The Power of Succinctness

    The extreme compactness of biblical narrative is likely to strike almost any modern reader. Some, naively, will attribute it to the relatively rudimentary state of ancient literature that lacks the means to elaborate the details of the stories it tells. The last several decades of literary analysis of the Bible have shown that this is by no means the case. Still, this is not the kind of narrative with which most modern readers are familiar. At least since the eighteenth century the predominant reading matter for narrative literature has been novels, and they typically proceed through a rich accumulation of descriptive details, narratorial comment, and extended dialogue. There is nothing like such novelistic abundance in the Bible. Thomas Mann deployed four volumes and a few thousand pages to tell the story of Joseph and his brothers, while the biblical narrative with great effectiveness makes do with thirteen brief chapters. What is impressive is how the Hebrew writers were able to convey a fullness in the evocation of emotions, relationships, and motives in just a few words, often only a single brief sentence, or even the strategic choice of one term.

    I will begin with a moment that illustrates the breathtaking efficiency of the Hebrew writers in dispensing with narrative exposition. When Moses flees from Egypt to Midian after killing an Egyptian who was beating a Hebrew, he arrives at a well where he rescues seven young women confronted by hostile shepherds. The girls rush home and report to their father, “An Egyptian man rescued us from the hands of the shepherds” (Exodus 2:19). How do they know that he is Egyptian? Presumably because he is clean-shaven while the sundry Semitic males to the north and east of Egypt were bearded, and also because he would have been wearing regal Egyptian garments, since he would have had to flee Egypt abruptly in order to escape arrest and possible execution. 

    If you imagine how a novelist might have handled this narrative information, it might read something like this: “Moses stood on the hilltop looking down toward the valley below, where he could make out people gathered around a well. His fine linen robe covered with dust and splattered with mud after his arduous journey on foot from the south, he leaned on his staff as he began the steep descent down into the valley. Drawing near, he could hear harsh shouts and see a group of young women being driven off from the well.” This is certainly not the way of biblical narrative. All we need to know is conveyed in two small words, ’ish ‘ivri, “an Egyptian man.” Since biblical narrative repeatedly works with thematic keywords, this takes us back to the previous episode of the killing of an Egyptian, when Moses saw “an Egyptian man striking a Hebrew man” (Exodus 2:11). His identification here by the Midianite girls as an Egyptian man then leads us to ponder: what, in fact, is Moses? Outwardly, he is an Egyptian man and has been raised as such in Pharaoh’s court, but inwardly he is a Hebrew man, and he has seen the man being beaten as one “of his brothers.” In just two words, we are given much to think about. 

    I will now proceed to more complex uses of brevity. In 2 Samuel, when David negotiates a peace agreement with Abner, the commander of the Saulide forces with whom he has been warring, David stipulates that his first wife, Michal the daughter of Saul, must be sent back to him. David had to flee from her father, who was bent on killing him, he has not seen her for years, and in the interim he has acquired two wives and is on his way to creating a small harem. It seems clear that his motive in insisting on the return of Michal is not love but political calculation: the public display of the daughter of the previous king as his wife will strengthen the legitimacy of his claim to the throne. Meanwhile, Saul has married off Michal to a certain Paltiel, an act of questionable legality because she was already married to David. The obvious intention was to effect a kind of erasure of David’s marriage to Michal. No information is given about Paltiel beyond his name and marital status. Neither Paltiel nor Michal has any choice in their separation because they have been ordered to comply by the powerful military commander Abner. This is all we are told about the parting of the spouses: “And her husband went with her, weeping as he went after her, as far as Bachurim. And Abner said to him, ‘Go back!’ And he went back” (2 Samuel 3:16). 

    No narrative report is given of the marriage between Paltiel and Michal. However it evolved, Paltiel clearly has come to love Michal, and it is plausible that she has returned his love. All this is poignantly conveyed in his wordless weeping as he accompanies her on her departure. Note that at first he is walking “with” her but then “after” her, as she, presumably led away by Abner, is taken off to resume her position as David’s wife. Abner’s brusque command to Paltiel to turn back cannot be disobeyed. Michal has been living with a man who really loved her, something David may never have done, perhaps not even in the early days of their marriage. In this way a few words evoke a domestic tragedy. More than two and a half millennia after they were written, they express, without the slightest elaboration of detail, the pain of loss that we all can understand when a beloved spouse is violently taken away forever.

    The great penetrating account of this kind of narrative was offered by Erich Auerbach in the seminal first chapter of his Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature. (The German scholar wrote it between 1942 and 1945 in wartime exile in Istanbul; it was published in German in 1946 and in English in 1953.) His memorable coinage, fraught with background, is applicable to virtually all biblical narrative. Here, in Auerbach’s words, are the clauses that lead up to his introduction of that phrase:

     

    The decisive points of the narrative alone are emphasized, what lies between is nonexistent; thoughts and feelings remain unexpressed, are only suggested by the silence and the fragmentary speeches; the whole, permeated with the most unrelieved suspense and directed toward a single goal (and to that extent far more of a unity), remains mysterious and “fraught with background.”

    Expressive succinctness — fraughtness with background — equally plays a role in dialogue. In the ghastly story of the rape of Tamar by her half-brother Amnon, after he has sated his lust and brutally thrust her out of the door of his bedchamber and she walks along screaming, her royal robe torn, ashes on her head, she encounters her full brother Absalom. Seeing her in this utterly devastated state, he says to her, “Has Amnon your brother been with you?” (2 Samuel 13:20). Absalom appears to realize that she has been raped by Amnon, perhaps because he is aware that she was summoned to Amnon’s bedchamber, perhaps also because Amnon’s lust for the beautiful Tamar was generally known in the court. Drawing the obvious conclusion from her torn garment and her despair, he could have said “raped” (‘inah) or “lain with” (shakhav ‘im), but instead he chooses the euphemism “been with.” As subsequent events will reveal, Absalom is not a kind person. He contrives to have his henchmen murder Amnon in revenge for the violation of his sister. Later in the story, he usurps David’s throne through demagoguery and fully intends to kill his father. But the biblical writer understands that a brutal person can have another side in a different relationship. 

    Absalom is perfectly willing to become a parricide in order to serve his own political interests, but he is affectionate toward his sister, and seeing her shattered by what he infers was done to her, he does not want to upset her further by plainly naming the act of violation, and so, with a delicacy of feeling one would not expect from his behavior elsewhere, he asks whether Amnon “has been with” her. Fraternal affection, the writer realizes, can be exhibited by the same person who will exact harsh vengeance and will be prepared to tear the crown from his father and destroy him. This complex understanding of character, for which a novelist would have used many pages, is expressed here in just two words. Writers such as George Eliot and Proust shrewdly grasped that bad people can have good sides, or at least good moments, and the same is true of biblical writers in all their extraordinary brevity.

    Biblical narrative bustles with individualized characters whose distinctive traits invite our attention, and attentive alertness is definitely required. Sometimes the revelatory concise item goes by so quickly that it could be missed. A case in point is the introduction of Laban, Rebekah’s brother, into the larger Genesis narrative in the story of her betrothal. Years later, he will play an important role in the life of his nephew Jacob. Rebekah has just encountered Abraham’s servant at the well in Aram-Naharaim, and after she has passed the test of bringing water for him and also for his camels, he bedecks her with what are in effect betrothal gifts. When she rushes home with the news of the stranger’s arrival, Laban, before running out to greet the man at the well, has taken note of something: “And it happened, when he saw the nose ring, and the bracelets on his sister’s arms, and when he heard the words of Rebekah his sister, saying, ‘Thus the man spoke to me,’ he hurried to the man standing by his camels at the well and said to him, “Come in, blessed of the Lord, why should you stand outside, when I have readied the household and a place for the camels?” (Genesis 24:30–31). Now, one might give this a benign interpretation: seeing the jewelry on his sister, Laban concludes that the stranger’s intentions are honorable, and his consequent invitation to the man is an expression of “Oriental” hospitality. But the more likely implication is that the glitter of gold is what catches his eye. That is what triggers his grand gesture of hospitality to the visitor. No explicit comment on Laban’s character is made, such as “this Laban was a crafty, grasping man,” merely the brief notation of his eye on the precious bangles. 

    Years later, when his nephew Jacob, fleeing from the wrath of his brother Esau, takes refuge in Laban’s Mesopotamian home, the uncle will make a great display of their kinship, embracing him and kissing him and declaring, “Indeed, you are my bone and my flesh” (Genesis 29: 14). The blood relationship, however, does not prevent Laban from driving a hard bargain with his nephew. After saying to Jacob, “Because you are my kin, should you serve me for nothing?” (Genesis 29:15), he makes his daughter Rachel the payment for Jacob’s labor while stipulating a full seven years of service in lieu of a bride-price. Compounding this calculation, he passes off Leah instead of Rachel as the bride, and when in the morning light Jacob discovers he has been deceived, Laban tells him he will also give him Rachel at the end of the bridal week, but on the condition that Jacob serve him still another seven years without wages. All this is aptly prefigured in Laban’s taking stock of the gold adorning his sister. 

    A devout reader might wonder why we need to know such things in reading the Bible. After all, the Patriarchal Tales are about the progenitors of the twelve tribes of Israel who will become God’s covenanted people. The biblical writers, however, keenly understood that even if the stories they told were an expression of God’s purposes with Israel and with humankind, the actors in the stories were palpably human, and their actions were driven by human traits and all-too-human imperfections. This meant that the writers’ imagining of the characters was akin to the way good novelists imagine their characters, and that is why they engage us as readers, whether we are believers or nonbelievers. As Jacob’s story unfolds, we see that he has his own calculating bent, and it will prove more than a match for his uncle.

    Another swift notation in Jacob’s story should be mentioned. What, we may wonder, was his state of mind over the long seven years of labor during which he had to wait for Rachel, the beautiful woman with whom he was smitten in a coup de foudre from their first meeting at the well, and whom he will continue to love all his life? Here is the crucial narrative report: “And Jacob served seven years for Rachel, and they seemed in his eyes but a few days in his love for her” (Genesis 29:20). This is a unique biblical comment on the intensity of a man’s feelings for a woman. The Israeli novelist Meir Shalev, who was deeply interested in the Bible and wrote sensitively about it, picked up the phrase “but a few days” and used it as the title for a novel about consuming love. One might object that for Jacob, burning with impatience to consummate his love for Rachel, the seven years would rather have seemed agonizingly long, but what the writer has in mind is that Jacob would be constantly focusing on the great reward that was to be his at the end of the years of labor, and that with this consciousness the years of labor seem a trifle. It is a moving expression of love in just six Hebrew words. 

    And because very little in biblical narrative is isolated from the larger context, this undying love will have consequences, some of them dire, as the story continues. Jacob will certainly favor Rachel over her sister Leah, preferential treatment that will not engender domestic harmony. After Rachel’s death, he will extravagantly favor her older son Joseph, who resembles his mother in his beauty; Jacob even feminizes him by dressing him in a ketonet passim (the “coat of many colors” of the King James Version), which, as we learn in the story of the rape of Tamar because she is also wearing it, is a garment “worn by virgin princesses” (2 Samuel 13:18). Jacob on his deathbed is still haunted by Rachel’s death, flashing back to it. 

    The emotions of the biblical figures are often unstated and left to inference or conjecture. Only occasionally, as in Jacob’s love for Rachel, are they spelled out succinctly. They may sometimes also be intimated by an act. The birth of the future prophet Samuel occurs after his mother Hannah, agonizing through years of childlessness, prays in the sanctuary at Shiloh for a child. She stipulates in her prayer that if she is granted a son, he will be “given to the Lord all the days of his life” (1 Samuel 1:11). After the son is born, she tells her husband that she will fulfill her vow once the child is weaned. In ancient Israel this could have been as much as three or four years. Still, she is constrained by her vow to part from the boy and bring him, not much older than a toddler, to become an acolyte at the Shiloh sanctuary. Her anguish at the separation from the child for whom she has waited so long can be readily imagined. The narrative report in 1 Samuel says nothing about it — yet what is done instead is in its brief manner more eloquent than a direct report. 

    Little Samuel, we are told, as an acolyte in the sanctuary, was girt in the priestly garment known as the ephod. His mother, on the other hand, in the very next words in the text, brings him something different to wear: “and a little cloak [me‘il] would his mother make him and would bring up to him year after year when she came up with her husband to offer the yearly sacrifice” (1 Samuel: 2:19). The mother’s loving care for the little boy from whom she has been parted is beautifully intimated. She makes the cloak herself, perhaps both weaving and sewing it; and since she brings it to Shiloh year after year, she is obviously mindful of him as he grows, making a bigger cloak each year that she comes. One could scarcely have a more vivid instance of how the biblical writers imagine their characters with very human feelings as they respond to the circumstances of their lives. Even for those who read the biblical narratives solely with an eye to God’s plans for Israel, the humanity of the represented figure is arresting. 

    Moreover, as with Jacob’s great love for Rachel, the detail here is part of a web of interconnections. The child’s cloak will become a recurring motif in the larger story. At the crucial moment of transition when an angry Samuel foreswears all bonds with Saul, the desperate king clings to the prophet’s cloak, begging the prophet not to reject him, and inadvertently tears it. Samuel, not one to miss a symbolic clue, thunders: “the LORD has torn away the kingship of Israel and given it to your fellow man who is better than you” (1 Samuel 15:28). Even after his death, Samuel is wearing a me‘il. When the necromancer at Endor summons up his ghost, Saul immediately recognizes that it is Samuel because he is wrapped in a cloak. The plurisignificant cloak is eventually transferred to Saul: when David finds Saul asleep in the cave at Adullam, he cuts off a corner of the king’s cloak as evidence of what he could have done to him. And, in a reversal of the cloak motif, in Saul’s concluding encounter with a band of ecstatic prophets, he strips off everything he is wearing and rolls naked on the ground, an emblem of his being stripped of the kingship. The little garment that Hannah makes for her son is thus both poignant in itself and sets in motion a chain of meanings around cloaks.

    The terseness of narrative report in the Bible can either point to a fraught significance, as with Hannah and Jacob, or it can open a window into ambiguous possibilities. Modern interpreters of the Bible like to make things unambiguously clear for their readers, but the biblical writers often aimed for uncertainty. One of the strengths of biblical narrative is that at times it cultivates ambiguity in the awareness that personalities and acts exhibit a complexity that may invite explanation in more than one way. A striking example occurs at the end of the last bitter confrontation between David and Michal. As noted above, Michal was forcibly separated from her loving husband Paltiel, almost certainly against her will, and brought back to her public position as David’s wife. After his conquest of Jerusalem, David has the Ark of the Covenant brought up to his new capital and dances before it in the procession, in what is probably a short tunic with nothing underneath. Michal comes out to meet him in front of the palace and sarcastically berates him for “exposing” himself — this is the word she uses — before the eyes of slave-girls. He angrily responds that God has chosen him to be king over Israel instead of her father and that for what she deems dishonorable he will be honored. His defiant rejoinder concludes with these words: “I will play before the Lord! And I will be dishonored still more than this and will be debased in my own eyes! But with the slavegirls about whom you spoke, with them let me be honored!” (2 Samuel 6:22–23). He has the last word in their dialogue. 

    The narrator concludes the episode with these words: “And Michal daughter of Saul had no child to her dying day” (2 Samuel 6:23). What explains this bleak report? Intriguingly, there are four conceivable explanations, two naturalistic and two theological. The most obvious reason for her never having a child — a grim fate for a woman in ancient Israel — is that in the wake of this bitter confrontation between her and David, they never again sleep together. A second possibility also suggests itself: Michal has been married to Paltiel for a number of years, and there is no indication that she had a child with him, so perhaps she was simply infertile. If, on the other hand, an interpreter prefers to see the story in theological terms, Michal may have been punished by God with barrenness for vilifying the anointed king of Israel in his great moment of triumph. Finally, still from the perspective of divine causation, punishment could have been exacted upon both spouses because her having no child would have deprived David of producing an heir with the daughter of his royal predecessor, an heir who would have provided a clear guarantee for the legitimacy of his successor and for the dynasty he aspired to found. In this understanding, both Michal and David are gravely at fault in their confrontation, she for publicly insulting him (the exchange takes place outside, in front of the palace), he for treating a woman with open contempt who is a king’s daughter and once loved him. We might recall that when they were to be married, it was said of Michal that she loved David, the only woman in the entire Bible about whom it is explicitly stated that she loved a man; and not long afterward she incurred personal risk in enabling David to escape from Saul’s assassins. 

    Ambiguity of explanation is not too common in literary narrative, ancient or modern, and its presence in the Bible is a manifestation of the ability of the Hebrew writers to represent human actions and relationships in all the shadowing of their uncertainties. Auerbach’s notion that the narrative method of the Bible compels interpretation is quite relevant in this regard.

    The examples I will go on to consider are, with one marginal exception, all in dialogue, as were Amnon’s delicate choice of a euphemism in his question to his violated sister and in the use of “an Egyptian man” in the Moses story. The preponderance of instances of expressive brevity in dialogues should not be surprising: biblical narrative swings between drastic summary (a span of eighteen or more years can be conveyed in three or so words) and dialogue, where narrating time and narrative time are equal. The rule of thumb is that when something significant is about to happen, the narrative drastically slows down and expresses the event through dialogue. The dialogues themselves, of course, are much briefer than in later literature, and the crucial aspects of representation are often expressed in half a dozen words or less, sometimes in a single word.

    Here are two such instances, which occur in antithetical moments following a sexual act. After David from his rooftop sees the beautiful Bathsheba bathing and orders her to be brought to him for sex, neither speech nor emotional response is assigned to her. Her only words conveyed in the entire episode, presumably after the passage of two months, are “I am pregnant” (2 Samuel 11:5). At this point in the story, we know nothing of Bathsheba except that she is Uriah’s wife and that she is beautiful. What, then, lies behind her words? Is she bewildered, confounded, fearful? Or does she have her eye on the main chance — now that I am pregnant, how are we going to make this work? She evidently has not had a child with Uriah, and bearing the offspring of the king could open grand possibilities for her. This of course is mere speculation, the ambiguity being akin to the ambiguity around Michal’s childlessness. 

    Bathsheba, after giving birth to Solomon, entirely disappears from the narrative until years later, when she vividly reappears as the aged David is failing and his son Adonijah attempts to usurp the throne. She returns to the story after David’s death when she contrives to bring about Adonijah’s execution. Her wiliness in these last two episodes may encourage the thought that she has her own advantage in mind when she tells David she is pregnant, but that is far from certain. Perhaps she was a naive young wife who unquestioningly obeyed the king’s sexual demand, and then through two or more decades of life in the court she gradually acquired the shrewdness required for negotiating palace intrigues. The very indeterminacy of her first very brief words — not, technically, dialogue at all, but a message, perhaps oral — imparts a piquant ambiguity to the story.

    The grisly tale of the concubine at Gibeah in Judges 19 is not a biblical text that would be read in Sunday school. It may be unfamiliar to many readers. A certain Levite is traveling with his concubine to his home in the high country of Ephraim. As night falls, they find themselves near the Benjaminite town of Gibeah, and when no one else welcomes them an old man who lives there takes them in for the night, displaying the sort of generous hospitality that is civilized behavior in the region, as it is in the Greek realm depicted in the Odyssey. As they are dining together, men from the town pound on the door and demand that the wayfarer be brought outside so that they can have sex with him. This is an obvious reprise of the story of the lusting mob assaulting Lot’s house in Genesis 19, even with whole phrases cited from the earlier text. But in this story, there are no angels to zap the assailants, and it ends badly. The old man tries to dissuade the mob, offering to send out to them instead of his male guest the concubine and — astoundingly — his virgin daughter. (This is surely pushing hospitality too far.) 

    The violent mob persists, and the Levite then “seizes” his concubine — his host’s daughter is left alone — and thrusts her outside. The terrible consequences are predictable: the helpless woman is gang-raped all night long, and at daybreak she staggers to the entrance of the house and collapses there, her hands stretched out on the threshold. When the Levite awakes, opens the door, and finds her there, he addresses to her only two peremptory Hebrew words, qumi weneileicha, “get up and let us go” (Judges 19:28). But she cannot get up because after being brutalized through the night she has died. The two words he speaks are an indelible expression of his scandalous moral character. Hours earlier, he had pushed her outside, leaving her to the assault of the rapists. Now, not at first realizing that she is dead, he issues to her a curt command that they must be on their way. He says nothing solicitous or concerned about her condition. His two words to a corpse, in the making of which he was directly complicit, tell us all we need to know about him. 

    And there is, moreover, a postmortem expression of his brutality: he butchers her body, cutting it limb by limb into twelve pieces that he sends to the twelve tribes of Israel as evidence of the atrocity that has been perpetrated at Gibeah — an atrocity, of course, in which he has played a key role. There surely could have been another way to get the message out to the tribes. (The sanctity of the body after death was an important value in Hebrew society as it was in Greek society, a value memorably articulated in the Antigone story.) The Levite’s ghastly message to the tribes leads them to launch a bloody war of retribution against the tribe of Benjamin. Things, then, end disastrously not only for the concubine and the Levite but also for the nation, which is torn by civil strife. Perhaps the whole story was meant to show the chaos that prevailed in Israel before the monarchy: “In those days,” the refrain runs in Judges, “there was no king in Israel. Every man did what was right in his own eyes.” But the vile Levite is at the center of this larger picture, his turpitude conveyed in the two abrupt Hebrew words he speaks to a corpse.

    Let us move from two words to one in the focusing of meaning. In 1 Kings 2, Adonijah, after his attempt to assume the throne has been upended by the coronation of Solomon, commits a fatal error. He asks of the queen mother Bathsheba “one petition” to convey to the king: that he be given Abishag the Shunamite as his wife. Bathsheba immediately realizes that such a marriage might pave the way to a future claim to the throne, for Abishag, though she did not have sex with David, shared his bed. Bathsheba then goes to Solomon and repeats the exact language of Adonijah’s request, adding one word: “There is one small petition that I ask of you, do not refuse me” (1 Kings 2:20). Adonijah did not say “small.” By adding it, Bathsheba knows she will enrage her son, for he, realizing the political ramifications of the petition, understands it is in fact a very large thing that Adonijah is asking. His immediate response is to issue an order to kill Adonijah, which of course is precisely what Bathsheba intended to bring about. The narrative dispenses with any analysis of Bathsheba’s devious shrewdness — it is conveyed in a single word. 

    A related use of a single word as a fulcrum of meaning occurs in Genesis 39, when Potiphar’s wife frames Joseph for the attempted sexual assault of which she is guilty. When she voices her accusation to the household servants, she refers to the supposed rapist as “the Hebrew man.” After her husband returns, she repeats her false accusation in the exact same language, changing just one word. This time she refers to Joseph as “the Hebrew slave.” In the throes of lust, all she could say to Joseph was, “Lie with me.” Now she manipulates language with calculating attention to her audience. The household servants, after all, are in all likelihood themselves slaves, so instead of inviting any status solidarity she calls Joseph “the Hebrew man,” as if to say, this is what you might expect from those wild Semitic barbarians from Canaan. When, on the other hand, she reports the supposed event to her husband, she makes a point of referring to Joseph as a slave because she wants to stoke his anger at the thought that one of his slaves should have, outrageously, attempted to violate her. The substitution of the single word shows that Mrs. Potiphar can be shrewd as well as concupiscent. It is microtextual evidence for biblical narrative’s elliptical but vivid imagining of character and motive in the midst of telling the story of the nation’s origins.

    A few words in dialogue can be rich in expressing feelings and the complications regarding social relations. At the beginning of the Book of Samuel we see Hannah, who has come with her husband and his other wife to the Shiloh sanctuary for the annual sacrifice, in evident despair over her continued childlessness, exacerbated by being mocked by her co-wife. Her husband Elkanah tries to comfort her: “Hannah, why do you weep and why do you not eat and why is your heart afflicted? Am I not better to you than ten sons?” (1 Samuel: 8). That last brief sentence (still briefer in the Hebrew) is of course a touching expression of a man’s love for his wife. He obviously cares very deeply for her and is distressed by her dejection. At the same time, these few moving words reflect his failure to imagine the acuteness of her suffering as a woman. Given that the bearing of sons was seen in ancient Israel as a woman’s ultimate fulfillment, her very purpose in life, his devotion to her cannot console her for this existential lack. He loves her well and certainly means well, but his hyperbolic assertion that he is better for her than ten sons could only heighten her anguish — she who has no sons is asked to imagine that she possesses something better than ten sons. One short sentence in a dialogue communicates a complex sense of a marriage — the husband’s unquestionable love, which the wife surely understands and appreciates, and his incapacity as a man to fully fathom the terrible turmoil she is undergoing as a woman without child. 

    Occasionally, the mere ordering of the words in a short statement is revelatory. This is the case for Jacob’s words to Esau in the scene of the selling of the birthright. The exchange is the first reported speech for either of the brothers, and it follows the rule that first words spoken by a character play a decisive role in characterization. Esau’s speech, famously, is crude and abrupt: “Let me gulp down some of that red red stuff, for I am famished” (Genesis 25:30). Jacob’s response — just four words in the Hebrew — is equally characterizing, though in a less obvious way: “Sell now your birthright to me” (Genesis 25:31). The words are simple and seem quite direct, but their ordering is carefully calculated. First, the imperative verb, “sell.” Then the stipulation of an immediate transaction — not tomorrow or next week but “now.” After that, the object of the initial verb — sell what, a deerskin jacket, a hunting knife? No, “your birthright,” a very high price to pay for a helping of lentil stew. Jacob is shrewdly aware that he can take advantage of his brother’s urgent hunger. Finally, at the end of the syntactic chain, like a trap snapping shut, li, “to me.” In these very few words Jacob reveals himself as wily and cunning, and a hard bargainer. It is behavior consistent with how he will continue to act through the first half of the story. Up to this point, we have been told nothing about Jacob’s character, but as with our previous examples no further exposition is needed. This is one reason, evident here, though by no means the only one, for why these stories in all their brevity strongly engage our perception of the human entanglements that they represent. 

    I will offer one final example from dialogue; it is a bit longer for biblical narrative practice but still fairly brief, and in its relative brevity it opens up a deep perspective on the life of the speaker. Jacob, after being brought down to Egypt, is led by Joseph to an audience with Pharaoh. The Hebrew patriarch is now very old, as Pharaoh can plainly see. So Pharaoh, with a certain solemnity, asks him, “How many are the days of the years of your life?” Jacob, in a solemn reply, pointedly substitutes “sojourning” for “life,” and tells Pharaoh that he is one hundred and thirty years old, which would have been twenty years beyond what the Egyptians assigned as the ultimate human lifespan. Having pronounced this prodigious number, Jacob continues: “Few and evil have been the days of the years of my life, and they have not attained the years of my fathers in their sojourning” (Genesis 47:8–9). 

    What does this gloomy declaration tell us about Jacob? In his long life he has gone through much, buying the birthright and garnering the firstborn’s blessing by deception, fleeing to his uncle’s home in the east, working seven years for Rachel but then finding he has been given Leah before her, then his return to Canaan with two wives, two concubines, twelve sons, a daughter, and abundant livestock. It would seem that Jacob has attained everything he could have wanted, the paternal blessing manifestly fulfilled — but everything he has gotten has come at a price, as his words to Pharaoh show. Rachel was the love of his life, but he had to marry her sister first, and the consequence was years of domestic strife. Then, after Rachel gave birth to Joseph, she died in childbirth with Benjamin, a loss from which Jacob never really recovered. Then his daughter Dinah was raped, and he was dismayed by the blood vengeance enacted by his sons Simeon and Levi. Perhaps worst of all, for some twenty years he was convinced that his beloved son Joseph was dead. What happened in his wrestling through the night with the divine stranger is an emblem of his life: he fights his mysterious adversary to a draw of sorts and is given a new, divine name, but he is hurt in his hip socket and will bear the evidence of the struggle in a limp for all his days. Jacob’s story has what may seem to be a happy ending — he is reunited with Joseph and gets to see him in all his regal splendor, and he is able to bless the two grandsons Joseph has given him before he dies. Yet this is no fairytale. The taste of bitterness does not disappear. On his very deathbed, he flashes back to Rachel’s death. All this is a token of the moral realism suffusing biblical narrative: “Few and evil have been the days of the years of my life.”

    Finally, here is what amounts to a zero-degree case of brevity, where something significant is communicated by a character’s not saying anything. In the episode of the rape of Jacob’s daughter Dinah, he berates Simeon and Levi for perpetrating vengeance, the massacre of all the men of Shechem. The objection that he voices is not moral but prudential. He and his family are only a “handful” of people, and they will now be exposed to the wrath of the Canaanites. Simeon and Levi yield no ground to their father: “Like a whore should our sister be treated?” (Genesis 34:31). The episode ends with these words, and the implication is that Jacob has no rejoinder to his two fierce sons. His silence is important because this is the moment in the larger story when Jacob, once a resolute and resourceful master of his large family, allows the power to be seized by his insistent sons. (David, too, will begin to lose power after the rape of his daughter Tamar, an act in which he was unwittingly complicit by directing her to Amnon’s bedchamber.) Not long after the incident of the rape, at least in the canonical ordering of the episodes, Jacob will be cruelly deceived by his sons when they send Joseph’s bloodied robe as evidence of his supposed death, and the once canny Jacob, now deceived, will slide into twenty crippling years of manipulated mourning for his beloved Joseph.

    A related episode, reported with the sparsest notation, is inserted in the next chapter: “And it happened, when Israel was encamped in the land, that Reuben went and lay with Bilhah, his father’s concubine, and Israel heard” (Genesis 35:22). This is a grave transgression: it amounts to incest and is also an implicit challenge to his father’s authority, for whatever Reuben’s desire-driven impulse, in ancient Israel to take sexual possession of the dominant person’s bedmate is to lay claim to his power. Jacob hears of it but he does not speak. At this point in his life he seems unable to confront his wayward sons. It is only at the end of his days, when he intones a long poem that spells out the destiny of the twelve sons through the tribes they will found, that he will curse Reuben for “profaning [his] couch.” The poem is almost certainly from a different literary source and antedates the prose narrative by many years, but its editorial placement at the end of the Jacob narrative picks up that enigmatic silence upon his hearing that Reuben has slept with Bilhah. When it happened, he did not speak, perhaps afraid that he no longer possessed the paternal authority to castigate one of his sons. If, then, one views the narrative and the poem as a continuum, even if created by editorial artifice, Jacob figures as a powerless father harboring resentment for years and allowing himself to express it only as his life draws to an end. 

    Revelatory silence occurs also in David’s grief over the death of Absalom. He is famously, and movingly, shattered to hear that his son has been killed, and he expresses his grief in an anguished stutter. Then his brutal, tough-minded military commander Joab, who in fact is Absalom’s killer, arrives after the battle and berates David for grieving over someone who was his deadly enemy. If David does not reverse course, Joab tells him, the troops will disperse and he will be left to a terrible fate. Joab issues a peremptory order to the king: “And now, arise, go out, and speak to the heart of your servants. For by the Lord I have sworn, if you go not out, that not a man will spend the night with you, and this will be a greater evil than any evil that has befallen you from your youth until now” (2 Samuel 19:8). David is compelled to obey Joab’s command, so he goes out and shows himself before the troops, but he simply stands there and does not say a word.

    As the Dutch Bible scholar J. P. Fokkelman has brilliantly observed, David at this juncture looks like “a man beaten to a pulp, who can barely stand, and does only the minimum requested or expected of him.” David’s silence in this respect resembles Jacob’s silence: it is the speechlessness of an eloquent man who was once powerful but now, torn between the political demands of kingship and the emotions of a bereaved father, falls silent. The fulcrum of power has passed to the strongman Joab, just as Jacob has lost power in the face of his angry sons. David, too, can give vent to his resentment only on his deathbed, when he enjoins Solomon to see to it that Joab will be killed in retribution for his murderous career. He mentions in his words to Solomon only two victims of killings, the two army commanders, Abner and Amasa, but he surely sooner or later would have heard of Joab’s murder of Absalom and would have had that in mind as well.

    Eric Auerbach drew a conclusion that in its time would have been somewhat surprising — that it was biblical narrative, not Homer, that was the precursor in ancient literature of the great realist novels of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As I became engaged in biblical narrative over the years, I was completely persuaded by the rightness of this conclusion, and I came to see certain ramifications of it not spelled out by Auerbach. But there is one respect in which Homer and not the Hebrew writers was a forerunner of the novel, and that is in the sumptuousness of descriptive detail. This is especially true of the Odyssey, which revels in the representation of the accoutrements of aristocratic life and the fine craftsmanship that produced them — the golden bowls, the beautiful woven cloths, the exquisitely carved wood of the furnishings, and much more. There is a line of affiliation from all this to Balzac’s elaborate rendering of Parisian interiors as reflections of their inhabitants and Dickens’ vivid description of the choking London smog that is the medium for the troubled fate of many of his characters. The ancient Hebrew writers chose an antithetical path. They contrived numerous ways to package complexity into highly compressed units, using just a few words or even a single word to intimate depth of character, coiled tension in relationships, unstated emotions. Among the many means through which biblical narrative grips its readers, the resonant, subtle deployment of terrific compactness stands out. Indeed, it stands out even more conspicuously, even more admirably, in our culture of verbiage and verbosity.

    Reading for Sins

    Is the only kind of magic left to literature dark magic — the power to harm with words? Recent debates in literary studies sometimes make it seem so. Consider the most-downloaded episode of the C19 Podcast, a podcast series produced by The Society of Nineteenth-Century Americanists. The episode, which appeared in 2019, is called “The N Word in the Classroom: Just Say No.” The Reaganite moralism of the episode’s title gives a good sense of the whole. Here are some college classroom rules insisted on by the host, a professor of American literature:

    The N-word won’t be used in this class by a person of any race, even if it consistently appears in our texts. The same goes for the F-word, regardless of a person’s perceived sexual orientation or gender expression. And this is simply not a space in which we call people trash.

    By “used,” the professor would at first seem to mean “mentioned” or “quoted,” although the equivalence with “calling people trash” begins quickly to suggest otherwise. She goes on: “My research specialty is African American literature. The N-word often appears in the texts I teach, but I never believed that I had to hear that word spoken in my workplace just because I had chosen to study art that often features it.” The emphasis on “workplace” erodes the distinction between use and mention; hearing a student read the offending word aloud might, in this case, constitute something like a discriminatory workplace environment for the professor, despite the fact that she herself had assigned the text.

    Later in the same episode, the professor acknowledges that she sometimes plays recordings of songs or of poetry in class that contain the offending word, spoken out loud and in its entirety:

    I mention this, because even as I acknowledge the power of performance to do harm when we give life to words by speaking them in the classroom, that doesn’t mean that we can’t respect an artist’s choices, while we also take our role seriously. My students and I are practicing what it means to be literary scholars and cultural critics. We are not reenactors, so we need not give the word life ourselves in order to engage the work thoroughly.

    Instead of giving the word “life,” students are asked when reading aloud to render it as the sound “en,” or “ens” if plural. Nor are such phonic reductions confined to the case of the word “nigger.” When teaching James Baldwin’s “Notes of a Native Son,” for instance, the professor insists that the phrase “yellow-bellied Japs,” whose racism Baldwin abhors, be enunciated, rather ornithologically, as “yellow-bellied jays.” “We notice that Baldwin is as critical of the racial slur as we might be,” the professor says, “but that doesn’t mean that we have to give that slur life in our learning environment.”

    There is a combination of conceptual incoherence and primness here that seems to me all too common when it comes to the way contemporary literature scholars think about words that wound. Its mystical metaphysics aside, though, “The N Word in the Classroom: Just Say No” does present an interesting occasion for examining how denigratory and insulting language operates. In his novel Open City, published in 2011, Teju Cole dramatizes the problem in a more sophisticated fashion. The narrator, Julius, an American immigrant of European and Nigerian descent, is talking to a couple of Moroccan Muslims. They are telling him about Moroccan Jews. One of the Moroccans says, “They look just like us, though, of course, they do better in business. I think sometimes that I should become a Jew, just for professional reasons.” He goes on: “What I am against is Zionism, and this religious claim they make on a land where someone else is already living.”

    Julius, neither a Muslim nor a Jew and with no connection to the Middle East, feels uncomfortable:

    I wanted to tell him that, in the States, we were particularly wary of strong criticisms of Israel because it could become anti-Semitic. But I didn’t, because I knew that my own fear of anti-Semitism, like my fear of racism, had through long practice become prerational. What I would impose on him would not be an argument, it would be a request that he adopt my reflexes, or the pieties of a society different from the one in which he grew up, or the one in which he now functioned. It would do little good to describe for him the subtle shades of meaning evoked in an American ear by saying “Jews” instead of “Jewish people.” I wanted also to take him to task for attacking a religious ideal when his own central ideal was religious, but the skein of argument was beginning to feel like futility piled on futility.

    Julius would like to have a substantive conversation about the politics of the Middle East, but he’s not sure how, at least not with these Moroccans. Impacted taboos intervene. First, there is the possible coincidence of anti-Zionism with antisemitism, which triggers Julius’ worry about indulging a political argument that is actually a racist one. Julius quickly realizes that something superstitious — in his words, something “prerational” — is at work in this fear. Indeed, his “reflex” against bigotry encompasses not only his “fear of anti-Semitism,” but also his “fear of racism.” The grammar is ambiguous. Does he mean his fear of expressions of racism from others — a plausible concern for an African who spends his time in the United States and Europe? Or does he mean his fear of being caught out, inadvertently, in some expression of prejudice on his own part? And who is he afraid of? What superego-like monitor is listening to his conversation?

    Julius’ fear of bigotry involves a heightened attention to verbal nuance, and accordingly to the possibility of mistranslation across idioms: “It would do little good to describe to him the subtle shades of meaning evoked in an American ear by saying ‘Jews’ instead of ‘Jewish people.’” To talk politics, at least Israeli-Palestinian politics, is to embark on a fraught course where the landmines of bigotry are everywhere, even in the difference in case between “Jewish” and “Jew.” In a less serious — but in its way just as precise — analysis, the comedian Louis C.K. has a routine about the word “Jew” that picks out its potential activation as a slur:

    “Jew” is a funny word. It is. Because “Jew” is the only word that is the polite thing to call a group of people, and the slur for the same group. Most groups have a good and bad [word], but [in this case] there is the same word with a little stank on it, and it becomes a terrible thing to call a person. ’Cuz you could say “He’s a Jew” [in a neutral tone], it’s fine, but, “He’s a Jew” [with contemptuous emphasis], and that’s all it takes.

    When Julius winces at the failure to recognize the distinction between “Jews” and “the Jewish people” on the part of his Moroccan interlocutor, he is detecting, or worrying that he might be detecting, the “stank” that Louis C.K. says can be put on the word.

    It is a sociolinguistic fact that, in English and in the right conditions, minor differences, such as the difference between “the Jews” and “the Jewish people,” can in fact indicate prejudicial intent. But Julius’s super-sensitivity to such potential maledictions exceeds any plausible situational warrant. It is a symptom of an American hypervigilance toward even inadvertent expressions of what could be taken for bigotry. For this detection system words are dangerous enough that they must be policed for their own intrinsic powers, entirely irrespective of inferable intention. They are like magical spells, or like primitive taboos. That is a part of what Julius means by “prerational,” by “reflex.”

    These are the reflexes of the American liberal of a certain time and place. They are the reflexes, for instance, of the Americanist scholar who wrote “The N Word: Just Say No.” What sets Julius apart from her, though, is his capacity to analyze the structure of the taboos whose violation he fears. Unlike too many humanities professors today, Julius recognizes that there is something dangerously “prerational” in the vogueish fear of words that wound.

    Today, for us, such words partake of that magic — in the very reduced, very polite way appropriate to our own bourgeois etiquette rituals — with which anthropology from the nineteenth century through the time of Freud was so preoccupied: the religious superstition whereby certain objects, words, or people are invested with a kind of sacred dread. The Columbia linguist John McWhorter has sketched a brief conceptual history of tabooed words in modern English. He begins in the 1930s, when the lexicographer Allen Walker Read could write an entire etymological entry on the word “fuck” that never actually spelled out the word. In our own time, “f—” or “f—k” (or “fugg,” as in Norman Mailer’s novel The Naked and the Dead in 1948) seems quaint; taboo has settled elsewhere. It has “been transferred from the sexual and scatological to the sociological.” These changes are of course not arbitrary. “What a society considers profane reveals what it believes to be sacrosanct: The emerging taboo on slurs reveals the value our culture places — if not consistently — on respect for subgroups of people.”

    This is an important supplement to Julius’ reference to taboo as “prerational.” In fact, the deep logic of any given taboo expresses important, and in some cases perfectly rational, societal commitments. The prerational aspect of any taboo isn’t necessarily the social argument it reflects, but the disabling emotions that its violation elicits.

    I have begun with slurs because they are the most concentrated, the most crystallized, site of our polite culture’s concern with taboo. But that makes them only the neatest instance of a much more general phenomenon. For college students and professors, a huge range of things became troubling in the years since 2012 or so. Literary texts, historical events, and venerated institutional leaders marred by the sins of their times became occasions for complicated rituals of disavowal and purification. Depictions or representations of sexual violence, for instance, are an especially common target. The environment could become punitive enough that college teachers would routinely report feeling afraid of doing their jobs. A Reed College professor described feeling “scared to teach courses on race, gender, or sexuality — and I am a gay mixed-race woman.” That was in 2016, during the first Trump administration; the professor was not anxious about surveillance by MAGA politicians seeking out wrong-think, but about Reed’s left-wing student activists, whose militant campaign against the college’s humanities core curriculum included outrage at the playful inclusion of a Steve Martin skit in which the comedian dresses up as King Tut. As one student said, “That’s like somebody . . . making a song just littered with the n-word everywhere.” The video deserved to be removed.

    Demands of this sort have of course become a mainstay of the resuscitated culture wars of the last fifteen years. And they have become fodder for right-wing critiques of student “snowflakes.” Such critiques, pretty plainly, are not exactly misplaced. There really is something pathological about the streams of activist sensitivity to the teaching of literature or art thought to contain harmful words, ideas, or depictions. But the interesting question, the one that demands a more persuasive social theory than it has yet received, is this: What does this sensitivity say about the place of the work of art more broadly in the psychic economy of students?

    To be sensitive to a work of art should be a good thing; one of the goals of a college education should be to cultivate the capacity for such sensitivity. That includes the inculcation of a critical sensibility sensitive to a work’s blind spots, omissions, political presumptions, and so on. But the sensitivity exhibited by the snowflakes — I’ll use that slur for them, with apologies — is not the broad but discriminating sensitivity that tries to comprehend a work in all its parts, however contradictory or ideologically opaque. It is instead a kind of fetishizing fixation on a quite narrow and specific range of meaning, which has been promoted above all other possible meanings — more specifically, on a particular range of political sins whose concretization in the work are thought to be traumatizing to those who encounter them.

    These students’ overall economy of attention has been deranged. One or two presumptively objectionable features of a work loom large, and the rest seems almost to disappear in the shadow of the bad thing. This new hermeneutics — call it snowflake hermeneutics — is a way of reading specifically for sins. It is a generational refinement, or debasement, of the broader “hermeneutics of suspicion” from which it is descended, that suite of demystifying critical practices, deriving from Marx, Freud, Levi-Strauss, and Foucault and culminating in the work of Fredric Jameson, whereby the hidden motors and meanings of artistic and cultural production are brought into exhilarating view. At their best, the interpretive tendencies lumped under “hermeneutics of suspicion” are not just clarifying but also — by increasing the range and multiplying the kinds of meaning attached to any work of art — dignifying, rather than reductive, prescriptive, or mechanistic. (That the latter lapses were a risk has been clear at least since the Russian formalists rebuked the crudity of their Marxist counterparts.)

    Snowflake hermeneutics, by contrast, is never dignifying. Sometimes, perhaps, students absorb these bad habits from their secondary educations or from other ambient forces in the culture and bring them to the college classroom. But to a substantial degree it seems obvious that students have picked up on cues from their college professors. With varying degrees of sophistication and vulgarity, snowflake hermeneutics is practiced by faculty members themselves, modeled for students in their writing and in their classroom instruction.

    The most obvious area where this is so is in the vogue for trigger warnings, a vogue which now seems to be receding. And to be fair, it met with stiff headwinds early on; all the way back in 2014, the American Association of University Professors released a statement arguing that “mandated trigger warnings threaten academic freedom.” I don’t want to revisit trigger warnings now just to attack the professors, often well-meaning, who used them, or to attack the students who sometimes demanded them. But a brief look back at this recent trend can tell us something about the academic humanities’ role in mediating taboos. Consider the list of topics which Oberlin University briefly contemplated requiring faculty members to include trigger warnings for, before dropping the policy after extensive public ridicule. An inexhaustive sample of potentially traumatizing topics: “racism, classism, sexism, heterosexism, cissexism, ableism, and other issues of privilege and oppression.” Even Chinua Achebe’s novel Things Fall Apart might “trigger readers who have experienced racism, colonialism, religious persecution, violence, suicide, and more.” More than suicide?

    The pseudoscientific emphasis on trauma triggers has a purpose: it is meant to proliferate taboos by expanding the range of topics to which “prerational” or “reflexive” responses might overwhelm the capacity for rational discussion. When McWhorter writes about the shift in our culture from the sexual and scatological to the sociological, including words that stigmatize disfavored social groups, he is describing something that happened, to a degree, organically, driven by large-scale shifts in societal sensitivity. But the taboo proliferation encouraged by the trigger warning movement was also a kind of conscious “norm entrepreneurship,” in Cass Sunstein’s useful phrase. The hope was that, with enough design, enough insistence, enough administrative coercion, these expanding lists of troubling and offensive topics would start to feel super-sensitive for more and more teachers, triggering a “norm-cascade.” What is a taboo, after all, except a norm with an especially intense emotional charge?

    Taboo proliferation of this kind is obviously a political project. The version at Oberlin and elsewhere draws heavily on political assumptions of various left-wing identitarian stripes. But it should always have been obvious that this kind of entrepreneurship was politically indeterminate. As early as 2015 some Christian conservative students began to object to representations in assigned works of literature that they felt demeaned their own political or religious identities. Last year, at Texas A&M, a professor was fired for teaching about queer issues in children’s literature; the student-driven campaign against her accused her of attacking students’ Christian identities. We can expect much more of the same in the months and years to come.

    The rawest and most strident instances of snowflake hermeneutics have always been on social media, which has both exacerbated the tendency and provided a convenient window into the pathological interpretive consequences of the prejudices of the professoriate. Here is a favorite example, which will first require a little background. A couple of years ago, the scholar and critic Merve Emre wrote a review of John Guillory’s Professing Criticism in the New Yorker. That review approvingly cited a phrase of Guillory’s, “professional deformation,” which was his rendering of an exactly cognate phrase in French. Originally, a professional deformation referred to a bodily deformation resulting from one’s professional activity: carpal tunnel for typists, for instance, or the asymmetrical shoulders that coal miners develop, as described vividly by D. H. Lawrence in Lady Chatterley’s Lover. But even in the nineteenth century and certainly after it, the phrase could be applied to the mental deformations attendant to certain professions. Different kinds of scholars might suffer from different kinds of epistemic, cognitive, and evaluative distortion. Intellectual historians might overrate the influence of Calvinist theology on the development of American political institutions, underplaying various economic causes. Or early modernist literary scholars might overestimate the influence of Shakespeare on the emergence of modern subjectivity. It was in something like this sense that Guillory used the phrase.

    I paid more than usual attention to the reception of Professing Criticism, because I had written about it several times myself. I was interested to see what the folks at a popular public Facebook page devoted to “Remaking the University,” hosted by a recent president of the Modern Language Association, would make of Emre’s review. They didn’t like it. And several of them — tenured professors of English, not naïve or overeager freshmen — were appalled by Guillory’s use of the phrase “deformation,” as well as by Emre’s approving use of it throughout her review. The subject is introduced thus, by a distinguished Victorianist: “I just read this and I’m feeling dismayed” by the “flippant, careless, and damaging work, including the unspeakable use of ‘deformation’ here, not to mention the Anglocentrism, elitism, etc.” This professor goes on: “It is horrifying that a person can use ‘deformed’/ ‘deformation’ in 2023 in an article in a major magazine and nobody flagged it.” Then another professor like the first, a well-known scholar in her field — weighs in: “the ableism was stunning.” And the first professor returns to the charge: “I just did a search for ‘deformed’ and felt physically ill. She uses it nine times in the article, starting with ‘hideously deformed.’ What the hell? How are disabled scholars supposed to feel when they read that? How is it possible that she could think it was cute to use such a derogatory term and that the editors didn’t flag it? I don’t even see how one can debate the merits of the idea with slurs like that sitting in the prose.”

    As a response to an essay by an important critic about another important critic, these hyperventilating non sequiturs are appallingly irresponsible. (They are also trivial.) But they do give a sense of the hair-trigger environment which some precincts of the humanities have become. This is a world in which the editors of the New Yorker are held to be incomprehensibly out of touch for failing to police the figurative use of “deformation.” It doesn’t occur to these professors that the discursive norms which they are demanding might seem odd, even bizarre, to verbal workers outside of their peculiar guild (and to a few souls inside their peculiar guild, too). Professional deformation indeed!

    None of this is to say that metaphors of ability or disability are not legitimate areas of interest for scholars of literature and language. “From the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made”: Kant’s famous apothegm might well yield to an interpretative analysis drawing on the resources of disability studies. By the same token, it is almost impossible to imagine describing activities of cognition and perception, at least in any of the languages with which I am familiar, without recourse to metaphors of blindness and insight, opacity and transparency, lightness and dark. Those are interesting facts, and perhaps a literary-critical interest in “ableism” can yield insight about them.

    But all that is somewhat beside the point. If I say “Finally, I see what you’re saying,” it does not mean that I have a problem with blind people. And after all, the angry professor who initiated the attack on Emre’s alleged ableism might be accused of an analogous crime. Emre’s sins, she says, are “unspeakable.” In using the phrase “unspeakable,” the professor would seem to be entirely insensitive to the fact that some people, for reasons either anatomical or neurological, are indeed incapable of speech. She should reckon with her own heart.

    The tunnel vision — one of those metaphors again! — that caused this professor to home in so intensely on the word “deformation” that, in her words, it is not even possible “to debate the merits of the idea” is a nonpareil instance of snowflake hermeneutics, not just because of its extraordinarily partial and distorted approach to a larger and more complicated text, but also because of the extreme emotional intensity of the response. The professor word-searched for the offending word and reported feeling “physically ill.” Physically ill!

    Like the compulsive probing of a wounded tooth, there seems to be some gratification in the discomfort. It is sought after. This is an indispensable feature of snowflake hermeneutics. Something is very offensive, dismaying, painful to encounter, traumatizing even — but these very discomforts are virtues in their way. They are quickening, exciting. They get the blood up. They afford, in other words, some of the powers of art. “Slurs like that sitting in the prose” are in their way magical words, talismans of intensity and poetic transformation, dark jewels. They unite the ethical, the verbal, and the aesthetic in ways that might be called literary.

    There is a connection between the moralizing extremism of the interpretive practice to which the eminent professors subjected Emre’s essay and what the very non-extremist literary critic Wayne Booth called “ethical reading” — a practice which, as Booth himself recognized in 1988 in his book The Company We Keep, can in its own right have much to do with “suspicious” reading (the phrase is Booth’s). His great book is bookended by a kind of allegory about ethical suspicion, in this case with regard to the teaching of Huckleberry Finn. The year is sometime in the 1960s; Booth is teaching in the University of Chicago’s humanities core where Huckleberry Finn is one of the assigned texts. There is only a single black instructor among the faculty who teach the core, an art historian named Paul Moses. (Moses died at the tragically young age of 36; The Company We Keep is dedicated to him.) Alone among the faculty, he feels that Huckleberry Finn should not be part of the core.

    Here is how Booth paraphrases what he calls Moses’ “overt, serious, uncompromising act of ethical criticism,” which shocked his colleagues:

    It’s hard for me to say this, but I have to say it anyway. I simply can’t teach Huckleberry Finn again. The way Mark Twain portrays Jim is so offensive to me that I get angry in class, and I can’t get all those liberal white kids to understand why I am angry. What’s more, I don’t think it’s right to subject students, black or white, to the many distorted views of race on which that book is based.

    In Booth’s summary, Moses says explicitly that he is not objecting to racial slurs per se, but to “the whole range of assumptions about slavery and its consequences, and about how whites should deal with liberated slaves, and how liberated slaves should behave or will behave toward whites, good ones and bad ones. That book is just bad education, and the fact that it’s so cleverly written makes it even more troublesome to me.”

    Booth’s initial response is condescending. “I can remember,” he writes, “lamenting the shoddy education that had left poor Paul Moses unable to recognize a great classic when he met one. Had he not even noticed that Jim is of all the characters the closest to the moral center?” Recalling with ironic distance his rejection of Moses’ views, Booth remembers feeling that “Moses obviously could neither read properly nor think properly about what questions might be relevant to judging a novel’s worth.”

    Toward the very end of The Company We Keep, Booth returns to Huckleberry Finn in order to vindicate Moses’ critique, at least to a degree. He rereads the novel with Moses in mind and then offers an account of “how a fully ‘suspicious’ interpreter might view it.” For that interpreter, the book reduces Jim to “simply a comic butt, suitable for exploitation by cute little white boys of good heart.” Even worse, Twain “simply treats Jim and his feelings . . . as expendable, as sub-human — a slave to the plot, as it were.” What’s more, the novel endorses a racial ideology in which “black people, slaves and ex-slaves, are a special kind of good people — so naturally good, in their innocent simplicity, that the effects on them of slavery will not be discernible once slavery has been removed.” Moreover, “black people are hungry for love . . . and they will be (should be) obsequiously grateful for whatever small favors whites grant them.” Finally, “the consequences of emancipation will be as good as they can be, in this wicked world, so long as you (the white liberal reader) have your heart in the right place — as you clearly do because you have palpitated properly to Huck’s discovery of a full sense of brotherhood with Jim.”

    Booth has much more to say about Huckleberry Finn, and the reading of the “fully ‘suspicious’ interpreter” is not the one that he himself ultimately settles on. But it is obvious to him, as it is surely obvious to us, that to the extent that the skeptical analysis offered by this fully suspicious interpreter was unavailable to Moses’ colleagues in the early 1960s, those colleagues were missing something. Their blindness to aspects of the racial dimension condemns their understanding of the novel to an embarrassing incompleteness. The kind of ideological critique that Booth offers, one developed after the prompting by Moses’ ethical rejection of the novel, clearly contributes to a more accurate and more probing understanding of what Twain had done.

    I should put my cards on the table. I think Moses was wrong to refuse to teach Huckleberry Finn. And his sweeping rejection of the novel — it’s “just bad education,” in Booth’s paraphrase — is simplistic to a fault. But Moses was obviously right that something had gone awry in the interpretative consensus around Huckleberry Finn in his time. The critical suspicion that made him the odd man out among his faculty peers in the early 1960s makes him look, in retrospect, like the only person to perceive how complicated a text, formally, ideologically, and politically, Huckleberry Finn is. Ethical suspicion of this sort is obviously a good thing, one of the good habits that literary study and the study of the arts generally is designed to cultivate. Yet I feel quite certain, by contrast, that much of the ethical suspicion of our own period, marred by the moralizing extremism (and overt politics) which is all too common in the literary humanities now, will not look prescient at any future point. It will look instead like a kind of derangement, a mania, a punitive fixation on discovered sins and a narcissistic wallowing in one’s own capacity to feel wounded by a text — to feel, as one of Emre’s critics put it, “physically ill.”

    Which brings us to the problem with Moses’ stance, the part that was prescient in the wrong way. Moses was wrong not about the interpretative complexity of Huckleberry Finn but about its traumatic impact on some of its readers, including himself. Moses (again, in Booth’s paraphrase) said that the book made him too angry to teach. But that just cannot be the role of the critic or the scholar. He should have striven to overcome it. Moses’ anger, after all, was not just a private experience. He was a professor, a teacher; his reaction was a pedagogical act, and a destructive one. It modeled a kind of disabling vulnerability for students which the university simply cannot afford to harbor. To the extent that ethical criticism is rooted in a kind of therapeutic emphasis on a critic’s emotional state, it is incompatible with the scholarly vocation. To the extent that those emotions are understood to have primarily political stakes, their invocation risks reducing the role of the critic to something very narrow and constricted. The mini-scandal that Moses’ refusal to teach Huckleberry Finn caused in Chicago should thus be understood as provoked by two related but distinct concerns. The first was about the meaning of a specific novel, on which point Moses and his opponents were each partially correct. The second was about the extent to which emotional vulnerability toward texts or works of art should ground interpretation and even authorize revisions to the curriculum. On that, Moses was wrong.

    The curricular sensitivity of our own time, and the therapeutic emphasis on the feelings not just of students but of professors as well, has met with far less resistance than Moses did. Why? I can speculate, but my speculations will be necessarily vague and telegraphic. The question comes down, I think, to a large-scale transformation in how and why we value literature and the arts, and to an accompanying change in which of the competing evaluative justifications are able to carry weight in our colleges. To put it very reductively, a certain set of political and civic concerns has come to seem like the most plausible justification for many areas of the high humanities, such as the study of literature and art history. Grounding the teaching of the humanities in these concerns reflects a profound revision of an earlier phase of institutionalized humanistic endeavor. The account of this transformation I have found the most compelling is the literary critic Simon During’s — he labels it “the second secularization,” a process whereby the substitutive religions of literature and art that had for educated people come to supplant the role of religion proper have themselves suffered a diminishment in power. For educated moderns, as I. A. Richards put it in the 1930s, the whole complex of metaphysical ideas — “about God, about the universe, about human nature” — that religion deals with had come to seem too tenuous or imprecise to keep religion vital — but they survived in poetry, which doesn’t even pretend to deal with real facts. Literature could therefore act as a kind of replacement religion. “As poetry conclusively shows,” Richards explained, “even the most important among our attitudes can be aroused and maintained without any believing of a factual or verifiable order entering at all.” Literary education and the institutionalization of the humanities would constitute a training in this surrogate religion.

    In our own time, university study devoted to what Richards calls the “pseudo-statements” of poetry no longer commands the same cultural prestige it once had. No one knows exactly why, but the high humanities have suffered a loss of power, and we are all trying to figure out how to recover from this diminution. But that fact can obscure a strange reality: what Richards calls the “arousal” of “the most important among our attitudes” — or what his Victorian predecessor Matthew Arnold called the “emotion” poetry attaches to ideas — remains a function of the literary even in the straitened form that is now encapsulated by trigger warnings and by what I have been calling snowflake hermeneutics. What Richards calls “the most important among our attitudes” has come to be understood as our identitarian attitudes toward one or another political situation.

    It’s as if the substitutive spiritual function that both Arnold and Richards ascribed to poetry, literature, and art has been chastened, for its modern secular adherents in our own hyper-political but also hyper-utilitarian moment, into a kind of restricted dark magic of the political word. The emotional charge of the aesthetic has been peculiarly channeled, attached to a set of therapeutic identitarian concerns with progressive political implications: not disenchantment but, perhaps, “misenchantment,” to borrow a phrase from the religious historian Eugene McCarraher. The multifarious taboos around “slurs . . . sitting in the prose,” to quote our angry English professor, depend on fundamentally political emotions and motivate a fundamentally emotional politics, disabling and constrictive however emancipatory it may feel. The cultic or magical power of the literary has been preserved, but in a kind of negative. This is the cultural situation in which, at no less a college than Oberlin, Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apartwhich, of course, brilliantly mounts a political argument — becomes the site of a series of taboos necessitating trigger warnings regarding “racism, colonialism, religious persecution, violence, suicide.” In its ironic way, this vulgar politicization of the literary is also literature’s astonishing aggrandizement, and even a kind of desperate wish. If only literature could mean so much.

    Thomas Mann’s Exemplary Fury

    When does a democracy tip into crisis? When is simply defending it no longer enough, and when does resistance become necessary? These were the questions that Thomas Mann (and many others) faced in the fall of 1930. For his “German Address,” subtitled “An Appeal to Reason,” he returned to Berlin’s Beethoven Hall — the same hall where, eight years earlier, he had declared his decisive support for democracy in his speech “On the German Republic.” Now, it seemed, his role as a political intellectual required a redefinition. 

    This redefinition came in the wake of a dramatic, almost explosive surge in votes for the Nazi Party in the Reichstag election of September 14, 1930. Nearly one in five voters had cast their ballot for Adolf Hitler and his party. Just two years earlier, in May 1928, they had garnered a mere 2.6 percent. When Mann gave his speech, the newly elected Reichstag had just met for the first time. Nazi deputies marched in wearing brown shirts and swastika armbands — a deliberate provocation and breach of parliamentary norms. In the days that followed, they and their supporters stepped up intimidation and violent attacks on political opponents. Jewish-owned shops and department stores came under assault as well. For Mann, these developments marked a turning point — not only for the country, but also for his own political thinking and commitment to politics. 18.3 percent: this figure transformed Mann, the committed republican and democrat, into a resolute activist and outspoken anti-fascist. 

    His address begins with an apparently unambiguous disclaimer. “I am no follower of relentless social activism,” he told his audience. The age of aesthetic idealism was irretrievably gone, but that did not mean one had to accept an “activistic equation of idealism and frivolity.” The disclaimer is a rhetorical gesture. Its function is to make the exception to the rule appear inevitable: “Nevertheless there are hours, moments in communal life when such a justification of art practically fails,” he explained, “when the artist can no longer create from within, because pressing necessities push aside the thought of art — when the crisis of public distress shakes him to the core, so that the playful, passionate immersion in the eternal-human, which we call art, . . . becomes psychologically impossible.”

    “Immediate thoughts of necessity,” “crisis of public distress”: in the eloquent flow of his words, the sharpness and urgency of Mann’s description of the situation in the fall of 1930 almost fade. But only against this background does the Lutheran resolve of his confession reveal its full pathos: Hier stehe ich. Ich kann nicht anders. Here I stand. I cannot do otherwise.

    Above all else, the speech aimed to explain the rise of National Socialism and, at the same time, to rhetorically discredit the movement. “Purely economically,” Mann began his analysis, Nazism could not be adequately understood — it was not merely the result of unemployment, hunger, and cold that shaped social life in the wake of the global depression. Rather, two tendencies converged. On the one hand, a pseudo-intellectual program “from the academic-professorial sphere,” consisting of “mystical philistinism and extravagant nonsense,” which, with “vocabulary such as racial, national, fraternal, heroic,” had “flooded and glued together the brains of Germans in 1930.” On the other hand, a “giant wave of eccentric barbarism and primitive mass-democratic fairground vulgarity” that swept through the modern world of consumption, nervousness, technology, and noise. From this fatal combination emerged a grotesque and orgiastic political style: “Fanaticism becomes a principle of salvation, enthusiasm epileptic ecstasy . . . and reason veils her face.”

    Having identified the activism in the speaker’s confession, it is important to understand his manner of speaking as a manifestation of activism, too. In rapid-fire style, the speaker hurls vividly charged labels one after another, beating down the very subject he describes: “fanaticism,” “principle of salvation,” “ecstasy,” and so forth. It is unmistakably a rhetoric of attack — fast, hard, precise. What is good and what is evil: in the “German Address” this distinction is framed in rhetorical and performative terms. And therein lies the most striking contrast with the speech “On the German Republic” delivered eight years earlier. There the speaker sought to “win over” his audience for his position, to engage them in a democratic contest of arguments. But now he was confronted with a political and social phenomenon that could no longer be debated — it had to be fought. In 1930, he no longer dealt with political opponents. They were enemies.

    And they were enemies not only in an abstract sense. That October evening in Berlin, a group of disruptors had mingled with the bourgeois audience — including the brothers Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger, two leading figures of what would later be called the “Conservative Revolution.” Joining them were twenty SA men, disguised in borrowed tuxedos, dispatched personally by Joseph Goebbels. What began with heckling soon grew into a tumult that required police intervention. A photograph documents the scene: while the audience turns, wondering what is happening in the back rows, Thomas Mann stands at the podium, his gaze fixed in stone. It must have been an uncanny situation: the very behavior he feared took shape in the moment he addressed it. Democratic debate was obstructed by force.

    The Nazi press exploited the scene for propaganda. They claimed the audience had turned away from the speaker, that no one wished to hear his appeal to reason, that he stood isolated in his political views. In fact, the opposite was true: the audience’s sustained applause had helped prevent the disruption from succeeding. The lie of Nazi propaganda served no other purpose than to recast the true failure of their actions as a triumph in the media. It is precisely the logic of fake news: turn reality upside down and present defeat as victory.

    The Beethoven Hall speech marked a deep break in Mann’s political biography. His status as a public adversary of National Socialism had become irreversible. When does a democracy begin to tip and what conclusions must be drawn? Thomas Mann had found his answer.

    From the “Appeal to Reason” in the fall of 1930, we can trace a clear line showing how Mann’s political activism took on different forms over time: beginning with his Open Letter to the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Bonn, which in the winter of 1936 — three years into his Swiss exile — stripped its honorary doctorate from him; through the Radio Addresses “ delivered from American exile after 1938, speeches that were both intended to inform the Germans about the reality of the Nazi regime and to call for resistance against it; and finally, his advocacy for Zionism, which after 1945 took the form of outspoken support for the founding of a Jewish state.

    These three examples show a form of political activism that did not end with the Nazi seizure of power. Instead, it had to constantly adapt — in Swiss and Californian exile, in transatlantic dialogue, and in the face of a new world order after World War II. At the same time, they are documents of confidence. They present a writer who saw in the political catastrophe of the twentieth century not only a historical challenge, but also a personal duty. Facing this task became part of his lifelong process of political learning.

    Jacob Grimm’s pamphlet, in 1838, on his dismissal from the University of Göttingen and his expulsion from the Kingdom of Hanover is one of the most remarkable political testimonies in German intellectual history. He had protested in writing the king’s perjury in suspending the liberal constitution and was therefore dismissed from his post — together with six other professors, including his brother Wilhelm. They entered history as the “Göttingen Seven.” This protest was widely regarded as one of the earliest acts of modern German academic resistance. “I was compelled to yield to force,” Jacob Grimm wrote in his account.

    It is hardly surprising that Thomas Mann took Grimm’s pamphlet as an inspiration when, in December 1936, he wrote his letter to the Faculty of Philosophy in Bonn, later published as a booklet, as his diary records. The analogy is clear. On one side stands a criminal regime with an ideologically corrupted university. On the other side stands the intellectual driven into exile. Even before his academic dismissal — on December 3 — Mann had already been stripped of his German citizenship. A double blow.

    Although he did not explicitly mention this in his personal letter, Mann followed the nineteenth-century exile’s example with striking precision: in the form of publication, in the self-positioning as a political intellectual, and in the style of his language. This was not just coincidence. Mann’s personal library included Jacob Grimm’s writings, which he had acquired in 1911 and annotated extensively, including the pamphlet on Grimm’s dismissal. Mann followed his long-standing inclination to “live in parables,” that is, to mirror his own situation in the lives of earlier historical figures.

    That Mann’s letter, like Grimm’s pamphlet, had to be published abroad — in Zurich and Basel, respectively — only reinforced in him the sense of a historical parallel. His diary even calls Grimm’s “form of publication” a “blueprint.” Wilhelm Grimm had once predicted that Jacob’s pamphlet, “written in such an urgent manner, will arouse great attention — more than you perhaps think.” He was right. Even before the pamphlet appeared, Swiss newspapers printed excerpts, which soon circulated in Germany. This marked the beginning of an extraordinary history of impact — one that endures. Today, the pamphlet is considered a founding document of intellectual integrity in Germany.

    Mann sought similar resonance when he devised his “plan for a pamphlet.” And the plan succeeded: not only the exile community and the international press took note, but even the opposition within Germany, through clandestine printings and private copies. Three months after the initial publication, Mann recorded in his diary: “Reprint yet again of the letter, which is said actually to have circulated in tens of thousands of copies in Germany. Snowball system, multiplication of copies by each recipient.” Like Grimm’s pamphlet, Mann’s letter was, as the scholar Steffen Martus has observed, “a polemic calculated for maximum public effect.”

    No one captured the profound consequences of this development for the persecuted more movingly than Marcel Reich-Ranicki, who, after the war, went on to become Germany’s most influential literary critic. At sixteen, together with a group of communist friends, he secretly read the letter in a Berlin apartment. “Everyone was silent; in the half-dark room there was something uncanny,” he recalled in his autobiography. The tension in that furtive reading was great: how would Thomas Mann, whom he admired, position himself toward the Third Reich? After the last sentence was read, the young Marceli Reich abruptly excused himself: “I mustn’t be late getting home, I have an important test tomorrow.” But the real reason was different: “In truth I wanted to be alone — alone with my happiness.”

    To “proclaim the German word in complete freedom” — this commitment, made in the Bonn Letter after Jacob Grimm, became the guiding program of Thomas Mann’s radio broadcasts from his Californian exile. The sheer volume of insults and invective — uncharacteristic for the exquisitely proper Mann — is the most obvious demonstration of this commitment. Consider, for example, the broadcast of March 28, 1944, in which Mann ridiculed Nazi press talk of a “new socialist Europe,” exposing it by pointing to the reality of German state capitalism:

    Hitler, as the principal shareholder of the Eher Press [the official publishing house of Nazi Germany] amassed a swollen personal fortune that surpassed that of most American multimillionaires. Reichsmarschall Göring, after establishing his industrial empire, the Reichswerke Hermann Göring [an enormous state-controlled industrial conglomerate producing war materials], and expanding it internationally through war, grew so corpulent with capitalist excess that he was likely the richest man alive. . . . Wasn’t the driving force of Nazism always envy, greed, the lust for plunder — the unrestrained urge to wallow in power and wealth?

    Mann abandoned all bourgeois restraint to portray the Nazi elite as vicious, aggressive, and fundamentally corrupt beasts. Hardly impartial, he even targeted Göring’s physical appearance with the phrase “capitalist fat.” Göring emerges as the grotesque embodiment of Nazi gluttony for power and money.

    Between 1940 and 1945, Mann delivered fifty-eight such broadcasts to Germany. These were not literature but “actions,” as he said, serving the purpose of psychological warfare. Never before or after did Mann step so far beyond literature. Despite the fact that listening to foreign radio was illegal and punishable in Nazi Germany, the BBC’s German Service was the most listened-to “enemy station” in Nazi Germany. Mann’s role was to undermine confidence in the regime and to spark resistance.

    The BBC prescribed only the length of each broadcast; otherwise Mann enjoyed full freedom. Slight disagreements arose over tone, particularly concerning certain harsh polemical phrases and insults that the BBC deemed “far too abusive.” Mann, however, insisted on maintaining his independence — especially when it came to personal attacks. They even gave him some leeway: “I cannot help it,” he wrote in 1942, “it does me good to call Hitler a stupid maniac straight to his face.”

    To undermine trust in the regime, the speaker himself had to establish trust with his audience. In this, his voice played a crucial role. Initially, a British speaker in London read his texts, but from March 1941, at Mann’s own suggestion, great effort was made to have him recorded directly. From an NBC studio in Hollywood, his speeches were recorded onto discs, sent to New York, relayed via telephone to London, and finally broadcast to Germany. “It is the voice of a friend, a German voice,” Mann told listeners in his first personally recorded broadcast — a technical and logistical feat with profound psychological impact.

    Nowhere was Mann’s personal engagement felt more profoundly than in his references to the systematic murder of the Jews. After the Wannsee Conference of January 20, 1942, Mann denounced mass gassings that same month. He drew not only on international press reports but also on Allied intelligence. Most dramatically, in September 1942 he cited reports that 700,000 Jews had been murdered in the Warsaw Ghetto. His follow-up was direct: “Do you Germans know this? And what do you think of it?” Rhetorically brilliant and suggestive: however one answers the first, the second allows no moral wiggle room.

    The “I” that addressed German listeners was never abstract. At times it appeared subtly, at times with striking directness. Consider his April 1942 broadcast on the British bombing of Lübeck, his hometown. About a year and a half earlier, the German Luftwaffe had devastated the English city of Coventry, causing massive civilian casualties; now Mann invoked this event to frame his reflections on Lübeck. His words shattered the self-image of Germans as innocent victims. Moral listeners, ethical Germans, he suggested, would accept — even welcome — the suffering of bombardment as an act of justice:

    The most recent raid over Hitler-land has damaged the old city of Lübeck. That concerns me, it is my hometown. The attacks were aimed at the harbour, and the installations of the war industry, but fires broke out in town, and I do not cherish the thought that St. Mary’s Church, the magnificent Renaissance Town Hall, or the house of the Seamen’s Society may have been damaged. But I am thinking about Coventry — and I have no objections to the lesson that everything must be paid for. Probably there are other people in Lübeck, in Hamburg, Cologne, and Dusseldorf who have no objections to it either, and when they hear the drone of the R.A.F. over their heads, wish them success.

    The “Appeal to Reason,” the Bonn Letter, the exile radio broadcasts — these are the classic texts when one thinks of the political Thomas Mann. But there was another side to his political activism that is less commonly remarked upon: his support of Zionism. From the mid-1920s he supported it, first as a member of the German “Pro-Palestine” association, later through a visit to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and finally, after knowledge of the Holocaust, as a forceful advocate of a Jewish state.

    This lasting conviction grew urgent in March 1948, when the United States suddenly withdrew its support for the UN plan to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, with Jerusalem as an international zone. Fearing immediate war, the Truman administration now favored UN trusteeship. The founding of Israel seemed indefinitely postponed. In his Los Angeles mansion, Mann followed events closely. Having publicly demanded a safe refuge for Europe’s Jews, he now reacted with outrage. 

    His response to a survey by the émigré newspaper Aufbau appeared just one day after the American announcement. It expressed profound disappointment in American policy, drawing an immediate and dramatic parallel to the Munich Agreement of 1938. That agreement is remembered as the epitome of appeasement, when Britain and France allowed Hitler to annex part of Czechoslovakia in exchange for the illusion of peace. Almost no event had ever outraged Mann as deeply as Munich — a moment that he had publicly protested in 1938 before 28,000 people at Madison Square Garden. Now, ten years later, as a new American citizen, he wrote that the reversal on Palestine was “the most humiliating and outrageous political event since the betrayal committed by democracy against Czechoslovakia in 1938. It is an act of sordid and low expediency, a murder of faith and trust, and reveals with horror how ideals of democracy, truth, freedom, justice have become empty words.” The article’s effect was immediate, and it certainly played a role in the successful campaign to persuade the Truman administration to return to its original position. Thus, on May 14, 1948, David Ben Gurion was able to proclaim the creation of the State of Israel. The voice of Thomas Mann, alongside many other voices, had made a contribution to this outcome. 

    But why did Mann speak out with such moral fury on Palestine? For him, the issue posed a decisive question: had democracy learned from history? Would it once again abandon Jews, as Czechoslovakia had been abandoned in 1938? “How can one betray a people who have suffered deepest misery, who seek to build a democracy of industrious, culture-loving citizens,” he asked, “in order to promote on the other side what is base, retrograde, rotten, hated by the nations — the feudalism of the Arab oil magnates?” The language carries a faintly colonial and Eurocentric undertone, of course, framing non-European powers in terms of backwardness and moral deficiency. At the same time, his diary shows that Mann perceived the threat to the Jews clearly and realistically: “15,000 well-armed Arabs threaten Jews in Palestine, who, under the eyes of the wretched UN, seem condemned to destruction.” Once again, his concern was democracy and its ability to defend itself.

    In the light of history, Mann’s position was almost prophetic. What he said in the 1940s — about the Holocaust, about Israel, about Germany and democracy — resonates today. It connects directly to the weighty term, revived since October 7, 2023, and first invoked by Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2008 in a speech to the Knesset, regarding Germany’s “special responsibility for Israel’s security.” That term is reason of state — in German, Staatsräson.

    After his Aufbau article, Mann wrote in a letter that he had “let loose so violently” he might have to answer before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The remark is telling. Over the decades, his political style expanded steadily: always ethically firm, increasingly rhetorically unrestrained. Already the “German Address” combined moral clarity with verbal force. What changed over the years was the tone: sharper, more direct, less inhibited. The bourgeois composure that Mann usually valued was shattered — not in anger, but with deliberate intent. He remained faithful to his humanistic ideals, but he understood that form had to adapt to urgency. That he pushed his language to its limits belongs to the story of a great political commitment: serious, uncompromising, never confined to argument alone. 

    My Dead Are Jealous of Your Dead

    It is very easy to bike into town to get provisions at the country store or at one of the farm stands, and appear like another Brooklynite up for the summer. The truth is that I am an interloper.

    To me, the town looks like a Raymond Carver story, an Edward Hopper painting, or any of the towns on the imported American network shows I grew up on. “Dawson’s Creek” and “Gilmore Girls” captivated my mind with images of a pastoral existence of quaint old wells and gentle brooding in gazebos. For immigrants to America, cultural shock is absorbed by the familiar blanket of simulacra. America is everywhere.

    It is 2 PM on an August weekday, and few people are out as I pedal the flat terrain. Here beauty is unavoidable. Any mundane errand means traveling between creeks, rolling hills, and fields strewn with yellow goldenrods and purple loosestrife. The air smells of cut grass and sometimes of hot gravel, but usually it smells of nothing — a soothing absence of stench. I cherish America for its vastness and the possibility of privacy, but I don’t belong to this inviting tableau of soft, deep greens. I belong to an aggressive mix of yellow and olive.

    Before I ride back to my cabin, I loop around the large field in the center of town, cycling past the old Victorians and the small cottages watching over it.

    Whoever owns the field rotates crops every year and sometimes grows nothing at all. A few years back, before marijuana legalization sprouted coolly designed dispensaries everywhere, hemp covered the field. That summer, increasingly desperate signs were taped to the fence: “Contains no THC!,” “Will NOT get you high!,” and — my favorite — “You WILL get a headache.”

     I find comfort in Americana: diners, motels with Googie-style signs, the majesty of Walmart. Here I make sure to be the nicest, cheeriest version of myself. Otherwise I might be found out. Directness is the most obvious mark of my alien origins, so I learned to sugarcoat and pussyfoot and not to say what I mean. I make small talk, commiserate about the road work on Route 23, and ask the locals if they know my elderly landlady. I tell them how much I love their town.

    I don’t tell them about my own town. I don’t tell them about my aunt, who was shot dead at the beginning of this war at the age of eighty-eight. I don’t tell them that my aunt’s body is now going to be exhumed and reburied, because, at the time of her death, her kibbutz was still an active war zone: too dangerous for the living, too dangerous for the dead. Next week my aunt is to be dug out, driven south, and put back in the dirt. I don’t tell them about that. 

    I don’t tell them about Noor, my friend in Gaza, who just sent me a goodbye note for the hundredth time: “This is the third night without shelter, the sun is scorching during the day and cold at night. As I told you before, no one will survive this war. Good night sister.” I have known Noor for eight years; we run a direct-aid program together. We message every day of the war, sometimes about the aid, often about the horrors. I am secular, godless even, but every day I tell Noor I am praying for her.

     I turn the corner and pass a farm stand, where honest Americans can buy eggs, corn, squashes, and tomatoes by simply putting cash in the designated box. An essay by Joan Didion pops into my mind. The essay, “Notes From A Native Daughter,” fills me with resentment, and for that reason it pops into my mind a lot. I resent how free Didion feels to call herself a “native daughter” of Sacramento. Or of anywhere, for that matter.

    Didion also knows her familial history, going back many generations, and has masses of living extended family: “Dozens of great-aunts, year after year of Sundays.” To my Jewish mind, this seems to be nothing less than a magical phenomenon; growing up where your great-grandparents, or even grandparents, were born and died, being undisturbed for enough generations to grow roots. Almost every branch of my own family tree was hacked off in 1940s Europe, save my grandparents, who fled in time. My family’s story differs only in detail from that of most of my peers, unremarkable, nothing to write home about.

    In the essay, Didion asks and answers:

    Q: In what way does the Holy Land resemble the Sacramento Valley?

    A: In the type and diversity of its agricultural products.

    Didion is lucky that her home doesn’t have holiness in common with the Holy Land. Diverse agricultural products are a far better thing to share with my country of origin. She goes on to describe her unholy home exquisitely: “All that is constant about the California of my childhood is the rate at which it disappears”. 

    How wonderfully bittersweet it must feel to watch your hometown modernize, the cultural and physical terrain morphing with the times. I experience this too, but my terrain is not evolving; it is burning to cinders. It is imploding and exploding. It is saturating itself with a stain so deep that it will never come off; it will cover everything until the stain is indiscernible from the fabric itself. Until it becomes the fabric.

    I am a native daughter of nowhere because my identity, the very name of where I am from, is in the eye of the beholder. When I state my geographical origin, it doesn’t read as an autobiographical detail; it reads as a political statement. In this, the Israeli identity is similar to the Palestinian one; others will decide, according to their personal stands, on the validity or even existence of these identities. So consider this, Joan Didion: no one ever says that Sacramento doesn’t exist.

    This year the field in the center of town is growing flowers, and its rows of carefully cultivated bright colors halts only a few feet away from the hordes of wild ones encroaching on them. Until the end of the eighteenth century, all the fields in the area and the surrounding 160,000 acres owed tithes to the Livingston dynasty. In 1715, Lord Robert Livingston the Elder purchased the land from the indigenous Mohican people, already nearly decimated by western-imported diseases, and received the deed from King George I. Livingston Manor became a feudal tract of land sprawling across what is now seven different towns. It differed from other British manors only in its avid exploitation of enslaved people. Livingston the Elder also went as far as investing directly in the transatlantic slave trade by owning shares of the slave ship Margriet. Amongst his descendants are the entire Kennedy, Bush, and Astor families, along with Michael Douglas, David Crosby, and Eleanor Roosevelt.

    I bike past the house where, a few summers back, a couple who sold both cars and haircuts from their little porch helped me with a flat tire. Two houses down, sharing the car salesman and hairdresser’s view of the field, lies the cemetery. 

    The graves jut out in moss-covered gray shards from the grass, which is dappled with bursts of purple wild thyme. There is no hard border, the graves just stop at a certain point in the green. The oldest tombstone reads 1757. Some of the epitaphs are barely legible, smoothed out by centuries of rain, the stones alive with mold and erosion.

    Only a few hundred graves look over the field. Almost all of them must now contain very little — dead people allowed to remain unbothered for long enough that they returned to nothing. How beautiful it must be to be completely taken over by moss, surrounded by thyme, slowly disengaging until nobody who ever knew you is alive to see your grave, because they too have turned to moss. The cemetery belongs to the local Methodist Church. Built in 1854, the building is a white one-story wooden Greek Revival structure painted white with a red door, another comforting American image.

    A row of quintessential American names — Harry, Frank, Fred — almost trips me, as these tombstones are no taller than two stacked bricks and bear only these first names. Small American flags billow over a group of graves at the far end of the cemetery. These are the graves of veterans. I check the dates — the soldiers buried here died in their eighties, decades after any battle they took part in was rewritten by the victors. They didn’t burn in their tanks or get shot following orders given by someone just as terrified as they were. They didn’t die killing people they knew were not their enemies. They died old and likely safe. Even the soldiers buried here are enjoying a peaceful death. How dare they?

    A sound interrupts my inner tirade. It is the sound of a man speaking softly, and it is coming from the entrance to the graveyard. The man has a ponytail and a border collie, whom he is coaxing to do his business. I nod my head to show that I see him and am not afraid of him. He nods back, probably oblivious to the possibility that someone might consider him scary. The border collie urinates on Fred. This horrifies me, although at this point Fred has been dead for over 150 years and has fully left the building, corporeally speaking. Pissing anywhere, at this point, would be pissing on Fred. But I can’t look away. I don’t want the man to think I am judging him — although of course I am — because I don’t want to make a strange man angry while I’m all alone in a field full of dead people. I look around, hoping that I am coming across as lost in thought, and wander away. A few minutes later, on my way out, I pass the man with the border collie again. I say, “Have a good one.” But what I really want to say is: “My dead are jealous of your dead.”

    I get back on my bike and turn the bend. I think of Noor’s dead, who are jealous of my dead. Noor’s dead are under the rubble, in mass graves, or nowhere to be found. Noor believes that every day is her last. During the previous war, she once wrote to me, “I hoped to die in my house; I have many fond memories of it.” In this war, this sounds like a fantasy. Noor’s home was turned into rubble months ago, along with the home of every other person she knows. For a moment, images of dogs eating corpses blind me to my surroundings, but then my eyes readjust to the beauty. How dare this beauty?

    I Am Joseph, Father: Recognition in a Poem by Mahmoud Darwish

    Forty years have passed since Mahmoud Darwish released his extraordinary micro-allegory, Anā Yūsufun Yā Abī, “I am Joseph, Father.” This was based, of course, on the biblical story of Joseph, widely appreciated for its psychological depth, acclaimed by Robert Alter as “the preeminent instance of biblical narrative as a fictional experiment in knowledge.” It is a narrative that has inspired myriad works of literature and art. With Joseph and His Brothers, Thomas Mann transformed the story into a four-volume epic exploring human cruelty, responsibility, recognition, and reconciliation. What was a Palestinian poet doing when he reimagined it in a slim ten lines that culminated in an astonishing challenge to the patriarch Jacob? What is the enduring relevance of a poem that Darwish continued to perform in public till shortly before his death in 2008? 

    Anā Yūsufun Yā Abī appeared as part of the collection Ward Aqall (“Fewer Roses”), published in 1986 (Dār al-‘Awda, Beirut) when Darwish was in Paris. He had moved there from Tunis after a four-year sojourn still managing the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Research Center after expulsion from Lebanon with the 1982 Israeli invasion — a rupture compounded by the subsequent Sabra and Shatila massacres that haunted Darwish’s writing thereafter, and precipitated his full transformation into a critical PLO insider. The shock, in the words of Fady Joudah, was “another glaring mirror of exile” reflecting the displacements he had already endured, beginning with the Nakba in 1948. The impact on his creative output seemed obvious: critics view his Paris period as the site of his transformation from resistance poet to an interpreter of exile as a universal condition.

     Edward Said calls exile “an unhealable rift” and Ward Aqall is an exercise par excellence in wrangling the internal disorder caused by that rift in the form of a non-teleological journey — in Arabic, raḥīl. Fascinatingly, Darwish’s collection revolutionizes the most deeply psychological and liminal movements of the oldest Arabic poetry — also conventionally called raḥīl. In these works poets externalize inner conflict — existential fear, bereavement, rage, chronic doubt — and metaphorically take to the saddle to process the experience. The poet’s persona typically splits into two, rider and she-camel, figures which symbolize, respectively, the mind — ‘aql — and the heart — qalb — the premodern seat of the psyche. The two may function in perfect harmony; but descent into crisis — the norm — will catalyze fragmentation and the two will constellate, sometimes multiple times, into different conflicting parties, each new scene allegorizing alternative modes of confrontation with danger or failure, and the rejection of despair. These “journeys” generally have no arrival. They are performances of self-resurrection through the poetic word. The goal is integration. Darwish’s Ward Aqall is a polyepisodic unity that follows such a psychological arc.

     I will relay here the substance of Ward Aqall, with no pretense of adequately conveying its artistry, breadth, or sublime musical lyricism. The collection is comprised of fifty short poems of approximately equal length as stages of exhausting movement through time, space, and memory, in pursuit of a dream. Poetry is invoked to reconstruct the homeland, to puncture circuitous exits and entries through rock, sky, and sea; but there is no returning to the journey’s start, and the end is always out of sight. Projections of war and loss echo with references to ancient histories and legend: Homer’s Odyssey and the fall of Troy; the travels of Imru ‘al-Qays, legendary poet-king, on the doomed trail to redeem his kingdom; the fall of al-Andalus, Darwish’s Paradise Lost, somehow fusing with Lorca’s “Song of the Horseman” on an abortive road to Cordoba. These are riveted with flashes of memory: sensory recollections of a mother’s home; the few minutes allowed him before an international community that clapped and forgot; impatience with peer-group humbuggery. There is also descent toward fatal despair, fear of the voice falling silent — but this momentum shifts.

    As the process nears its end, a daylight epiphany revitalizes the commitment to life, and affords the reprieve the poet desires to reconcile with himself, albeit “on the road to other folks’ destinations”: “Here am I, able to live till the end of the month, striving to write a plausible pulse into my heart, a believable existence for the spirit hereafter . . . able to go to the end of life as a couple: my solitary self with myself alone.” Moving forward, he begs the lightning to illuminate his way — “Brighten, Lightning, the night for us! Brighten even but a little” — once more channeling Imru ‘al-Qays, and the most famous night-crisis in the Arabic poetic repertory, in which that poet urges Night to clear into a day that will likely bring no respite. He then emerges from his own “long night” into a state of unbroken defeat and into a desolated old age where poetry has in fact won nothing, nonetheless charging the “butterflies” of his poetic imagination to write the record of his land and identity: “We will write in order not to die; we will write for the sake of all our dreams.”

    His identity at the close of the “journey” is a composite one: “Of us are the Messiah and Judas; and of us are the chroniclers of our wombs.” This compound identity chimes with other reworked biblical narratives in Darwish’s poetic raḥīl, most emotively his interpretation of Cain and Abel (Poem 15: “He Embraces His Killer”); and a metonymic retelling of Jesus’ crucifixion from the perspective of Maryam, mother of Jesus, who wonders if God has indeed “divorced” her (Poem 39: “My God, Why Have You Forsaken Me?”).

    In his lightly veiled reworking of Cain and Abel (he mentions no names), Darwish ventriloquizes the figure of Abel to wonder what sin he committed to deserve to be murdered by his brother. But, once bereft of the hope of life, Abel resolves instead to grasp hold of his killer, to embrace his own death, translating the mark of Cain into an ironic promise of eternal constancy: “I will never release the twine of our embrace. I will never, ever leave you.” The poet’s interpretation of Maryam, meanwhile, lodges a fatalistic complaint taken straight to God: “Why did you promise the soldiers my single vine? . . . You descended in me as the Word; you made two branches to descend from a single seed. What, did you divorce me? Or did you leave to save another — my enemy — from the chop?” Maryam’s experience of betrayal is grounded in a visceral sense of severance from a shared legacy; the pruning of her single vine — Jesus, descended through David from the root of “God’s vine,” Jacob, or Israel — to promote growth in a competing branch. Such biblical vignettes as these all intertwine at the levels of betrayal and injustice; but they also reflect the deep and tangled empathy that can exist in this no man’s land between love and hate.

    There is bitter empathy alive throughout the whole of Ward Aqall. Readers who understand this can better appreciate Darwish’s Joseph, albeit that his predicament is more tragic than bitter. It is at the three-quarter mark of the “journey” — following a vision of metamorphosis and ascension through the agency of a falcon to which he consigns his cadaver (Poem 36: “To the Falcon Your Remains”), and preceding a protracted Last Supper, where he urges the Lord to transport those present to the beginning of all things (Poem 38: “The Last Supper Draws Out”) — that Darwish chooses to place his singular Joseph.

    I am Joseph, Father

     

    Translated by Nadia Jamil

     

    Oh father, my brothers do not love me; they do not wish me among them, father.

        They are brutal to me; they assail me with stones and words of reviling; they want me dead 

            so that they can praise my life

    They closed before me the way to your house; they drove me out of the field

    They poisoned my grapes, father; and, father, they even broke my toys

        When the breeze came and caressed my hair, they were jealous; they rose against me; they     

            rebelled against you; but what was my offence to them, father?

    Butterflies would alight on my shoulders; sheaves of corn bent in homage to me

    Birds hovered over my hands; so what exactly, father, did I do? 

        And why me? You gave me Joseph for a name; and they threw me down in the pit, and 

            blamed the wolf; but the wolf is more merciful than they.

    Dear father, did I sin against anyone when I said: I saw one and ten stars, and the sun and the moon; I saw them bow themselves to me?

    The poem begins at the end of the story, bypassing twenty-two years of exile — Joseph’s enslavement and imprisonment in Egypt; his evolution from boy-dreamer to divinely favored interpreter of dreams; his rise to power in Egypt and deliverance of its people from famine; his reunion with the brothers who had betrayed him when they came to him to purchase grain; and his testing them before finally disclosing his identity and moving to reconcile. His dramatic self-revelation to them — “I am Joseph” — is replaced with an opening address to his long lost father. Time is collapsed on what remains of the story to permit a present-tense reprise of the injustices Joseph endured on his father’s watch, including a fleeting allusion to his dream of the sheaves which enraged the brothers. The poem culminates in a question of politest reproach for the near-blind patriarch who failed to validate either of his prophetic son’s dreams, both of which foresaw Joseph’s ascent. 

     The poem is told in only one voice but it is polyphonic, a counterpoint of complementary tones. A biblical timbre colors Joseph’s complaint of the poisoned grapes, for it raises the figure of the rootstock of “God’s vine,” represented in Jacob/Israel, and the fruit that it yields: his progeny. And it is a complaint consistent with the reasoning of Deuteronomy: “For their vine is of the vine of Sodom, and of the fields of Gomorrah: their grapes are grapes of gall.” That is to say that, for Joseph, the moral ecology is corrupted by his brothers’ sinful injustice such that his “grapes,” his life and legacy, are existentially threatened through their communal interconnection in the “vine.” This sin with its implications is, of itself, in tension with the meaning (and promise) of Joseph’s given name, which augurs “increase,” fruitful continuity — his brothers sought to rob him of his birth right. But it is a powerful testament to Darwish’s internalization of biblical logic that he also goes on to draw directly the kind of ironic contrast between what “Joseph” signifies, and the deathly constriction implied by the pit into which his brothers threw him. (“You gave me Joseph for a name; and they threw me down in the pit, and blamed the wolf.”)

    Woven into this tapestry of sound are strands of Darwish’s authorial voice, playfully intercalated like the cameos of a director walking briefly onto his set, shadowing Joseph’s beautiful, slightly vain, coddled persona: The phrase “They want me dead so that they can praise my life” is lifted verbatim from an earlier poem in which the poet anticipates the hypocrisy of ill-wishers who will one day eulogize him. And the butterflies which alight on Joseph’s shoulder are readily recognized by followers of Darwish as a recurrent, idiosyncratic motif symbolizing his own poetic inspiration.

    But the pedal tone is the resonance of the Palestinian experience: violent displacement, vilification, and exile — all as if a penalty for the crimes of others; the existential threat of erasure; the talismanic dream of a return to the homeland; the earnest expectation of validation for that dream. And this is performed entirely through the total inhabitation of Joseph’s voice — except for the climactic final question regarding his dream of the stars, sun, and moon, now proven true. This draws directly from the Qur’an’s Sūrat Yūsuf; and the sudden impact of his speech mediated by divine discourse is startling: register and idiom are flipped. The distance between Hebrew and Arab is erased to produce a mirror of deep, if unforgiving, empathy demanding recognition.

    The suspension of the story at this point is natural, for the extended lesson of Joseph’s tale — that the recognition of injustice, the validation of the account, are necessary precursors for reconciliation and forgiveness — lay outside the perimeters of the poem in its time. The same remains true today, so that Darwish’s retelling not only retains its power, but brings new urgency and nuance with each performance, at every shift in the political landscape. “True peace,” he declared a decade later, in a powerful encounter with the Israeli poet Hilit Yeshurun, 

    is a dialogue between two accounts. You claim that the land has always been yours, as if history didn’t continue while you weren’t there, as if there was no one there, as if the land had only one function — to wait for you. Don’t force your account on me and I won’t force mine on you. We must recognize that everyone has the right to tell his own story. And history will laugh at both of us.

    Capital Magic

    My grandmother sent us to catch a frog when I was about 13. Down to the riverbank we went, me and my cousins, tingling with the unease endemic to being assigned a task you don’t quite understand. In those days we used to catch frogs for the sport of it, and cruelly inflate them and turn them into balloons, but the activity earned us rebuke from our elders. Why my grandma — who always warned us against the practice and often enforced the prohibition with a stick — suddenly insisted upon the forbidden activity was unclear.

    Her son, my uncle, was 35 and still unmarried. This, apparently, required intervention from higher powers at the expense of a common frog. We were conscripted to provide the goods for a ritual. The frog was placed beneath my uncle’s pillow without his knowledge and we waited to see if he would dream of his future bride.

    Over breakfast, grandma probed him casually. She asked whether he’d dreamed anything interesting the night before. My uncle first couldn’t recall exactly what his dream had been about — he had been drinking with his pals earlier that evening, you see. This irritated her, a communist woman and the wife of the kolkhoz chairman, well versed in interrogations. She pressed for answers like a good government inquisitor, insisting he jog his memory. Under pressure, my uncle said he may have seen a snake or a reptile of some sort. The laughter that followed is what I remember best. Soon thereafter my uncle was roped into an arranged marriage and my grandma’s lifelong struggle with her daughter-in-law began. For the rest of her life, she called her daughter-in-law a “serpent.” 

    Recently the serpent slithered up from the murky recesses of my childhood memories, summoned by an invitation I received from friends in Washington, DC. “Sip and See Your Future,” the subject line read. A tarot card reader was selling us the opportunity to glimpse our romantic futures.

    Back home in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, Turkish coffee fortune telling was a common activity. We would drink our coffee thick and sweet, turn the cup upside down on the saucer, wait for it to cool, then press our thumbs into the dark deposit and read the shapes and patterns left behind. That is how we passed the time. And there were other such methods. The women I knew growing up had elaborate rituals for seeing their future husbands. They would tie a ring to a thread with a small cross, drop it in water, then hold it up to a mirror, hoping to see the face of a future spouse in the reflection. Or they would eat salty bread baked by a happily married woman before bed, believing their soulmate would appear in their dreams. 

    Men used the occult differently. Among teenage boys, there was a widespread belief that if you smeared lizard blood on your eyeglasses, you could see through girls’ clothing. And there were supernatural strategies that were equally useful to everyone. Students believed that placing a snake’s tongue under your pillow the night before an exam would make you dream the test questions. (What is it about human nature that tricks us into believing that hunting down and cutting out a snake’s tongue is easier than studying for a test?) 

    I never imagined that this sort of superstitious thinking would follow me to America, or that I would find myself in Washington, DC, about to have my cards read. After all, I had left all that nonsense behind: the bad coffee, the bargaining with fate, the superstitions of a collapsing Soviet experiment. I had moved to America, to the rational capital of the world, where people made decisions based on evidence. Right?

    The Pew Research Center, that ultra-American oracle, published a survey in 2024 that found that 30% of American adults consult astrology, tarot cards, or fortune tellers at least once a year. Women are nearly twice as likely as men to engage in such practices (35% versus 18%). Among women aged 18 to 49, the numbers are higher: 43% say they believe in astrology and 46% consult it at least annually. The revival of this brand of spirituality and of witchcraft is often explained as a consequence of declining traditional religion. In 1972, just 5% of Americans described themselves as religiously unaffiliated. Today that figure stands at roughly 30%. Churches weakened, but the need for meaning did not. At the same time, marriage, friendship, and sex have all become less common. In 1960, 59% of Americans aged 18 to 29 were married; by 2010, that number had dropped to 20%. The median age of a first marriage has risen by about seven years since 1960. 

    But hope springs eternal, doesn’t it? Maybe tarot would succeed where Hinge had failed. Even a rational person prefers magic to uncertainty. We knew this all too well in the former Soviet Union. Communism was intended to create a new man, a rational, scientific man who would not dabble in magic or religion. Occultism and witchcraft were criminalized. Fortune tellers, often accused of “anti-state activity,” were prosecuted.

    Faith, it turns out, is harder to kill than Romanovs. In 1989, as the Soviet Union unraveled, a psychotherapist named Anatoly Kashpirovsky appeared on state television, staring into the camera and performing mass hypnosis to calm a panicked population. An estimated 87% of viewers tuned in, streets emptied, and people insisted they were healed while Kashpirovsky conveniently called for renewed faith in the government and communism itself. The Soviet state, supposedly built on rejecting spirituality, spent its final days broadcasting mass hypnosis to save itself.

    Across fifteen newly independent republics, as the old order dissolved, people turned to anything that promised salvation, including magic and sorcery. When one of my relatives left his wife for another woman, his family knew why immediately: she had cast a spell on him. How else to explain it? They searched and found the evidence: clothes and feathers sewn into the lining of his sportcoat. Someone who knew the old ways had cunningly put them there. They took his photograph and drove all the way to the Azerbaijani border, where the old Zoroastrians, the fire-worshippers, lived. They were rumored to be the most powerful practitioners of the occult. The spell was removed. The man came home. For two weeks. Then he left again, back to the other woman. Maybe, someone suggested, they should have paid the witch more.

    But extra money to spend on altering fate was in short supply in newly independent Georgia, unlike here in the West. My friend, let’s call her Mariam, spent no less than $3,000 to have a curse removed by a fortune teller to get back together with an ex-boyfriend. One day she was walking with her friends in Dupont Circle, heartbroken and tipsy, when they stumbled upon a sign on a sidewalk and a small shop. “We thought it would be fun to try it,” she said. But what she learned convinced her that $3,000 dollars was a bargain. A witch named Victoria told her that she carried a generational curse. That her father had broken a woman’s heart, and that woman’s mother, naturally, cursed him. “She said I was paying the price for what he did,” Mariam told me. The bit about the father happened to be true. It turned out he had indeed broken off an engagement to marry her mother. “That was what got me to trust her — because it was true,” Mariam said.

     The curse was removed. But maybe Mercury was in retrograde because the ex-boyfriend proved resistant to the magic. “It’s easy if you see a girl who is in her thirties out single and tipsy to guess what her story is,” she said. “They work on generalities and insecurities that they sense and make educated guesses. I mostly got hope and comfort out of it.”

    I did not want to go to the tarot reading. Stars tell you nothing. Que sera sera, whatever will be will be, I always believed. The only time I had come close to tarot and witches was when I heard that my ex-boyfriend had gotten married. And to a fortune teller! Which made me dislike the practice even more, though I took some comfort in the fact that she was evidently not a very good one. They divorced quite quickly.

    But I went to the reading anyway.

    In ancient Greece, if you wanted to know the future, you made a pilgrimage to Delphi. The journey itself was part of the ritual, its length and difficulty shrouded prophecy in mystery and significance. Now the oracle comes to you. Witchcraft and related spiritual services have grown into a $2 billion-plus industry in the United States. Scroll on TikTok and #WitchTok — with over 30 billion views — will materialize between cooking tutorials. My algorithm feeds me manifestation rituals, birth chart readings, and crystal healing. We lonely hearts consume cosmic guidance the same way we consume everything else: passively, endlessly, while lying in bed at 2 AM wondering why we’re still single. 

    The tarot reader was scheduled for a Friday evening in a Dupont Circle apartment. We drank wine while waiting for her to arrive. “Can she put curses on people?” someone asked. “Because I got a list.” Then the tarot reader settled in and began laying out the cards. She was soft-spoken, with pointed elf ears, but apart from that did not seem in any way manifestly witchy. She had gotten her esoteric education in Salem, Massachusetts, as one does, and had taken up tarot reading right before the pandemic. It was catnip to the Capital crowd: she’d once read cards at a DNC side event. But her magic didn’t do the Democrats much good. 

    Over the course of her readings, she mentioned that her clients were mainly women. Most ask about their careers because people are ashamed of inquiring about their love lives. Or maybe her patrons suffer from the common DC myopia in which admitting you care about finding a partner is somehow more embarrassing than admitting you want to be an undersecretary of state. 

    Most of the people in the room were women in their late thirties, all successful, good careers, well-traveled, cat owners sprinkled liberally throughout. They had climbed the ladder, checked the boxes, done everything right. Everything except the one thing that apparently requires supernatural intervention: finding someone willing to split the rent.

    The witch offered nothing as concrete or damning as what Oedipus got at Delphi. No prophecies about murdering your father or marrying your mother. No unavoidable fates. Instead, her readings were conveniently vague. The cards offered reassurances: a period of transition was coming (isn’t it always?), trust your intuition (so why are we here?), the universe was aligning in your favor (the universe is procrastinating). Nothing specific enough to be proven wrong nor dramatic enough to make you change your life. Just enough meaning to feel meaningful. 

    Someone asked about the war in Ukraine. She laid the cards out. The Judgement card: a crossroads, she explained. The Pentacles reversed, or lack of money, and another, I can’t remember, that points to an uncertain future. The cards, like the rest of us, were confused.

    One woman asked about her romantic future. The reader laid out the cards: the Two of Swords, the Strength card reversed, the Five of Wands. “This is about having a choice between two different paths,” she explained. She paused at the Five of Wands. “This card is about conflict. I see this as talking about the past, having a lot of conflict and being like, ‘I don’t want to do that again.’” In other words: You’re single because you’ve had bad relationships before. Groundbreaking.

    Back home in Georgia, Turkish coffee readings and the sorcery that my friends practiced with mirrors and rings were games, really. Looking around the room in Dupont Circle at women in their late thirties, I understood that this felt less like fun and more like what made my relatives drive to the Azerbaijani border. When rational methods fail, you try the irrational. Maybe no matter where a person grows up, the hope that someone somewhere is keeping cosmic score is irresistible. Anyway, catching toads is fun.

    Phallocracy All the Way Down

    The Epstein Phenomenon ought to foist the subject of sexual cruelty to the forefront of our consciousness. It is a common cruelty, so common and so awful that we have had to find ways to blind ourselves to it so that we may be relieved of the jagged responsibility of interrogating our own complicity — our own comfort — with its prevalence in our culture. It would unknit our social order to take this evil seriously. 

    In this instance, our strategy has been to feign that Jeffrey Epstein’s cruelties have nothing to do with us, that we are not implicated by what his story demonstrates about human habit. We have localized his evil and sequestered it within the “The Epstein Class.” The progressive Ro Khanna, for whom Epstein’s monstrosities are a confirmation of Khanna’s class politics, uses the term “Epstein Class” to refer to a group of “elites” who, he hectors, “play by a different set of rules.” Those repulsive elites! They have their own rules! That blasted One Percent with its impenetrable carapace of privilege and power! The “elite,” the moneyed powerful whose names we all spent hours looking up with delicious voyeuristic glee in early 2026, has nothing whatever to do with us. We scanned the Epstein files as if it was a kind of game with no discomfiting lessons for the plebs. It was even fun. Did you know anyone in the files? Were you yourself inscribed? Can you believe it about Larry Summers? Can you believe it about the saintly, justice-seeking Noam Chomsky? Noam Chomsky. And my word, can you believe that they all knew

     Knew what? What was this awful secret to which these elites were all privy? Did they know something that we did not know? Did they do something that we would never do? They got away with rape or forgave it — but don’t we? Surely most people — certainly most women — have forgiven worse sexual cruelties than anything Larry Summers has allegedly done.

    Are you so certain, reader, that you have not attended dinner parties at the home of an abuser or a rapist? Are you so certain that you would scrupulously distance yourself from anyone so much as plausibly suspected of such debased behavior? Do good liberals, or good God-fearing and hard-working citizens of good democracies, really care all that much about rape? 

    I have, alas, reason to doubt our sterling records and intentions. I’m afraid I have reason to believe — to know — that ordinary unEpsteined non-elites of every creed, color, and political fealty care staggeringly little about rape. People choose to routinely rub shoulders with rapists with no power or money to speak of, and they are borne by simple, uncomplicated, uncalculated desire. They want to. There are so many rapists, you see, and most of them are just our neighbors or business partners or brothers-in-law living in small towns, the scandals of which would never grace the front pages of any newspaper. Most abusers are not famous. They are merely guilty. 

    Rape is too horrific a crime to believe anyone would actually commit it, and too mundane a crime to care about even if it is likely that someone has committed it. That, I can tell you, is what victims learn, and it is what readers of national newspapers deduce from coverage about cases symptomatic of this oxymoronic law. People are unfazed by rape and they are horrified by it. It is the ur-crime, absolutely unforgivable in soldiers except that it is to be expected, repellant in men with enormous power except that it is their inevitable wage, a black stain on a shimmering intellect except that brilliant men must be allowed their transgressions if society is to progress. As for the anonymous rapists — boys will be boys and what are we supposed to do, skin the bastard? There would be so many skinless bastards! There would be so many disarranged friend groups, so many sidelong glances and prudish or prurient staring. And what business is it of ours if something horrible may or may not have happened to some woman who may or may not have invited it? Why does she insist on talking about it? Even if it is true, each of us is more than the worst thing we have ever done, as Bryan Stevenson taught us. Time cleanses reputations even when it does not mend decimated spirits.

    We say that Epstein was permitted to indulge his evil predilections for as long as he did because of how much power he had. This is true with respect to the judicial system’s repeated incapacity to punish him. His power certainly accounts for the legerdemain which got him out of legally bolted cages time after time. “I own the Palm Beach Police department,” he used to say. But this is not the only reason that he escaped social opprobrium for as long as he did. Epstein got away with rape because people get away with rape. Far more people get away with rape than get punished for it. This is a hideous and inconvenient fact. If all ordinary people were decent people they would be compelled to act on this fact, to alter society. But society — by which I mean us — resists alteration. So we avoid drawing out the implications of Epstein’s sordid story. 

    He got away with it because he was powerful, but he also got away with it for the same reasons that men we all know have gotten away with rape. We all know men who have gotten away with rape. I know more victims of rape than I can count with two hands and I do not know a single one who has secured justice. The same — statistically — is more than likely true for each of you.  

    Virginia Roberts Giuffre’s name is well known because she was among the most outspoken and courageous of Epstein’s victims. But Giuffre, like so many of the girls whom Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell sniffed out, tormented, and emotionally disfigured, was abused by many other men and betrayed by many other women before she met the notorious evil pair about whom we have all been gossiping. The real villain of Giuffre’s deeply affecting memoir, Nobody’s Girl, is not Jeffrey Epstein. It is Sky Roberts, who was Giuffre’s father. In her haunting book she wrote that her father began assaulting her when she was 7 years old, that he raped and abused her for years, and that he invited a friend of his to do the same. She wrote that her mother, Lynn Trude Cabell, whom she remembered to have been loving and warm before her daughter reached the age of 7, suddenly became cold and cruel at about the time the paternal abuse began. Giuffre intimates that she saw her mother as an aging beauty who longed for the attentions of a man lusting after a helpless child. She believed her mother was jealous of and embittered by her adolescent daughter’s erotic provocations. Giuffre claimed to have detected the same icy jealousy in Maxwell — who hunted down teenaged girls for Epstein and as they aged toward 20 hissed that he would soon lose interest in and discard them — a decade later, but in her own mother the cruelty was formative. 

    How could a mother allow her husband to abuse her daughter under her own roof? What causes the wives, the lovers, and the mothers of abusers and abused the world over to turn a blind eye, to pretend not to see? Cruelty is not more or less common in elite or ordinary circles. It is a human sin, a human failing. We have been made to reckon with the cruelties that Giuffre endured because two of her abusers were famous, but not all of her abusers were famous. Sky Roberts was not less likely to abuse her than Jeffrey Epstein was merely because he was not a celebrity. Lynn Trude Cabell was not less likely to betray and permanently wound her daughter than Ghislaine Maxwell was merely because Lynn Trude Cabell was not a celebrity. And while Virginia Giuffre’s life story is inordinately horrifying, the horrors that she endured are not otherworldly, not at all. One woman I know was raped by her husband after telling him she wanted a divorce. When she told her mother about the rape, her mother said, “Well, he says he didn’t, and I believe him.” I know another woman who confided to her mother that she had been raped by a friend and her mother told her not to talk about that kind of thing. A girl I went to high school with had been abused by her father and his friend in her home and her mother did nothing to stop it. None of these rapists or their passive accomplices had astronomical power. None of them were members of any elites. They were just people, with power over their victims and with the capacity for committing or tolerating criminal cruelty.

    Sky Roberts was never punished for abusing his adolescent daughter because his daughter loved him and needed him, and because she never considered the police — or anyone else — a plausible source of protection from a man she loved and could not learn to hate. Virginia Giuffre spent much of her life, before her suicide last year, trying to mend her relationship with her father. She cared about this man who raped her. Most women care about the men who rape them.

    I’m going to tell you the stories of three different women whose alleged rapists sit somewhere between Sky Roberts and Jeffrey Epstein on the ordinary/elite spectrum. All of these alleged rapists are men of above-average fame and influence. They have been awarded honor and respect in their communities. If you were to hear each of their names you might recognize them from a book jacket or a lecture notice. All of them, even the ones publicly and credibly accused of rape, have remained welcome in some of the most distinguished intellectual venues in the world. 

    The first of these women went straight to the police to seek justice; the second went to the police and then appealed to other authorities for support; the third woman — me — went to private authorities and appealed to the public to strip her rapist of the high status he had won before the rape.

    Taken all together these three accounts are a useful thought experiment for the question that the Epstein story demands we ask ourselves: who really gives a damn about rape? I propose that there are two kinds of people: those who believe that rape is an unusually horrific crime and that just the possibility that it has been committed by or against someone we know places a moral obligation upon us to take the possibility seriously and to act on that knowledge as reason and compassion demand; and those whose immediate reaction to the possibility of rape having been committed is to say, like the mother of my friend did, “let’s not talk about that kind of thing.” Only the first of these two types is the moral one, obviously, and the rare one. Society stubbornly resists their influence. 

     The first of the women whose stories I will share, I’ll call her Samantha, went to the police immediately after she was raped, bleeding and covered in bruises. A rape kit exam was administered and photos were taken of the black and blue marks on her body. The police told her that a man who rapes in the way she had been raped was likely a repeat offender. They told her that she should try and find his other victims to strengthen her case. That, oddly, was how she found me. Her social media sleuthing had yielded evidence that she and I might share an abuser. As it turned out, she was mistaken — my rapist and hers were not the same person — but I was lucky for it. In the years since we found each other she has become a kind of sister. When she and I first met she had just been told by the police that her rapist’s arrest was imminent and she was instructed to prepare herself emotionally for what would follow in the coming weeks. But nothing happened. One season fell into another and her anxiety looped back on itself like a circular electric current. That was over three years ago. There has been no arrest. Her rape kit was finally processed a few months before this writing, but he still has not been charged with any crimes. To this day, every official and officer she can get hold of promises her that the case will begin soon, as they have for years.

    I read about the second woman in the publication Poets&Quants which reported that Bent Flyvbjerg, an emeritus professor at Oxford University, had been accused of raping a junior colleague, that he was arrested in early 2024 on suspicion of rape, but that the police let Flyvbjerg out of jail on bail and then did not bring charges because they believed a jury would be unlikely to convict him. The Cherwell, Oxford’s independent student newspaper, reported that the university did not launch a formal internal investigation into Flyvbjerg after police decided not to bring charges, and took no steps to restrict his access to campus or remove his emeritus status. And it went on to report this: “The case later intersected with the misconduct inquiry that led to the resignation of Soumitra Dutta as dean of Saïd Business School. The complainant has said she then approached Dutta seeking protection regarding her safety concerns. Instead, Dutta made a sexual pass at her. A five-month university inquiry substantiated three harassment findings against him, and partially substantiated a fourth.” 

    The public attributes impartiality to formal investigations, the authoritative aura of objectivity. When victims turn to official avenues to report rape, it is often because they hope that formal investigations will shield us from being called liars or worse, and will show that we are able to provide evidence and make cases that will withstand objective, rigorous scrutiny. That is what we want. We have the benefit of telling the truth, so we believe — however naively — that we have the ultimate advantage. But of course every investigation is conducted by human beings and so is therefore subject to the same biases that govern every other human attempt at impartiality. The woman who had accused Flyvberg had been able to provide police with sufficient evidence to arrest him, but the police had tossed out the case because they believed that the jury would not be likely to convict him. Then she went to Dutta seeking the safety and compassion that her narrative should have inspired, and Dutta did what Duttas sometimes do. 

    We, victims of rape with credible evidence and credible narratives, hope ardently that the people we trust to evaluate our cases will be girded by a profound sense of the urgency with which we feel and think about justice. The very possibility of rape should bind investigators with a sense of duty. And yet Dutta preyed upon the woman who had turned to him to help her shield herself from her abuser, and the authorities responsible for handling Samantha’s case are not interested in the injustice that she is alleged to have endured. Not interested

     As I say, the third woman is me. Samantha and I talk often about our respective hells. In the beginning of our friendship, our phone conversations took place in a reality that I was fortunate never to have encountered before, one in which the buttons with which society has equipped us to press in the event of an injustice do not trigger a response. I had avoided outrage at a culture that countenances rape by concealing what had happened to me. I never pressed a button, I never asked for help. No one had failed me but me.  

    I had watched Samantha twist herself into a condition of ever-burgeoning anxiety for months when I finally felt compelled to act. We had just had another in a series of phone calls in which I found myself in the familiar but always uncomfortable position of asking whether the case had moved forward. I didn’t want to make her feel guilty that she could report no such good news. I knew that she felt she was letting down the people she loves by failing to be lifted out of limbo and restored to a world that made sense. She is a truly formidable woman and I did not wish to embarrass her with a reminder of her helplessness. After this conversation, stoked by the adrenaline of my impotent concern for her, I decided that I would do for me what I could not do for her: I would force fate’s hand. She had done everything right, she had gone to the police immediately, she had gotten a rape kit, she had gotten a lawyer, she had made a legal claim. Before she and I met I thought that I had missed my chance at justice because I had done none of these things. But look — she did all of them and justice was no less elusive.  

    I contacted The Atlantic, the magazine for which my rapist regularly wrote, and notified them that one of their writers, whom I named, had raped me. I received an email in response to my allegation assuring me that my allegation would be taken seriously and then I waited for a month for future contact, expecting that an investigation would be undertaken and that at least one of the witnesses would be me. After waiting exactly four weeks in which I received no communication from The Atlantic, I tweeted a screenshot of the email containing my allegation and my rapist’s name, hoping that that abstract, all-powerful mass The Public would be moved by the sense of compassion and duty to which Dutta and the criminal legal system to which Samantha had turned had proven wholly immune. 

    After I made my allegations public, two institutions with which my rapist was associated reached out to me. One, the Council on Foreign Relations, notified me via a lawyer from the law firm Debevoise and Plimpton that they would be conducting an investigation with or without me, but they invited me to participate so that the investigation could be as thorough and fair as possible. Another, Johns Hopkins University, let me know that if I wanted to file a Title IX complaint the option was open to me despite not having any affiliation with the university. I chose to participate in the Debevoise and Plimpton investigation because they were going to conduct it anyway. I did not pursue a Title IX complaint with Hopkins at that time because I did not want to do both at once and because I had promised myself before coming forward that I would not waste my days pickling in rage, pursuing revenge. It was not my job to spend my life proving that I had been raped. 

    After an hour-long interrogation, the lawyer from Debevoise and Plimpton told me that, whereas she had been hired by the Council on Foreign Relations and therefore worked for them and not for me, she would do me the courtesy of calling me at the close of the inquiry to let me know how her client would choose to act on the basis of her investigation’s conclusions. There would be no evidence of the Council’s decision in writing, no formal statement, no communication of any kind between them and me. A few months later she called to tell me that on the basis of her investigation the Council had chosen to sever ties with my rapist. This was certainly a relief. But I cannot report that I was overjoyed, because such a “verdict” was what I deserved and what I expected, since I knew that I was telling the truth, and that I had solid evidence to support my claim. And that, I thought, was the end of the story. 

    I was wrong. For reasons I will explain, I was persuaded to file a Title IX report with Johns Hopkins University a few months later. I gave Hopkins all the same information and evidence that I had given the Council on Foreign Relations. I also offered to give them the contact information for all the witnesses whom the Debevoise and Plimpton lawyer had spoken to a few months earlier. Hopkins’ lawyers told me they were not interested in speaking to anyone who hadn’t actually been there on the night of the rape and so they never reached out to the publisher of the journal for which I work, the man whom I told first thing on the morning of the workday after the rape, about what had happened. Bill had helped me pay for the thousands of dollars worth of therapy that I needed in the months that followed, which is why I had given his contact information to the Debevoise and Plimpton lawyers. Other than him, though, Hopkins and CFR got the same information from me. At the conclusion of the Title IX investigation I was informed that Hopkins would not sever ties with my rapist on the basis of their inquiry. Just as with CFR, no notice of this was made public, but in this case apparently word got around. For obvious reasons my rapist had good reason to let people know about the results of this investigation but not about the results of the other one.

    In the time since then I have been contacted several times by women at various institutions that have hired or otherwise engaged my rapist. One of these women asked me whether it was true that her institution had reached out to me to ask for my side of the story before announcing his affiliation. I hadn’t heard of her institution before she contacted me and I searched my inbox to make sure I was correct in replying that they had never reached out. She told me that when she asked her superior about the fact that he had invited a man credibly accused of rape to join their program, he had told her that they had conducted an investigation and concluded that I had lied for the sake of attention.

    On April 26, 2016, a “Katie Johnson” filed a complaint against Donald J. Trump and Jeffrey Epstein. It reads, in part:

    On the third occasion involving the Defendant, Donald J. Trump, the Plaintiff, Katie Johnson was forced to engage in an unnatural lesbian sex act with her fellow minor and sex slave, Maria Doe, age 12, for the sexual enjoyment of Defendant Trump. After this sex act, both minors were forced to orally copulate Defendant Trump by placing their mouths simultaneously on his erect penis until he achieved sexual orgasm. After zipping up his pants, Defendant Trump physically pushed both minors away while angrily berating them for the “poor” quality of their sexual performance. . . . The Plaintiff, Katie Johnson, alleges she was subject to extreme sexual and physical abuse by the Defendants, Donald J. Trump and Jeffrey E. Epstein, including forcible rape during a four month time span covering the months of June–September 1994 when Plaintiff Johnson was still only a minor of age 13.

    According to Julie K. Brown’s book Perversion of Justice, Epstein and his ilk abused 12- and 13-year-olds in this way at parties attended by many men. In conversation with a male friend of mine, I expressed revulsion at the possibility that men who would not themselves rape adolescents could have witnessed such horrors and done nothing to stop it. He shook his head slowly and said: “I know exactly what men like that would say. They’d say ‘She didn’t look 12.’”

    When I was 10 years old, a group of men at the Orthodox synagogue which I attended approached my father. They told him that, whereas girls below the age of 12 are allowed to sit in the men’s section of the synagogue, I, a 10-year-old, did not look 12 — I looked like a woman. I looked too mature, they said, to continue sitting next to him, and so I would have to relocate to the women’s section behind the customary partition in the same sanctuary. And so, two years ahead of schedule, I was ushered unceremoniously into womanhood.

    When I was 13 years old, I wore a sequined, strapless cocktail dress to a bat mitzvah party from which my father took me home. We walked from the building in which the party was held to our car alongside a friend of mine and his father. When we got back to our house, my dad told me that this friend’s father had whispered to him: “Your daughter’s a fox.” My dad instructed me that I was not to wear sequined, strapless cocktail dresses anymore.

    When I was 17 years old, a group of boys in my small religious high school spread a rumor that I was sleeping with a rabbi — the head of our Judaic Studies department. I babysat for this man’s children. I idolized his wife, who was also a teacher in our school. The school, to its credit, conducted a formal investigation to establish whether or not the rumor was true, and the ensuing public humiliation occasioned my first dalliance with depression and suicidal ideation.

    When I was 19 years old, I was sexually intimate with a partner for the first time — my first boyfriend. On one of the first of these sessions, he took the watch off his wrist, held it up at eye level, and said “you have thirty seconds to make me come.”

    When I was 21 years old, while on semester abroad, I was assaulted by a stranger with whom I had hitchhiked from the college campus gym to the main building of Hebrew University. When I tried to get out of the car he used one hand to grab me by the throat so that he could force his tongue into my mouth, and the other to try and pull my skirt off. 

    When I was 25 years old, I was raped by a man who had, before that crime, been a dear friend of mine. He did his violence in my own bed while I was sleeping — after telling him several times to go home — after a birthday party that I had thrown for him on the roof of my apartment building. He had just turned 39.

    A decent person who overheard or witnessed any one of the instances in the above chronicle would have been provoked to defend and protect me. The humiliations that girls and women are forced to endure by sexual predators are compounded a thousandfold by the silent protection that society offers the abusers. No official investigative body can offer these girls and women the redemptive healing that a horrified and protective onlooker can. 

    The reason that I finally chose to pursue a Title IX complaint is that one such onlooker asked me to do so. A man I had met once before, a widely respected figure in Washington circles, contacted me a few months after the CFR investigation culminated in the phone call that I described above. I will call this man Gabriel. Gabriel was hesitant to reach out for fear of presuming a right to knowledge about the specifics of my innermost deliberations, but finally he felt that he had no choice: he was on multiple boards with the man I had accused of rape and noticed that suddenly these and other institutions were inviting him back into polite society. “It’s like they waited out the storm and decided he was kosher again.” Gabriel muttered over coffee. He was disgusted at the thought of sitting side by side with a man who had been credibly accused of rape, and this disgust was among the greatest antidotes to my devolution that any outsider was able to administer. “Did you file a Title IX complaint?” 

    I told him about the CFR investigation, but he said that he had approached the chairs of various boards with regard to this issue and they had told him they were waiting for a Title IX verdict from Hopkins. Later he relayed the information about CFR, but the board chairs repeated that it was a Title IX verdict or nothing. I was deeply moved by Gabriel’s concern, and shocked by the medicinal effect it had on me. He was acting precisely how I had hoped that all people in his position would act. He never pressured me and he never insisted that I provide him with the evidence that I had of the veracity of my claims since he did not believe it was his right or responsibility to conduct the investigation himself. He simply wanted to behave decently.

    The Gabriels of the world see injustice and are compelled to combat it. The fact that their community may have wronged an innocent person is a fact that they feel implicates them. They believe that inconvenient, awkward conversations are not so terrible an evil as living alongside banal, stable cruelty. The Gabriels know that a person’s dignity is a sacred thing and that it can be cleansed and mended by being treated with respect. Time does not always heal decimated spirits, but kindness can.

    There is a sexual etiquette which governs polite society. People who deviate from this etiquette quietly, without insisting on public approval for their deviant appetites, are permitted to remain full and honorable members of the collective. Society resists instability and punishes those whose true testimonies about their own experiences shake the communal boat — the outspoken victims and the Gabriels alike. That is why the Jeffrey Epstein story has been widely interpreted as a story about the elites — the attribution of his turpitude to his social class was our collective defense against a more encompassing and crushing truth, our sophisticated mechanism for containing the threat to our own everyday indifference and cruelty. We all agreed that those epicene elites have their own rules, so that the crisis did not force us to reckon with the fact that their rules are the same as ours, and that they are unjust. 

    There is no button one can press to secure justice. Even if all victims had the benefit of judicial or otherwise official systems that handled their cases with the requisite care and intelligence, no conviction of any kind can give the victim of rape what she deserves: to never have been violated in the first place. Jeffrey Epstein’s victims feel that he cheated justice by dying in his cell. I cheered when I heard he was dead and I cheer every time I remember it — that is as close to justice as they will ever get. But what those women — what all women, all people — deserve and need most of all is a society of Gabriels. 

    I remember where I was every single time a Gabriel reached out to or stood up for me. I remember where I was sitting when, after “news” of my rape spread, a man with whom I’d only ever exchanged emails called the number in my email signature to ask how I was doing. I remember the strength of the sun in the sky when a colleague nixed the possibility of collaborating with a certain famous and powerful woman because she had called me a liar. I know the street I was walking down when a friend texted to tell me that, when a stranger offhandedly mentioned my rapist’s name at a fancy event at which she was speaking, she replied in a firm voice, “He raped a friend of mine” and damn her interlocutor’s discomfort.

    The specter of discomfort or ostracism is enough to keep many a potential Gabriel from rocking boats. In some ways small decencies, rather than grand flourishes, are the hardest to agitate for, but they are the ones that alter culture. Dinner parties and after-work cocktails are the arenas in which acceptable behavior is conditioned, sanctioned, and transformed. Every one of these Gabriels has inconvenienced themselves for the sake of another person’s dignity. Each of them bestowed these small blessings without expecting accolades or even thank yous in return. For the most common and intractable evils, the greatest antidote is not heroism but kindness. Society-altering kindness. Is that too fanciful to aspire towards?

    The Patriots’ Ball

    A preliminary example of what not to wish for our country on its semiquincentennial

    One of the consequences of the American crisis has been a country-wide obsession with the definition of America, as if there will ever be only one. Political philosophy is now a national sport. The madness of our political circumstances has returned us to the inflammatory realm of first principles. This is not an unsalutary development in a polity that bases its governments on the opinions of its citizens, and therefore may be undone from within by bad thinking. Yet still we bless the founders who concluded that the establishment of a republic upon good thinking — upon good thinking in the mass! — was a splendid idea. Is there a more idealistic notion? It breaks new ground in reckless idealism. Or are we fools to commit our fate to the thoughtfulness of millions of people? The founders lived in the age of media innocence, of course, when facts and ideas were communicated by simpler instruments whose corrosive impact upon what they were communicating was not yet an insuperable obstacle to meaningful social discussion. The distortions that we confront make the distortions that they confronted look like typos. In our present-day wrestling with the American definition, it is a life’s work just to clear the field of the rubbish. 

    Opinions have become our opioids, our cheapest indulgences. The spread of the conspiratorial mentality is only the most extreme instance of our mental looseness, in which plausibility no longer has to answer to reality. No philosophical principle, no matter how foundational it once was, can any longer be taken for granted — which is a formula for a terrible confusion, but also a consequence of the glibness that liberals themselves visited upon our national liberalism. (In our social and political arrangements, and in our founding charters, we are a liberal country, and we have only ourselves to blame if we are surprised to discover that it includes also illiberal tendencies.) Anyway, principles must regularly be revisited if they are not to become high-minded alibis. What do we stand for? How do we stand for it? The freedom to be wrong is one of our glories, but the freedom to be stupid, well, there is nothing particularly glorious about that. Whereas all the holders of opinions are equal, all their opinions are not. They all await critical evaluation and none are exempt from the ordeal. Yet we are now marking 250 years of national contentiousness and our long patrimony of democratic experience appears to have made us no better at the art of reflective and respectful contention. There are pages and pages of Mencken that seem abundantly vindicated by what presently passes for democratic deliberation. We are still democratic amateurs.

    The best one can do in such a degraded democratic environment, if one is a writer, is to remain fiendishly wakeful, to give up some sleep, and to challenge nonsense, especially pernicious nonsense, with the speed of a first responder. The new technology is certainly conducive to such an alacrity of response, except that it is itself a stain upon the reputation of alacrity: its speed can thwart a genuine debate as efficiently as it can launch one. Its avowals may be indelible but they are not lasting. A first response cannot be a last response, if your objective is to persuade and then to rebuild, to move beyond destruction to construction, and the second and third and fourth and fifth responses, the programs of restoration and reconstruction, will have to be more patient, more steadfast, more discursive. Firefighters, bless them, are experts only on emergencies, and we aspire to lives, and to a social order, that do not consist only, or chiefly, in emergencies. Have you noticed that all news is now breaking news, and that all events have been promoted to the status of emergencies? 

    Intellectuals are also first responders, and they can begin their contribution to the recovery of our equilibrium by pleading that not all the ideas with which one disagrees are emergencies. Absolute truth and foul treason are not the only paths before us. Hysteria validates nothing and denotes only a razing of reason, which is anyway a sinister instrument of the elite. A fanatic is a person who is completely certain of himself because he is completely uncertain of himself. Our politics has been crippled by the prestige of fanaticism, by the desperation of Americans who cannot quite escape the ugly rumor that they are worthless. Why do so many Americans think so little of themselves? A man who denies his own worth, and the rational capabilities of his own mind, cannot aim high. And composure must be counted among the democratic virtues, because panic is inconsistent with wise self-determination.

    Yet sometimes one is rightly ruffled and calm really is out of the question. Sometimes one comes upon a traduction of an idea or a tradition that one deeply cherishes — not that umbrage is ever a proof of truth or falsehood — and one feels a bit firefighter-like oneself, and down the pole you go in order to prevent a sinister notion from proliferating. There we were not too long ago, for instance, the tillerman-intellectuals, calmly reading Notes on the State of Virginia upstairs at the firehouse, when the alarm sounded. An influential writer had proposed that the United States is, and should be, a Christian country! We are ready. The meaning of American is under attack. We suit up and slide down and hit the siren.

    Here is what the chatty and phony reasonableness of Ross Douthat loosed upon the land on the day in question, in the New York Times, on the subject, urgent for him, of “whether what you might call a Christian center can be restored in American life.” By “center,” he explains, “I mean a set of religious beliefs and institutions that are embraced and respected in the broad middle of the country, cultivate a widely shared interpretation of the American story and operate effectively at the elite level, informing political conduct and intellectual arguments even among nonbelievers. “Broad middle,” “widely shared”: it sounds so affable, so anodyne. But what if that lovely place includes people who are not Christians? The expectation seems to be that they should accept direction from a creed in which they do not believe, from a “faith tradition” that is not their own. And the tenderness of Douthat’s remark about “nonbelievers” disguises his assumption that no moral principles of any significance are to be found in the godless traditions — that only God, whose political role in history has generally been to divide people, can bring us together and make us good. 

    Douthat cites with enormous enthusiasm this perfervid passage by a professor of political theory at Georgetown University, writing in a journal that “aims at equipping evangelical Christians to confidently and forthrightly defend Scriptural truths and natural law in the face of widespread cultural capitulation”: 

    America is the New Israel, the city on the hill, the light to enlighten the nations, a battleground on which Satan and his legion tirelessly seek to undermine the promise of God’s New Israel. Did not King’s speech on the steps of Lincoln’s temple in 1963 call on America to live up to that promise? … Errancy and return: This is the New Israel’s perennially erratic path through providential history. America is not Aristotle’s polis, nor is it the faint glimmer of Plato’s iridescent city set up in the heavens. America is the 40-year wandering of Exodus, searching for the American dreamland of milk and honey (Exodus 33:3). Is not the frontier — from its “westward” iteration in the 19th century to Musk’s expansive vision for Mars in the 21st century — an American recapitulation of Exodus for the New World, and for other worlds, without end?

    As an Israelite I must say that this “Hebraic Christianity” is very flattering, even if it is more Christian poaching. I must also suggest to the professor and his journo acolyte that they have another look at the Biblical account of the ancient wanderings in the sands. For a start, the journey was directly supervised by God and led by a prophet who saw God face to face, whatever that means. Not so America! America in 2026 would be a terrible responsibility for God to bear, and I discern no evidence of divine afflatus in our squalid politics. We will never enjoy the certainties that the Israelites in the desert enjoyed. And see what those certainties accomplished! The Israelites were a whining materialistic lot with a slave mentality who were spoiled by miracles; their faith could not withstand the forty-day absence of their leader and they expressed their relationship to God mainly by clamoring and complaining. They represent the antithesis of a proper model for a redemptive politics, except that they were redeemed — but not by their own merit: what saved them was God’s own plan and the merit of their forefathers, and owing to their incapacity for freedom, the exodus notwithstanding, only their children were granted the privilege of entering the promised land. I would not dismiss the Aristotelian polis quite so peremptorily. It must feel wonderful to find Moses in Musk, in the way that hallucinations feel wonderful. 

    “All these generalizations are sweeping and poetic and of course highly debatable,” Douthat genially continues, “but let me do the pundit’s job and repurpose them into a simpler typology.” The typology is three-fold. First, “to really lead and shape America, a religious tradition would need to be, first, worldly in the sense of relating in a serious way to a complex cultural and political and intellectual landscape where many people do not share its beliefs.” Check, though the claim that America must be led and shaped by a religious tradition remains to be proven. (As for the worldliness of American Christianity in our age, the less said the better.) Second, “it would need to be American in the sense of believing in a national mission and sacred destiny.” But is the American narrative any less moving and any less inspiring when it is read secularly? Indeed, the opposite is more likely the case. If God is guiding you through the dark and unknown frontier, you will be less afraid but also less courageous. Lewis and Clark were not led by a pillar of fire. Third, “it would need to be Christian in the sense of believing in God and Jesus Christ and not just some kind of secularized ‘arc of history’ version of the Christian narrative — a version that gives way, under duress, to nihilism and despair.” Excuse me, but how dare you?

    I am an American and I do not believe in Jesus Christ. I have extremely thoughtful reasons. Also I have a profound and gorgeous prior tradition that has a strong claim on my allegiance. I am prepared to make sacrifices for America, and for my Christian friends, but not for Jesus Christ. My right to deny the alleged divinity of your savior is precisely your right to deny the alleged chosenness of my people. Truth to tell, I have some trouble with that legend myself, though irony requires me to note that your belief in the superiority of your religion, so that it deserves to be nothing less than the public philosophy of our entire country, is not completely dissimilar from my religion’s sense of its specialness, though we have the decency to apply the bewildering conceit only to ourselves. 

    There is a missionary quality to Douthat’s case for the moral and cultural supremacy of Christianity in America, a kind of soft conversionism — I say soft, because in the place of forced baptism and the other old cruelties, to which he most certainly does not aspire, there is the old weather of exclusiveness and exclusion, a promise of alienation and marginalization for Americans who are not Christians and Americans who are not theists, who will feel alien in a country that is supposed to have made this variety of alienness magnificently obsolete. It was my impression that Christianity teaches us to welcome strangers, not to create them. I certainly do not intend to be “tolerated” in my own country. Douthat does not require me to be Christian, to be sure; only my society and maybe my government.

    Douthat is selling snake oil also to his fellow Christians. How can anybody who has read in Christian literature, from Jesus at Golgotha to Hebrews 6:4 to the medieval mystics to Kierkegaard and the dark Christian moderns, the extensive canon of Christian abjection, contend that Christianity is a cure for despair? The fact that the story usually ends well — in what Douthat slickly calls “resurrection scenarios” — does not in any way vitiate the sting of the despairing believer’s torments. Devoutness brings more than good cheer. The experience of the hiddenness of God is common to all the theisms, and the spiritual and intellectual respectability of all our traditions depends in part on acknowledging the difficulties that they present. There are no humans who are perfectly armed against despair, the gospel of jolliness notwithstanding. 

    Douthat’s proposal, his birthday wish for our confused and iniquitous country, is not quite the establishment of a state religion — the First Amendment seems safe from his laptop, though its safety may not long be guaranteed in the Christianizing nation of which he dreams. What he does not grasp is that the introduction of a particular religion into culture as its controlling philosophical framework strikes far deeper than its introduction into politics, which would be damaging enough. (And damaging to the impertinent religion as well.) Or perhaps Douthat grasps precisely this, because he seeks an America that is Christian all the way to the ground. There is of course an aspect of his proposal that he omits to mention, which is that it is a program for a rank majoritarianism, as if the power of principles is owed not to ideas but to numbers. On the numbers, certainly, my kind loses and his kind wins. (Please note the intrinsic divisiveness of quantitative considerations in a democracy.) The tyranny of the majority is what Tocqueville and Mill accurately called this threat. 

    Does Douthat really have so much confidence in American Christianity’s interest in social peace? As he runs through the qualifications of various Christian denominations for philosophical precedence — evangelicalism, Catholicism, old-line Protestantism, woke post-Protestantism — his exercise begins to look sectarian and small. Why is he holding the definition of our country hostage to his shul politics? The burning issue before us on this anniversary is really not which Christian sect should be selected to constitute the national teaching. (Nor is it this: “Note that I am setting aside a scenario where a truly post-Christian religious consensus takes shape; that would require a re-founding or perhaps the Singularity.” By all means, set it aside.) 

    Who needs a Christian America? Only Christians whose faith needs help, and requires to be fortified by numbers and by power. (Social power can be even more total, which is to say, oppressive, than political power.) It has always been my understanding that the American revolution in these matters was that finally a country comprised mainly of Christians elected not to call itself a Christian country. Such a contraction had been unimaginable. (There was no Enlightenment program of toleration that did not exclude somebody from the end of exclusion.) The world has seen many Christian countries, with mixed moral results, but it has not seen many democratic countries, and it was the historical role of the American founders to insist upon a shift from the one order to the other, and in a particular arrangement of liberty that would not inhibit or prohibit any practice or profession of religion. Was that not miraculous enough?

    The self-satisfaction of some of our Christian pundits knows no bounds. Here is another example by another patriotic Christian American. Explaining the spiritual advantage of his own faith, David French, another God-fearing graphomaniac at the Times, recently declared: “Christians aren’t the only people who believe that man has a soul, that this life is not the sum total of our existence. We do, however, make a startling assertion, that God himself defeated death — that he entered into history, lived on this earth, was crucified and then returned to life.” Brother, this is uninformed and unintelligent. There was never any need for God to defeat death because no intellectually acceptable concept of God ever expected God to die. When you promote a man into God it may indeed seem astounding that this God and this man do not die; but who could ever call an evanescent being God, or worship what passes? Eternity has been an inalienable feature of any sophisticated understanding of God at least since the burning bush. And the notion that it was Christianity that introduced God into history is pure chutzpah. It is plainly belied by the entirety of the Hebrew Bible, in which God’s involvement in human life — not only melodramatically at the Red Sea but also in its most mundane activities (Psalm 127:1, for example) — is ubiquitous. If Christianity introduced God into history, then who was Abraham arguing with and who was Job’s interlocutor? This is all just newspaper theology. 

    These Christian friends who want the best for us think that they are what we should be. I am reminded of a delightful story. When Lionel Trilling’s son was born, he insisted to the doctor at the hospital that he wanted the baby to be circumcised. The doctor was shocked. Professor Trilling, the great Freudian, the avatar of the Enlightenment on Morningside Heights, the rational explorer of unreason, wanted the primitive ritual, the barbaric cut, performed on his own son. They argued the point until Trilling, in exasperation, ended the conversation: “Doctor, I want my son to be circumcised because I want him to look exactly like me!” I imagine him chuckling wickedly. The best prescription for an ideal of citizenship is surely not to generalize solipsistically from oneself. In a multiethnic society — is there any other kind? — one’s first obligation in the endeavor to find a moral and practicable criterion for membership is to look beyond oneself, so that premises may be devised that can be shared across differences. The sharing is everything. 

    Why a Christian center? Why not a center that we will each join for our own reasons? You bring the later testament and I will bring the earlier one (or none at all) and together we will defend voting rights. After all, the ethical and social values in our respective traditions are not so different, and they are derived from kindred metaphysics, if indeed they require any metaphysical basis at all. I count secularism as one of our traditions, incidentally. It is emphatically not spiritually worthless, as our churched pundits keep saying it is. It is incontrovertible that many souls are seeking and finding deep interior satisfactions in non-religious meanings and experiences, just as it is incontrovertible that many souls leave their houses of worship bored and hungry for lunch. Anyway, sin is hardly synonymous with the secular.

    It is discouraging that there is still an occasion to make these points a full two and a half centuries after the Declaration of Independence, “endowed by their Creator” notwithstanding. (The Enlightenment Christian who composed that document — the same one who cut and pasted his own version of the Gospel — did not have a Christian country in mind.) The belief that one is in possession of an exclusive truth makes a person restless, I suppose. Revelation eventually seeks dominion, benign or otherwise; it is hard for its bearers to see why they should confine their news to themselves. They must be reminded of the democratic reasons that make it imperative that they remain, in this matter, somewhat thwarted. The greatest of those reminders is called liberalism. Christian liberalism represents a misapprehension, whereas the liberalism of Christians is, well, a godsend. The American compact’s simultaneous hospitality to religious life and distrust of religious politics has always been one of the pillars of my own patriotism. 

     

    I love the country but I can’t stand the scene.

                                                        Leonard Cohen

    Many millions of Americans will mark this anniversary with a mixture of gratitude and melancholy, of ardor and distress. As for the millions of Americans who will celebrate it in a state of unalloyed happiness, I can only remind you that all of us love this country that you are ruining. I understand that for a long time you have held the view that it was I, and those of my persuasion, who were ruining it; but still I would have you assent that the liberal dream of America, the one that prefers opportunity to authenticity, equality to hierarchy, decency to rapacity, governance to revolution, fairness to privilege, reflection to paroxysm, work to grandiosity — that this dream, too, is a patriotic dream. Of course I will not sit by the phone for you to call with such reassuring acknowledgment of any larger commonalities between us. We are patriots at war with each other, not for the first time and not for the last. The least that we should be able to agree on is that this epic battle between our visions should be conducted according to Mr. Madison’s rules of engagement, but at this writing even that seems too much to ask.

    For this national anniversary, which at this low and debilitated moment in our history ought to refresh everybody’s sense of America’s reason for being, I offer a small and incomplete typology of patriotisms.

    The patriotism of justice

    There is no such patriotism, because there is no just society. There is not and there has never been a just society; history provides not a single example. Anyone who prides himself on the moral perfection of his society is a fool or on the payroll. All the countries that have ever commanded the allegiance of their citizens have been unjust polities. 

    Patriotism, therefore, is, to borrow a phrase, the last refuge of relativists. It takes place in the realm of “better than” and “worse than;” the celebration is always comparative. And it should be uncontroversial to say that some countries have more to be proud of than others. Forgive me for getting into the unholy business of distinctions, but some societies are more just than others. (Not all distinctions are invidious.) I am relieved to owe my devotion to my country in part due to its democratic character, though I do not claim that its democracy is remotely perfect; and I make the argument in good faith, having done my best — honestly, my best — to police within myself the intellectual corruption known as ethnocentrism. Democratic societies, even with the anti-democratic tendencies that they always contain, really are better than undemocratic societies. 

    “Better” is of course a triggering word, but I mean it to refer to universal and rationally examined criteria for moral conduct, though “universal” and “rational” are also triggering words. For some poor souls there is no way out of this semantic prison — so kick back with a kombucha and get triggered! — but those of us who still believe in the possibility of increasingly objective thought must insist that such judgments are not a power-seeking exercise in “standpoint epistemology,” at least if they disclose and examine their assumptions. 

    The problem with “civilizational” discourse is that it is too often animated by disrespect for one of the civilizations under discussion; and speaking for myself, and with a vivid awareness of how my own people have fared over the centuries in debates about the alleged superiority of cultures and religions, I feel no burning wish to crown my own. I detest the exercise. There is something pitiable about needing to be Number 1. There are great civilizations that are not my own; and the world-historical contributions of the West, whose tradition I am honored to serve, include not only liberal and democratic politics but also Nazi and Communist totalitarianism, which together slaughtered more people than any other causes in history. And yet, if it is the increasing welfare of more and more people all over the world that is our goal, it is still right, and unironically right, to prefer more just places to less just places, whatever the national and regional inflections of the language of justice. In a world without perfection we can do no more than select intelligently between imperfections, and unecstatically affirm flawed but fairer patrimonies and places. The question is how to make the selection among the imperfections, by what standards, and how to prevent the celebration of the less imperfect, the Fourth of July, from excluding shame and humility.

    The patriotism of reason and unreason

    The premise of such a way of thinking about patriotism is that national pride should have a basis in national reality — that it must to some extent be objectively justified. “To make us love our country,” Edmund Burke observed, “our country ought to be lovely.” Which is to say, patriotism should possess some degree of rationality. But sometimes no basis at all is found for the national vanity, and sometimes one discovers that one is a member of an evil society. (Which is not the same thing as a society all of whose members are evil: such a society has also never existed.) The disillusioned and disgusted citizen has a choice: he can secede, spiritually or physically, and find a new country that is worthy of his admiration, or he can revert to a type of patriotism that has nothing at all to do with reason and reality — a well-documented type. I have known extraordinary examples of the former, exiles and emigres from tyrannical states who bravely came to these shores and to their dying day despised their country of birth and stridently called themselves, in their almost hilariously heavy accents, Americans. (Joseph Brodsky’s notion of rhyming in English nicely illustrated the charms of an adopted patriotism.) A dissident is a patriot in grave crisis. My friends chose not only defection but also conversion. They demanded a life of justified loyalty. It was a matter not of politics but of integrity.

    But I had other friends from totalitarian societies who now and then could be heard to speak tenderly about their old countries. I do not mean to be harsh about them. Nostalgia is unavoidable, and comforting, in exile: I was raised in a long tradition of nostalgia in exile. And yet what I heard sometimes sounded like something more — a vestigial patriotism, a warm remnant of a still living loyalty. The conclusion was obvious: the veneration of the imperfect implies that in the absence of complete justification the boast about belonging must base itself outside the realm of reason. It is anyway a stretch to think that patriotism, even in the finest of moral circumstances, can be entirely, or even mainly, rational. It is, for a start, an emotion, and what do emotions have to do with reasoning? (Tell me, somebody!) If patriotism were rational, chauvinism and jingoism and ethnonationalism might not have scorched as much of the earth as they have.

    Patriotism, in other words, is love in the domain of history. If you have ever been brought to tears by a national catastrophe or a national epiphany, or just by the sight of the flag or the sound of Martin Luther King, Jr’s voice, then you know that patriotism is a form of love, with all its joy and gratitude and intensity and volatility — and blindness. Love is often the enemy of clarity, it is a glittering exemption from reason, a mental holiday, which accounts in large part for the pleasures of its swoon; there are no poems about falling in and out of objectivity. I confess that even a Sousa march can choke me up — this country saved my parents’ lives; and who is not a sobbing French patriot when they sing the Marseillaise in Rick’s Café Americain? When the cynical Yvonne, played by the refugee Madeleine Lebeau, re-discovers her patrie and sings its anthem like no song has ever been sung, our American hearts are hers, owing not to their fickleness but to their range. Only the wrong sort of patriot is moved only by his own country. 

    Stephen Decatur, Pablo Neruda: in 1816 Decatur famously uttered the words “our country, right or wrong” in a toast, and Neruda once declared that his love for his beloved was so great that he no longer cared what she was like. I used to admire the radicalism of such a passion; it promised a reprieve from the tasks and the duties — from the prose that follows the poetry — of love, a free and pure unaccountability. Is there anything more intoxicating than a respite from the constant scrutiny of one’s sense of reality? But a nation cannot afford such a respite. (We are wrestling with one now.) About half a century later, therefore, Senator Carl Schurz of Missouri sought to introduce a more sober spirit into American patriotism and added a stringency to Decatur’s exonerating license: “Our country, right or wrong; when right, to be kept right; when wrong, to be put right.” A critical patriotism, in sum, a patriotism with open eyes, a patriotism that drinks without drunkenness — which asks a lot of the love of country and has never made the life of any politician any easier. The blindness of love is not its glory but its undoing. No lover should be afraid to look or to see. The art of swooning lucidly must be developed in the individual and in the collective. A commitment that does not examine itself cannot be trusted, not in the bedroom and not in the halls of power.

    The patriotism of provenance

    Do accidents have moral meaning? As Ludwig Boerne, an affecting and caustic Jewish writer in nineteenth-century Germany, once remarked about the assimilationist anguish of his time: “You can change your religion but not your grandfather.” (This Jewish grandson converted to Lutheranism, which was his way of asserting that inherited conditions can be bested. In the end, in this instance, they were not.) Patriotism is most commonly determined by accidents of birth — indeed, patriotism is a method for making the arbitrary into the necessary and randomness into luck. The most tragic feature of human existence must be the extent to which lives are determined by locations, and life prospects by life givens, and this, I suppose, is one reason why disadvantaged people can be ardently patriotic. The nation — the combined social whole, its solidarity, its dignity-conferring symbols and practices, its sense of agency — is nothing less than a retort to fate, an empowering and ennobling way of playing a bad hand. For this reason, the poverty of poor people is often not the most salient aspect of their existences to themselves: they prefer to define themselves in other terms, by their religion, their culture, their customs, their music, their food, their parents and their children, by anything but money. Economic inequality, especially over generations, is not a purely economic problem, and proposals for mitigating it must be accompanied by more than a merely economic understanding. (For over a century, here and in Europe, liberals and social democrats have been regularly astonished by the frequency with which poor people vote for right-wing parties. They cannot imagine that poor people would vote on any grounds but economic ones, while it is screamingly plain that they do. Trump was elected twice by people down on their luck for whom he offered nothing but coal. But he ratified them even as he duped them; he had the con man’s practiced intuition of a mark.) 

    “I love my country because it is mine.” I have uttered the words myself. There is no disgrace in them, only an absence of reflection. An attachment to origins is natural, even if it begs the question of the extent to which origins should have the last word. Often a natural state of affairs must be rectified or rejected, but not always. We are not plants but we have roots, and the affections and dispositions that they inspire can be significant for the formation of character. Our racination can also be a source of wrenching sweetness. And so, like belonging, alienation too must be justified. Yet scrupulousness in this matter requires that we not exaggerate the allure of our own sway, our possession and sovereignty. The first person, singular and plural, hallows very little. Nothing is better or higher or deeper merely because it is mine. The admirable qualities of an object or a worldview are not owed to its circumstances. When a beautiful painting hangs on my wall, I am the fortunate one, not the painting. Even though I own it, I do not own it. Beauty and the other attainments of the spirit can never become property. The Torah was not lucky, the Jews were lucky. 

    The literature on patriotism is a long debate on the moral worth of the local. It was Orwell who most notably defended the local as the proper grounds of patriotism. In his view patriotism is not primarily a political emotion and it threatens nobody. “By ‘patriotism,’” he wrote in 1945, “I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force upon other people.” He contrasted patriotism with nationalism, which he despised because it is “inseparable from the desire for power.” Nationalism flourishes in enmity, he says, but not patriotism. It is a somewhat baffling distinction, since patriotic feeling has certainly been as responsible for cruelty and aggression as nationalist feeling, and the patriot may be guilty of the same trespasses as the nationalist. Orwell’s little lexical game is owed, I suspect, to his infatuation with Englishness. There is a touching passage in Down and Out in Paris and London when he is returning to London from his years of hardship in Paris: 

    I was so pleased to be getting home, after being holed up for months in a foreign city, that England seemed to me a sort of Paradise. There are indeed many things in England that make you glad to get home: bathrooms, armchairs, mint sauce, new potatoes properly cooked, brown bread, marmalade, beer made with veritable hops — they are splendid, if you can pay for them.

    Are these things trivial? Not if they are your customs, and everybody has their customs. Are they narrow? Of course they are. (“A foreign city,” as if that is all you need to know about Paris.) Yet I would think twice before condemning the local as simply provincial. In the struggle for human meaning there are no privileged locations — no centers and no peripheries. The human epic is global; that is, the local is global. We love on a planet’s worth of localities, which is why we can have foreign teachers. There is no greater refutation of ethnonationalism than a foreign film — not because it depicts a universe utterly unlike ours but because we recognize ourselves in its depictions. There are people in Kazakhstan with greater wisdom than people on Park Avenue. 

    Yet Orwell’s patriotism of home, his early notion of heimat and habitus, is sorely lacking as an account of human allegiance. I do not refer only to his failure to consider that in his beloved England bread was baked in many colors. There is also the problem that he saddles the sentimentalist with the knotty question of national characteristics, those gross generalizations that are impossible to establish with any rigor and are as useful to hating as they are to loving. Orwell’s own patriotism battened on stereotypes: “the English are not intellectual,” they “have a certain power of acting without taking thought,” they have “a love of flowers.” (There are antisemitic stereotypes in Down and Out in Paris and London.) Yet the principal difficulty about Orwell’s reverence for the local is that it distorts the relationship between the particular and the universal. It leaves the universal out. I imagine that he acquired his aversion to universalism from his horror of communism, but it nonetheless excises half the story. There is no particular that does not reflect a universal and no universal that does not imbue a particular. They are everywhere together; twins, not binaries; and one of the most typical and most injurious mistakes of our age is that we call them binaries. The moral hazard of local patriotism is that it will ease the patriot’s conscience by endorsing the contradiction between the particular and the universal, and by denying the relevance of abstract principles, global principles, human principles, to which we all must answer even as in our own way we cook our own potatoes. Orwell himself acknowledged the practical effect of this moral trap: “There is almost no kind of outrage — torture, the use of hostages, forced labor, mass deportations, imprisonment without trial, forgery, assassination, the bombing of civilians — which does not change its moral character when it is committed by ‘our’ side.”

    This anxiety about the foul potentialities of particularism is what inspired, in the ancient world and in our own, the all-encompassing patriotism, the citizenship of the world, known as cosmopolitanism. It is a patriotic feeling about the entirety of our species; or, if you wish to speak more strictly, it is the end of patriotism. I know of no cosmopolitans (except Diogenes of Sinope, who lived in a barrel and was the first to call himself a citizen of the world) who do not somewhere include a codicil about our obligations to the family and the community with whom we live — cosmopolitans, too, lead specific lives — but their bonds with their own do not seem to affect their altruistic priorities, the sequencing of their causes and their acts of kindness, as if the humanity of someone close to you is somehow diminished by their proximity and their intimacy. Camus’ vexation about the moral status of his mother during the Algerian crisis expressed a more intact conscience than the ethical preciousness of those who believe that the most rigorous test of your conscience is its ability to transcend your heart. There are situations, of course, in which the conscience and the heart conflict, but sometimes there is no conflict at all, and the highest ethical behavior may be demonstrated in your own kitchen. Surely it should not be held against someone in trouble that you happen to love them. Humanitarianism should begin at home but it should not end there. If it ends there, it has been stunted by lesser animal or tribal considerations. But there must be a universal dimension even to filial devotion, even to the case of maman; to be a good son is to be a good man.

    “What is patriotism?” asked a political philosopher named George Kateb in a famous and virulent essay. “It is a readiness to die and to kill for an abstraction: nothing you can see all of, or feel as you feel the presence of another person, or comprehend.” This is backwards, and not only in its absurd identification of patriotism with bloodlust. It is the cosmopolitan, not the patriot, who is promoting an abstraction, not that there is any dishonor in it. The more local is your allegiance, by contrast, the more concrete is its beneficiary. I imagine that it was precisely this sense of the nation, of his own nation, as too impersonal an entity, as an emotionally unsatisfying abstraction, that provoked Forster’s renowned observation in 1939 — not the best year for broaching the moral preferability of treason — that “if I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country.” He awarded his loyalty to something he could indeed see all of. But what doctrine of belonging can be derived from such an almost infantile immediacy? Do we derive our convictions from our senses? Are we not to exist within larger wholes unless they can be taken in easily and entirely, and who ever took in the entirety of a country or a culture? Ethically speaking, the great writer was incomplete, a purely local hero, and somebody had better remember to fetch him if war breaks out. (And his friend, too.) This is the sort of exquisiteness that relies on the services of the less exquisite.

    The scholarly and activist project that in recent decades has come to be called “global justice” is a tribute to the extraordinarily wide reach of our ethical concern, to the growing expanse of human suffering that we now include in the purview of our duties and our policies. Global emergencies, such as the spoliation of the environment or genocide in a distant land, demand a measure of cosmopolitanism from every village idiot. And so I was ashamed, as an American, when Trump and Rubio unconscionably terminated USAID and similar programs of assistance far away from home. We made the deaths of vast numbers of Africans inevitable — more simply, we killed them; and this heartlessness does not comport well with my construction of American amour-propre, of American patriotism. Isolationism is, among other things, the belief that non-American lives are worth less than American lives, and that indifference beyond our borders is a sign of our moral health as a nation. Alas, I do not yet see what it will take to persuade my fellow citizens, in both political parties, that we always carry, as a result of our powers and our principles, two sets of obligations: the obligation to the near and the obligation to the far. In space and in time, the near and the far; over here and over there, for now and for later. Otherwise we will slowly, or not so slowly, become Little America, a giant who is a dwarf, a self-defeating self-enclosure, and American patriotism will become a puny calling.

    The patriotism of mixture

    This patriotism does not yet exist, at least in large numbers. This is because mixture has not yet been widely accepted as a social ideal and a social reality. Too many citizens of heterogeneous societies entertain fantasies of homogeneity. How many catastrophes of sameness, from legal discrimination to physical destruction, must we witness until we realize that otherness is precisely what may save us from ourselves? The fervor for likeness leads only to illusion, anger, and grief. Too many Americans inhabit the America in their mind rather than the America outside their front door. They regard multiplicity, and any version of America with the infamous prefix “multi,” as the problem, when it is the solution. If we were all alike we would respect nothing.

    There are many reasons for this bias. One of them is the simplification of focus known as identity, which pays lip service to pluralism but is in fact just a pageant of monisms. I once wrote a denunciation of identity that included a snarky comment about the perfectly commonplace proposition that A = A. In logic, yes; but in human existence? Never. (Liberalism begins with A = B.) “Identity” is a confusion between self-reliance and self-sufficiency. It holds that any dependence outside your own group, any significant influence from a tradition not your own, is a sign of weakness, and so it preaches a protective psychological and cultural isolationism. (In this isolationism we must even take care that others not be influenced by us, which is known as “appropriation.”) The real infirmity, however, lies in the unspoken suspicion that one’s own tradition will not withstand an exposure to other traditions — that it can flourish only in the absence of alternatives. For this monopolistic temperament, as for its counterpart in the marketplace, competition means nothing but danger. A retreat into the desert is obviously impractical. And so buffers are built and walls are erected and conformities are enacted. Never mind that somehow the water always gets under the door.

    One of the ironies of this subject is that the people who most loudly proclaim difference, the “multis,” are the ones who are most wary of mixture. But where can difference flourish except in a mixed society? Or more precisely, in a mixed society that is free. Since we are compound and multivarious beings, the deliberation about sameness and difference must always begin with this question: with respect to what? The same or different, with respect to what? Patriotism in our mixed society is an answer to that question: the same with respect to America. We are alike in that we are all Americans. We have many attributes, and many commonalities, and our country is one of them; and when together we call ourselves Americans, we do not annul our other attributes, or renounce our individual interpretations of Americanism. To borrow the trenchant twelfth-century words of Maimonides, “our natural diversity will be hidden through the multiple points of conventional accord.” As with all our characteristics, we emphasize or consecrate them on certain occasions. Every day is not the Fourth of July. But on the Fourth of July, we express, or we ponder, the love of country — even, or especially, the love of a country in free fall. In 2026 anxiety becomes an American patriot. We may each have our own reasons for patriotism, and we do not all share an identical image of our country’s past — you bring Frederick Douglass and I’ll bring — actually I’ll bring Frederick Douglass too — and that fellow in the red baseball cap, the one with the beat-up copy of Patrick Deneen, he should join us on the Mall too, because we stand under one canopy and inhabit a single over-arching category. 

    But what about that Howard Zinn book in that New Yorker tote bag over there? Never mind. It’s Independence Day! Tomorrow is another day. Patriotism is a social truce, a hopeful simulation of the unity that we lack, a wager on the sympathy and the benevolence that remain after our quarrels; and a diversified patriotism is patriotism of the highest kind. 

    The patriotism of sorrow

    There are times when the truest expression of patriotism is sorrow. After all, we mourn only for what we love. Ubi lacrimae ibi patria. Sometimes infidelity is made most clearly manifest in the absence of grief.

    I do not grasp Americans who shed no tears for America and Israelis who shed no tears for Israel. Shame on the dry eyes! They, the dry eyes, are emblems of complacency or delusion or prejudice. Historians will explain how the countries took their sickening turns and surrendered so many of the stirring values upon which they were established, but we cannot postpone the attempt to comprehend why so many of their citizens are satisfied with the new national courses. I have heard no adequate defense of all the violence that has been committed, all the unending and unreluctant brutality. 

    Some of the finest patriotic compositions in history have been lamentations. I dare say that there is no language in which they have not appeared. Who will write our own? We do our political work in sackcloth. We wear black to the ballot box. At the patriots’ ball this year let us not omit the heartbreak waltz, if we can bear it. Strike up the band.

    Climate Change and the Primacy of Politics

    I.

    Wind turbines do not “cause cancer.” Offshore wind farms are not “driving whales loco.” And wind power is not “the most expensive form of energy,” no matter what the president of the United States says. It’s one of the cheapest.

    Donald Trump tells lots of dopey lies about wind. “If you have a windmill anywhere near your house, congratulations, it just went down seventy-five percent in value.” No, studies have found virtually no impact on home prices. “The whole thing is a con job. Germany tried it, it didn’t work.” No, wind is Germany’s largest source of electricity. “You won’t find any wind farms in China.” No, China has more wind farms than the rest of the world combined. “You want to see a bird graveyard? Go under a windmill. You’ll see more than you’ve ever seen in your life.” No, wind turbines cause 0.01 percent of bird deaths, orders of magnitude fewer than cats, cars, or windows. ”The turbines start to rust and rot in eight years.” No, they don’t. They just don’t.

    It is true, as the president often points out, that wind farms do not generate power when the wind isn’t blowing. But electric utilities in Republican-controlled Texas, which is America’s top wind-producing state despite its oil-soaked politics, are aware of this meteorological complication, which is why the story that Trump loves to tell about a Texas woman on a windless night rings about as true as his carcinogenic turbines or loco whales: “She says to her husband, ‘Is the wind blowing? I’d love to watch a show tonight, darling, but the wind hasn’t blown for three days. Darling, please tell the wind to blow.’”

    It’s all bullshit, darling — but consequential bullshit, because the president of the United States has launched an all-out war on the wind industry. He has not only cut off federal subsidies, he has also weaponized the federal bureaucracy to block new turbines, from the Department of Transportation, which is reviewing their alleged risks to planes and railroads, to the Department of Health and Human Services, which has suggested they might emit electromagnetic death rays. The Departments of the Interior and Defense have even shut down work on offshore wind farms already under construction, concocting bogus national security justifications about how they might interfere with military radar or somehow facilitate underwater drone attacks.

    Much of the commentary about Trump’s anti-wind campaign has emphasized its hypocrisy. He claims to want Energy Dominance — he declared a national emergency because our energy supply is supposedly inadequate — but he is relentlessly throttling a fast-growing energy source that already provides ten percent of our electricity. He claims energy prices are too high, but he is regularly intervening in energy markets to prop up exorbitantly expensive coal plants while cracking down on affordable wind. He is using bird protection laws to harass wind developers while loosening those laws for oil and gas companies that kill far more birds. He is forcing lickspittle lackeys like Interior Secretary Doug Burgum — who was a wind supporter when he was governor of North Dakota! — to spew preposterous talking points about how wind doesn’t work. 

    Yes, it’s all hypocritical. But it’s also terrible. As naive as it sounds, presidents should not lie. Presidents should not flout laws and gouge consumers and pretend to care about birds and whales in order to cripple industries they hate. 

    What’s really terrible about Trump’s jihad is that wind power is clean power, while his beloved coal and gas plants emit greenhouse gases that trap heat in the atmosphere. He claims that climate change is a hoax, but that is rubbish, too. Climate change is real, it is here, it is man-made, and it really is a problem. There hasn’t been this much carbon in the atmosphere in three million years. The earth has not heated this quickly in 485 million years. Global warming is already contributing to vicious wildfires in California and even Siberia; freakish heat waves in Arizona and West Africa; unprecedented ice melts in Greenland and Antarctica; catastrophic floods in North Carolina and Pakistan; and biblical swarms of locusts in India and Kenya. The last ten years were the ten hottest years on record, and swarms of locusts are generally reliable indicators that things are not going so well.

    That said, some climate activists have an annoying habit of exaggerating how badly things are going. Global warming is making droughts and floods worse, but it is not making them happen. In fact, global warming does not always make everything worse; tropical hurricanes, for example, do not seem to be getting more frequent, defying a lot of shrill eco-catastrophism. Apocalyptic rhetoric about how it’s game over for the climate if we do not cut greenhouse emissions 43% by 2030 is not only annoying but wrong. There’s no such thing as game over for the climate. Carbon gradually accumulates in the atmosphere, so the earth gets a tiny bit warmer every time a fossil fuel is combusted or a forest is clear-cut. So it’s true that the more carbon we emit, the worse disasters such as Superstorm Sandy or the current mega-drought in the Horn of Africa will get, and that the earth will keep getting warmer until we somehow start removing more carbon from the sky than our cars and buildings and power plants and deforestation and wildfires are putting up there. But there is no inflection point where we all suddenly die or are all doomed. There is only better and worse.

    And some things are getting better. The costs of wind energy and especially solar energy — as well as batteries to store wind and solar electricity when it isn’t windy or sunny — have plummeted. A global clean-energy revolution is underway; ninety percent of new power plants are now zero-emissions. Less than two decades after the documentary Who Killed the Electric Car? bemoaned humanity’s unbreakable addiction to gasoline-fueled transportation, a quarter of new automotive sales are now all-electric. The UN’s consensus business-as-usual scientific forecast for warming in 2100 has improved from an unfathomably hideous five degrees Celsius to under three degrees — still awful, but not human-extinction awful. It would be nice if more environmentalists acknowledged that better is better than worse.

    Climate issues are more complicated than the nose-ringed Just Stop Oil pests who glue themselves to museums or the contemptuous Bluesky in-crowd that snarks about insufficiently radical Democrats would have you believe. The climate left is often clueless about politics, and sometimes also about climate; the knee-jerk naysayers who fight zero-emissions nuclear plants, solar panels in tortoise habitats, and the transmission lines necessary to distribute renewable power to metropolitan areas are not doing the environment any favors. I recently wrote a book about the food piece of the climate problem, and it’s appalling how many enviros are making it worse by pushing fake solutions like farm-grown biofuels and organic agriculture.

    Honestly, though, it feels nutty to nitpick activist excesses when Trump is gleefully and relentlessly trashing the climate. He is almost as hostile to solar as he is to wind, even though solar is as transformative a technology as artificial intelligence. “We will not approve wind or farmer destroying Solar,” he announced, in defiance of all kinds of laws, on Truth Social. “The days of stupidity are over in the USA!” (An epitaph if there ever was one, from the scientific savant who routinely hails the existence of winter weather as proof that global warming isn’t real.) Do we really need to harp on the left’s ill-conceived crusades against fracking, plastic straws, and chemical fertilizer when Trump and his thugs are proclaiming unlimited power to crush renewables, bragging about their “concierge, white-glove service” for fossil-fuel interests, and defending a foreign invasion with petro-imperialist rhetoric straight out of Just Stop Oil’s fever dreams? I think we do, if we are sincere about fixing the problem someday, but we also need to acknowledge that our harping will not help much right now.

    It is boring to point out that the orange man is bad on climate, but the orange man is very bad on climate. He is a deranged and tireless advocate for carbon pollution. He is surrendering the race to lead the energy economy of the future to China. And for climate obsessives like me, he is a frustrating distraction from more interesting debates that will help shape the future of our country and our species long after he is gone. I suspect that immigration obsessives, rule-of-law obsessives, and other wonks who cringe at the excesses of Trump’s “resistance” critics even though Trump is very bad on their issues can relate. We are in a politically and rhetorically tricky position.

    So let us stipulate his unmitigated climate badness, and try to think about how to make the best of this bad situation. What should those of us who prefer less badness focus on as Trump takes aim at our atmosphere? What should we freak out about and what should we roll our eyes about? And what is a realistic save-the-climate strategy for this screw-the-climate era?

    II.

    If Kamala Harris were president and the Democrats held Congress, we would be talking about very different climate questions. Would the efficiency benefits of carbon taxes on fossil fuels, red meat, and other high-emissions products justify their political cost? Should the generous subsidies for solar, wind, electric cars, and other climate-friendly technologies in the Democrats’ Inflation Reduction Act be expanded or merely extended? How much more should Washington increase its spending on energy and agriculture research? How can America, which is now responsible for twelve percent of global emissions, use its leadership to help the rest of the world rein in the other eighty-eight percent?

    Obviously those questions are currently irrelevant. Trump has gutted environmental regulation and enforcement, slashed research funding, yanked America out of the global climate community, and teamed up with the Republican Congress to roll back Biden’s green subsidies. You don’t have to be a conspiracy theorist to believe that he’s in cahoots with petro-dictators in Russia and the Middle East as well as the American petro-giants he has invited to Venezuela. You just have to read the news.

    The first relevant question to ask amid this tsunami of terribleness is whether all American climate progress is dead as long as the climate deniers control Washington. The answer is, not necessarily, or at least not entirely. 

    For example, even though most congressional Republicans are now hostile to wind and solar — and the others won’t buck Trump — there is bipartisan enthusiasm for geothermal projects that transform underground heat into clean round-the-clock energy. The same is increasingly true for nuclear power, which is also clean and continuous, albeit costly and hard to build; to their credit, most green groups and non-hippie Democrats now acknowledge its importance. And solar has gotten so cheap and awesome that Republican opposition can only slow its expansion; Democratic states and cities (foreshadowing alert) can help to accelerate its growth — as well as batteries, heat pumps, electric-vehicle chargers, and other green stuff — with supportive policies. This would also be a nice time for Democrats to stop flacking for corn ethanol and other biofuel boondoggles — climate disasters masquerading as climate solutions that enjoy bipartisan support only because Democrats keep pandering to farmers who will never vote for them.

    The most prominent debate with bipartisan potential, over “permit reform,” is trickier. These days, the main obstacle to clean energy development is no longer cost; it is the maze of legal and procedural roadblocks that give opponents enormous power to delay and block projects. Many environmentalists hate permit reform, because they like delaying and blocking permits, and a more streamlined process could accelerate fossil-energy projects as well as clean-energy projects. But since clean energy, as enviros often remind us, can usually outcompete dirty on a level playing field, the climate benefits of easing all energy permitting would far outweigh the costs. It is more important to help clean alternatives that can reduce demand for fossil fuels get even cheaper and more abundant than it is to try to stop American companies from supplying fossil fuels that consumers still demand. The Stone Age didn’t end because of restrictions on stone extraction, which is why after decades of no, smart environmentalists are learning to say yes. 

    Except that they really can’t say yes to reform right now, because Trump would make them look silly. As long as he can keep halting permitted clean-energy projects, permit reform would just be dirty-energy permit reform.

    So climate progress in the United States, while conceivable, will be a tough slog until the November midterms, when Democrats have a chance to break up the Republican monopoly on federal power. (More foreshadowing!) The immediate challenge is to distinguish catastrophes from annoyances, the truly destructive and irreversible badness from insignificant or temporary badness. It is also wise to focus on stoppable badness. Judges are already blocking Trump’s attacks on permitted wind farms. And why not force his team to spend time and energy defending the indefensible, like its refusal to enforce air or water pollution laws for the filthiest and creakiest coal plants? Even though there is really no way to force environment-haters to protect the environment, it’s a righteous and popular fight to pick. The same goes for resistance to Trump’s assaults on research and data collection. Nobody asked for that, and the politics of climate matters. (Last foreshadowing alert!)

    On the other hand, a lot of the news that triggers climate hawks is less important than it sounds. Climate progress can be measured simply — by how much and how quickly the world reduces emissions — so the various pledges and deadlines that get walked back and extended by nations and corporations don’t matter much. Actions and legislation are what affect emissions. Similarly, it’s fine to be angry that Trump pulled the United States out of a slew of global climate agreements, but we wouldn’t honor those agreements anyway while he’s president, and we can always rejoin once he’s gone. More troubling is the way Trump used the threat of tariffs and visa restrictions to bully the rest of the world into scrapping a deal to slash emissions from the shipping industry. Our mad king successfully exercised American power on behalf of global warming — and once the deal was scuttled, he enacted tariffs and visa restrictions anyway.

    The most contentious debate in climate circles — it is related to permit reform — is whether to focus on fighting drilling projects, pipelines, new terminals for exporting liquified natural gas, and other new fossil-fuel infrastructure in the United States, or whether activists should pivot to yes-environmentalism focused on promoting clean energy. 

    The correct answer is: Pivot! The way to phase out dirty is to make clean even more affordable and reliable. The way to do that is to build more wind and solar to achieve greater economies of scale, more battery storage to make wind and solar less intermittent, more transmission lines to deliver it to consumers, and more electric-vehicle chargers to combat the range anxiety that is slowing the transition away from gasoline. And the center-left writer Matthew Yglesias was right to argue not long ago in the New York Times that American fossil energy is usually cleaner than foreign fossil energy, even though the climate movement’s hall monitors absurdly denounced him as a denier. Energy markets are complex, and Yglesias arguably overstated the climate benefits of expanding American oil production, but restricting it wouldn’t help, either; other countries will supply the oil we consume until we don’t consume it anymore. And blocking all natural gas is definitely counterproductive, especially now that the rush to build AI-driven data centers is creating a rush to build new power plants to meet projected spikes in electricity demand; electrification is vital for decarbonization, and gas-fired electricity is much cleaner than coal, even if it isn’t clean as wind or solar.

    Yglesias also pointed out that the all-of-the-above approach to energy is more popular than all-out opposition to fossil fuels, especially in states such as Pennsylvania (which does a lot of fracking) and Michigan (which has a lot of conventional vehicle factories). Polls suggest that climate is an extremely low priority for most American voters, largely because they associate it with environmental sacrifices that create higher prices. That is no longer always true — coal is fading because it is no longer cheap — but sometimes it is true. Even if it were never true, there is a good reason that President Obama touted the all-of-the-above approach in swing states, and that center-left leaders in Mexico and Canada support their petroleum industries. Just Stop Oil is a terribly unpopular message.

    And politics, after all, is a popularity contest.

    III.

    Climate politics are inherently tough. How do you get voters to care about an invisible and mostly imperceptible enemy such as carbon dioxide? A few extra degrees of warmth by 2100 doesn’t sound so horrific, especially to people who will not be alive in 2100. Americans like sport-utility vehicles, cheeseburgers, air conditioning, plastic toys imported from Asia, moving sidewalks, and other planet-warming stuff. They are less fond of policies that force them to make sacrifices to reduce emissions without forcing other countries to make the same sacrifices.

    And yet America has enacted some climate-friendly policies. Obama’s stimulus in 2009 poured an astonishing $90 billion into clean energy, jump-starting solar, electric cars, and LED lighting. Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, the most ambitious climate law in world history, had over four times as much green spending. Blue states such as Colorado, Washington, and Minnesota have also passed massive climate initiatives, as have blue cities such as Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York.

    It turns out that there is one foolproof strategy to ensure better climate policies. This “one weird trick,” as the climate writer David Roberts calls it, does not involve throwing soup at famous paintings, or talking about the climate in ways that emphasize hope or fear or relatable storytelling, or talking about the climate at all. It is not about mobilizing climate voters, or building bridges to climate skeptics, or persuading ordinary Americans that climate change is already affecting their lives right now.

    The one weird trick is to elect Democrats.

    I recognize that this is an awkward point for a nonpartisan journalist to make, but it’s simply a fact that Democrats almost always try to enact policies that help the climate, while Republicans almost always try to block and reverse them. Every Democrat in Congress voted for the Inflation Reduction Act; every Republican voted no. The worst Democrat on climate, Senator Joe Manchin from the coal country of West Virginia, got the bill across the finish line, even as climate activists ferociously attacked him as a planet-killer; the best Republicans on climate all tried to stop him. Climate policy has become another symbolic battlefield in America’s political-cultural wars, with Trump trashing anything climate-related as part of a communist-elitist Green New Scam designed to force real Americans to eat bugs; Democrats seizing the issue as a metaphor for Neanderthal Republican hostility to science and facts; and Republicans opposing anything Trump is against and libs are for. But it doesn’t really matter why the issue has become so partisan. What matters is that it has.

    This idea that climate action depends on the electoral success of Democrats, rather than their climate rhetoric or commitments, has uncomfortable implications for climate activism. It suggests green groups should stop pressuring Democratic candidates in states such as Texas and Ohio to embrace Green New Deal talking points about a hundred-percent renewable grid or climate justice for minorities, and give them a pass to take more moderate positions that enhance their electability. Ivory Soap environmentalism that rejects 99.44 percent pure as a sellout to Big Oil — such as the activists who held a sit-in in Nancy Pelosi’s office and gave Joe Biden’s absurdly ambitious $1.7 trillion climate proposal an F-minus grade — does not seem like a realistic path to electoral majorities. Activists angry about Arizona Democratic Senator Ruben Gallego’s vision of the American Dream as a big-ass truck should probably keep their anger to themselves. If Mary Peltola thinks supporting Alaska’s oil industry will help her flip its Senate seat blue, they should pretend not to hear her — unless she actually wants them to attack her, in which case they should oblige. 

    Certain “eco-realists” believe Democrats should stop talking about climate at all, since it polls poorly and reminds voters of Democratic attitudes that they dislike; that is a bit extreme, I think, since denying climate science and throttling wind farms also polls poorly. Yet it’s certainly true that activists who bash Democratic #ClimateSilence and demand maximalist climate promises are not doing the climate any favors. Neither Zohran Mamdani, the Democratic socialist mayor of New York, nor Abigail Spanberger, the Democratic centrist governor of Virginia, talked much about climate on the campaign trail, but both won, and both will be climate-friendlier than their opponents would have been. Even Tom Steyer, the billionaire climate activist who ran for president in 2020 on a climate platform, is soft-peddling climate now that he is running for governor — in California!

    What they’re all talking about instead is “affordability,” because Americans are much more upset about high prices than high atmospheric carbon levels. There is a reason why the Inflation Reduction Act wasn’t called the Climate Change Prevention Act. Even environmental groups have pivoted to affordability, pointing out that Trump’s assaults on wind and solar are jacking up energy prices. Of course, they do not also point out that Trump’s drill-baby-drill approach to oil and gas can decrease energy prices. They hate fossil fuels way more than they love affordability.

    Politics is not like climate science, where models can predict with some precision how various inputs will change the world, so reasonable people can disagree about what Democrats and climate advocates should say and do if their objective is maximizing Democratic electoral success. I suspect low-volume moderation that appeals to swing voters will work better than heighten-the-contradictions extremism that fires up base voters, but I am a moderate, so maybe I am wish-casting. I also suspect that deprioritizing climate issues will make Democrats more popular, but I am a climate obsessive, so I hope I’m wrong.

    Clearly, though, maximizing Democratic electoral success should be the objective. The environmental regress in Trump’s Washington’s will continue unless Democrats take back at least one house of Congress later this year. How else will they stop Trump from shutting down climate labs, grounding satellites that collect climate data, and terminating grants that include the word “climate”? And significant climate progress in America will be impossible unless Democrats take back the White House and Congress in 2028; that is the only way to undo Trump’s mishigaas, and to enact new laws and regulations (remember regulations?), and to rejoin the global climate community. Yet very few climate leaders or climate analysts like to admit that partisan political victories ought to be the top American climate priority. It’s unsatisfying. It feels so, well, us versus them. It is certainly orthogonal to the factional and ideological battles inside the Democratic party that many find more inspiring, urgent and even enjoyable. It doesn’t get as many clicks.

    These observations about the unavoidability of raw politics apply just as well to the immigration crisis, the rule-of-law crisis, and all the other crises Trump has created. I don’t know whether “Abolish ICE” is good politics or bad politics for Democrats, but I do know that the political question is more important right now than the policy question, because the only path to better immigration policy is to beat Trump and the Republicans. The same is true of Medicare for All, packing the Supreme Court, and just about any other Democratic proposal. Until there is a Democratic president and Congress, they are only useful insofar as they make a Democratic president and Congress more likely. Save the circular firing squads over policy issues for that blessed day when they might actually influence policy.

    We have all been wisely taught to distinguish, in theory and in practice, between policy and politics, and as a policy dork it is painful to admit that right now good politics matters more than good ideas. It is not insightful or distinctive or interesting to recognize that the orange man is very bad — and it is a bit cringeworthy to echo the “resistance” posters who screech about him all day long — but he really is very bad. For the sake of the whales, the country, and the climate that envelops the whole world, what matters most is beating him and his enablers. Only then will the days of stupidity be over in the USA.

    The New Ecclesiocrats

    The gods are once again at play in the public square. Around the globe, political claims are being advanced in the name of religion. Speaking in the Rose Garden on a spring day in 2024, President Trump declared that “we’re bringing religion back to our country, and it’s a big deal.” In the American political calendar, it was National Prayer Day and the most profane president in American history was announcing the establishment of the Religious Liberty Commission. Given the context and the identity of its members — who oddly include Dr. Phil and a former Miss America — it is reasonable to suspect that “religious liberty” does not mean the freedom to practice religion but the freedom to impose religion. Liberal criticisms of the politicization of religion, of the establishment of religion in the corridors of power, are bizarrely denounced as an attempt to suppress religion. This is all part of a global phenomenon — the remarriage of religion and politics. Their second marriage, you might say.

    For a while it seemed that the crosier had been successfully divorced from the sword and religion had been evicted from the halls of power. Secularism has spoken in triumphalist tones for a long time. In 1902, for example, William James surmised that “religion is probably only an anachronism.” Half a century later, the American sociologist C. W. Mills predicted that “in due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the private realm.” Such confident predictions were spectacularly wrong. Now the gods are back and they are carrying not only a crosier and a holy book, but also a flag and even a gun. 

    Four buildings

    In December 1992, a horde of Hindu nationalists tore apart the Babri mosque in Ayodhya. This followed more than a decade of incitement by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), targeting the 500-year-old mosque built on what Hindus regard as the birthplace of the god Ram. In the subsequent riots more than 2,000 people were killed. In 2024 the country’s president, Narendra Modi, who is also the leader of the BJP, consecrated a vast, flashy temple for Lord Ram on the site. His speech at the event had the theatrics of a religious sermon, but its content was unadulterated Hindu nationalism. The event, as Modi’s biographer summarized, marked “an era when the prime minister is the high priest of Hinduism, blurring all lines between religion and politics on the one hand and between religion and the Indian state on the other.”

    Religious nationalism doesn’t just blur these lines of separation, it rejects them categorically. The wedding of religion and nationalism is not a marriage of convenience, but a union of conviction. They are not distinct notions glued together merely by political expediency, though the political rewards of religion are not lost on the unifiers. For religious nationalists, religion is nationalist and nationalism is religious. It is a fusion rather than a conjunction. 

    The magnificent Hagia Sophia in Istanbul is an epitome of Byzantine architecture and one of Turkey’s grandest landmarks. For Turkey’s Islamists, however, this is not enough. In 1934 the medieval building, which had previously served as a Byzantine church and after the Arab occupation was converted into a mosque, was given a new and nonreligious identity as a museum by decree of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey and a devout secularizer. But Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Islamist government has reversed Atatürk’s secularization of the space despite legal obstacles and widespread opposition. For Erdoğan, the religious reclamation of the building was “a resurrection,” replenishing the nation’s spirituality and its “spirit of conquest.” Erdoğan described it as “a symbol of the re-rising of our civilization’s sun.” 

    Erdoğan went on to claim that the Islamic character of the building, its mosqueness, was the foundation of Turkish sovereignty. 

    Converting Hagia Sophia into a mosque . . . is no less a right of the Republic of Turkey than its flag, its capital, its adhan [call to prayer], its language, its borders, and its eighty-one provinces. 

    In other words, questioning Turkey’s Islamism is tantamount to challenging its borders — an assault on its sovereignty. Erdoğan emphatically claimed “the Turkish nation’s right to the Hagia Sophia,” as if such a collective right is denied when the structure serves as a national museum. To express Turkish greatness, the historic landmark must be imbued with religious significance. The ancient structure, with all its glory and its history, is not enough. It must function as a Muslim shrine. (Does French pride in the cathedral of Notre Dame rest on Sunday Mass?) 

    “The resurrection of Hagia Sophia heralds the liberation of the al-Aqsa Mosque,” Erdoğan declared. The shrine atop the Temple Mount in Jerusalem is another hotbed of religious nationalism. For over a century, nationalist Muslims and Jews have been quarreling over the site, regarding it as the Archimedean point of political legitimacy, of national sovereignty. “He who rules the mountain rules the land,” say the Jewish zealots. In their twisted worldview it is not the mountain that matters, but the deity to which the mountain is enshrined: in the Jewish tradition, the binding of Isaac took place on that peak. (And as a historical matter, the First and Second Temples, the centers of ancient Judaism, stood there.) In the Islamic tradition, however, the Prophet ascended from the same summit to heaven. Religious nationalism is now at the heart of the incessant strife between Israelis and Palestinians, as territorial conflict is increasingly becoming a holy war. It is also the driving force behind the government’s anti-liberal constitutional overhaul that has been tearing Israel apart in recent years. And the increasingly regular anti-Palestinian pogroms on the West Bank are motivated by a profoundly religious chauvinism.

    In India, Turkey, and Israel, to choose three especially explosive examples, religious nationalism now dominates politics. The ruling coalitions in all three countries are firmly controlled by religious nationalist parties. But even where it is not organized in designated parties, the toxic cocktail of faith and flag is reshaping politics. Dissolve to Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021. A journalist who filmed the pro-Trump riot against the Constitution later recalled: “The Christianity was one of the surprises to me in covering this stuff, and it has been hugely underestimated. . . . Christian nationalism is the driving force and also the unifying force of these disparate players. It’s really Christianity that ties it all together.”

    Obviously that insurrection had many causes, but there is no gainsaying the prominence of a certain strain of American Christianity among them. Many of the insurrectionists believed they were, in their own words. “taking America back for God.” Some waved the “Appeal to Heaven” flag, which has become a symbol of Christian nationalism. (It has been posted outside the office of House Speaker Mike Johnson and at one point it flew over Justice Samuel Alito’s vacation home). Some of the rioters knelt in prayer just before storming the building or they conducted prayers inside the chamber afterwards. The night before, General Michael T. Flynn rallied the crusaders using highly charged religious rhetoric, as did a host of other online preachers and prophets. (Supporters of Jair Bolsonaro, who ransacked Brazil’s Supreme Court, Congress, and presidential palace shouting “God! Homeland! Family! Freedom!” were running on the same theocratic fuel.) 

    In the ancient world, overrunning holy sites was an assertion of victory. By imposing their might on the gods of the vanquished, the winners showcased their triumph and hoped to bury the losers’ spiritual identity under their own. These days, the gods are overrunning many of the bastions of secular power. Rather than rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, their militant Christianity wishes itself to be Caesar.

    State of denial

    This unanticipated revival of providential politics is too often scanted. Critics are slow to voice condemnation, sometimes for fear that criticism will be mistaken for bigotry. In 2014, as the Islamic State was gaining ground and committing all sorts of atrocities, President Obama bluntly declared that “ISIL is not Islamic.” Soon after September 11, Salman Rushdie wrote in the Washington Post that “these are tyrants, not Muslims.” 

    Two decades later Rushdie was stabbed multiple times by an Islamist fundamentalist. He lost an eye, but not his life. In the book that he wrote after the event, he grappled with the motives of his attacker. He recalls the stabbing of another writer almost a century earlier. In 1938, as Samuel Beckett was walking with friends near the Porte-d’Orléans in Paris, a pimp with the fable-ready name Prudence tried to mug him. Beckett shoved the assailant, who lunged back at him and stabbed the young writer in the chest. At the trial Beckett confronted his attacker and asked him why he did it, to which Prudence replied, “Je ne sais pas, monsieur. Je m’excuse.” (“I don’t know, sir. I’m sorry.”) 

    But the two stabbings are hardly the same. Beckett’s stabbing was an act of senseless violence. The assault on Rushdie was no such thing: it was a premeditated and planned assault, driven by a very specific religious motive, one that had been inspired by a religious ruling in 1989, when Ayatollah Khomeini issued his notorious fatwa against the writer. That is not senseless violence. It is political violence and religious violence, just as the jihadis who took down the Twin Towers were both tyrants and Muslims and the mad mob that destroyed the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya were both tyrants and Hindus. The Jewish terrorists rampaging villages in the West Bank and murdering civilians in Gaza are both political thugs and religious zealots. We must describe reality correctly.

    This applies not only to homicidal terrorists. Scholars also tend to dismiss the religious motives of right-wing extremists. In 2004, in his influential What’s the Matter with Kansas?, Thomas Frank cast religion as a mere accoutrement: “The leaders of the backlash may talk Christ, but they walk corporate.” As if religion is, to borrow the old Marxist term, always epiphenomenal, and can never serve as a sufficient cause or a sufficient explanation. Frank’s confident pronouncements — “Abortion is never halted. Affirmative action is never abolished. . . . It may never bring prayer back to the schools.” — have not aged well. Analyzing the current populist backlash, some scholars assert that “the Christian identity claimed by populists is not Christian” or that “Christianity is embraced not as a religion but as a civilizational identity.” This is much too neat. The political reputation of Christianity will not be saved by looking away from some of its actual consequences. 

    Now, it is true that in some contexts, particularly in Northern and Western Europe, talk of Judeo-Christian values, of “the Judeo-Christian tradition,” (a collocation of breathtaking historical obtuseness, especially when cited by the descendants of Jew-haters) is deployed primarily to exclude Muslims — as a social weapon, not a religious weapon. Bigots do not need religion for their hatreds. It is also true that some contemporary theocrats — Catholic integralists, Dominionists, and Ultra-Orthodox Jews — are not necessarily nationalists. Still, the energy and the intensity of providential politics in our era derives from its fusion with belligerent nationalism. Religious nationalism is not reducible to nationalism. 

    Classic nationalism aimed to supplant religion, which seemed to be in its death throes. And besides, faith and ritual were ill-suited to hold together diverse and modernizing societies. Many national founders — Bismarck, Mazzini, Atatürk, Ben-Gurion, Nehru, and even Gandhi in his way — were openly antagonistic to religion. But religious nationalists have their own version of their secular nationalist pasts: they insert devotional vocabulary and sentiment into their definition of the nation (which is why, despite their zealous nationalism, they often diminish their secular founders). 

    Again, the tendency to discount the religiosity of political phenomena, especially when they are repugnant, has become a marker of civility, as if identifying religious influence is a form of religious intolerance. Yet whatever the etiquette of acceptable political speech, surely one must be tolerant and truthful. In the West, certainly, religion and political power have not been incompatible since Constantine; and the theocratic antiquities of Judaism and Islam are plain in their respective sources. If anything, they — religion and group identity, religion and nationalism, religion and power — have what Goethe called an elective affinity, a tendency to find each other and go together. 

    The implicit logic of the reductivist view, it seems, is that since these are political currents, they are, by definition, not genuinely religious. This view assumes a categorical distinction between religion and politics — which is precisely what the new ecclesiocratic reality seems to refute. The liberal aspiration to separate politics from religion has mutated into an analytical presupposition that religion and politics are mutually exclusive. But history complicates the tidiness of such a demarcation. It was precisely as a recoil from the wars of religion in early modern Europe — from the disastrous effects of religion’s penetration of politics — that European liberalism was born.

    Religious nationalism is a real phenomenon and a distinct one. It is not just xenophobia — or some variety of capitalism — embellished with ecclesiastical baubles. It may talk culture, but it walks Christ. It ought to be understood in its own terms, not distorted by ideological presumptions about how religion should manifest itself. 

    The providential state

    For religious nationalists, divorcing religion from the state is tantamount to emasculating both the religion and the state. Religion without a state is crippled and a state without religion is empty. Religion without a state is crippled because ecclesiastical ambitions can only be fully realized by worldly power, which is regarded as the historical proof of a religion’s truth. A state without religion is empty because the whole point of the state is to realize a divine purpose. Civitas terrena exists to serve civitas dei

    For some, this sacralization of the state rests on a messianic vision. Some American evangelicals clearly take the “City on a Hill” quite literally, and the religious fervor of that understanding is exactly like their faith in the Sermon on the Mount, from which that ideal originates. The state, in this case the United States, is nothing less than a vessel of salvation. Some see Trump as a modern Cyrus, the heathen Persian emperor anointed by God to deliver the Israelites from the Babylonian exile, according to the prophet Isaiah. The Patriarch Kirill, the current leader of the Russian Orthodox church, invokes similar tropes to describe his tyrannical leader. Vladimir Putin, he teaches, is part of God’s plan to restore “Greater Russia.” Likewise there are febrile rabbis who have anointed Netanyahu a messianic figure. Religious Zionism, which used to be more diverse and less irrational, is today premised on a messianic conception of the Jewish state as the climax of a sacred history; its secular architects may have thought that they were creating a vehicle of political emancipation, but in fact they were being steered by God’s invisible hand to construct the chariot of redemption. According to political messianists, salvation is not an other-worldly spiritual affair, but a historical project. Its avatars are not individual souls but flesh-and-blood collectives. Whether it is bringing about the Rapture, reinstating the Kingdom of David, or establishing the Caliphate, it takes place terrestrially, in this world, and it is thoroughly political.

    Most religious nationalists, however, are not messianic or eschatologically inclined in this sense. For them, religion requires temporal power because it requires a political community of faith, a civic order shaped by divine dictates; and it requires this for its vindication in the eyes of its believers. At the National Prayer Breakfast in 1993, President Clinton declared: “It is important to reaffirm that in this nation where we have freedom of religion, we need not seek freedom from religion.” He was quoting from a popular book by Stephen Carter, a Yale legal scholar, which argued that the liberal separation of church and state trivializes religion because religion is “a tradition of group worship.” The philosopher Richard Rorty, a devout atheist, rejected this argument. Even under a Jeffersonian separation of church and state, he contended, religion can still include group worship. “Our family or love lives are private, nonpolitical and non-trivial,” he wrote. “The poems we atheists write, like the prayers our religious friends raise, are private, nonpolitical and non-trivial.”

    Rorty’s criticism is well taken, but it addresses Carter’s words, not his intention. Like Clinton, he overlooked Carter’s point, which was not that religion requires community, but that its aims and values should be reflected in political arrangements and expressed in public debate about them. The issue, in other words, is not freedom from religion, but religion’s public role. It is religion’s social and political ambitions that are trivialized by its relegation to the private sphere. 

    While nonbelievers cannot live freely in a theocracy, the religious can exercise their faith in a liberal state. Setting aside a few civil regulations and laws (such as the French restrictions on religious attire in public institutions or the American ban on polygamy), believers would be hard pressed to list religious practices that they are precluded from performing. Liberalism was designed to guarantee “liberty of conscience.” Even in a Jeffersonian dispensation, therefore, religion may be encountered throughout the public square. But the new ecclesiocrats, even though they sometimes invoke the label of religious liberty, that is, the freedom to practice one’s religion without hindrance, are really intent on establishing the political authority of religion or, to be more precise, of a particular religion. 

    Theirs is certainly not the only conception of religion available, but neither is it a recent invention or a fabrication. It is not unusual for religious traditions to regard the state as the secular arm of spiritual power. Abrahamic religions, at least in their canonical forms, place politics squarely within their purview. Religions make claims on civic life. They aspire not just to publicly practicing religion, but to shaping society through public institutions. The idea that religion can be a private matter is a Protestant novelty (though the most rigorous argument for the protection of personal belief from the compulsion of the state was made by the Jewish religious philosopher Moses Mendelssohn in his book Jerusalem), and one that, as we can readily see these days, struggles to maintain a foothold even among Protestants. The orthodox view sees the state as the body and religion as the soul. The state is the hardware, the Gospel is (or should be) the software. 

    Though nonpolitical interpretations of most religions certainly exist, and some strains of American Christianity have wearied of the corruptions and seductions of politics and have come to prefer “the Benedict option,” the dominant traditions undeniably regard the state as a sphere of religious activity. Whether one endorses it or not, theocrats such as the Harvard legal scholar Adrian Vermeule, who advocate the enforcement of religiously grounded moral norms, have a solid ecclesiastical leg to stand on. Such claims can be justified in terms of sacred truth or by the demands of individual piety. One cannot live a fully Christian, or Hindu, or Muslim life in a secular state, it is said, because each of these religions makes claims on public life and civic institutions and has chosen to include political power among the fulfillments of spiritual life. The freedom to publicly express one’s faith — a miracle, by the standards of all our political and religious histories — is not enough. The ecclesiocrats also demand the authority to shape public affairs.

    Both messianic and non-messianic versions of political religion subscribe to a providential conception of politics — to the idea that political institutions should serve as instruments of divine purposes. For messianists, this means facilitating a divine plan. For non-messianist theocrats, this means seeking religious fulfillment in the state. For messianists, politics is a redemptive enterprise. For non-messianists, religion is nonetheless inescapably political. A secular state is a stale and sterile thing, and a depoliticized religion is impoverished, debilitated, thwarted. 

    As I say, these notions are not novel in orthodox religion and neither is the aspiration to reshape politics in light of them. But in recent years they have moved from the wings to center stage. What gives them broad reach and turns them into a potent political current is their ability to harness the rising tide of nationalism. Religious nationalism couches the imperatives of faith in the nonecclesiastical notions of culture and identity. 

    Religion’s Cultural Turn

    In 1925, John T. Scopes was prosecuted in Tennessee for violating the Butler Act, which made it illegal “to teach any theory that denies the story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible.” The prosecution argued that teaching evolution would undermine faith and lead to moral decay. In 2001, when Judge Roy Moore had a 5,000-pound monument to the Ten Commandments installed in the state capitol of Alabama, and adamantly refused to remove it, he did not appeal to the Holy Spirit but to the spirit of the nation: “This is not a nation established on the principles of Buddha or Hinduism. Our faith is not Islam. What we follow is not the Koran but the Bible. This is a Christian nation.” (A lawsuit in Federal court followed, the monument was declared unconstitutional, Judge Moore refused to move it, and he was suspended from the bench.) 

    These days theocracy marches chiefly under the banner of culture and identity. Americans hear that they are “a Christian nation” with increasing frequency and increasing volume. This is an Americanized version of the sentiment professed by that high priest of European Christian nationalism, Viktor Orbán: “We must protect our Christian traditions in order to keep Hungary Hungarian.” The preamble to Hungary’s revised constitution from 2016 officially enshrines this religious basis of national identity, stating: “We recognize the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood.” The aim of religious observance is not to salvage souls, but to preserve a Volksgeist.

    In a similar vein, Narendra Modi described the provocative Hindu shrine in Ayodhya as “a temple of national consciousness.” Its erection atop the ruins of a mosque is an expression of “unwavering faith in Indian culture.” The former Polish president Andrzej Duda argued that abolishing religious instruction would “remove an inalienable part of Polishness,” while Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of the country’s anti-liberal Law and Justice party, claimed that the church must have an authoritative position because “the foundation of Polishness is the Church and its teachings.” On this view, abortion must be banned because it is inconsistent with Poland’s Catholic character. Israel does not operate public transportation on the Sabbath, even though more than seventy percent of the population supports doing so, not because God prohibited the practice but “because it is a Jewish state.” 

    In America, banning abortion, gay marriage, pornography, and no-fault divorce, limiting access to contraceptives, and eliminating sexual health education, while introducing bible study and school prayer — all of these policies are pushed on the basis of the country’s purported Christian essence. When these Christianizers describe the United States as a Christian country, they are not speaking sociologically. It is true, as an empirical matter, that most of the citizens of the United States are Christians — yet the liberal dispensation of the First Amendment, its religious neutrality, is based not on numbers, on how many Christians live in the country, but on principles. 

    All this marks a seminal shift. The previous generation of conservatism pushed for a small government which would create a framework within which individuals would be free to live as they chose. “The conservative looks upon politics as the art of achieving the maximum amount of freedom for individuals that is consistent with the maintenance of the social order,” Barry Goldwater wrote in The Conscience of a Conservative. Despite occasional conservative collaboration with theocrats and religious nationalists, the latter remained marginal. The intellectual guides of mainstream conservatism were libertarians such as Friedrich Hayek and liberal conservatives such as Michael Oakeshott. Its political messengers were “small government” establishment figures such as Nixon and Thatcher. This conservatism conceived of itself as an heir to Enlightenment values of universalist humanism, rationality, and individual freedom. 

    The current crop of reactionaries sometimes still brands itself “conservative,” but sets itself up in ardent opposition to liberalism and the Enlightenment. Far from the prudent and reflective temperament of Burkean conservatism, they wax revolutionary, aiming to upend established norms and institutions, both foreign and domestic. And at the heart of this shift, of their certainty, stands religion. Or rather, the political role of religion. Their intellectual guides include theistic thinkers, God-hearing prophets, and revivalist preachers, and their political agents are religious nativists. But their arguments are unabashedly identitarian. 

    Senator Josh Hawley recently told a crowd of supporters that it is not religious liberty that binds Americans together, but religion. “Most Americans share broad and basic religious convictions. Theistic, biblical, Christian . . . these are things . . . that make us a nation.” Therefore, “conservatives must defend our national religion and its role in our national life.” Promoting Christianity in public affairs, preferring Christians as their rulers, shaping laws in line with “Christian values” — these are all defended by the claim that America was founded as a Christian nation. 

    Even theocrats who are not particularly nationalist turn to the rhetoric of identity. When he was still a cardinal, Joseph Ratzinger often spoke about secularism, or failing to “embrace our own heritage of the sacred,” as a denial of “the identity of Europe.” The insertion of religion into politics is imposed not in the name of divine decree but as a demand of identity. Tradition is anchored not in revelation or metaphysical truth, but in fidelity to culture. “It is not a matter of believing in God or not,” according to Yoram Hazony. “It’s a matter of whether you honor the traditions of your nation.” Patrick Deneen stresses “the priority of culture” and advocates “preserving the commonplace traditions of a polity.” The new ecclesiocrats are post-theological. Metaphysics is subordinate to history and culture takes the place of revelation.

    They do not argue that gay marriage should be banned because it is “so abominable in the sight of God, that He destroyed the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah because of this terrible sin,” as Jerry Falwell did. That is to say, their claim is not theological, but cultural: that homosexuality — like all significant extensions of equality and revisions of social mores — erodes the old, that is religious, values which underpin our culture. Their claims are not doctrinal and the express aim of many of them is not to impose dogma, ritual, or clerical rule. Instead, they stake the validity of religious principles on their indispensability for preserving a certain national character. Patriotism, and of a very exclusivist sort, is their surrogate for piety.

    The fatal conceit

    Theocracy’s cultural turn disarms its opponents. After all, it was liberals and the left who wove culture and identity into the fabric of politics. In the latter quarter of the twentieth century, multiculturalism and communitarianism emerged as supplements to liberalism, insisting on the importance of culture and communal associations to human flourishing. Initially, these were proposed primarily as footnotes to liberal political theory, stressing the need to protect minority cultures against assimilationist pressures. Communitarian thinkers stressed the role of ends and values inherited from unchosen cultural and religious associations, and championed the importance of communal cohesion and shared political culture for liberalism itself. 

    It was not long, however, before these friendly amendments, offered as a balm, hardened into a blade. Repurposed by reactionaries, the liberationist promise was replaced with conservative retrenchment. Rather than defend the plurality of cultures and encourage free engagement with one’s own, they chose to dwell on obligations and boundaries — obligations of fidelity and boundaries to protect the kinds of cultural engagement that conform to the standards of fidelity. 

    An example of this slippery shift can be found in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, the most sophisticated among the communitarian thinkers of the previous generation. While liberals were talking about “being the author of one’s life story,” MacIntyre argued that “the key question for men is not about their own authorship; I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’” These stories are dictated to us by tradition: we are born into these stories, we do not choose them. “I find myself part of a history and that is generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the bearers of a tradition.” From this almost banal proposition MacIntyre derived a stifling imperative — to “[sustain] those traditions which provide both practices and individual lives with their necessary historical context.” To sustain them, and then to reproduce them. The cultural buffet turned into ancestral force-feeding.

    It is a small step from this conservative mandate to the idea that the state should enforce at least some of these traditions. Imposed customs and traditions, which John Stuart Mill saw as “despots” stifling individual self-development, are for Patrick Deneen guardrails which “protect the stability and order that most benefits ordinary people.” As such, they can be shoved on individuals against their will (creating “a non-voluntarist cultural landscape,” as he slyly puts it), not only because they serve their “real” interests but in the name of “defend[ing] a preeminent role of cultural institutions.” Although he acknowledges that this is a form of the tyranny of the majority, Deneen exonerates it as “benign” and “deeply democratic,” apparently because — whether the objectors recognize it or not — these cultures are their own. That is all we need to know. This is reminiscent of Rousseau’s notion of forcing people to be free, which liberals, from Benjamin Constant to Isaiah Berlin, regarded as a prelude to oppression. 

    Such a culturally authoritarian development was invited by the conservative communitarianism of the previous generation. If culture is a manacle rather than an invitation — an inherited diktat to which one must submit rather than a legacy that one is free to inflect and make one’s own — then a good society is one that encourages, even if it does not compel, submission rather than autonomy. For the new ecclesiocrats, freedom means the freedom to revere and obey. In the words of Project 2025, “Our Constitution grants each of us the liberty to do not what we want, but what we ought.” Viktor Orbán calls this “Christian liberty” — the liberty to obey what the state determines to be “our” Christian heritage.

    It is hard to overlook the irony of such conservatism being advocated in the name of the Abrahamic religions, whose founders — Abraham, Jesus, and Muhammad — were all rebels. Each of them broke away from their tribes and turned against their inherited creeds; each of them founded a heterodoxy. Irony aside, the main point — the crucial gambit — is the usurpation of the living, unfettered, and open-ended notion of culture by a rigid, foisted, and thoroughly “non-voluntarist” concept of tradition. 

    Culture is essentially dynamic, plural, and contested. It evolves with shifting experiences, changing demographics, novel ideas, and advancing technologies. It is an invitation, not a mandate — a plenitude, not a doctrine — which is why it is consistent with individual freedom. Under the label of “tradition,” however, it hardens into a single dogmatic thing, a sealed package bequeathed from the past, to which one must assimilate and which one must pass on completely intact. In this way culture shrinks into an imperative and identity becomes a spiritual straitjacket. 

    This invites a fatal conceit: casting themselves as culture’s sole guardians, the new ecclesiocrats anoint themselves its exclusive arbiters. Why are the imagined “family values” of the Puritans a more authentic part of American heritage than the sexual revolution and civil rights? (Because they happened earlier?) What makes Orthodox Judaism, detested by many of Zionism’s founders, more of a Jewish expression than the secular Hebrew culture that they created? Is Erdoğan’s Islamism more Turkish than Kemalist secularism? Under the cover of cultural density, the self-proclaimed apostles of the nation are imposing their own version of a multifaceted collective heritage on all the rest. And they do the same with identity. In heterogenous societies there cannot be one settled version of national identity. There is never a single answer about what it means to be an American, a Turk, or a Hindu. National identity is an open question which always receives multiple answers. By politicizing it, the ecclesiocrats seek to foist their interpretation upon their society and delegitimize all the others. As Orhan Pamuk nicely put it, “they are taking away the pride of being both Muslim and secular simultaneously.” This is what identity politics looks like when it moves from left to right. 

    The enemy within, or us

    If theocracy’s cultural turn makes it harder for liberals to confront it, it makes it easier for different kinds of theocrats to band together. For despite its cultural lingo, religious nationalism is grounded in religion. Although it is evangelized in folkish terms, its only claim to supremacy is its divine provenance. This is a bait and switch — the terrestrial notion of identity is the bait and the transcendent authority of the supernatural is the switch. This allows religious nationalists to make common cause with theocrats who may not be nationalists (such as Dominionists and Catholic integralists). Their shared aim is to tear down the wall of separation between church and state. 

    Enlightenment secularism proposed a momentous distinction between a crime and a sin. That is, between an offense against society and an offense against God or tradition. The new ecclesiocrats sneak God back in by making what they regard as deviance from tradition an offense against society. This maneuver also identifies the enemy. When Erdoğan turned the museum into a mosque he was fighting not the crusaders but “internal Byzantines,” as he calls his opponents. He was sending a message to secular Turks such as Pamuk. Those who oppose his policies are not only turning their backs on Allah, they are traitors to the nation, and in effect to themselves: “may Allah not test this nation again with those who are hostile to its values.” And Pamuk got the message. The conversion of Hagia Sophia, he said, “simply means that we don’t respect Kemal Atatürk’s secularism anymore . . . But I am also a Turkish citizen and I am, like many millions of people who are secularists, against this. Unfortunately, our voices are not heard.”

    Orbán, who once advocated “illiberal democracy,” now full-throatedly advocates for “Christian democracy” and identifies the enemy accordingly: 

    When they attack Christian culture they are also attempting to eliminate Europe. They want to take our life from us and exchange it for something that is not our life. In return for the life we have lived up to now they are promising one which is new and more enlightened.

    “They” are not the Muslims, but the liberal secularists (whether they are believers or not), those who aim to replace a cherished form of life with new and modified and “more enlightened” life-forms. If Hungarian culture is indeed limited to Orbán’s Christian culture, then all the other Hungarians in Hungary are a Westernizing fifth column. If national identity is fixed and specific, then all those who stray from it are traitors to themselves and to the nation. Poles who are pro-choice aim “to destroy Poland,” according to Kaczyński. Liberal Israelis “have forgotten what it means to be Jewish,” Netanyahu once whispered in the ears of a revered rabbi. Describing secular Europeans, Ratzinger used an extraordinary phrase: he called them “apostates to themselves.” Treachery and apostasy — national betrayal and religious rebellion — merge into the cardinal sins of self-doubt and self-negation.

    The current surge in authoritarian politics cannot be understood apart from the rise of religious nationalism. However cynical authoritarianism’s instrumental exploitation by some of its leaders, their popular support draws from deep wellsprings of religious and nationalist fervor. The revolt against the secularization of politics has been revived not as theocracy but as nationalism (and never mind the long history of liberal nationalism). It claims not the mantle of the prophet but of the nation-builder, summoning culture and identity rather than divine decree — but all the while its theological ambitions persist, as does the threat that it poses to free societies. 

    No, the new ecclesiocrats are not aiming to revive the Inquisition. They do not generally demand ritual observance or public declarations of faith, nor do they openly aspire to clerical rule. Their goal, rather, is to sculpt the architecture of power by the cast of their creed. They arrogate to themselves the authority to shape laws, civic institutions, and cultural and public spaces irrespective of democratic choice and unhindered by constraints of fairness and toleration. And, most importantly, they claim the power to determine who belongs to the polity and who does not, who gets to count as a real American, a genuine Turk, a true Jew, and who is merely a guest, or worse, a backstabbing interloper. And they do so by invoking religious authority. This may not be your grandmother’s religion, but it is one of the principal forms that religion now takes. To counter it, an equally principled commitment to the secularization of politics — which emphatically includes the freedom of religion — is indispensable. A free society should not infringe on personal belief, but it cannot disregard providential politics and exclusivist designs upon power. No faith is owed political power, regardless of the number of its adherents in the society. Tolerating the intolerant is a recipe for tyranny. 

    “History,” Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1813, “furnishes no example of a priest-ridden people maintaining a free civil government.” The return of the gods into the halls of earthly power always happens the same way: it is never the gods who occupy the offices, but only those who presume to speak for them. In his Rose Garden speech, President Trump, with all the guilelessness of his ignorance, laid it out: “They say separation between church and state . . . I said, ‘All right, let’s forget about that for one time.’” But one time may be all it takes. 

    Svoї, or The Perks of Being Untranslatable

    I was already at work on an analysis of the Ukrainian word svoï, a little worried that it might be received as merely a linguistic exercise, a bit of pedantry, when I was unexpectedly assisted by the Ukrainian historian, writer, and public intellectual Olena Stiazhkina (whose novel, Cecil the Lion Had to Die, a linguistic puzzle of another kind, was recently published in the United States). In August 2025, she chose to give the closing lecture at the International Literary Festival Frontera in Lutsk on the theme The Formula for Our Nationalism Is The Word “Svoї.” This untranslatable word was exactly what I had been pondering, because I believe it has the potential to reveal a great deal about the Ukrainian character, and more.

    The credit for my inquiry goes to Marci Shore, an intellectual historian and a contributor to this journal, with whom I collaborated on a project about translation for last year’s book fair in Kyiv. She speaks Polish and Czech brilliantly, as well as Russian, and has a good command of Ukrainian. All these languages have the possessive pronoun “svoї” (the phonetics and spelling differ a bit from language to language, of course), unknown to English, or French, or German. During one of our conversations on untranslatability she mentioned svoї as a word that is lacking in English. It would be much easier to explain many things if English had such a word, she said. I was left thinking that svoï is so much more than a word. And that it also sheds a great deal of light about Ukraine these days, particularly about the galloping changes of Ukrainian society.

    So what does svoї mean? In Ukrainian and other Slavic languages it is technically a possessive pronoun. As a possessive pronoun svoї is used with the first person and the second person, and the third person if they are actors (for example, it replaces the “my” before “story” in the English sentence “I tell my story”). In such cases it is simple: you just translate the unique word as a possessive pronoun in English: my, your, his, hers, theirs, and so on. But the pronoun serves also a substantive term: svoї means a group of almost endless and barely appreciable features which is hard to explain but easy to recognize. It is close to “tribe,” and not accidentally: the root came from Old Norse svíar, which was “our tribe,” in contemporary parlance “Swedes.”

    In some cases, the closest translation into English would be “in,” as in the once-hip English phrase “the in-crowd.” A deep and natural belonging. But this usage of “in” denotes exclusivity, while the Ukrainian word is tricky: it is both exclusive and inclusive. Svoї could be used to describe someone you meet for the first time in your life and yet they are the opposite of “strangers.” They are always someone you can trust, even when you don’t know them. An anxious newcomer may be encouraged to speak freely in a new group in this way: “Relax, everyone is svoї,” meaning relax, you are among your own, among our own, no one will judge you. I once wrote an article in Ukrainian titled “Vsi svoї” — literally, “all are svoї” — and the title was translated for the English summary as “All in the Family,” a totally correct idiom for the context of the article but not the universal one. What would be the correct contemporary translation for the encouraging phrase to speak freely, I wonder? A “safe space?” Possibly. It can also be the increasingly familiar Danish hygge, owing to the image that it evokes: a small cozy party, a circle of friends, an informal gathering, one for which you need not dress up. 

    Soon after the Maidan Revolution of 2014, when Ukrainians became less skeptical and more interested in their own culture, the words “Vsi svoї” became a name for the monthly market and later for the department store at Khreshchatyk — Kyiv’s main street — which sells only Ukrainian products, from our own manufacturers of clothes, souvenirs, home design, and so on.. (The concept was not original, as a year before the Maidan a media project called “Made in Ukraine” launched the trend.) Inflation hit the country after the Russo-Ukrainian war started in the east of Ukraine and Crimea was annexed by Russia, so it made perfect sense to buy Ukrainian goods instead of imported ones when possible. It would be imprecise to call it a case of economic nationalism; it was instead a glamorous form of urban middle-class patriotism. 

    In fact, the word has a history of less glamorous usage in the context of economic nationalism. Most Ukrainians are familiar with “Svij to svoho po svoje,” the interwar slogan in western Ukraine (then Poland) in the 1930s — another untranslatable wordplay — to mean “each for his own.” Ukrainian cooperatives of the era (say, dairy) encouraged Ukrainians to buy from Ukrainian manufacturers, not Polish ones, and thus to support “svoї” and thereby create an economic basis for Ukrainian political parties and the Ukrainian national movement in general. It sounds positive, and most Ukrainians believe that the slogan and the campaign that popularized it were Ukrainian in origin. This is not so. In the second half of the nineteenth century, it was used by Polish traders to compete with German and Jewish entrepreneurs — particularly in Poznań, the territory of Poland that was annexed by Prussia in the partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century, which Germans dominated both administratively and economically. Unfortunately, Poles took to the slogan even when they were not a colonized nation: in the 1930s, when Poland was independent again, the slogan “Swój do swego po swoje” was revived in a nefarious way, as a call to boycott Jewish businesses. 

    This nationalist and antisemitic revival of the slogan and the sentiment behind it is mocked in the novel Cosmos, from 1965, by the émigré writer Witold Gombrowicz, a difficult writer and the enfant terrible of twentieth-century Polish literature. Danuta Borchardt, the first English translator of the novel, observed in the foreword to the book: 

    In order to develop the onanistic theme of the book, Gombrowicz chose the Polish expression swój do swego po swoje, which he used to convey a succession of meanings. Literally it means “himself to his own for his own,” and it refers to buying stuff from your own people — a distant cousin to “buy American,” or, more personally, “getting one’s gratification from one’s own.” It first appears, innocently enough, in one of [the character] Fuks’s remarks as early as the second chapter of the book, and then, in the second half, it gathers momentum and gravity as Gombrowicz gives it self-gratifying, onanistic implications. It seemed necessary to use a progression of English expressions — from Fuks’ “whatever turns you on” to [the character] Venomie’s “her own self, just for herself” — to achieve a satisfactory effect without violating the original text. 

    In other words, Gombrowicz elevated the casual intimacy of the term to the heights of the absurd (which was one of his specialties). 

    The intimacy of svoї can be quite broad. My formative experience with the word took place during the Maidan revolution of 2013–2014. The protests started small, and on the first night in the square it seemed as if I knew most of the protesters personally. Then the protests grew and grew: sometimes there were thousands of us, and sometimes hundreds of thousands. On the ensuing days and nights (mostly nights), more than 90 of them, I knew that I would eventually run into my friends or someone I knew, even when half a million or more appeared in the central streets of Kyiv. Sometimes I didn’t run into anyone I knew, sometimes I met new people, and yet the warmth always felt the same: that is what we call svoї. Maidan was the essence of it. And that was one of the reasons why people kept coming to the square in spite of the risk of being beaten, arrested, and even kidnapped and killed. It felt safe even when it was dangerous. A German journalist asked me how it was that I was not afraid to go to Maidan alone in the middle of the night. I explained that I wasn’t brave at all. What frightened me, terrified me actually, was the prospect of staying home alone. (I was single back then.) I kept going to Maidan because I felt protected there. I was among svoї. And we recognized each other, we intuited each other, even outside Maidan. There was a joke making the rounds that you could smell a decent person in Kyiv: our clothes smelled of smoke all winter because we tried to get warm near fire barrels. 

    The crowd was not all people like me or after my own heart. There were people from all walks of life and they held different, sometimes opposing, views. There were people at Maidan who would hate me under different circumstances, who did hate me before, and who maybe hate me now. But we were svoї. Even within the gathering there were occasional conflicts: in those turbulent times the wolf did not exactly lie down with the lamb, nor did the lion eat straw. Still, it felt pretty close to utopia, close enough to it that after the commotions ended I came to miss those perilous and exhilarating days.

    After Maidan, I came to think of svoї as a term for something extra-inclusive. The protest was itself the proof: you were welcome to our side of the barricades if you wished to be there. “Come to the light side, we have cookies!” was one of the slogans of our svoї. And insofar as this experience of belonging was also a matter of individual choice, svoї had become modern. It was actually an entire orchestra of individual choices: there was your decision to join and the decision of others to accept you. From this standpoint, svoї is the antithesis of identity, even an antidote to identity. Or at least it can sometimes serve as such a correction. 

    Later, with further reflection on the meanings of the Maidan, I recognized that as a concept svoї is both inclusive and exclusive: while everyone who had been there was included, the ones who weren’t there were naturally excluded, as they had not shared the same extreme 

    experience. And now we are all sharing an even more extreme experience, four years of full-scale war. But the svoï of the war is different from the svoї of Maidan: numbers matter, distance from the battlefield matters, there are degrees of extremity. Those in combat can hardly convey their experience to those in safer areas. For this reason, soldiers are feeling more and more distant from civilians. Ukrainians in Kyiv under constant missile and drone attacks feel distant from Ukrainians abroad. The official line is that we are all svoї but the truth is that we are not, and this has been a matter of public debate for some time. If svoї is created by a similarity or sameness of experience, then the radical and sometimes contrary experiences of the allegedly homogenous group (in this case, Ukrainians) will inevitably thwart it. 

    Back in Maidan, during a night shift in the first weeks, which were still relatively safe, we were warming ourselves near a fire barrel where I met a woman activist, a bit older than me, from Zaporizhzhia (a large industrial city now close to the frontline) who also took part in the Maidan protests nine years earlier, demonstrations that were so cheerful that they were sometimes called the Ukrainian Woodstock. “Maidan absorbs you,” she said softly to me, referring to her experience. I don’t remember her name, but I am still grateful to her for showing me the dark side of svoї: the seducing, lulling, comforting side. It is so nice to be with your people, your tribe, it is one of the best experiences in the world, it is so undemanding and so immediately affirming, it is happiness. 

    But like all happiness, it cannot last forever: at some point you need your miserable and doubting self back — contrary to the archaic bliss of belonging, contrary to the ancient svíar that is hidden in the modern svoї. My question is, must we all be svoї? Is svoї a minority or a majority? Again, Maidan was a good example: it felt like a majority when inside, surrounded by thousands and thousands of likeminded brothers and sisters. The overwhelming impact of the videos of the Maidan crowds gave the same impression. But statistically, all the excitement and the exhilaration notwithstanding, we were a minority. The ecstasy of the crowd, even in a just cause, must always be taken with caution. 

    This brings me back to Stiazhkina’s lecture on svoï. The full version of the sentence that became its title goes like this: 

    The formula of our nationalism is in the word “svoї,” since Ukrainian nationalism means that all the children sitting in the shelters, killed in the attacks of Russians, going to the frontlines, defending, dying in the fires after bombing, winning against all odds, all of these children are svoї. Ours. 

    That is the majority, of course. It does not remotely suffice for a Ukrainian identity, in my view, though all the avatars of svoї described by Stiazhkina are victims and survivors of a war against Ukrainian identity, a genocidal war, even when the identity of some of its casualties is not Ukrainian. What is inside of svoї, its true substance, its great gift, is solidarity. Identity is only an external frame, in this case imposed by Russia. 

    Michael Ignatieff has written in these pages about how his parents’ generation chose liberalism because “their generation also knew what it was to hunker down in a bomb shelter with strangers, trying to keep the talk in the darkness light while the ground shook” and “they had lived the cross-class solidarity of those wartime shelters, and they came home from the war believing that liberal government could bind the classes together in peacetime.” When I read those sentences, I reflected that that generation’s liberalism could also be described as svoї.

    Unfortunately, I have witnessed how the mercurial and barely tangible concept of svoї can be hijacked not only from outside by a savage foreign aggression, but also from the inside. Svoї seemed to be resistant to profiling — it is not a gender, a nationality, a generation — until it wasn’t. I noticed that it was often used to protect someone from criticism on the grounds that “one must not double-cross svoї.” In 2018 the phrase was prominently featured in the film The Wild Fields, based on the novel by Serhiy Zhadan, a writer who has become increasingly important in these war years. When I searched the novel (which was published in 2010) for this phrase, I couldn’t find it, though there were other formulations of a similar idea. 

    “One must not double-cross svoї:” precisely this sentence, cited from the film, has been employed to undermine the recent Polish-Ukrainian communiqué by a group of historians of the two countries, focused on the painful and bloody conflicts in the 1940s between Poland and Ukraine and their contemporary interpretations. The group was small, just two dozen researchers from both sides (two Ukrainian historians took back their signatures after the publication of the text and the scandal that ensued), and they tried to formulate a scholarly consensus on the conflicting interpretations of the twentieth-century violence in the villages of Volhynia, the western region of Ukraine during Nazi occupation — a notorious example of total war, ethnic cleansings, and cruel revenge. “We believe that it is necessary for both societies to acquire the paradigm all victims are ours regarding the shared past,” said the historians, “henceforth disabling the competition in victimhood, i.e. dividing them between “ours” [svoї in the original texts] and “the others.” Nationalists of both countries were unhappy with the statement, to put it mildly. The message of the critics was quite simple: stick with your own. No matter what some liberal academics say, the nationalist critics on both sides of the border declared, one should stand by svoї when it is right and when it is wrong. (The irony of these reactionaries citing the film based on Zhadan’s novel is that he was a leftist, even a communist, when he wrote it.) 

    There are other examples of this dark invocation of svoï. Here is one. In 2024, soon after the ferocious far-right nationalist Iryna Farion was killed on the street by an eighteen-year-old assassin, there occurred a remarkable discussion online. Before her death, Farion was much criticized for her hateful and often ludicrous speeches, even by people with nationalist beliefs. After she was murdered, the criticism of Farion — which was amply justified and much needed, in my opinion — became taboo. One of her defenders suggested that I was egregiously wrong to denounce her after death because we were, Farion and I, both “svoї”: both women and both Ukrainian. I replied with the Ukrainian equivalent of “I would rather be hit by a bus” than be considered svoї with Farion. 

    Something that I had considered ideology-proof suddenly appeared to be vulnerable to all sorts of ugly manipulations. As I say, svoï was hijacked. The integrity of the idea of svoї was based, at least in my eyes, on its immunity to such general frames as gender or nationality. It was certainly not a term for any kind of primordiality. It represented, instead, an ethics of solidarity. Yet now the joy of a happily-found human outcome had been turned into a prison. What was supposed to have been an expression of fellow feeling had been mutilated into an expression of prejudice and violence. 

    Let me be clear. I do not mind being profiled like all other mortals: as a woman, as a Ukrainian, as a European, as a member of Gen X, and so on. These generalizations are unavoidable, and they may even have some positive uses. I am certainly aware that we are even further from a post-national utopia than we were at the end of the last century. I believe that we all must pay taxes, even those of us who can buy an island to avoid doing so. But I need svoї. I need it to serve as the foundation of the hope that we can have communities which we build for ourselves and not only communities which have been built for us. A world in which svoї is nothing more than a form of predestination, an inherited fate, would be a dull and cruel world.

    But sometimes you find your svoї where you least expect it. 

    We were returning from a conference in Italy on the same plane with a new acquaintance of mine, a former judge from the Polish city Katowice, the youngest of a dynasty of Jewish lawyers. His grandparents came from Lviv, my native city, which they probably called Lemberg, and, pretending to be Poles, they managed to survive the Shoah. They left for Poland after the war. My new friend told me that he had located their prewar house in Lviv several years earlier. (I know the street; it is in the less fancy part of the former Jewish quarter of the city). “That’s my Wailing Wall,” he said. Now his family name is so Polish that it even sounds a bit Ukrainian to me. We are of the same generation, but we grew up in different countries — in socialist and post-socialist Poland and in Soviet and post-Soviet Ukraine — and in very different families. My grandmother came to Lviv from Kyiv at approximately the time when my new friend’s family left. And yet I immediately felt that he is one of my svoї. (I knew some Polish rock music and he knew Ukrainian rock bands, which may have helped.) 

    Yet finally I have no idea how it works. Something clicks when I meet people with a provenance from Lviv, a city that, to be honest, belongs to them more than to me. I have something that they don’t have and they have something that I don’t have. We all love dark humor and we exchange dangerous jokes. They live wherever they live and most of them have never lived in Lviv, and I live in Kyiv now. Still, we are a small global tribe, connected by intangible and almost undefinable lines. Try to profile us! Good luck with that.

    On our way from Kraków Airport to the railway station where we would part, my new friend was teaching me how to pronounce the Polish word “no!” properly. “No” is the close cousin of the Yiddish (and Ukrainian and Russian) “nu!” and it serves more or less the same purpose. I say more or less because the uses of “no!” are almost endless (which is why I had my lesson on the train). Depending on the tone in which it is uttered, it may mean either approval or disappointment, or a statement that life is full of hardships, or a signal to start a conspiracy, or “I told you so!,” or something else. On that train crowded with tourists we were rehearsing “no!” like two giant birds. 

    My newly acquired skill served me immediately on my next train. I sat next to a chatty Polish guy, a retired worker and a proud voter for the ruling party of national conservatives, who was also a bit skeptical about the amount of financial help that Ukrainian emigrants received in Poland — and yet he was very nice to me. The different “no” helped me to hold the conversation as the train was running to the eastern border, especially as my colloquial Polish is awkward. By the time he got off at his stop he had become a little bit svoï.

    How Poems Happen (For Me)

    I have come to recognize a certain kind of full-on insomnia as an aura, as before a headache, of a gestating poem. Which is not to say that these poems spring fully formed, Athena-like, out of the brain. Maybe it is how an oyster feels when the irritant gets under their nacreous skin.  It’s possible that the inability to sleep itself puts me in poetic mode (quarrels have a similar effect, evidently)—that that kind of disturbed, overwrought, stretched-thin consciousness creates the condition whereby the mundane shimmers with significance. 

    The poet A.E. Housman (who also posited the poem as pearl-from-irritant) confessed in a letter that “the desire, or the need [to write poems], did not come upon him often, and it came usually when he was feeling ill or depressed.” So it is possible that the not feeling one hundred percent well is part of it. Or maybe the poem is the logical result of being up all night, when the house is quiet (I have a teenager), and there are no distractions. Certainly, the anthologies are full of poets writing sonnets to Sleep or to the Moon. But there are other times when, during the broad light of day, I go hunting for poems, and make myself try to write them down. Sometimes a real poem comes out of a willing it to be, or even a mere exercise. Sometimes a good poem is fashioned out of a bad one, silk purse from sow’s ear, through cunning and relentless stitching and unstitching. Sometimes a poem starts as an “ear worm,” a catchy line or phrase that demands to be worked out and developed. Sometimes it is an image, a simile, a curious connection. Often there is a batch of poems, like pancakes: the first two raw in the middle, wonky, or burned, and the third just right. The method is that there is no method.

     One of the counterintuitive things about getting older is that writing poems does not get any easier after a lifetime of writing. Maybe it gets harder. I have been writing, and publishing, poems for a long time now. Among my very first acceptances was from Seventeen magazine when I was sixteen. I was elated beyond measure; it was summer and I remember going to the neighborhood pool and turning summersaults of joy under the water, blowing bubbles to keep water from going up my nose. And they sent me a check that was worth more than a whole night’s babysitting. The thrill of getting a poem right, and having an editor welcome it, never gets old. It still tickles the nose.

     I compose almost exclusively in “received forms” — sonnets, blank verse, syllabics, villanelles, etc. It is not that I do not appreciate well-wrought free verse, but my free verse poems are rarely as good as my more “formal” poems. For me, “free” and “formal” are deceptive terms. I find the infinite choices of a free verse poem, like an endless supermarket aisle of different breakfast cereals, to be paralyzing and unhelpful, while the limitations of formal verse are paradoxically freeing: the Universe, the Muse, the form, is collaborating, opening up possibilities you would never otherwise have considered. Rhyme, certainly, has the property of giving permission to the strange, unsettling, or serendipitous: rhyme is the reason. Form is about giving up some measure of control, a liberation.

     I do remember distinctly moments where I “learned” how to write a poem. Sometimes I was trying to do something else, something perhaps beyond my technical scope, and I stumbled into an unexpected thing. “The Man Who Wouldn’t Plant Willow Trees” was meant to be something smoother and more elegant — I think I was going to refer to the ancient discovery of salicylic acid (a chemical found in willow bark) as a painkiller, and that would connect somehow with the “weeping” willow. Now, I probably would be able to write that poem, and it might be clever and elegant, but I might not be able to write “The Man Who Wouldn’t Plant Willow Trees,” which surprised me with its hissing ending:

     Willows are slobs, and must be cleaned up after.

    They’ll bust up pipes just looking for a drink.
    Their fingers tremble, but make wicked switches.
    They claim they are sorry, but they whisper it.

     In short, there is no formula to writing a good poem. If one had a formula, obviously it would be easier to make them; you could have a production line. But then they would be, by definition, formulaic. Each time you make a poem you have to reinvent the wheel, or the pottery wheel. 

     Not that there aren’t tricks of a kind. One of the problems with being creative is that you have to somehow separate the childlike mind that creates and plays from the grown-up mind that censors and criticizes. (The grown-up mind can come in handy later, during revision, but needs to be completely misdirected in the first stage.) I think of the conscious mind, the editor mind, as something like an old-fashioned vampire, who can be easily distracted by various kinds of accounting, by flinging some buttons on the floor. Throw a number of syllables at him, or a new complicated rhyme scheme or verse form, so that he is left totting up their number on his abacus, and the essence of the poem can slip past his notice on tiptoe.

    I do have little spiels I give to young poets in hopes it will help them. Things I am constantly saying include “put it on paper; you cannot be too obvious.” Often there is a compelling idea, observation, or story in the back of the poet’s mind, but it exists nowhere on the page. The poet is afraid to be too clear, thinking that clarity is boring, or unpoetic. Yet clarity and mystery can coexist, like tide pools and their anemones. I tell poets to read and to memorize: make poetry part of the furniture of your mind. I talk about the anxiety of endings, how poets tend to panic once they are in a poem and go for an “emergency dismount” rather than finding the real ending of the poem. Often they have already passed that in their galloping panic. And I often prescribe W.S. Merwin’s “Berryman,” which ends:

     you can’t you can never be sure

    you die without knowing

    whether anything you wrote was any good

    if you have to be sure don’t write

     (Though I suspect Merwin knew that this poem was a keeper.)

     As for starting a poem, one way to think about starting a poem is getting into a pickle. The poet gets into a pickle, of their own devising, and has to figure a way out. If there is one. If there is an easy exit, you have not devised a good enough pickle. You have to somewhat enjoy being in a pickle — to, er, relish it, if you will. (Sorry!)

     Sometimes the most interesting part of a poem — the part of a poem that you might think was essential to its genesis — comes in at a late stage. This is where experience with revision is helpful. I know a poem is “done” (in as much as anything ever is) when I can return to it without tinkering, or when I can resist the itch to tinker. But during the tinkering phase, you need to hold open a sort of window in the mind — yes, many mixed metaphors here — for things that are trying to get into the poem. A villanelle I wrote during the stringent Covid lockdowns in Greece (a villanelle is a nineteen-line form of French origin with two rhyme sounds and two repeating lines waltzing around each other), which was perhaps about that claustrophobic lockdown feeling, called “Daedal,” is ostensibly about Daedalus and the building of the labyrinth on Crete to contain the Minotaur. Something about the villanelle form itself, which keeps turning corners onto a new path only to conclude on the same words over and over, felt like an aural version of a maze. The poem ends:

     The shaken Etch A Sketch awakes

    A lost child buried in its heart.

    To build a labyrinth it takes

    Some good intentions, some mistakes.

     That modern Etch a Sketch, its gray maze of lines and right angles, its rattling shuffle when you shake it to erase it, from my own Generation X childhood, is central to poem, I think, but it only made it into the poem in a very late revision. I think it was always there, in some vestibule of my brain, but I had to give it permission to enter the poem. You have to learn to listen to what might be out there, waiting to be let in.

    The novelist E.L. Doctorow observed that “Writing is like driving at night in the fog. You can only see as far as your headlights, but you can make the whole trip that way.” He is perhaps referring more to writing novels and fiction, writing that has plot and narrative and has to get from point A to point B. But any kind of writing has this element of un-knowing. (What Keats famously called “negative capability.”)  I would say that the difference, if there is any, in writing a poem is that you are also creating the road as you go. Remember that wonderful scene in The Wrong Trousers, with Gromit chasing Feathers McGraw in a train chase, but he is having to lay spare track as he goes? Something like that.

    To be in the midst of writing a poem is to be, willfully, and sometimes even pleasantly, though sometimes despairingly, lost. Darkling, you wander in a forest, your dropped breadcrumbs all behind you, being quietly devoured by woodland birds and snuffling wild animals. Or you are wandering in a labyrinth, darkling. (“Darkling,” I like to remind readers, sounds like an adjective, or a noun for a baby vampire, but in famous poems, is usually an adverb: “in the dark.”) But not a labyrinth of set stone — one that is alive, and moving, evolving. You are not the “hero” wandering in the labyrinth. You are also, usually, not the sad, hungry monster in the middle. You are his sibling, the perplexed princess maybe, with her ball of string, who invents the path by taking it. Only it isn’t yet a ball of string. Because you have to make that too, with your drop spindle and a cloud of unspun wool. You make the labyrinth by travelling it. And you make the clue of yarn.