A Letter From a Silent City

    This is one of an Iranian journalist’s dispatches from protests, morgues, and funerals over two weeks in January 2026, offering a rare ground-level view of what Amnesty International calls a “massacre.” Shared via an encrypted channel, these dispatches provide a firsthand account of a crackdown.

    Dear sister, hello. Today is January 8. It is 12:15 AM. I’ve just gotten home, and the sound of gunfire still hasn’t stopped. The internet and SMS have been down for hours, and even the phones are down. We have no way to reach each other. I don’t know why I’m writing these lines to you. I only know one thing: I have to write.

    I feel as if my lungs have swollen like balloons, filled with tear gas. My voice won’t come out after all the screaming. But none of that matters next to what I saw tonight in the streets of Tehran. There were so many of us. Everyone was in the streets. And yet, sister, tonight the best of us were taken. They went drenched in blood, as bullets tore through their heads, necks, and chests.

    The only reason we are still here, the only reason we didn’t go too, is that it wasn’t our turn yet. Maybe we slipped into another side alley. Maybe a bullet went astray. Maybe someone was running behind us, and the bullet found them instead. I don’t know. Maybe tomorrow it will be my turn.

    I decided to write you a few lines so it stays here. If I survive and the internet comes back, I will send it myself. If I don’t, I have entrusted a few people to send this to you. We are trapped in the darkest knot in Iran’s history. I came back alive tonight, but the volleys still haven’t stopped. I feel like a survivor of a massacre. For the rest of my life, I will have no duty except to tell of this crime.

    But if I’m here, one day when we sit together in a café on Khordmand Street and drink tea, I’ll tell you how long these hours felt, and how hard they were.

    I love you as much as all the moments we had the right to be together but weren’t.

    Sattar Khan Street, western Tehran, Thursday, January 8

    Tonight, I saw something in people that I had never seen at any protest before. A kind of clarity. People were determined to bring them down. Security forces opened fire. Instead of scattering, protesters lifted the wounded from the pavement and moved toward the gunmen.

    It was the strangest moment of my life. I was watching people who had accepted death. They came either to die or to be free.

    Eslamshahr, near Tehran, Friday, January 9

    A man brought his eight-year-old daughter to the protests. I begged him to take her home. This is dangerous. They have no mercy. They could shoot a child. The man pointed to his daughter and said, “This child is hungry. I would rather we both die here by bullets than watch my daughter die of hunger in front of my eyes.”

    Tehran, Kahrizak morgue, Saturday, January 10

    I went to Kahrizak, outside Tehran, to retrieve the body of my twenty-three-year-old cousin. I expected a morgue. Instead, we were taken to a warehouse. They opened a door, and bodies were heaped on top of one another, many shot in the head. An officer told us calmly, “Find him yourselves and bring him out.” His father fainted. We had to search through the corpses until we found Erfan and pulled him out. He had been shot in the heart.

    On the drive back, I saw refrigerated trucks heading toward Kahrizak. They carried the bodies of our young people.

    Tehran, Behesht-e Zahra Cemetery, Sunday, January 11

    At funerals, religious rituals have become political flashpoints. Each body should, by Muslim tradition, be escorted with “La ilaha illallah” (“No god is worthy of worship except Allah”). But every time a coffin was lifted, the crowd shouted “Death to the dictator,” as if to insist this young person did not die naturally. This young person was killed by the regime in the streets.

    Tehran Subway, Tuesday, January 13

    I was on the metro when her earbuds stopped working during a song. “Zombie” by the Cranberries had been playing. When the music cut out, I overheard two women nearby.

    They exchanged what they had heard and seen: a colleague’s niece killed in Rasht; a downstairs neighbor’s grandson shot on Sattar Khan Street. Then came a long silence.

    One woman asked: “Do you think it’ll happen this time?”

    The other replied: “I think it has to.”

    After another silence, twenty or thirty seconds maybe, the first woman asked: “If they’re gone, what will you do?”

    The answer was unexpectedly domestic. The other woman paused, then said, “I’ll do a deep clean. After Mahsa’s death,” a reference to the 2022 protests, “I haven’t done any house-cleaning. The place is a total mess.”

    In Iranian tradition, house-cleaning before the new year is a ritual of renewal: clearing away dust and sorrow to make space for something new. To me, the exchange suggested a quiet insistence that a future beyond fear is possible and worth preparing for.

    And the world owes our people a collective, national house-cleaning.

    The Re-Animators

    If, as we are told in Genesis, God created form from formlessness, and gave spirit to blank matter, then it is the puppeteer whose powers achieve something like the divine. Manipulating fingers, strings, hidden voices, shadows, paper cut-outs, or carefully placed lights, the artist crouches beneath or behind the stage and transforms into a kind of demiurge, animating the inert and imbuing a previously inanimate figure with movement, character, and life. This process is a form of transference, a physical transmission of energy and dexterity from puppeteer to puppet. The puppet is a hollow vessel, to be filled with our life force. Hence why puppets are so creepy: they require our life to live out their own. Yet no matter how cheap, how threadbare, how see-through their mechanisms, they fascinate us. In some strange and ancient way, perhaps, we recognize ourselves in them.

    This is how I feel, anyway, watching the films of the Brothers Quay. Surrealists, junk collectors, fetishistic recreators of a mythical Middle Europe: since the early 1970s, these identical twins from the Philadelphia suburbs have co-created some four-dozen shorts and three full-length features, on top of music videos, commercials, stage sets, and installation pieces. They are like almost nothing else. But Stephen and Timothy Quay are known, above all else, for their work with puppets: those ragged, remaindered figures scavenged and repurposed into a run of dreamlike stop-motion films. 

    If a typical puppeteer uses their movements to simulate life, the Quays use theirs to question life, and the reality that contains it. Their mannequins dance to outside music, ascend through dream-towers, battle enemies and compulsions within plainly-artificial dioramas — all while under the sway of forces from the beyond. The Street of Crocodiles, from 1986, begins with a live-action man slicing a puppet free of his strings, loosing him into a district of mirrors and display cases. This quarter is home to a good many other puppets, automata who act according to their own desires, without anyone to direct them. Rather, each is at the mercy of its particular design, condemned to enact a particular purpose, without the freedom to search for more. Everything is shot very closely. The effect is uncanny and unforgettable.

    The Street of Crocodiles is adapted from a series of short stories by the Polish writer Bruno Schulz, and this clash — between constraint and desire — is as Schulzian as it gets. Born in 1892 in the provincial city of Drohobycz, Schulz spent the early part of his life trapped beneath his merchant father, unable to pursue his art, and unwilling to enact his expansive sexual fantasies in his life. So he channeled them into his illustrations and his stories, a short corpus of domestic myths which transformed his hometown, his family’s house, and his father’s shop into zones of mysterious and magical simultaneity. In Schulz, everything is at once self and opposite: the miraculous is also the cheap; the present is also the past; the dead can, through some magical suspension, hover still on the border of life. A kind of humdrum animacy hangs in the air, an immanent sense that secret and profound truths might express themselves on shop shelves, in mildewed attics, in cracked and rusted objects, and in the life that thrives and multiplies on junk heaps, or a hidden crevice in the garden wall.

    Schulz’s writing, alongside the illustrations of postwar Polish surrealists like Roman Cieślewicz, helped the Quays to unlock their art. Reading him taught the pair “that matter was never dead; that it contained infinite shades and nuances; that it was in a constant state of migration”— and that it might be manipulated into any number of potential forms. Their aesthetic — which, in its insistence upon the life force in dead matter, is a junk-shop coexistence of unlike things: flatness and depth, texture and artifice, paper cutouts and frogspawn. They salvage their puppets and sets from flea markets and sidewalk sales, discerning vitality in tawdry things that others have cast aside.

    The Quays work alone in their London studio. They have spent the past twenty years piecing together an adaptation of Schulz’s Sanatorium Under the Sign of the Hourglass, from 1937. In the story, a man travels by train to a town in the high mountains. His father, long-dead in our world, survives up there as a patient in a peculiar sanatorium where time is “late by an interval whose length is impossible to define.” Both dead and not dead, Father has reactivated past time, postponing the moment of his own extinction, living on in a liminal gap between what has already happened and the possibility of what might not. 

    It is a strange and strangely plotty story, a shapeshifting lethargic narrative where nothing can or cannot happen, and every development is eventually undone. The drowsing narrator has seemingly entered someone else’s dream, full of phantasmagoric symbols which belong to everyone except him. The Quays follow the story’s essential beats, beginning with a prolonged train journey, an encounter with the sanatorium’s odd director, a night spent with Father in his coffin of a bed. They mix this in with symbols of their own: a paper theater in a valise; an examination room viewed through a peephole; repetitive, stuttering footage of a woman’s leg projected onto a wall. Using a variety of optical and editing effects, the animators are attempting to capture the postponed, refracted time of Schulz’s sanatorium, tripling images within the frame or harshly running them back, like the skipping of a scratched DVD. 

    For the first twenty or so years of their career, the Quays displayed a musical virtuosity, bringing their surreal images to something approaching life. The Street of Crocodiles is a degraded ballet of twirling screws and unwound thread that enacts Schulz’s constituent animacy. Their adaptations of Robert Walser turn that graphomaniac’s microscriptic tales into fables of subconscious conflict, the yearning of an imprisoned mind to ascend to a realm of magic. Institute Benjamenta, or This Dream People Call Human Life, from 1995, dispenses with animation altogether, deploying its cast of prospective servants (including a young Mark Rylance) as a dour collection of anthropoid puppets, ordered about by their teachers and submitting body and soul to their future calling. It is their vocation, not their humanity, that gives them life. Without it, they dissolve, dissembling into a mob that wanders blindly through the halls of the Institute, prodded on by old dead forms. 

    The world of the Quays’ Sanatorium Under the Sign of the Hourglass is a similarly degraded and symbol-infested place, a set of dust-filled dioramas and odd digital effects. If their early work mirrored the industrial avant-garde of David Lynch’s Eraserhead, their latest reminded me of Twin Peaks: The Return. Here, the experiments are not physical but visual, manipulating chronology to deploy and distort images. Like the residents of the sanatorium, the film is relative, not linear. Scenes will proceed and then immediately retract, images repeat themselves with a harsh digital stutter. There is no movement here, and very little relation from part to part. We seem to be in a dream within a dream, alienated from cause and effect, and thus from the sense that anything might — or can — change. It is admirable, if not always enjoyable. It can be uncommonly chilling.

    The Quays give their film a framing device, where an auctioneer gazes into a series of lenses set in an antique device which display the final seven images recorded by a human cornea on November 19, 1942 — the day that Bruno Schulz was shot by an SS officer on the streets of occupied Drohobycz. Each image corresponds with a section of the story, giving access to the memories and stories of this dead man. Yet it comes with a cost: in order to view the image, the cornea must be damaged; in order to see all seven, it must be destroyed.

    The film thus ends as an elegy for Schulz himself, whose seemingly infinite fictions mask the plundered brevity of his life — a death recorded out in the world which has not yet snuffed out the life of the work. The Quays can manipulate his limbs, bending him into strange shapes, marrying his old words to new symbols. But without their fingers, the figure collapses. Like anything from the Street of Crocodiles, it is a tawdry miracle, a paper mirage. Humans create and mimic and quite often destroy life, but they can only pretend to resurrect it.

    The War Society

    Four years have passed from the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Twelve years have passed since the capture of the Crimea and the start of war in eastern Ukraine. In 2022 it became manifestly clear that this was a war undertaken in order to destroy the entire Ukrainian nation. Its genocidal character is not concealed in the Russian media, it is emphasized: Russia cheers the decimation of Ukraine’s vital infrastructure and Russia relishes the death of Ukrainian civilians.

    Yet Russian society — if there actually is such a unitary thing — exists in two aggregate states simultaneously. According to the official position, the society supports the war unconditionally and stands united and ready for sacrifice. In contrast, among the cultural dissidents who consider Russian society as a countervailing force to the Russian regime, the society is against the war but cannot express its disapproval for fear of punishment.

    Which group is correct? What is Russian society and what does it think of Russia’s bloodletting? I think that the truth is not simply somewhere in between, not in numbers, not in the image of a society divided or oppressed or reduced to hypocrisy or coerced into mimicking the signals of loyalty desired by the authorities. Something else has happened in Russian society. The mask has grown into the face.

    Two Marauders

    There are still many liberal émigrés who say, “When the war began in 2022…” But this is historically inaccurate and morally blind: the historical changes that led Russia to its present state regarding Ukraine began in 2014, with the Crimean euphoria and the hybrid invasion in Donbas. That was the beginning of the corruption — I cannot find a better word — of the society, its acceptance of a new and unprovoked war against a neighboring sovereign state. The proxy character of the military action before the participation of the Russian army was revealed — remember the unmarked green men? — offered excuses for one’s conscience, and held out the false hope that this was just a local conflict that could be resolved without fateful consequences and that one could live with it the way one does with an unpleasant but not fatal disease.

    Encountering no prolonged systematic protest from opposition forces, the invasion of Ukraine did more than untie Putin’s hands for further escalation. It changed the Russian map of the world, in which the West became the grand and definite enemy of Russia. It also altered the country’s moral climate. Moral climate is difficult to measure, but it can be felt.

    I felt it at the military parade on May 8, 2014 — May 8, the annual Russian celebration of the victory in World War II — just a few months after the capture of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Ukraine — a military parade in a country that was at war again and pretending that it was not. I went not to watch the parade but to feel the mood of the crowd. What mood would pervade the crowds of people looking at tanks, self-propelled artillery systems, and armored personnel carriers of the same models that were being used by Russian army units secretly brought into Ukraine? What would be the spirit of this parade, the parade of the army that treacherously attacked its brothers-in-arms who had fought with them and won the victory celebrated on May 8?

    It was a bright but cool day, and there were crowds along the parade route: families, couples, random passersby who stopped to watch, magnetized by the anticipation of the sight of armored monsters of war obeying their drivers. Saint George ribbons fluttered here and there: yellow and black, flame and smoke, the colors of the imperial Order of St. George, which had become the official symbol of growing militarism under Putin. Children running through the crowd were handing out the ribbons, and when asked the cost, they cheerfully replied: “It’s free! This is sacred, not for sale!” They did sell straw-colored World War II Soviet infantry caps with red stars pinned on them. A lot of people were buying them and then setting them on the heads of their children and their girlfriends and their elderly parents. Men of draft age were too embarrassed to wear them, I suppose.

    In previous years, the grass verges of the highway and the internal police troops posted along the parade route clearly divided the military from the civilians, the street where technology and uniforms reigned from the broad sidewalks filled with viewers in profoundly civilian dress. But now the caps with stars blurred the boundary; the crowd no longer looked completely civilian. Thanks to those straw caps, whose style was recognizable from dozens of Soviet films about the Great War, the crowd seemed to be responding to the parade. Without a surge of emotion, without hysteria, but echoing it. It wasn’t out-and-out approval, but a kind of passive self-portrait: it was enough for every fifteenth or twentieth person in the crowd to wear the silly grandfather’s cap to make the multitude as a whole look different and feel different. A new mood, a new community, arose that did not yet sense itself as one: a community in which the boundary between civilian and military, between peace and war, started to become less and less distinct. 

    That boundary began to dissolve first at the level of symbols. No one was making people buy and wear the military caps with Soviet stars or forcing the crowd to pin the St. George ribbons to their shirts. It was hard to understand: were they doing it only because a new sign of collective identity was on offer, or did they actually need it? I tried to remember how that significant ribbon first appeared in Moscow. It was at the start of the 2000s, at the peak of economic success, when Russia seemed to be searching for a visible image, a visible emblem that would express its renewed claim to superpower status. It was then that the ribbons first appeared, tying victory in World War II to the present, casting the present generation as heirs of the victory and its triumphalist spirit. 

    Like a shadow, like a rhyme, came an accompanying fad: stickers on cars. “At Berlin,” some of the stickers said — the slogan that Soviet soldiers painted on tanks and Katyusha rockets. Others showed a figure of a man with a hammer-and-sickle instead of a head sodomizing a man with a swastika. The caption read: “We can do it again.” It was the absolute antithesis of the European “Never Again.” At the peak of the sticker fad, around 2012, probably every twentieth car in Moscow bore that awful sticker. The stickers were like the acne of aggressive puberty. Unlike the St. George ribbons, they were not supported officially, but they spread like a rash, signaling the retirement of a taboo, the openly articulated need for violence directed outward, and the confirmation of national greatness restored through brutal action. The actions came quickly.

    But let’s return for a moment to May 2014. At the edge of the crowd, maintaining an ironic, mocking distance two or three steps away, were two young men, in their early twenties I would say, dressed well but not like Muscovites. (Residents of the capital notice these things right away.) They were smiling and squinting in the sun and enjoying expensive ice cream cones. A couple of pigeons flew over to pick up crumbs and squabbled at their feet. Ordinary, affable faces, short hair, good bearing: they were former or active military in civilian clothes. They spoke in loud voices, apparently about something pleasant and unrelated to the parade or to military service, and I moved closer to eavesdrop.

    They had just returned from the zone of Russian hybrid occupation in eastern Ukraine. They managed to smuggle out the automatic rifles and ammunition that they had been given as “volunteers.” They were discussing what to do next, as they crunched the waffle cones and licked chocolate from their lips. The conversation was full of innuendo and insinuations, but anyone who spoke the language would have understood exactly what they were talking about and what they meant, and they seemed to enjoy that. They were weighing the advantages of staying in Russia and robbing banks, armored cars, and businesses that dealt with cash or going back to Ukraine and committing robberies there. Well, not robberies exactly, but confiscations, requisitions, expropriations. They had a rich list of synonyms for illegal seizure. The discussion was ended by a short phrase spoken by the older man, the leader: “They have police here. It’s risky. Back there we are the police.”

    I wasn’t the only one to hear this conversation. There were other people within earshot. The thundering vehicles of the parade had not yet reached us and sound traveled clearly. And no one was outraged, no one distanced themselves, no one led their children away. The contrast was not as sharp as it should have been: the emotional parade celebrating the sacred victory, the military caps, ribbons, and stars honoring the memory of heroic ancestors — and the two thugs relishing their ice cream and their loathsome plans, two heroes of our new times, in which Russia has become a shameless marauder.

    There are moments that seem to prophesy the future, to delineate a new norm that has already arrived but not yet attained its full force, not yet become the final quotidian reality.

    Playing Luhansk

    When people claim that Russian society is somehow insulated from the war and able to maintain “normality,” I always want to ask how that is possible. War is a powerful moral stressor that demands an absolute choice, and always demands explanations: war needs to be integrated into the picture of the world that it is upending and tearing apart. War, near or far, finds its way into homes, minds, and hearts, especially if the main component of a society’s defense against it is absent — clear public condemnation protected and ensured by the freedom to speak out without fear.

    It was a late evening in early May, a little over a year after the invasion, a year after the parade. I decided not to stay in Moscow and went out to the countryside. There would be no shameful surge of militarism there; in the country people had other concerns — vegetable beds, planting, greenhouses. Well, maybe some idiot would loudly play military songs while grilling shashlik in a campfire, but it would be far away. My closest neighbors were never like that.

    Our dacha was located where the front stopped in the winter of 1941. The Wehrmacht did not get any closer to Moscow than here. Flooded trenches snaked along the edges of the forest. Dugouts with collapsed roofs and tank trenches filled with black water were hidden deep in the woods. The forest to the east was ours, the forest to the west was theirs, the Germans’. We, the children of the last Soviet generation, grew up in this topography. We played war games in those woods and trenches: naturally we played the Great War, too. 

    We had toy Nagant revolvers that fired stinky blue caps, homemade guns made from slats and pipes that replaced rifles and machine guns — the Soviet toy industry did not produce such toys, as if there was some kind of fear among the Party bigwigs — and also a rare wonder: a plastic Maxim machine gun half the size of the real thing, with a characteristic water-cooling jacket around the barrel and a red light that flashed in the muzzle when you pulled the trigger.

    Perestroika had started, there were long lines for groceries, but every spring and summer in that forest outside Moscow battles from the past were recreated. The “Germans” attacked and “our troops” defended themselves, and then we moved into a counterattack. Of course no one wanted to be a German. You were made one because you were in debt or broke a rule or lost a toss. That was our childhood’s unconditional understanding of good and evil, seemingly inalienable from the understanding of the country’s history, its moral right in the world.

    After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the war games wound down. As a teenager in the mid-1990s I noticed that the next generation of children was no longer interested in fighting in forest trenches. They weren’t interested in forests, dugouts, and tents. There were new movies, new screen heroes, and new toy weapons. The children who came after us enacted in the dacha streets battles between robots and people, fighting the Terminator and space aliens; humanity against the others, mechanical or animate.

    By then Russia’s first war against Chechnya was already raging. But as far as I can remember, it never became the subject of children’s games. Neither did the Second Chechen War, which began in 1999. Despite all the official propaganda glorifying the heroic actions of the Russian Army, especially after Putin came to power, there was some kind of psychological barrier against acting it out. Something kept children from seeing these two wars of Russia as a plain explication of good and evil, a clear reflection of the debased moral situation.

    One evening I was sitting on the porch in the twilight, listening to the fading sounds of the day. One side of the dacha property led to the forest, the forest with the trenches, the forest of the old games of pretend war. I was thinking about those innocent but not-so-innocent games, the purple splotches of squashed rowanberries on our shirts intended to show wounds — and suddenly I heard rustling in the woods, I saw the slanting lights of telephone flashlights, and someone said, “Three, I’m One, can you hear me?”

    “I hear you fine, One,” came a voice from the right.

    “Surround them, Three!” commanded One.

    “Kill the khokhols!” shouted another.

    It was so strange, so unimaginable, that — even though the voices obviously belonged to adolescents — for a moment I thought they were actual Russian soldiers. The voices and the lights vanished into the forest, melted into the trees. I experienced a cognitive confusion, when the mind refuses to believe the senses and considers what actually happened a fantasy or a dream.

    In the morning at the well I met a childhood friend who now works in a bank and has a thirteen-year-old son. I told her what I had seen and heard. She sighed, waited for a bit, and making up her mind, said: “Yes, my boy is also one of them.” It turned out that on weekends, all the dacha boys pick up toy guns and play Luhansk.

    “I’ve forbidden it and taken away his automatic weapon,” she said wearily. “We don’t watch TV at home, so where is this coming from? It’s like an epidemic. And no one tires of it.” We said our goodbyes. I had the feeling that despite the seeming triviality of the subject — children’s war games, what of it? — I had witnessed a transformation in historical eras. If children accepted the aggression against Ukraine as a good cause, then things were really terrifying. And for the immediate historical future, hopeless.

    “We Can Do It Again”

    My grandmother’s two brothers, my two great-uncles, lie in Ukrainian soil somewhere near Kharkiv. They died during the encirclement of the Red Army forces in 1942 and the precise location of their burial is unknown. As far as I can estimate from old maps of the battle, it is highly likely that the Russian soldiers invading Ukraine in 2022 walked over their unmarked graves.

    The Russian propaganda discourse claims that this war is being waged in their hallowed name: the old Russian heroes who had fought fascism and Nazism, which had now reared its head again. The new Russian heroes were “finishing” the glorious work of their grandfathers. How could such an explanation, such a caricature, coming from the mouths of people who were notoriously full of lies, seem at all credible?

    But it did and it does. I wouldn’t say that it is believed literally, that is, that the lies are accepted as facts. But the crusading moralistic mood does legitimize the war, and more, it elevates the war to a mythological sanctity. This is not accidental. Victory in World War II was the main generator of moral meanings in post-Stalin Soviet culture. It set the typologies of good and evil, high and low, unprecedented heroism and vileness. Most importantly, it conferred meaning to life and, conversely, was the antidote to meaninglessness. It was the universal answer to existential questions.

    Left without the “carcass” of communist ideology, Russia long sought a replacement. I believe that the new idea-free ideology is expressed in its most concise form by that car sticker: “We Can Do It Again.” It is the quintessential idea of historical revenge, of lethal nostalgia, of the sentimental longing for the lost golden age of the Soviet empire which birthed our contemporary monsters.

    When they say in Russia that we can do it again, they mean that everything may be repeated, not only select parts of the past. And so Russia falls backwards through time, plunging into Stalinism, into its worst episodes of mendacity, ruthlessness, violence, and evil. “Falling into the archaic,” into savagery, may seem like hyperbole, an emotional description that cannot be grounded and systematically confirmed by facts. But that is not so. Consider that for the last few decades various institutions of the Russian state have commonly used torture. During the wars against Chechnya, prisoners of war were tortured by the Russian army and state security apparatus in secret cells. The list of torture methods used has been recorded in detail by human rights groups. Arrested citizens and prisoners have been tortured by Russian police and Russian prison guards, and periodically videos from security cameras are leaked to the internet, proving the commonplace reliance on barbarism. 

    With the full-fledged invasion in 2022 and the swell of Ukrainian prisoners of war, torture grew from a feature of Russian policy into a system, a regular practice of a new level of violence. The bodies of Ukrainian prisoners bear gruesome testimony. Male and female Ukrainians who were released during mass prisoner exchanges returned with mutilated flesh. Their testimonies confirm that torture was a constant feature of imprisonment.

    As a rule, police torture is meant to leave no traces, only occasionally growing into extremes of sadism that cannot be hidden; thus the military and security agents who tortured their victims in Chechnya hid the bodies to cover up the torture. But Ukrainians in Russian prisons are tortured and mutilated for show, performatively, knowing full well that this evidence might someday be seen by the whole world. This is clearly not an excess on the part of the torturers, it is a state-sanctioned modus operandi

    It is true that this is a strategy of psychological warfare, an attempt to break the prisoners’ spirits and erase their identities. (Psychological violence is often utilized to accelerate Russification.) Mass torture is a tool of intimidation, state terror, a threatening message to all citizens of Ukraine: this will happen to anyone who dares resist. But there is something else taking place too, some less familiar evil, a shocking surplus of cruelty. People in Russia were tortured on such a scale and so viciously twice in the twentieth century: during the Civil War and during the Great Terror, when they beat confessions and false evidence out of people. And now the Russian worst has returned, and then some. Russia’s withdrawal in September 2025 from the European Convention Against Torture is just another humiliation of the victims. 

    This barbarity, this enthusiastic dehumanization, this surplus of cruelty — which includes posting videos of murdering relatives and strangers, bashing a head with a sledgehammer, slitting a throat on camera — does not only remove a moral taboo and destroy moral norms. In the totalitarian model of terror in 1937, the justification “we didn’t know” was possible, albeit dubious, but in the new iteration of Russian terror, the public aspect is not hidden in dungeons and files. On the contrary, the horror is publicized. Now nobody can protest that they don’t know.

    There are situations in which there can be no neutral position — in which neutrality is excluded. Such circumstances demand an urgent and unconditional reaction: intervene, stop, save. When the defenseless are tortured, neutrality is impossible. When high tech weapons are used to kill civilians, neutrality is impossible. A society that does not react to such moral emergencies — whatever the reasons — loses its future, ties itself up in bloody bonds that will eventually turn into a denial of any guilt, into a vast collective lie.

    We can argue to what degree Russians actually believe Putin’s propaganda and support Putin’s war, but the argument is in many ways pointless. By not reacting, by not recoiling, by not demonstrating a natural disgust, the society becomes damaged morally to such a degree that the question of supporting or not supporting the war becomes secondary. The absence of an instinctive horror, the mass unspoken rejection of a critical reaction, this chilling mass complacence, is the war itself, the expression of the war in people’s behavior. They may think that they are neutral, that they have nothing to do with it, that the war is far, far away, but the war is here, it has triumphed within every individual.

    Many Russian liberals tend almost unconsciously to reduce the zone of criminality to the line of fighting, and the territory under attack by drones and missiles to the deepest and most distant reaches of Ukraine. There is where the Russian army is committing crimes, there is where the chief evil is taking place. This is an attempt to separate the war from the society, the war from the country, to depict the war as a centrifugal force directed outward, to prepare a kind of psychological alibi for the Russian population.

    Over the four years since the invasion, the war has penetrated deep into the society, expanding and spreading the zone of criminality, not always in the legal sense of the word. The war has lasted so long and demanded so many expenditures that in one way or another tens of millions of people are involved actively and emotionally in its prosecution, either via family ties to direct participants, or by working in related industries, logistics, propaganda, and so on. The circle of involved people is expanding, creating a war society — a transformation which did not occur either during the conflict in Afghanistan or the conflict in Chechnya. Those wars were punitive colonial expeditions that did not demand enormous excitement or participation from the entire country.

    Today, by contrast, the palpable burden of war is spread over the population as a whole. It might one day lead to a protest, there is always hope, but given the present social configuration in Russia I think it will more likely lead to a growing involvement supported by the certainty that a total defeat, which would ensure retribution, is highly unlikely.

    Losses and Hyperadaptivity

    Over the last four years Russian military losses (killed, wounded, imprisoned) have been enormous and certainly not comparable to any previous altercation since World War II. One would think that, even for purely quantitative reasons, Russian society would feel the losses and reflexively turn against the war; after all, cemeteries with “heroes of the armed forces” are expanding next to every Russian city, which means that the scope of the losses on the local level is not hidden and will continue to be obvious unless they stop burying soldiers.

    But that automatic reaction is not occurring. The increase in losses has not provoked a growth of antiwar sentiment, as it did, for example, during World War I, when the Russian army disintegrated in four years. Why not? I think this is a manifestation of the main characteristic of Russian “society”: its hyperadaptivity. One could say that it has no other cause determining its qualities  — it is essentially protean, mutable, although it can somehow appear essentially Russian in each of its adapted states, and even fool itself.

    I consider this hyperadaptivity to be the chief legacy of the Soviet project, which created a human type that, while capable of a certain sincerity in personal life, became thoroughly accustomed to imitation and imposture in public life to the degree that blending in became an absolutely essential social skill. Even in their finest manifestations, contemporary Russians are people of fluid emotions and moods rather than of unconditional convictions; they can express hope for the future and feel the cleansing winds of historical change, but they can just as easily (easily is the operative word here) reject those hopes. Oh well, it didn’t work out, better luck next time, or never.

    This rule has exceptions, of course. Generalizations about many millions of people are always inadequate, and there are many people whose biographies and actions contradict this tendency to serial conformism. I am speaking only about mass behavior, about the fact that after 1991 almost no social structures were created for extended struggle, for resistance and protest in adverse circumstances. Even the large-scale street protests against the falsification of the election results in 2011–2013, which had become a noticeable phenomenon, were a symbolic representation of the struggle but not the struggle itself, stemming from the unconditional prospect of the return of totalitarianism to a country that had weak immunity to it, a country with an imperial complex, a country possessing nuclear weapons and capable of destroying the entire world. The same lack of historical seriousness could be traced in Alexei Navalny’s stubborn refusal to dwell on the Russian aggression against Ukraine as one of the principal crimes of Putin’s regime between 2014 and 2022. 

    The hyperadaptivity of the Russian psyche is imitation that does not realize it is imitation — that is allegedly a struggle, but one in which everyone has already given up, and capitulated prematurely. There are semi-actions, heartfelt desires for change, the use of props — white ribbons as distinguishing signs, the slogan “Russia Will Be Free”  — but these stirrings are attended by a catastrophic lack of understanding of the seriousness of the situation, and by an underestimation of the enemy. I recall some friends, young architects, who took part in the white-ribbon demonstrations and at the same time worked on projects for modernizing public spaces in Moscow, projects that were initiated by the authorities to preempt protests by giving disgruntled young residents a less alienating and therefore more pacifying environment. They sincerely did not see the contradiction.

    Today this hyperadaptivity — this insurmountable flexibility  — is the main resource of stability and endurance for the Putin system. To be sure, Russians have practical reasons to keep their heads down: the repressive apparatus is harsh, and arrests and trials instill fear and force the population into submission. But I do not believe that this is the end of the matter: the repressions are limited but effective precisely because they find the fertile ground of the collective hyperadaptivity, which causes the society to be drawn directly or indirectly into the war, to accept it as a new reality that has no alternative, and to discover in this new reality new personal roles, opportunities, and benefits arising from the war.

    Drones in Schools

    As a former journalist who covered education, I sometimes read local newspapers online — city and regional, the lowest level of the press. My collection of links goes back to my old reporting days at a newspaper that closed in 2014. It is like a magnifying glass on daily life in the Russian provinces. In the old days I used this as my method of finding interesting stories to report. Now I use this loop to watch how the war weaves itself like a red thread into the fabric of everyday life, imperceptibly changing administrative and public institutions.

    Labor collectives and enterprises collect money “to aid the front.” A human rights activist has a column for “Veterans of the SVO” in which he answers questions about benefits and payments. (SVO is the euphemism for “special military operation,” which is the official Russian term for the war in Ukraine.) Perhaps the most telling change is in education. Cadet classes are multiplying, offering military instruction and advice. Within the framework of the “Conversations About Important Things” state program, schools are now giving institutional access to former military personnel in the growing infrastructure of war glorification, with jobs like “advisor to the regional head on SVO issues” or “representative of the Committee of Families of Homeland Warriors.” This infrastructure has not yet been formalized nationally, it varies from region to region, but it is growing everywhere, like the below-ground branches of a mycelium fungus. 

    Officers, soldiers, nurses. We can argue about how much attention schoolchildren should pay to them, but they now have their place and their hours in the schools. In poorer areas, master classes are held on weaving camouflage nets, making stretchers, sewing balaclavas, and so on; in wealthier regions, they open UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) control clubs or tank modeling clubs. These grassroots activities, which bring war into the lives of children, are difficult to track and to map, but their traces can be found in every local news feed. Moreover, special entertainment and support programs are often created for the children of Russian military personnel, setting them apart as a special “caste” with privileges that are significant against the backdrop of general regional poverty.

    According to an investigation last July by the Insider, a splendid independent Russian online publication, classes on the operation of drones are now part of the Russian educational system, reaching hundreds of thousands of students, some of whom — after passing a selection process — are already directly involved with the military-industrial complex and the armed forces. If we add local and decentralized initiatives such as drone lessons and classes, the reach of this training is even greater. This is no longer a Soviet-style basic military training lesson, where a military instructor shows kids how to throw a dummy grenade. It is a direct window into a large universe of cutting-edge technology, inaccessible to children and teenagers except through participation in government programs.

    We are witnessing the emergence of a somewhat intuitive, nonstandardized fusion of “classical” patriotic education and high-tech training. Ideological indoctrination, as was the case before, is gradually giving way to a de-ideologized futuristic training in the combat skills of a digitalized world, in which the enemy is conditional and vague, and where it is easier to dehumanize the opponent.

    In a situation where there is a lack of prospects and ideas about the country’s global goals, this contentless militaristic  futurism becomes a substitute for a vision of the future. This is, of course, a sop to the younger digitalized generation, but unfortunately it is a clever one. A true ideological fanaticism, a true party obsession, is no longer viable: after the collapse of communism in Russia, the human type capable of being its avatar has almost disappeared. But around the world we are seeing the emergence of a new type of fanatical technocrat (the sterling example is Elon Musk), who stands outside of parties, promises to transform the future for the better, and flirts with authoritarianism. Drones, AI — these technologies are synonymous with the future and are its material embodiment. They are already tangibly changing the present, including the practice of warfare, by injecting a glamorous high-tech dimension into the dirty reality of the trenches; the all-seeing eye of a drone hovering above the battle and looking for its victim..

    Russia has repeatedly tried to create a replacement for the Pioneers (the communist version of the Scouts), and the pro-Kremlin youth movements of the 2000s — Walking Together and Nashi — long ago faded into oblivion, stillborn from the outset and serving only as a springboard to power for hundreds of cynical young careerists. The creation of Yunarmiya (Youth Army) in 2016, the second year after the annexation of Crimea, followed by Dvizhenie Pervykh (Movement of the First) in 2022 was perceived as yet another attempt to continue this ideology-free training. But the semantic shift had already taken place: the word “Army” appeared in the name of this civil organization, and the ongoing war had changed the vector of its development from an anemic pro-government agenda with unclear goals to a militant patriotism and militarization. 

    Naturally, the official figures for these organizations — Yunarmiya, approximately 1.8 million members; Movement of the First, eleven million members — are just numbers on paper created for reporting purposes. But the danger is not in the token events, rallies, gatherings, patriotic song contests, and so on. The danger lies in the logic of a war of conquest, which requires ever more drones and accelerates military development and economic borrowing and imports technology, making the devices much more accessible, including for the purposes of the militaristic education of teenagers. Four years ago, the phrase “UAV class” would have been understood exclusively as a type of UAV, and the idea that Russian schools would include drone control in their curricula would have seemed absurd: why would they have included it, and where would the money have come from?

    Today, thanks to the Russian war industry’s current whirl into overdrive, UAV-equipped provincial schools have laser tag equipment in their classrooms. In 2025, a separate course on UAVs was introduced in schools with a textbook created by employees of Geoscan, a Russian drone manufacturer. This is part of the federal project called “Personnel for Unmanned Aerial Systems,” which is scheduled to run until 2035 and includes preschool, school, and university levels. Preschool!

    This reality has not yet been recognized by experts on Russia, and its consequences have not yet been described. And the Russian opposition, which insists that Russian society remains largely unaffected by the war, also does not want to recognize the militarization of the educational system. And while it may seem that I am focusing too much on drones and schools, that they are too narrow an issue, I think not. I think that they are the most important symbol of the current fusion of Russian society and Russian war. 

    The Ukrainians, too, have drones, and their drones attack Russian enterprises working for the war, and explosions and fires are recorded in virtually every region. But Russian drones are not only on the front lines and in the Ukrainian rear. They are in Russian classrooms, and everyone knows why they are there: the war brought them there. Everyone understands what kind of personnel the federal program should be cultivating for which kinds of unmanned systems. “The Movement of the First is a decent army,” Putin said in May of 2025. A very revealing description of a youth organization.

    From children who ten years ago played “Luhansk” in a forest near Moscow, shooting toy guns at imaginary Ukrainians and breaking their parents’ rules, we have arrived at a generation that will play the same game in school classrooms, controlling actual unmanned systems. The kids from 2015 may already be in the army. And this is still the same war. One war. One long war.

    Odious Art

     Is it possible to create an artistic masterpiece whose content is morally and politically loathsome? If so, what should we make of such art? I can think of one clear example: Birth of a Nation, the silent film directed in 1915 by D. W. Griffith. About its repellent message there can be no doubt. The story of two families, one in the North and one in the South, during and after the American Civil War, it is pure propaganda for the Ku Klux Klan.

    Based on two novels by Thomas Dixon, Jr., The Clansman and The Leopard’s Spots, Griffith’s epic movie paints an idealized picture of the antebellum South, where slaves lived in happy harmony with their white masters. This paradise of racial hierarchy is brutally disturbed by northern liberals, who not only win the Civil War but also give blacks the right to vote, thereby upsetting the “natural order.” Given their freedom, the blacks in Griffith’s movie start behaving like sex-crazed, power-hungry savages. White women are no longer safe. Chaos reigns. And only the heroic march of the white-robed KKK saves the virtue of white womanhood and the honor of white men.

     Many of the blacks are played by white actors, mugging and leering grotesquely in blackface. The most villainous character in the film is a venal mulatto politician who does the most unpardonable thing of all — he gets a law passed allowing mixed-race marriages. The horror of this is dramatized in the most notorious scene in the movie. A freedman named Gus is in love with a white girl named Flora. He follows her into the woods, declaring that he wants to marry her. Flora runs away from him, terrified. He follows her, shouting that he means her no harm. Standing on a cliff, Flora says she will jump if he comes any closer. He makes a move, perhaps to stop her. She jumps. He is duly caught by a posse of hooded Klansmen and lynched.

     It is a horrifying scene. Yet it also shows Griffith’s mastery of his art, for it is beautifully staged in a demonstration of cinematic realism that would change the medium forever. It is not just the innovative camera work, the clever use of music, and the dramatic cutting that lifts this scene and others from the level of squalid propaganda. There is real pathos in the characters. Griffith was too good an artist not to allow some ambivalence to seep into his film, despite his racist beliefs. The scene of Gus’ pursuit of Flora suggests more than the terror of rape. Gus strikes one less as a threatening figure than a pathetic one, who tries to express his love for a woman who can only see him as a wild beast. The intertitle says that it is better for Flora to die than to lose her honor. Griffith and much of his white audience might have agreed, but what he has shown is more complicated.

     It is hard to think of other masterpieces that are as repellent as Birth of a Nation. One might consider Jud Süß, the antisemitic propaganda movie made in Germany in 1940 by Veit Harlan — but Harlan, though perfectly competent, didn’t come close to the genius of Griffith. The film has its moments, but it is far from being an artistic masterwork. Consider also another example of a great artist with terrible ideas from the same period. Louis-Ferdinand Céline was indisputably an antisemite and a Nazi sympathizer. His pamphlets, such as Trifles for a Massacre in 1937, show him at his hateful worst in this respect. A typical passage: 

    When I was on the docks in London, I saw plenty of them, the Yids. These weren’t

    Hymie jewelers, these were vicious lowlifes, they ate rats together. 

    Or this:

    The Kikes that rule the Universe, they understand them, those secrets of public opinion. Hidden in the corners, they have all of the wires in their hands. Propaganda, gold, advertising, radio, press, the cinema. From Hollywood the Jewess, to Moscow the Yid.

     

    When Gallimard decided to republish some of his most odious texts in 2017, there was so much protest that the plan had to be suspended. But Céline’s best-known literary work, Journey to the End of the Night, from 1932, though filled with bile and pessimism about mankind, cannot be classified as extremist propaganda. That was not the purpose of his novel. There is great art in the book, which reflects the dark vision of human existence that Céline shared with other veterans of World War I, such as Ernst Jünger or Curzio Malaparte.

     Oscar Wilde said, as an aesthete would, that there is only good art and bad art — morality and the artist’s motives are completely beside the point. But it cannot be that simple. Aesthetics has a moral component. Art does not have to be uplifting or exemplary. But it is difficult to imagine great art that does not in some way express a sense that life is worth living. By implication — and I recognize the paradox — this suggests that some things might be worth dying for, too. But a simple death wish, for oneself or for others, is a poor basis for good art. We know that we can appreciate works of art even if we profoundly disagree with the beliefs or ideologies that they are meant to convey. An atheist can still be moved by a painting depicting the martyrdom of Christian saints. One mark of artistic quality is a degree of complexity. A good work of art (such as the suicide scene in Birth of a Nation) can be read in different ways. A Madonna and Child by Raphael was clearly meant as an expression of religious piety, but a secular person might read the image as a beautiful depiction of maternal love. This is even true of religious art, whether it is Christian, or Buddhist, or whatnot, that threatens hellish torments for sinners or unbelievers. We can recognize the human fear of death and retribution for our sins without believing in any particular religious dogma.

     Russian Orthodox icons are harder to read in a secular way, since they were themselves sacred objects. Devotion is both the subject and the purpose of these paintings. Devotees might not have considered them works of art, yet even that does not preclude other forms of appreciation. You do not have to be a believer in the Holy Trinity to be moved by the spirituality of Andrei Rublev’s famous picture (or moved by its reverential treatment in Andrei Tarkovsky’s great film about it); the yearning for transcendence is, after all, profoundly human too, and not confined to religion.

     Political ideology, moreover, can be detached from the enjoyment of art. Sergei Eisenstein’s films, such as Battleship Potemkin, are as propagandistic as Jud Süß. They were made to promote an ideology — communism — that would soon result in mass murder. Lenin’s secret police had already unleashed its Red Terror before Eisenstein shot Battleship Potemkin in 1925. The movie is technically at least as inventive as Birth of a Nation; the use of metaphorical images in Eisenstein’s montage, such as the baby carriage bumping down the Odessa Steps, has influenced film directors and artists ever since.

     Triumph of the Will, Leni Riefenstahl’s carefully staged quasi-documentary of a spectacular Nazi rally in Nuremberg in 1934, is similarly full of technical brilliance. Her use of multiple camera setups, her masterful editing, and her grand operatic effects were as influential as Eisenstein’s montage techniques: Hitler’s plane descending from the clouds to Wagner’s music, or his entrance into the stadium walking through the mass of uniformed men like Moses crossing the parted Red Sea. And yet, unlike Battleship Potemkin, Riefenstahl’s Nazi propaganda does not rise to the level of great art. Technical brilliance is not enough. There is nothing of human interest in Triumph of the Will, no intimacy, no psychological insight, no pathos, and certainly no complexity. A spectacle is all it is, and an odious one at that — a sinister version of Busby Berkeley patterns.

     A part of the difference between Riefenstahl’s work and Eisenstein’s may lie in the ideologies that they promoted. Even though communism led to dictatorship and the mass murder of millions of people, it contained ideals that were in themselves not reprehensible. It went on to betray those ideals, and to deceive people with the fine Enlightenment words that it employed, but Eisenstein’s films are at least made in praise of human solidarity against oppressive rulers. His revolutionary ideal was still full of hope. Battleship Potemkin exposes the violence of authoritarian government, while Triumph of the Will celebrates it. The promise of social equality can be the basis of artistic creation, whereas celebrating racism does not lend itself to good art. Nazi ideology, with its worship of the Aryan super race, is inherently a form of murderous kitsch, a cult of death. There were artists who made their compromises with the Nazis — such as Richard Strauss — or were drawn to Nazi ideals — such as Emil Nolde. But neither Strauss nor Nolde celebrated Nazi ideology in their art. Racism is the basis of Birth of a Nation, of course, but Griffith’s film has moments that escape from its crude message. Riefenstahl’s film never does.

     Eisenstein’s greatest achievement, to my mind, is Ivan the Terrible, from 1944, a film in two parts, commissioned by Stalin during the war to raise the morale of the Russians. This epic masterpiece depicts the rise of a sixteenth-century tyrant with whom Stalin personally identified. So the film was meant to be an ode to Stalin, too. Ivan uses his terrifying power to defeat foreign enemies as well as domestic ones, especially the Russian aristocrats. The second part, even stronger than the first, is about real and imagined plots against the Tsar, and the murders that are necessary to crush them.

     Communist propaganda was not the purpose of Eisenstein’s movie. It was an appeal to Russian nationalism and made in praise of a dictator. But like Griffith, Eisenstein couldn’t help but inject ambivalence into his portrait. He hints at the peculiar madness that comes with absolute power. His Ivan, no matter how terrible and stylized, is fully human. He shows real fear. He hesitates. There are even intimations of a conscience. Stalin, no fool, banned the film. Not because of the despot’s cruelty — on the contrary, he thought that Eisenstein’s Ivan was not ruthless enough, not fully a man of iron. His ban was perhaps the greatest compliment he could have paid to this extraordinary film.

     There is no fascist artist of Eisenstein’s stature. But there were some good fascist works of art. Fascism is not the same as National Socialism. In its early stages, fascism outside Germany, and possibly France, lacked the vicious racism of the Nazis. To the Italian Futurists, such as Filippo Tommaso Marinetti and Gino Severini, fascism represented youth, speed, and a glorious future untethered by the oppressive burdens of the past. One can appreciate the dynamic beauty of Severini’s cubist paintings without being drawn in any way to Mussolini’s grandiose and often brutal politics. The most famous fascist sculptor was Arturo Martini. His neoclassical sculptures of angular athletic figures were perhaps conceived to promote the glory of Mussolini’s New Rome, but they are beautiful in the way Arno Breker’s nudes of Aryan heroes are not. The difference must have something to do with the racist stereotypes that were clearly present in Breker’s work but not in Martini’s. But even racial prejudice does not always preclude artistic quality.

     For art to lift itself up from dubious or even repellent ideological sources, it has to be something more than propaganda. There are qualities that can be extracted from communism, most religions, and even fascism that do not stand in the way of good art. Nazism may be an exception. German films produced during the Third Reich are mostly mediocre, frothy, and sentimental, or they are works of Jew-baiting propaganda. Japanese wartime films, made under the strict auspices of an authoritarian militarist regime, are much better. Even though they had to pay lip service to the harsh politics of the time, some of these films are even excellent. The best war movies, such as Five Scouts, from 1938, or Mud and Soldiers, from 1939, both directed by Tomotaka Tasaka, are superior to most propaganda pictures because they do not focus on military glory but on the hard lives of men in combat. The stress is not on heroic deeds but on self-sacrifice. This can be moving, even if we view these films without any sympathy at all for Japanese war aims. But then, even though official wartime propaganda promoted a sense of racial superiority, racism does not taint the best Japanese war films. The enemy is never really seen. He is an off-stage abstraction, and beside the point, since the wickedness of the enemy is not the subject; the subject is the beauty of Japanese sacrifice.

    But even where racial stereotypes do occur, the art in which they appear cannot always be dismissed as rubbish. Richard Wagner was an antisemite. That is clear from his writings. He believed that Jews corrupted German culture, even though he worked with Jewish musicians to get his operas performed. (His conductor at Bayreuth was Hermann Levi, the son of a rabbi.) Wagner has frequently been accused of drawing on antisemitic images for some of his operatic characters. The pedantic Sixtus Beckmesser in Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg, for example, with his jerky speech, his lack of creative talent, and dry critical spirit; or the deceitful dwarf brothers Alberich and Mime, guarding the Nibelungen treasure in the Ring cycle: they cringe and crouch and mutter and screech in the way Wagner is supposed to have thought that Jews behaved. Not everyone agrees that antisemitism was intended. Marc A. Weiner, an American Wagner expert, thinks that it was — but he also claims that “Wagner’s racism led him to create some of his most complex, rich, and enigmatic dramatic figures, as well as some of his most haunting, iconoclastic, and beautiful music.” And even if Wagner projected certain antisemitic clichés into his characters, they were not identified as Jews. Jewishness plays no part in the Ring stories, or indeed in Die Meistersinger. Wagner’s writings about Jews are disturbing, and should not be dismissed as trivial, but his operas are not the obedient vessels of those views, and their musical beauty is not marred by them.

     Imaginary Jewish types do of course appear in some famous novels and plays. Shakespeare’s avaricious, vengeful Jew of Venice is the most famous example. Then there is Fagin in Dickens’s Oliver Twist, the petty thief with the huge nose who, in George Cruikshank’s illustrations and Alec Guinness’s performance in David Lean’s movie, cringes and whines just like Alberich, and corrupts the boys he picks up from the streets. But unpleasant though such antisemitic fantasies are, neither Shylock nor Fagin are merely villains. Shakespeare and Dickens quite likely shared many of the antisemitic prejudices of their time, but the Jews in their fictions are complicated figures, twisted inside by their fate as persecuted outsiders. Shylock is both an antisemitic stereotype and a very human and many-layered character. It is this ambiguity, this openness to different possibilities, that makes The Merchant of Venice not only upsetting but also great.

    Another kind of ambiguity lies in some of T. S. Eliot’s most controversial poems. Much worse than Shylock or Fagin is Bleistein in Eliot’s poem “Burbank with a Baedeker: Bleistein with a Cigar,” first published in 1920 and retained in all the editions of his poetry. Like Shakespeare’s play, the setting of the poem is Venice, the urban symbol of beautiful decay. Spiritual civilization — Christian, in Eliot’s mind — is doomed to collapse under the crass materialism of modern life. Bleistein is the face of that impending disaster:

    But this or such was Bleistein’s way:

    A saggy bending of the knees

    And elbows, with the palms turned out,

    Chicago Semite Viennese.

    A lustreless protrusive eye

    Stares from the protozoic slime

    At a perspective of Canaletto.

    The smoky candle end of time

     

    Declines. On the Rialto once.

    The rats are underneath the piles.

    The jew is underneath the lot.

    Money in furs. The boatman smiles,

     The antisemitism is undeniable and — especially in post-Holocaust hindsight — repulsive. Eliot’s most hateful passages are part of his pessimistic worldview. But as George Steiner observed, “Eliot’s uglier touches tend to occur at the heart of very good poetry.” They are blemishes that have tainted the poems, without disqualifying them as great art. One can marvel at the poetry, I think, without subscribing to his worldview or his antisemitism. The critic Michael Wood put this very well in an essay about Eliot’s prejudices: “But then I also find that the horror I feel at moments when I read these poems has very little to do with my response to the wit and dry splendor of the rest; and that I can’t use one response to trash the other, either way.”

     That Eliot expressed his deeply conservative vision in a fragmented modernist style is important. If there is one thing that right-wing ideologues, as well as Stalinists, hate, it is modernism. Populists agitating against the elites invariably accuse modernist and experimental artists of duping the common man. Hitler, Stalin, and Mao banned modernists, and sometimes killed them. The avant-garde was associated with liberals and Jews and other enemies of the people. Totalitarian art is designed to be instantly understood. Eliot’s poetry could not be further removed from the sentimental romanticism and coarse socialist realism that marked both Nazi and Stalinist art. 

    Is there such a thing as a fascist or totalitarian style? The similarities between official Nazi and Stalinist and Maoist art would suggest that there is. The totalitarian style is often realistic, in the manner of those bad nineteenth-century paintings of wholesome peasants toiling the German soil at sunset that Hitler liked. But the main inspiration of the totalitarian style is the nineteenth-century grandiosity known as Neoclassicism, or, especially in Germany, Romanticism. Hitler’s architectural fantasies are an outsized, grotesque version of the classical style. So are Arno Breker’s huge nude sculptures.

    Leni Riefenstahl’s movies, beginning with the mountain films in the 1920s, in which she scales lonely Alpine mountaintops exulting in the wild elements of nature, borrow a great deal from German Romanticism. Even in Olympia: Festival of Nations, a film about the Berlin Olympics in 1936, one of her less objectionable staged documentaries, there is a mood of pagan ecstasy: the adoration of athletic bodies (black as well as white, it must be said), and of hero worship. Like far greater Romantics, such as Caspar David Friedrich, she preferred the light of dusk or dawn, the intimations of doom or a new age.

     The same doom-laden skies are often a feature of paintings of the 1920s and 1930s in the Magical Realism style. The phrase was coined in 1925 — long before the Latin-American fiction with which it is usually associated — by Franz Roh, a German critic, historian, and photographer. He was in fact describing a return to realism after the flourishing of expressionism in German art. Roh was not a Nazi. On the contrary, he spent time in prison during the Third Reich. But artists with a sympathy for fascism or National Socialism, such as Franz Radziwill, or the Dutchman Pyke Koch, were drawn to this style. They shared T. S. Eliot’s sense of civilizational decadence, which only an appeal to strong leadership and militant order might halt.

    Susan Sontag famously drew a straight line from Riefenstahl’s earliest mountain movies through her films of Nazi rallies to her photographs of naked Nuba wrestlers taken in the 1970s: the same love of beautiful physiques, of warriors and heroes. It was Sontag who decided that this was the style of fascism. But she was perhaps drawing with too broad a brush. Western art is full of paintings and sculptures that celebrate physical beauty and glorify human and animal combat. Just because Riefenstahl applied this aesthetic sensibility to Hitler’s jamborees does not make the style itself inherently fascistic.

     The closest thing in art history to Riefenstahl’s esthetic is some of Jacques-Louis David’s paintings. David was a friend of Robespierre and he was involved in the Reign of Terror. He, too, was a hero worshipper, and a keen painter of naked warriors. While in prison, in 1795, he painted a violent tableau of the Romans attacking the Sabines. The Intervention of the Sabine Women is a scene of extraordinary violence: babies trampled underfoot, naked soldiers about to murder one another, women cowering in terror of being raped. The style might easily have qualified for Sontag’s category of fascist art — but this does not fit the intended meaning of the picture at all. For in the center of the painting is a woman in white, named Hersilia, trying to separate her husband, the Roman leader, from her father, the chief of the Sabines. David’s picture was painted in homage to his wife: love triumphing over war.

    There is, in short, no inherently fascist or totalitarian style, just debased versions of older styles put to nefarious purposes. This leaves subsequent generations of artists with a problem. Sometimes a style can become so debased that it has to be decontaminated, as it were. In his essay “Silence and Language” in 1986, George Steiner analyzed the roots of Nazism in German culture, but also in the German language itself. He believed that there was a “rasping cadence, half nebulous jargon, half obscenity” that Hitler exploited, and by doing so he debased the language of Goethe, Heine, and Mann. I am not sure this is entirely convincing: any language — Russian, Japanese, Chinese, or indeed English — can become in malevolent hands “the language of hell.” But Steiner was right to say that German had been so corrupted by Nazi jargon and obscene euphemisms for collective sadism that postwar writers had to reinvent a literary language. In Steiner’s words: “[Günter] Grass has understood that no German writer after the Holocaust could take the language at face value. . . . It is as if Grass had taken the German dictionary by the throat and was trying to throttle the falsehood and cant out of the old words, trying to cleanse them with laughter and impropriety so as to make them new.”

    Leni Riefenstahl certainly never did anything of the kind. She was too old and too obtuse. But other artists, such as Anselm Kiefer, did for visual art what Günter Grass had done for words. They tried to make something new, sometimes literally from the ashes. Debased styles, such as German Romanticism, had to pass through the post-Nazi sensibility of a filmmaker such as Werner Herzog to become acceptable again.

    But if styles and languages can be successfully decontaminated, the same is not true of tainted works of art. We cannot wish Bleistein or the Ku Klux Klan away. They will continue to sully the masterpieces that contain them. It is a blessing that such works are actually quite rare. Yet we should continue to pay attention to them, not just to recognize the artistic qualities that to some extent redeem them, but also to sharpen our awareness that artistic genius can be perfectly compatible with some of the worst impulses of the human heart.

    WE SHALL ALL BE CHANGED

    Locked in the vault of the cathedral

    the rubies, emeralds and sapphires

    of stained glass in their upright coffers.

    Locked in my throat the shards of tears.

    I was one among the audience

    who rose for the Hallelujah chorus

    and sang our hearts out when we came to

    And He shall reign forever and ever

    just before intermission, which

    feels each year like the time to leave—

    the heavenly overtones not over,

    ringing in the ear. But now

    Behold, I tell you a mystery

    asserts the manly solo voice,

    within the ups and downs a bass

    line of authority: the dead

    shall be raised incorruptible

    and we shall all be changed.

    Every time, that’s when I cry

    or almost cry: the threat or promise 

    of alteration from on high,

    I who was once a first soprano

    in a men’s choir running short on boys,

    settling for us girls because

    our voices wouldn’t break like glass.

    Not all at once; not in the twinkling

    of an eye; just the daily sinking

    [stanza break]

    of girlishness, unperceived, into

    the depth of a woman’s seasoned alto,

    destined not to remain the star

    but to end as harmony, the friend. 

    No harm in that; my tears held back 

    are of gladness, mostly, an amen

    for everything I’ve already been,

    all versions vividly retained 

    or forgotten; and a buried prayer

    that when next year’s last trumpet sounds

    I will not be so much changed

    as not to sing my range.

     

    DEAD FAMILY MEMBERS

    Billy Collins, in an interview 

    I read today (duly “edited

    for brevity and clarity”)

    said, “I believe that family members

    can burden a poem, especially

    if they happen to be dead.”

    He went on, “So if I come across

    ‘Daddy’ or ‘Mommy’ I’m out. ‘Grandma,’”

    he added in fairness, “gets a pass.”

    I laughed, which clearly must have meant 

    I thought he had a point.

    Half of poetry is Oh Dad, Oh Mom,

    or half of what I like—

    take James Merrill’s “The Broken Home”

    or Paradise Lost. Think of Robert Hayden’s

    father stoking the fire before dawn.

    Sylvia Plath chanting Daddy, Daddy

    so many times that bad became good.

    And what to do about Seamus Heaney

    helping his mother peel potatoes—

    are you telling me out it goes?

    What about epitaphs for children?

    You’re saying you can’t take the time

    to read Ben Jonson’s brave twelve-line

    immortal burial of his son?

    Sorry to complain, Billy;

    I really ought to thank you. So few

    poets these days are truly funny.

    Besides, you’ve written elegies

    for your bloodline, like the rest of us.

    Admit it. Your poem “The Death of the Hat,”

    which seems to be only about that

    for stanza after stanza, is really

    [no stanza break]

    a lament for your dead father, whether

    or not you knew it when you started.

    Part of the charm is finding out.

    Charm. Charm us please, don’t scream.

    Maybe that’s what you’re asking of poets.

    My father too wore hats with his suits

    until JFK stopped doing it.

    A poem in charming tribute to us,

    those who remember mid-century

    dads in hats, when “mid-century”

    still referred to the twentieth, might

    be in order sometime when we’re gone.

    Today, though, I’ll attempt again

    to write the poem I’ve failed to write

    for six years, ever since he died.

    My father. Jittery, somber, bored,

    we whispered above his sleep until

    midnight, when we all went back 

    to the hotel and bed. The call

    came an hour after that, of course. 

    We dressed, drove over, and the nurse

    gave us a little time in his room.

    One by one we took our turn,

    but nobody who preceded me

    thought to tell me they were shocked

    by how the old man looked:

    eyes open wide now, terrible

    enough, above his open mouth

    locked in a silent scream—

    proof that slipping into death

    at last could not have been, for him, 

    anything like peace.

    They shouldn’t have let me see this, I thought.

    They shouldn’t have let me come.

    I actually thought that, as if to shield

    a part of me long dead, a child.

    I’m writing about the shame.

     

    NOSTALGIA

    The pang for home: your roots in some other language.

    Saudade, as it’s said. The happy/sad of nostos

    the dumb tail-thumping dog; her hand-me-down

    cameo ring on your own hand, evoking

    a buried joy, her treble flights of laughter.

    Her delight in you. You who were very young.

    But you’re still living, aren’t you? Isn’t that home?

     

    You don’t actually want to be back there, no.

    There was bickering sorrow, more than you credit now.

    You heard them behind the walls, his drone, her tears,

    felt your own doubt and fear. What would become 

    of you when you left them? How could you find out?

    Being young was what there was and took forever.             

    But if you did get old, could you start over?

     

    But that’s not it, either. Not why your worldly-wise

    eyes fill at movies, why the corny score

    rising in volume raises finale goosebumps 

    against your will when Dad pulls into the driveway.

    Accommodation. As in home, and forgiveness.  

    With a basketball hoop above the big garage 

    and a hug with the uneasy teenaged son  

     

    who ducks away; he wants to dribble and shoot,

    so that’s how they’re bonding as the credits roll.

    It’s not the basketballs. Not even the people.  

    Your pain is that again you understand

    the shifting, slippery, benighted present

    is what the past was and is; and that you’ll find

    that shimmering insight instantly forgotten.

     

    The Life and Death of the Book Review

    Book reviewing, it would seem, has been in crisis from the start. As early as 1757, a contributor to Britain’s Literary Magazine complained that “critic is no longer an appellation of dignity,” because book reviewers had turned into “Visigoths,” “critical torturers” who took “malicious pleasure” in tearing authors apart. A century and a half later, in the very first issue of The New Republic, Rebecca West was sounding an equally pessimistic note, although for opposite reasons: “There is now no criticism in England. There is merely a chorus of weak cheers, a piping note of appreciation . . . a mild kindliness that neither heats to enthusiasm nor reverses to anger.” And in 1959, Elizabeth Hardwick famously said much the same thing about reviewing in the United States: “Sweet, bland commendations fall everywhere upon the scene; a universal, if somewhat lobotomized, accommodation reigns.”

    But now book reviewing faces more serious threats than blandness. I first started to worry about it sixteen years ago, thanks to one of those minor academic scandals that generate such malign delight among British literary people. Orlando Figes, a prominent historian of Russia, was discovered to have posted under a pseudonym favorable reviews of his own books on Amazon, and to have rubbished the books of rivals. A feeding frenzy followed in the upscale British dailies, with one of the rivals, Robert Service, calling Figes’ actions “contaminant slime.” The incident cast a new and depressing light on the faux-cheery emails I was by then regularly receiving from colleagues and friends asking me, “if you feel so inclined,” to post favorable notices of their own books on Amazon. 

    Sixteen years on, Amazon controls over half the American book market, and its user reviews exert ever more influence compared to serious criticism. I will admit to checking my own Amazon reviews from time to time. One of them gives my book The First Total War just one lonely star. It reads, in its entirety: “to be frank a boring book.” Another one-star review, this time for my Napoleon: A Concise Biography, is worrisomely titled “a hopeless situation,” but turns out to be a complaint that Amazon overcharged the purchaser. I am happier with the reviewer who gives Napoleon a much-coveted five-star notice. “I enjoyed reading this book,” he writes. “Lots of history.” Well, yes. 

    The rise of Amazon reviews has reinforced a larger pattern of populist impulses challenging older cultural norms. The book clubs and reading circles that do so much to fuel book sales today generally pay little attention to professional critics, instead taking their lead from celebrities like Oprah, or online influencers. The authoritative middlebrow cultural figures who once instructed Americans on what to read from perches at the Saturday Review and the New Yorker no longer exist (Adam Gopnik does not dictate American reading habits). The very idea of such cultural authority is widely dismissed as elitist.

    Meanwhile, mainstream venues for book reviewing continue their long-running magical disappearing act, with falling subscriptions and ad revenues acting as financial Ozempic on their budgets and page counts. The New Republic and the Nation, for instance, used to publish weekly, and included four or five excellent and carefully crafted reviews in each issue. Now they are each down to ten issues a year, with perhaps five or six reviews in each. In February of this year, as part of his evisceration of the Washington Post, Jeff Bezos killed its book section, leaving the New York Times as the only major American newspaper with a stand-alone weekly book review. And the Times’  book coverage is not exactly adventurous or comprehensive. It overwhelmingly favors famous authors and the “big five” publishers whose ads appear in its pages. In 2024, eight of its “ten best” books of the year came from a single press: Penguin Random House. Two years earlier, of the sixteen history titles that made its “hundred best,” no fewer than ten likewise came from Penguin Random House — and not a single one from a university press. The novelist Reynolds Price noted in his memoir Ardent Spirits that in the 1960s, even a first novel might get as many as 90 reviews in American and British newspapers. Today, a hopeful debutant author would be very lucky to get five.

    Newer online-only publications such as the Los Angeles Review of Books have picked up some of the slack, sometimes running terrific reviews. But they suffer from a problem that afflicts nearly all online publishing. One of the most important functions of a review is to alert readers to the existence of books they might not have an obvious interest in. Paper publications provide this experience naturally, thanks to those ultra-sophisticated search technologies known as “tables of contents” and “flipping pages.” But readers mostly come to online reviews from links in social media or email, with the all-powerful algorithms efficiently directing them to topics they were already curious about and authors they already knew. Often they do not even notice the name of the publication. Of course, they could navigate to the publications’ home pages, but relatively few readers do this, and emailed tables of contents, even if they escape the spam filters, usually end up lost in the ever-flowing mudslides of our inboxes.

    The decline of the book review might seem like a minor tragedy, compared to all the other tragedies afflicting us at present. Yet it is symptomatic of a larger change. The modern book review was born with the Enlightenment and it expressed key Enlightenment values: a commitment to the exploration of new knowledge and new forms of artistic expression, free of censorship; a belief in open, passionate, critical debate; and, above all, a dedication to making the results of this exploration and debate accessible to a broad general public. It is no coincidence that the book review, as a cultural phenomenon, is in steep decline, at the moment when the last gleams of the Enlightenment itself increasingly recall the unsteady flickers of a guttering candle.

    In the beginning there was the Republic of Letters: the name given to the sophisticated networks of scholarly correspondence that thrived in early modern Europe, in large part to report on and debate new books. In the mid-seventeenth century, with the birth of the periodical press, various entrepreneurs saw the advantages of moving these networks into print. France’s Journal des Sçavans and England’s Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society were born in 1665, soon followed by Rome’s Giornale de’ Letterati, the Leipzig-based Acta Eruditorum, and the Dutch Boekzaal van Europe.

    The Acta Eruditorum, published from 1682 to 1782, remains one of the most remarkable book review enterprises ever undertaken, although since it was published in Latin it is today largely forgotten (every issue is now available online, but as yet untranslated). For much of its history, every month it published ten or more detailed reviews totaling fifty or sixty closely packed pages, on subjects ranging from modern and ancient history to theology, philosophy, law, literature, astronomy, physics, mathematics, anatomy, medicine, logic, architecture, language, and rhetoric. Just in the year 1721, books under review included a new edition of Leibniz’s Monadology, Jean-Baptiste Dubos’ important early Enlightenment study of poetry and painting, a collection of John Locke’s miscellanea (including his Constitutions of Carolina), and Alexander Pope’s English translation of the Iliad, which the reviewer praised for its “elegance of diction, and above all the fervent heat of an impassioned poetic spirit.” Among other works discussed were a history of Cambridge University, a report on the recent outbreak of bubonic plague in Marseilles, and a Latin lexicon of the Hebrew Psalms compiled by a British colonial magistrate in far-off Charleston. The reviewer wrote that the last of these had “carried the principal language of the East to the farthest region of the West,” creating a “most precious treasure that has now come forth from the New World.” While the Acta printed its reviews anonymously, the editors kept records of authorship. I once considered myself reasonably prolific in the genre, having published some 157 book reviews over the past forty years, but my pride crumbled when I discovered that the German philosopher Christian Wolff, over an only slightly longer period, contributed nearly six hundred reviews to the Acta Eruditorum.

    Yet despite its dazzling range, the Acta was not exactly accessible. Besides publishing in a language principally used by scholars and clerics, its reviews often turned forbiddingly technical, with mathematical equations, long citations in Greek and Hebrew, and detailed anatomical diagrams. It and its sister publications, despite their broad coverage, resembled modern learned journals more than general interest magazines. Their readership remained largely limited to scholarly networks. And the authors usually put more of their effort into summarizing the books under review than into critically evaluating them.

    Then, in 1684, a brilliant, free-thinking, wildly opinionated French exile in Amsterdam named Pierre Bayle began publishing a new sort of periodical entitled Nouvelles de la République des Lettres. Although its format resembled those of the earlier journals, Bayle boasted that it would benefit from the press freedom that prevailed in the Netherlands, and that he aimed to please what he called “the public.” Bayle wrote much of each issue himself, and the Nouvelles quickly distinguished itself for its style, dry wit, and accessibility. One early review praised the historian Louis Maimbourg as “highly entertaining . . . because he has found the secret of writing history that seems like a novel, or perhaps a novel that seems like history.” And Bayle did not hesitate to dip his pen in acid. Reviewing the biography of a Turkish Grand Vizier, he commented that “if we speak of this book, it is only to warn readers not to trust the fables it contains.” And in the same issue, he savaged an author who had sought to refute the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza: “the insults and bitterness that characterize this book are not the worst things about it . . . Anyone who can believe suppositions so opposed to common sense has no right to criticize others.” (Not that Bayle meant to defend Spinoza, whom he called “equally false.”)

    While Bayle’s journal only lasted for a few years, it opened new possibilities for the book review, and as the periodical press exploded in size in the eighteenth century it had many imitators. Britain proved an especially exciting locale, owing to the end of censorship there and the spread of venues that provided free access to reading material (pre-industrial paper was an expensive commodity). By the mid-century, visitors to coffee houses and reading circles had several dedicated book-centric publications to choose from, including the Literary Magazine, to which Samuel Johnson contributed some thirty reviews in its short life. In an environment shaped by magazines such as the Tatler and the Spectator, with their artful mixes of fiction, news, travelogues, criticism, and gossip, British reviewers increasingly saw their work as entertainment, which could easily devolve into book reviewing as blood sport. As the dyspeptic contributor to the Literary Magazine complained, “every defect is represented with all the malice of exaggeration, and every beauty diminished with all the artifice of envy.” In France, the draconian censorship apparatus limited the possibilities for reviewers. Still, following Bayle’s example, French-language reviews sprang up in the Netherlands, with smugglers sneaking copies across the French border. The illustrious Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique, to which Diderot and many other philosophes contributed, circulated in manuscript only to avoid the censor’s attention. Its reach was small but select, with Catherine the Great and several other crowned heads among its subscribers. Eighteenth-century book reviews could have surprisingly profound political effects. Montesquieu published his masterpiece, The Spirit of the Laws in 1748. Although he made not-so-veiled criticisms of the French monarchy and the Catholic church, and arranged to have the book printed outside of France to avoid censorship, he did not expect any personal repercussions. He was a high-ranking noble, a former magistrate, and already one of the most famous authors in the world. The book became an immediate bestseller, going through twelve editions within a year, and receiving extravagant praise (“the best book ever written,” said Horace Walpole — a pity the blurb was not yet invented). But in October 1749 an underground French newspaper published by Jansenists (a dissident strain within the Catholic Church) published a scathing, 6,000-word review that called The Spirit of the Laws heretical for daring to suggest that a people’s religion was shaped by their physical environment, and that Christians should therefore tolerate practices such as polygamy and idolatry in certain parts of the world. The review also scolded the powerful Jesuit Order for being too tolerant of such heterodox ideas. 

    Various elements within the church and the French government were already coming to see Enlightenment writings as a threat to public order — the woke mind virus of the day. The review prompted leading bishops to fall over themselves denouncing Montesquieu, and Montesquieu himself was driven to publish a pamphlet in which he responded to the criticism and cringingly protested his devotion to Roman Catholicism. While he escaped formal prosecution, the controversy marked the moment at which uneasy official toleration of the French Enlightenment shifted into persecution. In 1752, the state formally suspended publication of Diderot and d’Alembert’s revolutionary Encyclopédie (although it was eventually allowed to continue).

    The reception of The Spirit of the Laws also showed how deeply book reviewing could influence reading practices. One of my favorite documents from the eighteenth century is a long manuscript letter to a friend written in 1749 by a young Parisian lawyer with the ponderous name of Claude-Rigobert Lefebvre de Beauvray. He had just finished reading Montesquieu’s book and could not control his excitement. He called the author “a genius who sees everything and sees it well.” But much of the letter was sharply critical, in the spirit of the day’s most popular book reviews. Lefebvre took Montesquieu to task for the book’s excessive detail and compared the final chapters to a man showing signs of senility in old age: “the author dreams, he talks drivel.” Unlike the Jansenist reviewer, the free-thinking Lefebvre de Beauvray scolded Montesquieu for excessive caution on religious matters, and he grew so animated on the subject that he started addressing the author directly: “How many more serious prejudices would you not be capable of freeing us from, Monsieur de Montesquieu, if you had dared to speak seriously and forcefully?” At the end of the letter, Lefebvre de Beauvray apologized for going on at such length, and added, so as to revive his friend’s attention, a short obscene poem of his own composition about another bestseller of the day, the pornographic Theresa the Philosopher.

    It was no coincidence that the book review flourished in tandem with the Enlightenment. Far more than any set of intellectual predecessors, Enlightenment writers deliberately targeted their writings at a large general public. That public — mostly but not entirely urban and well-off — in turn demanded more than ever of their books. In the eighteenth century, Europe and its principal colonies were awash in an unprecedented volume of consumer products: coffee, tea, sugar, spices, ceramics, textiles, home furnishings, musical instruments, religious paraphernalia, engravings… and printed matter. Merchants started to lure customers to their establishments with artfully presented displays of their wares, including especially in shop windows, giving rise to a new cultural practice to which Londoners gave the name “shopping.” Fashion was ceasing to be a preoccupation of the aristocracy alone. Empowered consumers purchased far more books and periodicals than before and no longer treated them as authorities to be studied with reverence. This new breed of readers demanded entertainment and engagement, as well as guidance to help them navigate their brave new world of choice. “Commonplacing” became a widespread habit, with readers copying out or literally cutting and pasting favorite passages from their reading into what amounted to books of their own composition.

    And Enlightenment authors responded to these changes, pushing readers to engage with them. They chose to write in accessible language. They embedded their philosophical arguments in prose fiction and poetry (think of Candide, or Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees), or in reference works that readers could flip through at will (the Encyclopédie). They adopted a dialogue form (a favorite of Diderot’s) leaving uncertain which point of view they favored. They delighted in writing puzzles and paradoxes (a habit of Rousseau). They addressed the reader directly in parenthetical asides (Sade, most notoriously, when his narrator was in flagrante delicto). They did not invent any of these strategies, of course, but they made greater collective use of them than any previous group of authors. As Montesquieu remarked in The Spirit of the Laws, “You should never so exhaust a subject that readers have nothing left to do. The point is not to make them read, but to make them think.”

    Book reviews formed part and parcel of this new social and intellectual universe. They guided readers through the book market. Indeed, reviews made readers aware of a far greater range of books than they could hope to come across in any single bookstore or by word of mouth. They provided divergent points of view, encouraging book readers to come to their own conclusions. They turned every prominent published work into the centerpiece of a wide-ranging, multi-sided discussion; the imperative of consumer guidance comported comfortably with serious analysis, polemic, and style. Or almost every prominent publication — because sometimes the critical enterprise faltered. In 1739–40, for instance, David Hume published his philosophical masterpiece A Treatise of Human Nature. British reviewers largely ignored it, and the one exception mocked the book with strained sarcasm: “What a prodigious Stretch of Invention is here? How vastly do these Speculations exceed in Fineness the finest of the Aristotelian Cobwebs!” A review in a German periodical, meanwhile, grumped that “the author has peculiar thoughts about certainty and probability, and a great talent for obscuring what others might have said clearly about these subjects.” The poor reception contributed to the Treatise’s miserable sales, and Hume himself later lamented: “Never literary Attempt was more unfortunate. . . . It fell dead-born from the Press; without reaching such distinction as even to excite a Murmur among the Zealots.” Among philosophers and thinking people the book has been exciting Murmurs to this day.

    Although the general-interest book review had already assumed its mature modern form during the Enlightenment, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought major changes, notably thanks to the explosive expansion of book publishing itself. In 1749, the newly founded Monthly Review claimed it would report on all new books and pamphlets published in Great Britain, but already this goal was impossible to meet. By 1800, the expansion was forcing reviewers to specialize, which reduced the marvelously cosmopolitan range of the early review publications. (By 1800, no one in Europe other than a professional cleric was likely to come across reviews of a lexicon of the Hebrew psalms published in South Carolina.) In 1890, the British editor W. T. Stead could complain that there were not only too many books to read, but too many book reviews as well. He proposed a solution in the form of a publication called the Review of Reviews that provided capsule summaries of reviews published elsewhere. Meanwhile, the pressure on reviewers to keep up with the volume of new books grew so great that it became conventional wisdom among disgruntled writers that, as Anthony Trollope put it, “books are criticized without being read.” In New Grub Street, one of George Gissing’s characters declared that “I got up at 7.30, and while I breakfasted I read through a volume I had to review. By 10.30 the review was written — three-quarters of a column of the Evening Budget.”

    Yet even with these pressures, book reviewing remained a key element of the literary and intellectual scene around the Western world, and the Enlightenment ideals connected with it survived. It also served a democratizing function by providing an avenue for young and unknown authors to establish a reputation and meet editors and publishers. George Bernard Shaw got his start in this way, earning two pounds for every thousand words that he published. In 1905, the editor of the recently-founded Times Literary Supplement in London commissioned a review from an unknown twenty-three-year-old known as A. V. Stephen — the future Virginia Woolf. Over the next three years she wrote fifty brilliant and witty articles for him: she was on her way. In 1934, my uncle Alfred Kazin, then just nineteen years old, the college-student son of poor Yiddish-speaking immigrants to Brooklyn, paid a cold call on the daily book reviewer of the New York Times, impressing him with his intelligence and his strong opinions. Within little more than a year Kazin’s own reviews started to appear in the Times, the New Republic, and other papers.

    And the key elements of the Enlightenment review survived, including what Rebecca West memorably called “the duty of harsh criticism.” Enlightenment authors had fulfilled this duty with gusto, and rightly so, for ideas do matter and there are such things as bad books. As Montesquieu wrote in Persian Letters, “nature seemed to have wisely arranged for men’s follies to be fleeting, but books immortalize them.” Some bad books condemn themselves, so to speak, by their obvious errors and fallacies, and do not even require a mercy killing to fall silently into the oblivion of remainder piles and off-site library storage. But in other books the badness is harder to spot and does more damage. The fallacies come cloaked in elegant prose. The errors perch atop vast piles of footnotes. The hammering assertions compel assent, while the false assumptions slither unnoticed into the brains of unwitting readers and take up permanent residence. With these books, harsh criticism is indeed a duty. As West wrote so brilliantly in 1914: “Now, when every day the souls of men go up from France like smoke . . . we must lash down humanity to the world with thongs of wisdom. . . . And that will never be done while affairs of art and learning are decided without passion, and individual dullnesses allowed to dim the brightness of the collective mind.”

    The tradition of the finely savage book review flourished above all in Great Britain, and great examples are almost too numerous to choose among. My own favorite practitioner of the art was the English historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, who could give the “critical torturers” of the eighteenth century a run for their money. Here he is, for instance, on Arnold Toynbee’s Study of History: “Although every chapter of it has been shot to pieces by the experts, and although it is written in a style compared with which that of Hitler or Rosenberg is of Gibbonian lucidity, it has been hailed by the unprofessional public, at least in America, as ‘an immortal masterpiece’… [and] as a dollar-earner, we are told, it ranks second only to whisky… Surely this phenomenon requires some explanation.” Trevor-Roper mauled the young historian Lawrence Stone so badly that Stone’s mentor, R. H. Tawney, protested that “an erring colleague is not an Amalekite to be smitten hip and thigh.” But even the Marxist historian Christopher Hill confessed an admiration for his Tory colleague: “His wit is never kindly when dealing with what he believes to be Error . . . but always the manner is grand, the range enviable. . . . It is not for his philosophy that we read Professor Trevor-Roper. We read him because energy is eternal delight. He never writes boringly, because he is never bored. And how he can write.”

    Alas, in recent decades the tradition of reviewing as blood sport has waned, even in its one-time arena par excellence, the Times Literary Supplement (although enjoyably dyspeptic exchanges still regularly populate its Letters to the Editor section, especially over minor points of Shakespeariana). And the reason is most assuredly not a decline in the production of bad books, which remain as mephitically numerous a species as ever. But even as the public sphere as a whole has turned more brutal and crude with the rise of the internet and social media, its more genteel precincts sometimes seem to have embraced the intellectual equivalent of anti-vivisectionism, allowing mediocrity to breed uncontrollably.

    Throughout the modern history of the book review, one source of this anti-vivisectionism has come from publishers. Occasionally, a devastating and prominent review, by spurring an entertaining controversy, can spur book sales. More often it sentences books to the fate of Hume’s Treatise, falling “dead-born from the press.” The problem is not necessarily that publishers bring overt pressure to bear on reviewers — although book review publications depend on book advertisements for support. But publishers and book review editors travel in the same circles as the authors of the books they assign and review, rubbing shoulders at places such as London’s Reform Club and New York’s Century Association. Editors understand that their own livelihoods depended on a thriving book business, and they too easily justify cheap praise as a way of encouraging a love of reading. These problems seem especially to have afflicted the New York Times Book Review. Forty years after Elizabeth Hardwick zinged it for its “unaccountable sluggishness” and compared it to a “provincial literary journal,” Jacob Weisberg offered much the same indictment in Slate, calling the Book Review’s by-now century-long history “100 Years of Lassitude,” and warning of its “quietly reverential attitude toward books in general.” Garrison Keillor’s evisceration of Bernard-Henri Lévy’s pretentious American Vertigo on its front page in 2006 stood out as much for its rarity as for its humor: he called the author “a French writer with a spatter-paint prose style and the grandiosity of a college sophomore.” During the pandemic, Pamela Paul, then the editor of the Book Review, remarked in an interview: “We love the publishing industry, and we support what they do, but really we are here for readers.” It was a revealing remark. Are journalists supposed to “support” the industry they cover?

    Unfortunately, a quarter of the way into the twenty-first century, the challenges to the book review go far beyond the inadequacies of any particular publication. The internet has disrupted the world of letters more profoundly than any innovation since the rise of the printing press itself, and early irenic hopes that it would lead to the democratization of knowledge now look as pitifully naive as the notion that social media would generate richer forms of human connection. Publishers genuflect to the Amazonian colossus, and if book reviews still matter to them, they do so mostly just as one less and less important form of publicity. To be sure, the art of the book review still flourishes in publications such as the New York Review of Books, the Times Literary Supplement, Bookforum, the Literary Review and the London Review of Books. But in our world of intellectual climate change, what were once grand peaks towering over the landscape now often seem more like islands in a rising and roiling sea. Reviews now count the most in those corners of academic life where professional advancement still depends on the publication of books rather than journal articles (history and literature, for instance, but not philosophy, economics, or any of the natural sciences). In these niches sheltered from commercial pressures, a laudatory review can still help make a career; a devastating review can destroy one. Most such academic titles, I should add, sell at most a couple of hundred copies in print, and have prohibitively high prices. (Oxford University Press and Cambridge University Press books routinely cost $100 or more.) They are also available electronically, but only to those lucky enough to have access to the portals of major research libraries, and the same is true of book reviews in academic journals. These barriers to entry certainly represent the antithesis of the Enlightenment and its commitment to free discussion, open to all.

    But beyond these economic and technological issues, what future does the well-reasoned, learned, witty, engaging book review have in a world of howling identity politics, 280-character hate posts, and raging populist anger against anything deemed elitist — in sum, our post-Enlightenment world? A book review can be corrupted by demagoguery and ideology as much as any other literary genre. I do not doubt that the book review will survive in some form, among like-minded people in small, sheltered corners of the electronic universe, but it will no longer have the same centrality to the culture it once did, or the same power to disrupt or reverberate through intellectual life, or the same ability to promote the values of intellectual audacity and freedom, critical debate, and public education. It will no longer do what it once did to help readers come to informed judgments about books, and, more broadly, to help them think for themselves about the subjects in question. Judgments about books are very often nothing less than judgments about life. So a great deal is at stake in the fate of this seemingly humble activity. But just as the last remnants of the Enlightenment appear to be flickering out, so, too, does this small but fundamental component of our once-grand intellectual enterprise.

    Stopping by Milton

    I.

    In 1888, as a young man, William Butler Yeats found himself in a novel predicament. Having come to his first séance in the hope of making contact with spirits, he felt a tremor, a spasm, a convulsion that flung him into the wall. The circle thought he must be a medium. He steadied himself and sat back at the table. Awaking from mesmerized sleep, the medium leading the circle warned of great danger and began trying to ward off the spirits. Yeats convulsed and broke the table, his friend prayed to the Virgin and the Father. Knowing no prayers in the moment, Yeats declaimed the opening lines of Paradise Lost — and all was still. 

    No episode better illustrates the changing climate of faith for English-language poets near the turn of the century. Yeats’ experience is of a world animated by mysterious forces unmediated by the old institutions. His explanation afterward is agnostic between faith in the spirits and the suspicion that they might have been imagined. And yet, when beset by bad spirits, his recourse is to formal invocation of a divine figure, not the Father summoned in the Lord’s Prayer but the heavenly muse summoned in the first lines of Milton’s epic. Faith, once widely received, had become an uncertain inheritance. The same would shortly happen to Milton.

    Those of us who have not made a study of our literature might find it hard to imagine Milton’s stature as of the late nineteenth century. In Milton, a popular biography of 1879, Mark Pattison pronounced Milton’s first collection “the finest flower of English poesy.” That book, from 1645, contained Milton’s inimitable elegy “Lycidas,” for Pattison the singular “high-water mark of English Poesy.” A year after the appearance of Pattison’s volume, Matthew Arnold, the most eminent critic at the time in England and for later generations the hollow donkey to blame for most every excess of “Victorianism,” declared Shakespeare and Milton the two “poetical classics” of English literature, the standards against which other verse might be judged. Arnold went a step farther in the year of Yeats’ séance, praising Milton expressly at Shakespeare’s expense, as “by his diction and rhythm the one artist of the highest rank in the great style whom we have.” The great testament to Milton’s centrality is Arnold’s assurance in pronouncing his style the better of Shakespeare’s: “This I take as requiring no discussion, this I take as certain.” (Arnold was like that.) Such was Milton’s authority that Arnold saw no need to argue the point that Yeats would invoke it to set the room still.

    The regard professed by Arnold and revealed by Yeats is in line with the reception of Milton that had prevailed for over two centuries. The tradition was reverential but far from uncritical. Yeats’ father held with Arnold that Milton dealt in abstract opinion to the detriment of his verse, and Arnold was far from first or last to entertain doubts about the theology and the probity of Paradise Lost. Still, two hundred years after Milton’s death, an elderly Robert Browning was representative of the tradition’s esteem in keeping a portrait of Milton in his study, just as a younger Browning had been representative in slighting an elder poet by contrast with the heroic example of Milton. “Shakespeare was of us, Milton was for us,” Browning wrote in 1845 in “The Lost Leader,” his broadside against an unnamed poet whom everyone understood to be Wordsworth, accusing Wordsworth of abandoning the cause of British freedom in a rough paraphrase of the latter’s famous encomium to the cause from a sonnet of 1815:

    We must be free or die, who speak the tongue

    That Shakespeare spake; the faith and morals hold

    Which Milton held.

    In the same year in which Browning wrote “The Lost Leader,” his beloved Elizabeth Barrett, soon to be Elizabeth Barrett Browning, wrote him a letter with the purest distillation of the reverence that Milton inspired in his heirs: “Our inferiority is not in what we can do, but in what we are. We should write poems like Milton if [we] lived them like Milton.” His superiority as a poet was tied inextricably to the faith that he embodied and lived. Robert Browning, given a lock of Milton’s hair, placed it with a lock of Elizabeth’s.

    Across the Atlantic, Emerson celebrated “Shakspeare and Milton” in a breath as emblematic of English poetic genius: “its poetry is common sense inspired; or iron raised to white heat.” This last phrase may have served as inspiration for Dickinson (“Dare you see a soul/ at the White Heat?”), who in any case knew her Milton profoundly. His work had been a fixture of New England literary culture as long as it had existed and shows up in the poetry and prose of every canonical author in the mid-century American Renaissance. Longfellow’s short poem “Milton” praised the poet, “England’s Mæonides” (that is, England’s Homer), for the “mighty” song that “floods all the soul” like the resounding waves that leave the sand gold. Preceding this in England by a dozen years was Tennyson’s short poem “Milton,” which praised the poet, “O mighty-mouth’d inventor of harmonies . . . God-gifted organ-voice of England,” for the distant echoes of his thundering song quietly felt in the sunset on an “ambrosial ocean isle.” As Longfellow echoed Tennyson’s rather mawkish mellifluousness, Whitman echoed Shelley and Blake in numbering Milton’s Satan among the immortal types of world literature. For Shelley, Blake, and every English poet of the Romantic generations beginning in the late eighteenth century, their own achievement is inconceivable without the example of the man Wordsworth called “That mighty orb of song,/ The divine Milton,” the “voice whose sound was as the sea” — “our great Poet.” 

    The epithet had also been applied to Milton in the most influential work on aesthetics from the British eighteenth century, Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, in 1757. The young Burke quotes passages from Paradise Lost to illustrate the sublime in several aspects, such as “the light and glory which flows from the Divine presence; a light which by its very excess is converted into a species of darkness.” Dr. Johnson echoed Burke’s esteem for Milton’s distinctive sublimity while carping at the great poet for his republican politics and his prolixity. In a fine literalization of tradition, Dr. Johnson received a lock of hair from Joseph Addison, Milton’s great critic of the early eighteenth century, before handing down the lock until it reached Leigh Hunt, who showed it to Keats and in his final years gave it to Browning. 

    No English poet of the eighteenth century escaped Milton’s shadow. Perhaps that helps to explain why the most memorable poetic encomia of the century, Alexander Pope’s, are less fulsome than those of Pope’s predecessors, Milton’s younger contemporaries. Pope qualifies, albeit with reverence, the figure whom John Dryden and Andrew Marvell evangelized. If Dryden’s “Epigram on Milton” is perhaps the most superlative praise ever written of Milton by a major poet, outdoing even Wordsworth in proclaiming Milton a fusion of the highest in Homer (loftiness) and Virgil (majesty), Marvell’s verse preface to Paradise Lost would prove the most unwittingly prophetic:

    That majesty which through thy work doth reign

    Draws the devout, deterring the profane.

    The good Marvell could have hardly imagined the profanations of one so undevout as Ezra Pound. In 1910, Pound proclaimed Paradise Lost “conventional melodrama.” In 1915 he declared that “Milton is the worst sort of poison.” Our great poet had lost his authority.

    Histories tend to credit Pound and his coadjutants with the regicide, and surely their role was outsized. Pound, the prime mover of English-language Modernism, the most influential tastemaker in English poetry for the first half of the century, told all who would listen that Milton’s influence was malign. Pound’s charges had a parrot in the poet William Carlos Williams, also influential, and elaboration in the prose of T. S. Eliot, whose critical authority was unrivaled for decades. They charged, variously, that Milton had debased the language with Latinisms and stultified the meter of English poetry with a bland and hegemonic pentameter. If he had been the presiding genius of the nineteenth century, then he was to blame for the nineteenth century in its sonorousness and sentimentality, its vagueness and hollow idealism. Eliot ingeniously traced these sins of the Victorians to Milton’s “dissociation of sensibility,” his supposed alienation of his ideas from his experience. 

    If Pound and Eliot differed on the details of their charges, they were at least consistent in setting up Milton as the opposite of what the age demanded for its poetry. Pound saw the age demanding the “definiteness” of Dante in contrast to the “rhetoric” of Milton, elsewhere the enemy of “the image” and later an “abominable dogbiscuit.” The age demanded “a renaissance, or awakening,” whereas what Milton offered was “decadence.” While Eliot avoided the crudity of Pound and the buffoonery of Williams, his use of Milton was the same until it was too late to matter: counterexample to the example that he intended to set, standard foil to the standards that he worked to impose. And here was the rub. Their standards had much to recommend them, their examples much to love. There really was much to outgrow in the long shadow of Wordsworth and Tennyson, much fluff and piety that demanded a new dexterity of thought and expression, demanded a new difficulty to stir readers from the complacency of outworn experience. And there was much to admire in their new examples, from the modernized Yeats under Pound’s tutelage to Marianne Moore and Robert Frost (briefly, ironically, soon acrimoniously). There was of course also the poetry of Pound and Eliot themselves, signally The Waste Land in 1922, the poem of the century, authored by Eliot and edited with genius by Pound. They stood for Joyce, Hemingway, Ford Madox Ford (who helped to harden Pound’s anti-Miltonic animus). Though few can now recall the fine points of the Modernist case against Milton, he is cast still in the role of slumber from which the movement struggled to awake.

    Yet this story can tell of no more than the proximate cause of Milton’s desacralization. It remains to be seen not only why Milton was cast in the role of Adversary but why audiences found it believable. Something had changed between 1888, when the invocation of Milton had the force of prayer and exorcism for Yeats’s circle of spiritualists, and 1910, when Pound could feel no more than “conventional melodrama” in Milton’s epic and Ford Madox Ford (then surnamed Hueffer) could find Paradise Lost “dull and pompous,” for which he imagines that “all men with their accepted ideas on a literary hierarchy will exclaim against the impertinence or the very atheism of the critic.” Hueffer’s imagined conventionalists would have been close. What mattered was not the atheism of any given reader, which Shelley shared and Hueffer did not, but the secularism of the age, which Hueffer shared with Pound in 1910 but not with the bad spirits who had beset Yeats’s circle. Yeats published his first book of poems in 1889, beginning his first lyric poem with a lament over the ascendant “Grey Truth” of secular materialism. By 1910, a world raised on grey truth had come of age.

    This account follows the framework and general chronology of Charles Taylor’s monumental history A Secular Age. Taylor tells the history of secularism not by numbering believers and unbelievers but by inferring the received standards of belief at a given time and the range of normative beliefs in a culture. Taylor dates the modern norm of secular materialism in Europe to the late nineteenth century, roughly as Yeats did. That first lyric, voiced by a shepherd out of an old folk tale, grieves over a world in which dreams had lost their reality for so many. One could hardly give a date when English literary culture grew secular. But in 1888 Yeats can feel himself thrown against a wall; in 1658 Milton, blind like Mæonides, can summon a muse from heaven to guide him through Genesis, a vision that inspired poets of varied faith for a quarter of a millennium and that in 1910 strikes two of the best literary minds of the age as mere dullness, having failed to speak to them. 

    Hueffer and Pound issued their dissents of 1910 more as proclamation than as argument. They took their cause to require no discussion, as Matthew Arnold had thought of his laudation thirty years earlier. The Poet’s assailants charged an unlocked gate.

    “I can conceive that this is the essence, of which almost all other poetry is the dilution.” So wrote Virginia Woolf of Paradise Lost in her diary of 1918, an entry that shows the immense potential of secular regard for the epic as well as the probable limits of such admiration. 

    He deals in horror & immensity & squalor & sublimity, but never in the passions of the human heart. Has any great poem ever let in so little light upon one’s own joys and sorrows? I get no help in judging life; I scarcely feel that Milton lived or knew men & women; except for the peevish personalities about marriage & the woman’s duties.

    The very essence of poetry, its subject the fall and redemption of all mankind in depth of horror and height of sublimity, was for Woolf utterly removed from her own sorrow and joy, and no help in judging life. “The figures are majestic; in them is summed up much of what men thought of our place in the universe, of our duty to God, our religion.” What men thought, not what she might think, or believe, or imagine taking on faith.

    Woolf uses “majestic” much as Dryden and Marvell had, referring to that which makes divinity sensible (or imaginable) to humanity. If majesty makes legible the divine will, it shows us rather a lot about “our duty to God, our religion.” It is this that Marvell meant in writing that Milton’s majesty would draw the devout and deter the profane, and this quality of moral and religious emulation that distinguishes the reverence for Milton in the tradition from the narrowly aesthetic evaluations that tended to follow. Elizabeth Barrett Browning wanted to live poems like Milton. Wordsworth distinguishes his civilization not by its regard for Milton’s art but by its holding to Milton’s “faith and morals,” the phrase given its best presentation, as so often, in the elaboration of Coleridge, who quotes Wordsworth’s sonnet to distinguish Shakespeare’s and Milton’s imaginations as Wordsworth had their supreme gifts to Britain. Where Shakespeare is Proteus, Milton is a realm: “While the former darts himself forth, and passes into all the forms of human character and passion, the one Proteus of the fire and the flood; the other attracts all forms and things to himself, into the unity of his own ideal.” Coleridge understood the epic as the embodiment of an ideal we might live by in the blind poet’s “sublime listening to the still voice in his own spirit.”

    This sublime listening invokes a pillar of English cultural tradition: the liberty to trust the still small voice in one’s soul. More than any other, this principle marks the emulative reverence for Milton from what followed. Blake and Shelley and Wordsworth hardly shared Milton’s theology but lived for their visions of liberty and an eternal realm beyond sense. They could read Milton’s “apostrophe to light” (Coleridge’s phrase), in the beginning of Book III, with its culmination in the prayer “that I may see and tell/ Of things invisible to mortal sight,” and feel that he might well have seen and told them. Rarer to credit these visions in a secular age. What had struck generations as majestic came to feel merely imagined. As Woolf wrote famously in 1928, “there’s something obscene in a living person sitting by the fire and believing in God.”

    Woolf’s subject was her friend T. S. Eliot. He was as sensible to religious vision as anyone, but had this to say as to the voice in one’s head:

    The possessors of the inner voice ride ten in a compartment to a football match at Swansea, listening to the inner voice, which breathes the eternal message of vanity, fear, and lust.

    Bombast aside, Eliot makes the sensible point that the inner voice in a secular age tends not to be the still voice of spirit. Such considerations made the young Eliot at once conservative and radical, his aim both to conserve tradition and to restore the roots from which it deviated. And the deviation was Milton. Where Milton embodied the Protestantism that had softened from the Puritans of Plymouth Plantation to the amorphous Unitarians of Eliot’s youth, Eliot idealized the Catholic worlds of Chaucer’s England and Dante’s Florence — order, not liberty. Milton was the great English enemy of priestly interposition between man and God; but Eliot played the priest.

    The prelatical station that he assumed was Matthew Arnold’s, a literary eminence pronouncing upon works in part for their effect on public morals and social order. Eliot’s early charges against Milton often read as overstated reactions against Arnold’s own inflated claims for the poet, such as Arnold’s case that Milton purified English with the diction that Eliot held largely responsible for gradually alienating our poets’ thoughts from their feelings. Less conspicuous but more fundamental was Eliot’s agon with another conservative and an earlier eminence, Coleridge, over the power of imagination, which for Coleridge was a transcendental faculty, distinct from other operations of the mind, a voice and vision in the spirit that might be of majesty. Eliot denies the distinctness. Coleridge’s Milton haunts the whole of The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, from 1933, a book that Eliot would come to regard as an authoritative statement of his critical position, his animus the assertion from Coleridge that “Milton had a highly imaginative, Cowley a very fanciful mind.” Eliot would elevate fancy — the creative recombination of memory, as in daydreams — to the plane of imagination, as his earlier writing had drawn out the subtle importance of wit, another aesthetic quality deprecated by Coleridge and the tradition. Eliot’s vision was all or nothing, an aesthetic analogue to his vision of culture writ large — not a part of experience conserved but the whole of experience radically reordered to restore its lost roots.

    The grand artistic expression of this vision was The Waste Land, an epic of collective experience and a great provocation upon its release in the winter of 1922. Among the reactions it provoked was the finest short poem in the Miltonic tradition from the twentieth century.

    II.

    A quarter of a century earlier, in the fall of 1897, Robert Frost walked into a lecture on Milton. Frost, twenty-three, a Harvard freshman on his second shot at college, adored the lecture, a brilliant exposition of Milton’s “On Time,” but attended no more of the course. He could not abide the other students’ frantically recording the professor’s every word.

    Frost had first attended college at a conventional age, matriculating to Dartmouth at eighteen and lasting almost the whole fall semester. The reasons he offered for leaving were, as often with him, a little suspect, perhaps even to himself. He had domestic concerns — a mother who needed him, a girlfriend he desperately missed — but also an abiding sense that he was an odd fit with his peers. On a working scholarship, he felt poor; as a poet, he felt stuck. He thought of himself at the time as an unacknowledged legislator of the universe in the lineage of Shelley. The homework and hijinks of college seemed an impediment to the real work of writing. He spent the half-decade between schools in towns and small cities north of Boston, working a variety of jobs — lightbulb trimmer at the factory, teacher at his mother’s school — publishing poems here and there, feeling provincial and aimless.

    As a consequence of spending these years as he did, he was late to encounter a secular milieu. Had he spent these formative years in the university, he might have talked and thought as a Dartmouth man for the rest of his life. Though his mother worried that Harvard would render him godless, what happened was close to the opposite. Cambridge left him shocked by the blithe irreverence with which peers and professors talked of things of the spirit. Their influence made him more reticent to speak of faith but no less inclined to it. One gets a hint of the difference plausibly made by age and environment from the journal of the younger Wallace Stevens, Frost’s former classmate at Harvard, who had this to say after having Paradise Lost read to him in the fall of 1900 as he sat in a shaft of sunlight: “The sun was better than the poetry — but both were heavenly things.” By the next year, Stevens was in New York City for law school and Frost was raising hens in Derry, New Hampshire.

    Stevens had fallen under the spell of George Santayana, the philosopher who most repelled Frost in his two and a half semesters at Harvard. Santayana, the charismatic Spaniard, held that there were no religious truths, only illusions, more or less true according to circumstance. An aesthetic hierarchy of illustrious illusion would be the heart of Stevens’s poetry, some of the best of the century, none of it in the Miltonic tradition. Stevens’s regard for Milton was as aesthetic as his understanding of imagination, the poetry of holy light no better than the sun. But Frost could hardly speak of Milton except in reverential terms. He thought the sound of “Lycidas” alone would bring something close to perfection. He called the character of his beloved New England “the residue of Cromwell and Milton.”

    Frost and his family set sail for England after thirteen years in rural New Hampshire, settling in a suburb of London near the grave of Edmund Burke and the cottage where Milton wrote Paradise Lost. (Frost’s wife, Elinor, said as much in one of her first letters back to America.) Having come to make his name, Frost succeeded in short order, publishing his first book, A Boy’s Will, to an enthusiastic misreading by Pound that made Elinor cry. Pound pronounced Frost simple, sincere, and artless; whereas Frost was subtle, cunning, and complex, if as understated in complexity as any poet since George Herbert. Yet Pound was not wrong to see an affinity. A Boy’s Will exemplified much of what he was urging of poets — a concreteness of description and a thoroughgoing lack of the verbal ornament and vague piety that had tended to plague poetry since the late Victorians. The language was plain for its time, and the language of Frost’s second book, North of Boston, would be plainer still. What Pound missed was Frost’s surpassing complexity, hidden as it was under an unassuming surface. Frost’s poems tend to offer a dual aspect, a surface of plain sense with tumults of mind underneath and trials of spirit. Frost’s portraits of nature intimate the prospect of majesty for those inclined to take the hint. Pound was not. He urged difficulty but had an eye for difficulty of surface, as would his young protégé of whom Frost jealously heard as he began to displace Frost in Pound’s eyes in late 1914 — Thomas Stearns Eliot.

    Frost’s jealousy is telling. He had fallen out with Pound in buried fury, comparing him to a self-appointed high priest in an unpublished poem. He later drafted part of a play in which Pound’s alter ego operates in the art world as if he were an old machine politician, a “poetical boss.” Frost bemoaned Pound’s influence on Yeats, calling him “a kite with a one Pound tail.” But for all of Frost’s conviction that Pound’s authority was illegitimate and wielded corruptly, he was distressed to feel Pound’s favor shifting to Eliot. Frost’s newfound success rested on validation from the literary establishment, which Pound bestrode like Boss Tweed, and Eliot, fourteen years younger than Frost, had needed no years in the wilderness before attaining an eminence that Frost would mock soon enough. 

    The form of The Waste Land was singular, its four-hundred-odd lines of highly irregular verse, mostly blank, bestrewn with unattributed quotations and, in book form, footnotes, the poem speaking elliptically of the present from the vantage of a mythic past. Frost published a poem the next year that was his first of that length, his first with such irregular meter, his first with footnotes and unattributed quotations everywhere, his first that dealt elliptically with the present as if from a mythic past, with a strangely hysterical intellectual making gloomy pronouncements about modernity and quoting Matthew Arnold from his “intellectual throne.” Frost never admitted that the poem, “New Hampshire,” was a response to The Waste Land, pretending to have written it the summer before and not in midwinter, when he was driven to a reactive pique upon seeing The Waste Land and its immediate reception as the herald of a new age in literature. However implausibly Frost dated the composition, there is good reason to trust the heart of the story he told of it, in which he wrote all night and then, on stepping out to see the sun rise on his farm in Vermont, heard as if in a trance the words that would become “Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening.”

    Milton speaks variously through Frost’s poems. In a poem of Frost’s from the early years of the century, “Pan With Us,” titled at first “Pan Desponds,” Frost tells of the lost music of pagan poetry as Milton had in his “Ode on the Morning of Christ’s Nativity,” in which the nativity makes a music of the spheres far greater than Pan ever made. More subtly and more exquisitely, “Lycidas” supplies structure, myth, and meter for the sense of transcendence just under the surface of “Birches,” as well as inspiration for that poem’s companion, “After Apple-Picking.” If “Birches” tells of worldly experience with an intimation of spirit, “After Apple-Picking” offers a Judeo-Christian cosmology with nothing deeper than sensation to sate it. In every instance, Frost borrows phrases and sounds of stunning grace as well as a realm to hint at — the supersession of Pan, the fall and transcendence of “Lycidas,” itself an alchemical blend of music Pagan and Christian, sublime heights of gods and transcendence of God.

    Most of Frost’s allusions to Paradise Lost are clustered in a relatively brief stretch of the epic. Wordsworth’s are much the same, recurring to Milton’s direct invocations of the divine in the beginnings of Books I, III, and V. Frost’s references span the middle of Book II through Book IV — Satan’s escape from hell and flight to earth, Milton’s address to Light and God’s speech on man’s condition and fate, Satan’s first sight of paradise, the temptation of Eve. In “Fire and Ice,” Frost speaks with unnerving calm about the end of the world, recalling the fallen angels’ composed debate on “Fix’d fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute,” the angels all brought perpetually “From beds of raging fire to starve in ice” as Satan resolves to intrude upon paradise and bring about the destruction of humanity. Frost’s echoes of the epic all bring such richness of context, as of Satan’s flight out of hell in Book II (in Frost’s “Bond and Free,” “Birches,” “Desert Places,” this last about the void of the heavens, Frost’s “The loneliness includes me unawares” recalling Satan’s encounter of “A vast vacuity: all unawares”); Milton’s apostrophe to Holy Light and God’s subsequent speech in Book III, respective inspirations for Frost’s late major works on religion, his Masques of Reason and Mercy (inspired also by Milton’s masque Comus); and Satan’s beholding of the “imparadis’d” Adam and Eve in Book IV, once more in “Bond and Free.” The same stretches of the epic to which Frost alludes in “Bond and Free,” Satan’s escape in Book II and his spying in Book IV, recur in Frost’s “For Once, Then Something,” a poem as representative of Frost’s mind and Miltonism as anything he ever wrote. 

     Others taunt me with having knelt at well-curbs

     Always wrong to the light, so never seeing

     Deeper down in the well than where the water

     Gives me back in a shining surface picture

     Me myself in the summer heaven godlike

     Looking out of a wreath of fern and cloud puffs.

     Once, when trying with chin against a well-curb,

     I discerned, as I thought, beyond the picture,

     Through the picture, a something white, uncertain,

     Something more of the depths — and then I lost it.

     Water came to rebuke the too clear water.

     One drop fell from a fern, and lo, a ripple

     Shook whatever it was lay there at bottom,

     Blurred it, blotted it out. What was that whiteness?

     Truth? A pebble of quartz? For once, then, something.

    The poem offers its readers something of the epiphany of which it speaks. Hard as it is to resist a sense of triumphal discovery in reading the poem, that sense is no less hard to sustain on rereading. The optical epiphany declared in the end had been slipping into uncertainty for the better part of the poem, leaving us readers to wonder what to make of the poem’s crescendo, final and titular, alpha and omega with seemingly little support in between. We are thrust into an uncertainty similar to the uncertainty that the poem describes. 

    One can resolve the uncertainty by appeal to a pair of allusions familiar enough to make the poem cohere almost into a parable. Democritus taught that truth was not to be found because it lies at the bottom of a well. Jesus taught in the Gospel of Luke that signs of revelation will never be so clear as to be beyond doubt because a sign beyond doubt would not demand the exercise of faith, always issuing “rebukes” to his disciples for asking him to clarify his parables much as “water came to rebuke the too clear water.” The poem responds to the empirical charge of Democritus, from its first six lines, with an experience of Lukan revelation, as if to impress that any momentary sense of revelation, in the world as it is, would feel no clearer than this, an indefinite memory, redescribed and reinscribed, fading in sense but preserved by a last declaration of faith. 

    One might also suppose that this is only more elaborate fulfillment of a wish by the speaker to feel a sense of spirit in an obdurately physical world. He is, as others taunt him to be, looking in the well and seeing a heavenly image where he ought to discern his reflection. He is Eve in Book IV of Milton’s epic as she mistakes her reflection, in a clear lake that looks like the sky, for a transcendent other. It is a grave accusation, charging him with an error like that which led to her temptation by Satan and the consequent fall of humanity. Yet the poem pairs the accusation with a graver one against those who would so accuse him, putting them in the situation of Satan. 

    In Milton’s revision of Genesis, birth and death have parallel origins. As the mother of humanity encounters the gleam of her “smooth watry image” shortly after emerging fully formed from Adam’s rib, Satan fails to recognize the creation who had sprung from his head entire, Sin, with whom he bred Death, who stands sentinel with Sin at Hell’s gate. Sin recalls Satan’s first impression of his own creation: “Thyself in me thy perfect image viewing.” How much like Frost’s “Me myself in the summer heaven godlike” — the same meter, rare in English, and much the same phrasing and ravishment. While the risk of doctrinal error is like Eve’s, projecting your own image into your preconceptions of divinity, the possible error of the skeptical empiricist is like that of Satan forgetting his creation, the empiricist forgetting preconceptions that might obstruct present perception — demands for clarity that might draw a rebuke, self-certainty that might be its own form of destructive self-love.

    An epiphany and its erasure; the faith of Galilee and the reason of Athens. Frost inscribes depth upon depth without imposing the least erudition, leaving readers to follow him in a tension between experience and reflection for which Milton is both an inspiration and an astonishingly intricate precedent. The reader is left to judge and imagine the prospect of the slightest revelation and to feel the stakes of their own judgment. The weight of the choice may be heavy for those who happen to see, however blurred and blotted out, the echoes of divinity or evil in their very choice. 

    The caricature of Eliot drawn by Frost in “New Hampshire” is defined by his denial of the uncertainty at the heart of human experience. In his “terror of the flux,” of whatever lies beyond or beneath the reach of human perception, Eliot’s stand-in, unnamed, is acutely phobic of trees. His curious phobia exemplifies an intellectual retreat to erudition and high-minded preconception. For him “The only decent tree had been to mill / And educated into boards” — as if there were no limit to what education could change. Having approached “a grove of trees,” he turned to flee, repeating passages from Matthew Arnold and Macbeth, shielding his refined conception of human nature from an encounter that might leave it unsettled:

    He knew too well for any earthly use

    The line where man leaves off and nature starts,

    And never over-stepped it save in dreams.

    Like the students frantically annotating their professor’s words on Milton, Eliot’s stand-in takes refuge in study at the expense of apprehension. 

    Frost’s “Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening” is a figure of such apprehension. It takes place at precisely the kind of line fled in “New Hampshire,” a grove of trees that serves as threshold between humanity and nature, approached with understated awe.

    Whose woods these are I think I know.

    His house is in the village though;

    He will not see me stopping here

    To watch his woods fill up with snow.

     

    My little horse must think it queer

    To stop without a farmhouse near

    Between the woods and frozen lake

    The darkest evening of the year.

     

    He gives his harness bells a shake

    To ask if there is some mistake.

    The only other sound’s the sweep

    Of easy wind and downy flake.

     

    The woods are lovely, dark and deep,

    But I have promises to keep,

    And miles to go before I sleep,

    And miles to go before I sleep.

     

    Many a reader has seen a longing for death in the draw of these ethereal woods. A more spiritual age might have recognized a guise of the sublime, that which allures and forbids in its evocation of power vastly beyond us. Lovely, the beautiful; dark and deep, the sublime, the majestic. 

    Burke had catalogued the effects of language pairing great things and small, annihilating and hospitable, delimited and imperceptibly immense, as well as the distinctive genius with which Milton rendered the darkness of Hell and pictured God as a surpassingly bright darkness. Burke was speaking of God in Book III of Paradise Lost, shortly after Satan’s emergence from Hell in the end of Book II, out of Night and Chaos, into the glimmer of dawn at the farthest reach of Nature. Satan’s travels bear a strange resemblance to those of the unnamed speaker of the poem Frost recalled hearing at dawn after writing all night about the horizon of Nature. Like the snowflakes in “Stopping by Woods,” Satan flies with quiet and ease. He pauses his flight to gaze at his erstwhile home, then turns his gaze to our world, to him as small and luminous as a distant star (as, to us, a snowflake). Then he proceeds with his long journey to our world, as promised, in the last pair of lines in Book II, whereupon Milton moves the epic to Heaven with his extraordinary apostrophe to Light.

    Hail, holy Light, offspring of Heaven first-born!

    Or of th’ Eternal coeternal beam

    May I express thee unblamed? since God is light,

    And never but in unapproached light

    Dwelt from eternity, dwelt then in thee,

    Bright effluence of bright essence increate!

    Or hear’st thou rather pure ethereal stream,

    Whose fountain who shall tell? before the Sun,

    Before the Heavens, thou wert, and at the voice

    Of God, as with a mantle, didst invest

    The rising world of waters dark and deep,

    Won from the void and formless Infinite!

    After the threshold of pending destruction, the threshold of creation recollected. Milton speaks to a light he reveres but is unsure how to make sense of. Amid the rapture of mysterious light, “dark and deep” appears for the only time in the epic — holy light falling on (rising) waters dark and deep, much like the light of falling snow on woods dark and deep. One might also see a vestige of “the rising world of waters” in Frost’s frozen lake, might hear the “pure ethereal stream” in the hush “of easy wind and downy flake.” 

    If Frost walked out to dawn after his night of writing “New Hampshire” and heard what would become his masterpiece of form — with its intimations of evil and the light of divinity, with its abiding awe at the majesty won from “waters dark and deep” and “formless Infinite,” with its singular distillation of Milton into what looks like a simple story of nature — he was surely following the calling of the blind poet, who ends his long apostrophe with the great promise of his own creation if granted light of the spirit:

    So much the rather thou, Celestial Light,

    Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers

    Irradiate; there plant eyes; all mist from thence

    Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell

    Of things invisible to mortal sight.

    The eyes were planted. 

    Variations of Uncertain Significance

    Gentlemen, I am tormented by questions; resolve them for me.

     Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground

    As the blood drips into the vial, I rue how little of genetics I remember. It is April 2017, an eternity since I stared out the window in high school biology. Now I stand here holding Misha’s sweaty palm and relying on a platoon of metaphors to contemplate the secret of my son’s nature. The doctor compares the genome with an instruction manual. Proteins are the syllables that activate the genes. Nucleotides are the letters that carry the code. Think of chromosomes, the object of today’s inquiry, as numbered pages. Once the doctor ships Misha’s sample to the laboratory, a microarray analysis will count them. Are the pages of his manual all present and accounted for?

    The doctor slightly unnerves me. His toothsome smile and pigeon chest remind me of the pitchmen in commercials for breakfast cereal. In reality, Brian Skotko is Professor at Harvard Medical School and Director of the Down Syndrome Program at Massachusetts General Hospital. Down Syndrome is one of the neurodevelopmental diagnoses attributable to a discrete chromosome variation. I have come to find out whether Misha’s autism diagnosis is likewise attributable. Such genetic variations, as Dr. Skotko explains, may come to roost in a newborn either via inheritance or interactions between egg and sperm. The latter cases, spontaneous occurrences of combined “germline” cells, are “de novo,” new. I remember enough Latin to stay in the conversation.

    Lo and behold, the microarray discloses a variation in chromosome 11q. The extra letters on that page run along a belt of seven-and-a-half million nucleotides. Neither his mother nor I, nor his sister Niusha, share the duplication. His is de novo, from the germline. All it took for him to draw this lottery ticket was one errant bounce of the buttocks. 

    The standard algorithm classifies variations from “benign” and “likely benign” to “likely pathogenic” and “pathogenic.” Misha’s is a “variation of uncertain significance,” a classification not uncommon in a young field chockablock with reports of de novo variations. Dr. Skotko will consult medical research published on 11q. I will consult rarechromo.org, a global repository of parent reports. If 11q is inculpated in autism, those sources will tell us. When we reconvene, however, we break the same news. The repository contains no reports of 11q. In the published medical research, Dr. Skotko chimes in, “there are no cases that we are aware of that are the same size as Misha’s.”

    Is the duplication, new to Misha, new in nature as well? Or does a dearth of reporting account for his matchless status? Dr. Skotko cannot say. “Your son,” he does say, “is on the far edge of science.”

    For the next four years, I take Misha to Boston’s most distinguished hospitals and clinics in search of ballast. He acquires more diagnoses. An occupational therapist at MGH ascribes his wobbly motor control to sensory processing disorder. Margaret Bauman, renowned neurologist at the Integrated Center for Child Development, orders metabolic tests to find out whether mitochondrial DNA disease can explain his puny musculature. It does not. Timothy Buie, equally renowned as a gastroenterologist at Boston Children’s Hospital, orders antibody tests to find out whether he has inflammatory bowel disease or celiac disease. Negative. A neuropsychologist at the Lurie Center for Autism diagnoses Misha with mixed-expressive-receptive language disorder. Does an impairment in his bilateral hearing explain it? Nope, rules out an audiologist. 

    Barry Kran at the New England College of Optometry diagnoses cerebral vision impairment, a neural kink in the process by which objects in the environment become subjects of perceptual discrimination. A neuro-ophthalmologist at Boston Children’s conducts a structural MRI of Misha’s brain. “The MRI was normal,” reports Dr. Gena Heidary. The images reveal no evidence of abnormal anatomy, no signs of injury or stroke or trauma, no underdevelopment of the regions that host executive function. Where is the neural kink?

    “It is the case that some of our children with CVI have clear injuries to the visual pathways, and we can see it,” Dr. Heidary responds. “We also have children with no clear injuries.”

    “It seems impossible that Misha has a normal brain.”

    “We don’t have the sophistication to really tell at the level you’re asking.”

    Perhaps it is time to revisit the meaning of the 11q duplication. Could his chromosome variation be lurking in the matrix after all? Lineagen, the laboratory that analyzed the microarray, makes a genetic counselor available in October 2021. As we delve in, a strange ambivalence permeates my thoughts. The intellectual historian Mark Lilla breaks out the polarities of my condition in his book Ignorance and Bliss: “How is that we are creatures who want to know and not to know? How is it possible for both desires to inhabit the mind?” 

    BC Emily Palen’s opening statement takes me aback. “It’s very likely the explanation for his diagnosis of autism,” she states. Variations of uncertain significance fall between −0.89 and 0.89 on the algorithmic scale. The likely pathogenic start at 0.90. Initially, Misha’s was scored 0.88. Emily offers that, just before our call, Lineagen’s analysts had rescored his duplication to 0.90, bumping him over the threshold. On what basis and for what reasons the analysts had undertaken to do so? Emily does not say.

    “Okay, but if we all have some variations, and if Misha’s duplication has never been reported before, then how can you think Misha’s duplication is ‘very likely the explanation’ for his autism?”
    “What we know about these types of genetic changes — pretty sizable duplications or extra sections of DNA — is they tend to have an impact on brain development, and we know there are several genes in this region that we call ‘highly expressed,’ or more active in brain development, so that’s why I’m suspicious that this is likely related to the developmental difference that we know about in Misha, likely related to that diagnosis of autism.”

    “But autism isn’t definitively correlated with any genetic conditions, is it?” 

    “So, there’s a handful of particular genes and a handful of other copy-number changes like the one that we saw in Misha that we know are more common in individuals with autism, developmental delays, and other differences in brain development. So, there is — I don’t want to use the word ‘list’ — a group of genetic changes that we know are more common in those individuals and not common in the general, typically developing population.”

    “You keep saying ‘autism and other developmental delays.’ I’m specifically interested in autism as it is diagnosed in the DSM. From that diagnosis, his treatments ensue. You’re saying there are genes that are definitively and specifically linked with autism?”

    “Yes.”

    “And some of those are found within Misha’s duplication?”

    “Not that we know of, at this point.”

    “So, you haven’t discovered genes that show up specifically in Misha’s sample and that are definitively correlated with autism.”

    “Right.”

    “But you infer, based on the fact that some genes are definitively linked with autism, that some genes within Misha’s region may also be associated with autism? I’m just trying to figure out the basis for your inference that because you have found some genes that are correlated with autism in other regions, you conclude that other genes, duplicated in Misha’s region, are ‘very likely’ to be correlated with autism.”

    “So, I think I’ll back-track and rephrase how I presented that information. Within this duplication there are genes that we know are more highly expressed in the brain and seem to be pretty critical for brain development.”

    “Okay, got that.”

    “Since the body has them turned on more often in the brain’s tissue, we suspect they play a pivotal role in brain development. So, historically, those types of genes — those that are highly expressed in the brain and that we suspect are critical for brain development — we can consider a category of genes. We know that, in other individuals with autism, that category of genes tends to be more common for mutations or maybe deletions or duplications involving those genes.”

    “So, the relevant category is ‘genes that are more highly expressed in brain development.’”

    “Yes.”

    “Help me understand the incidence of duplications in that category.”

    “In Misha’s duplication, there are eleven genes out of sixty-six that we would put into that category of highly expressed in brain tissue, probably important for brain development. Of all of our genes — we have 20,000 — there are many, many, many genes that are important for brain development. What we know about Misha so far is that those eleven genes that we identified in his duplication out of the sixty-six we know, we suspect are important for brain development based on their expression. This is what we know of him so far, from the microarray.”

    “Got it. But the genes that are important for brain development, presumably they are suspects in developmental disorders other than autism, right?”

    “Yes, and that’s why I was using the canned language of ‘autism and other developmental disorders.’ We know this is just one genetic factor. We know that there are many other genetic factors at play in each individual. So, sometimes we meet with families, and the child has a diagnosis of autism and other diagnoses. So that’s why I used the group language.”

    “The more I observe Misha and learn about autism, the less I understand autism and the more I learn about Misha. That’s why I’m trying to drill down to the relationship, if any, between the cluster of genetically-linked behavior that support the diagnostics of autism.”

    “We don’t have enough research or information to say Misha’s duplication is pathogenic. That’s why we say it is ‘likely pathogenic.’ But I think based on the size of the duplication and based on the fact that there are genes within that duplication that we know are expressed in the brain tissue, I think it’s likely — I know it’s frustrating for both you and I that I cannot be more concrete — that it’s the answer to his diagnosis of autism. I think it’s likely based on what we know about, at this point in time.”

    “But he doesn’t talk. He doesn’t have language.”

    “Right, and that’s related to his diagnosis of autism, correct?”

    “You tell me! Why do some kids with autism have language and others don’t? As far as I have been able to tell, nobody knows the answer to that question.”

    “Yeah, that’s my understanding as well. I think if you and I could figure out that question, then we’d be millionaires.” I think then Misha might speak.

    BC Emily’s “canned language of ‘autism and other developmental disorders’” irks me. Autism is a spectrum disorder, a junk-drawer diagnosis. Any two children may receive it without sharing a behavioral symptom. Given that only the diagnosed undertake microarrays in the first place, how can Linegan adequately detect and sub-sort their samples? The difficulty is not that such researchers are not finding de novo variations. The difficulty, as I understand it, is that they are finding too many — and trumpeting matching incidences as statistically low as a fraction of a percentile.

    “Genetics is an exact science, isn’t it?” 

    “It is and it isn’t. Even though we have these results and find them ‘likely,’ the explanation for the behavioral diagnosis of autism, unfortunately it doesn’t provide us with a guidebook or a rulebook of what therapies or what strategies might be most effective.” 

    “It sounds like these results don’t provide us with the answer to the question of ‘how likely?’ That’s a matter for probability, and a pretty crucial one, no? One in a million carries a different implication than one in ten. You say the duplication is ‘likely pathogenic.’ Can you answer the question of ‘how likely?’”

    “Um, not exactly.” 

    “Okay, but you still think, based on these results, that scientifically speaking 11q is the key to Misha?”

    “I think so, yes. My gut feeling — if that’s okay with you — my intuition, is that 11q is the key to Misha. This is likely the piece of the puzzle as to what makes Misha Misha.”

    “Even if you’re correct, how do you know you will still be correct in a few years? He will change, right? One of the implications of your discussion of highly expressed genes in early brain development seems to me that those may become less relevant as he becomes older and therefore that his profile might change. I sometimes hear about children ‘growing out of autism.’ Which gives me pause. But it sounds like there’s no way of having a hunch about that, at this point, given how little we know about 11q and what the specific genes in his duplication may represent — beyond the general category of seemingly important for brain development because they are highly expressed.”

    “Yes, that’s right. Based on this result, based on what we know of it right now, I expect he’s going to continue to make progress. He will continue to show us his strengths and where he needs support.” Boo! Emily retreats to cliché. 

    “Well, he may show us where he needs support, but the efficacy and potential harm of that support will depend on how his clinicians are looking at him and listening to him in relation to his genetic profile. If they look and listen only through the diagnostic lens of autism, then they might miss a lot. I’m sorry, but I simply don’t understand your confidence. I understand the utility of the diagnosis, but I am still searching.”

    “Yes, for some families, they need a name for what’s going on. It sounds like in your case that’s not the situation. I’ve worked with other families who have said ‘I just needed to know what to call it, what label to call my child’s behavioral diagnosis or their challenges.’ For some families, they just need that term, to have something to call it. And other families don’t.”

    After we hang up, it occurs to me that Emily misunderstood my motivation. I do not want a name because I crave an illusion of perspicacity. I had put her through her paces because I crave objective truth, and I had persisted over the course of an hour because I sought to reconcile discrepancies in her testament. Genetics “is and is not” an exact science? In one breath she conceded “we don’t have enough research or information to say Misha’s duplication is pathogenic,” and in another propounded her personal intuition that it is “the key to Misha.”

    My own posture had not lacked for contradiction. I had requested genetics counseling, yet when the occasion for it presented itself I had turned it into an agon. I might as well have barged into a church to palaver with a priest. In shifting the burden onto Emily, was it knowledge that I had sought, or the grounds to resist knowledge? 

    BC An opportunity to find out comes unbidden three months later. Linegan’s Allison Ortega solicits me with a request to enroll Misha in a research study. Molecular sequencing, the methodology, would “read through letter by letter, nucleotide by nucleotide, to see if there are any differences in the spelling of particular genes that could impact how those genes are functioning in the body.” The microarray counted Misha’s chromosomes, inspected their structure. Molecular sequencing targets particular genes, detects anomalies in their functionality.

    Allison elaborates the institutional context. Lineagen is broadening the forensic scope of molecular sequencing from physical deformities to intellectual and developmental disabilities. “We hope to generate data and to publish that data in order to help other families who are looking at those types of symptoms and want to know if they’re related to a genetic diagnosis,” she says. Allison offers to send a “mobile phlebotomist” to our doorstep to collect a vial of Misha’s blood. In exchange, Lineagen would pay us sixty dollars.

    “And what would be the benefit to Misha?”

    “It’s hard to say,” Allison answers. I ask her to try. The purpose of the study, she eventually discloses, revolves around Optical Genome Mapping (OGM), a new machine-learning model that Lineagen hopes will identify genetic diseases “faster, easier, and cheaper.” That night I find myself flipping through the Annual Report of Bionano Genomics. The company has recently acquired Lineage for the sake of its signature innovation, which is called Saphyr. Bionano has reaped $350 million from investors banking on Saphyr to operationalize the OGM model. If the research study in which Allison wants me to enroll Misha winds up validating Saphyr, then Bionano may obtain a medical license. In that event, the company can begin selling to hospitals, clinics, and labs. 

    “Your new owners want to sell Saphyr for prenatal autism screening, correct?” I put to Allison during our next call. “The tool would be useful to families who would want to abort children like Misha. I won’t even ask you to deny that.”

    Allison does not deny that. “There is an arm that is looking at prenatal testing,” she confirms. Still, she stipulates, there are reasons other than abortion for parents to elect prenatal genetic screening. Saphyr could help estimate the odds of a child developing cancer, heart disease, immune deficiency, or epilepsy. Parents forewarned could plan for more robust and refined monitoring and mitigation than currently available.

    The humanitarian motive calms my conflict, even inspires me. What if his contribution cures legions of cancerous children? A Henrietta Lacks of our time! I amuse myself with the notion of a counteroffer. Sixty dollars seems low.

    Then the bait and switch dawns on me. Allison had baited me with the idea that Misha’s duplication could help parents of infants with his duplication get a jump on cancer, heart disease, and epilepsy. Yet she knows as well as I do that Misha has never evinced symptoms of any such diseases. Linegan had turned up no predisposition for disease, no principle of degeneration. Bionano’s investors have their switch set on his autism diagnosis. “The Last Leaf,” by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., serves as my answer to the solicitation. 

    And if I should live to be 

    The last leaf upon the tree

    In the spring,
    Let them smile, as I do now,

    At the old forsaken bough

    Where I cling.

    BC Dr. Skotko is partial to Emily Palen’s interpretation. It is May 2022, five years since the microarray. Despite myself, I have returned for more. A new developmental pediatrician has bestowed upon Misha yet another diagnosis. Intellectual disability brings the number to seven. His 11q chromosome duplication remains the sole reported case. 

    “It leaves us with a sense that this may very well be the answer,” Dr. Skotko asserts, “that this might be the explanation for everything.” I relate why I demurred over Bionano’s research study in molecular sequencing. I ask the doctor to think with me about the clinical value of the same, a distinction that would at least allow me to control applications of any new knowledge. He offers that autism genetics has made rapid strides in the last five years. “There are several hundred genes that we now know, when changed, can lead to some of the characteristics of the diagnosis,” he announces. Moreover, Gene DX has developed a “state-of-the-art” Autism Spectrum Panel to zoom in on those very genes. Molecular sequencing can “bring an end to your diagnostic odyssey.”

    Do I want the odyssey to end? Is a fear of conclusory evidence why I allow Dr. Skotko to irritate me with his desultory sprinkling of “cause” and “determine” in sentences otherwise strewn with “heterozygotes” and other jargon? Does he expect me to take it on faith that he is privy to the mechanism of action vouchsafing Misha’s symptoms to his nucleotides? An inferential leap of such enormously indeterminate proportions is virtually a divination. “We always start with the diagnoses,” he avers, “and then we, together, as detectives, see what genetics has to say.” What if we are starting with a diagnosis liable to breed false positives? 

    My reasoning begins with the particulars of Misha and then searches out generalities. Dr. Skotko, reversing my sequence, begins with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, as though the point of the investigation were to validate an artifice of nouns and verbs. For Sherlock Holmes, molecular sequencing is elementary, just a method for the most efficient application of means to a logical symmetry of causality, explanation, and prediction. Method plus model plus technique equals end-in-itself. Dr. Skotko deals in know-how. I want to know who wants to know, even if I am still not altogether certain that I myself want to know.

    I cite a history of breakthrough technologies that have never actually broken through. Once autism became a checklist diagnosis in the third edition of the DSM, the same edition that heralded a “biological revolution,” a vanguard of researchers went forth armed with electroencephalography, computerized axial tomography, positron emission tomography, magnetic resonance spectroscopy, and magnetic resonance imaging. The technology freed neurobiologists from having to section postmortem tissue — live brains, unlike other organs, cannot be biopsied — and set the field on a mission to network their anatomical, electrical, and chemical functions. The inward searchlight of the revolution was to have discovered correlations between neurodevelopmental phenotypes and brain hemispheres and subregions, perhaps even to have validated the “localization” thesis that had been kicking around since the 1880s.

    Forty years later, the biological accountants of neurobiology have advanced treatment options in autism not one jot. Misha, for his part, has been pictured by a neurobiologist, neuroimmunologist, neuropsychologist, neuro-ophthalmologist, and neuroradiologist. When the latter, Dr. Richard Robertson, pronounced his structural MRI normal, the tension between my will to know and my will to not-know generated some questions. I emailed Dr. Robertson requesting the size of the data set plied by the algorithm. I said I assumed the concept of a normal brain derived from the nineteenth-century’s vision of the “average man” and the concomitant birth of inferential statistics. I questioned whether mechanical instrumentalism could see Misha. No reply. I downloaded the images. I thought I might frame a souvenir. Scanning a dozen of the 1,431, I closed the file. In their spectral mystery I perceived no beauty.

    Dr. Skotko, too, brushes me off. He exhibits no appetite for debating the empirics of methodology or the metaphysics of inference. If I reject molecular sequencing, he will chalk it up to impudent subjectivity. If I elect to proceed, I will fall into line with the conventional justification for such ventures: scientific investigation ripens in the fruits of its discoveries. “If we find this gene,” he claims, “it might come with a medical playbook. We might learn, for example, that at age twenty-five Misha will be prone to bone cancer.” Bone cancer?

    That October, five months after I swallowed the bait, the data extracted from the buccal swabs comes in. Gene DX has sequenced Misha’s genes against “all the genes that we know are associated and causative of autism spectrum disorder,” Dr. Skotko confirms. Roll of the drum . . . “They are all programmed typically in Misha.” Having undertaken the microarray and the sequencing, “you’ve done all the latest and greatest testing for autism.” We have discovered nothing. I am pleased. 

    BC Although Gene DX found no hits for autism (or bone cancer), the sequencing did reveal another de novo variation. This second variation, a deletion, is located in Misha’s RASA-2 gene. Like the chromosome duplication, it is classified as a “variation of unknown significance.” Also like the duplication, it has never been reported in medical genetics.

    Two weeks later, we are consulting with Dr. Amy Roberts, a cardiovascular geneticist at Boston Children’s Hospital. RASA is the pathway that cells take as they multiply. “If you’ve altered the pathway — the cell-multiplication pathway — to the point that it’s down-regulated, then you can have growth issues, cognitive issues, narrowing of the heart valve, blood-clotting problems,” Dr. Roberts explains. Variations causing down-regulation in the RASA-2 pathway, she continues, have been associated with Noonan Syndrome. We are in good hands. Dr. Roberts is “the super-duper expert on Noonan,” according to Dr. Skotko’s referral.

    Misha does appear to have some features “that could potentially be consistent with Noonan,” she remarks during the examination. His eyes do slant downward a little. The spacing between his nipples is indeed a mite wide. Language impairment and developmental delay are also characteristics of Noonan. At the same time, his neck is not webbed. His stature is not stunted, and his testes are not undescended. He is a tall boy, with balls.

    Noonan often implies congenital heart disease. Dr. Roberts orders an echocardiogram, plus bladder and renal ultrasounds and a blood clotting screen. Everything checks out normal. She cannot diagnose Noonan Syndrome. “We don’t have information about his particular deletion,” she concedes of RASA-2. “And he’s a boy who has a chromosome change as well; understanding how those two things do or don’t interact is impossible for me to really know.” 

    How is it possible that a boy laden with so many diagnoses is impossible for the diagnosticians to explain? At ten years old, Misha carries autism, speech and language disorder, cerebral vision impairment, intellectual disability, sensory processing disorder, and two genetic mutations. No disagreement about his profile has emerged between his clinicians. Yet among his hodgepodge of therapies and treatments — behavior modification, homeopathy, immunotherapy, yoked prism glasses, sensory clay, weighted blankets, augmented communication devices — nothing works better than chance. Misha himself is blithely unimpressed with the rigamarole. Steven Pinker, the Harvard psychologist, once took a kindly interest and referred us to a clinical trial of Google Glass directed by a neuroscientist in Cambridge. On a tiny screen, embedded in the “World’s First Augmented Reality Glasses for Autism,” a gem was to have appeared as Misha’s reward for recognizing a correct emotion. He slipped on the glasses, crinkled his nose, and slipped them off. That was that.

    How should I think about diagnoses with no detectable biological provenance, seven diagnoses from which nothing follows? “I’m having a hard time pinpointing Misha,” once said Karen Barrows, his vision therapist at the Perkins School for the Blind. “I’m looking at him and going ‘ok, where’s my next step,’ and then I go home at night thinking ‘what’s my next step with Misha?’ He doesn’t fit your standard anything. He doesn’t strike me as a kid with autism.” After a second neuropsychological examination, Dr. Kirstin Birtwell of the Lurie Center for Autism reaffirmed his autism diagnosis. As we walked together toward the front door, however, she confessed “we don’t even know whether ‘autism’ is the best word to describe your son.” 

    What kind of game are they playing? Are they making him up? In what material sense can he be said to have the disorders they allege when the sum total of what he yields is a couple of genetic variations of uncertain significance? I admire Misha’s fortitude in the face of absurdity. He is a student who does not talk in a classroom of students who do not see. I swell with pride for my uncaused cause, my unicorn.

     

    BC Dr. Amy Roberts, the cardiovascular geneticist, has a friend and collaborator who happens to be a super-duper expert on RASA-2. Her name is Maria Kontaridis. She directs the Masonic Medical Research Institute, in Utica, New York. 

    Dr. Kontaridis describes her research to me over the telephone. The genetic modeling she conducts in her laboratory should enable her to determine whether Misha’s variation is pathogenic — whether it is downregulating his pathways, inimical to the functioning of his proteins and thus his cells. Her methodology, called iPS (“induced pluripotent stem cell”), improves on both the old postmortem sectioning and the newer imaging that lights up brains like Christmas trees. If I deliver her two tablespoons of Misha’s blood, Dr. Kontaridis will induce his brain cells to devolve into their embryonic state. She will manifest a three-dimensional “brain organoid” in vitro. iPS, less than five years old, bestrides a vanguard alliance of neurobiology, molecular genetics, and biomedical engineering.

    When I queried Dr. Roberts about the benefit to Misha of involving him in her friend’s research, she had cited a need for “long-term monitoring of his heart and any blood-clotting issues” — despite that he does not show any signs of heart or blood-clotting issues. Dr. Kontaridis is franker. Her study would yield no conceivable clinical benefit to him. Still, “this would be the first time that this particular genetic variation has been characterized.” She would create a special assay just for him. She invites me to visit her laboratory in Utica. She sounds excited. 

    My own brain boggles over the juxtaposition between reverse-aged “cerebral organoid intelligence” and the Freemasons, an age-old fraternal society. The anti-Masonry crusade of the 1820s and 1830s promulgated a ghastly lore about the secret doings supposed to be taking place in the lodges. Masons were alleged to dabble in the occult, to drink wine from human skulls in their rituals. Two centuries later, Masons actually are wheedling brains out of thimblefuls of blood.

    The will to know and the will to not know are desires, according to Mark Lilla’s Ignorance and Bliss; reasoning vibrates with emotional and aesthetic impulses. Lilla’s insight explains why the brain organoid illustrating the Annual Report of the Masonic Medical Research Institute looks to me like an Edvard Munch painting. My emotions are getting out of hand. What happens, I wonder, if our little frankenstein were to get a headache? I ponder the philosophical questions re-raised by iPS. Masonic membership requires affirmation of a Supreme Being. So what would be the metaphysical status of Misha’s mini brain in the laboratory? Would he/it exist as a moral being, or not-exist as a tool of research? iPS technology can clone unlimited cellular tissue. Am I to anticipate his mini-brain developing sentience? Consciousness? At what level would he merit the status of personhood? Would his doppelgänger then become a Mason? Poor Dr. Kontaridis. She must be comparing me with the primitives who guarded their souls from the invention of the camera.

    “The purpose of this study is to understand the causes of autism spectrum disorders,” reads the informed consent document I received. That looks on the level. As I scan the document, however, a sentence in paragraph four stops me: “Your child’s cell lines will be stored indefinitely in locked freezers in the Molecular Genetics laboratory.” Paragraph five, curiously, suggests otherwise. “If you decide to withdraw from the study, we will discard the DNA and/or the cells.” Further down, I feel my blood pressure rising once more: “We may use your child’s samples as de-identified control samples for other studies. Samples may be shared with collaborating research laboratories.” Prometheus got his liver eaten for such brazenness.

    “Thank you for being the first to catch this and point it out,” responds the manager of the Institutional Review Board. Dr. Kontaridis has taken my objection to the pooh-bahs. “Samples may be shared with collaborating research laboratories” has become “Data may be shared with collaborating research laboratories.” The document, thus revised, now sits on a desk beneath my trembling hand. 

     

    BC Am I willing to stand athwart the scientific future due to a few sketchy lines in an informed consent document? Will I deny the world the profit of enlightenment and understanding? Perhaps so. Perhaps I am listening to the voice of Dostoevsky’s underground man. Perhaps I agree with him that “two times two is four is a most obnoxious thing” because “then there’s nothing to seek out.” The underground man’s self-consciousness stems from his dividedness. His perversity of will is both irreducible and non-negotiable. “This caprice of ours, gentlemen, may in fact be the most profitable of anything on earth for our sort because it preserves for us the chiefest and dearest thing, that is, our personality and our individuality. This profit is remarkable because it destroys all classifications.”

    Temporizing, I relish my power to spite medical genetics. On the wall above my daughter Niusha’s kitchen chair hangs an issue of Collier’s magazine. Black letters spell out the title of the May 20, 1939, cover story: “Legalize Mercy Killing!” Inside, Dr. Robert Foster Kennedy argues for euthanizing “nature’s mistakes” under the color of benevolence. “To these unfortunates we surely might be allowed legally to grant a dreamless and unending sleep.” The following year, the American Neurological Association elected Dr. Foster Kennedy its president. Invited to address the American Psychological Association, he behooved scientists of good faith to cooperate in the extermination of every “retarded child over the age of five.” Meanwhile, over in Germany, nurses and doctors obligingly began murdering children with disabilities, gassing, starving, and mutilating the black flowers of civilization. In the pediatric killing wards, the Nazis perfected the technologies of a race science urged upon them by two generations of distinguished Americans.

    Is Dostoevsky turning me paranoid? The year is 2022 and we live in Cambridge, Massachusetts, not in the St. Petersburg of 1864 or the Berlin of 1939. Foster Kennedy died in 1952, his eliminationist dreams unfulfilled. The Masonic Medical Research Institute started out in 1958 with a mission to eradicate rheumatic diseases. Dr. Kontaridis has been studying RASA-2 for a quarter century. I can think of no reason to impeach her auspices. She sounds motivated by what Richard Feynman called “the pleasure of finding things out.” I like her. I should be careful not to turn Misha’s mystery into my personal fetish. I should sign the consent. I have to make dinner.

    “Don’t do it,” Niusha interjects.

    “Why not?”

    “Because if Misha wasn’t here, we’d be different people. He’s helped us. I’d be a lot less nice.”

    The scientists have wagered that genes explain the mystery of “what makes Misha Misha.” I have played both accomplice and accuser in a dance of imputation whose corollary we have all abdicated to a fourteen-year-old girl. Say her brother’s variations do determine his impairments and aberrant behaviors. How can anyone be sure they do not also determine his sanguinary traits — his private jokes, his rapture for music, his aureoles of sensory hallucination? What Niusha intuits is that being with him, as opposed to acting on him, allows his unique biology to engender no less unique relationships. The farragoes that make Misha Misha, in other words, make Niusha Niusha. In The Trouble with Being Born, Emil Cioran places her existential affirmation into an aphorism. “The only way to reach another person at any depth is to move toward what is deepest in yourself.” 

    Where does that leave my decision? I reckon up probabilities between the unrestrained telos of natural science and the legal fiction awaiting my signature. I reckon the Sherlock Holmeses of genetics will continue to flog the diagnostic junk drawer of “autism and other developmental disorders.” I reckon they will accuse more genes of associating with the DSM. I reckon rounded-up scores and dread diseases foretold will gaslight prospective parents into selective abortion, striking untold artifacts from the human family. If that is so, then the God’s-eye view, the view from nowhere, will progressively purify the species of variations of uncertain significance. Will the mini-brains of the neverborn repose in the eternal winter of a freezer in Utica?

    I reckon so. But a future in which two plus two always equals four shall not have my consent. I refuse to sign, come what may. Out of spite, out of ignorance, out of love, I cling to my forsaken bough on the far edge of science.

    Poems l Spring 2026

    Draft of a Letter: Elizabeth Hardwick to Simone de Beauvoir

     

    Dare I say it? He was the best thing

    that ever happened to me. My man, the poet, mine

    then not mine, then briefly and nearly mine again.

     

     Why and how these things happen you would have said

    better than I—don’t you think?—free and unfettered

    as you were, another kind of liberated woman, never—

     

    horrid phrase— male-identified, your man, Jean-Paul,

    small and ugly and never for a moment yours as I thought

    mine now and then to be, though in the end we

     

    both of us knew them as the real distinguished thing,

    well worth the trouble we endured on their behalf.

    On their behalf. How little they knew,

     

    each of them, what they cost us, though here I Imagine

    you didn’t much mind what your man put you through,

    determined not to let him demand more of you than

     

    you demanded of him. Tedious, this effort to settle

    accounts, tally up the wounds and losses, to fight free of

    envy or resentment. Funny that I write to you now

     

    as if we had once known each other, had ever met,

    as if I hadn’t, young and maybe foolish, written about

    The Second Sex all those years ago and wondered at

     

    what you knew about women that I never quite believed,

    that we were as strong as men and had only ourselves

    to blame for our doubts and disappointments.

     

    No reason now or need to make amends, with you

    long gone and the occasion for this meeting, if you can

    call it that, a photo you never got to see, still

     

    nubile and naughty, slated to appear on your

    100th birthday—on the cover of Le Nouvel Observateur:

    you in your birthday suit, stark naked, your 1950 ass,

     

    alluring as it surely seemed to Sartre, back when

    he might still have gotten it up

    and wooed you with those inconstant off-center eyes.

     

    Can it be that yet again they’re raving about

    The Second Sex, as if there might be still some scandal left

    to fight about or repel?

     

    I look again at those perfect buttocks,

    the muscular legs and high stiletto heels and wonder

    at the Peeping Tom who got near enough to capture

     

    you and keep the photo stashed and secret,

    so that now the feminists you spawned can rage

    about the photo and the insult to your memory,

     

    while I see you smile and think to fix the stray curl

    you were standing at that dressing room mirror

    to tease or unleash.

     

    So much for the two of us to talk about, more than this photo

    of you standing stark naked for the hidden camera. So much

    still unresolved about the old story: Power and Subordination.

     

    Fancy words you wielded with a confidence and appetite

    I never had, not when it always seemed to me so boring

    to be nattering on about Dominance and Disenfranchisement

     

    at a time — our time — when women like the two of us could do

    as we pleased, take on men at least as brilliant — or more so —

    than the two of us, my Cal coming back to me but dead almost

     

    on arrival, after wasted years with that other woman, while you,

    who knows what you were doing with all those lovers, Jean-Paul

    never jealous or possessive, thinking you too much

     

    for any other man, certain you’d leave them fainting at your feet,

    fit for a good lay or two but not for more,

    the Woman Thing always your reliable calling card,

     

    Why you came on so querulous and angry

    even at the end I can’t imagine.

    Odd, you know, I always like you best

     

    when you tell them, your disciples, that they

    all live too much in their heads, though—forgive me—

    I don’t think you’d have been much of a wife, or a mother.

     

    To Appetite

    That summer of the incessant migraine you left me,

    The meds incremental, appetite weak and depleted,

    my sleep deep, without texture or upswell,

    by day the nocturnal fog lingering, desire at best remembered.

    First to go was my craving for sweets—chocolate, mango, 

    papaya, guayaba, the cherished fruits of childhood.

    Nothing enticed. Swallowing was hard.

    All passion drained from me. And with it the pain.

    All energy—even my longing for the old ways, some

    Surge of hunger—was sapped. I did not want you back.

    The famous itch that wants scratching

    was gone. I was at home at the farthest edge of Scythia,

    like Limos in her underworld, too numb to hurt.

    Really I did not pine for you. Rather, I feared your return,

    and with that terror a glimmer of something like strength

    came back: the spark of thought that awakens

    the next glimmer, and the next. From deep

    in the fog the famished brain cried for its want—

    so that at last and again the migraine came back,

    savage and tyrannical, came back, and with it, so did I

    come back to myself, desire indecent,

    resurgent, hunger insatiable, the wanting and the

    not having a torment and a gift, a restitution.

     

    Obliterated Light

                                          —to Seamus Heaney

    I am practiced in the art of goodbyes.

    You might say I do it for a living.

    No tears, no breast-beating laments,

    no wailing or gnashing of teeth: only a calm embrace,

    a soft kiss on each cheek, some simple words.

     

    But the dead, closer now, keep pressing

    —first one, then at once another, and

    another—Russell and Barry, Louise and now Pat—

    all dear to me, so that I want to ask—but won’t,

    knowing the answer—Where will it end?

     

    Today I awoke to the sound of a dog barking relentlessly.

    For hours he howled and complained

    to no avail. His suffering, so it seemed,

    was unanswerable.

     

     I was reminded of the unhappy dog

    in your exuberant English rendering

    of an African folk tale, replete with

    desperate crows, and one mischievous frog.

     

     That stupid frog you wrote about

    is still stuck in the mud, Seamus,

    and the dog, crying out in vain, still howls

    all night behind the corpse house — inconsolable — 

    for the House of Life — too late,

    too late!

     

    Last time you left us you said — was it a promise? — we’d meet

    again, that you would fly in, read us your poems, enchant

    us over dinner and walk us through the morning woods. 

    We said our goodbyes, confident of the next meeting.

     

    Of course, there are always endings, Seamus, early deaths

    and late, pointless murders, sectarian assassinations you know

    too well — but what had they to do with you?

    You, our jovial big-hearted genius. You,

    our irrepressible, earth-loving friend.

     

    In that clearing, just outside the House of Life, dear Seamus,

    the grass brims over its sacred cargo,

    and the company you keep is growing.

    The gate at the portal is open and the dog still wails at the wall;

    the new arrivals, slipping through, will be glad to see you.

    Shine your light on them.

    Tom Wolfe, Graduate Student!!!

    I.

    Live long enough and eventually people will come calling and start asking you questions. In the last decades of his very long life — ninety years, from 1898 to 1989 — the editor and critic Malcolm Cowley became an increasingly attractive target of opportunity for a phalanx of inquiring minds who wanted to pick his brain about his personal history with the marquee names of American literature in the twentieth century. One of the dubious honors that attend literary longevity is that the survivor can become regarded as something like a vending machine of anecdotes and facts about the distinguished departed by biographers, historians, literary scholars, graduate students, and the merely curious and intrusive. 

     They were right to do so. Cowley had been in the thick of the action in American literature ever since he arrived at Harvard from Pittsburgh in 1915 as a scholarship student. He had driven a munitions truck on the Western Front as one of the many literary-minded “gentleman volunteers”; lived in France as the first wave of American cultural pilgrims hit the Left Bank (and wrote about it, first and perhaps best, in his classic memoir Exile’s Return); replaced Edmund Wilson as the literary editor of The New Republic, a true power seat in American letters; and made himself all too visible in the 1930s when American writers took a hard left turn politically. The breadth of his associations and his significant actions as an editor and a critic — and participant, observer, and all-round tastemaker and operator — positioned Cowley as a central player in the long-delayed rise of American literature to world stature. 

    This wave of curious and importunate callers began to accelerate in earnest in the 1950s, as the 1920s and the figures of the Lost Generation that Cowley knew so well and wrote about so consistently were coming into academic and popular vogue. Cowley took on this burden diligently and for the most part with good humor, with the occasional irritated complaint registered. In 1978 he wrote to Allen Tate that “People come round here with tape recorders to tap, tap, tape my memories as if I were a National Scholarly Resource. The National Endowment for the Humanities ought to provide me with a secretary. I should be funded before being embalmed.” But Cowley’s cooperation with them, sometimes willing and sometimes weary, is testified to by his prominence in the pages — text, acknowledgments, endnotes, and indexes — of unnumbered biographies, cultural histories, literary studies, journal articles, and long unread graduate theses.

     One of the earliest of the graduate students to contact Malcolm Cowley was a twenty-one-year-old by the name of Thomas Kennerly Wolfe, who was pursuing a degree in the still new and swiftly blossoming field of American Studies at Yale. In early January 1953, he wrote to Cowley at his Sherman, Connecticut, home, hoping to arrange a meeting on the Yale campus when he was scheduled to arrive in New Haven. For a seminar that his adviser, Professor Ralph Gabriel, was teaching on twentieth-century American intellectual history, Wolfe was writing a paper on the League of American Writers and the Writers’ Congresses that it had sponsored in the 1930s and early 1940s. As he put it in his letter, “What I want to find out is what documents, minutes, or perhaps other sources there may be, bearing on the Congress and the League of American Writers, besides the speeches that were published. I figured you might be in a good position to help me out on that.” 

    Tom Wolfe — to call him by the name the world now uses — had come to exactly the right person for his purposes. Malcolm Cowley was one of the most knowledgeable people on the planet about the League of American Writers, having been from its founding a prominent, energetic, and influential member for most of its seven-year existence. But in 1953, and for some years before and after, the League of American writers and his activities on its behalf would have been the very last thing Malcolm Cowley would have cared to talk about. His involvement with the League had been one of his most disastrous failures of political judgment in a decade full of them. It was known, even at the time, as a transparently Communist-front organization created to sway literary opinion in the direction of the Party and Soviet Union, and his reckless visibility as a Stalinist fellow traveler on its behalf — and more than a dozen other front organizations of lesser stature and duration — had come close to destroying his career. It had gotten him cashiered from his editorial post at The New Republic and reduced to mere contributor status, with serious financial consequences. Even worse, he was very publicly hounded in 1942 and forced to resign from a government position in the Office of Facts and Figures in Washington by the Dies Committee, Whittaker Chambers, and conservative attack-dog columnist Westbrook Pegler. In the postwar, his bright pink past had a tendency to rear its head whenever he was appointed as a visiting scholar at a state college, and on occasion the job offer would vanish. By the time of Wolfe’s letter Cowley had long retreated into a defensive crouch where politics was concerned, and he kept his opinions (straightforwardly liberal now) resolutely private. 

    Wolfe did not connect with Cowley at that time, but they finally did meet two months later, when he interviewed Cowley for what would become his doctoral thesis, “The League of American Writers: Communist Organizational Activity Among American Writers, 1929-1942.” I discovered this fact in the course of writing a biographical study of Malcolm Cowley, and the connection intrigued me no end. Here was a totally unexpected name to add to Cowley’s vast association with the great and the good of twentieth-century American literature. I had followed Tom Wolfe’s exploits in journalism and latterly in fiction from his earliest days as a pioneering New Journalist in Esquire and New York magazines, usually with delight but sometimes with annoyance and even distaste. (I Am Charlotte Simmons — eeeuuuuwww.) Eager to learn just what it was Cowley and other figures, including James T. Farrell and Archibald MacLeish, told Wolfe, and also to see the kind of writer he had been in his grad student phase, I downloaded and printed out the thesis, all 355 pages of it, and began to read it. You can do this yourself, but I don’t really recommend it. 

    A very famous writer once disparaged the dissertation as “so diligently dull and puritanically objective, it’ll dry up your skin and make your teeth fall out.” That writer was Tom Wolfe. Put less colorfully, his book-length thesis demonstrates all the flaws of graduate student prose, including bland language, repetitiveness and padding that suggests the writer was being paid by the word, a graceless grinding out of core arguments that soon gets tiresome, an utter absence of humor and lightness of touch — in sum, not a single trace of the skywriting prose style and cheekiness that would in the next decade make Wolfe famous. There is a high Cold War approach to the material that feels to the contemporary reader uncomfortably adjacent to Hearst red-baiting and the HUAC hearings (from which much of the underlying evidence derives). Example: “The Expansion of the Communist Writers Apparatus: The Master Plan” is the title of Chapter Four. I could go on in this vein, as Wolfe did. 

    Yet for all its longueurs — well, it’s basically one long longueur — the portrait that Wolfe’s dissertation paints of the political credulity of the American literati and intelligentsia in the 1930s is an important one — cold, mean-spirited at times, devoid of empathy and the effort to understand, but factually accurate. Wolfe’s approach is historical rather than literary — not a single book from the 1930s is mentioned, aside from a brief take on the short-lived vogue for proletarian novels — and also heavily sociological. He discovered Max Weber in New Haven and became enamored of Weber’s theory of the central role of status in the conduct of human affairs — a discovery that would serve him well throughout his writing life. This, in his telling, is the sole motive that drives his dramatis personae, who otherwise have all the agency and internal psychology of the average lemming. The unlovely phrase “manipulable mass” is one that recurs constantly in Wolfe’s pages. And yet there was a genuine aspect of herd behavior in the way that the American literary elites of the time swung left politically after the aestheticized 1920s and put themselves in the orbit and under the influence of the American Communist party, and by extension the Soviet Union. 

      The story that Wolfe tells in his dissertation is narrowly focused on means rather than ends. Marxist ideology and politics in general interested him very little. He announces up front that “this is an organizational study and does not deal with the history or the influence of ideas per se.” Instead he concentrates single-mindedly on “the role of the Communist party (in all countries) as an agency of social control” — one gets the feeling that Wolfe at heart rather admires this role for its theoretical discipline and technical expertise.

    In the first half of the 1930s the approach of the Communists towards writers and intellectuals applied a one-size-fits-all strategy that stressed conformity to, literally, the Party line above all else. In fact, many American writers had in some sense met the Communists more than halfway. A group of prominent writers calling themselves the “League of Professional Groups for Foster and Ford” — including Cowley, Edmund Wilson, Sherwood Anderson, Erskine Caldwell, John Dos Passos, Sidney Hook, and Lincoln Steffens — had organized on behalf of the Communist candidates for president and vice-president in the election of 1932, scanting the pre-New Deal Roosevelt and even the Socialist candidate Norman Thomas. They generated considerably more ink than votes.

    The Party’s main strategy regarding the literati in those years was the establishment of a nationwide network of John Reed Clubs, which gave economically beset younger writers in need of camaraderie places to meet and share tips for advancement and survival and, of course, to strategize, with Communist guidance, about the downfall of capitalism and the fight against fascism. Many of these clubs had their own literary magazines, shoestring operations with names like Leftward, The Hammer, Red Pen, Cauldron, and most resonantly and lastingly, Partisan Review. Their circulations were tiny, but they gave their writers a place to see their work published at a time when they were shut out from the established magazines and publishing houses. The clubs were in one sense farm teams meant to develop a new generation of ideologically-trained writers for the bright revolutionary future just up ahead. 

    The Communists viewed “The Professional Writing Class of the United States as a Manipulable Mass,” as Wolfe ungracefully puts it, because they were by and large concentrated in urban areas, especially in New York, making the goal of taking “effective control of the literary style of life” a practical one. Their putatively anomic and isolated way of living meant that writers were vulnerable, in Wolfe’s account, to the “status structure of the writing craft,” and the prefabricated social and professional life that the Communist orbit offered. Thus, he asserts, the Party was able to apply “the economically non-rational goal of literary prestige” to organize writers of even mildly leftist persuasion into a near-bureaucratic faction of considerable usefulness. In some of the most po-faced sentences Wolfe ever wrote, he zeroes in on the “bizarre side of party-situations prevalent within the New York literary community” and their “extraordinary degrees of intoxication, sexual promiscuity, and exhibitionistic garrulity.” Writers! They weren’t just getting loaded and laid at cocktail parties as normal people do. They were “acting out the value tensions which existed between the literary community and the surrounding spheres of influence and which insured the integrity of the literary style of life. “

    In any case, the word “prestige” is key to the change of Communist strategy in this regard that began in earnest in 1935. The Party had discovered “the utility of sheer prestige” in the literary and cultural realms, which meant a shift in emphasis towards established writers with attention-grabbing names rather than the tyros in the John Reed Clubs, which were swiftly and cold-heartedly dissolved, along with their magazines. In their place Alexander Trachtenberg, the head of the Communist publishing house and acting under orders from Moscow, began to lay the groundwork for something called the League of American Writers, the equivalent in the United States of the Union of Soviet Writers. His first action was to announce an American Writers’ Congress to be held in New York City in April of 1935, a conclave consciously modeled on the Soviet Writers’ Congress held eight months earlier in Moscow. 

    Wolfe does not mention this, but the call for the Congress ran in The New Masses in January: “A new renaissance is upon the world… The revolutionary spirit is penetrating the ranks of the creative writers…” It was signed by sixty-two writers of considerable clout, including Theodore Dreiser, Dos Passos, Farrell, and Cowley, as well as Trachtenberg and Earl Browder, then secretary of the Communist Party. The Congress took place at the Mecca Temple on West 55th Street, today called New York City Center, and was a great success, attracting more than 4,000 attendees who heard stirring speeches by the assembled literary celebrities (and Earl Browder). Wolfe bases his claim that some of the non-Communist members of the organizing committee were not fully aware of the Party’s control of the proceedings on his interview with Cowley, which if true demonstrated an exceptional blindness or naivete. 

    At the final session of the Congress the climactic event was the formation of the League of American Writers, with an executive committee chaired by the novelist Waldo Frank and including such figures as the Marxist bullyboy Mike Gold, Joseph Freeman, and Granville Hicks (all three of them Party members), as well as Cowley and his close friends Kenneth Burke and Matthew Josephson. The League and the many smaller satellite organizations, sometimes ad hoc and usually short-lived, provided the institutional structure for the Communist Party to begin to rationalize and bureaucratize its use of prestige as a tool of influence. (Wolfe’s organizational language in his thesis is catching, as you can see…) The timing, whether by accident or design, worked to the Party’s advantage, because in the late summer of 1935 the Comintern announced its Popular Front policy, which involved a retreat from revolutionary sectarianism to a new, big-tent, we’re-all-in-this-together strategy against fascism abroad and against hunger and want at home. The cunning new ethos was expressed by Earl Browder’s infamous but effective slogan coined around this time, “Communism is Twentieth-Century Americanism.” The façade of the Popular Front made it far easier for writers who might otherwise have kept a careful distance from Communist causes to sign on to such organizations and activities with a clear conscience — thus becoming, in Wolfe’s view, which was correct, part of an ever-widening “manipulable mass” of the literati cunningly controlled by the Party’s puppet masters. Or, in Wolfe-speak, “the League became an effective instrument for the political mobilization of the New York literary community.”

    The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 provided just the right cause with which to energize and accelerate the Popular Front. The Loyalist’s struggle against the Nazi-supported insurgents and anti-fascism in all its international and domestic manifestations became the binding agent for a wide array of writers who might otherwise as usual have acted upon the narcissism of small differences. (The derisive Communist term for such people was “stooges.”) Undoubtedly the high point of the League’s visibility occurred in 1937 at the opening session of the second American Writers’ Congress when Ernest Hemingway, newly arrived from his journalistic exploits in Madrid and terrified of public speaking, gave a speech to a packed Carnegie Hall in support of the Spanish Republic and against Franco’s Fascist insurgency. 

    For a while the LAW’s mobilization of the means and the markers of literary status succeeded in keeping a majority of the country’s best-regarded writers “on the left.” Good things could happen in your career if you kept in line; a great deal of punitive abuse and sometimes a diminished status could occur if you did not. Your politics and your social life could align nicely, or as Wolfe puts it in another ludicrous sentence, the intoxication of so-called “cause parties” became a “state which Communist organizers found most advantageous, a half-chemical, half-psychological state in which the conventional cocktail party symbols of literary status would be indistinguishable from the political symbols and ideology embodied in the cause and the active commitment of the money contribution.” Arthur Koestler, meet Robert Benchley. (And, later and infamously, Leonard and Felicia Bernstein.) 

    It was all downhill from there, however. The Party may or may not have been, as Wolfe claims, “on the threshold of creating a monolithic writer-bureaucracy” — that seems badly overstated to me — but the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 and the LAW’s hypocritical and incoherent support of it spelled the organization’s doom. The naked fact of its Soviet control could no longer be ignored, and a mass resignation of its most glittering names, including Thomas Mann, Archibald MacLeish, and Malcolm Cowley, followed, leaving in their wake only the Party members like the president, the screenwriter Donald Ogden Stewart, the most pliant fellow travelers and a cohort of commercial writers distinctly lacking in literary status. The League of American Writers limped along for the next couple of years until 1942, when it was not disbanded so much as abandoned like a dilapidated house. 

    Anyone who might read Wolfe’s arid dissertation without prior knowledge of the human drama of the American literary left in the 1930s and its individual players would come away with no sense whatsoever of the political excitement, hopeful exultation, and moral anguish of those years. Or of the vast catastrophe of the Depression, one so overriding that capitalism seemed not just rocked back on its heels but comprehensively failed. For that you have to turn to books such as Daniel Aaron’s classic and still definitive Writers on the Left and Malcolm Cowley’s own too-delayed memoir, The Dream of the Golden Mountains. (It did not appear until 1981.) The Communist Party (and Tom Wolfe) might have seen the American writers caught up in all this turmoil as a manipulable and faceless mass, but each one of them had to decide in the privacy of their conscience, as the language of the time had it, which side they were on. There is a rich and somewhat tortured literature on this subject, but Wolfe’s dissertation fails to cite a single instance of it, nor does it even mention any other highly pertinent works of literature published in those years — not The Grapes of Wrath, not “September 1, 1939,” not Waiting for Lefty, not U.S.A. He must have been aware of such works; twenty years later he would write that the Depression “stimulated the great phase of social realism in the American novel.” 

    Instead Wolfe’s relentless focus is the sociological and even Pavlovian uses of status hunger as a tool for the control of even — or maybe I mean especially — the most culturally and intellectually developed members of a society. In this aspect alone does the dissertation foreshadow the role of social philosopher of status in human affairs to which Wolfe would later appoint himself — the village explainer of its peculiar folkways on the island of Manhattan. See his relatively early and still amusingly on-target “The Big-League Complex,” in the New York Herald Tribune in 1964, on “the pleasures of status, the impulse of status striving in the status capital of the United States, if not the whole hulking world” for the details.

     Although, come to think of it, the contempt for writers and intellectuals that runs just below the surface of the thesis also foreshadows the goad and scold that he would become and his conservative — even reactionary — political bent. Decades before the phrase was coined, Wolfe made a specialty of “owning the libs,” most famously in his viciously effective takedown “Radical Chic.” His receiver was tuned very finely to the contradictions and hypocrisies of the left, and he delighted in skewering its most visible figures. 

    So is Wolfe’s thesis just another dreary Ph.D. dissertation that deserves to be consigned to an intellectual landfill with many thousands of others? What nagged at me was that I could not quell my curiosity regarding how a writer who was such a keen observer of the human spectacle managed early in his career to have noticed not a bit of it while writing about the 1930s. So I dug deeper into the matter of just what kind of person Tom Wolfe was in his five years in New Haven, including a sojourn in his archives at the New York Public Library. And the more I gleaned about the circumstances under which his Ph.D. thesis was produced, and the more I looked into the personality, the writer, and, yes, the thinker he was, the more telling the whole episode became. I came away with a richer, more complex, and altogether more proleptic sense of who Tom Wolfe, Graduate Student, was. 

                   

    II.

    In his later years Tom Wolfe did not look back up on his time engaged in graduate studies fondly. “I’m not sure I can give you the remotest idea of what graduate school is like,” he wrote in 1973. “Nobody ever has.” Still, he tried: “Try to imagine the worst part of an Antonioni movie you ever saw, or reading Mr. Sammler’s Planet at one sitting, or just reading it. . . . That will give you the general idea.” There is the telltale Wolfean anti-intellectualism. Paeans to the joys of graduate school are nonexistent, but still, something in it at least triggered his impulse towards impressive, even mildly astonishing productivity judging from the considerable handwritten and typed record that he left behind. If he really was that miserable, he was the hardest-working miserabilist in the history of graduate education. A good guess as to his motivation might have been an impulse to show those effete, snobby Northeasterners just what he could do.

    Wolfe came from Richmond, Virginia, and had deep Southern roots. His grandfather fought for the Confederacy and his father, an agronomist and the editor of The Southern Planter, was an intellectual rooted in the soil. He retained the gentle manners of his class for his entire life; pretty much every profile of him ever written begins by noting the contrast between his wildly idiosyncratic prose style and bomb-throwing persona and his soft-spoken demeanor. This was a handicap in New Haven: “It was the one time in my life I was really stuck. I couldn’t stand out because everybody was eccentric in graduate school. They had everything from genuine dirty-neck Bohemians to true British fops.” An Eisenhower supporter in the land of Adlai Stevenson, he was reduced to wearing a black turtleneck and growing his hair long (for 1956, that is) to make some sort of impression. The bespoke tailored white suits came much later. 

    Wolfe attended Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia, where he studied English and was a good enough baseball pitcher (big hands) to have had a cup of coffee — a tryout — with the New York Giants. But while he had a slider, a screwball, a sinker, and a variety of curves, he lacked a fastball (“my tragic flaw,” he remembered), so he was cut after three days. Instead, under the influence of his American culture professor Marshall Fishwick, he applied to the American Studies program at Yale and was accepted. 

    In 1951 American Studies was a fairly new interdisciplinary program in academia, but it was aligned in the highest degree to the intellectual spirit of a country newly aware of itself as a superpower. It really came of age in the 1940s and 1950s and was the product of an emerging Cold War consensus that sought to study and to bolster “‘the American way of life,’ which was rooted in liberal individualism, pragmatism, suspicion of rigid ideologies, democratic self-governance, and capitalism,” as the historian Greg Barnhisel has written. Unlike the New Criticism-dominated English departments, which focused single-mindedly on the text, and the text alone, of a work of literature, American Studies scholars brought the perspectives of history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, folklore studies, political science, and other disciplines to bear in studying American civilization. Which, by and large, it viewed as a highly positive thing, for the country itself and for the world. It was not a discipline congenial to scholars of an anti-American bent. It was designed to bring close attention and, by extension, stature to the artifacts of American culture, and to our literature above all. 

    Perhaps the most energetic figure in this nexus of academic study and cultural warfare was the enigmatic and altogether fascinating Yale professor Norman Holmes Pearson. According to Greg Barnhisel’s revelatory biography Code Name Puritan, Pearson earned one of the first doctorates in American Studies and was the program’s first undergraduate director at Yale. But just as importantly he was a man of parts, some of which do not fit together very comfortably. He was deeply involved in modernist poetry, becoming close friends with and a career advisor and something like an unpaid literary agent for both Hilda Doolittle and Bryher. He moved adeptly in the highest altitudes of the American poetry establishment, including correspondence and involvement with T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and William Carlos Williams. He was, as one of Barnhisel’s chapter titles has it, “a Networker,” and a very skilled one. 

    There was something else of compelling interest about Pearson. He had been one of the most effective American spymasters of World War II. A serious hip infection of long standing had rendered him semi-crippled and unfit for military service, but in the Office of Strategic Services in London he applied his scholarly habits of mind to gleaning counterintelligence about sleeper agents left behind in the wake of the German retreat in Europe and rolling up their networks. His main tools in this endeavor were index cards on suspected spies, which he fanatically kept accurate and up to date. He was awarded the Medal of Freedom for his exploits. After the war he was briefly involved in planning for the new Central Intelligence Agency that would replace the OSS, but he then returned to his teaching post at Yale. 

    But his services to his country were not over. Yale in the 1950s was infamously a feeder school of high-born, highbrow recruits for the Company — William F. Buckley, Jr., and Peter Matthiessen, for example — and Pearson was instrumental for some years in this effort. It was hardly coincidental that James Jesus Angleton, the ultra-literary head of counterintelligence for the CIA and an intimate of T.S. Eliot, had been Pearson’s student at Yale before the war. And Tom Wolfe was another one of Pearson’s students. There is no evidence, alas, that Pearson tried to recruit him for the Company, but his influence on the young graduate student was profound. 

    Pearson was a riveting showman in the classroom; none of his students ever nodded off. In a warm memorial tribute to him in 1975, Wolfe wrote that “he was the most superbly theatrical teacher I have ever seen,” going on to an extended description of a mesmerizing piece of business with a cigarette Pearson pulled off while describing how a police reporter for the Kansas City Star turned himself into Ernest Hemingway, revolutionizer of American prose. This eulogy is, as far as I know, unique in the Wolfean canon, in that it is completely free of the least trace of irony or sarcasm or hyperbole or stylistic capers of any kind, let alone the snide tone that was his default register. Here he was transparent and sincere. He clearly meant every word of it, and the words were deeply affectionate. 

    Wolfe spent so much time and energy mocking and attacking other writers, particularly his contemporaries in American fiction — his nadir in this department was his broadside in 2000 against John Updike, Norman Mailer, and John Irving, which he charmingly called “My Three Stooges” — that it is hard to remember how hyper-literary he really was. His manifesto “The New Journalism,” from 1973, name- drops everyone from Balzac, Beckett, and Borges to Zamyatin and Zola, stopping off at Cervantes, Dickens, Defoe, Flaubert, Rabelais, Smollett, Sterne, and a dozen or so other big shots along the way. He pretty clearly had read them all, and he was highly aware of, in Mailer’s phrase, “the talent in the room.” 

    Wolfe’s papers from his graduate school days show that this hyper-literary bent arrived very early. He enrolled in 1952 in Pearson’s popular graduate seminar on Ezra’s Pound’s Cantos, one of the densest and most arcane long poems in the modern canon. As a service to Pound and his publisher, each student’s term project was to annotate all of the references in a single canto. Wolfe got the bit between his teeth and produced 117 dense pages of glosses for Canto XLVII’s 109 lines, tracking down allusions to the Odyssey, Metamorphosis, Works and Days, Virgil, Theocritus, figures such as Isis and Osiris from Egyptian mythology, and much, much more. In those pre-search-engine days the paper must have required interminable hours in the stacks, and reference books stacked high on either side of the young man’s carrel. In comparison, two other students produced annotations of other Cantos in two pages each. 

    This paper was by no means an outlier. Wolfe’s original idea for a thesis subject was “a study of Thoreau’s prose style as it relates to the formal values assumed by the Concord group as an esoteric literary school.” In his archives is an entire folder of a hand-drawn Excel Sheet-style table of Thoreau’s rhetorical figures and strategies in Walden and other works — the compilation is of almost alarming density and obsessiveness. He not only read Melville’s virtually unreadable Mardi (try it some time), he also produced a long paper titled “An Annotation of the Quest Allegory in Mardi” that hunted down the book’s numerous allusions and borrowings from, among other sources, Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel. Who knew? There are papers on “Hemingway’s Use of the Mystic And in The Old Man and the Sea” (864 times in its 193 pages!), “On Allusions in Eliot’s Marina” (“If we may regard Marina as a beatitude of the irrational…”) and, tellingly, one on H. L. Mencken, clearly one of his later career models, which predicted that he “will be considered the top American humorist since Mark Twain.” 

    There are also papers produced for his sociology classes that mimic the dreadful vocabulary and style of so much of the discipline without a trace of irony. There are notes from those sociology classes so heroically detailed and organized — his note-taking everywhere in his archives is nothing short of astounding — that to read them is to experience the class as if on fast forward. These written artifacts are the products of an ambitious overachiever with Stakhanovite energies more than comfortable in the world of literary arcana and disciplinary jargon, not a grad school drudge in the slough of despond. 

    The youngish Tom Wolfe also tried on other forms and styles outside of his academic work. He made a stab at short fiction with a stylistically unusual if less than fully achieved story about a bunch of American GIs on a tear in Seoul during the Korean War, titled “Goddamn Frozen Chosen.” There is a cycle of brief poems from 1956 under the rubric “Jocko Thor’s Keyhole Autobiography” that some observers think was a parody of Beat poetry; they read to me rather as a mash-up of E.E. Cummings and William Carlos Williams. Most intriguing to me was a small Champion notebook: the notes inside were indecipherable, but on the cover in Wolfe’s baroque and instantly recognizable hand is written “Santa Barranza,” one of his signature apostrophes. How he latched on to the phrase is unknown, but he liked it enough to deploy it numerous times. 

    Wolfe’s adviser for his thesis was the distinguished American historian Ralph Gabriel, who was one of the founders of Yale’s American Studies program and had been its chairman. It is more than a little suggestive that in 1950 Gabriel resigned that position when Yale accepted a donation of half-a-million dollars from the business magnate and fervent anti-Communist William Robertson Coe. The gift came with the proviso that “the Professor to head the Program of American Studies shall always be one who firmly believes in the preservation of our system of Free Enterprise and is opposed to the system of State Socialism, Communism and Totalitarianism.” (A year later Gabriel was twitted for his insufficient fervor for American capitalism in William F. Buckley’s career-launching God and Man at Yale.

     In any case, Wolfe’s original 1953 paper for Gabriel is in the archives and perusing it is a revelation. Unlike his eventual dissertation, this paper is a genuine, if modified, pleasure to read. The writer who would become Tom Wolfe is already in there, scratching to get out. An example: “In fact, it might well be asked to just what extent did the votaries of the Communist Party’s three cultural renaissances, the ex-aesthetes, the willowy liberals, the mooncalves [!] with their bright images of a Soviet Russia, their sullied image of a tired capitalism, fascism, war — to just what degree did they differ from the ‘Lost Generation?” Wolfe’s conclusion was that “the two generations could not have been more alike.” Well, excuse me, but Santa Barranza! Where had this stylish person been hiding? Wolfe throws off nifty little phrases such as “the hour of liberal frolic was fun, but short.” — in reference to The New Masses — and “that awfully serious, rather preposterously earnest pose which one naturally acquired in the 1930s.” 

    Professor Gabriel must have liked what he read since he approved Wolfe’s thesis subject. Wolfe then proceeded to write a draft of this dissertation that, like his initial paper, differed considerably, even radically, from what he eventually produced. This first draft is present only in snatches in the archives, but what is there shows that he proceeded to address his subject in the same cheeky, somewhat personal (as opposed to coldly objective) and distinctly un-grad-student-like manner. In one folder I discovered and became unreasonably excited by ten pages of typescript titled “Beaux Arts on the Barricades,” probably a draft chapter on the socially conscious artists of the 1930s such as David Siqueiros, Rockwell Kent, Stuart Davis, and Diego Rivera. It is quite a bravura performance: “Legions of the less famous artists were clogging the stale corridors and second-story flats of lower Manhattan, where, grimly, vicariously, with veins popping out of their necks, they spent the decade arguing those issues so intimate to them all: Communism, capitalism (and its overthrow), fascism (and how to fight it), the United Front, the Hearst papers, the Scottsboro Boys, the Lincoln Battalion, Father Coughlin, Trotskyism, Kulaks, breadlines, and the Chinese Kuomintang.” I thought, here are the birth pangs of The Painted Word and From Bauhaus to Our House, and it needs to be published! Sadly, the piece breaks off mid-sentence and was either lost or never finished. But this was the vein that Wolfe was writing in as he made his first stab at his dissertation, and it was blazingly premonitory of what was to come. 

    When he handed the work in, however, it turned out to be an academic disaster. The three anonymous examiners were not pleased, and the comments in their reports were scathing: “He has written a piece of polemical journalism in which he offers too many assertions that are not supported by the evidence.” “He has however oversimplified the issues in reference to those who were decoyed; and weakened the persuasion of his arguments.” “Wolfe’s polemical rhetoric is . . . a chief consideration of my decision to fail the dissertation in its present form. The consequences color every page.” Another premonition of the Wolfe to come! This last examiner concluded that “Wolfe has brought together a synthesis of evidence which might have been a most valuable contribution (and still could) had he not yielded to polemics and a manner quite unsuited to the requirements of a scholarly dissertation.” 

    Of equal or perhaps even greater seriousness than these objections about style was evidence that Wolfe had been less than scrupulous — sloppy, really — with his sources. As David Potter, the American studies graduate supervisor, wrote in a summary, all three of the examiners lodged “the criticism that you misused your sources, giving incorrect quotations, misstating evidence, etc. All three readers checked various sources (a routine duty of readers) and all three made this criticism.” In a file, there is a long and detailed list of specific instances of Wolfe’s scholarly defalcations in this regard and they prove without a doubt that this charge was both true and extensive. 

     Wolfe-watchers will immediately recognize that the above criticisms echo many of the attacks that were lodged against him and his New Journalistic practices by his adversaries over the years. In any case, Potter wrote Wolfe a more-in-sorrow letter sharing the bad news about the reports and telling him that he was not going to be recommended for a degree. This would have been devastating to the ambitious and still youngish writer, of course. But at the end he was thrown the bone that there were still enough positive aspects to his first attempt, specifically “that you write very skillfully, that you organize well, and that you have an excellent case that the literati were indeed manipulated by the communists.” And he still had the opportunity to rewrite his thesis in light of these responses and it might be accepted in a new and improved form. 

     This was even worse than being cut from the Giants. A different writer might have given the whole business up as a bad job and found another avenue of endeavor, but not the dogged young Wolfe. He wrote, angrily and more than a little self-servingly, to a friend that “these stupid fucks have turned down my dissertation, meaning I will have to stay here about a month to delete all the offensive passages and retype the sumbitch. They called my brilliant manuscript ‘journalistic’ and ‘reactionary,’ which means I must go through with a blue pencil and strike out all the laughs and anti-Red passages and slip in a little liberal merde, so to speak, just to sweeten it.” None of the readers’ reports get anywhere near the word “reactionary,” and no one can reasonably point to anything in the revised dissertation resembling “liberal merde.” Wolfe is imputing a political bias to his academic naysayers that simply did not exist. 

    Wolfe would find the succor and assistance he needed in the person Barnhisel calls “the misfit-collecting” Norman Holmes Pearson. He was more than familiar with the figures Wolfe had interviewed, including Cowley; he was fully simpatico with Wolfe’s anti-Communist stance; and as one of the biggest dogs in the American Studies department, Pearson’s voice would be crucial when the time came for Wolfe’s new dissertation to be judged anew. Within a year Wolfe would be awarded his Ph.D., and after a six-month period of literary-minded slumming he began his journalistic career as a reporter for the Springfield Republican. He would stay in contact with Pearson until his death in 1975; his lifelong scholarly project, an edition of his fellow Puritan Nathaniel Hawthorne’s complete correspondence, still uncompleted. 

    The whole extended episode of Tom Wolfe’s time at Yale and the painful rejection of his initial dissertation maps, however imperfectly, onto his subsequent career and especially on to his — for me dubious — reputation as a conservative firebrand and hit man. There is no question that Wolfe’s resentments ran deep and were permanent. In context we can see that his revision process was really a calculated act of self-erasure. He cold-bloodedly expunged every trace of his unmistakable individual style — the wit and the high spirits and the verbal virtuosity — and substituted a cold and distant objectivity that he thought would please his faculty critics. It must have been a galling process, accomplished in anger and with gritted teeth. 

    He never forgave his having had to do it, and his gentlemanly demeanor obscured a considerable chip on his shoulder. As Niall Ferguson says in the documentary film Radical Wolfe, “That is a kind of searing experience, and I think it explains the vendetta that Wolfe pursues against the intellectual left.” This is certainly true. Wolfe’s favorite targets were the people who used to be called “limousine liberals,” the well-heeled, highly credentialed, bien pensant denizens of elite universities and think tanks and publishing houses and urban salons whose loudly expressed sympathies for the downtrodden sailed right over the ordinary people Wolfe used to call the “raw vital proles.” There had to have been a lot of payback in that. 

    And yet, while Tom Wolfe may have written about the most colorful of those raw vital proles, he certainly never consorted or socialized with them. Did he really have anything that can accurately be called a politics? He may have had a perfectly reasonable distaste for Communism, but if he ever took a position in favor of, say, the Vietnam War, it has escaped me. He certainly never endorsed a candidate of either party. He preferred rather, Ali-like, to float like a butterfly above the human comedy, politics included, and from time to time, to sting like a particularly lethal bee when something struck him as irresistibly amusing, hypocritical, ridiculous, or all three at one. He was at heart an eighteenth-century satirical moralist of a Southern cultural bent, but never the Manchurian Candidate of journalism launched from Cold War-era Yale at the heart of liberalism that some people accused him of being. 

    There is no question, though, that the form of American Studies in which he engaged at Yale profoundly influenced the other kind of American Studies that his entire career in nonfiction and fiction alike represented. You don’t have to love Tom Wolfe to recognize that he was one of the major figures in American writing in the postwar years — and an uncommonly interesting one at that. As far as I know, though, no one seems to be working at the moment on the big biography that he requires and deserves — and we live in a world more than fully supplied with biographers. Time for someone to get cracking. The man cast floods of light on his time.

    “Orthodox in Nothing”: The Saga of Bernard Lazare

    In Notre Jeunesse, or Our Youth, his memoir of the Dreyfus Affair, Charles Péguy, the poet of Catholic France’s salvific mission, wrote that “the prophet in this great crisis of Israel and the world was Bernard Lazare. Let us salute here one of the greatest names of modern times and . . . one of the greatest among the prophets of Israel.” If, for Péguy, the Dreyfus Affair was proof that in the republic “everything begins in the mystical and ends in the political,” Lazare was one of the few to withstand this degradation of a noble cause. He said of Lazare that “he undeniably had elements of a saint, of saintliness. And when I speak of a saint, I shouldn’t be suspected of speaking metaphorically. . . . He was a prophet. It was thus only right that he was buried prematurely in silence and oblivion.” 

    Lazare earned these exalted words of praise from his fellow Dreyfusard by being the first person outside Alfred Dreyfus’ family to come to his defense after he was found guilty of treason in 1894. If other names, more famous ones such as that of Émile Zola, come to mind when we think of Dreyfus’ defenders, that is more a reflection on the vagaries of history and memory than of the truth of events. And Lazare was more than just a noble controversialist. He was also a Jewish thinker who, after perversely explaining antisemitism as the fault of Jews, created a form of radicalism that viewed the Torah as a foundational revolutionary document. A saint with a strange trajectory.

     

    Lazare was born Lazare Marcus Manassé Bernard in Nîmes on June 14, 1865. On his mother’s side his family had resided in that city for several centuries; one of his maternal ancestors was said to have been a silversmith in service to the pope in Avignon in the fourteenth century. His father, a successful tailor, came from a family that settled in the South of France in the late eighteenth century after leaving its native Lorraine region. Lazare, after completing his high school studies in 1882, chose to educate himself in literature. After leading a literary society in Nîmes, he “ascended,” as they say in French, to Paris in 1886.

    Writing as Bernard-Lazare, he published symbolist tales, a collection of which was reviewed by Anatole France. France wrote floridly of Lazare that “there is in him the Asiatic and the African. His style has the thorny richness, the thick and heavy abundance, the enormous flower, the bitter juice of the vegetation of the torrid zone.” France concluded on a note that never had the chance to be proven true: “He is precise and firm in his thinking, and he expresses himself with verve. He will be totally to my taste when age will have given him gentleness and a tad of indulgence.” Lazare’s early death saved him from gentleness and indulgence, and the fire France saw in him never dimmed. 

    Lazare was militantly apolitical at the beginning of his writing life, but he soon became an outspoken anarchist. He explained his commitment in a book published in 1895 by his friend, the anarchist writer Augustin Hamon, called Psychologie de l’anarchiste-socialiste. Lazare’s contribution to the volume was a veritable profession of faith. “The value of authority is something I could never understand . . . . For me, that a man could arrogate to himself the right to in any way dominate his kind was, and still is, something inconceivable. In my eyes, nothing was and is as dishonoring as obedience, that is, the partial annihilation of the individual.” He was, by his nature, a purist, a dissenter, an agitator, an almost naive sort of moralist. He continued to write literary fables, but now with a political point. Lazare would publish articles in a variety of anarchist journals, coming in contact with leading figures of the movement such as Sébastien Faure and Zo d’Axa. He also established a number of journals of his own, editing the impressive though little-read Entretiens politiques et artistiques, which had a total of eighty paid subscribers. (But here we are, remembering it!) 

    Though some have questioned the sincerity of Lazare’s anarchism, he was serious enough in his beliefs to have the police trailing him and reporting on his doings. A police report on one of his speeches quoted Lazare proclaiming, “Yes, we want no more armies, no more fatherlands, and our acts of revolt are acts that are just.” Lazare found much to admire in the act of Auguste Vaillant, who threw a bomb into the Chamber of Deputies on December 9, 1893. This violence became known as the “propaganda of the deed,” a concept with a long and highly destructive career in modern politics. Writing to the Dutch socialist Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis, he praised Vaillant for his courage and spoke of how “the blood of sacrifices is a fertile rain; it causes the good wheat to germinate even in the souls of the indifferent; it prepares the harvests of the future.” The panic that accompanied the wave of bombings in the early 1890s resulted in a series of laws known to history as the lois scélérates, which effectively banned anarchist propaganda. Fearing for his freedom, Lazare briefly fled to Brussels. He returned home and defended his friend Félix Fénéon, an art critic who was accused of planting a bomb in a Paris café that cost its one victim an eye, in the press. Fénéon was found not guilty. Lazare’s activities during this period earned him a reputation as a man willing to defend the unjustly accused, a reputation he would soon confirm.

     

    In 1892 Lazare took to the pages of the journal he edited, Entretiens politiques et litteraires, and published the first of a series of articles which he would later expand into a book that remains his most controversial book, L’Antisémitisme, son histoire et ses causes (Antisemitism, its History and Causes). The book marks the confluence of two currents that were on the rise in France at the time, antisemitism and anti-capitalism. Lazare’s book is a work that is deeply and unapologetically anti-capitalist. This is hardly surprising in the work of an anarchist. But anti-capitalism had many faces in fin-de-siècle France, and not only the radical left embraced it. Opponents of modernity hated capitalism for destroying traditional ways. And hatred of the Jew as the beneficiary and the ace of capital was where left and right met. 

    What, for Lazare, was the explanation for antisemitism’s ubiquity, its seemingly eternal nature? “If this hostility,” Lazare wrote, “this repugnance had been shown towards the Jews at one time or in one country only, it would be easy to account for the local causes of this sentiment.” But this is not the case. For the Jews, or as he calls them resorting to the concepts of the time, “this race,” (though elsewhere in the book he calls the notion of race “a fiction”) “has been the object of hatred with all the nations amidst whom it ever settled.” Those who have hated the Jews over the millennia have come from every class, every nation, virtually every corner of the world, “ruled by different laws and governed by opposing principles.” Their own ways of viewing the world are radically opposed, they worship God in different ways, and yet they all hate the Jews. There can only be one explanation according to Lazare: “It must be that the general causes of antisemitism have always resided in Israel itself, and not in those who have antagonized it.” 

    The outrageousness of Lazare’s assertion is hardly mitigated by what follows this disturbing diagnosis. “This does not mean that justice was always on the side of Israel’s persecutors, or that they did not indulge in all the extremes born of hatred; it is merely asserted that the Jews were themselves, in part, at least, the cause of their own ills.” Lazare’s lapidary explanation for how they are the cause of their own ills was a simple one: “Until today and everywhere, the Jew has been an asocial being.” He is asocial because unlike other conquered peoples, the Jew has refused to accept any master but the Law: the Torah. 

    The Jews’ separateness was religious and political, for wherever they settled their sole desire was to be able to follow their own religion and be ruled by their own laws. They thus always formed a state within the state. (The phrase became a platitude of modern antisemitism.) In Lazare’s telling, the results of this were rights and privileges that differentiated them from the rest of the nations in which they lived and which excited the jealousy of those around them. “Thus, Israel’s attachment to its law was one of the first causes of its unpopularity, whether because it derived benefits and advantages from that law which were apt to excite envy, or because it prided itself upon the excellence of its Torah and considered itself above and beyond other peoples.” 

    Antisemitism, in Lazare’s account, will not last forever, and in fact, thanks to its condemnation of capitalism, antisemitism bears within it the seeds of its own destruction. Lazare bizarrely saw something positive in Édouard Drumont, France’s leading antisemite, the editor of the daily La Libre Parole and the author of the two-volume best-seller La France juive. Lazare wrote that in attacking Jewish capitalists, the antisemites are actually opening the way for socialism! Antisemites such as Drumont “stir up the middle class, the petit-bourgeoisie, and sometimes the peasantry against Jewish capitalists, but in this way gently [lead] them to socialism, [prepare] them for anarchy, [lead] them to the hatred of capitalists and above all of capital.” The revolution that will inevitably arrive will be carried out by forces that will include Jews, for the Jews are, by their very nature, a revolutionary people. Jews naturally “seek justice” and their revolutionism has its basis “in their concept of life and death,” their insistence on the here and now and not the afterlife. The coming revolution will see the Jews as actors, for they are “a revolutionary ferment in society.” Antisemitism “works at eliminating not only the economic causes [of antisemitism], but also the religious and national causes that engendered it and which will disappear with the society of today of which they are the products.” Antisemitism, in the view of the pre-Dreyfus Lazare, is an ally — an unpleasant ally, but an ally nonetheless — in the revolutionary struggle. 

    Antisemitism will end not only with the end of the antisemitic movement, Lazare continues, but also with the fading of Jewish religious belief and practice. With general social trends moving in a secular direction, “the prejudice against the Jew, a prejudice as persistent as the Catholic prejudice against the Protestant, and the Jew against the Christian, cannot be the only one to continue. It is diminishing in intensity and they will doubtless soon no longer hold the Israelite responsible for Jesus’ suffering.” And this is not all. National prejudices, built on religious foundations, are also headed for extinction. “National particularism and egoism, however strong they might still be, are showing signs of decay.” (This, of course, was the standard Marxist assurance about the inevitable disappearance of nationalism, which was a supremely bourgeois distraction from the class struggle.) Foreigners are no longer hated, humanity is tearing down barriers, and antisemitism is doomed. It will perish “because the Jew is being transformed, because the religious, political, social and economic conditions are changing, but above all, it will perish because it is one of the final and persistent manifestations of the old spirit of reaction and narrow conservatism which vainly attempts to halt the revolutionary evolution.”

    Lazare had no kind words for rabbis, those voices of reaction, but the Jewish religion itself possessed a “revolutionary spirit” that, given the antisemitic conditions in which Jews lived, also “constituted the Jewish fatherland.” Limned in Antisemitism, Its History and Causes is a historiosophical vision, a version of religion that was not just a source of sustenance for Jews as a people but also for Jews as a revolutionary force. The Torah served as a revolutionary manifesto for Lazare. Drawing from God’s words that “For unto me the children of Israel are servants” Lazare asks “what authority can, then, prevail by the side of the divine authority?” Here is the revolutionary core of Judaism: “All government, whatever it may be, is evil, since it tends to take the place of the government of God.” Writing at the time of the propagandists of the deed, the anarchist Lazare declared that earthly powers “must be fought, because Yahweh is the only head of the Jewish commonwealth, the only one to whom the Israelite owes obedience.” Through the centuries of oppression, this was the essence of Judaism that kept them going. “The funeral pyres, the massacres, the carnage, the insults, everything contributed to make dearer to them the justice, the equality, and the liberty which during many long years were for them the emptiest words.” 

    There is more than a hint of Karaism in Lazare. For Karaites, a medieval fundamentalist Jewish sect that survived into the modern era, the Torah, the “written Toirah” that was given to Moses at Sinai, is the only valid document of their religion: the Talmud, or the “oral Torah,” the dicta of the rabbis, has no validity, and all “rabbinite” authority is rejected. Lazare’s references to the Talmud are, in true Karaite fashion, all negative. Those who created the Talmud are dismissed as “casuists.” Marx is called a Talmudist owing to his mind “which does not falter at the petty difficulties of fact.” The dreadful state of the Jews of Eastern Europe, “where the Talmud still dominates,” is caused by the dominance of rabbis, “where he lives under the guidance of his rabbis, who unite with the powers in authority to prevent him from attaining light. (Two decades before Lazare wrote these words, the German Catholic theologian August Rohling published Der Talmudjude, or The Talmud Jew, which became an instant classic of modern Jew-hatred.) But even though rabbinical power via the Talmud “has put to sleep their instincts of revolt,” Lazare went on, it “did not debase all Jews.” There remain “some who persisted in the belief that justice, liberty, and equality were to come to this world; there were many of them who believed that the people of Yahweh was [sic] charged with working for this coming.” Lazare considered himself to be one of them. He did not stand outside the Jewish people, and his immersion as a Jew in the struggle of the Jews was about to begin.

    On October 15, 1894 — the same year that Lazare’s tome on antisemitism was published — Captain Alfred Dreyfus, an officer on the French general staff, was arrested for espionage on behalf of Germany. Three pieces of evidence served as the basis for his condemnation: a secret dossier that was never shown to Dreyfus’ defense lawyers; a document called the bordereau containing information on French military matters fished from the garbage at the German embassy by a cleaning lady working for French intelligence; and a note referring to “cet canaille de D.” — “that scoundrel D.” — alleged by the government to refer to Dreyfus, though it was later learned that it referred to an officer named Dubois. Dreyfus was found guilty and publicly degraded, with his epaulets and the stripes on his pants torn from his uniform as he continued to proclaim his innocence. 

    This was not yet the Dreyfus Affair, but simply the case of an officer found guilty of treason. The headline of Édouard Drumont’s antisemitic newspaper screamed “The Traitor Condemned. Ten years of Prison and Degradation. Down with the Jews!” There was no public outcry, but Dreyfus’ brother Mathieu believed in his brother’s innocence. He regularly visited the condemned man in La Santé Prison, where he was being held before being sent to Devil’s Island for life. Mathieu wanted to publicize his brother’s case, and he had an unexpected ally: the governor of the prison, who had been impressed with the supposedly treasonous officer. He told Mathieu that there were only two men who could help him: the antisemite Édouard Drumont and Bernard Lazare. How and why he would have suggested Drumont is an unsolvable mystery. As for turning to the Jewish anarchist, Lazare later wrote in an unpublished memoir of his involvement in the affair that “I suppose that during the preceding years he had at La Santé revolutionaries and anarchists who had spoken of me.”

    Even before meeting the prisoner’s brother, Lazare was convinced of Dreyfus’ innocence, and when he met Mathieu in February 1895, while the captain was still waiting to be sent to Devil’s Island, “I had decided to do all I could to wrest him from there.” Lazare gathered all the facts he could, with Mathieu Dreyfus providing invaluable information. In the summer of 1895 he began writing a pamphlet outlining the injustice of the captain’s fate and the falsity of the case against him. The pamphlet was quickly written, but the Dreyfus family requested that its publication be delayed until they felt the right moment had arrived. For a year nothing happened, and it was only in September 1896 that the family decided that the time had come to go public. In the end Lazare published three pamphlets defending Dreyfus, in 1896 and 1897 (both titled A Judicial Error) and in 1898 (How to Condemn an Innocent Man). They were masterpieces of forensic literature, detailed examinations of the case, laying bare the weakness and the falsehoods of the prosecution’s case. Yet however cogent the arguments in Lazare’s pamphlets, they failed to obtain Dreyfus’ release or calls for a new trial. They did, however, bring on board some new defenders of the cause. 

    On the left, the affair was generally viewed as an intra-bourgeois dispute. Why should an anarchist or socialist care about the army’s attack on a wealthy officer? In 1897, at the end of his pamphlet in defense of Dreyfus, Lazare had this to say to his comrades: “There are men for whom freedom and justice are not vain words. I am going to speak to them. They have no right to content themselves with general and generous theories if they refuse to apply them.” He condemned those leftists who, “preoccupied with humanity as a whole, turn away from unfortunate individuals.” If not all of the left lined up behind Lazare, some of the most important anarchists, such as Sébastien Faure, did support him, though with certain reservations, as did the greatest of France’s socialists, Jean Jaurès. It was thanks to Lazare that the editors of La Revue blanche were won over to the cause, bringing the future head of state Léon Blum into the fight.

    The pamphlets that Lazare wrote are important for another reason. Lazare dared to state the obvious: “With such weak evidence, and if the pressure of the antisemitic gang hadn’t forced the hand of a government lacking in character or courage, they would never have dared lead Captain Dreyfus before a court martial.” The Jewish angle was a touchy one, and even among Dreyfus’ defenders there were Jew-haters. Captain Georges Picquart, who would deliver the fatal blow to the prosecution by proving the real traitor was Major Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy, despised Jews. 

    As support grew for Dreyfus, his defenders accused French Jews of doing nothing so as not to rock the boat. French Jews were throughout his life a particular bugbear of Lazare. Feeling that Juif was too harsh a term, one that loaned itself into being turned into an epithet, French Jews of a certain class called themselves “Israelites.” (German Jews of the same era had the same problem with the term Jude.) Israelites went along in order to get along. Israelites didn’t raise Jewish issues. Israelites turned their backs on their brothers, both in France and in Eastern Europe. 

    Antisemites spoke of a shadowy group, a “syndicate,” that was working behind the scenes on behalf of Dreyfus, suborning politicians and journalists as well as men and women known by the newly-coined term “intellectuals.” According to Lazare’s biographer Philippe Oriol, there in fact was a group working behind the scenes in the Dreyfusard cause, called the Defense Committee, and Lazare was its most active agent. Lazare visited politicians at the highest level, proof in hand of the falsity of the military’s case. He visited the editors of the country’s most important newspapers, sometimes obtaining support, more often not, yet never deterred. Writers and critics received his visits. Among them were men and women of the left, such as Octave Mirbeau and the revolutionary feminist journalist Séverine, who would soon be strong allies. Lazare did not only visit editors; he also started Dreyfusard newspapers from scratch. The list of people he importuned is enormous, and some, such as Lucien Herr, the librarian of the École Normale Supérieure and the great French Jewish archeologist and historian Salomon Reinach, would become key figures in the Affair. When Lazare first went to visit Émile Zola to convince him to become involved in the case, “I found [him] full of sympathy, but grace only struck him when the full tragedy, with Esterhazy the traitor, and Picquart the good genie, and Dreyfus the martyr seized his novelistic imagination.” Lazare’s specialty as emissary of the “syndicate” was in providing funds to groups on the left. Le Libertaire, an important anarchist newspaper, received funds for the paper’s general use and to publish a pamphlet in support of Dreyfus to be distributed free of charge. He assisted in the setting up of public meetings, and of newspapers such as Le Parti ouvrier, L’Antijésuite, and L’Ouvrier des deux mondes. Lazare continued this work for several years, spreading funds even into Belgium, where in 1901 he was the intermediary in forwarding money from the Defense Committee to establish a Committee for Propaganda Against Antisemitism. The organizer of that group wrote in thanks to Lazare: “You’re a magician.”

    In 1899, during which two further trials took place, the second before a military tribunal, Mathieu Dreyfus asked Lazare to step back from the case, to have less of a public presence, to “let others act.” Lazare acquiesced, explaining in later years that “I cared more about justice than about myself.” Even so, he continued to work furiously behind the scenes. Yet in the heat of the Affair Lazare felt his role was already being forgotten and he worried about how he would be remembered. In a moving open letter sent to the head of the League for the Rights of Man, Lazare spoke out on behalf of his efforts: “For my family, I want it to be said that I, who was the first to speak out, to stand up for the Jewish martyr, was a Jew.””

    Lazare attended Dreyfus’ military trial in Rennes in 1899, and it was there that for the first time he laid eyes on the man he had been defending. He spoke of his “fear” as he awaited Dreyfus’ appearance, and also of the effect the man had on him. “My fear vanished as soon as he entered. When I saw him as I’d never hoped to see him, after all these years of torture, full of the internal flame of life, firm and stiff, all I then felt was the tranquility of a perfect soul and more than ever the certainty that the innocent man was going to emerge victorious.”

    When Dreyfus finally received a pardon in 1899, after being found guilty with attenuating circumstances of espionage at the Rennes trial, the various factions of the Dreyfusard movement exploded into opposing factions. Some supported Dreyfus’ acceptance of the pardon, which allowed him to be freed while letting the guilty verdicts stand, while others felt that the pardon had to be refused in the name of truth and justice. Lazare supported the former group. Dreyfus was fully exonerated in 1906, three years after the death of the first Dreyfusard.

     

    Lazare’s activities in support of Dreyfus prepared him for the next and final phase of his political development. Before the Dreyfus Affair, in 1894, Lazare had been contacted by the cultural-Zionist thinker Ahad Ha’am about assisting the latter in having a collection of his writings published in French, though nothing came of it. In 1896, barely a month after the appearance of Theodor Herzl’s Der Judenstaat, Lazare wrote to Herzl asking about a French translation, telling him that “I would be happy to learn of this, and when it occurs to learn of your means of action and your practical projects so as to make them known here.” The two men met in Paris in July of that year, and Herzl described Lazare in a letter to a friend as an “excellent example of a fine, intelligent French Jew.”

    Lazare was ripe for Zionism, and he would become a central member of the movement in France, though, as he wrote in 1897, “Zionism in France does not exist” and had but ten adherents in the entire county. In the same year he published a pamphlet called Jewish Nationalism. It is a typically unorthodox work, for the nationalism in the title is not, or is not just, the construction of a Jewish homeland. Lazare proposed two solutions to the injustices that Jews endured in Christian-dominated countries: a Jewish land, and a Jewish nation within the greater nations in which they live. Like the Jewish Labor Bund, Lazare accepted that Jews were a nation within a nation, a claim he himself had made and employed in explaining Jews as the cause of Jew-hatred. This was now viewed as a positive thing. It was, indeed, the road to liberation, and away from the worst outcome of all: assimilation. At the same time Lazare, unlike the Bundists, believed that Jews needed a country of their own, and saw Zionism as the only way to establish it. These contradictory ends were not always clearly melded in Lazare’s writings.

    Lazare first had to establish that the disparate people of the Jewish Diaspora was one, that there really was a basis for Jewish nationalism. Jewish history, he wrote in his pamphlet, was made up of “common traditions and customs, traditions and customs that have not all equally persisted, for many of them were religious customs and traditions. Nevertheless, they have left their mark on us; they have given us habits and, even more, a similar attitude, thanks to which, despite the necessary individual divergences that separate us and must separate us, we look upon things from the same angle. How, then, do we translate this fact of a certain number of individuals having a common past, traditions and ideas? We translate it by saying that they belong to the same group, that they have the same nationality. . . . There is a Jewish nation.” 

    This, as he had once observed, was one of the sources of antisemitism, but the hatred of the Jews had a paradoxical effect. In an expansion of Jean-Paul Sartre’s later assertion that the Jew is created by the antisemite, Lazare wrote that the effect of antisemitism is to render that nationality more tangible to the Jews: “it is to make even stronger their consciousness that they are a people.” This old claim that the origins of Jewish identity were to be found in Jew-hatred does not withstand even perfunctory historical scrutiny, though in the modern period it explains some of the psychological perplexity of the assimilated Jew. 

    Nationalism for the Jews, Lazare proclaimed, means “collective freedom.” The Jew who proclaims himself a nationalist is saying that “I want to be a completely free man; I want to enjoy the sun; I want to have the right to my dignity as a man. I want to escape oppression, escape insults, escape the contempt that they want to bring to bear on me. At certain moments in history, nationalism is for human groups the manifestation of the spirit of freedom.” What Lazare’s Jewish nationalism did not mean at this point was a mass exodus to the Holy Land. It does not mean, as he wrote, that “I am a man who wants to reconstitute a Jewish state in Palestine and dreams of re-conquering Jerusalem.” 

    For Lazare the anarchist — which he remained until his dying day, however eccentric his version of anarchism might have been — the unity of the Jewish people, of the Jewish experience, ended at the point where the classes divided. In this pamphlet as in all his Jewish writings, the Jewish bourgeoisie desired nothing so much as to be not only like Christians, but actually to be Christians, and as such is an enemy. Lazare wrote with no ambiguity that “the Jewish bourgeoisie, deprived of its secular stays, poisons the Jewish nation with its rot. It will poison the other nations as long as it has not decided — and this is something we cannot encourage it strongly enough to do — to adhere to the Christianity of the ruling classes and to leave Judaism behind.” Jews, like all nations, are divided into different camps: “There are Jewish conservatives, Jews of the juste milieu, and socialist and revolutionary Jews.” Lazare’s Jewish nationalism, and later his Zionism, would stand on this Marxist ground of class division and class struggle. It would ultimately drive him to oppose Herzl and leave the Zionist movement.

    Was a retreat into nationalism a denial of the central socialist doctrine of internationalism? Lazare dismissed this possibility out of hand. Abandoning his earlier hopes of Jews being liberated by the revolution, he now felt — given the sufferings of the Jews, as well as the depth of Jew-hatred — that “I don’t think that it would be legitimate to count on an economic and social transformation. In the first place this transformation, which I hope for, and whose coming I will participate in fighting for with all my might, sadly seems to still be far off. And then, it is not proven to me that it will bring Jews better conditions.” Going further, Lazare saw the Jewish fight for its nationhood as consistent with his anarchist goal of a future society being made up of a free federation of groups. “I believe that one day humanity will be a confederation of free groupings and not organized in keeping with the capitalist system; free groupings in which the distribution of wealth and the relations of labor and capital will be completely different from those of today. These groups must be allowed to be constituted, to form themselves. Why wouldn’t Jews form one? I see nothing that opposes this, and it is in the development of Jewish nationalism that I see the solution to the Jewish Question.”

    Lazare was perhaps most clairvoyant in his response to those who denied the right of Jews to self-determination, to nationhood. In words that could be written today, he asks “In any case, are most socialists, even the internationalists, totally consistent? Do they act in conformity with their doctrines? Are they not demanding — and rightly — autonomy for the Cubans, Cretans, and Armenians? Don’t they recognize that all have the right to fight for their freedom, and don’t they join together this freedom with the demand for a nationality? Can someone tell me in what way the Jews are different?”

    He then pivots one last time. Invoking the Passover “chant” of “next year in Jerusalem,” he calls on his fellow Jews to take their fate in their own hands. “From this day forward they should not expect help from heaven, or the assistance of powerful allies. The Jews will only find their salvation in themselves. It is through their own might that they will liberate themselves; that they will re-conquer that dignity that they have been driven to lose. The contemptible and vile portion, without convictions or any other motives than their personal interests, will convert. It won’t have any scruples to overcome in order to do this. What will believers and non-believers do who will never resign themselves to the recantation? They will ever more strongly feel that they will be free as individuals when the collectivity to which they belong is free, when that nation without a territory that is the Jewish nation will have a land and can dispose of itself without any constraints.” His reasoning here brings to mind the “auto-emancipation” of which the Russian Zionist thinker Leo Pinsker had written in 1882.

    Lazare attended the second Zionist Congress in Basel in 1898, where he was greeted as a hero. As a contemporary account had it, as he entered the hall he was introduced as “Bernard Lazare, the noble, the bold, the strong,” and the hall rose as one in a standing ovation. Prior to the conference he had given an interview to a British journalist for The Jewish World, in which he seemed to have opted for colonization, saying that “I am in favor of colonization, the establishment of new colonies, and the introduction of industries in Palestine.” But he insisted that his Zionism had little to do with the Jews of Western Europe, specifically the French. He had joined the movement not for the hundred thousand Jews of his native land, but rather as an answer to the question of “What shall we do with millions of our brethren in Eastern Europe who have been ground down by their misery?” All the ambiguity, the eccentricity, of Lazare’s Zionism is summed up when he told the journalist that “As I see a future for them in Zion, I am a Zionist.” 

    The first task before Zionism, he told the interviewer, was to “form our masses into a Jewish people. It is therefore our duty, besides attending to colonization, to attend to the education of our people.” It is worth noting that unlike many early Zionists, Lazare was not Ashkenaz-centric. He spoke regularly of the sufferings and pogroms inflicted on the Jews of Algeria, who had been French citizens since the promulgation of the Crémieux Decree in 1870. In Basel he insisted that the proceedings be published not only into German but also into French — not for the Jews of the metropole but because “the Jews of Morocco and Algeria need us to bring them the consolation of Zionism.” 

    Yet Lazare was not convinced that the Zionist movement as it was constructed could bring that consolation to anyone but the bourgeoisie. Basel was the only Zionist conference he ever attended. (They were annual events until 1901.) He rejected the program developed at the congress as “a program of a faction of the bourgeois Jewish intellectuals, which in no way responds to the reality, to the situation of the Jewish people and its needs.” 

    Lazare’s opposition to the Zionist movement of Herzl began with his opposition to a bank to be established to support colonization. He was opposed less to the bank itself than to its centrality in Herzl’s thinking. The mobilization of the Jewish proletarian masses was Lazare’s aim, not the gathering of funds from wealthy supporters. He wrote to Herzl in February 1899 that “you are bourgeois in thought, sentiments, and ideas; bourgeois in social concepts. Being so, you want to lead a people, our people, a poor people, an unfortunate people, proletarians.” Herzl and the movement wanted to rule the Jewish people from on high, “in an authoritarian fashion.” Lazare accused Herzl of wanting “to lead them where you think is best for them. . . . You want to set a herd on the march.”

    Lazare had been elected to the presidium of the movement as well as to its action committee, but this spell among the leadership was not fated to last. Along with the bank, Herzl’s entourage displeased Lazare, but even more Lazare found Herzl’s imploring the aid of the world’s autocratic rulers abhorrent. He resigned his official posts in the movement in early 1899, and when the fifth congress of the movement, in December 1901, paid homage to the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid, it was the last straw. In an article published in the review Pro Armenia, Lazare let loose: “The representatives — or at least those who call themselves such — of the most ancient of persecuted peoples, those whose history can only be written in blood, sent their greetings to the worst of assassins.” Their degradation could not be worse: “This people, covered in the blood of its wounds, is thrown at the feet of this Sultan covered in the blood of others, yet in this assembly not a single protest echoed.” Herzl was clearly the subject of his reproach that “still today the descendants [of the Jews of the past] follow a man and ignore the means employed. . . . Yesterday [the leaders] placed the Jews at the feet of Kaiser Wilhelm; today they make them kneel before the Sultan; tomorrow they will have them lay flat on their bellies before the Tsar, and we will have the beautiful and grand spectacle of slaves licking the whip of the master.” The anarchist Lazare could not accept this. It was not enough to obtain foreign support and land. “For the task, the great task to be accomplished, is that of the intellectual and moral regeneration of the Jewish people.”

    Herzl and his allies, with their realpolitik, were incapable of fulfilling this role. They were wed to “a politics of the ghetto, of serfs, worthy of those who walk hand in hand with the most fanatical rabbis of Galicia, Russia and Poland.” All forms of superstition must be abandoned. “It’s necessary to wrest them from their economic slavery. And the day of their liberation they will be able to freely dispose of their destiny.” In a letter to Chaim Weizmann, Lazare vented his spleen against what his entire life he viewed as a factor inhibiting Jewish liberation, again in tones strongly reminiscent of his peculiar modern Karaism. “I am convinced that the essential task is, above all, that of liberating the Jewish people, but especially liberating it from its internal obstacles. . . . The Jews must be taught to think, they must be wrested from ritualistic and Talmudic superstitions. . . . They must be shown that the very basis of Judaism is rationalist thought. We must extirpate from their minds all false Jewish belief as well as the Christian prejudices which have encumbered those who have escaped depressing rabbinism.” 

    Lazare did not abandon Zionism, though. He remained an independent Zionist, and most of all a defender of his fellow Jews. As he remarked in his final letter to Herzl, announcing his resignation from the established movement, “If I separate myself from you, I don’t separate myself from the Jewish people, from my people of proletarians and beggars, and it is for their liberation that I will continue to work, though by roads that are not yours.” Lazare the anarchist, the internationalist, and the universalist never entirely disappeared. This was made clear in the series of articles that he wrote in 1902 for the newspaper L’Aurore and, more importantly, for Charles Péguy’s Cahiers de la quinzaine (with whom he was close from the time of the Dreyfus Affair) under the general heading of “The Oppression of the Jews of Eastern Europe: The Jews of Romania.” The article, which also appeared as a pamphlet, was written before Lazare visited the country. When he later did, he was greeted as a hero. 

    If ever there was a situation that would appeal to a Zionist of the time, it was that of the Jews of Romania.  Treated as foreigners in their own land, left to their own fate by other countries, already emigrating en masse, Lazare did not present Zionism at the end of this grim portrait of Romanian Jewry, which, alongside Russian Jewry, he regarded as the most oppressed.. Instead Lazare saw the only hope in a classically left-wing solution. “If tomorrow [the government] prepares to attack the rural workers, it will ignite the flame. Perhaps if it causes the Jews to despair, if it pushes them to the limit, the latter, despite their passivity, despite the counsels of the timorous rich, will unite with the workers of the fields and will assist it in shaking off their yoke. But even if they don’t join, it is the rebellious peasant who will, directly or indirectly, resolve the current Jewish question by freeing itself and liberating the Jew.”

    Until the end of his days Lazare was torn by the tension between a socialism built by Jews where they currently lived and a socialism built in the Jewish homeland. At around the same time as his article on Romania, Lazare, in an article on Russia, wrote that “there will doubtless only be a cure in the midst of a general cure. Jews will only be free when the countries will be [sic] free.” But in 1900 he averred that “I am convinced that Judaism can only free itself from its slavery by emancipating itself as a nation and not by seeking a vain emancipation in the countries in which the Jews live. . . . Judaism must everywhere organize in a national proletarian party.” Lazare’s final work speaks eloquently of the contradictions that animated his radicalism. 

    Left unfinished at the time of his death, Le Fumier de Job, or Job’s Dungheap, incorporates the ideas that Lazare developed across all the periods of his life. (An English translation was published by Hannah Arendt at Schocken Books in 1948.) The short volume is written with poetic flair, harkening back to Lazare’s Symbolist days. It is militantly proletarian, a final nod to his anarchism. But it is also and centrally Jewish in a religious and socially radical way. Lazare said of himself that he was “orthodox in nothing.” This work is proof of that.

    Job’s Dungheap is a thumb in the eye of the Christian world, a case not just for the right of Jews to live like any other people but also an uncompromising argument for the nullity of Christianity. Even more, it is explicit in its expression of the superiority of Judaism over Christianity. For Lazare, Judaism is not a religion, it is a form of superiority. Judaism, he says, “can be considered, not as a religion, not as a nationality, (so many diverse peoples are Jews), but as a discipline of the mind, as a concept of the world superior to the Christian discipline and concept.” He is nothing if not candid. And there is more. “The Jew consoled himself for his social abjection by recognizing himself to be intellectually superior and by inventing a thousand adventures in which his adversaries recognize his intellectual superiority.” Judaism is, in its very essence, modern, owing to the reason for its superiority: “The torch of rationalism in Israel has not gone out for an instant.” (Historically speaking, this is not remotely the whole story.) Judaism is therefore an element of progress, for “what has allowed the Jew to do better, to have a social influence, is that he has maintained the idea of justice with the hope of realizing it in this world, something Jesus put off until the millennium.” In any case, Christianity “is unable to understand justice, for it is founded on a monstrous injustice, since for [the Christian] the death of the Innocent One led God to pardon the guilty, since his justice was in this way satisfied.” His distance from actually existing Judaism notwithstanding, the idea of Judaism loomed very large in Lazare’s eccentric and intensely moral view of the world. 

    Job’s Dungheap is also a brutal examination of antisemitism. Lazare still maintains that “the religious factor is [its] basis;” that “the religious passion has always needed economic reasons as an auxiliary factor. But when these reasons are born religious passion and prejudices aggravate them.” “Every Christian is profoundly antisemitic,” he declares. He warns his co-religionists, “Jew, you will never know the hatred for you hidden in the soul of Christians, venom reheated for two thousand years in the darkest corners of the mind, poisons distilled for centuries in the spirit, ferments of scorn, leavenings of disgust and horror, all that sleeps and is being awakened.” 

    Lazare’s analysis of antisemitism had been deepened and simplified by the experience of the Dreyfus Affair and his studies of the experience of Eastern European Jewry. He still maintains that “the wealthy provoke antisemitism for which the poor suffer. They are at least the pretext.” But he adds that “antisemitism is a form of Christian hypocrisy. The Christian is cleansed by attributing his vices to the Jews.” This attribution of their own sins to Jews is a key idea in Job’s Dungheap. Any trait attributed by antisemites to Jews is actually a Christian trait: “Filth is Christian, it was never Jewish.” The claim of Jewish ritual murder is simply a Christian way of deflecting Christian thirst for blood as manifested in their art. The Christian spirit is mired in petty subjects, for “a religion where one wonders if the Word was resurrected with or without its foreskin has no right to mock Talmudic subtleties.” This is why the Jew is better able to grasp science, since he does not have to “cleanse his spirt of antirational dogmas, those of the Trinity and the Eucharist for example.”

    The delicacy and saintliness for which Péguy and others admired Lazare appears to have abandoned him here. Filth is human. But Jew-hatred signifies something else for Lazare, and shows him overturning his original view of the universality of antisemitism. This hatred is now evidence of something positive, a cruel honor: “To be hated in this way by all of humankind, one must bear something grand within oneself.” 

    Zion is the solution, but a Zion in keeping with Lazare’s revolutionary vision. “Go to Zion to be exploited by rich Jews? How does this differ from the present situation? That’s what you are proposing to us? The patriotic joy of being exploited by being those of the same race?” Despite this, Zion is still the way out. The Jew must “leave his brothers in habits, mores, and customs, and go to those from whom you have been separated for years, whose faces and language are foreign to you. And yet, one must go there to guide them down the path that we, more fortunate, have gone down.”

    Lazare began to feel run down as the twentieth century began. His friends and comrades attributed this to his overwork during the height of the Dreyfus wars, but this wasn’t the case. He was suffering from stomach cancer, and surgery performed by his physician brother was unavailing. He died in Nîmes on September 1, 1903.

    In February 1905, Pierre Quillard, a writer and childhood friend of Lazare, spoke of the need for a monument honoring his late friend. The following year, after Dreyfus’ rehabilitation, a subscription for the monument was opened, and a total of 21,384.85 francs was contributed.The monument, close to ninetee feet tall, featured a bust of Lazare with a woman bearing a torch below. The inauguration was scheduled for October 5, 1908, but anti-Dreyfus forces had not given up the fight. In June 1908, a member of L’Action française fired on Dreyfus at the ceremony of the transference of Zola’s ashes to the Panthéon. The inauguration of the Lazare monument gave them further cause for upset, and the far right held a demonstration in the city against the “statue of dung.”

    On July 14, 1909 the statue was vandalized by a man who swung a hammer at the bust and broke off its nose. The figure remained in this damaged state, and during World War II it was covered in antisemitic graffiti then taken down and stored in a museum in Nîmes. At the end of the war it was not restored it to its original location, and the monument was finally confiscated from the museum and its material was reused for a statue honoring the city’s liberation. For a long while, history committed the forgetting that Lazare had feared. But last December an exact replica of the monument was erected in precisely the spot the original once stood. 

    Kyiv War Diary

    January 1, 2026

    It’s 12:56 AM. My family and I have just greeted the New Year together. We heard explosions nearby and a siren wailing over the city: Russian drones. Explosions were also reported in Odessa, Donetsk, and the Sumy region, and drones were detected flying in the direction of Kyiv and its surroundings. And yet I am calm and happy: For New Year’s we had our family’s special roasted duck. Just like my mom used to make. 

    January 2, 2026

    Yesterday was my friend Dania’s birthday. Friends toasted to him tonight. We told stories and celebrated his life. But just as I was walking home suddenly the wound of losing him opened up again, and so here I am sobbing in the middle of downtown Kyiv close to midnight, a military curfew.

    War keeps taking the best of us.

    January 5, 2026

    1:48 AM 

    Two Russian bombs have just been detected. If the report is accurate, missile launches will begin four hours from now. It will take them about an hour to reach Ukraine post-launch, so they will arrive around 6 AM (if they are coming). Do I feel anything as I write this? No. My brain takes care of itself. I feel only that I have a cup of tea to make and there’s a car chase in Inception (which I just paused) that I want to continue watching.

    2:42 AM

    I am in a hallway and Russia just attacked the city with ballistic missiles. Heard very loud explosions. Doors are shaking, which means that the attack is close enough for the sound of the blast wave to reach us before we could hear the rounds of smaller explosions and the sound of air defense shooting down Russian drones. I am in a puff jacket because it’s quite cold here in the hallway. It’s warm in my room, but it’s safer out here.

    2:48 AM

    Monitoring channels report that Russian Shahed drones are falling on the southern part of Kyiv and I am trying hard to remember whether I am in the south or the north. 

    3:03 AM 

    I am sitting on a hallway floor feeling the warmth leave my body second by second. I decide that I can’t stand it anymore, that I need a hot cup of tea and I need my warm room, but as I move to open the door I hear what sounds like a Russian Shahed drone buzzing, and adrenaline starts pumping into my blood as the buzzes get louder. I open the door and inside the buzz gets even louder. Just as I am about to panic I see through the window that it’s only a trash truck driving past my building. I exhale. I make my cup of hot tea and take a sip. God, tea never tasted better. 

    6:38 PM

    You don’t know true luxury until you’ve seen your lights stay on for three minutes after a blackout was supposed to have started. Oh what bliss: the heater is still working. My home is warm and well lit. I am so rich. 

    January 6, 2026

    Being adventurous means deciding to wash your hair despite the fact that there is again a blackout in Kyiv: you will have to dry your hair, and it is getting colder inside your apartment by the minute, and you have only an hour and half until you need to leave home, and outside it is minus one degrees. But you have a feeling that it’s all going to work out. 

    January 8, 2026

    4:50 AM

    Blackouts got so bad in the city of Dnipro today that its metro stopped. Trains didn’t run. Escalators didn’t work. People were evacuated from the tunnels. This might sound like some thrilling post-apocalyptic movie script, but thanks to Russia it is life in Ukraine now.

    11:39 PM

    Talking to my dad and there is an explosion outside. Russian drones are attacking Kyiv at this minute. 

    11:52 PM

    I hear our air defenses shooting down Russian drones over Kyiv at midnight while having a relentless cough that just won’t stop. A very special way to spend a Thursday night. 

     January 9, 2026 

    12:12 AM

    Russian drones are attacking Kyiv and I have a violent reaction to a loud noise, but it’s just the neighbor upstairs moving a chair.

    1:33 AM

    The explosions continue: now the drones are attacking the thermal power station. It feels like negative eleven degrees outside. Yes, Russia wants to freeze us.

    2:39 AM 

    A couple of blasts that sounded just like thunder. Almost familiar. Oh, here is another one — rocking my building gently.

    9:33 PM

    This evening I learned from my doctor that air raid siren alerts had started in Kyiv. I was in his office at my appointment. We had just finished — and good thing we did, because doctors don’t work in public hospitals during air raid siren alerts. “Not great,” the doctor said, “after Oreshnik yesterday.” “Yeah,” I replied, “though my blocked ear pisses me off much more.” He smiled. Bonding in Ukraine on a Friday night. 

    January 11, 2026

    I don’t have gas here so I am hoping there will be electricity in the morning because otherwise there will be no green tea for me and that will make me mad.

    January 13, 2026

    Since about midnight we haven’t had electricity in my part of Kyiv. It came back on ten minutes ago. That’s more than seventeen hours without light. The longest so far. The streets outside looked pitch dark, I couldn’t see the other bank of the river at all. Have I started to panic? I’d say a bit. 

    It’s inhumane. What Russia is doing to us is inhumane.

    And after a while, however heroic or stoic or resilient you think you are, sooner or later you will learn that resilience has a price. Just as I’m discovering now. It is scary.

    January 16, 2026

    It is midnight and an air raid siren is wailing over the city because Russia is preparing to attack us yet again. A ballistic missile threat. It’s the fifth air raid siren alert today.

    10:00 PM

    I woke up to find the electricity on in my part of Kyiv. How did I know it was on? My sister suddenly started shouting “woo” from the kitchen and singing “I’ve got the power.”

    January 17, 2026

    Hello to all from Kyiv. It’s 9:30 PM here and we have had no light since… I honestly don’t know when it went off. It certainly has been dark for over seven hours. We have no schedules now — it can go out at any moment. But still I’m thankful. You could say I’m privileged: we have heating and gas here, so hot tea is available. Others have it worse, there are buildings where ice is on the inside already. And there are reports that Russia could attack our energy systems again — today or tomorrow — and that is… what I’m trying not to think about.

     11:44 PM

    The light was just restored to my part of Kyiv after almost ten hours of blackout. A happy moment.

    January 18, 2026

    12:27 PM

    Oh the luxury of boiling water in an electric kettle after ten hours in darkness! 

    January 19, 2026

    8:03 PM

    Here we go again: the light just went out. And so the usual routine starts: we switch to blackout lighting — turn on the small pre-charged flashlights in the kitchen — check; bathroom flashlight — check; the Christmas lights in the room — check. No talking, just switching everything on. It’s a kind of ritual now. 

    January 20, 2026

    12:41 PM

    Electricity is back in my part of Kyiv and we have heating, but no water supply. “For a change” my sister said. “Keep things from getting boring.”

    Not boring at all. 

    January 21, 2026 

    11:50 AM

    The first thing I heard when I woke up was my dad and my sister talking. Turns out he came to visit us and make us breakfast — we have a gas stove and he doesn’t, and the electricity is down in my section of Kyiv. We all gathered in our small kitchen. I made the tea, dad made the oats, my sister worked on her laptop. And for a second I forgot it was all because of Russia’s bombs, I forgot about the war. 

    It was just… nice, being all together like this.

    January 23, 2026

    1:30 PM

    Yesterday the impossible happened: we had electricity for almost the whole day! After days of blackouts. I charged everything. I mean everything. After nothing was left to charge, the electricity was still on. 

    That’s when I started getting nervous.

    3:19 PM

    Woke up to no electricity in my part of Kyiv. Then the water went out too. “Maybe the heat will turn off soon,” my sister mused when I got to the kitchen. We checked to see if there were bottles that we could fill with hot water for warmth that night, and we planned to get a whole pot of water boiling on the gas stove to warm the kitchen. 

    Just a typical morning chat in Kyiv.

    January 24, 2026

    1:25 AM

    The air raid siren is on because Russia is attacking us with drones. I hate the beginning of the siren, that loud first note and the way it starts rising, crawling through your bones and muscles. It’s the most disgusting part of the whole experience. It gets under your skin. I was told once that they made it irritating and disgusting on purpose, so that it would be difficult for people to ignore it. It’s revolting in order to save lives. There’s a certain irony in that.

     1:31 AM

    Detonations again. Doors shaking. Explosions continue. Air defense work.

    1:39 AM

    Drones and missiles. Heard many explosions. As I write this, air defense is trying to shoot down — what? — a Russian drone by the sound of it. We have been warned that more are coming. 

    1:53 AM

    In a hallway, trembling. Not because I’m frightened but because it feels as if part of every explosion gets stuck in my body, and maybe it does. And every subsequent one makes my body shake more.

    1:56 AM

    It is amazing, in a way, how normal air defense work now sounds to me. Like the most mundane thing. Like the sound of a generator. The buzzing. A mundane and precious thing that keeps us alive.

    2:04 AM

    Russian bombers just launched missiles in the direction of Ukraine, reports say.

    2:33 AM

    Fuck it was so loud and sudden! I almost screamed. Now I’m shaking and it’s stuck in my chest.

    2:42 AM

    “Have no idea how we managed to not go fucking insane from all of this:” a monitoring channel that reports on Russian drones and missiles just posted that. “Oh we did, a long time ago,” the first commenter replied. “Yeah, we did big time, we just don’t notice it yet,” said the next one. “My neighbor threw beer bottles out the window to shoot down a Russian Shahed drone” wrote someone called Alexander. 

    And I thought to myself, shooting down a Shahed drone with a beer bottle. Huh.

    3:10 AM

    The radiator battery started making weird sounds just after the explosions. It’s still a bit warm but it is certainly colder than it was before.

    1:07 PM

    Temperature already dropped two degrees in the room.

    Went for a walk to a spot where my parents used to bring me as a kid and saw people sledding and skating. That is what the people of Kyiv did the day after Russia bombed us. We went sledding and skating because fuck you Russia, that’s why.

    6:41 PM

    I managed to warm our rooms a bit with heaters, but the light went out. Still no heat and it’s negative twelve degrees in Kyiv right now. The darkness and the cold are slowly crawling in through the windows with no heating to protect us. Vaguely unnerving.

    7:56 PM

    Just put on my third pair of socks. Already in a hat. Warm sweater and a puff coat. Blackout in Kyiv, and no heat for seventeen hours now.

    9:22 PM

    Just heard my neighbor shouting “there is hot water!” with excitement and I’m now just so happy for them.

    January 25, 2026

    1:04 PM

    The heat is back! Radiator is still a bit colder than usual, but it’s warm again!

    4:21 PM

    A Russian drone just hit an apartment building in Kharkiv. There are casualties.

    5:08 PM

    I just used a microwave. I forgot we even have one. Right before I managed to switch on my electric kettle. Standing in the kitchen feeling like a billionaire. 

    January 26, 2026 

    2:09 PM

    I’ve never felt a Kyiv winter this cold in my entire life.

    2:45 PM

    Light returned but went off after less than two hours. Feeling strangely relieved: I felt guilty having light while so many others in Kyiv did not.

    6:39 PM

    The lights are back again and the street looks festive. I just finished a therapy session. The connection was breaking every ten minutes. Russia bombed all our power stations. I thought I’d be sad but instead I feel light and good for the first time in a while. I somehow stumbled upon the set of a DJ I once liked and here I am dancing in the middle of my room with Christmas lights on and windows in the building opposite shining yellow and white and me shimmying because I am okay. I am okay.