatsby. Conrad’s method of storytelling prompted Fitzgerald to operate in the shadows, between narrative and narrator, and in this space Fitzgerald’s style came into its own. It could convey the wish to be at the party and the regret that one was there, the wish to recall it all in detail and the wish to forget that it ever happened. A supple Conradian style helped Fitzgerald turn ugliness into beauty. The beauty proceeds from the folly, while the ugliness is what wisdom sees. For all its sheen and supposed glamor, The Great Gatsby is a critique of rich Americans and of the ugliness for which they are responsible.

    Tender Is the Night exceeds The Great Gatsby. It synthesizes the three elements of Fitzgerald’s style, employing a varied poetic range — ode, elegy, sonnet, epic, tragedy, satire, confession, ballad. Its modernism is self-evident. In Tender Is the Night, Fitzgerald makes a constant claim on freedom of language; its words very often struggle free from their conventional uses. Modernism also furnishes the organizational scheme for Tender Is the Night, a story broken into pieces: middle, beginning, end, beginning, middle. Gaps and disjunction dominate Fitzgerald’s canvas, and Tender Is the Night employs a Conradian narrator, one who goes unnamed. The novel’s narrative voice is omniscient and skilled at prose-poetry, the imperturbable and godlike voice of wisdom. The tale of human folly is entrusted to this voice, which without surprise, without outrage and without rancor seems to expect folly to run its usual course, and so it does.

    Starkly cautionary, Tender Is the Night is inviting to moralists. Dick Diver, a Rhodes Scholar, has been blessed with good looks, intelligence, willpower, and charm. He becomes a psychologist, a scholar and practitioner, marries a wealthy patient and slowly starts to lose his life’s thread. He finds himself in thrall to money, to leisure, and to drink. The scholarship trails off and the marriage unravels, Dick having fallen in love with a movie star, for whom he is simply one of a hundred youthful adventures. As many of his friends succumb to midlife despair, Dick follows along. His wife leaves him for another man, and he is banished less by poverty than by rootlessness to upstate New York. His ex-wife, who now and then pretends that “his career was biding its time, again like Grant’s in Galena,” knows that he is lost for good. Dick has traveled a cosmopolitan path to obscurity, to the nullity of a life in which everything significant has been mismanaged. The thief who stole his own promise, Dick is a fool who receives a fool’s comeuppance.

    Tender Is the Night upholds an elaborate architecture of folly-wisdom. Much as the novel might attract moralists, it is not moralistic. Its architecture has two planes, or consists of two relationships — between narrative consciousness à la Conrad and story, and between style and narrative consciousness. The filter for a story about fools (Dick is not the only one) is a narrative consciousness of luminous wisdom, neither naïve nor especially sorrowful, and a wisdom rigorously uninvested in condemnation. The wisdom of the narrative consciousness interacts with the novel’s style and with the novel’s high poetry. The interaction casts up an insight into mismanaged lives, which is that their folly can be restorative. The beauty in these lives — in all our lives — would not be there without the folly. Dick Diver’s folly is to have loved two women, both of them wrong for him. A wisdom of retrospect clarifies his every misstep, while the folly invests his mismanaged life with richness and with love. Dick’s folly, Tender Is the Night says to us in its style, corresponds to that which is best in him.

    Without being obtrusive or even very noticeable, the narrative voice regularly steps outside the story. It comments on its characters and on their evolutions. A knowing and unconfused voice, it wavers between sociology and philosophy, peering far beyond the characters’ passions and misdemeanors. The voice reminds the reader that, though it is set in France, Tender Is the Night is an American story, harboring American meanings, one of which concerns wisdom. As Dick says about Rosemary’s mother, “She has a sort of wisdom that’s rare in America.” The narrative voice confirms this rarity, suggesting that power and money and modern times, “the enormous flux of American life,” have fused into a mass unconsciousness. Americans are heedless, and they think they can get away with being heedless. The narrative voice observes a “tall rich American girl, promenading insouciantly upon the national prosperity.” Enjoying her paradigmatic prosperity, this American girl walks with insouciance, handmaiden to the unexamined life.

    Lacking cultural depth, Americans disappoint the narrative voice in Tender Is the Night. This is especially true of Americans in Europe. The narrative voice editorializes about a group of bored American tourists: “no stimuli worked upon them, no voices called them from without, no fragments of their own thoughts came suddenly from the minds of others, and missing the clamor of Empire they felt that life was not continuing there [in rural France].” Tocqueville, who worried about democracy as a dissolvent of nuance and therefore of the individual, could not have improved upon this description of American restlessness. Fearing the silence of their own solitude, they hope to mistake the thinking of others for their own thoughts. The narrative voice makes a similar point through Rosemary, who is American in her way of being unwise. She was “accustomed to seeing the starkest grotesqueries of a continent heavily underlined as comedy or tragedy, untrained to the task of separating out the essential for herself, [and] she now began to feel that French life was empty and stale.” (In a notebook entry in 1924, Fitzgerald wrote that “I’ve talked so much and not lived enough with myself to develop the necessary self reliance.”)

    Dick Diver and his wife Nicole come close to separating out the essential for themselves. The novel begins in 1925. The war is over and the Great Depression nowhere in sight, as Dick and Nicole summer with their gifted friends, living lavishly on the Cote d’Azur. The narrative voice explains that the “Divers’ day was spaced like the day of the older civilizations to yield the utmost from the materials at hand, and to give the transitions their full value.” No tragi-comic grotesqueries for them — not there, not then. They have made leisure civilized and rarified, “representing externally the exact furthermost evolution of a class, so that most people seemed awkward beside them.” In the word externally is the clue to the story. Internally, Nicole is still a psychiatric patient, still suffering from an abusive father, and internally Dick is unwell. He is wasting himself, looking back occasionally “with awe at the carnivals of affection he had given, as a general might gaze upon a massacre he had ordered to satisfy an impersonal blood lust.” 

    Underneath, Dick is yet another unwise American. As such, he wills himself past success and money and into the endless night of failure. His degeneration elicits no harshness from the narrative voice: it begets tenderness, even if the narrative voice does not indulge Dick. He is romanticized in the novel’s opening pages for the sake of contrast, so that his hell might be maximally dramatic. What the narrative voice tells us — with emphasis — is that Dick’s fall is his fault. No natural or external disaster covers him in misfortune. His folly is his erotic cluelessness, undeniably the same thing that Fitzgerald saw in himself and stated to his daughter — “the mistake I made was in marrying her [Zelda].” I made. The mistake I made, which is the mistake Dick makes twice in Tender Is the Night, is less the mistake of marrying then of falling precipitously in love. A modest two mistakes and the promising young man has reduced his life to “a perilous accident,” and to an accident that he is too weak and too unwise to survive. The peril and the accident expel him from the paradise — from the south of France in 1925. The novel’s narrative conscience is too stern to pity Dick for any of this.

    Dick goes astray in love, the narrative voice persuasively argues. Simultaneously, the novel’s style teaches us that Dick lives most expansively and most wisely in his love. The folly pushing his love forward undoes him, and it also makes him, robbing him of his self-discipline and revealing to him that life is poetry and poetry life. The contest between wisdom and folly plays out in this manner, back and forth, back and forth. Given Fitzgerald’s reverence for style, his genius for style, it cannot be said that wisdom triumphs over folly in this novel. Folly comes closer to triumphing over wisdom. It goes where wisdom cannot. It prospers where wisdom cannot. It enlivens in a manner that wisdom cannot. Adult life comes to fruition in the food for thought that folly gathers for wisdom. The wisdom would be pointless without the folly, antiseptic and unnecessary. Where wisdom is by nature astringent and melancholic, folly can be liberating and gorgeous, for folly recklessly affirms and acts and creates. In Tender Is the Night, its vast potential is realized not in narrative, not in character portrayal, and not in philosophizing about life and fate, but in the singular domain of literary style. 

    Two examples demonstrate folly’s splendor in Tender Is the Night. The first is the moment Dick falls in love with Nicole (around the time of World War I). She is a rich American girl and his patient at a Swiss sanitarium, and she is not at all insouciant. He tries to resist her, cognizant of being her doctor and of her being unwell, intuiting something of his eventual fate. He cannot resist, and “the impression of her youth and beauty grew on Dick until it welled up inside him in a compact paroxysm of emotion. She smiled, a moving childish smile that was like all the lost youth in the world.” The novel elaborates on this smile: “she smiled at him, making sure that the smile gathered up everything inside it toward him, making him a profound promise of herself for so little, for the beat of a response, the assurance of a complementary vibration in him. Minute by minute the sweetness drained into her out of the willow trees, out of the dark world.” 

    This passage unites detail, rhythm, and metaphor into a verbal medium at once meticulous and lyrical. It has the insistent motion, the grammar and the diction, of prose. There are pauses but not breaks. As in poetry, though, each syllable and each sound is calibrated for musical effect, the “compact paroxysm of emotion” doubling as a compact paroxysm of multi-syllabic accents. Metaphors fuel the climactic last sentence, a polished gem of expository prose. The willow trees donate their dolcezza to Nicole, and the world’s very darkness is drained away by her moving childish smile, less an enticement than a painterly image of love itself. It is all a poet’s homage to folly, for Dick happens to be making the worst mistake of his life. Yet his loss of self-control causes the world’s darkness to dissipate. Dick has enough folly within him to receive Nicole’s smile, while she passes — minute by minute — the world’s sweetness from the willow trees through herself to him. She is not robbing him of anything: she is bestowing the logic of beauty on his existence. Not to have experienced this moment would have been a mistake more grave and more enervating than the mistake Dick will make by marrying her.

    The second example concerns Rosemary, the femme fatale from Hollywood. Dick is married to Nicole; they have two children; and Rosemary is much younger than Dick. She is an object of desire who adores him and who is obviously not right for him. Again he cannot resist. Again he gives in. They cross a line in Paris — not quite into adultery but away from probity. It is the mistake that will definitively destroy Dick, the worst transition of his adult life, the point of no return, the cardinal error. Beset with emotion, Rosemary and Dick ride in a taxi with “no time to cry, and lovers now they fell ravenously on the quick seconds while outside the taxi window the green and cream twilight faded, and the fire-red, gas-blue, ghost-green signs began to shine smokily through the tranquil rain. It was nearly six, the streets were in movement, the bistros gleamed and the Place de Concorde moved by in pink majesty as the cab turned north.” Dick is turning onto a long series of false paths and dead ends.

    A study in foolishness, this passage lays bare the transformative power of love. They are traveling — Dick, Rosemary, Nicole, and their Parisian companions — from entertainment to entertainment. No one is sober, all of them are along for the ride. Paris is just a stage set to them. Dick and Rosemary enter another world in the taxi, falling “ravenously” on themselves, a world that seems an impressionist watercolor, a zone of magical adjectives, each quite simple and yet riotous in their profusion. A twilight that is green and cream fades into the city’s vibrant night. The forgiving tranquil rain distorts the fire-red, gas-blue, ghost-green signage into a shining smoky light. The majesty (pink or otherwise) cannot have been perceived by the two lovers, who are lost in their rapid embrace; the majesty is within them. They are the Paris twilight in movement. They are the taxi as it voyages through the Place de Concorde. Not-quite-consummated desire and the lights and bistros and ambient people of Paris get transformed (by means of an extraordinary style) into a set-piece work of art. This rampant aestheticization comes alive not against but through Dick’s folly, and not to have experienced this moment would have been a wounding and terrible mistake.

    Dick’s downfall, when it comes, has less to do with his ruined marriage than with his eventual inability to love. He is left with night and no signage, no Paris, no bistros. The denouement comes in Rome, where Dick and Rosemary meet and finally sleep with each other. It is “not a wild submergence of the soul, a dipping of all colors into an obscuring dye, such as his love for Nicole had been.” In Rome, Dick is flirting with emptiness instead of folly: “if he had to bring all the bitterness and hatred of the world into his heart, he was not going to be in love with her again.” Leaving Rosemary behind, Dick goes out to drink and is utterly miserable: “there seemed nothing to do but to go back to the hotel and lie down with his black heart.” “A vast criminal irresponsibility” burning inside of him, he continues drinking, gets into fights, and demeans himself. Dick does not progress from folly to wisdom in Tender Is the Night. He loses his capacity for folly and acquires no wisdom in the process. To be bereft of folly is to be bereft of wisdom, something akin to emotional suicide. Nicole, by contrast, wills herself into becoming healthy. She initiates an affair with a French aviator and, having been too serious in the past, she claims the laurel wreath of folly. Dick is left to contend with his black heart entirely on his own.

    Christian Gauss, Fitzgerald’s favorite literature professor at Princeton, once quipped that Fitzgerald resembled all three Karamazov brothers. He had an ascetic and spiritual side like Alyosha; he had a quizzical-philosophical-moral side like Ivan; and like Dmitri he was a hedonist. Fitzgerald may have contained multitudes, but whoever he was as a person, however riven or broken, he was not at all fractured or schizophrenic as a writer. His prose style synthesizes, it combines, it harmonizes, and on the printed page Fitzgerald could be — without cacophony — Alyosha, Ivan and Dmitri Karamazov. The harmony stems from the tonalities of his prose style, an impeccable harmony of the surface. This harmony is palpable and audible in Tender Is the Night, though it is a novel of depths. Precisely because the surface, the prose style, is so wondrously in harmony, the all-in-one Karamazov craziness of Fitzgerald the artist could be given free reign. In Tender Is the Night, chaos could be chaos and madness could be madness, and because of the laborious and uphill battle undertaken to find the right words, the right rhythms, the right images, and the right metaphors, neither chaos nor madness devolve into artistic bedlam. Fitzgerald applied a poet’s pen to the fabrication of a novel that must be twice as long as Gatsby, and a novel about people who themselves contain stubborn multitudes.

    Fitzgerald, who would not have disputed that folly is folly, indecorous and potentially lethal, uncovers the dignity of folly in Tender Is the Night. This dignity is not pleasure, not the desire to be entertained, not an addiction to the clamor of empire. Folly often brings pain and can easily issue in indignity, as it does for Dick. Dick humiliates himself with Rosemary by giving in to her allure, forcing himself into the role of the desperate older man. Folly’s dignity is more subtle and less familiar: Erasmus spelled it out in detail. Folly can coincide with intoxicants — wine, poetry, heroism, love — wisdom being meted out only to God. Intoxicants consumed to excess are poisons, and (with the possible exception of love) they are also temporary in effect. So, too, are they bound up with the dignity of a life well lived, that preoccupation of philosophers. Folly’s dignity inclines toward wisdom, and at the pinnacle of wisdom stands the ideal of a life well lived. Ivan Karamazov, the philosopher, should have learned more from Dmitri, the hedonist, who himself has everything to learn. In search of dignity, Alyosha is too young — in The Brothers Karamazov, the first volume of an intended though never completed trilogy — to understand that dignity and folly can and should be paired.

    In 1940, after Fitzgerald’s death, Zelda wrote a letter to Gerald and Sara Murphy, friends of the Fitzgerald’s, and to Harold Ober, Fitzgerald’s literary agent, that captures the dignified dichotomy of folly-wisdom in her husband’s life and art. In it, she described grieving for “his devotion to those that he felt were contributing to the aesthetic and spiritual purposes of life — and for his generous and vibrant soul that never spared itself, and never found anything too much trouble save the fundamentals of life itself.” He never took control of the fundamentals. In his incapacity, in his folly, he did not spare himself, he spent himself, without ever pulling back from the folly of an error-filled life. The merciless fundamentals did him in, but not before he discovered the aesthetic and spiritual purposes of life, a discovery that added up to no organized set of propositions, no immortal dialogues on justice or the soul, no tractatus philosophicus, and no theories of any merit. The discovery of these purposes, present just beyond the literal meaning of his words and most searchingly just beyond the words that make up Tender Is the Night, was contained, as it might be in a novel by Flaubert, within the style. In its quicksilver instability, this style wears the noble mask of wisdom, wearing it graciously and sincerely. Beneath the mask is the face of folly, which can approach and approximate wisdom. When it does, folly is wisdom with a human face and a human heart.

    Mourning Negative Space

    My estranged father’s death did not affect me as I had expected it would. I had been informed just two days before his passing that he was gravely ill. On the windless drive from France to Germany, somewhere in Belgium on the Sunday before the American elections, I was told he had died. My husband was driving us through a thicket of slow cars. He was the first person to hear me say it after receiving the phone call. “He just died.” We were three hours away. Our GPS predicted we would arrive at the hospital in Cologne where we expected to find him sedated by 6:43 PM. I had been looking out the window and my recollection now is of a mildly sunny pastoral view, like those from my childhood train trips through the flat corridors between Paris and the other side of the Rhine where he had lived since I was a teenager. 

    Just the previous week I had been told he did not want to speak with me or even see me one last time after receiving his terminal diagnosis. But his wife had offered me the option to visit him during his final drift from consciousness. Perhaps he would recognize me or even be roused to speak. A close friend of his predicted he had been clinging to life so he could have a final visit with me. I was told my visit might ease his passing. 

    The whole saga was bizarre. How could this man, whom I had not spoken with or seen in more than a decade, be dying? I had been in a state of apprehensive terror over the prospect of another Trump term, and hardly had the bandwidth to brace for another looming cataclysm, even for the passing of my father. It is hard to imagine the death of a man who bathed you and played with you as a child, made your favorite foods and told you when putting you to bed that he loved you; the death of a man who kept secrets from you, who hid whole lives from you while you grew up, who would invite his young graduate students to his living room and have affairs with them in the home you shared. There had been many lies and even more omissions that I would learn of over the years, so much that explained my mother’s outbursts throughout my childhood. 

    My estranged father was a mild mannered and gentle man. He would cry occasionally, and rarely raised his voice. This made the rare occasions when he had violent outbursts towards me even more disturbing. I recall with special clarity the time he beat me with a walking stick till it broke. 

    I had been playing with dolls while wearing one of my mother’s handbags over my shoulder. I cannot remember if I was also wearing her heels at the time. He came into the room, and asked me to hurry up or else we’d be late. “Get up now!” he shouted, which startled me. I began to put away the dolls and the toy tea set — it was aluminum, colored powder pink with magenta borders and I think some white rose patterning. I walked towards him in the doorway with my mother’s handbag swinging from my shoulder. He yanked it off as I passed and I asked, “Why did you take that off? I want to keep it.” He put the handbag down on a bench near the door.

    While he looked for his keys I picked up the bag and restored it to my shoulder. Enraged, he grabbed a wooden walking stick and struck me hard across my back with it. I screamed in pain and shock, and fell to the floor. He loomed over me and repeated the violence all over my body. I was shaking with terror and each strike felt as though it was cutting through my skin, which the bruises later would confirm. He had never hit me before. No adult had. I had always been the studious and obedient child. A primary school teacher had once told my parents that when boys pushed or hit me on the playground, I would never fight back. My parents said that the teacher found this passivity confusing and disturbing.

    The stick could not bear his wrath and it snapped mid-assault. He threw it down. He walked out of the door, and drove off in his car leaving me on the entryway floor. I was alone in the house, shaking and crying. After what felt like hours I relocated to my bed. Later I told my mother everything, and in tears she reassured me that I would never be staying with my estranged father again. Though he apologized profusely for what he had done, I felt numb listening to him as he explained his anger at himself and his shock at his own actions. On some level of consciousness it was clear to me that he had beat me because of the handbag, the dolls — that he had beat me because I was a girl. A girl, without the body to match.

    He had often seen me play with dolls or dress up in my mother’s accessories, and the most I could ever detect in his expression was a mild discomfort. Other children would mock me or ask in confusion why I played with dolls. Sometimes if someone was coming over while I was staying with him, my father would hide the dolls. “They don’t understand why boys play with dolls, and they will laugh at you.” 

    At about four or five, having never heard of gay people, or queer identity, and never having seen a person in drag, I began to find it uncomfortable to be referred to as a boy. It was deeply confusing for me. When I played house, I always wanted to play the mother.

    In the early months of kindergarten, I remember walking past a few teachers, two women and a man, and saw them looking towards me and laughing amongst themselves. My cheeks burned and a cold chill that I can still feel rippled through my body as I walked towards them, heart pounding. The man was swaying his body in an exaggerated way to mimic how I moved, and waving his hand to caricature my femininity. The women were both laughing. As they walked towards me their expressions shifted from mirth to warm smiles. They didn’t know I had heard them. “Are you not going to the playground?” one of them called out to me. I rushed to my desk in the classroom, relieved to discover no one else was there. The shudder of shame came over me and the chill gave way to a cold sweat. I wept. Why had these teachers, one of whom was my own, mocked me as so many of the children in my class did! 

    Usually the teachers would reprimand the other children for teasing me, and mine would intervene when the boys hit or pushed me to the ground. A boy once kicked me for no reason. I was just walking toward the swings, and as I fell a rock slashed my knee. The pain was sharp. Blood stained my pants. I started to scream at the sight of so much blood. The bully himself was stunned. A teacher called my parents, and I needed to be taken to a clinic where I was given stitches. The scar is still there, a permanent reminder of that day. “Why don’t you hit these boys back when they hit you?” my mother implored her child, whom she mistook for her son, her voice breaking with frustration and remorse and — what I only later could decipher in her expression — fear. Unlike most of the scars in my life, it has remained visible. 

    It would have brought me immeasurable relief to have understood who I was as a child, and to have known that children like me existed and that we were born this way. The affirming care I received as an adult was essential. It relieved a distress that had been a part of me since I was old enough to be self-aware. As early as seven or eight, I remember wondering when it would all change down there for me, even though at that age I could not remember having seen anyone else naked. My parents were concerned, but not as concerned as certain doctors who recommended running chromosomal tests on me to see whether there was something “wrong.” 

    At my father’s hospital I felt like I was moving out of time as I walked out of the elevator and down the corridor. There my estranged father’s wife stood, waiting to let me into his room with tears in her eyes. Regulation required her to remain there while I was in the room with his body. As I caught a glimpse of him, covered in a white linen sheet, it was suddenly like the numerous times when I would walk into his room when he was asleep, either to tiptoe and collect something, or to wake him up for some reason. There was no sound of him snoring, or even breathing, and that was different, but it seemed to me that he could still just be asleep. The nurse came in and said something to his wife in German, which I could not make out, other than it sounding like permission for me to approach him. “You were very dear to him, so you should know you are also very dear to me,” his wife said to me after a few minutes.

    How do you mourn a negative space?

    Night and Golden Stuff

    The Met on a cloudless Tuesday afternoon was not too crowded (the Vermeer room was empty for five minutes — a record, in my experience). We came to Rembrandt first. I entered his art with a helping of Malraux to guide me. He had written that Rembrandt was a brother to Dostoevsky and “one of the few biblical poets of Western Christendom, and that is why his painting, which does not illustrate his poetry but expresses it, encountered bitterer hostility than Franz Hals had to face.” His poetry “expresses” his painting — again that primal word. I hadn’t been able to make that connection even on the day I read Malraux — I had to see it myself, in person. Here were the familiar six late period paintings, ending with the vaunted Self-Portrait from 1660 and beginning with Aristotle Contemplating a Bust of Homer (The Toilet of Bathsheba is just before it) and going to Hendrickje Stoffels, then to The Standard Bearer, before the Woman with a Pink, and finally Man with a Magnifying Glass. What they all share is that burnished background chiaroscuro, so the figures — often in dour or dark garb, save Aristotle — emerge from the plane of the canvas like Ezra Pound’s words in Canto XVII:

    Flat water before me,
    and the trees growing in water,
    Marble trunks out of stillness,
    On past the palazzi,
    in the stillness,

    This image of Venice is perhaps unsurprising. This poetry might not express Rembrandt’s painting, but it portrays it.

    While looking at these paintings assembled in a certain trajectory, I came to see the haunting of Rembrandt by Rembrandt and the reverse-haunting of myself in the similarly dark portraits hung in a local faux Mexican fast-food restaurant of my youth, a chain called Zantigo. It held half-swarthy, half-kitschy paint-by-numbers works with a host of subjects similar to Zurburan and Velazquez — particularly the former, a key cog in my fossil record, as his large dark (six and a half foot-long) St. Francis of Assisi in His Tomb hung in the Milwaukee Art Museum, a bejeweled though rare trip of youth. Velazquez and Rembrandt have overlapped in the greater world in the centuries following — Malraux: “Idealized faces, realistic faces, Raphael, Rembrandt, and Velazquez were grouped together, in one collective style.” The Rembrandt paintings in the Met don’t have much in common (save the background) except as a series that New Yorkers may come to know. The sailor sea-blue wall backing makes a difference in the presentation (all the European paintings in the museum have color schemes for the specific country of origin). What goes on when I see the Rembrandts at the Met is hard to perceive, but put the words of Malraux in the atmosphere next to them and changes ensue. In the opening of his Museum Without Walls, he observes: “Inevitably in a place where the work of art, and at a time when the artistic exploration of the world is in active progress, the assemblage of so many masterpieces — from which, nevertheless, so many are missing — conjured up in the mind’s eye all the world’s masterpieces. How indeed could this mutilated possible fail to evoke the whole gamut of the possible?” The paintings compete with one another. So much of the Rembrandt six comes across from what is not there in the other more realist portraits in the room: works by Hals and de Hooch and Flinck, with a couple of quiet Dutch still-lifes by Maes, plus a “follower” of Rembrandt’s more intriguing canvas.

    When one looks long enough at a painting things emerge, say the squarish parcel of canvas with a more slick-grained patch of black just above Aristotle’s head that is fairly impossible to see in reproductions. This glaze is a major part of the painting — in a dark honey way it highlights the exigencies of the emotional power of line and coloring that seem to be contained in the clothes, the hat, and the withered, though still strong, face of one great man contemplating another (in stone) — the ruffle of his enormous shirt lending weight to a human body that the bust lacks (Malraux: “Rembrandt showers his [figures] with light so as to raise them above man’s estate”). The massive bunchy folds of the garment (off-white off the black of his torso) suggested something else grand and uncommon. Though the man is Aristotle, he is no Aristotle that we have ever imagined — he is dressed in seventeenth-century Dutch clothing. So he is simultaneously in and out of time — himself and more and other. But this eventually gave way to another painting, a smaller one, the portrait of Hendrickje Stoffels — it was at this picture that I looked most during the visit, though I did not know who she was. I just kept gazing at her face, which isn’t so much looking as floating forth caught in some commotion, but standing in to show herself to the viewer like few other figures can — a fresh degree of love.

    One cannot fully grapple with Rembrandt until our hairs get stippled with gray and our face has been under the sun for fifteen-thousand days. Helen Cixous details Rembrandt’s subterranean ways: 

    Where does Rembrandt take us? To a foreign land, our own.
    A foreign land, our other country.
    He takes us to the Heart. [. . .]

    — A scene by Rembrandt (let’s take a family scene, or a scene like this one, a scene of “corporation”), what gives it its force — by which it takes us, pushes us, pinches us, caresses us, is, beyond courtly war exchanges — beyond pretenses, codes . . .
    — that it always occurs at the same time in the cellar in the cave or in the forest, in these great and somber prehistoric cathedrals where our colors, our drawings stir, where attraction and repulsion shine, like lanterns in our obscurity. It is there (to the bottom) that Rembrandt leads us. Taking the red staircase, down to the bottom of ourselves, under the earth’s crust,
    This world is full of night and of golden stuff. The stuff of night is a clay. A mud. It is still moving, imperceptibly.
    No landscape and no “furniture” either. Instead of furniture, “shelving,” “shelves” of color. Bands, brush strokes.

    I often don’t know what I’m seeing until I read another’s words on the image before me. Cixous is more than generous in this regard. Malraux keys in the overall, Berger details the emotions, and Cixous nails the landscape, which is “no landscape.” “It is there (to the bottom) that Rembrandt leads us. Taking the red staircase, down to the bottom of ourselves, under the earth’s crust” — this is why I could not get a full sense of Rembrandt until fifty — how do you know at twenty-two that the bottom of ourselves is under the earth’s crust?

    The War on Foreign Students

    When Rümeysa Öztürk, a 27-year-old Turkish student, was snatched off the street by masked plainclothes police officers and put in the back of an unmarked car, she wasn’t marching on the streets of Istanbul protesting Turkey’s authoritarian president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. She was walking in America in broad daylight, about to meet friends for dinner in Somerville, Massachusetts. Ozturk’s “crime,” so far as anyone can make out, is to have co-authored in March 2024 an op-ed in a student newspaper criticizing Tufts University’s unwillingness to divest from companies with ties to Israel. After the article’s publication, Rümeysa Öztürk’s name and photo were published on the website Canary Mission, which documents individuals who “promote hatred of the USA, Israel and Jews on North American college campuses.”

    For months now the Trump administration has been ramping up its cynical war against freedom of speech under the guise of combating antisemitism on college campuses. In his “Executive Order to Combat Anti-Semitism” of January 30, President Trump promised to deport Hamas sympathizers: “To all the resident aliens who joined in the pro-jihadist protests, we put you on notice: come 2025, we will find you, and we will deport you. I will also quickly cancel the student visas of all Hamas sympathizers on college campuses, which have been infested with radicalism like never before.” During a visit to Guyana on March 27, Secretary of State Marco Rubio bragged that the administration had cancelled over three hundred student visas thus far. “We do it every day, every time I find one of these lunatics,” he stated. In May, the Trump administration revoked Harvard’s certification for accepting any students from abroad.

    At the time of her detainment, Rümeysa Öztürk was a Fulbright Scholar on an F-1 student visa completing a doctoral program for Child Study and Human Development. She had previously completed an M.A. in Psychology at Columbia University. She is exactly the kind of student the United States ought to covet, not reject. And yet for exercising her right to free speech she was arbitrarily detained outside her home, put in the backseat of a car, and then, in violation of a court order, flown over fifteen hundred miles to an ICE detention center in Louisiana. “It’s fully constitutionally protected speech, no crimes at all,” said Esha Bhandari, an ACLU attorney who is representing Öztürk. “If this is allowed, anyone could be punished for anything they say.”

    I came to the United States in 2007 as a foreign student. I could hardly believe my luck. Like everyone else who grew up in the 1990s in northern Europe, my cultural upbringing was decidedly America-centric: American television, American music, American books. In high school I had a poster of the Brooklyn Bridge on my wall; I would lie beneath it on Saturday mornings reading Saul Bellow and listening to Thelonious Monk, dreaming of one day living in an American metropolis. And suddenly I was there: first in Miami, then in New York. On my morning commute to classes I would crawl out of the subway at Union Square and walk down Fifth Avenue. Every morning, without fail, I turned to see if the Empire State Building was really there behind me.

    One of the many reasons the ongoing assault on educational institutions and students’ civil liberties is so heartbreaking is because it is a betrayal of the very ideals many of us not born here most associate with life in America: openness and tolerance. Why would any American want to tear up the admiring image of America abroad? Contrary to the claims of conservative culture warriors, American campuses, in my experience of a handful of them as both a student and an adjunct professor, are largely inclusive and reflective spaces in which students are prepared for the responsibilities of democratic citizenship. And yet we should not let the current administration’s brazen actions delude into thinking things were fine before. It was former Columbia University President Minouche Shafik who permitted the New York City police to enter campus and brutally conduct mass arrests of student protesters last year. And neither should concern about political and intellectual insularity and dogmatism at colleges and universities be dismissed out of hand. Everyone stands to benefit from an educational environment in which free thought and free speech is actively encouraged.

    But let’s not delude ourselves: the Trump administration’s attack on universities and students is no misguided plea for educational reform or viewpoint diversity. It is a nihilistic attempt to sow fear and chaos, buoyed by a decades-long campaign by the right to undermine American institutions of learning. “The professors are the enemy,” as Vice President Vance said in 2021, echoing Richard Nixon. This folkish, nativist dislike of anything cultivated or foreign makes international students easy and obvious targets. According to the Associated Press, more than 1200 foreign students have had their visas inexplicably revoked since March, leaving them at risk of deportation. Following court challenges and resistance from federal judges, the administration abruptly reversed those terminations and instead issued new guidance expanding the reasons international students can have their legal status terminated.

    The release of Rümeysa Öztürk on bail on May 9 offers hope — for now. Clearly, this administration will go to extraordinary lengths to bend the American justice system to its will. In the meantime, many foreign students have left the country. And why not? The process of applying for and being granted a student visa is intimidating enough as it is. I could never quell a flutter of anxiety every time I traveled back to Copenhagen for the holidays, all too aware of holding a non-immigrant visa that did not guarantee me a right of entry at the border. But the great good fortune of receiving an American liberal education was more than worth it. It played a significant part in my later decision to become an American citizen and participate in the public life of my adopted country. John Dewey’s claim that “a society transforms uninitiated and seemingly alien beings into robust trustees of its own resources and ideals” has always held a special resonance for me.

    I was therefore shocked, and deeply saddened, by my own sense of relief when my youngest sister recently decided not to apply to American colleges. I told her I thought it was a wise decision under the circumstances. How many other young people like her, or like Rümeysa Öztürk, have reached similar decisions? If ever America was exceptional, it was in part because young people from all over the world aspired to come here and study. No longer, I fear. The Trump administration has put students on notice. The damage done is incalculable. We are all the poorer for it.