The Complacent Admiration of Courage, or Ibsen and Us

    The production opened with a stutter. Entering through the aisles of the Mitzi Newhouse Theater at Lincoln Center, five actors in Ibsen’s Ghosts made their way to the stage and picked up bound scripts that were waiting for them on what would become the Alving family’s dining table, as if getting ready for rehearsal. Ella Beatty and Hamish Linklater began to play the first scene as Regine, the Alvings’ socially ambitious housemaid, and her father Engstrand, a drunken carpenter whom she is doing her best to leave behind. But they spoke in a barely audible monotone, as if they were “marking,” going through the lines while sparing the voice. After a few exchanges, they started over from the beginning, now speaking quietly, conversationally. The third time was the charm: after restarting the scene yet again, Beatty and Linklater finally became Regine and Engstrand, and Ghosts was underway.

    This framing device mostly left critics cold. Was it necessary to remind us that we were watching actors in a play? After the last scene, did we need to be dismissed back into real life by having the cast return with their scripts and slap them down on the table? But the warming-up makes more sense if it is understood as a reminder of the difference not between life and art, but between the present and the past. To leap over the chasm that separates 2025 from 1881, when Henrik Ibsen wrote Ghosts, it may be necessary to back up a few times and build up speed. 

    Starting with its title, the play itself insists that the division between past and present is an illusion. Ordinarily, a ghost is what we call a dead person who intrudes into the world of the living. But Ibsen inverts this supernatural definition. For him, it is the living who become ghosts, as they reenact the behavior of the dead and blindly follow their commandments. 

    The first such apparition in Ibsen’s play comes at the end of the first act, just after Mrs. Alving has finished explaining to Pastor Manders that her late husband, the locally revered Chamberlain Alving, was in fact a drunk and a womanizer. She realized this early in their marriage, when she overheard him making advances to their maid: “Oh, it still rings in my ears, so dreadful and yet so ridiculous — I heard my own housemaid whisper: ‘Let me go, Chamberlain Alving! Leave me alone.’ ” A few moments later, she overhears her son Osvald doing the same thing to Regine in the same room. “Ghosts,” Mrs. Alving shudders. “The couple in the conservatory — they walk again.”

    At the Mitzi Newhouse, a small theater, there was no conservatory; the seduction took place at the lobby door, where it could be heard but not seen. It was an austere production all around, directed by Jack O’Brien, with a functional set and costumes. Only the lighting design by Japhy Weideman aimed for expressionist extravagance. In the final scene, when Osvald collapses into a syphilitic stupor and can only murmur to his mother over and over again, “Give me the sun,” the glare was dialed well past the “bright sunshine” that Mrs. Alving had promised him, as if the world was being erased along with Osvald’s mind, in the way that intense light can obliterate everything. 

    For Ibsen himself, writing for and about the late-nineteenth-century European bourgeoisie meant well-upholstered stages teeming with furniture and objects. His stage directions tend to be lengthy and detailed, as in Hedda Gabler: “Towards the center of the room is an oval table covered with a tablecloth and surrounded by chairs. Further forward, by the right-hand wall, are a wide porcelain wood stove, a tall armchair, a footstool with a cushion and two stools. In the right-hand corner, at the back, is a corner sofa and a small round table.” And so on. 

    Early in his career, Ibsen worked for a decade as a theater manager in Bergen and Kristiania (as Oslo was then called), and had his own ideas about how his plays should be produced. He left these instructions for future productions and continued to include similar descriptions in play after play, as if it were a necessary step in priming his imagination. Realism meant presenting life on stage exactly as the audience lived it at home, so that they could be confronted with the ugliness of that life, which they worked so hard to ignore.

    Ibsen’s contemporaries found Ghosts the ugliest of all his plays. Two years earlier, in 1879, A Doll’s House had been a huge success, selling out a large first edition of seven thousand copies in Scandinavia. (Ibsen’s practice was to publish each new play as a book before it was produced on stage.) It went on to become a hit across Europe, turning Ibsen into one of the most important writers in the world, a position he kept until his death in 1906. The fuel of its success was controversy. Everywhere A Doll’s House was staged, audiences debated whether Nora Helmer was right to leave her husband and children, whether Ibsen was a prophet of liberation or a symptom of moral decay. The timing of his provocation in the history of European mores was perfect. 

    For Ghosts, the book, Ibsen’s Copenhagen publisher raised the print run to ten thousand, but this time there was no controversy: everyone agreed the play was grotesquely immoral, and almost no copies were sold. Two years had to pass before it was staged in Norway. Even many of Ibsen’s former champions were revolted by a play whose message seemed to be that marriage, family, and Christianity are wicked, while adultery and incest are admirable, as long as they are products of what the Osvald calls “the joy of life.” 

    “The joy of life? Can there be salvation in that?” Mrs. Alving wonders. Her own life has been spent in the service of the opposite principle: duty. Urged by her relatives to marry the wealthy Chamberlain Alving, she was so appalled by his character that after a year she ran away to Pastor Manders, the man she really loved. But the pastor overcame his own feelings, withstood temptation, and ordered her to return to her husband in the name of religious principle and wifely obedience: “It is the mark of a rebellious spirit to demand happiness here in life. What right do we mortals have to happiness? No, we must do our duty, madam!” 

    Mrs. Alving’s only remaining hope was for her son. Determined to protect Osvald from the influence of his father’s depravity, she sent him away to school at a young age, and as the play begins he has just returned from Paris, where he is making a career as an artist. Like the Greek tragedians, however, Ibsen believes that there is no escaping the past, and it turns out that Osvald has been doomed by his father’s debauchery after all: he has inherited syphilis, and by the end of the play it will destroy his mind. 

    Syphilis was widespread in nineteenth-century Europe, but it was never discussed openly, and certainly not on the stage. Even in Ghosts the name of the disease is not spoken: Osvald only says that a French doctor has told him he is “vermoulu,” or worm-eaten. This was enough of a hint for Ibsen’s audience. Today it is so oblique that theatergoers unfamiliar with the play might well be baffled about what’s wrong with Osvald and why his mother is so horrified. It doesn’t help that we now know syphilis cannot be inherited the way Ibsen imagined, ticking away in the brain for decades until it suddenly explodes.

    As if that were not wicked enough, Ghosts also brings incest onto the stage. Regine turns out to be Osvald’s half-sister, the child of the dalliance that Mrs. Alving overheard long ago. Yet even when he learns this, he still considers seeking “the joy of life” with her. Meanwhile, Pastor Manders, the play’s sole exponent of conventional virtue, is exposed in the end as a weakling and a hypocrite, willing to pay off the lowly Engstrand to take the blame for a fire that he himself accidentally started.

    All of this made the play a magnet for outrage. When Ghosts came to Britain in 1891, it had to be put on privately because the censor would not approve a public performance. That did not stop the critics from seeing it. William Archer, Ibsen’s first English translator, published an article titled “Ghosts and Gibberings” that collected quotations from dozens of incensed reviewers: “positively abominable,” “absolutely loathsome and fetid,” “a wicked nightmare.” Leading the pack was the Daily Telegraph, which devoted a whole editorial to Ghosts, comparing it to “an open drain,” “a loathsome sore unbandaged,” “a dirty act done publicly,” “a lazar-house with all its doors and windows open.” 

    What makes Ghosts a significant episode in the history of culture, however, is not that the establishment moralized against it, but that its conservative moralism provoked a tidal wave of progressive moralism, which turned out to be vastly more influential. Archer drew attention to the worst tirades printed about Ibsen because he knew that for Ibsenites the slurs were the best compliments. They proved that the playwright’s punches had landed. 

    Revulsion made Ibsen powerful. The Danish critic Georg Brandes — a now forgotten figure who before World War I was one of the world’s most celebrated intellectuals, as Morton Høi Jensen explained in these pages a few years ago — published long essays about Ibsen in 1867, 1882, and 1898, growing more ardent each time as the playwright’s stature continued to grow. In the last essay, Brandes observed that even at the age of seventy “his works are opposed, ridiculed, loved and worshiped as only a young or comparatively young man’s generally are,” so that “in French and English, such words as “Ibsenism” and “Ibsenite” have been coined from his name.” 

    George Bernard Shaw responded to the controversy over Ghosts with a pamphlet titled “The Quintessence of Ibsenism,” in which he argued that the spirit of Ibsen was the spirit of the future. “The pioneer must necessarily provoke such outcry as he repudiates duties, tramples on ideals, profanes what was sacred, sanctifies what was infamous,” Shaw wrote. “What he does it is not given to all of his generation to understand.” But the young understood it, and the young in spirit, because they recognized that many of Western civilization’s official ideas were only apparently alive. In fact they had died long ago, and could now be described as undead — zombies, we might say today, or ghosts, in Ibsen’s image. “It’s not just the things that we have inherited from our fathers and mothers that return in us,” Mrs. Alving tells Pastor Manders. “It’s all kinds of old dead opinions and all sorts of old dead doctrines and so on. They aren’t alive in us; but they are lodged in there all the same, and we can never be rid of them.” 

    As is often the case, never arrived ahead of schedule. When Nora Helmer slammed the door on her marriage in 1879, it echoed around the world. Thirty years later Norway legalized divorce, and today the country has more unmarried couples living together than married ones. When Pastor Manders told Mrs. Alving to go back to the husband she hated, she did as she was told, because he was a minister of God. Today, surveys show that the Scandinavian countries are among the least religious in the world. 

    This evolution would not have surprised Shaw, who made an ingenious diagnosis of the sources of Ibsen hatred. In any society, he writes, seventy percent of its members simply accept established institutions without thinking about them. This majority, whom Shaw (following Matthew Arnold) called Philistines, were not troubled by Ibsen’s attacks on marriage or religion because they found the status quo “quite good enough for them.” The thirty percent who did get upset by such attacks were “idealists,” actively committed to the belief that “the family [is] a beautiful and holy natural institution.” 

    Idealism is ordinarily thought of as a good thing, but Shaw, with his typical love of paradox, turns it into a term of opprobrium. The reason that people are idealists, Shaw argues, is not because they think their ideal is true. It is because they know it is not true, and they fear that if the truth were to be revealed, the family along with most pillars of society would collapse. That is why the idealists wrote nasty articles about Ibsen, one of the rare individuals Shaw considers “realists,” able to describe things as they really are. Idealists hate the realist because they are “terrified beyond measure at the proclamation of their hidden thought, at the presence of the traitor among the conspirators of silence.”

    Ibsen is often described as a revolutionary dramatist, but Shaw’s definition makes clear that the revolutionary and the realist are quite different creatures. Both employ shock and destruction, and both claim to see what others do not. But a revolutionary makes war on powerful institutions, sometimes at the price of his own life, while a realist performs euthanasia on decrepit institutions, and sooner or later he is rewarded for it. 

    Nietzsche saw his own mission in similar terms. In 1882, the year after Ghosts, he published The Gay Science, which includes the famous parable of the madman who announces that God is dead. Crucially, Nietzsche’s madman does not say that God ought to die, or that he intends to kill God. Rather, he brings the news that humanity has already killed Him and doesn’t realize it yet. “This deed is still more distant from them than most distant stars — and yet they have done it themselves,” the madman declares. This is what Shaw would have called realism — a report on a fact that most people do not wish to acknowledge.

    Like Ghosts, The Gay Science went unread when it was first published, but by the turn of the century it had been recognized as a work of genius, due in large part to the enthusiasm of Georg Brandes, who took up Nietzsche’s cause the way he had taken up Ibsen’s. Unlike Ibsen, however, Nietzsche didn’t live to enjoy his vindication. In an eerie coincidence, he suffered the same fate as Osvald Alving, losing his mind to tertiary syphilis in 1889. At the end of Ghosts, Mrs. Alving is left with the choice of whether to fulfill her son’s last wish and end his life with an overdose of morphine, or allow him to linger on in the way he dreaded — “lying there as helpless as a little baby, incurable, lost, hopeless — beyond salvation.” Nietzsche lingered in a state of imbecility for another decade, unaware that European intellectuals had finally begun to embrace his ideas. He was only fifty-five when he died in 1900. 

    With Ibsen, indignation turned into acclaim even more quickly. In Ghosts, Mrs. Alving explains that she sent her son away to school early because “I felt sure my child would be poisoned just by breathing in the air of this infected home,” and Ibsen wanted to force audiences to acknowledge that their homes were equally infected — that all of bourgeois society was steeped in a toxic, decayed ideals. In response, critics insisted that he was the sick one — fetid, leprous, loathsome. 

    The next year he returned with An Enemy of the People, whose hero, Dr. Stockmann, informs his neighbors that the town’s spa, advertised for its curative powers, is in fact “a health hazard of the greatest magnitude,” its waters polluted by runoff from a tannery. He expects to be thanked for exposing this suppressed truth, which will enable the town to avert scandal and ruin by relocating the pipes that feed the spa. He even complacently tells friends that there is no need to organize “a parade, or a banquet, or a subscription list for a token of honor.”

    But when it is revealed how much it would cost the town to close the spa and rebuild it, everyone is determined to hush things up. Dr. Stockmann isn’t too surprised when his brother, the town’s conservative mayor, turns against him, but he is shocked when the editor of the local newspaper, known as a crusader, reveals that he is equally hypocritical and corrupt. Rather than confront the truth, everyone prefers to curse the messenger. “The man who flings such offensive insinuations at his own hometown has to be society’s enemy,” the mayor tells the doctor. 

    In the play’s climactic scene, Dr. Stockmann decides to embrace that accusation. At a town meeting, he declares that a man of integrity must always be an enemy of the people, because “the most dangerous enemies to truth and freedom among us are the solid majority.” Ibsen does not fail to spell out the implications for democracy. If “stupid people make up a quite terrifying, overwhelming majority the world over,” as Stockmann says, then majority rule is a recipe for disaster: “Never in all eternity, damn it all, can it be right for the stupid people to rule over the intelligent ones!” The only way to raise the general level of human intelligence, he concludes, is through eugenics — a program of selective breeding like dog trainers use to turn mongrels into poodles. “Oh, there’s a quite terrifying distance between poodle-humans and mongrel-humans,” Stockmann rages. 

    How cathartic these lines must have been for Ibsen, so often slandered and misunderstood: at last he could pour out his bitterness on the public. In the play Dr. Stockmann pays a high price for his insults: he loses his job, he is evicted from his house, and people throw rocks at his windows. But the story is more complicated. In real life, audiences embraced An Enemy of the People as enthusiastically as they had rejected Ghosts. Contrary to his usual practice, Ibsen didn’t send the script to theaters, but “waited with amused confidence for theater directors to come and beg,” writes his biographer Hans Heiberg. “This they all did, sooner or later. . . . Successes then followed thick and fast.” The Kristiania Theater, which had paid Ibsen two thousand five hundred crowns for the right to perform A Doll’s House, shelled out four thousand for An Enemy of the People.

    Why does an audience line up to buy tickets to a play written by a man who insists that “our entire civic community rests on a plague-infested ground of lies”? Did Shaw err when he estimated that out of a thousand people, seven hundred are Philistines and two hundred ninety-nine are idealists, and only one — Shaw himself, or Ibsen, or Nietzsche — is brave enough to be a realist? Not necessarily. Rather, the formula needs to take into account the speed with which the realist’s radical critique can destroy decrepit ideals — and then replace them, turning into a new kind of orthodoxy. The cultural success of realism disproves its own pessimism. Moral reform turns out to be within its powers. Realism may be another sort of revolution. 

    This is the paradox of progressive moralism, in our own time no less than in Ibsen’s. When Ibsenites in Norway and around the world went to see An Enemy of the People, they were sure that Dr. Stockmann’s wrath was not directed at people like them. Rather, they recognized themselves in his description of “the few, those individuals among us who have embraced all the new, vigorous truths. Such men stand at the outposts, as it were, so far ahead that the solid majority has yet to catch up with them.” At the end of the play, Stockmann famously declares that “the strongest man in the world is he who stands most alone.” For more than a century, people have left performances of An Enemy of the People applauding this credo and flattering themselves that it refers to them — and thus making a mockery of it. 

    This irony has been unmistakable in the recent spate of Ibsen revivals on Broadway. This year’s production of Ghosts comes on the heels of An Enemy of the People last year and A Doll’s House the year before, all featuring starry casts. An Enemy of the People, whose plot can easily be assimilated to present-day environmental concerns, was especially hailed as a timely inspiration. Last year’s production used an adapted script by the playwright Amy Herzog, who invented lines for Dr. Stockmann that quiver with twenty-first-century eco-piety: “We just have to imagine that the water will be clean and safe and the truth will be valued,” he says in this version. As for the line about the strongest man being the most alone, Herzog simply cut it, telling the New York Times, “That didn’t resonate with me at all.” 

    Ibsen himself could not have invented a clearer fable of the way idealism curdles into cant. Sam Gold, who directed the production, said that he saw a likeness between Dr. Stockmann and Greta Thunberg: “It takes a certain kind of personality to be able to say the truth, to be able to say you’re all being nuts, and I am just going to tell you the truth, which is we’re destroying the world.” But the message of An Enemy of the People, at least as Ibsen wrote it, is not that pollution is bad. It is that people — even liberals, maybe especially liberals — get very angry when you tell them truths that they do not wish to hear. In this way, with their prior certainty of their own rectitude, the audiences who are applauding Ibsen are also domesticating him, robbing him of his original force. 

    Nothing makes certain liberals happier, meanwhile, than telling truths that they do want to hear, and that they believe will bother other people — the backward, the religious, the traditional, the provincial, the patriarchal. One preview performance of An Enemy of the People was disrupted by protesters from an environmental group called Extinction Rebellion, who shouted “No theater on a dead planet!” The audience didn’t get angry; many initially thought it was part of the show. Afterward Jeremy Strong, who played Dr. Stockmann, praised the protesters: “I personally felt I wouldn’t have the right to finish the play if I had tried to stifle or silence what they had to say, which I think is correct and deserved to be heard.” 

    The protesters were angry at someone — oil company CEOs, people who drive Range Rovers — but clearly they were not angry at the people they were actually addressing. On the contrary, the disruption was an expression of solidarity with the audience and the actors, whose agreement was taken for granted. To use Shaw’s terminology, the protesters were idealists, who announce that what everyone holds sacred really is sacred, and not realists like Ibsen, who tell us that nothing is sacred. It is Ibsen’s compulsion to dissent, not his views on the sexual mores of late-nineteenth-century Scandinavia, that makes him an enduringly modern writer. 

    Lionel Trilling wrote that the distinctive quality of modern literature is its aggressiveness: for the modern writer words are weapons, “and one does not describe a quinquereme or a howitzer or a tank without estimating how much damage it can do.” No writer fits this definition better than Ibsen, above all in the three plays recently revived on Broadway. A Doll’s House, Ghosts, and An Enemy of the People, written one after another, are the quintessence of Ibsenism as a dramatic genre — plays in which the moral corruption of respectable society is rudely exposed and punished, as inexorably as in a Greek tragedy. Ibsen dealt real damage in these plays because he aimed at vulnerable targets, and several generations of playwrights learned from his example — starting with his defender, Shaw, who took on prostitution in Mrs. Warren’s Profession, military honor in Arms and the Man, and the business of medicine in The Doctor’s Dilemma. Arthur Miller’s All My Sons, about a businessman who knowingly sells defective aircraft parts to the Army during World War II, borrows major plot elements from Ibsen’s Pillars of the Community and The Wild Duck

    There were plenty of social evils left for Ibsen himself to blast at, if he had wanted to keep doing so. Instead, after An Enemy of the People, he began to turn his fire on his supporters and on himself, writing a series of plays in which idealism serves as an alibi for selfishness and cruelty. In The Wild Duck, from 1884, Gregers Werle cherishes a Stockmann-like commitment to the truth, which is why he insists on telling his friend Hjalmar Ekdal that his beloved daughter Hedvig is not really his. Gregers expects this revelation to bring Hjalmar and his wife Gina closer than ever, in “a way of life, a union, in truth and without secrets.” Instead Hjalmar reacts by rejecting Hedvig, who then kills herself in what she intends as an act of redemptive sacrifice. 

    Hedvig’s end is as horrifying as Osvald’s in Ghosts, but this time tragedy is tinged with the ludicrous. Ibsen seems to conclude that human beings are too weak to live in the truth, after all. We would rather have a “life-lie,” a story we can tell ourselves to make our wretched existences bearable. “Take the life-lie away from your average man, and you take his happiness with it,” says Dr. Relling, the Ekdals’ cynical neighbor.

    By the time of Hedda Gabler in 1889, Ibsen has reinterpreted idealism as a species of sadism. Hedda’s acts of cruelty start out small — insulting an old lady’s hat, refusing to visit a sick relative. But when Eilert Lovborg, an old admirer of hers, returns to town, they become shocking. Lovborg is a reformed alcoholic, but Hedda urges him to go to a drunken party where he is sure to fall off the wagon. She claims to be doing it for his sake, imagining him transfigured by wine into a Greek god with “vine leaves in his hair.” When Lovborg gets drunk and ends up disgraced and ruined, Hedda hands him a pistol to commit suicide with, once again out of idealistic motives. If he kills himself, she says, it will show that “there can be acts of courage born of free will in this world after all. Something imbued with a glow of impulsive beauty.” 

    One cannot feel indignation against Hedda Gabler, as one can against Torvald Helmer and Pastor Manders. They stand for social evils that right-thinking people, in Ibsen’s day and our own, feel good about attacking. But Hedda is too strange and unsettling to represent any institution. Marriage or the church or oil companies can be legislated against, but what kind of political movement can take on human perversity, the will to power and the refusal of self-knowledge? 

    If modern literature is a weapon, then the most modern writer of all is the one who turns that weapon against itself, who aggressively interrogates the sources of our aggression, showing how our claims to serve causes and ideals are actually ways of serving ourselves. Like his contemporaries Nietzsche and Freud, Ibsen is permanently modern because he achieved this kind of self-overcoming. The best tribute we can pay him is not to applaud him for having opinions so progressive that they were already being applauded a hundred and fifty years ago, but to ask what bitter things Ibsen would have to say about us — and not just about our enemies.

    The Passion Not to Be Lonely

    In “Songs Among The Ruins,” an essay that he published in the Times Literary Supplement in 1965, the English poet and critic Ian Hamilton wrote: 

    In the best works of poets like Robert Lowell, John Berryman, and Sylvia Plath one finds not just a cerebral attempt for the distinguishably United States idiom but an impassioned exploration of whatever chances the imagination still has of making sense of a civilization that is bent on self-destruction, that cruelly cannot fail to involve the poet in its manic processes but demands also that he survive as guardian of what is being killed; to these poets America is distinct from other societies in the sense that it is more efficiently dehumanizing, having abused its promise as it now prepares to abuse its power, and the best that they feel able to attempt is to oppose its abstracting pressures with the full weight of whatever in their own lives seems concretely worth saving.

    Born in 1936, in Newark, New Jersey, the American poet C. K. Williams belonged to the generation after Lowell, Berryman, and Plath, but to revisit his poetry, not least on the occasion of the recent publication of Invisible Mending, a selection from the entirety of his work, is to confirm that his writing had much of the same drive behind it as that which Hamilton diagnosed in those who went immediately before him. 

    His is a poetry which, in its maturity at least, attempts to forge connections and to counteract loneliness — spiritual, physical, psychic — in settings which often seem to preclude any such attempts at communion. His are poems grounded in a concrete, recognizably modern, reality; urban, sensual, at times mysterious — which proceed from the self, its intimate tangles with experience, thought, and growth, its homesickness for a sort of imagined, or lapsed, purity. They are poems which acknowledge but do not unquestioningly accept a sense of dehumanization, and abuse, at all levels of society — often focusing their eye on the down-at-heel, their Baudelairean street scenes of drinkers, junkies, beggars — “Every misfit in the city, every freeloader, every blown-out druggie and glazed teenybopper” (“Flight” from Tar) — and other of thrusting advancement’s bothersome marginalia. 

    Williams’ early poems appear, on their surface at least, to be his most directly political, written around and out of the Vietnam War, but their often too-straightforward bombast ends up diluting, rather than sharpening, their attempts at forceful urgency. In setting out to lead with a forthright tone, they risk a pile-up of strafing, big feelings, straining for effect rather than trusting the language itself to create an ecosystem of organic meaning and sense. They tend, as in “Being Alone,” to veer into abstraction, to “drift inconspicuously / in the raw dredge of your power.” One finds, in those early works, a poet whose mind is outpacing his stride, catching hints of frustration in the syntax and, occasionally, in direct statements, such as in “Yours” from Williams’ second book, I Am The Bitter Name: “I’m working as fast as I can I can’t stop to use periods / sometimes I draw straight lines on the page because the words/are too slow.” 

    Rather than having to settle for drawing straight lines as his language — and his thought — gallops away from itself, Williams, between books two and three, hit on a far more effective method for letting in contemplation, plot, and diligent nuance. The poems in With Ignorance, in 1977, read like the work of an entirely different writer. Suddenly, through the use of a long clause-laden line, Williams is able to significantly bolster his poetic arsenal; no longer relying only on an abrupt, somewhat spikily Imagist approach, he has access to many of the techniques of the prose writer. Narrative can be added, character development, interior monologue, scene-setting, atmosphere, but without sacrificing the innate compression of poetry, its cinematic juxtapositions and jump-cuts offset by what Michael Hofmann has called “Bellovian fellow-feeling,” creating layered, condensed studies, rich in mood and founded on a speaking tone, rich in the felicities and warmth of the vernacular but maintaining a clarity of vision. 

    These poems have, at their core, a concern with silence, the experience of enduring loneliness and loneliness’ endurance — there is often an attempt at revisiting scenes from the past, dredging up memory, in order to come to an understanding of why these moments, in particular, have outlasted their occasion:

    All I know about that time is that it stayed, that something, pain or the fear of it,
    makes me stop the wheel and reach to the silence beyond my eyes and it’s still there:

    (“Bread”)

    The morning goes on, the sun burning, the earth burning, and between them, part of me lifts and starts back,
    past the wash of dead music from the bar, the drinker reeling on the curb, the cars coughing alive,
    and part, buried in itself, stays, forever, blinking into the glare, freezing.

    (“The Shade”)

    The roots of so much of what will come to characterize Williams’ best poems from this point onwards can be found in this first book of long-lined work: the seeking of common ground, the sensual search for justice and radiance in unpropitious circumstance, a constant attempt to exist somewhere in the unsettling gap between decision and resolution. Ongoing, too, is that sense Hamilton talked of in Lowell and Co., the drive towards using the weight of what most needs to be kept, and rescued, from a life and an experience as ballast against the encroaching, steamrolling forces of modernity, their attempts to degrade and debase being met with an urge to look towards radiance and longing; an accounting for simplicity and joy amid the rubble and renovations of a difficult, frequently barbaric, century.

    That Bellovian empathy that Hofmann touched on can be seen not only in Williams’ poems of human connection, but in those where creatures become the focus of his attention, too; all things feel prey to the same oppressive forces as the self, and as the human, such as in “The Storm” from perhaps Williams’ finest collection, Flesh and Blood, from 1987: 

    Down across the roof lines, the decorative dome of Les Invalides looms, intruding on all this,
    and suddenly a swallow banks around its gilded slopes, heading out but veering quickly back
    as though the firmament, figured by so many volumes now, were too intimidating to row out in alone.

    In fact, if one can characterize Williams’ view of life, or at least the sensual and coherent experiencing of it, it might be possible to do so with lines from The Vigil, from a decade later:

    so, sometimes, in the sometimes somber halls of memory, your life as you’ve known it,
    in the only way you can know it, in these disparate, unpredictable upsurges of mind,
    gathers itself, gathers what seem like the minds behind mind that shimmer within mind,
    and turns back on itself, suspending itself, caught in the marvel of memory and time,
    and, as the child’s mind, so long ago now, engendered itself in attachment’s touch and bestowal,
    life itself now seems engendered from so much enduring attachment, so much bestowal.

    (“Time: 1972”)

    That feeling of suspense, of “unpredictable upsurges,” is a constant in Williams’ poems of interiority, as is a feeling of “touch and bestowal” and “enduring attachment,” of a link between the sensate and the gift, the idea of grace being rendered through small physical acts, all fed by a lifelong “passion not to be lonely” (“Lonely,” from Falling Ill). Williams’ poems are often strung between twin poles, or competing impulses — the despairing, at times wrongfooting, note of “how separate we all are from one another” (“Archetypes” from Repair) which seems always in danger of creeping out from behind that hardwired fear of being cast adrift, and its counterpoint, the “soft herd-alarm, a warning signal from the species” (“Experience” from Flesh and Blood) which prevents, or precludes, an absolute resignation to the feeling of abandonment. 

    Williams’ poems of isolation often fight their own instincts, after a fashion, never fully being able to give in to the sort of desolation, or spiritual vagrancy, that their openings and settings hint might be their fate. It’s as if something within the poet, at times, forbids despair — that so much of his art is founded on that seesaw between opposites, between the necessity of acknowledging the damage wrought, the ugly multi-sensory incursions on simple enjoyment, and also something deep-rootedly hopeful, or at least never hopeless. Something of this can be seen at its clearest in “The Park” from Flesh and Blood and its progression towards an almost rapturous ending. It opens 

    In that oblivious, concentrated, fiercely fetal decontraction peculiar to the lost,
    a grimy derelict is flat out on a green bench by the sandbox, gazing blankly at the children.

    A narrative of childhood selfishness, a refusal to share “a lovely fire truck,” plays out until the poem veers back to the figure from the opening, now by virtue of grammar both individual but also emblematic:

    The ankles of the derelict are scabbed and swollen, torn with aching varicose and cankers.
    Who will come to us now? Who will solace us? Who will take us in their healing hands?

    That unexpected lurch in the final line hits a tone of desperation but also of rhapsody, and the shift to the third person plural becomes an implicating one, providing not just a bit of “soft herd-alarm” but also something more generational, managing to do what those early and more confrontingly political poems never could and involve the readers’ senses in the national plight, rather than only appealing to their outrage muscles. Williams, then, never abandons his search for justice, his abhorrence of tyranny or betrayal, but rather finds a means of involving the whole self in it, and in lining up his narratives, and atmospheres, to create environments in which the many abuses and underminings of a life can be given physicality, to see where they hurt. 

    Just as Williams is interested, in all his mature poems, in finding and unpacking the times that have stayed, there is something else at play in his selection and rendering of these particular narratives. As he writes in the title poem from With Ignorance, there is a need to isolate the true from the false, “a single moment carved back from the lie,” as he puts it there, behind so much of his writing. The desire to look so closely at the lost and the forlorn comes in part from his unwillingness to look away from the underside of what encroaching forces of barbarism — military, political, economic — have done, in the name of progress, but it is also tied to one of the other crucial drives behind all his writing: a sense of bearing witness. In part, this becomes an artistic decision, and a line can be drawn from the early deep Imagist principles which never fully leave the poet, however his prosody and lineation shift, from his deep-rooted belief that, as per “Combat” in Tar, “one’s moral structures tended to be air unless you grounded them in real events.” 

    Williams’ is a world in which — whether in the realm of the intimate and carnal, or on the broader political and economic scale, “justice won’t I know be served” (“Peace,” from Flesh and Blood) but yet, in spite of — or perhaps because of — all the world’s falsehoods, and the possibility of being powerless in the face of the lie, he feels a duty to give structure and language to things as they are, to attempt to dignify and preserve “tedious normality.” The aesthetic shift towards the longer line, the narrative poem, isn’t the only reason why Williams becomes a sort of barstool Scheherazade, counteracting loneliness through a brand of optimistic loquaciousness, even in the face of many reasons not to be so. The ending of “Time: 1978” from The Vigil is a more nakedly real-time rendering of the breathlessness and panic which lies beneath his need to chronicle, and to catalogue:

    . . . as I write
    this, trying to get it all in, hold the moments
    between the sad desolation I thought if not to avert then to diminish in writing it down,
    and this, now, my pen scratching, eyes rushing to follow the line and not lose Jed’s gaze,
    which dims with sleep now, wanders to the window—hills, brush, field cleft with trenches—
    and begins to flutter so that I can’t keep up with it: quick, quick, before you’re asleep,
    listen, how and whenever if not now, now, will I speak to you, both of you, of all this?

    This sort of devoted, enrapt, attention can be turned on the intimate, on the family or the lover, in Williams’ poems, and it can act — as it does here — as a means of arresting time, capturing in amber something the poet cannot bear to have disappear. It can — alternatively — be weaponized, turned into a means of holding the past and its cast list to account. There is an urge towards a settling of accounts, a righting of wrongs, which comes in with the latter version, as can be seen in “The Cup,” from Repair, a narrative of childhood about his mother’s coffee-drinking:

    that excruciating suction sound again, her gaze loosening again.
    I’d be desperate, wild, my heart would pound.
    There was an expression, then, “to tell on someone”; that was what I craved, to tell on her,
    to have someone bear witness with me to her awful wrong.
    What was I doing to myself? Or she to me?
    Oh, surely she to me

    While here this childhood urge to “tell on” his mother for a perceived wrong comes with an air of levity, a knowing adult slant on the confusion of his younger self, there is a darker edge to his recounting of a different matriarchal figure, in “Dirt,” where his grandmother “is washing my mouth / out with soap.” The present tense creates an immediacy, but the poem moves through a latter-day self-awareness and runs, almost, on parallel tracks of re-experiencing and restitution. Through this, Williams is able to both “tell on” the grandmother while also using the poem as a means of achieving some sort of “justice,” or at least finding a way of forgiving her this historic wrong: 

    I know now her life was hard:
    she lost three daughters as babies,
    then her husband died, too,
    leaving young sons, and no money.
    She’d stand me in the sink to pee
    because there was never room in the toilet.
    But, oh, her soap! Might its bitter burning
    have been what made me a poet?

    This isn’t the only time Williams associates burning in the mouth with the urge towards speech, or poetry — the coals on Moses’ tongues perform a similar role in “Spit” from With Ignorance, another poem about oral tyranny, and the fact that “every word we said would burn forever.”

    Williams doesn’t only lean on this desire to bear witness in poems of his own immediate experience, or memory. He becomes something of a chronicler of others, too, in part in that ongoing search — however unlikely — for justice, or at least an urge towards ensuring that those most put-upon or poorly served by the world will not suffer the second injustice of being ignored in the process. One of Williams’ great strengths as a narrator, and something which is enabled by his choice of the more prosaic line and clause-heavy diction, is his feeling “as though I were a portion of the story” in instances where he is more chronicler than participant. A self-implicating streak, a desire to get involved, comes further to the fore in these sorts of poems, such as “The Dirty Talker: D Line, Boston” from Flesh and Blood, or the countless other street scenes, overhearings, voyeurisms, and recountings in which the “I” of the poem is in part a camera, but in part an explicator, empathizer and occasionally inadvertent accomplice. 

    Indeed, Williams — in a manner akin to the omniscient narrator of a prose story — can do something like free indirect style, as Alan Shapiro highlights in his introduction to Invisible Mending, and by doing so we get the best of both arts, a poetic narrator with Williams’ gifts for incision and the clinching image, but also a disembodied generosity of perspective, a significantly bulked-up range of possibilities when it comes to the selves whose lives we might overhear, collide with, or encounter in a Williams poem. In those moments where he is less the revisitor of his own past experience and more our street guide, Williams becomes twinned with the woman at Les Deux Magots in Paris, where he lived for many years, in “Love: Intimacy” from Flesh and Blood: “not commiserating, really, just keeping record of the progress of the loss.” 

    Williams applies the same criteria for choosing his scenes from other lives as he does from his own, making a hierarchy of types of experience which might point to some of that warning signal of the species but also adding them to the store of items worth saving from the void, in lieu of any guarantee of intercession from a God, or the universe, to offer the same preservative benevolence. 

    It’s something stronger than a desire to witness or to catalogue which powers this degree of scrutiny, something more to do with a belief — however unlikely, or ultimately thwarted — that by keeping track or setting down these things they might be ripe for a second go-around, that the dead moments, and even the dead figures which populate them, might really live, and be had all over again. Something of this can be glimpsed in “Last Things” from Repair, where Williams acknowledges that he hasn’t any right, as such, in the telling of his friend’s story of photographing his child just after his death, but that “If you’re reading it, you’ll know my friend pardoned me, / that he found whatever small truth his story might embody/was worth the anguish of remembering.” 

    Remembering is not always — or only — anguish in Williams’ work. In “Still Life,” from Tar, we come close to seeing Williams’ desire to go back, to pin down and reinhabit, at its most bare, and fully palpable:

    I don’t know then how much someday — today — I’ll need it all, how much want to hold it,
    and, not knowing why, not knowing still how time can tempt us so emphatically and yet elude us,
    not have it, not the way I would, not the way I want to have that day, that light,
    . . . . .
    even, too, her gaze, so darkly penetrating, then lifting idly past, is so much imagination,
    a portion of that figured veil we cast against oblivion, then try, with little hope, to tear away.

    The tension between those two urges — to have “that day” again, but also knowing that it is finally just “so much imagination,” one “with little hope” — is fundamental to Williams’ tone, to the pathos of his desiring and sometimes self-deceiving faith, never fully abandoned, which he writes of in “Gardens” in Flesh and Blood: “The ever-consoling fantasy of my early adolescence was that one day time would stop for me.”

    If a poem such as “Dirt” moves through affronting experience towards something like forgiveness — “Dare I admit that after she did it / I never really loved her again? . . . I never, until now, loved her again” — it has something in common with another of the key engines of Williams’ work: a need for, and searching after, some sort of lost purity, or innocence. It’s no coincidence that Williams chooses, in poems such as this one, and “The Cup,” and his much-anthologized “My Mother’s Lips,” to return to scenes from early childhood, because — as he notes in “The Gas Station” — he remained “mad with grief for the loss of my childhood” long after it ended, and came to associate this grief, and this loss, with much of the oppressive desiring which goes on throughout his adulthood. Purity as an idea, or a lost paradise, recurs throughout Williams’ work, and never with anything less than a tug of the heart, a pining, desolate tenor. 

    While Williams states — severally — the sadness which accompanies his lack of faith in a God, something which takes up that part is hinted at across his work, with a number of references to “purity” in its various guises. Some of it is synonymous with innocence — not only, or even entirely, in the sense of blamelessness, but also a kind of untutored, prelapsarian one, still looking around for teachers, and for direction, as in “The Gas Station”:

    I still haven’t read Augustine. I don’t understand Chomsky that well. Should I?
    My friend at last comes back. Maybe the right words were there all along. Complicity. Wonder.
    How pure we were then, before Rimbaud, before Blake. Grace. Love. Take care of us. Please.

    This is one sense of the purity which sometimes hides behind that veil of experience, but it also has something to do with an instinct akin to the lyric lift-off, and to which Williams’ poems sometimes return, or at least reach — the “radiances / I believed passionately existed,” as he puts it in “Depths” from Repair. For all its injustice, its denial of rectitude and its potential for severing connections, or causing intimidation and despair, Williams’ universe is one in which — on occasion — some Platonic hint is offered, often in the least likely setting. “The Dance,” also from Repair, is one such moment, where a “middle-aged woman, quite plain, to be polite about it” moves “with effortless grace” and it creates “consoling implications” for the viewer, ending in something like unalloyed hopefulness:

    . . . so the world,
    that world beyond us which so often disappoints, but which sometimes shows us, lovely, what we are.

    This yearning quality is what prevents Williams’ down-at-heel flaneur persona from calcifying into tough-guy flippancy, and which ensures that the tour of thwarted ambitions and disappointments never risks becoming mere grief tourism, or vampirism. Something similar happens in a later prose poem, “The Broom” from All At Once, where the inhabitants of a Greyhound bus station suddenly find themselves thinking of “a wheat field after harvest” and “a brutal August sun none of us trapped here has beheld for centuries, only fancied, dreamed of, here in this hallowed, middle place of bland fluorescent longing.”

    This need, and the capacity, to acknowledge — and hope for — glimpses of real sunlight beyond the fluorescent longing is one means by which Williams can finally counteract the ache of loneliness, the lifelong battle for connection. Another is touched on in a recognition of the upside of the loss of innocence, laid out most overtly, perhaps, in “The Foundation” from his late book Wait, where “I’m not alone in my dancing, / my being air, I’m with my poets”:

    Watch me again, I haven’t landed, I’m hovering here
    over the fragments, the remnants, the splinters and shards;
    my poets are with me, my soarers, my skimmers, my skaters,
    aloft on their song in the ruins, their jubilant song of the ruins.

    From a poet for whom words were once too slow, Williams became someone who rebuilt what the poetic line might do, bringing in — as a result — many of the tools of the novelist, their possibilities for a more omniscient empathy, one in which — always — as in “The City In the Hills” — there are “humans implied so richly.” His poems became means of bringing what had most mattered along, out of the silence of the past, out of the unforgiven or troublesome disappointments of innocence-stripping adulthood, with accuracy and flair. In so many of the poems of experience one feels the need, however impossible, to re-experience things as they were, exactly, in something richer and more tactile than any kind of religious afterlife, but rather — as in “Realms” from The Vigil:

      . . . it must be actually you, not my imagination of you, however real: for myself,

    mind would suffice, no matter if all were one of time’s terrible toys, but I must have you,
    as you are . . .

    Williams’ most vital and lasting poems are those of “enduring attachment” — attachment to those he has loved, and to humanity itself, especially its would-be detritus, its otherwise unsalvaged. His brand of tensile empathy can sometimes make him part of the stories being recounted, overheard, “told on,” and there is seemingly nowhere that his voice, or his eye, cannot take him, nowhere that he is unwilling to look for those breakthroughs into unlikely, often unlooked for, loveliness, where the world wins back a little credit, for all its habits of disappointing. These are poems set against atomization, but which face up to it — to the divisions, humiliations, and affronts committed daily by those in power, or those involved in perpetuating “the lie,” against which Williams sought to carve out singular truths. They are often built from pain, fear, or loneliness — often forced to contend with the silence, the great void of indifference — but they manage, when taken whole, to ground their moral world in real events, and come as close as the genre will allow to having “that day, that light” in perpetuity. Williams’ songs among the ruins point towards a possibility for poetry as closer cousin to fiction, but with its own integrity, its own lyric potential for real-time reply, to offer its own kind of afterlife, as in “Again,” from All At Once, about his grandson:

    he calls my name each time he appears, and as I stand waiting, listening, watching him materialize again, it comes to me that if that old legend of having your life flash before you as you die is true, I’ll have this all again, and again.

    Can We Be Blissful on the Rack?

    Consider a political dissident who defies a ruthless dictator, is captured by the regime’s henchmen, and is publicly tortured to death. Your response would likely be outrage — you might appeal to Amnesty International, call for sanctions, or demand that the dictator be tried in The Hague.

    The Stoics reflected on a similar case in antiquity: Phalaris, the sixth-century BCE tyrant of the city of Akragas in Sicily and the Brazen Bull that he commissioned. Victims were locked inside the hollow bronze bull while a fire was lit underneath, slowly roasting them alive. Some accounts claim that the bull was designed to amplify and distort their screams, transforming them into eerie bellowing — a spectacle meant to amuse the tyrant and to terrify his enemies.

    Were the Stoics appalled by such cruelty? Not at all. They insisted that the wise and virtuous are just as happy inside the Brazen Bull as they would be enjoying a good meal with family and friends. Shocking? Certainly. But their view challenges a core modern moral conviction: that we should strive to eradicate suffering and fight injustice. If the virtuous can flourish even in the Brazen Bull, this is no longer self-evident. The burden shifts from the torturers to the victims — what matters is not what is done to them, but how they respond, the attitude they adopt. According to the Stoics, all that we should do by way of response to injustice is cultivate virtue. But even if we ultimately reject Stoicism, engaging with its defiant perspective — and its popularization as self-help literature in recent years — forces us to confront some of our deepest assumptions and brings into view an ancient ideal of flourishing and resilience that still merits our attention.

    Bending the arc of the universe

    In 1853, Theodore Parker, a Unitarian minister and fiery abolitionist, declared that while “the arc of the moral universe is long,” it “bends toward justice.” This wasn’t just rhetoric — he tried to bend it himself, sheltering fugitive slaves, defying the Fugitive Slave Act, and even supporting armed resistance against slavery.

    The drive to make the world better has become so deeply ingrained in our moral sensibility that we rarely ask whether it is justified. On a sunny morning in 2019, my children left their schoolbooks behind and grabbed the protest signs they had drawn the night before. My son’s was taped to a hockey stick: “S.O.S.,” with a painted Earth as the “O.” My daughter had glued hers to a tennis racket: “I’m sure the dinosaurs also thought they had more time!” They were seven and ten. In the schoolyard, they joined classmates for a rally against climate change. Like many parents, my wife and I went along — partly to support them, partly to keep them safe. We felt proud. On that day half a million people marched — the largest demonstration our city had ever seen. My wife took my hand. We smiled in the middle of the surge, the shouting, the urgency.

    It was a small moment in a much larger movement. Grassroots activists block pipelines, billionaire philanthropists fund vaccines, students march against war, UN peacekeepers are deployed to conflict zones. Superheroes battle injustice, celebrities launch charities, musicians call for change in anthems such as “Imagine” and “We Are the World.” We respond to wildfires, tsunamis, and pandemics with early warning systems, emergency aid, and scientific breakthroughs. The impulse behind it all is the same: the world is not as it should be, and it is up to us to fix it — through protest, policy, philanthropy, science, pop culture, and more. The arc of the moral universe will not bend on its own. We have to pull it in the right direction.

    There is no arc to bend

    According to the Stoics, all these efforts are pointless. We cannot improve the world because we already live in a flawless one. There is no arc to bend. If you list evils — war, crime, poverty, racism, disease, earthquakes — the Stoics acknowledge the existence of such things but deny that they are evil.

    Consider Job, God’s greatest accuser. He has a loving wife, thriving children, a large estate, and a trusted circle of friends; his piety appears beyond question. “Have you considered my servant Job?” God asks Satan. “There is no one on earth like him; he is blameless and upright, a man who fears God and shuns evil.” Yet Satan retorts that if you strip away all his blessings, his faith will collapse. God accepts the challenge, granting Satan free rein to make Job suffer. Enemy tribes plunder his estate and kill his servants; a fire consumes what remains; a storm destroys the house where his children gather, burying them in rubble; Job is stricken with painful sores “from the soles of his feet to the crown of his head.” The only thing spared is his life.

    Job’s story highlights the age-old problem of undeserved suffering. Why do bad things happen to good people? For believers, in a world governed by an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God, there should be no unjust suffering — yet the world seems full of it. The Stoics dismiss this puzzle as based on a false assumption: that suffering is an evil needing justification. They claim the only true good is virtue and the only true evil is vice — everything else is irrelevant. Since virtue depends solely on our choices, it is within everyone’s reach. Had Job been wise, he would not have seen himself as suffering evil at all.

    The Stoics are equally unmoved by the challenges posed by God’s other accusers, from Candide to Ivan Karamazov. Candide catalogs horrors — war, earthquakes, persecution, slavery, colonialism, rape — to argue that no grand cosmic plan exists. Ivan goes further, insisting that even if a divine order did exist, it could never justify the suffering of a single innocent child. Yet the Stoics stand firm: none of this is evil. 

    They are equally dismissive of the things we cherish — first kisses, a toddler’s smile, landing a dream job, or winning a prestigious prize. Just as vice is the only evil, virtue is the only good. In a world of true Stoic sages, there would be no longing, no tragedy, no heartbreak. Odysseus’ yearning for home, Hamlet’s existential despair, Billie Holiday’s ballads of love and loss — none of it would make sense.

    Radical egalitarianism

    Should we applaud the radical egalitarianism of the Stoics? They insist that virtue — the only thing that matters — is open to all, regardless of background or circumstance. Epictetus, a former slave, is just as much a Stoic sage as Marcus Aurelius, a Roman emperor. Success and happiness do not depend on gender, race, religion, class, wealth, or health. A black transgender woman in a wheelchair living in a shantytown can be completely happy, while an athletic white hedge-fund manager sipping champagne on his yacht can be utterly miserable. It all comes down to whether they choose virtue or vice.

    But this radical view comes at a cost. The Stoics seem to remove any reason to change the world. Why fight poverty, racism, oppression, or torture if none of these truly affect our wellbeing? As Epictetus puts it:

    If he [the director] casts you as one of the poor, or as a cripple, as a king or as a commoner — whatever role is assigned, the accomplished actor will . . . perform it with impartial skill. 

    Here lies the fundamental difference between modern activists and the Stoics. The modern approach aims to change external conditions so that everyone has a fair shot at a happy and flourishing life. The Stoics, by contrast, detach happiness and flourishing entirely from external conditions. 

    Sleepless nights

    Imagine if nothing could upset you — not a spilled coffee, not the loss of a loved one. The Stoics propose a path to this kind of freedom — they call it ataraxia, or freedom from disturbance — a deep and unshakable peace of mind. But can virtue alone really make us invulnerable to what Hamlet calls “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”?

    Consider three moments when my own equanimity unraveled. Growing up, my self-confidence was tied to academic success. I excelled in school and was rewarded with admiration. As class valedictorian, I was nominated for a prestigious scholarship. I burst with pride. After the selection process, I couldn’t sleep. Every morning I waited anxiously for the postman, my heart pounding. When the letter finally arrived, my hands trembled. “We regret to inform you . . .” was as far as I got before my world collapsed. For a year, I was consumed by shame.

    Vastly more terrifying is the thought of death. I don’t believe in an immortal soul — when my body dies, my mind goes with it. No afterlife, no second act, just vanishing into eternal nothingness. So I catch myself fantasizing: Could I upload my consciousness into a computer? Could science stop my body from aging? Could I merge with machines and live on as a cyborg?

    But the most visceral fear came when doctors discovered a growth in my six-year-old son’s brain — a rapidly expanding perivascular space, ominously labeled “giant” on the MRI. It was extremely rare, and all my wife and I could do was wait and watch. If it didn’t stabilize, it could lead to brain damage, surgery, or worse. There was no cure, no action to take — only the unbearable prospect of seeing our son’s life change in ways we couldn’t control. The helplessness was crushing.

    What tools do the Stoics offer to restore my peace of mind? First, they would remind me that the things I sought (recognition) and the things I feared (death, harm to my son) were not fully in my control. No matter how much effort I put in, uncertainty remains — a constant source of worry that, when hopes are dashed, turns into grief.

    The only thing I fully control, the Stoics argue, is my value judgments — whether I see success as good and failure as bad, health as good and sickness as bad, and so on. Desire and aversion simply follow judgment. First, I see the chocolate; then, I assess it. If I judge it to be good, the craving that draws me to it follows. Wisdom and virtue are nothing more than correct judgments, aligning our desires and fears with what is truly good and truly bad. Conversely, false judgments lead to misguided attachments and anxieties. I cannot control whether I see the chocolate or whether I will get to eat it — but I can control how I assess its value. For the Stoics, everything hinges on that.

    My desire for acclaim, my fear of death, and my worry about my son’s condition all stemmed from value judgments — that acclaim is good and that death and harm to a loved one are bad. In all three cases, the Stoics say, I was mistaken.

    So what is the cure? Philosophical therapy! Change your beliefs about good and bad, Epictetus instructs:

    It is not events that disturb people, it is their judgements concerning them. . . . So when we are frustrated, angry or unhappy, never hold anyone except ourselves — that is, our judgements — accountable.

    Once I replace false beliefs with true ones, I will achieve ataraxia. But where did I go wrong? According to the Stoics, acclaim, death, and harm to loved ones are “indifferents” — they neither add to nor take away from our wellbeing. Remember: the only thing to pursue is virtue, the only thing to avoid is vice.

    The Stoics know that this is easier said than done. That is why Epictetus recommends many exercises to rein in misguided desires and fears. A sample:

    In the case of things that delight or benefit you, remind yourself what they are. Start small. If it’s china you like, say, “I am fond of a piece of china.” When it breaks, you won’t be as disconcerted. When giving your wife or child a kiss, repeat to yourself, “I am kissing a mortal.” Then you won’t be so distraught if they are taken from you. . . . Sickness is a problem for the body, not the mind — unless the mind decides that it is. Lameness, too, is the body’s problem, not the mind’s. Say this to yourself and you’ll find the problem pertains to something else, not to you.

    The goal is to gradually detach from what we cannot fully control — from possessions to people we love. It begins with reframing our judgments: we stop seeing their presence as good and their absence as bad. As desire and fear fade, we no longer cling or dread. Eventually, their presence brings no elation, and their absence, no distress. The result is peace of mind: nothing can sway us, either positively or negatively.

    Thumbs up to everything?

    At first glance the Stoic proposal seems absurd. Sure, the things that fill us with hope and fear, joy and grief, are not fully under our control. But how does detaching from them make life better? Isn’t this just Aesop’s fox declaring the unreachable grapes sour? The alternative to life’s ups and downs looks like a big, bleak void.

    The Stoics, however, double down. “Welcome events however they happen — this is the path to peace,” writes Epictetus. The shattered teacup, the maimed limb, the death of your child — not only are these not bad; they are good and should be welcomed. The Stoics want us not merely to endure losses, but to reverse our negative judgments about them.

    How can they justify an attitude that seems to run against every human instinct? To begin with, they are determinists: everything unfolds necessarily in a system of causes and effects. Say your child’s death from leukemia was inevitable — how does recognizing that help? For one, it frees you from guilt or resentment toward others for not preventing it. But even so, wouldn’t it still feel like a terrible loss?

    This is where the Stoics appeal to God. The system of causes and effects, Epictetus insists, is not a blind mechanical chain but one governed by divine intelligence:

    The chief duty we owe the gods is to hold the correct beliefs about them: that they exist, that they govern the world justly and well, and that they have put you here for one purpose — to obey them and welcome whatever happens, in the conviction that it is a product of the highest intelligence. . . . And this cannot happen unless you stop applying “good” and “bad” to externals. . . . Because, if you regard any external as good or bad, and fail to get what you want or get what you don’t want instead, you will blame the gods . . . for being the cause of your trouble.

    If we embrace Stoic theology and fulfill our “chief duty,” how would it affect our judgments? We would no longer see the shattered teacup, the maimed limb, or the death of a child as misfortunes, but as parts of God’s plan — products of “the highest intelligence” — through which he governs the world “justly and well.” That, for the Stoics, is what makes the world flawless: it is perfectly ordered by divine reason.

    Think of a child whose toy is taken away. He sees the loss as bad and cries. But the parents may have good reasons for making him cry: disciplining him, removing a health hazard, donating the toy to a refugee family. If the child fully grasped their motives, the loss might no longer seem bad but something to be accepted, even welcomed. 

    Yet even if the parents’ decision is justified, they still cause pain by removing something their child cherishes. Likewise, God appears to inflict harm on parents who lose a child, even if it is part of a larger plan where the benefits outweigh the costs. But in a flawless world any harm is too much. The Stoics handle this problem by denying that harm exists at all. External and bodily goods make no difference to our well-being. The only true goods are those of the soul — wisdom and virtue.

    Follow nature!

    Virtue, the Stoics argue, means “living in agreement with nature.” But don’t turn to physicists or biologists for guidance. The Stoics want us to align our lives with God’s plan as revealed in the natural order. Since God’s plan ensures that everything turns out for the best, the only rational course is to follow it.

    But how do we know what God prescribes for us? By looking at human nature in its purest form — before socialization distorts it. The answer, according to the Stoics, lies in the cradle. A newborn’s instincts reveal nature’s design. Breastfeeding? Thumbs up! Hunger? Thumbs down! Warmth? Thumbs up! Cold? Thumbs down! Walking? Thumbs up! Falling? Thumbs down! Epictetus puts it this way:

    Babies seek what is good for them and avoid the opposite . . . This would not happen unless they valued their own constitution and feared destruction . . . So one must realize that it is self-love which provides the primary motivation.

    Why did God implant self-love in us, making us naturally drawn to what preserves us and repelled by what harms us? Because our existence has metaphysical value: we are part of God’s plan. Just as a watchmaker wants every gear to exist so that the watch can function, God wants us to exist as part of the universe he has perfectly ordered.

    If self-preservation is our divinely decreed duty, then the Stoic’s life will often look like everyone else’s — as Cicero explains in On Moral Ends:

    For some [things] there is good reason to prefer them, . . . as is the case with health, well-functioning senses, freedom from pain, honour, wealth and so on. Likewise, . . . some offer good reason to reject them — for example pain, illness, loss of a sense, poverty, ignominy and so forth.

    The difference is that Stoics do not cherish what they pursue for its own sake. They don’t eat scrambled eggs because they are delicious, but because God wants them to eat them. If the eggs slip to the floor, they embrace the mess with equal joy — because that, too, is a part of God’s plan. They diligently care for their children, but if a child dies of leukemia, they will not shed a tear. They pursue careers, protect reputations, and invest in health care and pension plans, but if they are burned alive in the Brazen Bull they accept it with complete equanimity.

    To capture this paradox — that some things should be pursued even though they hold no true value — the Stoics invented the notion of “preferred indifferents.” These are things to which we are naturally drawn because of the self-love that God implanted in us, yet they ultimately do not affect our well-being. The Stoic sage is like an archer who does everything to hit the target — but whether he actually hits it does not matter. What matters is living in agreement with nature, that is, with God’s plan, which dictates both to aim at our goals and to welcome whatever outcome follows.

    Virtue eclipses everything

    But isn’t there a contradiction? If God implanted self-love in us and a natural desire for what preserves us, how can he also expect us to welcome what destroys us?

    The Stoics would reply that aligning our life with God’s plan is a higher-level form of self-preservation — not of the body but of the mind, which is the divine spark in us. We perfect this spark through wisdom, which means holding true beliefs about the value of things.

    Preserving the body and the mind often go hand in hand — we seek food, avoid danger. But if they come into conflict, we would be fools to complain — whether about broken eggs, a child’s death, or a house destroyed by an earthquake. Why? Because mourning the loss of these things means making false value judgments — believing that having them is good and losing them is bad, when in truth they are indifferent. And by making false judgments, we destroy the only thing that truly matters: virtue, our bond with God.

    Being attached to indifferent things is always a terrible trade-off — even when misfortune never strikes. It does not matter if the eggs get cooked, the child thrives, and the house stands. The moment we mistake these for genuine goods, we fall into false judgments — and lose virtue.

    To show how irrational that trade-off is, the Stoics use a series of striking metaphors:

    It is like the light of a lamp eclipsed and obliterated by the rays of the sun; like a drop of honey lost in the vastness of the Aegean Sea; a penny added to the riches of Croesus. . . . Such is the value of [external and] bodily goods that it is unavoidably eclipsed, overwhelmed, and destroyed by the splendor and grandeur of virtue.

    As a rule, ancient philosophers are ethical egoists, and the Stoics are no exception. Everything we do is driven by self-love — the desire for what is advantageous to us. But wise self-love is directed at the goods of the soul: wisdom and virtue, which consist in correct judgments. Chasing external goods is like trading the light of the sun for the glow of a candle or the wealth of Croesus for a penny — choosing something worthless over the one thing worthwhile. What could be more self-destructive?

    Stoicism stands or falls on the claim that virtue eclipses everything. If that is true, then nothing can shake a virtuous person’s equanimity. Once we have virtue, there is nothing left to gain or lose.

    We can now revisit the three moments when I lost my peace of mind. Had I been a Stoic, I would not have been upset by the scholarship rejection, the prospect of dying, or the perivascular space growing in my son’s brain. I would have seen them as part of God’s flawless plan and made the right judgments — not only accepting them but endorsing them. Eclipsed by the “splendor and grandeur of virtue,” my losses should hardly have registered at all. 

    Fortune’s rollercoaster

    Few rode the wheel of fortune more wildly than the Seneca.

    At the top: the Stoic philosopher was born into a prominent Roman family and built an impressive career, rising to high office and serving as mentor to the emperor.

    At the bottom: Emperor Caligula, envious of Seneca’s brilliance, orders him to commit suicide — only sparing him because he is gravely ill and expected to die soon anyway.

    Back at the top: under Emperor Claudius, Seneca becomes a trusted advisor.

    And down again: Claudius, angered by Seneca’s criticisms of autocracy, exiles him to Corsica. He loses his status, his property, and his homeland, spending eight years in exile, where he writes a letter of consolation to his mother, Helvia.

    Another rise: Agrippina, mother of the future emperor Nero, brings Seneca back to court. He becomes Nero’s tutor and later his advisor.

    The final fall: Nero, determined to rule without interference, murders his mother and commands Seneca to commit suicide. Seneca complies with equanimity, calmly having his veins cut while dictating his final thoughts as his life drains away.

    We can now explain Seneca’s trajectory in Stoic terms. Why pursue wealth, honor, and a political career? Because God implanted self-love in human nature, and these things help us preserve ourselves. And why not mourn the losses that came with exile and death? Because wise self-love preserves the goods of the soul through correct value judgments.

    That is exactly how Seneca consoles Helvia. The things taken from him — property, status, homeland — have no true value, he argues. And the things that have true value can never be taken away:

    This universe, the greatest and most splendidly furnished of Nature’s creations, and the most magnificent part of it, the mind of man, that surveys and marvels at the universe, are our own possessions in perpetuity.

    Whether at home or in exile, in a villa or a prison cell, we are always in the flawless universe. And a beautiful mind is an internal good, not an external one — something no tyrant can take away. So, Seneca reassures Helvia, she has nothing to worry about.

    Are the Stoics hypocrites?

    Among all the ancient schools, Stoicism enjoys by far the biggest modern revival. Today thousands of self-described Stoics pursue a sleek self-help version of the philosophical life. Athletes, military officers, executives, and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs are especially drawn to it — and not by accident. Repackaged by best-selling authors such as Ryan Holiday, Stoicism has become a toolkit for personal success, mental toughness, and peak productivity — less a path to wisdom than a strategy for winning: morning routines, journaling hacks, and motivational quotes from Marcus Aurelius, cherry-picked to fire up a CEO on a treadmill. But is this just a caricature of the ancient doctrine, as some maintain — or does it, in some way, capture its spirit?

    Stoicism can easily slide into a license for ruthless selfishness. The concept of “preferred indifferents” lets you chase wealth, power, and a sculpted physique — whatever enhances your resilience. And if divine providence governs all, then the misfortunes of others are not unjust — they are ordained. Virtue may be the only true good, but it turns out you can have that and the yacht. What begins with a bow to Socrates ends in a TED Talk on hustle culture.

    To be fair, one can give Stoic ethics a social-democratic twist. As a Stoic, you believe God has implanted self-love in you, drawing you toward health, status, and wealth. But you also recognize that same self-love in every other person — and that God wants their self-preservation as much as yours. Helping to create conditions in which others can flourish, then, becomes an extension of your own duty — and a part of aligning your life with God’s plan and assisting in its realization.

    This social-democratic Stoic might support progressive taxation. He may even look like a modern activist, working to reduce suffering and improve society. But beneath the surface lies a deep moral divide. The activist fights to fix a world he sees as unjust. The Stoic believes justice already permeates the universe. For him, activism is not about mending a broken world — it’s about playing one’s part in a perfect one. And whether he succeeds or fails makes no difference: the world remains flawless either way. 

    If, like me, you don’t believe in divine providence, that version of Stoicism is no more persuasive than the self-help one.

    Is Stoicism obsolete?

    Imagine you are the director of a UN refugee camp. The people in the makeshift tents have survived a brutal war and lost nearly everything. Would you hand them a brochure of Stoic consolation — telling them that everything unfolds according to a flawless rational plan, that nothing of true value has been taken from them, that their suffering is simply a matter of mistaken judgments? Or would you focus on protecting what they have left and creating conditions so future generations are spared what they endured?

    At first glance, Stoic consolation seems cruel — not only rationalizing away the refugees’ suffering, but adding insult to injury by blaming them for it. It is also based on a view of God and the universe that few moderns accept.

    Should we then give up on virtue and return to bending the arc of the universe? The liberal vision of justice looks roughly like this: securing for everyone the freedom to live as they please, ensuring a fair distribution of resources so that all have the means to pursue their life-choices, and guaranteeing equal opportunities, free from discrimination. Whether or not one embraces Stoic virtue is a personal matter — it has no bearing on this conception of justice. Virtue does play a role in modern liberal thought, but it is largely confined to civic responsibility: respecting others’ rights, upholding fair institutions, and participating in democratic life. That’s no small feat, to be sure. Still, on the liberal view, justice depends on the right arrangement of external conditions, with civic virtues as a means to that end; on the Stoic view, justice consists entirely in the virtuous choices of individuals.

    As I have said, I do not believe in the flawless, providentially ordered universe of the Stoics. But I am interested in the power of virtue — and have come to experience first-hand the resilience that the “goods of the soul” can provide. During my contentious divorce, several pillars of my world collapsed at once. It wasn’t just the marriage or the family structure that I had built my life around. Almost overnight, I lost access to the beautiful city and the country houses where our children had spent their happiest years — both houses owned by my wife. Parts of the social networks that had shaped our shared life unraveled. Much of what was familiar and stable was suddenly gone.

    And yet my life was not shattered. One of the things I most looked forward to during that time was teaching my university classes. For those hours, my mind was immersed in philosophical ideas, engaged in lively discussions with students. Reading, teaching, and writing offered not just reprieve, but moments of bliss. I grew close to a colleague who was also going through a divorce. We commiserated a little — but we were far happier talking about Plato.

    Another source of stability was moral action: I poured my energy into shielding my children from the upheaval, doing everything I could to keep their world as intact as possible.

    Of course I felt the losses. Of course I grieved. The goods of the soul — exercising my intellectual, creative, and moral capacities — did not “eclipse and overwhelm” everything, as the Stoics would have it. But they did offer some protection. They gave me something to hold onto when much else had slipped away.

    I reject the Stoic claim that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness — that we can be just as happy in the Bull of Phalaris as at a dinner party. But their radical position serves a crucial purpose — it throws into sharp relief an insight central to ancient philosophy from Socrates onward: the importance of the “goods of the soul” as a cornerstone of both flourishing and resilience.

    Stoic egalitarianism likewise goes too far. A flourishing life isn’t available to all just by making the right choices. Still, the goods of the soul are remarkably inclusive: they do not depend on race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation, on good looks or perfect health, on great wealth, power, or prestige. They are, in short, very widely available.

    Aristotle or the Stoics?

    My conception of virtue is far closer to Aristotle’s than to the Stoics’. And the difference is significant. Aristotle scoffs at the idea that a virtuous person could be happy in the Brazen Bull: “People who claim that the person being tortured, or the person who has fallen on very bad times, is happy if he is good are . . . talking nonsense.” For Aristotle, the good life depends on external conditions from the moment we are born. Our upbringing, he insists, “makes all the difference.” Raised in a virtuous family and community, we are on the path to flourishing; raised in a corrupting environment, we are on the path to ruin.

    His world is flawed: crime, war, and earthquakes are genuinely bad. The wise may be less vulnerable than the foolish thanks to foresight and prudence (they won’t sail during hurricane season or build where wildfires rage). But they are not invulnerable.

    While Aristotle ranks the “goods of the soul” highest, he makes room for external goods. You cannot achieve scientific breakthroughs, just laws, or great works of art under just any conditions — say, if you are enslaved on a sugar plantation, trapped in an assembly line job, or growing up in a Mumbai slum. Aristotle’s flawed world is also one we can improve — unlike the flawless one of the Stoics. He holds the active life — a life devoted to justice and the common good — in high esteem. His Nicomachean Ethics is, above all, a guide for lawmakers — a manual for how to build a society in which all citizens can flourish. Moreover, a flourishing life means something different to Aristotle: realizing our moral, creative, and intellectual potential. With no all-encompassing providential plan, virtue cannot consist in giving the thumbs up to everything.

    Even if we attain the goods of the soul, we remain vulnerable to “torture” or “very bad times.” Yet in Aristotle’s view even the gravest misfortunes cannot destroy the virtuous person entirely:

    The noble shines through, when a person calmly bears many great misfortunes, not through insensibility, but by being well bred and great-souled. . . . The truly good and wise person . . . bears all the fortunes of life with dignity and always does the noblest thing in the circumstances, as a good . . . shoemaker makes the noblest shoe out of the leather he is given. . . . If this is so, the happy person could never become wretched, though he will not be blessed if he meets with luck like that of Priam.

    The Aristotelian would not emerge happy from Seneca’s rollercoaster, but he would not be crushed either. In the refugee camp, he would not collapse in grief or preach consolation. He would set about organizing food, shelter, and opportunities for creativity, learning, and conversation.

    Should we all become Aristotelians?

    The Aristotelian, it seems, gets to have it both ways. He works to improve the external conditions for flourishing — justice, peace, education, vaccines — while also cultivating the internal ones: art, friendship, moral character, wisdom. He acknowledges the role of luck yet strives to make us less vulnerable to its blows. He both bends the arc of the universe and invests in inner transformation. Unlike the Stoic, he does not deny the value of external goods; unlike the modern activist, he doesn’t limit his mission to distributing these goods fairly.

    Yet there are problems with Aristotle’s flawed universe — problems the Stoic and the activist would be quick to point out. They lie in his metaphysics, which the Stoic sees as incoherent and the activist as obsolete. Though flawed, Aristotle’s universe is still a far cry from the “disenchanted” one posited by modern science. Like the Stoic cosmos, it is ordered by a Divine Mind — “the first principle of heaven and nature.” But then where do the flaws come from, the Stoic wants to know. Meanwhile the activist sees no evidence for a divine order in the first place.

    Consider a table, Aristotle would tell the Stoic. It consists of matter — the wood — and form — the table’s shape. The wood has the potential to become a table; the form, imposed by the carpenter, actualizes that potential. All physical things, he argues, are made up of matter and form. At the most basic level lies prime matter: completely passive, featureless, and able to receive any form. But where there is potential, there is also failure. An acorn becomes an oak if it falls on fertile soil; it withers if the ground is barren. A gifted child’s potential is wasted if there is no school in town. Even Phalaris had the potential for virtue. His failure reflects the contingencies of embodied existence — nature, habit, and society. So Aristotle gets the Divine Mind off the hook: the universe’s flaws stem not from God, but from matter’s instability. The Divine Mind is all-good but not all-powerful. The rational order it grounds is compromised by the imperfection of the material in which it is realized.

    The Stoics reject this answer. If matter is completely passive and contributes only potentiality, then all outcomes must ultimately derive from the active principle — the Divine Mind. A flawed world would mean a flawed plan. For the Stoics, that is unthinkable. If the Divine Mind governs all things, flaws simply cannot exist. Metaphysically speaking, they have a point — and they are willing to bite the bullet for consistency, embracing claims that fly in the face of lived experience: You can be happy in the Brazen Bull! No reason to shed a tear over the death of a loved one! The suffering of the innocent is not evil!

    We moderns are tempted to dismiss the entire debate. We are not troubled by whether matter limits the power of the Divine Mind. Our problem is that we see no compelling evidence for a Divine Mind to begin with. What we observe is a vast, dark, mostly empty universe that burst into existence some fourteen billion years ago. In it, we spend a brief moment on a small planet in one of countless galaxies, living lives of no cosmic consequence. And these lives emerged from a primordial soup, shaped not by rational design, Stoic or Aristotelian, but by the random mutations of evolution and countless chance encounters across generations.

    Secular virtue?

    Can we still be Aristotelians in an indifferent universe? Does it still have an arc for us to bend? Aristotle, like the Stoics, believes that the moral order is inscribed in the structure of the world. The key difference is that for Aristotle we must work to actualize it — the potential for virtue in ourselves and for justice in our communities. Everything, in Aristotle’s world, has a telos — an end it naturally strives toward. Acorns aim to become oaks; human beings aim to develop their creative, moral, and intellectual capacities. Flourishing — eudaimonia — is not just a feeling, but the objective fulfillment of what we are meant to be. That telos is determined by nature’s rational order, whose ultimate cause is the Divine Mind. In an indifferent universe, however, there is no built-in purpose. Our capacities remain — but whether we ought to develop them is anything but obvious.

    Contemporary virtue ethicists have tried to preserve Aristotle’s ideal of human excellence without a divine order. In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that without a conception of the human good — without a telos — moral talk about rules, duties, and virtues becomes hollow. He offers a stark choice: Aristotle or Nietzsche, teleology or nihilism. To avoid metaphysics, MacIntyre turns to culture: our telos, he says, is shaped by the traditions and narratives of our community. But that opens the door to relativism. What if you grew up in Nazi Germany and found your purpose in annihilating Jews and ensuring Aryan supremacy? Plenty of cultures promote ideals we find abhorrent — racist, misogynistic, homophobic, inegalitarian. Macntyre replies that only cultures that let us flourish as rational, social beings count. But in that case, isn’t he appealing to natural teleology — the very thing he set out to avoid?

    Philippa Foot does embrace natural teleology, but without the theology. If we can objectively assess what it means for an oak or an elephant to flourish, why not do the same for humans? But her answer begs a question: why should we want to flourish in this way? If Van Gogh or Kafka had flourished like vigorous elephants, we might have been deprived of some of the greatest works of modern art. And does flourishing entail moral virtue? The wild lion tearing into a gazelle may flourish more fully than the tame one in a zoo. But is it more virtuous? Can nature, purged of the divine, really provide an ethical model for us?

    In the end, neither MacIntyre nor Foot succeeds in detaching teleology from metaphysics. Of course, secular atheists are free to develop whatever capacities they please, and to fight for peace and justice. But if we seek a reason — if we want a coherent account of why we should strive to flourish and help others do the same — we need something like the Aristotelian framework: a universe that is both rational and flawed, a human good that is both objective and vulnerable, a moral arc that does not bend on its own but still gives us reason to try. 

    Otherwise, we are left with two extremes: the flawless universe of the Stoics, where justice already reigns, or the indifferent universe of the atheist, where flourishing and justice lack a deeper foundation. We may think that we are secular, but when we take our children to piano class, or nudge them to read, or encourage them to sell lemonade for a good cause; when we find comfort in books, art, conversation, or volunteering; when we do our part to make justice prevail — we unwittingly affirm the ethics and metaphysics of virtue.

    My Identity

    All my life, reading has made me feel on the verge of something,
    like a bird turning in the wind to lay itself bare
    before going higher — with feet stretched out behind —
    higher than the indifferent trees and noisy earth.
    I’m grateful to my teachers who nurtured this experience,
    education being our first need after food,
    for this created calm within the mutilated bower,
    where I lay — still a nascent thing —
    muttering language with its two beats
    speaking the music of my heart, and with three my mind.
    Many experience separateness as exhaustion,
    but I didn’t; instead, I felt so unified and whole,
    as when sunshine lights up the hut and all
    the ground about it is warm and dry again.

    Wild Type

    Mutants are not so very interesting
    as wild types and other natural strains,
    like penguins wearing tuxedos
    and tigers with black-striped orange fur.
    With my regular looks and manners,
    I am no mutant made of chemicals.
    Still, the world makes no sense to me,
    and sometimes it’s as if I am wearing
    the wrong eyeglasses. Then time passes —
    “Life is a stream!”; people often say this,
    though it isn’t really my experience.
    Is it possible a need to express myself
    with words is the result of my wild type?
    Lately, mutants have been in the news a lot,
    with the South African variant and the X-Men
    (super-heroes led by Professor X, a telepath).
    The wild types have felt a little neglected,
    though letting go of certainty has almost
    freed us from seeking the regard of others,
    that most lowly mode of satisfaction.
    Despite the nights when the moments seem
    to pass like hours (from sleeplessness),
    I am always so surprised and grateful,
    when morning arrives, to hear my voice
    asking again, with a burst of love
    in my hungry, wild-type heart,
    “Darling, how would you like
    your eggs cooked today?”

    “No One Over Fifty, Please”

    A man doesn’t cease to exist because he is invisible.
    He is like a lone guitar, or curly neck-hairs, or false water.
    Pull his arm when you go by, and he forgets
    it once was a fin (according to Darwin).
    Another year passes, never to be lived again.
    I remember being touched, but I cannot be and have been.
    Since we don’t know if we live beyond this life,
    let’s give ourselves to loving —
    to eyes, hands, lips, and ears.
    Do you hear those birds talking —
    is there anything more ravishing?
    In the world of things — so animalistic and blunt —
    we are but tumbles of flesh seeking definition,
    like sterile florets awaiting daybreak.

    Young Tom’s Room

    Gloucester, Massachusetts

    I.

    I’m sorry you were not my favorite.
    Probably your dark substratum was too much for me.
    I don’t believe in Hell; therefore, I don’t fear it.
    I’m no possum playing dead to conceal myself.
    Reading in your boyhood room, I feel like a counterpart to nature and the animals,
    and I still prefer Marianne Moore, who created a marvelous new idiom.
    But I love bicycling along your grey granite shoreline, from the boatyards to the port.
    And I love watching the pea fog burn off the icy water.
    Certainly, I fear death by water more than Hell.
    Yesterday, a fingerless man was selling cod.
    A child peered into a rock-pool at a sea anemone.
    The fir trees looked thirsty and seagulls screamed in the air.
    A schooner with a mermaid bowsprit sailed toward open sea.
    I was wearing my trousers with the cuffs rolled up like a knockabout sailor.
    Church-goers emerged into the marine light, but I felt no ancestor worship.
    Home and Mother were faraway.
    Still, the blue sea and birdsong beckoned to a place deep inside me. 

    II.

    At night, the wind howls and black waves smash against the rocky coastline.
    There are visitations:
    a skunk in the corridor, pictures awry on walls, wet pillows, coyotes baying.
    I read all night and drink wine with pistachios.
    I love the bare-rock outcroppings from glaciation that surround the house like staunch comforting arms.
    Tom, I agree that genuineness (your word) is more important than greatness.
    Tom, I agree that our duty is to serve, extend, and improve the language.
    Tom, I agree that forms have to be broken to be remade.
    I don’t want to write only from my head and cling to youthful experiences.
    I don’t want to become a dignified man who says what is expected of him.
    I don’t want to lose myself in a larger context, like a bee in the foxglove.
    Clambering over rock, I study the pool’s frail seaweed and the hungry starfish.
    I hear the song of the fishermen’s dories lowered into the deadly sea.
    At dawn, the pure sweetness of the hermit thrush calls to me.
    For all I know, the rest of my life is taking flight.

    Stephen Foster in Exile

    For my brother, Bryan Lightweis (1977–2024)

    Comrade, fill no glass for me 

    You might as well cancel the songwriter’s century. Nothing short of that could eliminate his hooks and rhythms, the vocables and caesurae and scansion that have, in each of his songs, a performance history of their own. Born in the American provinces, he traveled the sonic planet, pillaging traditions to build his own oeuvre. He wrote about places he had never or not yet seen — names on the map and nameless sites, too. The music dances with or without the motion of your body in space: you hear in his songs a certain strut, a spin, a pivot on the heel. Women’s names in his lyrics feel like wanted posters: the beginning of a love story or a missing person’s report. Sometimes, I wonder at his raw feeling; sometimes, at the purity of his commercial ambitions. No one was ever so tender or so grasping: a songwriter and a widget-maker all at once. He lived in the terrarium of his music; he seemed to ablate his identity, erase his own face. Some necessary shifts in the culture have nonetheless rendered his music dangerous: bad in the old and older senses. He stole something profound from the most powerless people in his world, and so we are left to contemplate reparative action in our own time, even at significant cost to his legacy. But any cost, any reduction in his status, rattles the foundation of vernacular music and — if it doesn’t sound too alarmist — the nation itself. How will they hum? How will they whistle? How will they sing? Perhaps a scalpel could remove those sounds from the American brain, but we would be left with his inheritors — which is to say, everyone. 

    Who, you might ask, is this artist who has defined America? No, not Michael Jackson. It is Stephen Collins Foster, the nation’s first professional songwriter. Think about their characters, all assembled in the singular and strange American canon: Susie and Susanna, Diana and Jeannie, Billie Jean and Nelly Bly. Think, too, of the troubles they travel with in contemporary America. One doesn’t want to linger on the subjects of “Pretty Young Thing” (1982), “Thriller” (1985), or “Smooth Criminal” (1987), which now seem like signed confessions of Jackson’s pedophilia. Foster’s danger, of course, feels more foundational to the composition of his music than Jackson’s not-so-secret life: blackface minstrelsy is more often the text than the subtext of his work. But it is nonetheless true that these two songwriters created our soundscape. 

    Myths circle Foster, who had the fortune — good or bad, depending upon your perspective — of life before MTV. Among those myths, there is a post-hoc conversion narrative that claimed he moved from the blackface stage to the domestic parlor with the conscious composition of more genteel music, that he redeemed the minstrel’s lampoon in “Oh Susanna!” (1848) with tender songs like “Nelly Was a Lady” (1849). Both songs pry apart a man and woman, but the latter ends with a widower’s lament — “toll the bell for lovely Nell / my dark Virginny bride” — that refuses the flattening language of the minstrel stage. The conversion narrative, however, is belied by any complete chronology of Foster’s career. The historian Emily Bingham demonstrates that he likely turned to — rather than from — the blackface stage in order to support his young family. Foster wanted to “build up a taste for the Ethiopian songs among refined people,” as he wrote to the showman E. P. Christy in 1852, “by making the words suitable to their taste, instead of the trashy and really offensive words which belong to some songs of that order.” 

    This is no conversion: Foster sanitized the minstrel song for the family piano, rather than wholly leaving the genre behind. Another famous songwriter, John Newton, is said to have given himself to God during a turbulent voyage in the Atlantic Ocean. He wrote “Amazing Grace” in 1748 and quit the ignoble profession of slave-trading after only seven more years of feathering his nest. Whatever pangs of conscience Foster felt, he similarly answered in the Augustinian tradition of saying “not yet.” He wrote plantation songs until 1864, when he drank himself to death on the Bowery in New York. His body was found with a potential first line — “Dear friends and gentle hearts” — scrawled onto a torn piece of paper and tucked into his pocket. He might have died of drink, or more efficiently taken his own life with a knife. Accounts vary. 

    Much of Foster’s myth was devised by his brother Morrison. An able promoter, he saw some advantage in inscribing Stephen’s birth on July 4, 1826, within a few hours of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson’s eerily proximate deaths. We approach Foster’s bicentennial — as marked in calls for academic papers and special journal issues and smaller-scale events near his Pittsburgh birthplace and spiritual home along the Ohio River — but we are unlikely to see his life memorialized in proportion to his influence. A few interested parties might turn to his music — from Paul Robeson’s stentorian “Swanee River” (1930) to the Byrds’ proto-psychedelic “Oh Susanna!” (1965) — with the blinds drawn and the volume low. In the opening scene of Blazing Saddles, written by Mel Brooks with Andrew Bergman and Richard Pryor, a white foreman demands a “good old work song” like “Camptown Races” — a Foster song from 1850 — from an all-black railroad crew. Instead Bart suavely sings “I Get a Kick Out of You” with that urbane indifference to racial aggression that characterizes every sublime second of Cleavon Little’s time on screen. But as soon as he is out of the line of sight of the white cowboys, Bart dances a modified chicken wing on a pump trolley. He sings Foster’s doo dah doo dah while he dances, though he claimed to prefer Cole Porter. I may try the same ruse.

    I arrived in Cincinnati close to midnight on an autumn day in November 2023, and found myself locked out of an AirBnb close to Washington Park. For a while I wandered in freezing temperatures, through cobblestone streets and slim rowhouses. I passed a ragged man sleeping under the awning of a Lebanese restaurant, closed for the evening. A woman leaned out of a third-story window to tell me that I shouldn’t smoke on this block, an interaction you will interpret as a sign of gentrification or the “authentic” neighborhood cultures that preceded it, depending on where you live. (I hurried along but did not extinguish the joint. A Louisiana resident for most of my adult life, I needed this simulation of a campfire on a cold winter’s night). Little alleys passed between the park and the interstate. Any lane might take you to the river eventually, but Cincinnati has been mutilated, like so many cities north and south of it, by ring roads and commuter loops.

    I had some fantasy of walking toward the Ohio River, where Stephen Foster lived from 1846 until 1850, but sensibly I waited for daylight, when my traveling companion could walk beside me. Near the site of the Foster marker promised by internet sleuths, I found unnatural changes in elevation — a hill up, a pitch down — that attend mid-century highway construction. The stadiums glowed across the interstate; a casino hunched a few blocks back on my side of the road. Able travelers will tell you that the expansion of gambling is a signal change of American spaces in the last decade; you see the billboards for sports betting, tribal bingo, or ersatz “riverboats” — terrestrial buildings defined by river frontage, not seaworthiness — everywhere you go. Foster had the Bowery to feed his appetites; we have the Hard Rock Cincinnati.

    Last decade’s headline from The Onion — “Mayor Hits on Crazy Idea of Developing City’s Waterfront” — springs to memory in places like the Cincinnati riverfront: tense collaborations between the lures of the historic quarters of a city and the monstrously ugly roads that carry you toward them. Once the sun set again, I let my vision blur and saw the exit ramps and frontage roads as modern echoes of the architecturally preserved Factor’s Walk in Savannah. The Walk is a series of stairwells and bridges built into the Yamacraw Bluff at Savannah’s Riverfront. They once served as transit between cotton warehouses, accountant’s offices, and the port below; now it is full of bars and gift shops. The riverfront neighborhood of Cincinnati had the same function in Foster’s America. A warren of antebellum buildings abut a tunnel to I-75; somewhere inside, the songwriter worked as a bookkeeper for his brother Morrison’s steamships. Here he wrote “Oh Susanna!,” which is not the song of the Gold Rush, whatever historical shorthand reports, but of what Ira Berlin calls the Second Migration: the forced displacement of slaves from the East Coast to the Cotton Kingdom. If the narrator finds Susanna in New Orleans, it will be because he boarded the “telegraph” ship that stole her southward. Perhaps it is the boat that slave trade “innovators” such as Isaac Franklin and John Armfield used to move captives from Alexandria, Virginia to Louisiana by water, rather than inefficient overland chain gangs used by their competitors. 

    Foster gazed across the Ohio River into captive Kentucky. The river rolled in his songs. The enslaved stevedores in nearby Louisville sometimes chanted doo dah, doo dah, as the legend goes. Foster tailored the sounds of their labor for the minstrel stage. More than the Mason–Dixon line or the Long Bridge, the Ohio River is the border between slavery and freedom. But if you go there looking for a hard line, you will find that it is a porous boundary. Perhaps these slender rowhouses and cobblestones are not what you expected from Ohio, but of course there was something before all the Rust: another obsolete economy that left an imprint on its waterfront. “In Native ballad form and melodic strain distinctively American he sang of simple joys and pathos to all the world,” the marker to Foster reads. And what is more distinctly American than dislocation? 

    Al Jolson enacts two tremendous masquerades in The Wonder Bar, a Busby Berkeley film from 1934, set on one busy night in a Paris club. In the film’s twenty-minute musical climax, he wanders through heaven, meeting various characters of the minstrel stage, including Stephen Foster’s Old Black Joe and the “cabin show” iteration of saintly Uncle Tom. He sings Al Dubin and Harry Warren’s “Going to Heaven on a Mule,” a hit for Rudy Vallee in the same year. He searches for his mule in the afterlife and they are reunited once the beast wins its own bright wings. Each angelic appendage looks like a leftover meal hastily wrapped in aluminum foil. The film is set in the contained space of a Paris nightclub, populated by American tourists, displaced Russians, and European demi-mondaines, but the set wildly expands during the musical sequence. Now the Wonder Bar is big enough to contain a rainbow bridge from the land of the living, a celestial Main Street as setting for the newly-dead’s welcome parade, a club-within-a-club for dice-throwing and roulette-spinning angels, and hundreds of extras — all in blackface — made to look like a crowd of thousands with the help of strategically placed mirrors. The Archangel Gabriel and Saint Peter appear, with their cotton-ball beards affixed to corked-up faces. Heaven has a skilled barber and a grove where cooked pork chops fall from trees. A chicken walks into an oven with claws and combs intact but comes out as a three-piece and a biscuit with no trail of blood and feathers.

    This is heady blackface — strong poison for contemporary viewers who experience minstrelsy as “moral typhus,” in Robert F. Moss’ words. Notably, there is very little writing about The Wonder Bar in the canon of film criticism, despite the marquee careers of its star and its director. Insofar as anyone seeks out the film these days, I suspect it is for glimpses of a pre-Hayes Code sexual morality. Older women on holiday in Paris boldly arrange adulterous liaisons with younger men. As the singer Inez, Dolores del Río can scarcely keep her dress on; she looks like she knows — to paraphrase Joan Didion — the erotic charge of a suicide pact. And while the Wonder Bar isn’t a gay club, it’s also not not a gay club. “Boys will be boys,” Jolson whistles when two men dance past him in a clinch. 

    But “Going to Heaven on a Mule” is the showstopper; it offers the audience some relief from Al’s romantic disappointment with the fickle Inez. The staging is closer to the deliberate artifice of Singin’ in the Rain (1952) than the sung-through verisimilitude of Les Miserables (1987). Which is to say: Peter and Gabriel and Old Black Joe and Uncle Tom and the blackface cherubs singing Cab Calloway’s hi-dee-ho do not advance the story, even if they provide eruptive pleasure for audiences. What we learn about Al — his circumstances, his mischief, his great escapes — comes from his earlier masquerade. Here Al Jolson is in costume as Al Wonder, but Al Wonder is not yet in costume as the blackface minstrel. 

    Strolling between his patrons’ tables, he instantly recognizes a White Russian. I dare not speculate about the reason for this recognition; I note only that a contemporaneous comedy, Israel Zangwill’s The Melting Pot in 1908, ends with the marriage of a Jew to a Slav in New York. David Quizano recognizes his new father-in-law as the man who killed his family at Kishinev, but the New World recognizes no reasons that the nuptials should not proceed. (David holds his peace.) Jolson’s Al Wonder, by contrast, commits to a more fleeting bond than matrimony, sitting with the Russian to spin a tale of romance, of a lost culture, of cheek-kisses and heel-clicks to salute the dead Tsarina. He weaves a tale of his family and gives them all elite jobs in the Bolshoi and the Mariinsky. The Russian never drops his drink or hesitates to part with his money for the unctuous host; he has been off-country so long that he doesn’t recognize a gonif from Srednik. The stakes of the subterfuge are minor; Al takes some pleasure in the old aristocrat’s sentimental treatment of him as a landsmann, then walks toward the audience and delivers the Russian chestnut “Ochie Chernye,” or “Dark Eyes,” which was written in 1843, with the same tenderness that he devoted to his “Mammy” in The Jazz Singer in 1927. 

    The masquerade is undone on the blackface stage; this is authentic minstrelsy, with the shtetl in the frame of the performer’s memory. Before we get to heaven, the audience sees Al applying black paint in the mirror, still humming the old Russian song about dark eyes. The mirror pose is a signature shot for blackface performers from the age of classic cinema — who, I hasten to mention, included black actors as well as white. This simple fact is often ignored, but it is nonetheless true that sweeping-away the minstrel tradition would, if successful, leave us bereft of performers such as Bill Bojangles Robinson and Dooley Wilson, and writers such as Bert Williams and James Weldon Johnson, and Jolson’s sometime-collaborator Cab Calloway, and his foremost interpreter Jackie Wilson. (Yes, that Jackie Wilson. In 1961 he recorded a tribute album to Jolson.) 

    Once Al changes from his tuxedo to his overalls and straw hat, he sits on the porch of a fake cabin. A little girl asks him, “Uncle Asa, are you going to heaven?” The musical sequence shows not only Al Wonder and Al Jolson but also Asa Yoelson, the cantor’s son who trained himself to emote sacred and secular music alike by holding a lit match between his teeth with the flame licking his tongue. When Al sits for the first haircut and shave of his afterlife, cherubs deliver newspapers to the men waiting for the barber. The little angel saves the Yiddish paper for Al. In translation, the headline reads Paradise Times and announces heaven’s new arrivals. For a moment, the camera freezes on the front page with cork-painted hands holding it up for the spectators’ perusal. Then Al lowers it slightly and, peering over the Yiddish lettering, lubriciously winks at the audience. 

    Pretending to be a Slav is a practical joke, but painting your face to answer to your own name is an authentic ruse: an excavation of unsayable sentiment, nostalgia, and yearning for dangerous places. Jewish Lithuania made Al Jolson, but it was a point of departure. Two years later, in The Singing Kid (1936), four music executives badgered Al to try something new. “Those Mammy songs have whiskers and they’re hammy songs,” sing The Yacht Club Boys, a vocal quartet, in disguise as management. “My Mammy may be ham today but she made me what I am today,” Jolson sings back. As they debouche the elevator, the executives hustle Jolson away from a black woman waiting to embark; they enforce a racial separation that minstrelsy incompletely resisted. (The earliest bowdlerizations of Mark Twain were by conservatives who were distressed by the ways in which Huck Finn — a racist by present-day standards — transgresses the color line.) 

    Yes, this scene is transferable to the twenty-first century, but the executives would have a different slate of objections. On the street below the recording studio, Al’s efforts are endorsed by an Irish cop, a Yiddish newspaperman, and an Italian window-washer trying out operatic trills. Nearly one hundred years later, the authentic ruse has accrued some sentimental attachments — without the paint, of course — because it became a pleasurable legerdemain for performers in the decades that followed. In Seinfeld, the hero’s Jewishness is acknowledged for the first time in Season 5, when Jerry exonerates himself for buying his Native girlfriend a cigar-store Indian. After all, he’s never gotten offended when someone asks “Which way is Israel?” The studio audience laughs in waves: incompletely, then slowly and with more conviction. For five seasons they have believed that Jerry’s Sicilian best friend is the son of two Jewish vaudevillians; Seinfeld’s own parents are portrayed by two ferocious Irish clowns. The WASP ex-girlfriend is portrayed by Julia Louis-Dreyfus: yes, the Dreyfus of the Dreyfus Affair. 

    This, too, is elaborate masquerade; and when the paint disappeared, some of its fluidity departed, too. Inoculating the popular culture against the “moral typhus” of minstrelsy has stripped it of some of the complex experiences of “white ethnics” in America. In 1927, The Jazz Singer could unbraid the tensions between assimilation and tradition because it was a comedy. Dramatic acting, on the other hand, had a stricter code of concealment for Jews: Leslie Howard (born Leslie Howard Steiner) went to the plantation, too, in 1939, playing Ashley Wilkes in Gone With the Wind, but his reputation was made by Hollywood’s marketing of him as a boarding school boy, an English gentleman, a leading man. Churchill chose Howard as the United Kingdom’s man in Europe. He died in this higher-stakes subterfuge, shot down by the Nazis over the Bay of Biscay.

    All of this is to say that contemporary thinking about blackface relies on a misapprehension. Eric Lott’s now-canonical book Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class, from 1993, reads the minstrel’s love as a kind of curiosity, a chaotic raid on racial boundaries led by painted clowns. But the minstrel’s love is a route into his own core, not into black culture. Blackness provides a shorthand for America itself. When I asked a friend to read a draft of this essay, she circled my reference to Busby Berkeley’s hundreds of extras in blackface and exclaimed “anything not to hire a black actor!” But of course the minstrel’s whiteness is the point: Al Jolson’s skin shows through the paint as he grips the Yiddish newspaper. Beards and wings are falling off the other minstrels despite the production values; only the ecstasy of performance — of tap-dancing, of appetite, of revelation, of wonder — can turn a painted face into blackface. 

    So what is being concealed? Jolson gave the audience his history; in the cliché of modern therapy-speak, he brought his whole self to work. No one would accuse him of loving Mama Yoelson a fraction less than his tearful performance of “Mammy” suggests; after all, she died within weeks of his arrival in the United States. When Jolson grew old, he collaborated with Columbia Pictures and dubbed his own voice over Larry Parks’ dancing body in The Jolson Story (1946) and Jolson Sings Again (1949): yet another displacement. In short, he wrote his life story with the instrument that Stephen Foster — born a world away, in radically different conditions — had refined. And Jolson repaid him by singing the forgotten verse to “Oh Susanna!” Even postbellum minstrels omitted its hideous description of a boat accident that leaves hundreds of black people dead. Jolson sings it, with notable revision: 

    Oh I jumped abroad the telegraph and traveled around the bend
    The electric fluid magnified and killed five hundred men
    The bulgine bust, the horse run off, I really thought I’d die;
    I shut my eyes and hold my breath, Susanna don’t you cry.

    The original line does not refer to the dead as men. Jolson replaces river with bend; in Foster’s original version, river is an assonant rhyme with the n-word. (And a “bulgine” is an old word for a steam locomotive made up of “bull” and “engine.”) 

    Contrary to the notion that people have only recently learned to avoid the slur, I would note that it functions as a bright line between racists and their enemies among other whites as early as 1852, in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin. When Simon Legree calls Tom by that name, gentle George Shelby punches him in the face. Without the racial slur, Jolson’s line is a postmortem collaboration with and correction of Foster, offered by a singer we can imagine as a grieving witness to exilic suffering, because he was. And once he painted his face, he could cry about it. 

    An addict has many guises. He wakes each morning to adjust the mask of normalcy and sanity. Perhaps the most refined of his masquerades is his performance as his child self. He feigns helplessness and disorder even though he planned the last bender as carefully as a trust fund kid plans their gap year. Skip the “he” and “one”: I am the addict in question. Sometimes, on the way to an act of self-destruction, I stop and remind myself that it hasn’t happened. I haven’t done it yet; I’m only wishing for it. Occasionally that pause opens a door for grace to enter. Sometimes, after fervent planning and long travels, I find myself sitting across the table from someone or something and think, “Why the hell did I do this?” And by this, I mean, why did I effect yet another plan that can only end in my death? 

    I suspect that Stephen Foster asked himself these questions; I know that his song “Comrades Fill No Glass for Me” (1855) proffers an answer.

    I know a breast that once was light
    Whose patient sufferings need my care
    I know a hearth that once was bright,
    But drooping hopes have nestled there.
    Then while the tear drops nightly steal
    From wounded hearts that I should heal
    Though boon companions may ye be,
    But comrades, fill no glass for me.

    Though boon companions may ye be,
    But comrades, fill no glass for me.
    When I was young I felt the tide
    Of aspirations undefiled,
    But manhood’s years have wronged the pride
    My parents centered in their child.
    Then, by a mother’s sacred tear,
    By all that memory should revere,
    Though boon companions may ye be,
    Oh! comrades, fill no glass for me.
    Though boon companions may ye be,
    Oh! comrades, fill no glass for me.

    There it is: the addict runs through his index of loss and failure, and that shame is a lure to, not a cure for, what ails him. He grieves his marriage’s dissolution into resentment and despair. Written in 1854 in proximity to “Jeannie with the Light Brown Hair” — likely a love song for his estranged wife, Jane — the narrator’s half-willing bond may be better than Foster could have hoped for. Jane Foster left him in 1853. By 1855, the light of retrospection offers him some clarity, but not enough to keep him sober. The grammar of songwriting is always more tangled than that of a plain prose sentence, but I suspect these “boon companions” are raising a toast to their poor friend’s wounded mother in the final lines, drinking by and for her suffering. He asks them twice not to fill his glass; perhaps they acquiesce to his plea. Sometimes they do not; this I can attest.

    By 1862, Foster had lived apart from Jane and their daughter Marion for nearly a decade, but the conflict surfaces again in “My Wife is a Most Knowing Woman,” co-written with George Cooper. “This life we all know is a short one, but some tongues are long, heaven knows,” they write. “And a miserable life is a husband’s who numbers his wife with his foes.” The wife here is not an archetypal fishwife, but a true antagonist; he takes pain to exclude all the usual reasons for strife, including sexual jealousy. Insofar as women notice the man in “My Wife is a Most Knowing Woman” on the street, it is because he reeks of booze and failure. 

    Historians impose a dyad on Foster’s songwriting: they are either parlor songs or they are written for the minstrel stage. Between and beyond those bookends, however, Foster wrote autobiographical songs with all the force and clarity of poets a century after him, in the postwar confessional genre. Yet there is a curious tendency to see even this branch of Foster’s work as political. The Library of Congress indexes his drunken laments as temperance ballads, as does the University of Pittsburgh, home of the Foster archives. But certain bruises to the soul, especially but not exclusively addiction, are not political, yet without being apolitical: that is an impossible fiction. It strikes me as strange to put Foster’s dissipation and despair into the Procrustean bed of temperance politics, which were, in the last decades of his life, coalescing into a radical movement that touched the same nerves as abolitionism. “I am a temperance man because I am an anti-slavery man,” Frederick Douglass told a Scottish audience in 1846. “And I am an anti-slavery man because I love my fellow men.” Foster’s drinking songs, by contrast, are singular: stories of one man in which his fellow men might find some corner of understanding. And — contrary to postmortem exonerations that are wholly unnecessary for the celebration of his music — Foster was no abolitionist.

    Fifteen years ago, as a fledgling graduate student and an untreated addict, I wrote about the “conversion narrative” in Foster scholarship — from minstrel to parlor, from racist to respectable — in hopes of understanding his relationship to race in the twenty-first century. The rhetorical ruse that begins this essay — the bait and switch between Michael Jackson and Stephen Foster — was one I tried then, with Foster and Mark Twain. I cited Norman Podhoretz and Elizabeth Hardwick calling Twain the soul of America and tarring his critics as Stalinists. The reader’s reports were terrible; a colleague later told me there was a kind of blacklist among musicologists, who mistook my argument for an attempt to cancel Stephen Foster. The essay has had an afterlife, though, and I have some small part in the coming bicentennial celebrations for Foster.

    Then and now, I write to say that an artist who bears the weight of the nation bears too much, and that a troubling artist excused in nationalistic terms has found poor defenders. No artist requires the imprimatur of national value or, for that matter, communitarian or identititarian value. Recent writing on Foster has asked that institutions such as the University of Pittsburgh and the Kentucky Derby place his fate in the hands of black communities — a suggestion often made by whites who endorse the truth and authenticity of a single perspective with which they agree and use as a shield against criticism. These calls reject the answers that Paul Robeson and Ray Charles and Marian Anderson and Mavis Staples have already offered in song; we do no justice by explaining their germinal performances of Foster as strictly commercial, or by imagining that they would sing a different song in these putatively enlightened times. 

    I didn’t understand the politics of antebellum America when I first wrote about Foster. Even now, I don’t fully understand their murkiness and imbrication: Roger Taney, Charles Sumner, Preston Brooks, and Eastman Johnson all lived on a single block in the District of Columbia in the decade before the Civil War. No public denunciations or revoked dinner invitations would have clarified, or resolved, their differing politics or brought Emancipation decades sooner. It took a war, in which more than half a million people died for three or four million reasons. “One of the biases of retrospection is to believe that the moral crises of the past were clearer than our own — that, had we been alive at the time, we would have recognized them,” writes Kathryn Schulz. The past was murky — not the clear young spirit of vodka or gin, but the long-distilled poison of my beloved, fatal deep brown single-malt whiskey. The borders were as fluid as the river between Kentucky and Ohio. 

    And this is the trouble with writing about the representatively American body of “Ethiopian music”: the paint is gone, but the music remains. The white performer lingers, but the black man he seems to lampoon was never there. It is blackface in the same way that clowning is whiteface — which is to say, not at all. It is a means of expression for people at the margins: immigrants and exiles, who sacrificed some portion of particularity, history, and expression to become straw men for arguments about whiteness. (As a young teacher, I sometimes quoted Malcolm X in a lecture about immigration; he said that the n-word was the first English word that immigrants learned. I hereby apologize to my grandparents for sweeping away the full range of their experience with these social justice pieties). Yes, blackface is injurious. But the cork paint was a Trojan mask: the artists inside are (still) a motley crew. 

    If you are a centenarian, you might have seen a performance of Foster’s songs on the blackface stage. You might have performed in black paint even if you are quite a bit younger — say, a current elected official to statewide office in Virginia or to national office in Canada. Younger than that, and you might only know Foster from Looney Tunes: Bugs Bunny was a fan. Perhaps someone is reading this essay and learning Foster’s name; I assure you that you have heard him in the rhythm of a riverboat’s paddle. In 1985, Jerry Lee Lewis, Fats Domino, and Ray Charles performed “Swanee River Rock” — Charles’ adaptation of Foster — live in New Orleans with Paul Shaffer and Ronnie Wood. It takes two hundred and sixty four keys to make this song swing so hard. A video is widely available, and it is no exaggeration to call it required viewing. The camera begins on Lewis’ diamond-studded hands and moves to Domino’s grin; Ray Charles is a late addition, but his face transforms with pleasure for the music, and for the fellowship, too. The two are inseparable. 

    Estuaries of American music can, like the Swanee, the Ohio, the Mississippi, and the Great Pee Dee, take you somewhere familiar. Their iterability offers you something to grasp — a crew to roll with in the streets of New Orleans, even. The songs, as the fictional folksinger says in Inside Llewyn Davis, never get old though they never sound new. The conversion is not the songwriter’s retreat from his troubling genre, but your own adaptation to the sound of your life, your voice, your submerged and emerging histories. Every time the road brings you to Stephen Foster, like Jolson, you make him, but you never make him new. You make him yours.

    Enlightened Sirens: Naples and Music

    1.

    Opera arrived in Naples twice, first among the contortions of myth and then in an unlikely twist of history. The myth is an extravagantly famous one about someone who survives hearing some singing that should destroy him.

    Homer barely describes the Sirens, but their high voices float all the more forcefully out of the Odyssey as a result. The heaps of bones surrounding them on their island are described, but Odysseus has been told what to do to avoid being pulled by their singing to shipwreck and destruction. So he fills the ears of his oarsmen with beeswax, a material that echoes the honey of the voices that it must exclude, and he gets them to bind him to the mast so that he can listen and yet voyage onwards. No one had ever done so, and no one was meant to do so. We are invited to imagine his cries to be released, so that he could shatter himself in the ecstasy of listening, mingling with the singing of the Sirens. The beeswax was there to keep this out, too. Homer’s poem follows the Greek hero to his next adventures, of course, so it is elsewhere that we learn that the singers were so appalled by his escape that they drowned themselves in the Tyrrhenian Sea. You could call this an atonement for their failure, or conclude that they somehow sacrificed themselves so that Odysseus could survive. One of their corpses washed ashore in what would become the bay of Naples, and her name, Parthenope, was originally given to this city that would become the capital of the singing voice, and of the liquid pull of opera.

    Its second arrival waited for modern history. We find the latter starting as it meant to go on, in a mood of fragility, doubt, and bravado. The year is 1650 and the great, sad, violent empire of the Spanish Habsburgs has spent the last three decades throwing enough conflict across Europe, not without help from others, to persuade later historians to invent something called the Thirty Years War; and now, as is the habit of empires, it needs funds. Naples, a seething port with a grand past and a vast population that makes it heave with both wealth and poverty, is one of the oddest and most constitutionally anomalous points within the whole frenzied tapestry that made up Habsburg power. Genoese bankers, Spanish politicians, and Calabrian landowners mix there with hyperactive teams of builders and rivalrous religious orders, and with phalanxes of entrepreneurs on every scale, from ambitious maritime speculators to the most scabrous smugglers. Modern cities are places of layers and knots and tangles, and Naples grasped and was hit by modernity early. The more deliriously modern cities become, the more raw and unresolved the voices with which the past speaks in them are forced or allowed to be.

    Naples loved spectacle, and three years earlier a sharply charismatic fisherman and smuggler in his early twenties known as Masaniello had exploited a day of public festivities and war games to turn what had been tremors of inchoate discontent at Spanish taxes into an outright revolt. One especially unpopular tax targeted fruit; a contemporary chronicle reports with dry outrage that it extended to lupins and both red and white mulberries. The Habsburg Viceroy was forced to hole up with a rump of troops in the Castel Nuovo with its access to the sea, and this insurgent conducted the city’s affairs from the door of his meager house, wearing his tattered fishing clothes. His uprising was energetic but its aims were opaque and improvisatory, and it proliferated confusing protagonists, such as the radical and brilliant priest and lawyer Gennaro Genoino, who was a longstanding agitator against Spain, or the rather tremulous current incarnation of the Duc de Guise, who came adventuring down carrying suggestions of French help and dreams of a kingdom of his own. 

    At one point something called a republican monarchy was declared, as if all that these rebels could do was to throw words into the void that they were uncovering at the heart of power. After Spanish rule had grindingly reasserted itself, the Viceroy knew that this void called for some new version of spectacle, whether to articulate it or to cover it up. Opera had been surging forwards in Italy during the recent strife because of the mixtures of festive splendor with vivid uncertainty that make up its very substance, and so it was to opera’s new-fangled and acute glamour that he turned. A wheeling producer from the Veneto called Curzio Manara was available to bring a troupe, partly because not long before he had been forced out of a similar undertaking in Paris, under suspicion of passing on sensitive city plans to the French. 

    Thus did a Neapolitan fisherman conspire with continental unrest to set going the processes that would eventually bring something called classical music to creation. And so, in 1650, Naples staged its first opera, Francesco Cavalli’s La Didone. The piece tells its story with a ragged opulence that must have matched the mood in the hectically festooned pavilion in the Viceroy’s palace where it was put on, as the Carthaginian queen Dido takes in and is betrayed by the refugee Trojan hero Aeneas, whose vast destiny of founding Rome precludes her. Reports from Neapolitan newspapers tellingly shift its title to emphasize the sack of the city of Troy, which only begins the narrative; its own recent fits of violence and instability must have made the city’s first operagoers feel as if political reality itself was singing within Cavalli’s music, and much of his most torrid expressiveness does indeed come as the opening act tears nimbly through Troy’s destruction. Ecuba and Cassandra sing with mixtures of excruciating plaintiveness and dire moral menace that preempt, at least as much as they prefigure, the later laments of Dido herself as the future of the world leaves her behind.

    Lament thus pervades Cavalli’s opera, but it suddenly departs just where Dido’s story should bring it to its height. While Aeneas finally steers away towards Italy like Odysseus slipping away from the Sirens, her voice has begun gathering together all the opera’s vistas of loss when the tale twists. A local king called Iarbas has been providing dramatic complexity and vocal variety by rivalling Aeneas’ claim on Dido’s heart, and he bursts on stage to turn her imminent suicide into the lieto fine, the happy ending, to which opera seria would often seem wedded. Still, innumerable later settings of her story in Naples across the eighteenth century would prove sonorously sure that they should end with her suffering. But right at the wobbly start of Neapolitan opera, we find this odd clue to what would keep making vocal style there so fluid, dynamic, and restless: the great collision at the heart of the local form. Drives of lament and all the violence and wounds of history collide within the city’s music with comedy, pleasure, and the delirium of form as it keeps limiting and freeing itself.

    One argument of this essay is that opera was ultimately a less important musical phenomenon than the aria itself. The claim is complicated, though, because the coming of opera with all its quantities of prestige, investment, and collaboration, all its heightenings of desire and pleasure, did pump new, richly unsteady momentum into the already vibrant world of Neapolitan vocal music across the second half of the eighteenth century. Venice was the undisputed champion, around 1650, of opera in Italy and so across Europe. La Didone is indeed almost exaggeratedly exemplary of the aspect of ambitious seventeenth-century opera that the coming of the new versions of Neapolitan vocal style would overturn, because recitative passages feature so much of its most wrenching, probing music. In Naples the aria became the wings, the flesh, the very psyche of opera, and one consequence of this was the teeming density of interaction between operas and all the other versions of vocal music that arias sing in. 

    As Europe went about seeking an enlightened entrance into modern history, it was Naples’ version of vocal style that became the crucial artistic vector and analysis of the culture’s minds and bodies, and it did so by concentrating with spiraling relentlessness and finesse on defining and extending how arias worked. Because change and dispute and divergency made up so much of the city’s political and civic substance, it needed an artistic form capable of great flexibility and nimbleness, one filled at once with a teeming simplicity and a sort of tough abundance. It would turn out in fact that arias can only get defined by being extended, because nothing in the world of the aria has any inside except by expanding vociferously outwards. The name of the composer who did most to achieve all this was Alessandro Scarlatti, and the da capo aria, the one that starts again from its beginning and to our ears sounds like a hoary cliché, was the form that he turned into the crucial stylistic driver of the movement to modernize music.

    The Scarlattis were a powerful musical clan from Sicily, but the vast reputation that brought Alessandro Scarlatti as a very young man to Naples was made in Rome, where he was the prodigious favorite of that splendid and difficult exile from the wreckage of the Thirty Years War, Christina, the former queen of Sweden. He was just eighteen when he composed the first of his crowds of operas, and Gli Equivoci nel Sembiante repaid the confidence that this exotic tyro evidently inspired in himself as well as others, becoming such a heady success when it was first privately performed in the winter early in 1679 that Christina briskly arranged for it to be put on again for a larger audience. She also immediately made Scarlatti her maestro di cappella despite not having a chapel or anything much else for him to be master of, and a small riot ensued at the opera’s second venue among those pushing to get in. The buzz of controversy continued as more of the city’s movers wanted to see the thing; no one wanted to miss out, so it continued to be performed despite the tendrils of the Pope’s official desire to suppress opera. Bologna’s hunger for aesthetic novelty meant that later that same year it became the first of many cities, around Italy and up to Vienna, to put the opera on. As early as 1680 the work hit Naples, trailing glamorous combinations of prestige and scandal.

    Gli Equivoci nel Sembiante is indeed a deliciously unnerving work in its compounds of formulaic efficiency and raking, torrid, creative willfulness. The cascades of excitement that it set off among the day’s cultural grandees are oddly, loopily mirrored in the congested mirrors and loops of desire that its drama sets out. Yet Another Comedy of Even More Errors would be one title for it in English, though the Italian gleams with the suggestive idea that resemblance itself is what is confusing. So two eventual pairs of lovers find themselves driven through a gyrating machinery of misapprehensions and mishaps, their moods and interactions spiraling with such crackling speed and density that the pastoral backdrop feels at points like a sort of hothouse for expressive fervor. At other stages, it starts to feel like the sort of wasteland that such fervor leaves behind; the compounds of giddiness and obsession that make up the inner life of expression in modern culture all the way through to Breton’s surrealism are already present as Scarlatti’s career ignites. 

    Almost grim in the relentlessness with which it pulls these characters through desire, confusion, and reconciliation, the little opera triumphs because of the stunning stylistic variety with which Scarlatti both offsets and exploits its conventionality. The arias are generally far from the da capo shapes that he would soon start specializing in, and they sometimes nearly choke on everything that he has started asking them to do. Scarlatti’s music languishes and then snarls, and then swaggers into abrasive little bursts of harmonic wit, leaping between moods with a rapidity that keeps threatening to turn cursory. At the same time, though, the recitative passages that carry the actual narrative developments in Baroque opera are still far more prominent and distinctive here than they would remain. But all this is of course the point. As it presses its own forms and rhythms and timbres for their every momentary juice of expressive color and purpose, the opera becomes a sort of manifesto for the world of arias that was looming.

    Naples became the place for Scarlatti to expand in because it was large but inchoate, because it was swarmingly copious and various, because it was uncertainly suspended between drives of civilizational uplift and a sort of sheer agglomerative mayhem. It was, in other words, a place markedly like this brilliant, driven, convulsive young man who was now spinning with both worldly success and cultural afflatus. Opera in Baroque Rome was too institutionally embattled and commercially stifled, while other centers offered less room to maneuver than this overpopulated city with its complex governmental structure and its notorious diversity of festive occasions and institutional bodies. The field of action in Naples was remarkably free and abuzz with potential a few decades after opera had been thrown into its extravagant mix of musical and theatrical traditions, and Scarlatti travelled there with an operatic troupe himself in 1683 at a happy moment. Early in 1684 the viceregal maestro di cappella died after only a handful of years in position, and the young man was there on the spot, with his mixture of energetic freshness, expansive reputation, and Roman authority and sleekness.

    Viceroys in Naples acted fast when it came to music. Within days Scarlatti got the job, in a hurry that reflects the keenness on some parts to grab him, but also the amounts of distrust that needed bypassing. The hugely talented, hugely spiky figure of the composer Francesco Provenzale was the local favorite, and he had been holding grudges already since being passed over for the post those few years earlier. At the same time Scarlatti’s sister had thrown herself into show business in Naples alongside him, and lurid rumors surrounded her from the start that were both viciously misogynistic and probably fairly well-founded. But then for Scarlatti Naples was always a dazzling problem, a mutating provocation that made him become a master of fluency and flexibility. Constant tensions between the Viceroy’s court and the city’s ecclesiastical leadership typified the political multifariousness that reigned in the place, and would have made themselves felt for someone with his job in the most intimate details of style, of his moment by moment compositional choices. 

    One of his first major pieces in his new position in Naples was the Passio Secundum Johannem, which he composed in 1685 as a setting of the Easter story, and it is almost vehement in its insistence on the adaptability of his style for such purposes. He deploys his feel for melodic charm in riveting bursts and touches to point up the largely austere sound world; elsewhere, sweeps of harmonic openness spread a keening pathos over crucial but crucially brief passages. The listening priests may have felt reassured by the combinations of tense spiritual pathos with angular stylistic vim, or they may have felt upbraided. Versatility and metamorphosis would be vital to everything that Scarlatti bequeathed to music and so to modern culture. But his versions of them would feed on how endlessly he was also committed to analysis and simplification, and a certain stately curtness.

    2.

    Inventing the da capo aria is no longer, thankfully, the sort of achievement that music histories tend to confer on someone like Scarlatti merely because he composed so many fine ones that they have survived in teeming numbers. His oeuvre even so has been preserved too patchily and performed far too sporadically for accounts of his development to be very confident, and it was surrounded by misty, colorful seas of vocal music that it now offers us slippery and prismatic ways of listening in on. Using an artistic form strongly enough makes a paradigm of it — and then that paradigm gets cast back onto the blanks of the past and interpreted as a matter of invention. As Scarlatti took up his career in Naples, the da capo aria was probably already turning itself slowly but fiercely into the chief shape available for vocal music. The composer died in 1725, just as the era of the great poet and librettist Pietro Metastasio began to gel, based as it was on an often extremely rigorous alternation of da capo arias with sparsely set recitative passages. Did Scarlatti do more than anyone to make this happen? No one did more to show what the da capo aria could do, to interpret the potential statements within this avid little vessel about what language, expression, and action were becoming.

    The da capo term is a simple one, and the shape that it names can sound more like a sort of show-business ruse than like one of the technically rigorous forms that Scarlatti’s epoch of fugues and courtly dances exalted. A da capo aria is simply one that at a certain point starts again from the beginning; it tells its performers to go back to the head or to take it from the top. But no one wanted arias that looped on endlessly, so the idea was not to sing again everything that had come before the da capo instruction, but just to repeat the first of two increasingly rigorously distinct initial sections. Overall the result was thus a ternary form in which the third section repeated the first, and the second was left as a sort of floating pivot that was at once enclosed and richly undefined. The geometry is all the more pliable, expansive, and even rampant for having such basic foundations. One of the stylistic and indeed existential phenomena that the da capo aria keeps under constant, fluid examination is repetition itself. Not even repetition is ever the same thing twice, after all, and a form based on repeating and reversing is an ideal means by which a social world beset by change and obsessed with innovation can try to keep track of itself.

    The genius of the da capo aria is to find in this single formal gesture routes to both definition and multiplicity. At the heart of the form was the demand that the repeated section be sung with extensive, often voluble extra layers of decoration and flourish. It is a perpetually weird and thrilling moment: right at the point when the aria has said the two things that it has to say, the thing that everyone has really been waiting for unleashes itself and the singing voice pours out its abundance. Composing vocal music was less a matter of telling the voice what to do than giving it a pliant, suggestive batch of materials to go to work on. Scarlatti’s acute analytical mind must have found this a perpetually equivocal process, one that hands over the keys to arias to their singers and lets them decide whether expressive elucidation or gorgeous obliteration should prevail. Descartes himself had been Christina’s crucial favorite earlier in her hungry cultural progress, and it seems clear that the composer either shared or had taken on some geometrical passion for clarity and the identification of a thing’s essential engines. The da capo aria is the point in the emergence of modern Europe where Descartes and show business meet and conjoin, as singing digs deep into the essence of its resources and turns them into panache and impact.

    Is the point of art to discover essence and bedrock, or do we want change and flux and new vistas? Scarlatti had arrived in Naples as a very young man who was both a vastly admired phenomenon and a much distrusted outsider; he had to be zanily productive both to keep the status and to maintain the sheer momentum of his artistic growth, and his every move was sharply scrutinized. Naples itself becomes a sort of constant, noisy, plangent collaborator in these arias as they go on opening themselves to their singers’ voices and the hungry ears of their listeners. Whenever a da capo aria returns to its beginning, the composer’s notes let their authority flow out into the performer’s decisions, the passions and powers of the performative moment that streams between a voice and an audience within the heady or gaudy or stifling atmosphere of this or that dramatic occasion. The aria loops backwards and pulls the character and the singer alike ever further into its present tense of expression, but then reveals deep within itself the audience’s teeming pleasures and demands. Because its machinery of reiteration can so easily seem formulaic but is in fact so filled with potential, the da capo aria offers itself as a state of endless exposure to the judgments of tiers and worlds of others.

    Urban life itself is thus in a way the major driver of Neapolitan vocal music, the great song within all its shapes and ecstasies. The city grew and grew through the seventeenth century as a result of deliberate policies and the lure of imperial wealth, but also because controls were lax and the levers of policy slippery and haphazard, and because imperial economics had brought atrophy to the surrounding regions. Scarlatti arrived right during the pivotal passages when this seething, uncertain place began to assert its distinctive claims and logics, began indeed to try to grasp its own breaks with the past and its need to make its own present. Roiling debates about the nature of newness itself and the relationship between ancient and modern styles of art and learning characterized the early enlightenment years across Europe, and in Naples during the 1680s they reached a distinctive pitch. 

    Giuseppe Valletta was the great businessman, lawyer, and bibliophile who gave crucial direction to the city’s burgeoning enlightenment scene by making his vast and impressively radical library available to arrays of readers and thinkers. He was a promoter of Epicureanism at a time when its strains of atomistic materialism were controversial to the point of danger, and he pushed the new scientific theories that were both promising and threatening a changed world, as they threw their innovations up into the decreasingly heavenly spheres and down into the workings of everyone’s flesh. The hectic flash of presentness itself as incarnated in his rapid, heady brushstrokes was the great Luca Giordano’s constant subject and draw as he became decisive amongst the city’s painters; his sobriquet was “fa presto” because of how fast he worked. As Naples finally pulled its visual culture free of Caravaggio’s shocking impact there early in the seventeenth century, Francesco Solimena became the city’s next great painter, and his work has qualities of intellectual thrust and scrupulous vim that partly explain how he became Scarlatti’s close ally and almost married his daughter.

    Naples itself could have been called an Accademia degli Investiganti, the name that belonged to the tangled gang of Cartesians and reformers and sceptics gathered around Valletta. Within music itself, the place was charged with performative life craving compositional shape. Carlo Cailò was establishing a piquant local version of the widely accelerating styles of solo violin playing, setting up symbioses between the instrument and the city’s vocal traditions that would bear complex fruit with Tartini decades later. Matteo Sassano, known as Matteuccio, was by 1690 establishing himself as a vital early megastar in the city’s great, weird, and notorious line of castrato singers. The flesh of the likes of Matteuccio or “the nightingale of Naples,” carried especially livid reminders of how much performance meant in this world: Losing so much makes someone need to be special, and want to use the intensity of the present tense to chase the past from sight. But then the century’s last decade saw the arrival and the graduation in law of Pietro Giannone, the pioneer of secular historiography who by the early 1720s embodied the city’s drives of change and consciousness ever more fractiously, and whose destiny of flight and imprisonment rancidly darkened the enlightenment in Naples. The power of Scarlatti’s vocal style comes not from any simply glamorous opening up of performance and delight, but from fusing such energies with taut and angular sorts of shapeliness, scrutiny, and restraint. It is this fusion that makes him the great pivot, far more influential at least in the short term than those anomalous monsters of drastic technique and pulverizing brio Bach and Handel, between the innovations in musical modernity brought by Monteverdi around 1600 and their culmination towards and around 1800 in Vienna.

    The composer and violinist Gian Carlo Cailò arrived in Naples from Rome at around the same time as Scarlatti, and may well have gone as part of his circle. Sassano’s deep and enduring connections with Scarlatti are vastly attested, but only amount to one vista onto the blaze of links, collaborations, affiliations, inheritances, rivalries, and disputes that drove Neapolitan music rapidly forwards as the turn of the century approached. During these decades the city’s famed systems of musical pedagogy began to reach full acceleration, involving not just its seethingly energetic conservatories but drives towards whole new educational methods based in repetitious drilling and the simplification of compositional units. Urbanization and music were pretty much the same thing in Naples, and Scarlatti’s place at the peak of the city’s central musical hierarchy only exposed him to how voraciously other versions of authority and power were proliferating. The noble classes were squeezed between the centralizing pulls of Spanish rule and the city’s dense forests of civic governance, but shinily expensive musical entertainments were forums that they could excel in. In Naples, religion and the throng of urban life flowed together turbulently like two seas on top of each other, as the church gorged on the zeal of local cults and the excitements of festive cycles — and all this needed musical expression, too. Splintering religious meaning and practices filled the city with rivalrous churches or pushy fraternities keen to commission their own masterpieces of sacred uplift. The crisply bountiful Stabat Mater drawn from Scarlatti by one such commission was the precedent for the imperishable setting by Giovanni Battista Pergolesi a handful of decades later, which would become the flagship for Neapolitan vocal style in the twentieth century. Proliferation and simplification were indeed the artistic drives that Scarlatti wielded in answer to the churning commissions, requests, and opportunities thrown his way; proliferation and simplification are the da capo aria’s deep vectors.

    It must have sometimes felt like being a city himself. Scarlatti seems to have combined imperiousness and charm in his character as well as his music; a kick of excitement and prestige tends to surround his name when contemporaries mention him, however patchily. But he needed a vehicle as nimble and steely as the da capo aria to negotiate the sheer ferocity with which he was being asked to absorb and to manipulate a vast and mutating cultural world. He sets high spiritual meditations and great Biblical stories, poignant or prim pastoral verses and mighty or obscure passages from ancient or medieval history, severe set pieces of tragic pathos or cleverly caustic blasts of satire. His oratorios on Scriptural stories may have more weaving narrative dash than any of his operas, and among the latter his comic intermezzos have a stunningly sturdy waggishness. But Scarlatti’s most fully achieved body of work may well be his musical monologues — dramatic or chamber cantatas, shorter pieces often full of fragile intellectual verve as they typically alternate a couple of arias with recitative passages, and designed for one singer to perform privately with very limited accompaniment. Their introverted dramas and rarified audiences encourage artistic ambitions that are almost esoterically strenuous, as their recitativi pour speech rhythms and states of high psychic tension down through often extravagantly open musical textures. Paradoxically, the tense expressive momentum that thus feeds into the arias themselves lets Scarlatti turn them into a sort of cumulative laboratory for his love of compression and coolly shaped wit. His chamber cantatas become a massive, ongoing experiment not just in the inner structures by which arias function, but in the shifting and volatile levels of mobility and autonomy with which they do and do not belong to their surrounding works.

    One such aria has proved so adventitiously detachable that it has ended up existing as a freestanding little masterpiece, either severed from a cantata or possibly composed in quirky isolation in the first place. It is known as “Sconsolato rusignolo,” from the disconsolate nightingale that its first line addresses, and the neatly silvery sort of soprano voice which suggests that the nightingale of Naples himself may have been the intended singer. But the key word in the first of the aria’s two tercets, and hence the centerpiece of the decorations when that tercet is repeated, is the injunction “rispondi,” “respond,” with which the singer implores the bird to make its song into an iteration of his own. Distinctive scoring deepens the aria’s enigmas and its exquisite sonorousness alike; Scarlatti gives what was already an expanded accompanimental group of instruments a final kick of almost excessively sweet piquancy by adding a very independent part for an instrument that he labels a flautino, and that was probably an especially high recorder. Scarlatti loved playfully literal types of descriptive instrumental writing, and of course this obbligato part is there to draw the nightingale right into the aria’s notes. But who is responding to what here, really? The fiction of address set up by the text is deliciously collapsed in advance by giving the nightingale an instrumental voice that makes it playfully integral to the aria’s musical machinery from the outset. By the point of the da capo section and the singer’s even more expansive pleas for an avian response, it has become an aria with no outside, one that has pulled its own drama inward into how giddily and yet rigorously the music explores and answers itself. Sparse but sturdy sorts of archness and wit bespray the violin writing too, and across the aria overall a certain twitching playfulness emerges from within the poignancy, turning it lustrous.

    Across the whole high period of Neapolitan vocal style, zeniths of expression are indeed things that undo or contradict themselves. Richly expressed pains and losses yield pleasure and release, thereby turning themselves into triumphs. Joy and reconciliation reveal again and again their inner loads of fragility and pathos. It is one reason why the famous Affektenlehre or theory of the affects that was so influential then (and remains a favorite recourse for music historians) is mainly unhelpful: the da capo aria is indeed a machine for squeezing the juices out of any given emotion, but it is also a microscope ratcheted up to reveal teeming levels of diversity and ambiguity within every drop of each juice. The two high vowel sounds that surround the lower central one in the word rispondi turn it in this aria into a skittish little effigy of the da capo shape itself, and the decorations that the aria suggests are similarly diagrammatic matters of shifting pitches and intervallic stretches, rather than the sort of engorged melismatic runs that Neapolitan vocal music would increasingly specialize in. 

    Scarlatti’s background in Christina’s Rome had suffused his youth in the Arcadian ethos that would define the modernizing sides of Italian literature well into the eighteenth century, and reverence for Descartes was indeed compatible to the point of symbiosis with the urges towards order and refinement that powered the Arcadian movement, which set out to rid Italian poetry of its Baroque flamboyance and adopt a more classical and pastoral simplicity of taste. Pastoral itself becomes Cartesian in an aria such as this one, as sheer intensity of artifice exhibits its own structures with a frenzy so polished that it comes across as calmness itself, and a wit so lucid that it can claim those structures as facts of the natural world. The aria can be fairly securely dated to early 1701. Right at the beginning of the eighteenth century, delight itself had to be fierce.

    3.

    The arc of European history across that century was driven by a sort of frenzy within sovereignty itself, one that led to the flash of the guillotine. Among Neapolitan wags the running joke around its start was to ask whether justice would be done tomorrow. Would the next day bring the widely expected upheavals that would cast judgment on the city and its affairs, and finally reveal where its future led? But the question was also a playfully practical one of whether the chaotic, splintering legal system could function at all for another day. The death of Charles II of Spain in 1700 with no obvious successor laid bare Naples’ pervasive, multifarious uncertainty about who it wanted to belong to or where legitimacy lay or how coherent its constitution was. It took a while for the question of the Spanish succession to swell fully into the jerky, tenebrous war that scrambled territorial holdings across the continent.

    Amid swarms of more or less edible smaller players, the Habsburgs and the Bourbons were the grand predators whose vast proclamations of righteous supremacy were matched by the endless, malicious opportunism of their maneuvers. Swagger and panic made up the inner life of their political visions, and they can be heard across much of the period’s music, as the vocal lines of the arias that its regimes loved continue simultaneously to gleam with formal verve and to cascade with often raucous nervous charge. Matteo Sassano himself had been summoned to the Spanish court to see if his singing could assuage the crippling gloom of the emperor’s last years, in a twist that could have been designed to allegorize the tight relationships between high vocal style and the debility of power. Sassano’s greatest successor amongst Neapolitan castratos replicated the allegory a few decades later when the imperious Farinelli went there to sing to another sad monarch. In fact Farinelli became a real political player at the court, as well as an ally of none other than Alessandro’s son Domenico Scarlatti.

    Rumors surrounding Charles’ decline and what would follow his death had for years suffused civic life in Naples, endowing the city with the type of cryptic energy that is inseparable from ricocheting doubt. His demise operated like a sort of slow spasm releasing political confusion into the place from long before and until long after the little physical event itself, and seemingly issuing to about equal degrees in mordancy, doomsaying, and plots. The Macchia conspiracy of 1701 to decouple the Neapolitan monarchy from Spain in favor of the Austrian branch of the swaying Habsburg tree must have been lengthily premeditated, to judge by how quickly it got going after Charles’ death. Named after one of the grand but ill-fated aristocrats behind the attempt, the plot dissipated quickly too. It was the lack of hard military backing that doomed it, and the coming of outright war eventually doomed the Spanish themselves, so that by the middle of the 1710s the city’s viceroys were indeed being sent from Vienna. But the transfer of sovereignty only slowly became official, and power in Naples continued to be frayed by the knowledge of its own unsteadiness and fungibility, and by the split allegiances and fallback plans cultivated by any number of its sharper citizens. 

    Since the Austrian regime only lasted until 1734, when a fairly small Bourbon invasion finally dispatched it, it is important to remember that the political atmosphere of these years was filled with a tenuousness so complex and enfolded as to support plenty of fantasies and indeed fears of durability. It is often noted that early eighteenth-century opera was enmeshed with state power, but less often how rife with such fantasies and fears such power typically was, how giddy with the excitement and bravado of its own improvisatory innovativeness. During these drifting, treacherous crises, Naples was a sea of disparate buildings and jerky projects that did not so much give the lie to Baroque fantasies of the muscular choreography of urban power as reveal their teetering restlessness.

    Composers and musicians felt all this with special nervous, and indeed financial, directness because their lives were at once hemmed in and explosively driven by high political affairs. In Naples the commissioning classes were diverse, insecure, and rivalrous, and its music made its styles as much out of these forces as out of the same classes’ drives of aggrandizement and pleasure. The basic terms of engagement changed so often and so vastly that musical stardom must have felt like a special sort of vulnerability. So in 1701 this place that was becoming the pumping heart of European vocal music got an edict briefly banning singing altogether from the stage! Scarlatti and his collaborators devised an outrageously crude workaround whereby puppets enacted the visible drama while behind the scenes the singers carried on. 

    Understandably, he spent much of the first decade of the new century travelling in ardent search of openings elsewhere. He was increasingly preoccupied by the fate of his prodigious son Domenico, whose posthumous fame has often all but submerged his father’s. As posterity very richly knows, the younger Scarlatti was really a keyboard specialist, and Naples was not the place for his fullest impact. But by the time the new regime was sufficiently settled in Naples to be disappointing those who had vested hopes of regeneration in it, his father had settled himself more fully back there in a spirit of productive resignation to compose through his later years. The Austrians were impressively keen to have him back in his old job, and he did not need to be nearly as productive this time around.

    Naples was full of people switching codes, hedging bets, and biding blurry amounts of time over these years. Scarlatti’s reputation and the odd mixtures of haughtiness and flexibility that made up his charisma allowed him to get by on alternations of opaque calm with fits of entrepreneurial energy. The early enlightenment in Naples was a time in which buffoons, tricksters, and high idealists constantly join hands or switch places, in patterns of combination that become crazily familiar later in the writings of such as Diderot. In Andrea Perrucci, a deracinated Sicilian nobleman who wrote a major early treatise on the aesthetics of improvisation right around the turn of the century, Naples had its first great librettist; having failed in elaborate attempts to prove that he had been deprived of his inheritance on his home island, he ended up practicing law in the city while in effect incarnating some thesis about how losing the past drives cultural invention. 

    There was also the picaresque, erratic aristocrat Emanuele d’Astorga, one more figure to combine Sicilian roots with Neapolitan culture like Scarlatti and Perrucci, a zesty composer who skipped across Italy and far beyond over the early eighteenth century after political shenanigans and familial violence forced him from the island. He wanderingly teamed up with a brilliant, shady Neapolitan poet called Sebastiano Biancardi, who is better known to posterity as Domenico Lalli. The name ostensibly came from the craze for sonorous aliases within the Arcadian movement, but he was something of a con man as well as an entrepreneur of taste and uplift; the two friends were then themselves devastatingly robbed by their own servant in Genoa. Aristocratic titles were handed out over these years with nearly satirical keenness, and lives were filled with departures and reversals, lurches from high to low fortune or status and from episodes of needy sycophancy to ones of bristling showmanship. Names were changed for fun or because of clerical changes across borders, because of debts or as part of some vicious scheme, or as part of a cultural scene where pseudonyms reflected a cult of metamorphosis pervaded with hints of political caution.

    Eighteenth-century music is driven by this cultural and political churn. Far from the neatly arranged and stably absolutist jigsaw of courts and territories that its rulers wanted to add up to, and that music historians persist in crediting, the political culture of the first half of the century was volatile, cunning, fitful, inventive to the point of hallucination, anxious to the point of fervor, lurchingly violent. It went on commissioning works of opera seria because it wanted to seem confident, wealthy, radiant. But relentlessly opera seria is a genre where the holes and the wishfulness show through, filled with quantities of lustrous but often spreadeagled extravagance at the levels of music and overall spectacle but also with weird and often stultifying freights of dramatic incoherence or narrative monomania. The aria could absorb all the grandeur of the operas that it lived in, and all the desires that they instilled, while insisting on being mobile, changeable, fluid, on operating as an ongoing bejewelled switching point between lucidity and disorder. Along with the da capo aria itself, the grand innovation associated with Scarlatti is the strict, streamlined alternation between relatively dry recitative passages setting out the opera’s action and the arias that carry the real charge. 

    Deeply controversial throughout its reign, the operatic system thus created can seem so stiff that the overt rebellions against it that set in around 1750 have ended up defining its reputation far too thoroughly. In fact a flux of reform and rejigging constantly characterized the spread of opera seria. But its results were constantly incomplete, not least because the sharper, quicker voice of the zest for change and innovation was the aria itself. Its fusions of hard definition and streaming potential sent the da capo aria across Europe in a sort of fervor of transmission, as an icon and a prophecy of mobility and possibility; operas kept turning cumbersome or glib in their dramatic workings partly because the real action was in the limber detachability of these gleaming animals. Power in rapidly modernizing societies is always both deficient and excessive; around 1700 Europe’s courts could do far less than they wanted, but they were also filled with drives and capacities that they could not grasp or guide. Opera seria is the lurching aesthetic form in which this deficiency and this excess collide, a vessel of grand ambitions that is also an endlessly haphazard patchwork. But the aria is the sound of the truth of this world’s desire.

    Opera has always grown most voraciously as an art when ruling elites and high versions of culture have come into precipitous contact with dense popular energies and with the widest cosmopolitan vistas. The great generation of Neapolitan composers, including Leonardo Vinci and Leonardo Leo and Pergolesi himself, which emerged on either side of 1730 during the later Austrian years, fed their artistry by pressing opera seria and its associated styles into ever more porous contact with the city’s love of comedy, pantomime, and satire. The Bourbon regime was in place to associate itself with the city’s musical pre-eminence as it became increasingly obvious across Europe towards the middle of the century, and deserves credit for building the vast San Carlo opera house, whose opening in 1737 sumptuously announced what was happening. But all the key elements were in place well before the nicely oiled Bourbon invasion in 1734, and most of the most original music had been composed. And in the end no credit should be given to the finally hapless Austrian regime either. Its years in diffuse charge became a crucible in which the city’s writhing relationships to, and revisions of, power were illuminated and summarized. The restlessness of modern culture and the uncanniness of power make the melismas of Neapolitan vocal style ripple and snake. Unmatched amongst the day’s opera houses for its sheer scale, the Teatro San Carlo epitomized the city’s decades of liquid experiment in architecture and theatricality, in institutional life and relationships between classes, and in the routes and folds of space itself.

    His intellectually austere, stylistically erudite sides make it possible to forget what a nimble comedian Scarlatti was. His great breakthrough had been with a comedy, but it was not until 1718 that he would compose his one major comic opera set in the sort of satirically realistic urban milieu that commercial Neapolitan audiences wanted. Il Trionfo dell’onore is indeed one of the great revelations of the veering, critical flexibility at the heart of Scarlatti’s aesthetic vision; in fact its own flexibility drives many of that opera’s jokes. The opera’s action scampers about with a brisk combination of carelessness and intricacy between several possible or disputed pairs of lovers, after the caddish young soldier Riccardo arrives in the Pisan household of his rich uncle. Scarlatti gets maximal comic juices out of the ways in which the work’s flailing, largely ignoble characters are mismatched with its conventional and even fulsome aria shapes, and then he gets more comedy and further revelations from how intricately they also turn out to match them after all. Maybe the great man felt resentfully obliged to indulge the growing Neapolitan demand for streetwise comedy, and he may then have taken waspish pleasure in showing how richly his characteristic idioms yielded such deeply light results. 

    An exuberant anomaly within Scarlatti’s oeuvre that also reveals the pluralism packed into it from his first triumph, Il Trionfo dell’onore is at the same time an acute homage to the sheer multifariousness of its Neapolitan moment. Its characters are so riven with neediness, plangency, or sheer lust that the drives of excess within their expansive arias become astute — severely funny sorts of psychological description. The result is a dramatic world filled with people bamboozled as to what sort of drama they are in, stuck with the emotional intensity that their arias pour out while the plot’s farcical remorselessness churns on, chasing grand prototypes of character or expression that they can no more feel confident of than the citizens in the audience could feel sure of the historical ground beneath the theater. Serious opera in Naples was often oddly light, sprightly, and untragic, while comic opera was often brooding and interrogative. Lurking behind this interchange is the depth with which they share a basic dramatic addiction to moving characters between couples or groups or alignments, removing disguises or revealing origins, unmaking or reconfiguring the orderliness of social surfaces. All the recapitulatory, agile adaptability of Scarlatti’s music amounts finally to a syntax for this vision of social life as a thing of skips and surprises, a substance constantly piecing itself together out of losses and changes and fraying codes.

    In 1720 the viceregal court treated itself to a brilliant, lithe entertainment that announced the next expansive phases of Neapolitan vocal style. Nicola Porpora had emerged as an invigorating young composer simultaneously with the coming of the Austrians, and had been cultivating links to Vienna far more energetically than Scarlatti. He also grasped more deeply than anyone the essential fact that Neapolitan vocal music was indeed an art of the voice, and had been merging his compositional practice with an increasing dedication to training and honing the city’s next singers. But Porpora’s feel for talent and indeed for the future did not stop with the voice, and it was his collaboration with a young poet and librettist named Pietro Metastasio that created the dramatic serenata L’Angelica out of a story from Ariosto for performance amid the city’s displaced and attenuated version of the Habsburg court. 

    Metastasio had recently arrived as another graduate of Rome’s grandest cultural circles, and his surname was another of the Arcadian aliases that such gangs loved. The Roman Arcadians included plenty of flaky idealists and grandiose hacks, but also the occasional really fine mind such as the great jurist Gian Lorenzo Gravina, who indeed fell out with most of the others. Gravina became the major booster during the 1710s of the vastly talented teenaged Metastasio, and he happened to be from Naples. Gravina’s death brought the poet an inheritance which he quickly spent, and Naples was where he took himself around the age of twenty. The legal strand is vital; its divagatory institutional life made the city a hive for lawyers and a hotbed of legal thought. The philosopher Giambattista Vico had to become a professor of law rather than his preferred subject of rhetoric, but he was about to emerge from wrestling in the caves of Neapolitan jurisprudence as the greatest mind of eighteenth-century Italy, while the operatic scene was awash with men who were also or had been or had meant to be lawyers. It is as if music was vying with law to define the European future.

    The young Metastasio turned up with the intention of adding himself to the city’s buzz of aesthete lawyers. Instead he became something like the legislator of vast territories of eighteenth-century culture, the librettist who sculpted and polished the aria form to a zenith of nearly icy, nearly fatal perfection. If the enlightenment was the time of the ruses of reason and the trickery of progress, Metastasio’s whole career was a sort of grand and productive ruse exerted against his own values. He was the finest and most stubborn representative of the brilliant aesthetic misunderstanding that was on its slow and controversial way out, in which presenting the dramatic text was the fundamental business of opera, and all the music just a more or less apt and splendid means for doing so. At the same time this meant that he was producing the stanzas whose glistening meters, succulent vowel sounds, and array of consonantal snaps made them irresistible invitations to musical and vocal exploration. The love triangle at the core of L’Angelica between the titular heroine and the great opposing warriors Medoro and Orlando becomes indeed a sort of glintingly unsteady portal into what were already the central drives of Metastasio’s aesthetic on the brink of his takeover of the Neapolitan epoch. His whole art across work after work lived by maintaining a protracted equivocation in the face of authority and power, a sort of double consciousness that asserts itself here in the nearly chilly, nearly satirical exaggerations of languor and idyll as these erotic passions tear away at the heroic world of duty and battle. Emotional expression sounds like an obvious task for an aria and an obvious center for Metastasio’s aesthetic, but it is a sleekly ambiguous undertaking in his vision, something endlessly suspended between the most fastidiously lucid hedonism and a nearly demented turbulence. Opera itself has inhabited this doubleness ever since. So in some ways have we all.

    Metastasio was as suited to the da capo aria as a dove is to blue winds. Medoro indeed soaringly likens himself to a lonely dove a few numbers into the serenata as his love for Angelica clarifies, in maybe the first of the many great simile arias penned by the librettist, in which the psychic lives of characters come neatly or grandly alive in expansively stylized comparisons from within a fairly limited repertoire. The lean rhythms and repetitive rhymes of his verses give them a continual sense of rapid, willowy steadiness, and this base is what lets them and the voices that they were made for explore the vast reaches of assonance and meaning opened up by words like tortorella or paterno or agitata with a sort of explosive deftness. Language is simultaneously exalted and pummelled.

    It may seem paradoxical that the most official version of opera seria emerged in Naples in the 1720s just as the comic genres that challenged, parodied, and ransacked the seria world were gathering power. But the paradox is really a clue to the paradoxes and doubts afloat within the seria vision. Around this time, the odd, sinuous practice solidified of interspersing the scenes of what therefore became known as a comic intermezzo between the three acts of a seria opera; La Serva Padrona by Pergolesi was the greatest of all such works, and would be the piece to carry the fullest and most delirious impact of Neapolitan vocal music into the heart of the enlightenment, when it became not just a hit but an intellectual craze in Diderot’s circles in Paris decades later. Neapolitan vocal styles leapt between modes or fused discordant attitudes as readily as the same arias could turn up in different operas, or as the same opera could use settings by different composers of different parts of the text and action. Neapolitan vocal music should perhaps not be conceived as the usual sort of sequence of composers, styles, and masterpieces at all. Let us picture instead one brightly churning wave of drives and factors and desires, throwing sirens and their listeners ceaselessly together.

    4.

    “Galant” style is the idea that gets attached to composers such as Porpora who moved in Scarlatti’s wake towards simplified structures and limpid textures, towards melodic charm and rhythmic swing, who learnt from him how to shimmy away from polyphonic complexity or highly geared counterpoint in favor of quick splashes of harmonic drama and color. A sort of loose and light ethos of venturesome, cosmopolitan, and insouciant hedonism holds the category together better than any strict set of technical changes: galant music is the early enlightenment made audible, turned into sound and its pleasures, and into what those pleasures do to meaning. The seething, shape-shifting reductionism of Diderot’s furthest reaches of materialism can be heard waiting within it. But so can the values of sociable practicality and serviceable craftsmanship that his circles of Encyclopédistes would espouse. Composite and pluriform as it shifts between rhapsody and diagram, the version of Neapolitan vocal style that would triumph in the course of the 1720s carried at its throbbing, artful heart a prophecy about the ambiguities of the whole enlightenment movement.

    It was in 1725 that Giambattista Vico’s great, jagged masterpiece known as the New Science made the first of its shifting appearances in the world under the title of Princìpi di una Scienza Nuova, as its author neared the age of sixty. Commentators have argued ever since as to whether he was one of the great Enlightenment thinkers or the movement’s grandest foe, because what they miss is the density with which he really summarizes Enlightenment ambiguity itself. Newness is as vital to his opus as the title suggests, but this newness is packed tight with myths and history as he re-narrates the basic cycles of civilizational progress and decline, crammed with reanimations of past modes of thought and consciousness. Is the book a prophecy of disenchantment or an effigy of mythomania? Since Vico, too, had been living through the zany and dangerous gyrations of the past decades of Neapolitan politics, his arguments filled with intricate, gnarly flexibility. His new science gravitates alongside opera seria itself towards the points of twisting transition between myth and history. Likewise, an enriched idea of creative and political making constitutes his exit from Cartesian doubt, but it is richly unclear whether this move goes in the direction of further intellectual progress or back towards visions that Descartes had meant to leave behind. The book’s combinations of systematic thrust with hectic zigzags of assemblage, as it spins down into the inner workings of historical change, match the spiraling sleekness of Neapolitan vocal music with an apt sort of cryptic rigor.

    Newness was vital in the 1720s in Naples, but Scarlatti was no longer new. Maybe this is why Rome was the destination of what has become the very last to survive of his scores of operas; maybe he wanted to plunge back towards the sense of glamour and potential that had accompanied his emergence there decades earlier. But then La Griselda is itself preoccupied with matters of survival and endurance, and much of its fierce, eccentric greatness is in how tightly its own writhingly extreme energies of innovation combine with a certain gritty stylistic aloofness from any full embrace of the gallant. The ordeals by which her royal husband determines to prove Griselda’s virtue make for a work so lavishly harrowing that it can seem determined to show how grotesquely serious opera seria could be. At the same time its story thus pulls the work away from the cruel machinations of authority and politics, and throws an intense spotlight of artistic pressure on the richly desolate, finally triumphant figure of the queen herself. Her arias are the things that the opera must use if it is to turn its own refractory cragginess into a vision of the weird intractability of emotion and expression themselves, and Scarlatti indeed makes them outrageously singular distillations of what his art had become.

    As the full impact of Griselda’s situation lands towards the end of the first act, her aria ‘Di’, che sogno o che deliro’ turns the shattering of her reality into a sound world so agitated and angular that it feels at once sparse and superabundant. Starkly skittish rhythms and tight bursts of songfulness that can never quite become melodies render the impact on a vivid mind of a world that is somehow both overwhelming and dissolvent; of course, da capo repetition might as well have been invented to intensify this doubleness. But at the very start of the second act ‘Mi rivedi, o selva ombrosa’ instead surrounds her with a deceptively supportive brand of accompanimental lavishness as she returns to the rural obscurity from which her grand marriage had plucked her. Vastly more variegated string lines are joined by a deliciously figurative role for two flutes, but as so often with Scarlatti the da capo structure makes us linger on an emotional scene that is itself one of return just long enough for unease to enter in. His addiction to pastoral was often addled and always complex, and there is something hectic and anguished here about the very fulsomeness of the musical means, as if the aria knows how complicit nostalgia can be with maltreatment and disaster.

    But it is Griselda’s great, bizarre, spiraling third-act aria ‘Se il mio dolor t’offende’ that ends up giving a sort of sharply complex analysis of the meaning of stylistic abundance itself. Griselda has just been told that she must hide any pain at her own sufferings, and this extra twist of anguish brings her to a brief passage of something like musical vertigo that is also replete with stylistic and indeed psychic potential. Her aria begins with a couple of bars in which she sings with almost no accompaniment, as the very word dolor, or pain, rasps and dilates, trying to figure out where it is leading. A jerky rush of accompaniment then arrives, and indeed rapidly intensifies further as her reply grows. If the king is offended by her sadness, so Griselda continues as the aria gyrates, he will instead see joy and smiling. The aria becomes a virtuosic exercise in what might be called reverse anguish: our exhilaration at Griselda’s nerve and resilience is held in cascading check by the pain that is utterly unhidden by her mimicry of joy. But might there not be here one further reversal in the end? Within the anguished, caustic imitation of exultancy given here by the composer to his character, do we not hear a deeper exultancy nearly break through the opera’s surface? Griselda’s suffering inhabits her pretended levity and joy, but a joyful creative levity inhabits Neapolitan vocal style. The great, weird drives within eighteenth century culture towards happiness and happy endings get their richest account in the city’s music, on their way to issuing eventually in the fierce comic exuberance of the classical Viennese symphony and of Hegel’s interpretation of history.

    Imagine some vast throat pouring out notes into and across cities and palaces and chambers in all directions, pitching lines of music into churches and inns and spa resorts. Eighteenth-century Europe became more and more such a culture of the throat. Of course, it thought that it was a culture of the classical word and of didactic clarity, of reason. But reason itself would prove to be liquid, voracious, and turbulent as the century continued, a thing made of dispute and mutation. As Kant ended up nearly putting it, the substance of the Enlightenment may have been knowledge, but audacity was its form and its ethos. And the da capo aria was a sort of lustrous compromise, whose repetitions could seem to the partisans of the word to be ways of heightening literary meanings while in fact they were melting words down into syllables and sounds, flinging them into the throat’s pleasures and powers. Voices became hungry laboratories in which the culture’s highest words and meanings were torn apart and examined and remade, and similarly lacerating and joyful processes of scrutiny and recomposition were what the Enlightenment movement lived for and by, too.

    It would appear, then, that Adorno and Horkheimer were wrong. Their great, bracing, stifling book Dialectic of Enlightenment turns Homer’s poem into a precocious parable of the bourgeois mind in which Odysseus’ evasion of the Sirens exemplifies the crushing erasures essential to reason. But the myth of the founding of Naples by Parthenope suggests a different interpretation, one in which such voices cannot be outmaneuvered and do not die. Instead they turn into cities. An expanded vision of the enlightenment still awaits within all this music, one more holistic and more alive to its own riptides. Metastasio made his debut in 1724 as a full operatic librettist for the main court theater, and chose the story of the desolate queen Dido, who is such a profuse sister of the Sirens. Neapolitan vocal style carried on drenching itself in her story for decades thereafter: as it went on piecing together ways of turning loss into construction, it kept staring at the sea. Scarlatti’s last cantata was probably Là dove e Mergellina, which does indeed date to the year of his death, and its text audaciously and movingly locates its richly conventional Arcadian imagery in the real pleasures of the world surrounding the composer by this use of a place name from the Neapolitan coast. Its music is full of restrained turbulence as the cantata pursues yet another of its relentless composer’s visions of emotional questioning and ambiguity.

    But let us sail forwards five years, to the emergence in 1730 of perhaps the greatest of all Neapolitan da capo arias at the end of the opening act of Metastasio’s Artaserse in Leonardo Vinci’s crisply tumultuous setting. In ‘Vo solcando un mar crudele’, the image of plowing a cruel sea becomes indeed the vehicle for turning personal catastrophe into expressive power. The story is a fierce fever dream of court violence and internecine intrigues, and the first act finishes with the central character of Arbace accused of a regicide that is known only by him to have been committed by his father. Narrative development was never meant to be pushed forwards within an aria like this one, but what Vinci achieves is the transformation of this basic aesthetic condition into an engine of complex drama and insight. Arbace is stuck in an impossible situation, his very innocence part of his disaster, since proving it would inculpate his father; he is as incapable of propelling the narrative as his aria is, and Metastasio’s lyric gives him only its own almost brutally rich elegance and shapeliness. But that is enough for Vinci’s wildly incisive feel for the strengths within galant simplicity to kick in, and the aria’s closed shapes and tight textures turn its exploration of paralysis into a way of converting it into vigor and expansion. 

    All the turbulent mixtures of triumph and catastrophe that coursed through Vinci’s own life can be heard in the invincible agitation of this music; his death at around the age of forty in the same year may well have been murder, after a life beset by his own torrid rivalrousness as well as by convulsive gambling. The composer does not contradict this text’s visions of misfortune and shipwreck, but transfigures them with a rigorous glee that turns reiteration into refreshment. Sequences of scrambled, rampant triplets for the violins imitate the frenzy of the sea with a pithiness that turns it into an accompanimental basis for vocal ardor and psychic strength. Within the machinery of the da capo structure itself Vinci mines deep possibilities of change and uplift, of survival itself. The game of modernity is one that is won by whoever can drink in the largest quantities of reality and
    keep creating.

    The Brutal Masterworks of Saadat Hasan Manto

    In January 1948, four months after the traumatic partition of the Indian subcontinent, the Urdu writer Saadat Hasan Manto boarded a ship to Karachi from Bombay. He was moving to Lahore, where his wife, Safia, and daughter, Nighat, had travelled the previous year to attend a wedding, but after yet another British colony was split up along sectarian lines in August, and refugees began to trickle into both sides of the border with tales of arson, murder, and rape, Safia had decided not to return. At twenty-two, Manto had briefly worked for a newspaper in colonial Lahore, and later, after his literary career took off, he often came back to defend his stories against multiple charges of obscenity filed in the city’s courts. But now Lahore was in Pakistan, a new nation that had been carved out overnight as a homeland for the region’s ethnically diverse Muslims, a country to which Manto had abruptly decided to migrate one morning in Bombay in the wake of endless riots and killings everywhere. And yet, as he wrote later, “I found it impossible to decide which of the two countries was now my homeland — India or Pakistan.”

    He could not return to his ancestral home in Amritsar, to the house where he grew up and learned to write, since back in March, before a decision had been made on whether Amritsar would belong to India or Pakistan, rioting mobs had torched down and destroyed every last brick in the neighborhood. (A visiting friend would later write that Manto’s old neighborhood “looked like a replica of Berlin after the Second World War.”) He could have stayed put in Bombay, except that his wife was now pregnant with their second daughter in another country. In Bombay, he had earned his living for years from film studios, writing screenplays, dialogues, and songs for early Bollywood musicals.

    On August 15, the day of India’s independence, he started a new screenwriting gig at Bombay Talkies, having been persuaded to join by Ashok Kumar, then the country’s biggest movie star. One evening, Kumar was dropping off Manto after work when his car was stopped by a wedding party in a Muslim neighborhood. Manto was horrified. “We were in an area that no Hindu would dare enter,” he wrote. “And the whole world knew Ashok was a Hindu, a very prominent Hindu at that, whose murder would create shockwaves.” But nothing happened. The wedding party was just starstruck by Kumar and kept chanting his name. Two men helpfully gave him directions. “Ashok bhai,” they said, adding an honorific word to his name, “this street will lead you nowhere. It is best to turn into this side lane.” Later, after Manto had decided to move, he recalled these lines: “I said to myself, ‘Manto bhai, this street will lead you nowhere. It is best to turn into this side lane.’ And so I took the side lane that brought me to Pakistan.”

    In Pakistan, however, Manto didn’t survive for long. His stories were again tried for obscenity; he was convicted twice, though he managed to avoid jail time on both occasions by paying a fine. His books ended up being pirated in both countries even as he struggled to make ends meet. He produced two films in Lahore — Pakistan’s film industry was still nascent — but they flopped at the box office. Fellow left-leaning Urdu writers and editors effectively blacklisted him for trying to start a new magazine with a conservative literary critic. He could no longer publish his work in prominent journals and newspapers, which meant that his freelancing income also dried up. The very stories that had been lauded earlier by his peers as iconoclastic masterpieces were now deemed “reactionary” and not “progressive” enough. Faiz Ahmad Faiz, perhaps Pakistan’s most famous poet, was once summoned as a witness when Manto was on trial for a story called “Colder Than Ice.” Faiz testified in court that the story was not obscene. “However,” he added, “the story does not measure up to a high standard of literature either, for it does not satisfactorily analyze the basic problems of life.”

    With peers like these, Manto didn’t need enemies. In desperation, he wrote to his old friends in Bombay, wondering if a studio there would hire him back. “Do something,” he implored the novelist Ismat Chughtai, “and call me back to Hindustan.” He had always liked drinking whisky in the evenings: as a teenager in Amritsar, he used to hide his stash in a shelf above his father’s portrait. But now he woke up every morning and finished bottles of deadlier bootlegged stuff. The one rehab clinic in Lahore was located in those days inside the Punjab Mental Hospital’s “anti-alcoholic” ward. Manto checked himself into the hospital twice for treatment. These stints prompted a popular myth, which endures even today, that in his last years he became mentally ill and was institutionalized twice. Condemned by courts, by his contemporaries, and by his family for his drinking, and disparaged by progressives, right-wing zealots, and even himself as a “fraud,” Manto died at the age of forty-two, seven years after leaving Bombay.

    It would not be inaccurate to say that Manto was “cancelled” shortly after moving to Lahore. But he also wrote prolifically throughout that dark period, churning out stories, sketches, editorials, personal essays about his time in Bollywood — anything that would pay for his next drink. Between 1948 and 1951, he published seven collections of short stories. He was among South Asia’s pre-eminent modernists, casually inventive about literary forms: a writer named Manto was popping up in his Bombay stories, for instance, decades before the French writer Serge Doubrovsky came up with the word “autofiction.” Just before his death, Manto wrote a series of impishly mordant letters addressed to “Uncle Sam,” where he turned out to be prophetic about the disastrous consequences of a military alliance between the United States and Pakistan. Seventy-five years after India’s and Pakistan’s independence, his work remains synonymous with the specter of the Partition, but in his writings he also captured Bombay’s grit, and foresaw in many ways the ongoing dissolution of Indian secularism into majoritarian Hindu nationalism and hinted at the doomed fate of Pakistan as an Islamic republic.

    His early life was marked by yet another colonial catastrophe. On the afternoon of April 13, 1919, one month before Manto’s seventh birthday, fifty British soldiers secured the only exit of the Jallianwala Bagh square at Amritsar and unloaded over fifteen hundred rounds of bullets at a gathering of over ten thousand people, many of them rural farmers who had travelled with their families to celebrate the local spring festival and were almost certainly unaware of a recent embargo on public assemblies in the city. The scale of this infamous massacre feels unfathomable, even today. British officials estimated the death count to be less than four hundred, but survivors and eyewitnesses recount grisly scenes of at least a thousand bodies piled one on top of another, and of truckloads of corpses still being whisked away for burial twenty-four hours after the carnage in the park. In Manto’s first published story, a child named Khalid hears the gunfire from his home on the fateful afternoon and naively wonders if fireworks are going off in a carnival somewhere nearby. Peering out of a window into the street, Khalid sees a boy limping alone, blood trickling out of his leg. The shops in the street are all shuttered because of the curfew. Khalid can make out the sounds of people shrieking in the distance. The injured boy falls face down in the middle of the empty road. Khalid dashes back inside and tells his father who comes to the window to look. But the father is too scared to step out.

    Manto’s own father was a more imposing presence: a stern-faced Kashmiri lawyer who dabbled in Islamic theology in his spare time and lived with two wives in the same house. Ghulam Hasan had married Sardar Begum late, almost out of pity — she had been married off once earlier, after her parents’ death, at the age of nine. Sardar lived with her two children, Nasira and Saadat, relatively cut off from the rest of the family, including Ghulam’s first wife and nine other children, in a smaller section of the house. Childhood was a hapless affair. Manto suffered from chronic chest pain, which fuelled his teenage drinking habit. He failed his school exams three times; the fourth time around he flunked in Urdu, the language in which he would go on to write his stories. Ghulam wanted his youngest son to be a lawyer, much like the other men in the family, though he didn’t invest equitably in his education: Manto’s stepbrothers were sent to college in England. He died when Manto was nineteen, before reconciling himself to his son’s “useless pastimes” — the fleeting interest in the occult and in photography, the daydreams about becoming an anti-colonial revolutionary, the Marlene Dietrich poster pinned next to Ghulam’s portrait. Much of his later literary pluck was a defense against a simpler wound: Manto could never please his father.

    But it was another man who set the young writer on his path. Abdul Bari Alig was a journalist, a historian, an editor, a binge-drinker extraordinaire, a foolhardy Quixote in mid-1930s Amritsar. Bari Sahib, as he was called, introduced Manto to Russian and French literature — Maupassant, Chekhov, Gorky, Hugo, Dostoyevsky — and let him write a film column in a magazine that he was editing at the time. He encouraged Manto to translate Hugo’s The Last Day of a Condemned Man into Urdu, and also published his first short story, which was set in the afternoon of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. With his tall tales and anti-imperial zeal, Bari Sahib helped spur a twentysomething’s imagination: how could a boy who had grown up fantasizing about running away to Moscow not be taken in by this peculiar soul who thought that Hugo was the greatest novelist in the world and went on and on about Hegel and Marx? On a couple of occasions the police came knocking on Manto’s door, having been apprised that Bari and his cohort were putting on agitprop plays and promulgating “seditious content,” but Bari would by then have conveniently disappeared from the city. In a later essay, Manto wrote that Bari was a rather timid activist, one of those reluctant organizers who typically go missing in action, which was all too well, because otherwise “I would be lying in an unmarked grave or serving a long prison sentence . . .”

    Apart from Bari, there was Bombay, where Manto ended up in 1936, when he was hired as an editor for an Urdu film magazine in the city. He wasn’t paid enough — the owner of the magazine deducted a fixed amount from his pay because he bunked alone at the office the first few months — and he soon began moonlighting for film studios. Bollywood had just started making talkies around then, and egotistical studio heads and directors needed scribes to churn out screen treatments of brainstorms they might have in the afternoons, as well as to extemporize dialogues for the day’s shooting scenes. As employers, they were erratic and exploitative — Manto’s stories are littered with teenage actresses who are coerced to sleep with older male leads and producers, writers who are lured into a new film with a good advance but then spend years chasing up their dues. Manto didn’t harbor any artistic pretensions as a screenwriter. “Serve literature,” he counselled a younger writer years later, “and make money from films.”

    The advice was, of course, ironic, coming from a writer who famously struggled to stay solvent all his life. In Bombay, he moved from the magazine office to a room in an overcrowded two-story tenement, where forty tenants shared two bathrooms among themselves. The bathrooms had doors, he later recalled, although “nobody knew when the latches went missing.” His mother fixed up his marriage with Safia, a Kashmiri woman who grew up in Zanzibar and had recently moved with her family to the city. For a year after the wedding, Manto didn’t have money to move out of the tenement and Safia continued to live apart in her parents’ flat. His steadiest job was probably during the Second World War, when he wrote radio plays supporting the British war effort for India’s public broadcasting service in Delhi. But then he lost his infant son to pneumonia, and a year or so later he was back in Bombay.

    He was happiest in the city’s countless dingy bars (renamed “permit rooms” during prohibition) and Persian restaurants, abandoning one for another once he racked up too many unpaid bills. Where else but in Bombay could he commute to work in a congested train to the studios in the suburbs and end up being driven home by the country’s biggest superstar? Where else would he see homeless men fall asleep on pavements night after night in the alleys between Art Deco buildings and opulent hotels? Like the millions who still move to Mumbai every year, he discovered that the city was its own autonomous republic, full of ambitious characters at every turn. At any moment you could run into gangsters, sex workers, businessmen, politicians, the elderly Goan Catholic woman who lives alone with her cat in your neighborhood, the weird guy who asks if he can give you a head massage while you are strolling around a promenade. In Bombay, Manto could be rich one day and penniless the next. No one seemed to particularly care.

    I read Manto when I was a child. His stories about the Partition were still lauded as cautionary tales in India at the turn of the millennium. The renowned story “Toba Tek Singh,” the legend of a mentally ill man bewildered by this business of having to decide which country is home, was a staple of school textbooks and regularly performed as a play outdoors. I remember a classmate once summed up the plot of “Colder Than Ice” during recess and everyone was stunned by the image of a man nearly raping a corpse during a riot. We imagined these characters as safely in the past, both in their violence and their delirium. As children, we were aware that sometime in the winter of 1992 a mob of Hindu supremacists had stormed into the Babri mosque, a Mughal-era monument in northern India, and razed the entire thing to the ground. In 2002, we skimmed through newspaper headlines of Muslim homes and neighbourhoods being mercilessly attacked over three months in the western state of Gujarat. (Narendra Modi, then the chief minister of Gujarat, was later refused a U.S. visa for allegedly inciting these riots.) But we perceived those events as anomalies, a few aberrant footnotes in the fairytale of Indian democracy and diversity, ongoing now for six decades. There was a moment in the mid-oughts when our president was a Muslim scientist and our prime minister a Sikh bureaucrat. The top three male actors in Bollywood had the same Muslim last name: Khan. We swayed to MP3 tracks by Pakistani bands and solo artists at parties.

    At thirteen, heedless of history and convinced of the solidity of Indian pluralism, Manto’s stories seemed to me didactic and puritanical. I would come across a grim one every now and again, be taken in by its simple Manichean morality, then look around and wonder where is the hate. Sometimes I felt that Manto was gratuitously adding to the despair and the shame of Partition another tale of the despair and shame of the period. In “Open It!,” a Muslim father looking for his lost daughter in a refugee camp finds that his worst nightmare has come to pass. In “The Assignment,” a Sikh man horribly betrays his father’s friend. My grandparents on both sides were displaced by the Partition. Decades earlier they had made the treacherous journey — via road, water, and forests — from Sylhet in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to Assam. But they were all dead by the time I was five, and I was left with my parents’ second-hand accounts of terrifying bloodbaths and exoduses, of multiple relatives being preyed upon by tigers during the trek across the border — accounts that felt just as forbidding as Manto’s stories. Whenever we were told in a classroom that Manto was an “eyewitness to history,” I used to wonder whether I was born too late, or eyewitnesses were indeed fated to become irrelevant over time. Either way, the dust of the Partition was invisible on the surface and the past felt like another country, grisly and remote.

    I enrolled in a college in Bombay, ostensibly to study film. There, in the cramped insomniac streets that Manto had left behind sixty years ago, he still seemed miraculously present. I lived on Lamington Road, just a block away from Arab Galli, the side lane on which Manto had once lived in a boxy tenement and shared two bathrooms with forty other tenants. On my way home from the Grant Road train station, I would walk past Kennedy Bridge, where groups of older men lined up after midnight to study the idle sex workers leaning out of the windows of a nearby brothel. If you descend the bridge from a staircase at the top, you come to Congress House and Jinnah Hall, two adjoining buildings named respectively for the Indian National Congress, the political party instrumental in securing India’s independence, and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan. In one of Manto’s stories, a character visits a public toilet around the corner from these iconic buildings and is repelled by both the stench and the competing nationalistic graffiti on its walls. All along stretched the ruins of pre-1947 Bombay: the old British-era theaters that now exclusively screened B movies, the packed commuter trains that still shuttled to and fro from the suburbs every five minutes, the Irani cafes where Manto’s characters sometimes met up and reflected on the distances that they had travelled from their hometowns. On Sunday evenings, I would start walking along the southern seafront, where Manto often sat alone and compulsively smoked his preferred Craven A cigarettes, then stop for a dinner of keema and bread buns at a restaurant somewhere on Grant Road, before resuming my weekly pilgrimage to Adelphi Chambers on Clare Road, the apartment building into which Manto and Safia moved in a year after their marriage.

    In Bombay, it was possible to read Manto as a writer imaginatively absorbed by the city’s charms, and not as an anguished witness to history. There is a lightness to his early stories about the city that stays with you despite their illustrative intent. “Barren,” for instance, is ostensibly about the ways in which both writers and readers delude themselves with tall tales, but halfway through the story the narrator is sitting alone on a bench near the Gateway of India monument, when he overhears two men chattering away in Gujarati, each with a different accent: “When they both talked rapidly at the same time, it sounded as if a parrot and a mynah were having a duel.” In “Mammad Bhai,” the protagonist is a dagger-wielding city gangster — you could call him the Al Capone of Arab Galli — who is persuaded into believing that a judge might go easy on a murder case if he were to shave off his moustache. Halfway through “Babu Gopi Nath,” an aging businessman tells the narrator, also named Manto, that he doesn’t mind being cheated of his wealth:

    Once he said to me, “Manto sahib, in my entire life, I have never rejected advice. Whenever someone offers it to me, I accept it with gratitude. Perhaps they consider me a fool, but I value their wisdom. Look at it like this. They have the wisdom to see that I am the sort of man who can be made a fool of.”

    Gopi Nath, the gullible businessman, has moved to Bombay from Lahore on a peculiar quest: he wants his youngish mistress, a fickle courtesan named Zeenat, to find another rich man. “I don’t have long to go,” he tells Manto, “my money has almost run out. I don’t want her life to go to waste after I am gone.” He buys Zeenat a car and a flat and observes her having a sequence of affairs with caddish men closer to her age. After every breakup Zeenat copes with trust issues, and often, with some missing jewellery from her flat; but Gopi Nath also seems visibly hurt. When Zeenat runs out of cash, he goes back to Lahore to sell off some family property. Sometime later he pays for her wedding and tears up on seeing her dressed as a bride. With every passing year, he becomes more of a father to his lover.

    So many of Manto’s stories conclude with the protagonist’s eyes welling up, be it the eponymous gangster in “Mammad Bhai” crying over his moustache, or Gopi Nath sniffling softly at Zeenat’s wedding. The frequency of tears points to an unabashedly operatic view of the world, probably carried over from Manto’s work in Hindi films. The women in his Bombay stories are mostly sex workers and actresses, doomed to a melancholy lot because of their choices. They are carefully observed but appear curiously withdrawn: his lusty male protagonists seem perpetually surprised that women want it, too. The bluntness and the lack of technical finesse makes for a raunchy combination. In “Smell,” Randheer is married to the “daughter of a distinguished magistrate, with a bachelor’s degree, the heartthrob of countless boys at her college,” but in bed he keeps obsessing about an old encounter with a free-spirited working-class woman he picked up in the street, the “warmth of her naked, unwashed body.” In “Women,” Ashok is wracked with guilt after making his genteel wife watch a porn film, but then he comes home one evening to find her watching the same movie in the dark with her siblings and friends.

    Manto once blurbed his own collection of stories thus: “Manto writes rubbish. People say that Manto is obscene, but if you start reading Manto you cannot leave the story unfinished.” A writer accused of obscenity multiple times throughout his career might indeed brandish the accusation with a bit of pride. Later academic readings, by contrast, end up conflating his artless style with honesty. After all, you cannot fault a traumatized witness to South Asian history for being messy because what he was saying was not meant to be articulated in the first place. The truth, as usual, lies somewhere in between. Manto’s characters seem to know about love only through its absence: he was, in the truest sense, the bard of lovelessness. If Randheer in “Smell” can’t get over the memory of his old flame Paro, an actress in “Scissors from Meerut” tries to seduce a male lead but anoints him her brother when he refuses her advances. In “Barren,” a male writer owns up to his lack of experience at one point: “I’ve known very few women in my life. The stories I wrote about women were either because of a particular need or just to indulge in mental gratification of the senses.” 

    In Manto’s nonfiction you come across a quieter, more languorous writer, someone with more affinities than distastes. Susan Sontag once wrote that “a poet’s prose is the autobiography of ardor,” and it is in his essays that Manto seems most passionate. There is the piece on the matinee idol Ashok Kumar, which starts out as an oral history of the Bombay film industry and goes on to record Manto’s eventual disillusionment with the city. In “Krishna’s Flute,” an ode to Manto’s best friend Shyam Chadha, also a movie star, we discover his love for the slapdash argot of Hindi, Urdu, Marathi, and Konkani that is still spoken in Bombay’s streets. If you read another essay, “Bari Sahib,” in the Urdu original, you will notice that a word Manto employs twice to describe his mentor — posheeda, meaning “furtive” — could just as well describe the shadowy stance of the autofictional narrators in his own stories. Halfway through “The Ladies’ Man,” supposedly about the Bollywood music composer Rafiq Ghaznavi, Manto realizes that he has rambled on too long about his youth in Amritsar:

    I have begun to reminisce about things that happened a long time ago and I find myself getting carried away. I had begun writing about Rafiq and I went into unrelated things, though the truth is that it is these unrelated things which I like. Isn’t life itself the sum total of unrelated happenings and people?

    It is perhaps a testament to Manto’s literary range that his essays and sketches feel less polemical than his celebrated fiction. Rare is the Manto story that doesn’t end on a morose note, but he allowed himself to be more digressive elsewhere, to go off on tangents about “unrelated things.” One moment he can be acerbic (“But the special gift that Rafiq possessed in my view was his utter lack of honour and shame”) only to turn elegiac a few pages on (“And so I took the side lane that brought me to Pakistan . . .”) He can recount his childhood dreams of escaping to the Soviet Union, dish out gossip about an actress who was later accused of spying for Pakistan, and also laud the pluck of Sitara Devi, a legendary dancer and friend: “In my book, she walks tall. I do not know what she thinks of me but I have always thought of her as a woman who is born once in a hundred years.” These portraits appear all the more impressive when you learn that Manto wrote them during his last years in Lahore, more or less at the same time that he was finishing up his hallowed Partition stories. In their waywardness, they read like a cathartic counterpart to his tormented tales. For once, Manto seems romantic, an artist pursuing his own fancies and whims, free of the inordinate responsibilities of history.

    I have never quite forgotten the desultory way in which Manto recalls the turbulence of the Partition in one of his stories:

    One Sunday morning, I was at home reading the paper. The sports page showed the tally of cricket scores while the front page gave the number of Hindus and Muslims killed in the riots.

    Not long after Narendra Modi was elected India’s prime minister in 2014, reports of riots and sectarian killings began to dominate the front pages again. There was the hideous mob lynching of Mohammad Akhlaq, a Muslim farm worker murdered by his fellow Hindu villagers over suspicion of storing and eating beef. (Many Hindus consider the cow sacred.) Then the news about Junaid Khan, a fifteen-year-old kid stabbed to death by a group of Hindu men on a train. In the southern state of Karnataka, Muslim girls were unceremoniously stopped outside college campuses and forbidden from wearing headscarves in classrooms. Videos of Muslims being harassed and assaulted on streets continue to clog our social media feeds every week. Mosques are regularly attacked and vandalized by Hindu zealots. In August 2019, Modi sent in thousands of troops to India’s only Muslim-majority state, Jammu and Kashmir, annulled the state’s special autonomous status under the Indian federation, and forced a long communication blackout on its residents. Days later, millions of religious and linguistic minorities were stripped of their citizenship in Assam after a four-year-long mass profiling exercise reminiscent of Nazi Germany. 

    To read the daily papers in Modi’s India is to re-live the same shockwaves of majoritarian psychosis that had once engulfed the subcontinent during Partition — I say re-live because many of us born decades later had soaked in the atmosphere of the period from Manto’s stories in school. His didacticism doesn’t rankle as much now: even his most overly solemn of fictions seem germane at a time when, in the words of an Indian political columnist, “we are passing through the most difficult phase for Muslims in independent India.” Over the course of his life, Manto went from thinking about his work in impulsive ways — “I write because I am addicted to writing, just as I’m addicted to wine” — to something more purposive and utilitarian: “Literature is a thermometer that reads the temperature of one’s country and people.” His own trials, coupled with those of the twin republics of India and Pakistan, probably made him less playful. If his stories became more illustrative after he moved to Lahore, how else could he have written in the wake of a violent cataclysm? I remember feeling embarrassed once by the uniformly tragic fates of his characters. It is only in recent years that I have come to appreciate that the embarrassment I feel on his behalf is the embarrassment of finding one’s baser self reflected in fiction. 

    In an essay on Manto, his friend and fellow writer Krishan Chander recalled his contrarian personality:

    If you praise Dostoevsky, he will eulogize Somerset Maugham. If you commend something about Bombay, he will go into raptures about Amritsar. . . . If you express a wish to get married, he will insist that you remain a bachelor. . . . If you abuse him, you will discover that he has been going around looking for a job for you.

    This chronic volatility did not win Manto many friends, but it also temperamentally disposed him to register the seismic shifts of the Partition. After a point he couldn’t go on writing about the gangsters and film stars whom he had known in Bombay, and yet I cannot imagine him feeling vindicated by the choices that he made after 1947. His notion of a “fraud” was pretty capacious and suggestive of his rabble-rousing affinities: a defective telephone receiver in his father’s Amritsar house could be a “fraud.” At one point in “Babu Gopinath,” the narrator finds the idea of a courtesan being grandly married off fraudulent. In a caustic piece about his literary career, Manto even dubbed himself “a first-class fraud.” 

    What did he mean by that? Perhaps that the act of putting down words on a page can feel inherently deceptive. But underlying the self-criticism is also the conviction that our dislikes reveal more than our affinities. The narrator of “Constipation,” a magazine editor and scriptwriter, brags about being “an expert when it comes to hate”:

    You may well ask why hate requires expertise, and I will tell you that every task has its protocols. Hate requires fervour, and therefore, a skilled practitioner. In comparison, love is a pedestrian sentiment. Through the ages . . . humans have practiced love, but very few have understood the protocols of hate, which has an acuity more pleasurable than love.

    Manto cherished acuity as a writer, which is impossible to sustain after a certain length. No wonder he wrote only one novel. His grasp of the “protocols of hate” chimes with his obsession with the loveless days of the Partition, the accounts of displacement and bloodshed that he skillfully evoked in his fiction. In an era when we are careening past mean hateful streets again, in India and elsewhere in the world, Manto’s rattling voice rings out from the side lanes of South Asia’s tumultuous past.

    For Names I Will Not Name

    God, bless the lowborn and the shy of luck,
    Those rubbing nickels, hoping for a spark,
    The tweakers, boozers, losers, and the fucked
    Who breed like cats behind the mobile park.
    And bless them even when they’re screwing up,
    Or shooting up, or burgling something sad,
    Or fishing for old cig butts in that cup
    That’s sat on each back porch they’ve ever had.
    You’ll know them by their teeth and by their rage,
    And by the way they’ll give you their last dime,
    And how their faces never match their age,
    And by how slow they are to judge a crime.
    God, bless the misfits, midwits, whores, and flameouts too.
    For they are lowest who live most near you.

    Notes For a Poem (To a Dead Friend)

    Have I been faithless to your memory,
    Who died before our beards had come full in?
    We who’d buzzed our hair short in the yard,
    And punched each other’s arms until they bruised?
    Our falling out was from a dozen things.
    You mocked me secretly to the wrong friend,
    I thought myself the better of the pair,
    And on. So, years went by until the call
    In which somebody told me you were sick,
    And wished for visitors. I never went.
    We buried you behind the white board church.
    Your mother too, a few years afterward.
    There was a rusting fence. A walnut tree.
    There was you underground, and there was me.

    This poem appears concurrently in Paul’s new collection from Wiseblood Books, The Locust Years