The Psychoanalyst and The Poet 

    The following is, for the first time translated and brought to print, the written correspondence between Sigmund Freud and Rainer Maria Rilke. The record was only completed in late 2022, when the German Literature Archive (GLA) acquired Rilke’s entire literary estate from his descendants. Letters between the two went unnoticed by scholarship; the GLA itself didn’t seem aware at the time of acquisition that Freud was one of Rilke’s correspondents. Over a century after they were written, the German literary review Sinn und Form corrected that astonishing oversight, and through their publication granted us the two writers’ reflections on psychoanalysis and war.

    Freud and Rilke had a strong (albeit indirect) relationship through their close friendships with Lou-Andreas Salomé. Salomé was a pupil of Sigmund Freud (she is often labeled the first female psychoanalyst), and a sometime lover of Rilke. The epistolary exchanges between Rilke and Salomé lasted until his death, and formed the contact surface between him and psychoanalysis, a subject which terrified and allured him. Analysis and poetry brawl throughout their letters for mastery of the soul. Rilke likened it to an exorcism, a ritual that would drive out the demons underneath both his hypochondria and his sensitivity to nature. Salomé agreed, at last warning him: “Never let yourself be analyzed. Your creativity will die.”

    This context infuses the conversation between Freud and Rilke with a sinister air. Rilke is vulnerable, even frightened by an animal sense of who has the power. The poet wants to keep his distance from the analyst, due not to mundane social anxiety, but to his fear of what that meeting might bring. Freud meanwhile strolls casually through topics sensitive to Rilke: the assault on Duino, and his own verdicts on human nature. Near the end of his letter, Rilke resigns: “the choice to see it through alone prevailed, insofar as I still retain the dregs of my solitude.” By choosing loneliness over therapy, while revealing that loneliness is all that he has left, a paradox is simultaneously created and resolved. Declining company because you are alone is obviously a contradiction, but, by incarnating loneliness and joining himself to it, he collapses subject and object into one. Against the brutal invasions of his world by analysis and war, he replaces that world with solitude and rejects that which he could have lost. In doing so, Rilke places himself in an untamed expanse of will, at the origin of art, a poet to the bitter end.

    Freud to Rilke, February 11th 1916

    Prof. Dr. Freud

    Wien, IX. Berggasse 19.

    11.2.16

    My dearest and most esteemed doctor,

    It was somehow brought to my attention that you are back in Vienna, on military duties, and live at this mailing address. I had to suppress my urge to visit until you showed signs of life, that is, until I gathered that you had ordered your affairs. But my son Ernst (to whom you were kind enough to write, and even somewhat resembles you) is on leave from Isonzo for a few days. He had me ask when and where he could meet you. Naturally, I’d much rather have you at ours for a bite, but I don’t know if you’ll make it – Tuesday evening I’m holding a lecture somewhere, and either Thursday or Friday my wife travels to Hamburg with Ernst.

    That is to say, a prompt response would be most kind.

    Your most humble servant,

    Freud

    Rilke to Freud, February 17th 1916

    Hopfners Park-Hôtel

    Wien XIII. (Hietzing.)

    on Feb. 17, 1916

    My esteemed Professor Freud,

    Have I missed your son? It’s as I fear: your letter is dated the eleventh, but consider this — I first found it today, have been away on “business” since precisely the eleventh, and returned this morning. Could the timing be any worse? Or do you still have him in Vienna? In this case, can he come tomorrow evening at five–?, for I am too tired, too upset, too confused to come myself; indeed so oppressed by these incommensurable daily circumstances, I’m saddened to think that he’ll even see me like this. This strange world and its demands are so preposterous, that they petrify me deep within. First were some fourteen days of basic training. Then came my assignment to the War Archives, where I squander the hours in intellectual despair, just as I had in physical despair. But the greatest terror is the rubble burying my heart, deeper by the day, and often I’ve thought that a talk with you would save me from this burial. Alas, the choice to see it through alone prevailed, insofar as I still retain the dregs of my solitude. If I can gradually collect myself, then I’ll be sure to call on you and visit; I know this will be good. 

    In the meantime, convey my greetings to your ladies, and should your son Ernst already have departed, the most heartfelt regret at not having met. Should he still be in Vienna, I’d request a word by phone: but here [at home], for we may not receive calls in the Archive.

    Yours truly and sincerely devoted,

    R.M.Rilke

    Freud to Rilke, February 18th 1916

    Prof. Dr. Freud

    Wien, IX. Berggasse 19.

    18.2.16

    Most esteemed,

    The pattern has continued: on the very evening that your pneumatic letter arrived, my Ernst departed for Germany. But he returns in a week, and now knows where to find you.

    If you do feel the urge to unburden yourself with a chat, don’t hide yourself from us. I’ve struggled with this particular monstrosity for 1½ years. I armor my weak spots here and there, hoping to check it, so long as it leaves my four weakest alone – my three sons, and my son-in-law in the service. And even if you aren’t as vivid, composed, or polished as during your first visit, we’ll make it work.

    The war confused me, but only at first. I soon developed a pessimistic revulsion and ever since have had general license to cast authoritative judgements on human nature, as I’ve always secretly wanted to do. I can be pessimistic without bitterness. It’s most advisable.

    Perhaps you’ve gone too far in separating your inner and outer lives. Now the dam is full to bursting. Perhaps — but I won’t triumph presenting this image, I’d rather not compete against a poet. Yet, it’s rather easy for me to empathize with your fate. If I were to be sentenced to spend half the day under one roof with psychiatrists!

    Your beloved Duino is now under bombardment! Ernst tells me the enemy shoots wastefully, while we hold back.

    In conclusion, let’s rendezvous soon on a Monday, Friday, or Sunday! Tuesdays and Wednesdays are association days, Thursdays are game nights, and Saturdays are for lectures.

    With warm regards on behalf of yours truly,

    Freud

    Hidden in the Bourgeois

    The hero of The Magic Mountain — the perfectly ordinary, blond, blue-eyed Hans Castorp —  is the typological bourgeois male. I spent seven years writing a book about the novel of which he serves as protagonist and in that time I wondered often what possessed me to devote so much energy to him and to it. At a certain point, I rather tragically resigned myself to the obvious answer that I have a deplorably bourgeois soul.

    The Magic Mountain is one of the great novels about the bourgeois soul. It challenges Joseph Schumpeter’s idea that the bourgeois is a fundamentally unheroic narrative type. “The stock exchange is a poor substitute for the Holy Grail,” Schumpeter wrote. Yet, rather ironically, the poet Howard Nemerov interprets Hans Castorp’s quest for knowledge as precisely a quest for the Holy Grail. Thomas Mann would have approved of Nemerov’s interpretation. 

    Hans Castorp, significantly, is from Hamburg, the merchant city of the middle classes, a city whose center is dominated by that most bourgeois of German buildings, the Rathaus, or Townhall. As the novel opens, he is about to join the ship-building firm Tunder and Wilms, and seems to everyone around him “an honest, unadulterated product of the local soil, superbly at home in it.” And yet as we read on, we learn that the family doctor suspects Hans Castorp of being anemic and has prescribed him a daily glass of robust porter — intended to help build his blood, but which Hans Castorp enjoys for its soothing, dozing effects. We also learn that although he is a decent tennis-player and oarsman, Castorp prefers sitting on a terrace of the boathouse with a drink in hand, “listening to music and watching the boats as they drifted among the swans.” Hans Castorp is not especially interested in exerting effort, in working, that supreme of bourgeois activity. Effort strains his nerves and exhausts him. He prefers it when time passes “easily, unencumbered by the leaden weight of toil…” When he first meets the shrewd, intellectually active Ludovico Settembrini, Castorp declares: “I only really feel healthy when I am doing nothing at all.”

    Hans Castorp resists our understanding, he is difficult to know — perhaps because he is insubstantial. (Though maybe not! Hard to say.) When asked by the director of the Berghof why he chose to become an engineer, Castorp claims he did so purely by chance, and that he could just as well have become a doctor or a clergyman. Similarly, when local citizens of Hamburg wonder if Hans Castorp will ever seek a career in politics, given his good family name, they cannot decide if he would stand as a conservative, like his grandfather, or as a progressive, as he has entered the fields of commerce and technology. “That was quite possible – but so was the opposite.”

    The narrator hypothesizes that Hans Castorp may be suffering from the nihilistic condition of his age, from the hollow silence with which the universe around him responds to the question of meaning. It is above all this question that Hans Castorp is confronted with during his seven years at the Berghof, where his latent sympathy with death is awakened and aroused by Clavdia Chauchat, who teasingly calls him “my little bourgeois.”

    And indeed, what could be more bourgeois — as Thomas Mann understands the term — than Hans Castorp’s celebrated epiphany in the famous “Snow” subchapter, that “man is the master of contradictions.” The coexistence of apparent opposites is characteristic of the bourgeois. Werner Sombart, in his The Quintessence of Capitalism, makes the Faustian claim that “two souls dwell in the breast of every complete bourgeois: the soul of the adventurer and the soul of the respectable middle-class man.” A claim that sounds quite a bit like Thomas Mann’s Tonio Kröger, who, in the eponymous novella, cries out: “As an artist I’m already enough of an adventurer in my inner life. So far as outward appearances are concerned one should dress decently, damn it, and behave like a respectable citizen…”

    Thomas Mann offers the image of the writer as someone who keeps his office hours and dresses appropriately, whose writing is characterized not by the heat and flame of inspiration but by the cold comfort of thoroughness and industry. “There is much to be said for a wife and children,” Thomas Mann wrote in his diary in 1919, “but given my nature, the decisive consideration for me is that it allows me to hide in the bourgeois realm without actually becoming bourgeois.” As the French writer Bernard Groethuysen observed in 1927, “the bourgeois likes to keep his incognito.”

    It was Flaubert who originally formulated the contradictory character of the bourgeois when he observed, in a letter, that “one should live like a bourgeois and think like a demi-god.” But it was Thomas Mann in whom this dialectic, the yes and the no of bourgeois culture, found its most prophetic repository. “I have become what I am,” Thomas Buddenbrook, the good bourgeois, tells his brother, Christian, the failed artist, “because I did not want to become like you.” Many years after writing those words, Mann described his enemy Adolf Hitler as “a brother, a rather unpleasant and mortifying brother,” by which he meant that Hitler, like himself, was an artist, only he was an artist gone astray, a good-for-nothing who believed himself “reserved for something else — as yet quite indefinite, but something which, if it could be named, would be greeted with roars of laughter.” Significantly, Mann titled his essay “A Brother,” as though aware that he and Hitler represented two paths for Germany. I have become what I am, because I did not want to become like you. A few weeks after the war, Mann, ever the conscientious artist, confessed: “it is all within me, I have been through it all.”  

    “I Am Trying To Live A Life I Do Not Understand”

    Frequently, in conversation with others or in an incessant inner monologue, I try to imagine what a world after this, after this political crisis, after this historical paroxysm, will look like. I love two countries — America and Israel — which have, let us say, transformed themselves. I am rich in crises, overwhelmed by hopelessness and heartache the causes of which are so enormous I cannot fully fathom their implications for the world or for my conception of myself. My loyalties torment me. After October 7 a certain cohort that has since fragmented spoke wistfully of “the day after,” but even in those early weeks the phrase was an insult to human wisdom. The phrase itself has become a synecdoche in my mind for our outrageous lack of a proper understanding of what was occurring around us and what we have become.

    I am trying to imagine an Israel-and-Palestine and an America in which the word “peace” means something substantial, a world in which that word has not been thinned to a pixelated, politicized flourish. But neither of these places — neither of my homes — are sufficiently familiar to me anymore, and so I do not trust my own intuitions about what will happen and what is possible in either context. I want ruminations on these futures to be rooted in reality, to be based in deep understandings of the peoples at stake. But it never feels that way. When I listen to or participate in discussions about a future worth living for, they feel grotesquely ignorant or fanciful. I think I know why that is. No one alive today was raised to understand the versions of our countries that exist now. This is not only because we were living “in a bubble,” but also because genuine transformations have taken place. And we cannot responsibly possess what we do not know. It is difficult to conceive of ourselves as leaders (or even members) of the strange places we live in now, these mutations of the countries we used to think of as ours but which have become alien to us.

    In my mind these ruminations are associated with a particular image of nullity. I am a painter and so I am familiar with the dread of staring at a blank canvas — and that is the sensation that comes over me when conversation turns to “the day after” and related themes. I recently spent an afternoon in my studio face to face with an easel on which there rested an unblemished canvas. The trouble was I did not have something particular I wanted to paint, I just wanted to be painting. I wanted to feel the brush sliding pleasantly along the slick primed surface. I wanted to make something intelligent and even beautiful. But that abstract yearning could not bear fruit. Beauty — the kind I am occasionally capable of when properly prepared, and the kind I most admire — is the result of having intimately understood an entrancing subject (entrancing at least to me) and communicating that intimate understanding through a medium over which I have a measure of control. Yearning to create some unknown beautiful thing is exactly like yearning to be in love without loving someone. What intimacy? What understanding? (A relevant Jewish piece of wisdom: in an essay excoriating a literary critic, the great Yiddish writer I.L. Peretz scolded, “It is not enough to write in Yiddish. You have to have something to say.”) Usually the memory of actively engaging with my bouts of creative sterility is disturbing enough to keep me from entering the studio without proper preparation. 

    The urge to paint has to come from within. I need to be captivated by some subject and driven to communicate its seductions, to externalize in paint what has occurred inside me. I have to arrive at the easel possessed by this inspiration. The assignment of meaning to a subject comes from me: I am forced to action because of an inner necessity. I am not referring to “self-expression,” but rather to the effort to be loyal to my sense of an intuition or a perception. But in the realms of other loyalties, particularly collective and political allegiances, I act on values that I did not assign to myself but that were assigned to me. I used to move through the world armed with a profound sense of received meaning and conscious of the life choices that a serious life required of me. There was a time in my life when my sense of loyalty and honor was so concrete to me that I could rely on my inherited frameworks to give me both a worldview and a course of action. My life was plotted according to that heritage. This is no longer true. In so many essential ways the world I was born into does not any longer exist. The countries which I had been raised to love and serve have revealed characteristics so strange I cannot recognize them, so unattractive that I am no longer pulled toward them, though I still derive meaning from my loyalty to… them? To my idea of them? To a version of them for which I try to fight and in which I tell myself I still believe? If honor is a matter of loyalty, then honor will mean something new to me now. 

    The artist Chaim Soutine called the compulsion to paint something new “being hit by lightning” or “the lightning bolt.” If it did not come, he would not paint; and not painting was, for him, a form of not living. Soutine experienced two of the most devastating horrors in human history and throughout both of them his primary context, his significant world, remained the canvas. The first of these crucibles was the first war. He spent much of World War I in the south of France weak with hunger (he had made no name for himself and so had no money for food), subsisting on the goodwill of Amedeo Modigliani, his closest friend, and the kind-hearted members of Modi’s social circle. For everyone else the scarcity of resources was the stuff of war — for Soutine it was what kept him from his vocation.

    Soutine’s most famous period as a painter began just after the war was over, the same year that Modigliani died, in a small French village in the foothills of the Pyrenees miles from the Spanish border, called Céret. He was a long way away from his community, lonely, poor, and recently bereft of his closest friend (Modigliani was just thirty-five when he died), but he thought only of his work. This is not an exaggeration: his single-mindedness was fanatical. Each day was like his last: he painted with gusto for as long as he could sustain the energy. When his agent Léopold Zborowski made the long drive from Paris to Céret to visit him, he found Soutine holed up in a small, airless shack with all the windows sealed shut. Apparently he feared that his paintings — which were piled in a massive stack — would be damaged by the oxygen outdoors. The agent asked to see the completed works but Soutine refused. He said they were failures, unfit for view. Zborowski determined that he had better find his painter some food before continuing the argument, and when he came back he found that Soutine had set fire to the heap of canvases. It was with great difficulty and no small risk that Zborowski salvaged a number of them.

    The mania with which Soutine worked during the Céret period he never matched again. He spent the rest of his career waiting for the next thunderbolt to strike. He would on occasion try to put himself in the way of inspiration, to invite the bolt. His most trusted mechanism when in such straits was to go for a drive, to shift location, to shake up his context. Soutine was intensely affected by his surroundings, and when he felt stultified rather than excited by the quality of the sunlight or the vertiginousness of the landscape in which he found himself, he would peripatetically seek out someplace else. In the years after he achieved success Zborowski secured Soutine a chauffeur for precisely this purpose, and that man – his name was Daneyrole – recalled that there was a particular tree situated in Vence in the south of France to which Soutine would instruct Daneyrole to drive. The tree’s shape or placement, or the way the light hit it, could trigger a trance. The drive from Paris, where Soutine usually lived, and the tree to which he pilgrimaged took roughly ten hours. Such an intensity of commitment strikes ordinary people as excessive and bizarre, but the regular ten-hour slog was not the strangest or most unpleasant inconvenience Soutine endured in service to his passion.

    In the mid-1920s Soutine was overcome by the need to paint a painting inspired by Rembrandt’s Woman Bathing in a Stream. That canvas, which hangs in the National Gallery in London, depicts a woman hoisting a thin white dress to her knees while standing in what appears to be a lake licking the sides of a cave. Soutine had to paint from life — he could copy neither a painting nor a photograph nor could he paint from memory and imagination. If he wanted to paint a woman in a stream, he had to be standing in front of such a person. Soutine enlisted his patroness, a wealthy eccentric woman named Madeleine Castaing, and her husband in a mad search for an appropriate model. The group drove about the Castaing estate in Lèves until such a woman was identified, convinced to model, and dressed in appropriate garb. A lake was located. The woman was placed to Soutine’s satisfaction and then… a thunderstorm came over the pair. But Soutine would not hear of stopping — he had to paint a whole picture from start to finish while the paint was still wet — and so he painted through the gales as the woman shrieked for permission to leave and he shouted back instructions to stand still. 

    During his episodes of creative commotion Soutine was in thrall to a mandate that no one else could fathom. What seems inconceivable to the rest of us was obvious and necessary to him. He was obeying the dictates of a value-framework which assigned worth and honor known only to him. This was not the result of reflection; Soutine was not consciously deducing a system of appropriate painterly behavior. He was heeding an edict that came from the interior, that was a part of who he was. It was not inherited. It was not subject to any nature but his own; it would exist for as long as he did. He could not separate himself from this orientation, and it could not be altered by outside forces. They were insulated from history — so long as Soutine’s health, wealth, and safety permitted him to follow his own course.

    The love of Soutine’s life was a woman named Gerda Michaelis. She understood nothing of his painting and she was, for the entirety of their relationship, uninterested in discussing it with him. But she did grasp what it was to be borne forward by a force that compelled her to deep and irrational action. Her love for Soutine was like that. It was not as violent or idiosyncratic as his analogous aesthetic mania, but it was the effulgence of a similar maniacal configuration, and it did become the central force which conferred meaning on her life. Her obedience to her own romantic impulses was as much the result of her self-understanding as his obedience to his painterly dictates was evidence of a similarly visceral self-knowledge. Their loyalties, you might say, were entirely self-generated, which made them invulnerable to the world-transforming events which took place in the years in which they lived together. In fact, those events both occasioned their meeting and forced their separation.

    Michaelis was born in 1910 into a Jewish family in Magdeburg, a German city on the Elbe. The racial laws that the Nazis enforced after their rise to power in 1932 stripped Michaelis’ father of his livelihood and then the entire family was forcibly relocated from Magdeburg to Berlin — the Nazis had decided to address the housing crisis by seizing Jewish homes and collecting Jews in centralized locations. Gerda was not optimistic, stupid, or dedicated enough to the Volk to ignore the tidal pull towards what could only be a brutal end and so she decided to flee to France. Michaelis returned to Germany only once, in 1935, to see her family. Her mother, father, and two sisters were killed shortly afterwards.  

    She met Soutine on an autumn evening in 1937. She had stumbled into her usual café, Le Dome, at Vavin, the white-hot center of Montparnasse and the meeting spot for a community of German refugees and other émigré artists. Immediately upon entering she noticed a man whom she had never seen before. He was seated at a table near three of her friends. “Medium build, pale complexion, with deep black hair and dark brown eyes, he could have been about forty… Everything about his physicality pleased me.” On their first date he took her with him to a boxing match — one of his favorite pastimes — but he collapsed in the middle of it. In a prefiguration of the beneficent role that she was to play in his life, she took him home and nursed him the whole night through. When he awoke to find her preparing to leave for work, he told her not to go. He said that he would take care of her from then on, as she had taken care of him. Garde, he called her, for she was his guardian. 

    She moved in with him immediately, and she loved him forcefully and totally. They had three years together. Soutine’s health deteriorated and on the strength of a doctor’s advice he and Garde left Paris in the summer of 1939 for a visit in Civry-sur-Serein. While they were there, war with Germany broke out and Garde was suddenly a citizen of an enemy country. She could not leave the city freely, but Soutine’s poor health necessitated trips to specialists in the capital and so he would leave her alone for long stretches while she laid low awaiting his return. This tormented status quo held for eight months till the pair snuck back into Paris. A full third of their relationship was consumed by the fear and helplessness which stalks all people with precarious legal status during wartime. And Soutine was a Jew, as was Garde. She spent those months agonizing over what could have happened to him in her absence, and what might happen to her before he had a chance to return. She would subsist on the food and meager funds that he left behind and so she was always at risk of running out of basic necessities. When they could no longer submit to these conditions, the pair fled overnight. Clutching what they could fit in bags light enough to carry, they walked for miles in silence holding their breath until the city thinned out. They reached the train station at one o’clock. When the train pulled into the outskirts of Lyon, Soutine took Garde in his arms and whispered, “You are saved.” Two Jews fleeing into Paris in April 1940, laboring under the delusion that safety was a luxury that they still enjoyed. 

    Reality rapidly asserted itself.  The morning after their return all German women were commanded to report to the bicycle stadium known as the Vel d’Hiv, from where they would be transported to an internment camp in the Pyrenees. On their last night together they repeated promises to find one another as soon as they could, to write, to wait until the war was over before resuming life as before. The next day they took a taxi together across Paris. He kissed her goodbye and she disappeared behind a mass of uniformed bodies. They never saw each other again.

    The historical paroxysms which decimated her family, her home, and all the frameworks for happiness, success, and meaning that she had been bequeathed are hardly mentioned in the only remaining account of her life. Garde’s memoir is a slim volume of reflections on the fleeting years she and Soutine lived together, written decades after his death, as if her whole life up to and since the time they spent in the world they created together was the only stretch of years that she recognized as “my life.” The book begins “today, like yesterday, despite the time, his image is constantly present to me.” This, though his final years were spent in hiding with another woman, a woman he met just weeks after Garde was rounded up along with all German nationals in Paris while France was still at war with Germany.  Soutine remained for her a fixed ideal, a constant phantom companion. 

    Michaelis recounts her great love story in straightforward language, as if she wrote it to help her remember exactly what had happened. She does not recount an instant of hesitation. From the moment she saw him her fate was sealed. The only standard of existence for Gerda Michaelis was generated organically from her love and her dedication to Soutine. Her needs grew around his motion forward, much like his needs emerged from his ferocious commitment to painting. And both of these concerns, these ever-fixed marks, bore the two of them forward in a world in which the communities they both knew were decimated.

    Soutine and Michaelis were blessed. Their primary sources of meaning came from within themselves. They were not blind to the evils around them, but in some essential way they were living outside of those evils and so their souls could not be snuffed out by social and political events until death forced extinguishment. Their souls, as Leon Wieseltier once wrote, exceeded their circumstances. In ordinary times, Soutine’s and Michaelis’ oblivious behavior might have been called clueless or insane. In fact, during his life and since his death Soutine was and often is referred to as a madman, and this characterization is due largely to the public way he lived utterly beholden to a system of values and actions that made little sense to others and that was in violation of the ones which governed the commonplace life around him. Even his admirers cannot enter into his stirringly idiosyncratic psyche and understand it. The same is true about Michaelis — though her folie is more familiar to us. We have seen mad love and there is a literature about it. But still she led a rationally incomprehensible life. 

    Is such monomania admirable? Is it admirable to think only of art or only of a beloved while your family (and many other people) are being rounded up and slaughtered? Is such a myopia, such an exclusive commitment, an aesthetic strength or an ethical weakness? Admirable or not, that model of existence certainly provided Soutine and Garde with an answer to a question that many now have to grapple with: how can one live after one’s world has been mutilated or even obliterated?

    We have all been born into contexts that offered us blueprints for how to live our lives and standards for how to measure our success or failure. We hold ourselves in contempt or with pride depending on the degree to which we rise or fall against those expectations. But we have also all been born into communities that have already been outgrown and sloughed off. Soutine and Michaelis witnessed the engine of industrialized decimation which altered their worlds and ours. To this day our ur-example of mass destruction is the war that forced them apart. The Holocaust did not only destroy people, it also destroyed the conditions, the ethos, that made possible the worldviews that made life comprehensible and meaningful to the victims and the survivors.  But genocide is hardly necessary for such an obliteration. Technological development has whipped us all into ceaseless forward motion and we are helpless in its grip. Our constant velocity is violent even without the blood and the ash — though it does seem to catalyze much blood and ash. We are living in our own crucible of erasure and destruction. It too is wounding and pitiless.

    The late Jonathan Lear’s astonishing book Radical Hope valiantly treats a response to such an experience of obliteration. It is an interrogation of a philosophically perplexing pronouncement made by Plenty Coups, the last great chief of the Native American Crow Tribe. Just before his death, Plenty Coups told the first part of his life’s story to a white man who pressed him to continue it up to the present day. The last great chief refused, and he offered the following as explanation: “When the buffalo went away the hearts of my people fell to the ground and they could not lift them up again. After this nothing happened.” After this nothing happened. What could that possibly mean, Lear asks. And he proposes the possibility that after a certain way of life was destroyed it became impossible for “happenings” to continue in the sense that happenings had before the buffalo’s departure — in other words, Plenty Coups was speaking literally. “Happening” in the sense that the Crow could understand the word no longer occurred. The Crow “conception of what happiness is could no longer be lived. The characteristic activities that used to constitute the good life ceased to be intelligible acts.”

    We might suppose that Garde experienced a similar loss of meaning after Soutine’s death — after a secret emergency surgery in Paris — in 1943, and that subsequent “happenings” were not possible or not vital in the way that they had been while the two were together. Garde was the kind of person who was especially vulnerable to the loss of a beloved. There are people who can continue living after such a loss. Most people find their partners in a community and choose their partners with the intention of creating a certain kind of family which belongs within a certain kind of communal context. Such people are less vulnerable to complete desolation and inconsolable grief after a beloved’s death, though the prospect of the destruction of communal life would surely terrify them. Garde was not like this. She had no community, she had only him. Soutine perished, her heart fell to the ground, after this nothing happened.

    Lear suggests that courageous people are especially vulnerable to the destruction of their community. As he puts it, “the very traits of character that make for a courageous person would place such a person in an especially disadvantaged position to make a courageous transition out  of traditional forms of courage. The courageous Crow warrior willingly gave up his life… all his training and encouragement from early youth was directed toward producing such character.” But, as Lear explains, after the buffalo went away the very acts that had previously accrued honor were suddenly rendered ridiculous. Lear emphasizes courage because his chosen case study is the Crow Tribe and for them — as for all warrior communities — courage was the highest virtue. Every element of their way of life was defined in relation to battle, and honor itself was derived in relation to that occupation. When battle was no longer possible, their rituals, their vernacular, their very family structure, ceased to be comprehensible even to themselves. As one Crow elder woman repeats throughout the book, “I am trying to live a life I do not understand.” 

    This is why we are so starved for honorable models now. The frameworks that we have for conferring honor have themselves been degraded and disgraced. The leaders among us who pledged fealty to a country that has betrayed itself have themselves been delegitimated. Even if they are not guilty of ideological betrayal they are at least guilty of poor stewardship. Courage has absconded. What can we do when the world in which we derived honor by professing loyalty to our country changes so dramatically that the reasons for that profession no longer hold? What if the foundations of our patriotism, the premises about our country and its trajectory toward justice, have been ruptured, perhaps irreparably? What do we do when, say, a country that represented freedom, liberalism, equality, and generosity violently and democratically overturns those commitments? Who decides what America is? Who decides who Americans are? 

    The natural response to all of this horror, in the wake of the catastrophes that have destroyed our worlds, is to flip things, to invert the value systems that we inherited and to condemn the attributes and people and symbols we once admired with energy equal to the energy with which we once loved them. I am conscious of a powerful impulse to detest what I once loved. This detestation has the added benefit of allowing me to preserve the frameworks according to which I used to live, just in the negative. That way the energy I have exerted developing intimate knowledge of people and ideas can remain alive inside me — as it will anyway, since I am inseparable from it. The tactic of philosophical and emotional inversion allows me to take vengeance in my own heart and my own mind against the figures who made a fool of me by accepting my loyalty and my admiration and then traducing and abandoning the values that undergird them. A bloated self-hatred swollen to encompass my entire peoples, the peoples in whom I locate my essence, is a great temptation. Another sip of rage, please, another glass, the bottle, I can’t help myself. We are pitiable. 

    Jonathan Lear suggests that when Plenty Coups was still young he intuited great tragedy ahead for his people and he offered the Crow a method for living beyond the time of the buffalo. He did this through a prophetic dream and its interpretation, one of the holy rituals of the tribe and one which fused together the tribe’s spirit allies and its generations: it was customary for the young to have prophetic visitations in their dreams and then for the elders to interpret the dreams’ meanings for the community — a collaborative prophetic exercise. This way the authority of the prophecy was affirmed by the old, the young, and the gods. Plenty Coups’ dream was interpreted by the elders to mean that, though great tragedy and destruction would befall the Crow, there would be life for them on the other side of it if they did not resist the violence of the white man. This dream allowed Plenty Coups to invoke the authorities the Crow already revered in service to the transformation of Crow life. The integrity of the tribe was in that way intact. Meaning could survive. Faith in that possibility is what Lear called “radical hope.”

    I have no such hope. How could I? Plenty Coups saved the Crow from losing faith in their elders and in the spiritual authorities to which his community devoted itself. He provided them with a framework for preserving the structures that assigned honor, and updated them for an unrecognizable age. But the authorities I know how to trust, the ones who lead the countries and communities that I love, are now thoroughly debased. Even if I believed in prophecy I have no elders to interpret one, except those elders who are as alienated as I am. The only mentors left to me are the ones who share in my disgust. We are all equally lost. But disgust is not a policy. It is abundantly warranted, but we need something more to live: some force propelling us forward in service to an ideal. 

    When I come to the easel freighted with the image and the ambition of a painting, itching to begin the process of articulating through paint this vision which has taken possession of me, I do not pause for questions. I do not wonder if this is a worthy subject or if I am the proper person to paint it. The subject and I are one thing — it is an experience of absorption. I want to spend myself through painting, to exhaust myself the way Soutine used to do, to hold nothing back. I used to feel this way at the sight of my countries’ flags — I was not distinguishable from the objects of my loyalty and each had total claim on me. (I believe in multiple loyalties as long as they are genuine.) I long for that feeling, for the oceanic thrill of being bound up in a movement that I believe has a right to all my heart and mind. I would have given so much, perhaps even everything, for those flags and all that they represent. But what do they still represent? What is my life worth without that loyalty, without those loyalties, now?

     

    Temporalities

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Remembering Jonathan Lear

    A vision of the future must never be only about the future. Otherwise we will commit the terrible mistake known as futurism, which is nothing more than an attempt to make a virtue out of velocity.

    Whether in the form of impatience or dread, the future can deplete the life out of the present, and no less ravenously than the present can deplete the life out of the past.

    It makes no sense to believe in a mode of time. To believe in the future is to believe in a cipher, or to perpetuate the illusion that the future will be one thing, this and not that, when in truth it will be everything, as all life is everything. And to believe in the past is also to believe in everything, because everything may be found in the past. The past does not all go together and neither will the future. (This is abundantly demonstrated by the historical origins of every innovation, by every “unprecedented” breakthrough. Chemists may look with contempt upon alchemists, but the science of chemistry was born in the superstition of alchemy, and for a while they coexisted in an incongruous explosion of the desire to know.) Until we make decisions about what we wish to retain and to cultivate from the past, until we make selections from among the survivals, until we impose some italics on the welter, the past is only a pile of events — an annals and not a history. It is only rich clay. But on what grounds can we make such selections? Only on ahistorical grounds, I would say; on philosophical grounds. And what certifies these philosophical grounds as criteria for our commitments is not that we find them in the past. The fact that certain values once existed and once animated a society does not establish their legitimacy. Their pastness teaches nothing about their correctness. Evil communities also had elders. Venerability verifies nothing, though their possible irrelevance to truth is no excuse for the wanton destruction of inherited beliefs. And contemporaneity, too, verifies nothing.

    Conservatism — remember conservatism?— is no less selective about the past than progressivism, and no less committed to the future. The distinction between conservatism and progressivism lies in the philosophical criteria for choices among the many legacies. 

    We have no right to erase something old merely because it displeases us; the erasure of disagreeable survivals of the past — statues, etc. — will establish not justice, but only a chimera of innocence. The grand telos of all the history that came before us was not to affirm us. We are the past’s stewards, not its tyrants; its stewards and its interpreters. There is no point in fighting its facticity, its finality.  And what we gain from our stewardship of the remains of evil is knowledge, which is one of the conditions of responsibly established belief.

     

    Iconoclasm has a sterling reputation for its independence of mind, but it is also a variety of vandalism. Where were the independent of mind in the iconoclastic mobs? Consider, for example, the paintings of the sixteenth-century iconoclastic riots in the Low Countries, particularly in Antwerp. They give the lie to the categorical loftiness of iconoclasm. They depict only power and hatred.

    Spit, abhor, but don’t demolish. 

    A mile away, as I write this, the East Wing of the White House is being transformed into a heap of dust. Not a catastrophe by any means, and nothing like the rubble that one encounters in other locations in this roughed-up world. At least the local debris is not the work of war. But this demolition is certainly a perfect emblem of the Trump regime’s flippancy toward the past. Historical figures should be less casual about history, which normally should serve as a quarry for the inhibitions that are among their qualifications for office. An inhibition is often the expression of an appropriate reverence. An uninhibited man is an ahistorical man. There is something essentially disrespectful, essentially callous, about a rampaging backhoe, as there is about a rampaging president. 

    Our power over the past is so immense that often we prefer not to know that the responsibility for what endures is ours. Secular and religious doctrines of inevitability relieve us of the anxiety of stewardship, not least by providing us with alibis for obsolescence, as if certain things are simply doomed to disappear, destined by time or by science or by providence. But nothing is obsolete until we agree that it is obsolete. We make it so.  We let it go.

    The inheritance of the past and the reception of the past are two discrete moments. The former is passive, but the latter is, or must be, active. Without active reception, tradition expires. Culture advances when we revolt against the heir’s passivity, when we refuse to certify raw contingencies and we rise above our apathy about the flow of things. Allowing valuable pieces of the past to slip through your fingers is worse than melodramatically discarding them.  

    Natural oblivion, the passing of memory with the passing of the years, is a permanent feature of human experience, and it may also be a blessing by leaving room for those who come after us, who would otherwise face an extremely discouraging sense of their own redundancy,  the asphyxiating feeling that there is nothing left for them to say or to do. Yet there is also unnatural oblivion, which is what we wreak upon the past with our laziness and our indifference. Unnatural oblivion can also be the consequence of persecution and oppression. We not only neglect and forget our own patrimonies, other people sometimes attempt to erase them, to coerce oblivion, so that the development of certain cultures, particularly the cultures of oppressed peoples, must proceed not least by means of salvage. And we sometimes attempt to coerce oblivion on others. 

    Finding a responsible position among the generations is a matter of calibrating the feeling that we are not worthy of what we have been bequeathed with the feeling that what we have been bequeathed is not worthy of us. 

    Futurism is a fantasy of a new beginning, a new birth — but really there is only a single beginning and only a single birth. We can travel far from our origins, but we cannot abolish them. Yehuda Amichai wrote: “I search for new beginnings / and find only changes.” 

    It makes no sense to be born again. A transformation owes its resonance, its softly tragic consciousness of an earlier privation, to the lingering awareness of what preceded it. Otherwise a second birth is just an escape hatch, a “do-over” (what children want when they are too young to grasp the constraints of meaningful activity and seek to be held unaccountable for a mistake or a failure and want it not to “count”), like a third birth and a fourth birth. Moral and spiritual progress can be measured only against a continuous substrate.

    Marx’s famous pronouncement that “the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living” was a little cheap — another outlandish bid for newness. All the dead generations will never be overthrown, nor should they be. A war on origins is a waste of spirit, and misuses the energies that are required for constructing our own place in the epic chain, for creating the material with which to stimulate our descendants in their own nightmares of being trapped by the past, that is, by us.

    What we call the past is only the remainder of the past. However overwhelming the past may feel, the truth is that we inherit only relics. By the time the past reaches us, oblivion has already done its work; so much has been forgotten or destroyed. “The past” is what’s left. 

    There are always grounds, big ones and small ones, for the complaint about entrapment in the past. Until theories of necessity are cobbled together, the circumstances into which we have been tossed will seem capricious. Most people live their lives conquered by accident. The absence of restlessness, which can be mistaken for wisdom, can also denote a premature surrender to the given. But what home ever sufficed for a living soul? Restlessness is the attribute of a significant existence, or more accurately, of an existence laudably anxious about significance.  

    My tradition teaches me that inherited customs are sacred, but all the customs that I inherited were invented. (They are sacred but they are not divine.) The problem with our derivativeness and our belatedness is not that we were robbed of the opportunity for self-creation, which is the adolescent Nietzschean-Rortyan objection. The problem is that we may not know what to do with what came before us, how to interpret it and to adapt it, how to hear it and how to see it. 

    And what about the dead hand of the present that weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living? In the alienation sweepstakes, the past is a piker.

    One of the sins of the traditionalists is to regard restlessness as a sin.

    Whoever wishes to be born again really wishes to be blameless. And blamelessness is not in our cards.

    Ex nihilo: that train left the station on the day you were born. “Self-fashioning” as it is propounded by the professors — who have the sabbaticals required for it — is a haughty doctrine; Emersonian arrogance without Emersonian humility. Who really wants to come from nowhere? And who is so vain to believe that he can suffice with his own resources for his identity and his improvement? A wish for a different beginning may be an expression of early pain — a wish, say, for different parents; a common wish, I suppose, since human beings are more biologically equipped to have children than they are psychologically equipped to raise them. But a wish for no parents? Self-fashioning is self-orphaning, and with the passage of one’s years it becomes more and more clear that orphanhood is overrated as an experience of emancipation. Nor is racination the threat that certain freethinkers have said it is, in the way that language is not such a threat. Obstacles can sometimes be overcome. Our specificity certainly condemns us to limits, but it is not obvious that we can flourish without limits. Whether or not we stand on the shoulders of giants, we stand on shoulders. 

    In a tiny, low-ceilinged, plainly tiled room in a modest house in an obscure town in the countryside Spinoza conjured the entirety of the cosmos. On my first visit to Rijnsburg the disparity between the scale of his setting and the scale of his thinking made me spin. Limited or not?

    Nothing is true because it is old, and much that is old is false. The history of science, for instance, is a history of mistakes, which is why contemporary scientists need not consult their ancient and medieval precursors. Old physics does not belong in the science of physics but in the history of physics. That is not so with old philosophy. We still study Aristotle, because the obscurity in which many questions of human meaning are shrouded, and the slim likelihood of arriving at perfect certainty about them, transforms ancient opinions about them into contemporary opinions. When we reject an Aristotelian theory of justice or truth, it is not in the way that we reject the Ptolemaic cosmos or the theory of phlogiston. Rational argument is transhistorical, which in our historicist culture, drunk as it is on developmental analysis, is an exhilerating respite.

    The prestige of antiquity, of what came long ago, can be easily exaggerated, and culminate in a thoughtless piety — a counter-futurism, which longs for a cessation of movement, for stasis. For this reason, the querelle des anciens et des modernes of the seventeenth century seems beside the point. In its time, the exaltations of newness, the inebriating phenomenon called modernity, were becoming undeniable, provoking a panic about the tenacity of the past. The panic, and therefore quarrel, was unavoidable — but we have the privilege of considering it more calmly, because modernity, too, is now a piece of our past. Those modernes are our anciens! Time makes all precedence ironic. In that grand early modern disputation, both parties were right and both parties were wrong. 

    There is a similar tension in the Talmudic tradition. One Talmudic opinion declares that certified instruction, or binding independent rulings, the ancient authority known as hora’ah, ended in the sixth century, which implies that the earlier a rabbinical decision was made, the more confident we may be in its correctness. Priority takes priority. But another Talmudic opinion states that the law is to be determined according to the “later ones,” the most recent experts, because the later you live the more you know. (Would that this were always so!) Belatedness, in this view, is an advantage. 

    For the purpose of living meaningfully, one is always right on time. 

    The recognition of one’s genealogy, of one’s place in the parade, should be a source of humility. But here is Nietzsche, moving steadily from brilliance to madness, denouncing humility and confusing it with timidity, and demagogically recommending self-origination, and bequeathing his culture not only the most challenging questions that have so far been asked about it but also a crass assertion of ontological arrogance. He once wondered how God can exist if he is not God. Nietzsche liked to call himself a psychologist, and sometimes he makes philosophical expressions seem like clinical expressions.

    Heine once said of a French industrialist: “He is a self-made man, which relieves God of a terrible responsibility.” 

    We have it backwards. The ancients are not old. They are young, because they came first. That is why we find their limitations not exasperating but enchanting, as with infants, and also why we marvel at the depths of their understandings when they are deep. But we are old. The later you come in the history of a culture, the older you are. And we will be judged by how much we have to show for it. 

    The price we pay for our late appearance in history is that our avowals lack the patina of wisdom. This may not be altogether a bad thing, since the promotion of an idea into wisdom often insulates it from skepticism and removes it from the requirements of critical examination. Sanctification is an efficient way of ending a discussion. Whereas a laboring mind is too busy for wisdom. And wisdom is easily degraded: consider only the wisdom racket of our own era, in which there is a Stoic on every corner. Wisdom may be reduced to a style, to the style of wisdom. Maybe the difference between truth and wisdom is merely that wisdom is truth that has aged. Did the contemporaries of Anaximander and Empedocles regard their opinions as wisdom, or as physical and metaphysical propositions for their consideration? (I omit the adepts, which anybody can attract.) I do not recall that Descartes and Hume and Kant and Hegel were regarded as too immortal for their contemporaries to challenge. The thinkers of one’s own time must never be beatified as sages, since we are still in the midst of evaluating the merits of their ideas. Pedestals make people stupid. And wisdom, to count as wisdom, must manifest the additional quality of being true. 

    The problem for the wisdom-lovers among us is that all the wisdoms do not agree with each other, and sanctimony alone will not resolve the contradiction. 

    Conservatives often chastise us for having forgotten wisdom. If they mean that we are wasting ourselves with intellectual ephemera and simulacra, it is hard not to agree. But there is often a churchly sentimentality in their complaint. The important question is not, Do we have wisdom? The important question is, What do we believe, and why? 

    A wise man knows also the limits of wisdom. The worship of wisdom does not make one wise. 

    Unlike some wines and cheeses, truths do not get better with age. Unlike other wines and cheeses, truths do not get worse with age. 

    In his ravishing writing about his old manse — have any more beautiful pages ever been written by an American? — Hawthorne declares that we should be grateful for our ancestors and grateful for our distance from them. Of course there are cases when gratitude for our ancestors is impossible, because they were evil or otherwise wrong, but generally Hawthorne’s prescription gets it right. There need be no ingratitude, no treason, in our distance from our ancestors. Indeed, one of the reasons that we admire them is for the distance that they put between themselves and their own ancestors, so that they could become themselves, the figures whom we admire. The distance between fathers and sons, however agonistically it is established, is a necessary test of the sons’ capacity for freedom. 

    The perfect reproduction of oneself in one’s child is a narcissist’s fantasy.  All heirs are deviationists.

    The pathos of the traditionalists lies in their futile belief that the forward movement that has characterized their traditions on their long journey to the present, to the traditionalists themselves, should stop with them. Yet even within orthodoxies there was always movement. The forms that the traditionalists wish to freeze were themselves the products of churnings and revisions. Unlike tradition, traditionalism is often a formula for unhappiness. The unhappiness is often weaponized.

    In traditional Judaism, authors are known to posterity not by their own names but by the names of their important works. This pious habit can have a slightly comic effect. It would be like referring to Kant as The Critique and to Hegel as The Phenomenology. (As in: Did the Phenomenology ever meet the Critique? Or: I have a friend who studied with a direct descendant of the Critique.) This personification of books is an astonishingly effective device for making books live. The author’s name is scanted in favor of the author’s work. And this, ironically, makes you feel closer and more personal.

    The nostalgist is an editor, and with no pretense to impartiality: he omits the disagreeable parts of the past, the episodes that are unedifying or useless to his intellectual framework, which is why every nostalgic picture of the past is axiomatically incomplete. In this way nostalgia takes the critical edge off the encounter with the past: it softens the life lived in time and is a kind of early stage of self-forgiveness. It is a cure for vertigo and a cure for loneliness, if ghosts can do the trick. But nostalgia is not quite happy. It is laced with melancholy, because it is born in the sense of loss, of disorientation in one’s own surroundings. Sadness always runs through its delight. Yet what delight! Surely the present in its various degrees of oppressiveness owes us such a passing recompense, a spate of rest. We can be hard-boiled and up-to-the-minute later. We must never become the sum of our carapaces. When Adam was discovering the first sweat on his brow and Eve was enduring her first labor pains, who could begrudge them a recollection of Eden? 

    One afternoon, when my son was two years old, I asked him how his day was going, and he replied: “I don’t remember yet.” I have pondered that remark for decades. Too soon for a past! Experience without memory! I was jealous.

    The police captain: “Those were the good old days!” Nick Charles, serving drinks: “Don’t kid yourself. These are the good old days!” In 1934.

    Language confers upon us the illusion that the modes of time are distinct from one another, conceptually and even existentially separable phases, when in fact the past, the present, and the future are always spilling into each other like sauces on a plate. How porous can a border be and still be a border? Duration is, among other things, a condition of initial chaos. How we live, individually and collectively, depends on how we make order out of the ticking disorder. 

    A vision of the future cannot be inspired by the future, because the future is still a nullity and without substance. Of course we never experience it as such: since it arrives as early as tomorrow, it will look a lot like today. But not always; and there will come days in which the differences will exceed the similarities — days of genuine departure, of the emergence of something new out of the old. Where else could it emerge from? We tiresomely refer to these hours of mutability as “inflection points.” Kinetically we adore them. Only inflect! But they are certainly not as common as we think, as we hectically inflect the recently inflected on our way to the next inflection; and sometimes we are forced, for stability’s sake, to devise mental techniques to retard the rapids and mitigate the shock of  the discontinuity, to preserve connections across the crucibles, to incorporate the breakthroughs into prior schemes and systems even when they will not fit. (Many years ago I had a Syrian Marxist friend who used to amuse me when we argued, because every time I presented him with a logical contradiction or an empirical refutation of his views he would blithely respond: “Well, I just have to work that into the analysis.”) But there are moments when we must concede, or lament, or rejoice, that things really are no longer what they were. The people who make these announcements regularly are called visionaries. The problem is that the visionary mode — like the prophetic mode — is notoriously facile. In contemporary America, who is not a visionary? Here all it takes to qualify as a visionary is a t-shirt and the latest iteration of a jargon. (Unless you are a visionary, you won’t get the financing.) We are drowning in the clichés of our dime-a-dozen visionaries. An entire population suffers from vision migraines.

    Tocqueville’s most profound contribution to historical understanding may have been not his dazzling intuitions about America but his careful descriptions of how much of prerevolutionary France persisted into post-revolutionary France. In the age of revolution the incompleteness of revolution was a revolutionary idea. He wrote the greatest book ever written against the tabula rasa.

    Our fashion in visionaries accounts also for the inundation of our culture by science fiction, which is the literary form that futurism takes. From Jules Verne on, radical depictions of the future have occasionally inspired a more helpful and sophisticated grasp of what may be possible: innovation is always the product of an expanded imagination. The problem with these prophecies is that too often they loosen not only the imagination but also the mind. The imagination involved in those visions is chiefly technological: the master plot of science fiction is the behavior of familiar human beings in unfamiliar technological circumstances. It is only lately that the imbecilic geniuses of Silicon Valley have had the effrontery to also promote the technologization of the human being – that “post-humanity” has become an ideal. Replicants are too human for these futurists. (Phillip K. Dick, the most accomplished futurist imagination of our time, never surrendered his humaneness and what he liked to call “the authentic human being.”) The insolence of the Kurzweils and the Andreesens and the rest of the Prometheans with offshore accounts knows no bounds. Billions and billions in the cause of de-humanization! I have been reading the unintentionally risible theological speculations of Peter Thiel — on the legend of “a zombie Nero resurrected in a parody of Christ,” for example, and its source in the Book of Revelations: “Saint John identified 666 as the number of the beast, and Nero’s Hebrew name, Neron Kaisar, has a gematric value of 666.” And so on, in this pseudo-esoteric vein. Thiel’s deep original thinking is a parody of hermetic tripe, a witless exchange of engineering arcana for chiliastic arcana, according to which what most direly imperils us now is the Antichrist. In this way thinking outside the box culminates in the least original and most poisonius thinking of all. “One question ripe for literary treatment,” Thiel reflects, “is how the Antichrist will take over the world.” His literary standard is low, since he treats comic books as metaphysical sources. (In one of these scriptures Christlike Luffy defeats Kaidou and Big Mom. Praise the Lord!) It will come as no surprise that the quasi figura Antichristi of our day is for Thiel the critic of artificial intelligence – or more generally, “in the twenty-first century the Antichrist is a Luddite who wants to stop all science,” as if the technical (and economic) connivings of Thiel and Altman and the others are coterminous with science itself. (Needless to say, Carl Schmitt has a cameo.) We are paying heavily for one undergraduate’s infatuation with René Girard’s vaporizings about the redemptive power of violent unreason. 

    It is no wonder, amid this outburst of science fiction and its antihumanist sensibility, that another genre of film and fiction is also thriving. The genry of the moment is horror. In our culture now it is everywhere. It responds to one variety of antihumanism with another variety of antihumanism, the genre of horror is consecrated to giving the darkness the last word. It, too, is visionary, except that its vision of the future is of a time in which uncontrollable sadistic forces have not been eradicated because they are ineradicable. What did the Saw and Hostel and Chainsaw franchises advertise if not the eternal recurrence of human depravity? Which, as a fact of history, is of course indubitable. But there is no courage in horror, no fearless confrontation with what must be faced, no high-minded reckoning with the worst that we need to know about ourselves. It is merely a commercial formula that exploits the fragility of our dignity, and the emotional infirmity of those who find pleasure in fear. Horror is to Thanatos what porn is to Eros. There is nothing especially tough-minded about the presentation of torture as entertainment. It is only a program for learning not to feel. Everybody was so frantically searching for the feminist lessons in that repulsive Demi Moore movie about a woman’s viscera that they neglected to note its virulent hatred of the human, its nihilism disguised as a bracing interpretation of body dysmorphia. (5,500 gallons of phony blood!) And the Gothic blockbusters of the nineteenth century — which like Dracula will never die, but continue to seduce filmmakers who prefer the demagoguery of special effects, Guillermo del Toro most recently — these allegedly transgressive classics teach the perdurability of the past at its most despairing: that there is nothing anachronistic about all those medieval castles and capes because the descent into the irrational and the insane is a perennial norm. Neither reason nor religion will keep the demons down. Transylvania forever! Pessimism with popcorn. We are at the same time so advanced and so atavistic. I guess atavism is the flip side of advancement. Or is it the other way around? For every gleaming gadget, a lopped-off limb. For every app, a fang. 

    There was a time — all of human history until approximately now — when the existence of the future could be taken for granted, all the histrionics of apocalypse notwithstanding. But now we must pause over the houses slipping into the sea and the fires in the rain forests and the ice caps as they vanish to reflect that this platitude — this quotidian assurance about the lastingness of the world, upon which all human activity was premised  — may have been a momentous blunder. Futurity is no longer what it used to be. We must begin to picture what it will be like to live in the absence of any confidence about the year after this one and then the day after this one and then the moment after this one. What will it be like to carry on without the sense of an unbounded and unendangered future? Only the condemned have known that feeling. The sensation of ordinary mortality is certainly nothing like it. After all, the steadiness of the dying, or so I imagine, the equilibrium of the soul on the brink of the body’s extinction, is premised on the conviction that the world will not die with them. What will it be like to die without the certainty that the world will live on? What will it be like to be the last one to die? Bill Gates now declares that we need not worry about the end of the line “for the foreseeable future,” but what exactly is the foreseeable future? I am not yet prepared to exhale and open a bottle. Futurism (and its cult of the machine) may turn out to have been the indulgence of a shallow and greedy species that could not be bothered to look after the vast portion of nature that was not itself.

    “The end of the line”: I suppose that the phrase comes from the railroads. Anybody who has ever been to the end of a line, to the final buffer where the tracks ignominiously stop, will agree that it is a peculiarly melancholy place. Whereas the sight of tracks running into infinity is peculiarly heartening. 

    There is something funny about the fashion in infinity pools. Another game that the rich play with limits. 

    Why should boundlessness be heartening? Why should we aspire to what we cannot be? (Americans evade the difficulty of such questions by hiding behind “the aspirational.”) To want to be what one can never be is damaging and dangerous, to oneself and to others. Surely it is the work of a lifetime to become no more than what one can be. In that enterprise we are in no danger of early or easy success. If you think hard about infinity, you will recognize that it is terrifying — but perhaps not for its silence, as Pascal remarked. The silence may be the best part of it.

    The name that finite creatures have often given to what they are not is God. Some religious philosophers have been so militant about the conception of God as everything that we are not, as the strict and perfect antithesis of what we are, that they unwittingly lend support to the modern criticism that theology is no more than an exercise in human projection, except in the form of a negation. (This negation also explains how the idea of infinity can occur to a finite mind, which centuries ago was regarded as a miracle that proved the existence of the deity.) I do not see how a God worthy of the name, or the Name, can have anything in common with human attributes, or how infinity can also be finite, which is why the Christian idea of the Incarnation is philosophically offensive to me; but it is not hard to understand why finite creatures would need to find something of themselves in infinity – a link, a sign, a wink, a loophole — a back door to pagan satisfaction, the body of Christ. 

    Unless you already believe that Jesus was the Son of God, the effect of a beautiful representation of Christ — say, Zurbaran’s huge corpus floating in a field of the purest black, in Chicago — is to encourage not heavenly religion but earthly desire. Listen to Buxtehude’s lachrymose seven-cantata cycle, Membra Jesu Nostri patientis sanctissima, or The Most Holy Limbs of Our Suffering Jesus, each cantata a penitential celebration of a different part of his body, and you will hear the sound of monotheism gently vanishing.

    The most daunting challenge of all is to believe in a God who provides little or no satisfaction.

    In the very few instances in my life when I seemed to have been lifted to some sort of brush with infinity — by the third movement of Beethoven’s fifteenth string quartet, for example, the “Lydian” movement, on a rainy night in a small room in an old stone manor at Oxford, a rickety gramophone on the trunk next to my monk’s bed — it was a relief to come away from the uncanniness without an obligation of worship. It was real, but it was only an experience. Is there a less reliable authority for cosmic conclusions? Epiphany, delirium, ecstasy, apotheosis: I wish I were visited by more of these heightened moments, but not because they are intellectually trustworthy. There are many reasons to want to vibrate, but a climactic illumination, the vouchsafing of an irreversible clarity, is not one of them. I am, alas, spiritually overprotective, with a phobic attitude toward illusion, which can interfere with pleasures of the imagination, and with experiences of abandon, and this almost neurotic skepticism has condemned me to a relatively unadventurous mundanity; but still I would rather be starved than swindled. 

    A brush with the unlimited, maybe; but contact, never. Or not yet. No, never. 

    The doors of perception? Don’t let them hit you on your way out. 

    The plot thickens with the introduction of the infinitesimal — a thing not infinitely large but infinitely small. The origins of the concept are to be found in mathematics, where I am never to be found. My understanding is that it refers to a numerical value that is as close to zero as it can be without being zero. Or it could refer to a minute point somewhere far down an infinite line. Yet the dissociation of infinity from size permits a marvelous thought — that there is no end to littleness, or: the grandeur of humility. It is big to be small. (The self-abnegation of a point: an ethical allegory from poorly understood mathematics.) 

    “There will be no other end of the world, / There will be no other end of the world.” Czeslaw Miłosz wrote those lines in one of his scorching poems about the Warsaw Ghetto, which he composed from the other side of the ghetto walls. Just think: a second end of the world! It sounds unbearable. But really it may be the most comforting thought of all. To live after the end — which, unless the entire planet burns up, somebody always will — is to benevolently recontextualize the idea of an ending, to fight back successfully against the most frightening aspect of extinction, which is its finality. Panic owes its power to its literalness, but a with panic disarms that literalness. The future may be good or bad, but so far it has never not arrived.

    We go through our lives attempting to create permanent things — commitments and institutions — but the permanence to which we aspire for our creations is premised on the open-endedness of life, on the banality of time. What if time is no longer banal? My parents, and all the other survivors of the modern world’s protracted kingdoms of killing, lived for years without being able to rely on the open-endedness of life, while around them so much of the world stayed open-ended — which, for them, between 1939 and 1945, was one of its worst cruelties. 

    The end of the world is more coherent than the end of a people. It is at least a shared human fate.

    In 1948, a time when Jewish history was simultaneously flush with sorrow and joy in an impossible disequilibration of feeling, the Jewish thinker and scholar Simon Rawidowicz wrote a mordant and gentle essay called “Israel: The Ever-Dying People.” It was a critique of Jewish morbidity, in which he observed this about the chronic Jewish “fear of the end”: “A nation dying for thousands of years means a living nation. Our incessant dying means uninterrupted living, rising, standing up, beginning anew.” And also this great release from the prison of grief: “But if we are the last – let us be the last as our fathers and forefathers were the last, let us prepare the ground for the last Jews who will come after us, and for the last Jews who will rise after them.” That prayer belongs in the prayerbook. 

    But what about calamities that are in some way without precedent, and cannot be tucked into prior patterns, into a salving familiarity which can lessen the temptation to hopelessness? I am thinking of the political nausea that occurs with the first appearance of post-liberalism in liberal societies. It is the sickening moment that we are living presently. The Trump era in America and the Netanyahu era in Israel are groundbreaking calamities in the histories of these countries, first iterations of national nightmares, and while they do not come out of nowhere they are an incontrovertibly new chapter, and so the customary consolation of historical irony will avail us nothing. About these developments there is as yet no way to knowing or weary. The first time is a heartbreak all its community.

    Never, ever write the story of your own as a narrative of angels. Otherwise the discovery that you are not perfect strangers to evil will shipwreck you.

    Is every heartbreak like the first one? 

    We are mongrels of temporality: all the tenses exist in us at every moment, and our task is to attend to the proportions in the mix. Is the past colonizing the present? Is the future? Guard the frontiers! But we are never unmixed. 

    This is the case also about previous epochs. In his defense of “the painting of modern life,” and more generally of the legitimacy of modernity, Baudelaire wrote that “by ‘modernity’ I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent” — He was concerned that the speed of the new urban life, its pandemonium of people and incident, its noisy vulgarities, would disqualify it from the classical ambitions of art. And so he sagely pointed out that “every old master has had his own modernity,” because everybody has lived in their time, which was the latest time, and no time is incapable of transmutations into beauty. The poet – who was writing here as an art critic — was not privileging modernity; he was insisting that it be treated with the same philosophical and cultural privilege that other eras enjoyed — that the transience of a streetcar is no less real and interesting than the transience of a blossom, and no less inviting to art. Baudelaire’s whole sentence reads: “By ‘modernity’ I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable.” Never unmixed.

    So, the temporal and the eternal share in all things, or all things share in them – a partnership of opposites. But the alliance is not always legible. It is easier for me to find the eternal in Brueghel’s pictures of tiny people shitting on the ice than to find the temporal in Poussin’s ideality composed pastorals. (In his The Rape of the Sabines, a true masterpiece of pictorial design, the sub specie aeternitatis mood has, for me, always offended against the terror that is portrayed. What on earth is an orderly breakdown of order?)  

    And for those who do not believe in the eternal or the absolute? Even for them, reality is not just a landfill of data. As long as there is form, we are not forever shut up inside our empirical preoccupations and conditions. Form has the power to alter our experience of a thing, of any thing, and to broach a beyond. How distant a beyond? Not necessarily as far as the heavens: no metaphysics are necessary for a faith in form, though a measure of abstraction is. The godless are not excluded from this realm of numinousness. And form is utterly neutral, devoid of prejudices or prerequisites: it will put up with, or shape, or disfigure, or transfigure, any material.

    There is nothing more difficult than to live significantly in the present. Most people accomplish this by, well, cheating: they borrow from the past and from the future, from memory and from hope, until the present is overrun by the other modes and comes to consist chiefly in commemorations and in dreams, in hindsight and in anticipation. To be sure, the influences of the past and the future upon the present are impossible to annul; as I say, in the matter of temporality we are forever mixed. But can we control their intrusions? Can we calibrate our own temporality? This gave birth to the riveting notion of a pure present, an Eternal Present — to the view that the present is spiritually primary because it is the only mode of time in which we may experience the transcendence that we seek. In one sense, of course, this observation is trivial. When else is transcendence supposed to take place? In this sense, the ideal of living solely in the present, though it may be a fiction, is a magnificent attempt to protect transcendence from the relentless interferences of time — to insulate the soul’s shot at fulfillment from the distractions of memory and desire. One prooftext out of many: in the second part of Faust, Goethe has his hero declare that “the spirit looks neither ahead nor behind. Only the present is our happiness.”  

    Whether or not it is easy to seize the day, it is not easy to seize the instant. Modern philosophers — Husserl, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Bergson, Bachelard, and others — have gone to pains to isolate the instant from the flux and attempt a characterization of it. The project proved to be rather Sisyphean. In 1932, Bachelard, inspired by an amateur play by a university colleague who was a historian and a winemaker, suggested that, as opposed to Bergson’s search for time itself, “the only way we ourselves can feel time is by multiplying conscious instants.” An instant is “the compressed center around which we would posit an evanescent duration.” But is evanescent duration the answer or the question? Four years earlier Heidegger edited and published the lectures that his teacher Husserl delivered in the 1910s on “the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness.” This may be the most impossible book I have ever read. A sentence randomly chosen from the discussion of “longitudinal intentionality”: “If we now let the flux flow away, we then have the flux-continuum as running-off, which allows the continuity to be retentionally modified, and thereby every new continuity of phases momentarily existing all at once is retention with reference to the total continuity of what is all-at-once in the preceding phase.” I do not adduce such a passage to make fun of it. In his admirable search for a close account of the lived experience of the fleeting moment, the philosopher was heroically undeterred by the difficulty of trying to capture in language what probably cannot be captured in language, even in the compound-coinages of a style of philosophy unfazed by turgidity. Husserl was braver than Heraclitus, who believed that he could make do with the metaphor of the river. Yet the more one considers these attempts to clarify the smallest and most immediate units of lived time, the more plausibly one may conclude that a life lived completely in the present would be incoherent without the shadows and the foreshadows of the past and the future. The coherence of a temporal life may require a mess of temporal intrusions. What, after all, can we do with an instant? 

    There are perfunctory versions of the ideal of pure instantaneity. Animals live completely in the present. So do voluptuaries (Casanova’s memoirs are eight volumes of pure presents), and so do the beaded forever-young Baba Ram Dassians on the coasts and in the mountains. Yet they experience nothing like an eternal present: they live merely in a series, moment to moment, climax upon climax, high after high, sensation followed by sensation, over and over, robotically, by rote, in a frantic and unconnected collection of what Americans call “peak experiences.” But peaks are nothing without valleys. There are peak people and valley people. An existence of endless stimulation — the peak people — requires a deformation of time based on its complete atomization: be here now, and then now, and then now, and then now. Never mind that there may be more attractive than here. But the passage from here to there takes time — dumb extended duration of an unatomized and unmagical kind, provisional and continuous. Be there and then there and then there and then there, until the achievement of arrival will be yours. A series of theres is often deeper and more sustaining than a series of heres. The fantasy of a pure present expresses a kind of temporal provincialism; it is the connections between the instants out of which a life is made. (For the animals with whom I have gratefully lived, by contrast, I detected no distinction between ordinary experience and peak experience, except for sleep. Lucky pugs!) 

    Another name for a pure present: immanent exile. What else could follow it?

    Nothing valuable can be accomplished without repetition, but repetition deadens more than it quickens. The only solution I know for this problem is the musical form of theme and variations.
    The colonization of the present by the past — there is so much past! — is a more common phenomenon than its colonization by the future, but there is an increasingly troublesome instance of the latter: messianism, or more precisely, political messianism. No matter how traditional they seem, messianists are people who derive the meaning of their lives not from the past but from the future — or rather from a particular construction of the future in which it will reproduce a particular construction of the past. Restorations are conspiracies between the future and the past. In their own minds the restorationists are already living in the future because they have already been living in the past, usually an ancient past that ended badly, and this hallucination of time travel accounts for their obnoxious tone of spiritual superiority. (All redeemers are obnoxious. They come with love but without respect.) They have come from their future to drag the rest of us into it. They are high on historical rupture. They mourn destruction and are ready to destroy. Guns sometimes follow. 

    Another reason for preferring the present, a completely worldly reason, was given by Pierre Hadot. “Ordinarily our life is always incomplete, because we project all our hopes, all our aspirations, all our attention, into the future, telling ourselves that we will be happy when we have attained this or that goal. We are scared as long as the goal is not attained, but if we attain it, already it no longer interests us and we continue to run after something else. We do not live, we hope to live, we are waiting to live.” Hadot, as is well known, argued that the Stoics and the Epicureans had devised the solution to this conundrum: “to live not in the future but as though there were no future, as though we only had this day, only this moment, to live.” This is a little precious. We must add, compassionately, that hoping to live, and living in hope, is not the worst fate that can be imagined. Having lived but living no more, or having no grounds for hoping to live, is much worse. As for waiting, it is an art, a lost art; it is not a grudging way of meeting an inconvenient or frustrating delay, but a mature way of grappling with the stubbornness of time and the work requirements of truth and goodness and beauty.

    To recommend impatience is to play with fire.

    Hadot goes beyond his customary proselytization for Stoicism and its illusion of personal immunity. He suggests that an intensity of focus upon the present confers a different advantage. “To live in the present moment is to live as though one were seeing the world both for the last and for the first time. To work at seeing the world as though one were seeing it for the first time is to get rid of the conventional and routine vision we have of things, to discover a brute, naïve version of reality, to take note of the splendor of the world, which habitually escapes us.” How splendid this is. Since we are so accustomed to confusion in the present, it is encouraging to be reminded of its power to clarify. The purpose of Hadot’s putative ban on the past and the future is to prevent them from blurring a precise apprehension of what actually now exists. For lucidity’s sake they sometimes need to get out of the way. 

    To see clearly: a stupendously immodest goal. It is the secular mysticism, the sharpening of perception as a spiritual elevation, that one finds in many modern poets and painters — the thrilling notion that seeing clearly is not only a practical matter but also, when the focus rises above our everyday eyes, and we succeed in a degree of detachment from our commonplace cognitive practices, an attainment of transcendence, even if it remains terrestrial. Seeing clearly is a life’s work. I am reminded of the passage in Rilke’s Ninth Elegy when he suspends his swooning and wonders whether the most that we can do in the way of an accurate grasp of reality is to delineate it properly, to say “house, bridge, fountain, gate, jug, fruit tree, window” — “such saying as the things themselves never hoped so intensely to be.” Nouns and nothing more, but each of them with the force of a revelation. Behind this dream of comprehensive clarity, of complete optical definition, was the poet’s revelatory encounter with Cezanne’s apples, which, like Zurbaran’s lemons and Chardin’s cherries and Morandi’s bottles, challenge ordinary perception with their distinctness and their vividness and their concreteness — with their overwhelming but immanent presence. 

    Will someone who seeks a better view of heaven be satisfied with a better view of earth? Can apples do the work of angels?

    The plot thickens. A jug figures prominently — two jugs, actually — in another twentieth-century attempt to seize the instant. This one occurred not in philosophy but in psychology, and this endeavor arrived at the opposite conclusion: that clarity about an object is to be found not in the delineation of its boundaries but in the blurring of its boundaries. Marion Milner was a British psychoanalyst and a strangely riveting writer about lived experience, born in 1897, a colleague of D. W. Winnicott and a friend of Adrian Stokes, who in 1950 published an exciting book called On Not Being Able to Paint. The story begins, as it often does for the analytical Milner, with a subtle observation of a small incident:

    I woke one morning and saw two jugs on the table; without any mental struggle I saw the edges in relation to each other and how gaily they seemed almost to ripple now that they were freed from this grimly practical business of enclosing an object and keeping it in its place. This was surely what painters meant about the play of edges: certainly they did play, and I tried a five-minute sketch of the jugs.

    Her sketch is reproduced in her book: two jugs overlapping, two solid objects with open borders. This imprecision gladdened Milner, and provoked her to a war against outline, against “the need to make objects keep themselves to themselves within a rigid boundary,” against “the fear of losing all sense of separating boundaries.” Her actual experience of the jugs was tentative and unclear and transitory, very much akin to the “transitional objects” that Winnicott interposed between the “inner reality” and the “outer reality” that the baby and then the child had to negotiate. Milner, in the realm of the visual arts, argued what Winnicott did in the realm of child psychology: against hypostatization, against too much fixity. When Rilke said jug, in other words, he had it backwards. He was distorting the object by means of excessive definition. In his search for a lasting crystalline reality, he made the object overly distinct. In this way he sought to idealize it, to make poetry out of it, but by idealizing it, by seeking to complete what revealed itself best in its incompleteness, he withdrew it from the world of natural perception. There is no instant, no present, in which you see the jug, unless you have the stamina for mysticism. Winnicott wrote wisely about “the strain inherent in objective perception,” which is to say that objectivity involves both a gain and a loss, because it represents an elaborate treatment of perceptual experience; it may grant truth but not immediacy. It might even be a stranger to experience.

    I look again at Cezanne’s apples, first with Rilke’s eyes and then with Milner’s eyes. It’s a wash. Sometimes they have edges but not outlines, sometimes they have outlines in place of edges, and sometimes the shadows make the inquiry moot. How much of a shape must one see to know it? Not the entirety of it, to judge by the evidence of some of Cezanne’s incomplete still-lifes. Sometimes it is more powerful to suggest a shape than to document it. (One of the most precious aspects of Milner’s writing is her loss of interest in wholeness.)

    Freedom may lie in the difference between an edge and a border, though both can be emboldening.

    As they were together contemplating one of Cezanne’s depictions of Mont Sainte-Victoire, Rilke remarked to Count Harry Kessler: “Not since Moses has anyone seen a mountain so greatly.” Was he thinking of Sinai or Nebo? Not every peak is the same. 

    Presence occurs only in the present. This is not as pretentious as it sounds. A presence that has departed and a presence that has not arrived are poor nourishments, though we snack on them constantly.

    Why would mortal creatures expend themselves with a longing for the end? It will come, it will come.

    A short drive from Alamogordo, the cursed town in New Mexico where the first nuclear weapon was created, is one of the strangest and most spiritually addling places in the world. It is White Sands National Park, almost three hundred square miles of blindingly white gypsum sand. Truly one feels translated to another reality. With the rare exception of the skeleton of a dead tree — nothing can grow in that glistening ground — the white desert stretches featurelessly and without interruption in all directions as far as the eye can see. I never comprehended the obliterative power of white until I walked those dunes. The infinite was there, and so was the infinitesimal. I was surrounded by sublimity and I was lost.

    Lviv: A Canary’s Diary

    February 20, Sunday

    Yesterday, at home in Kyiv, we listened to Boris Johnson’s speech and immediately bought tickets to Lviv. My husband Roman suggested a week ago that S, our three-and-a-half-year-old daughter, and I stay with my parents in Lviv, but I refused, despite the American and British embassies having already relocated there (and my mother begging us to come). A few days ago, the older daughter of my husband, a first-year student, left to join her mother who lives abroad.

    Now it’s time for us.

    As I’m packing, S is running around, exclaiming “Let’s go to Lviv, to Lviv!” An unusual enthusiasm, which I wouldn’t notice if she didn’t also say: “I don’t want him to kill us all!” “Who?” I ask. “Who’s gonna kill us?” She doesn’t answer, just keeps selecting which things I should pack. I’m astonished: she couldn’t have heard anything like that from me or Roman, as we didn’t discuss the situation in such a dramatic manner. Her kindergarten, maybe? They were preparing children to go to a shelter, and she might have overheard the older kids. During the last month schools and kindergartens in Kyiv and Lviv (I’m not sure about the other cities) taught children what to do in case of an air raid. We were all urged to prepare survival bags, or, if literally translated from Ukrainian, “an anxious backpack.” There were dozens of how-to articles everywhere. Yet we didn’t pack ours until now.

    I keep telling myself that we will come back in a week, covered with shame. Another voice in my head tells me that we may never come back if the city is occupied or destroyed. We send a couple of boxes with clothes by post to pick up in Lviv later. We take all the documents, many toys, and almost all of S’s clothes with us. What I learn instantly is that you look differently at your belongings when your home may be destroyed or vandalized. I take my diary, which I gave up after I started to write a book last year. I take my daughter’s vyshyvanka (a Ukrainian folk embroidered shirt) for the same reason: I just hate to think anyone may touch it. I take three books: two old Polish books I recently purchased at the Internet flea market, and the first edition of Yuri Andrukhovych’s novel Perversion. Not only is it my favorite book, I bought it at a very special moment of my life in 1997, so I guess it’s my most precious possession, when it comes to material objects.

    One of my duties as a fellow at a Central European think tank — the fellowship is named for Marcin Krol, the Polish philosopher and democratic activist — has been to contribute to a weekly overview of security in the region. And so I’ve been explaining my anxiety by the fact that I have to read all the news. It’s hard to draw a line between my intuition and my information overload. I notice my relief as soon as our train reaches the Ternopil region, officially western Ukraine, the area that is not of Russian interest according to the published maps of future invasion.

    A canary in a coalmine:
    No, the Russian invasion was not a surprise.

    Ukrainians tend to say that we’ve been at this war for eight years, since 2014. That is true: even those not directly affected by the aggressions of the past eight years know someone who was. Almost every morning the war was mentioned in the news: someone was killed or wounded; even in the “quiet” period it was not really quiet. My husband later told me that his heart sank as he was closing our door, thinking of his friends who, in exactly the same way, closed the doors of their apartments in Donetsk eight years ago.

    At the same time I never felt so much at home in my country as after Maidan. The paradox is that while parts of the country — Crimea and areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions — were occupied by Russians in 2014, the rest of the country was, as I experienced it, de-occupied; emancipated. I started my own small business, a publishing house, in 2015, since finally I knew that I wouldn’t be persecuted by the tax administration, and that my business would not be raided, as happened before to many people I knew, especially when Kuchma and Yanukovych were our presidents. Of course, many others had businesses in the pre-Maidan years, but I was not as brave as them. In 2014 I applied to the State Security Service to use its archives because I realized that they are my public service now, no longer just the former KGB, politicized and filled with Russian agents.

    Then, in 2018, it changed for me, when my daughter was born. I became terrified by the images of all possible dangers and risks. I couldn’t see a movie or read a book (except for some non-fiction) if they included a situation with a child in danger. Even fairy tales horrified me: how can any sane person let a child go into the woods alone?

    Of course, I told myself, there were rational explanations for my outbreak of fear. First, the oxytocin storm, which is normal when you have a newborn on your hands. Second, all survival mechanisms are on. And finally, the family traumas in anamnesis: both of my maternal grandparents were orphans. My grandmother lost her mother when she was seven, growing up mostly with relatives who weren’t particularly kind to her. Her painful memories were among the first stories I heard. And so I felt like I was five again, brimming with the fear of becoming an orphan. My grandfather, too, grew up in an orphanage, after his parents were killed by the Bolsheviks as “class enemies.”

    It didn’t get better with time. I read so many books about the atrocities of the twentieth century. I wrote and edited articles about them, and here I was, helpless to say “no” to my daughter asking for a cookie because how can you not give food to a child? Five years earlier I put some effort into the Ukrainian edition of Bringing Up Bébé by Pamela Druckerman, an American journalist who moved to Paris and tried to raise her children in the French way, that is, giving them only healthy food and teaching them to eat gracefully. A big enthusiast of the book, I was sure that one day my own child would eat steamed broccoli, too. Now I realized that one needs to have had one’s grandmother live through World War Two in occupied Paris, not in occupied Kyiv as my grandma did (though she was a survivor of the famine in 1933), to have a gut tough enough to issue a firm “no” when a child asks for an unhealthy snack. Pamela Druckerman is Jewish, and so I speculate that this partly explains her struggle. Now, as I was preparing chicken meatballs for my not-that-French baby, I suddenly realized that I have myself become the proverbial Jewish mother from the jokes we used to tell. Except that they are not so funny anymore.

    I have been living with these fears for more than three years. During the last month before the invasion, I was totally freaked out for seemingly no reason. And so with the first bombings I felt a kind of relief, and I began to calm down. As in a horror movie, the part after the monster is visible is not as scary as the suspense at the beginning.

    Something like this had happened before. I knew that something was coming before the Maidan revolution. I wasn’t afraid, I just avoided making big plans. During the three months of Maidan I was extremely lucky: I didn’t suffer a bruise, though I was in the thick of things. Like a canary in a coalmine, I feel the danger before the explosion.

    February 22, Tuesday

    As expected, Putin signed the decrees of “independence” of the occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Shchastia (a town on our side of the frontline) was shelled. It has begun.

    February 23, Wednesday

    It seems that everyone I overhear while taking my walks with S comes from elsewhere. On a playground on the neighboring street, I met a woman from Vyshhorod, near Kyiv. She rents an apartment in a building of the same type as ours — they call it “Polish luxe,” meaning very nice and comfortable interwar Constructivist buildings, with thick walls, relatively wide stairs, sometimes marble panels in the hall, and solid, deep cellars. She asked me where the local bomb shelter is. I told her to use the basement, they are good for this purpose in our neighborhoods. And I realized that basements in these buildings are so well equipped as shelters because the people of that era expected a war. That never occurred to me when I was growing up here.

    Later I noticed a sign that said “Shelter” in our own hall.

    February 24, Thursday

    I wake up as my mom was talking on the phone with my in-laws. Kyiv and its surroundings were attacked from the air. The Russians invaded. Roman’s parents are coming to be with us. Or rather they are trying to come. All roads from Kyiv are jammed with cars, and the lines for fuel are huge.

    Later I go to a pharmacy and do some grocery shopping. There are no signs of panic on Lviv’s streets, except perhaps the long lines at the ATMs and at every pharmacy. It’s unusually quiet for this area: we live seven minutes from a big crossroads and a farmer’s market. I notice that there are fewer cars. Some shelves in the grocery store (bread, flour, sugar, and so on) are already empty. That’s understandable, I say to myself: we live in an old residential area, there are a lot of elderly people here, and they are not used to Internet shopping. And they remember the Soviet shortages of, well, everything.

    I also went downtown. Most of the shops are closed. That makes sense: who needs boutique clothes today? I noticed some people in military uniform with rifles.

    I spent most of the day writing emails and texting. Friends from all over are worried.

    A tale of two cities:

    I moved to Kyiv from Lviv in 2011. Before that I spent thirty-three years here. Most of my friends left Lviv earlier, some of them when I was still a student. They graduated hastily from university and moved on. I’m not sure how much I belong here. Still, all this time I’ve been registered in Lviv and my income taxes go to the Lviv city budget. I once had an apartment here (I sold it in 2019). My mother was born here.

    But my grandmother came from Kyiv in 1947, the period called “the second Soviets” (the first Soviet came in 1939, after Stalin and Hitler invaded Poland). She left starved and ruined Kyiv, where she didn’t have any means to live with her sister, who moved earlier. In other words, she came to save herself and her daughter (my aunt). The population of Lviv changed almost completely after World War II. Many Poles, who had been the majority, were killed or forcibly deported to Russian camps, and so were Ukrainians. Almost all the city’s Jews — they knew it as Lemberg — were killed by Nazis during the Holocaust. After Yalta, Lviv became a part of the Soviet Union, and few Poles stayed in the city. Russians, Ukrainians, and Jews came from the USSR. They somewhat derisively called those Ukrainians and Poles who had stayed “the locals.” Their children, and often their grandchildren, did the same. My grandmother used the word in that way. My mother pronounced it mostly with respect, as she considered “the locals” to be kinder than the people she knew at home; but pronounced in a different tone the word was a pejorative. “The locals” in turn called the newcomers “liberators” — vyzvolyteli in Ukrainian, or osvoboditeli in Russian (the latter was used to add a little acidity to the sardonic usage).

    Were we “liberators”? Technically, we were. We spoke Russian while my grandparents were alive. We lived as the majority of Soviet people did, an extended family in one apartment. Both my mother and I went to Russian schools. We lived in the city center, that is, the quarter of the city built before 1939. My grandfather was a captain in the Red Army and an invalid of the Great War who came to Lviv in 1947.

    And yet we were not like typical Russians, not at all. My grandmother never had a job in Lviv, and she lived completely immersed in the world of relatives and family, never embedded in any Soviet social structure. My grandfather once held some power in his hands: he distributed “liberated” apartments (empty after their owners were either killed, or deported, or left for Poland or the West, the luckiest ones). As he had never known anything but an orphanage, a military training, and the Red Army, my grandfather believed that a person may be happy with only a bed and a nightstand, and so he stayed in a shared apartment (kommunalka) and refused to get a four-bedroom place for himself. It was only when he married Grandma that she made him apply for a modest one-room apartment. Nor did he avail himself of any of the opportunities for corruption, except for a bottle of vodka as a present after the paperwork was done. Soon he ended up on the bottom of the Soviet bureaucracy’s food chain, and most of his life he worked at a factory. Moreover, he was not Russian but Chuvash, the Turkic ethnicity in the region of the Volga River. The most interesting thing about the Chuvash is that their language is the closest to the dead language of the Khazars, a Turkic people who are said to have adopted Judaism in the Middle Ages. Anyway, my grandfather struggled with Russian grammar until his death. My father, born near Lviv, grew up in the Dnipropetrovsk region, and came to Lviv as a student. So maybe we were not real “liberators,” but neither were we “locals.”

    The real “liberators” were mostly part of the machinery of repression in a rebellious region, where the underground Ukrainian resistance operated until the late 1950s. (Strangely, I never heard of the banderivtsi, the anti-Soviet partisans, before I went to school at the age of seven, which means that in our family they were not considered a menace.) Unlike in other Ukrainian cities, Russophones here were not Ukrainians who had to switch to Russian, but ethnic Russians, since they were regarded by the authorities as more reliable politically, and dominated the army and the KGB. Even the Russian language was different in Lviv: it was proper Russian, without a Ukrainian accent. And the KGB staff was as large in Lviv as it was in Kyiv, the capital of the Soviet republic, a city almost three times larger. The closeness of the Western border (the territory of the enemies — yes, socialist Poland too) explained the extensive presence of the military. Thus the lines between the castes were more visible in Lviv (as in the other cities occupied by Soviets after the war) than in the east.

    My grandmother missed Kyiv, but she never came back. My history with Kyiv had one more twist: my father started to work in Kyiv, and my mother joined him soon after I became a student. We started to live in two cities: me in Lviv with my grandparents, and my parents in Kyiv. Mom hated it, and that was understandable. It was not a hospitable place back then. They came back to Lviv in late 1998. That was their first experience of living apart from my grandparents, and they switched to Ukrainian there, a rather non-conformist move for Kyiv in those years. I meanwhile switched to Ukrainian in university, so it was all very natural when they were back.

    I decided to move after I realized that I was spending more and more time in Kyiv and enjoying it a lot, that I had exhausted Lviv, that most of my friends were in Kyiv. I wasn’t bitter. I left determined to be happy, and I was, just as I had once been in Lviv. My 33 became a new 19. I had a happy farewell to Lviv and a happy arrival in Kyiv. I found a place in an old building in Podil, the nicest neighborhood in the city, just a few blocks from the riverbank. My windows faced the emerald rococo dome of the Andriivska church (and a red flag directly in front of me, as I lived next door to a Communist party headquarters). The Maidan was a short walk away, which was a strategic advantage during the revolution. I spent the next eight years in that apartment. My future husband moved in, and later we bought a new place, also in Podil, after our child was born.

    While I lived in Kyiv I didn’t like to come back to Lviv. I did so, just a few times a year, mostly for an annual book fair (I worked in publishing), and sometimes for Christmas or Easter, certainly far less often that most of my friends did. At some point I realized that the obstacle was physical: I felt suffocated in Lviv, as if I had only one lung. The thought that I might one day have to return to Lviv (if I lost my job, say) was my nightmare. Yet something changed last year, in March 2021. I came for longer, more than a week, to work with the Cultural Strategy Institute, a think tank for which I serve on the supervisory board. Though the institute is a relatively new municipal body, for its institutional memory and its people it is a sort of sequel to the Dzyga Art Association, where I worked twenty years earlier, and which provided the best professional experience of my life. Dzyga organized festivals, rock concerts, and exhibitions, a sort of production cmpany with an asymmetrical focus on being good in art rather in business. It also opened clubs and cafes, and its venues were safe spaces for artists, journalists, academics, and students like us.

    This time I came to Lviv with my daughter, who brought long and slow walks to my life: you can’t walk fast with a two-year old. For the first time in years, I had occasion to meditate on the blurred surfaces of the old Habsburg-era buildings, on all the backyards, on the hypnotic topography of the city. Another novelty: I began to think obsessively about people who had lived there before World War II. Not that I wasn’t aware of them all those years. I just didn’t have much empathy for them. In Kyiv I once started to write a book of essays partly about that. I even entertained the possibility I might come back to Lviv someday. I didn’t tell anyone.

    February 25, Friday

    I woke up in the middle of the night because of a strange noise — the airplanes, I guess. The distant sound is familiar, and not: it was as if I had heard the planes before, but in a dream, not in reality. Though I understood the planes were most likely Ukranian. I think that the afterlife may sound like that.

    Then we heard the air raid sirens. I held the sleeping S tight.

    Roman’s parents are still on their way: they drove all day but could only make it to Ternopil, and they stayed there for a night. They arrive, finally, in the afternoon, exhausted.

    Roman is busy renting and arranging everything necessary in the apartment for the refugees. His friend gave him a substantial sum of money for that purpose on her way to Poland. She threw a pack of cash over the heads of the crowd at the railway station. He reported that the people at the station were weeping and gnashing their teeth.

    February 26, Saturday

    I texted Andriy, my daughter’s godfather, to check on him. (He stayed in Kyiv.) I found him on his way to his hometown for conscription: the military mobilization is not digitized. His home is high in the Carpathian Mountains.

    Andriy is an old friend and a kum. Kum is a family you choose yourself. The official title “godparents” means that they should provide spiritual guidance for a child of their friends. I recently realized that our bloodlands made the title special also for another reason: godparents have the responsibility to care for a child if the parents should die. That signifies an enormous degree of trust, and the ties are so important that they gave a name for the Ukrainian practice of nepotism — kumivstvo.

    Andriy is seven years younger than me. I got to know him when he was a student at Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, and I had just started to write articles in English. I wrote a piece about the heroes of the Orange Revolution, and he was one of them. In 2004, as an observer at the second round of the presidential election in some distant village in the Odessa region, he hid himself under the wheels of the truck when local authorities tried to steal the box with the votes. When he confronted the local authorities, they tried to ignore him; he figured that they wouldn’t dare drive over his body and kill him, and it worked. He came to Maidan directly from there and spent the entirety of the revolution in the square. Graduating with a masters in theology, he moved to Kyiv to work in an organization providing assistance for people with HIV. Sometimes I stayed at his place when I was in Kyiv. For years Andriy has been providing me with guidance in several areas, above all in music (he is also an extraordinary DJ) and spirituality. He has a special talent for explaining the Bible in the style of a stand-up comedian, using the vocabulary of a street pusher. He looks like another hedonistic Kyiv hipster, and few know that he is a devoted Christian, living what he preaches.

    Most universities in Ukraine have military classes for male (and sometimes female) students, so they can get a rank with graduation. Ukrainian Catholic University does not have any. Andriy is a private now. I saw him at Maidan and in many other situations, I know how selfless he is, so now I’m desperately worried about him. When I asked him to be my kum, I made him promise that one day it will be he who introduces my daughter to her first joint. He must keep that promise.

    February 27, Sunday

    In Hostomel, Russian bombings destroyed AN-225, the famous gigantic airplane known as “Mriya.” It wouldn’t matter so much if “Mriya” had not had its special moment last August, during the thirtieth anniversary of Ukrainian independence, when my daughter became fascinated by it as it flew over our home during the rehearsal for the parade and then over the parade itself. Since that day, she has called every airplane “Mriya.” Not long afterwards Roman took her to the Aviation Museum, and it looked like she found her new passion. We haven’t told her that it is gone, of course.

    “Mriya” means “dream” or “aspiration.”

    February 28, Monday

    It is snowing, and the trees in the huge backyard that we share with the nearby buildings are all white. You can barely make them out through the wet snowy lace. In the morning someone plays the Ukrainian anthem on a trumpet, we can’t see exactly where, maybe on his balcony. We open our balcony door and applaud him as he finishes, as do some other neighbors whom we do not see.

    Lida, my old friend and colleague at the Cultural Strategy Institute, called. We worked together at Dzyga: she was there from the beginning, in charge of finances, and I came later and did press and promotion. Her mother died shortly before the invasion. Contrary to Ukrainian tradition, she didn’t wait and instead let refugees live in her mother’s apartment immediately, and gave away most of her belongings to those who need them now.

    Lida is just back from the cemetery, visiting the grave on the ninth day after her mother’s death, in accordance with Ukrainian tradition. She couldn’t buy candles there, as is the custom; the gravediggers were busy preparing Molotov cocktails for territorial defense.

    March 1, Tuesday

    The Russians hit the TV tower in Kyiv. Five people were killed, and some were injured who were just passing by. The shells damaged the broadcasting facilities nearby and also the territory of Babyn Yar, which is right there. The tower stands.

    March 2, Wednesday

    It seems like everyone I know is volunteering. I joined Lida to help pack necessities for the territorial defense and the refugees; she had volunteered there the day before. It turns out that the hub is managed by the daughter of a well-known Lviv architect and political activist, one of the members of the Lviv Student Fraternity in the late 1980s. Lida was also a member. In those days the “brothers” organized anti-Soviet student strikes, including the major hunger strike in Kyiv in 1990 that led to the resignation of the prime minister in the still-Soviet republic. (It was the first Maidan.) The head of the fraternity, the late Marek Ivashchyshyn, shortly thereafter founded the Dzyga Art Association. Both Marek and most of the other “brothers” never stopped being politically active, no matter what they did professionally.

    I can’t help noticing that today I see the same people I knew from my work at Dzyga. The network becomes visible with every political crisis: when Georgy Gongadze was killed and the Russians used the political crisis to assert control over our president Kuchma, and when Marek and Yaroslav Rushchyshyn, another former student leader, founded an opposition newspaper and were persecuted by the brother of Victor Medvedchuk, Putin’s kum, during the Orange revolution, and then during the Maidan revolution. (Medvedchuk was the director head of Putin’s presidential office in the early 2000s and is now under arrest for state treason. His younger brother Serhiy was the head of tax administration in Lviv, an institution that was weaponized for political repression.)

    And now their teenage children are packing the medicines, the clothes, and the food for the war with the same enemy. Will it end with their generation?

    March 3, Thursday

    We saw our trumpeter: he went out and played the anthem between the two neighboring yards.

    I came back home in the evening to have an online PEN discussion with the historian Marci Shore, who knows so much about Ukraine. I was covering for the wonderful Ukrainian philosopher Volodymyr Yermolenko, who was evacuating his family from Brovary, a town near Kyiv.

    Today we mostly sorted out thermal underwear and packed it for the people in Kharkiv. It is much easier to do manual labor than intellectual work. That was the same problem during Maidan. Being a rational thinker, I tried to create added value amid the turbulence, to do what I do best. Anyway, I’m never sure I do the right thing.

    March 4, Friday

    I stay home today: S is very nervous when I’m away, despite the two sets of grandparents. There is a lot of drama when I get back. She sleeps badly.

    In the city center the sculptures in the UNESCO heritage area are wrapped in special protective materials. Some of them, such as a crucified Christ from the medieval Armenian church and a seated Christ from one of the domes, are hidden in shelters. The famous Renaissance market square and the nearby quarter have already survived several wars, as has the rest of the city. Even after World War II the damage was minor, nothing comparable to Kyiv or Warsaw. Over the last two decades the city fulfilled the dream that was in the air in the early 2000s, which I felt when I would cross the deserted square in the evening on my way home from the gallery. Lviv became the new Krakow, full of tourists (before Covid), with a bar in every hole in the wall.

    It is full of other kinds of newcomers now. It is easy to spot them: they are usually waiting for someone. Do they think I’m one of them when we look at each other nervously? I, too, also wear warm comfortable winter clothes when a simple coat would be more appropriate. I, too, keep looking around as if I had never before noticed the strange mascarons on a nineteenth-century facade. But I’m not like these new arrivals: I came in peace to the city I know.

    March 6, Sunday

    In her sleep my child says, “Home!”

    She is needy for my attention, demanding that I “read” a tourist guide of Stockholm that I brought from there in 2005. I promise her that we would go to Stockholm when she is a little older. She asks questions about every picture, and we make plans: we will see the Royal Palace, we will meet the Queen and the King, we will run in a park. Nothing is more important these days than spending time with her.

    I’ve been to Stockholm once, and I fell in love forever. Ever since that visit I used to say that I will go there to die. Today I received an invitation to spend some time in Gothenburg, a fine opportunity for Ukrainian editors in need. Well, I’m not in need, at least for now; I’m quite comfortable. I have no right to take a place that others may desperately be seeking. And I don’t want to go anywhere without Roman. Besides, the prospect of going to Sweden is not as attractive these days. If I really need to go there — if, say, Lviv is occupied — it is very possible that I will never come back. The idea of dying in Sweden is still attractive, but I would prefer to do it on my own terms.

    March 7, Monday

    I’ve written a short piece called “Postwar” for Krytyka, the journal I used to work at, about how the West has been mesmerized by toxic Russian narratives for decades, about how disgusting are the attempts to justify Russia’s “great culture,” as if that is the most important thing right now. At first I thought that my piece was too harsh. Then I read the statement of German PEN, which was concerned mostly with the fate of Russian writers and made an equivalence between “poorly equipped Russian soldiers” and Ukrainians under attack, since both were “Putin’s victims.” No, my piece wasn’t too harsh.

    The infotainment of our days: a woman at Darnytsia, an old working-class area in Kyiv, knocked off a Russian scouting drone with a jar of preserved tomatoes. She was out on her balcony for a smoke, and this was what she thought to do when she saw a drone and panicked. Some may say it’s an urban myth, but I can easily imagine such a woman: she might be one of the women I met many times in the printing shop at Darnytsia, where I discussed the paper and the bindings with them. They could easily do what the woman in Darnytsia did.

    I notice the announcements on every pharmacy door I pass: “No iodides available.” The Russians have occupied Chernobyl and are holding personnel as hostages; there was a fire at the captured nuclear plant in Energodar, the biggest in Europe. The possible consequences may be far worse than the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986. No wonder people bought out everything that might protect them. After Chernobyl they gave us kids antistruminum, small sweet pills of potassium iodide. Like almost everything in Soviet schools, it was obligatory: from time to time a school nurse would deliver it to the classroom at the beginning of a lesson.

    Recently I remembered that we moved into the apartment in which we now live three days before the Chernobyl catastrophe, on April 23, 1986. I was in the first grade, and I don’t remember exactly when we learned about the explosion. I’m sure that my parents understood how serious it was from some of the “hostile voices,” that is, from Radio Liberty, the BBC, or the Voice of America. My father brought a Geiger counter. It stood on a windowsill for some time, but soon my parents were so annoyed by its sound that they just put it away in the basement. Lviv was lucky again in 1986, not affected by radiation, but Kyiv was heavily affected. I don’t really remember people coming from Kyiv and Prypyat those days, though I knew they were trying to escape. Only later I learned how difficult it was to leave Kyiv. People fainted in lines to get a train westward. Exactly like now. I don’t remember anyone using the word “refugees” back then, but we were aware that many people from Prypyat found their new home in Lviv.

    I was eight, and my own fears were a consequence mainly of books and movies: as with many Soviet “technical intelligentsia” — people involved in what is called R&D in the West — my parents liked science fiction and I was caught up with their interests. In the Soviet Union science fiction was a loophole in Soviet censorship, but probably a slightly different pool of authors than people in the West read. Ray Bradbury, Herbert Wells, Arthur Clarke (until some point), and Clifford Simak had been translated and published in the Soviet Union, but I doubt that I know a single name of the writers whom Americans of my generation preferred. Stanisław Lem, who grew up in Lviv, and had to leave for Poland after the Soviet occupation, was hugely popular. As we didn’t have real news in 1986, but only indoctrination programs, my idea of the catastrophe that we faced was embroidered out of the plots of man-made apocalypse in science fiction. Yet the idea of a nuclear apocalypse had one more source in my case: oddly, I loved the Soviet “international news” TV program, which was in fact propaganda speeches about how mad Ronald Reagan was and how the USSR was striving for peace. I was the only one in the family who watched it, terrified that Reagan might start nuclear war at any moment (as they said he might). In school corridors I saw older kids running in gas masks. Happily I was spared that experience, thanks to Gorbachev.

    Chernobyl marked a huge shift in Soviet consciousness, as Soviet people realized that they themselves may cause nuclear catastrophe, not the capitalist demons overseas. Many years later I read that it was also the beginning of the end for the USSR: people learned that there are things more dangerous and powerful than the KGB. My interest in science fiction faded with glasnost and perestroika: it turned out that reality itself had almost infinite resources for miracles. Westerners often underestimate the isolation in which Soviet people lived. (The situation was very different in “socialist” Central Europe.) Back then no aliens and distant planets could compete with the newly opened Western world. In fact, we were the aliens.

    March 8, Tuesday

    I saw a person I’ve known for ages. Yurko is also my neighbor. He had a Kyiv period too, and now lives with his family and children at his old home, the grand neoclassical four-story apartment building that we see from our windows. The building is quite unusual for Lviv: its palatial design would fit Paris. When I was a child, everyone called it the “professors’ house.” Yurko’s father, who is now ninety-six years old, is a member of the Academy of Science, a distinguished achievement, and the honorary director of the Physico-Mechanical Institute, where my parents once worked and started dating. Yurko tells me that until recently his father went to work, having taken a break only due to Covid. Yurko himself walks with a cane: he badly injured his popliteal ligaments five months ago, and this keeps him in Lviv. As he spent two years in the military in the Donbass war, he is one of “the first-call reservists.” “They told me to come back when the knees are fine,” he says. In the 1990s Yurko was one of the first Internet-providers in Lviv and more broadly in Ukraine. His company made the first websites for almost everyone I knew. He was also the ultimate party guy, making cocktail shots of his own recipe and usually the last man standing.

    I received a long email from my editor at the European Review of Books, a new magazine for which I’ve been working on a review of a new book by Yaroslav Hrytsak, a historian and public intellectual whom I’ve known for years. (He lives in Lviv.) This task was a real joy from the start, but now it gets tricky: as I write about Ukrainian history, Ukrainian history starts to run amok. Now I discuss the ending of the review with my editor. The previous ending is outdated already. The article is supposed to appear in May. Our history will be different in May. But how different?

    March 9, Wednesday

    I texted with my kum. He finished his training and is “fully deployed.” I can’t ask where he is and he can’t say. I promised to keep a bottle of cognac for him. (I was referring to a Ukrainian brandy that we prefer. It’s imprecise to call it cognac, but we do.) We agreed to drink it on a bench at Podil as we did after Maidan.

    An acquaintance of mine, a Belarussian poet who moved to Ukraine many years ago, and his wife, a Ukrainian poet, wrote on Facebook that they are stuck in occupied Bucha. He quoted a Russian occupier who told a group of women and children: “Well, Ukrainian tribe, are you dying out? No one is gonna rescue you from here.” They didn’t let them leave.

    We celebrated the New Year together once, in 2012. It was my first New Year’s party in Kyiv. I was happy then, and even happier that night. We danced to a remix of a Soviet children’s song with a refrain that was changed to “Lu-ka-shen-ka!” I had many hopes for the upcoming year.

    Our host that night went to Donetsk in 2014 and was arrested as a “spy” by the separatists. He spent forty-eight days in the Donetsk concentration camp known as Izolyatsia, interrogated by the Russian FSB. (A book about Izolatsia by Stanislav Aseyev recently appeared in English.) I guess it was then that he (or his kidnappers) deleted the photos from that New Year’s party from his Google drive, the ones that he shared with us back then.

    March 10, Thursday

    I take S for a walk in the park near our home. There is also an amusement park there, obviously not functioning now. Many of the carousels are the same ones I used to ride decades ago. It is cold, even colder than it was in winter, and we are almost alone there. S likes the small stadium where I ice-skated with my mother when I was six. S keeps herself busy cleaning the seats with her mittens, when a David Lynch-ish thing happens: an elderly man who had been pacing along the stadium suddenly stops after having walked three hundred feet and starts to step backwards, slowly, almost like a moonwalk. He traces his entire way backwards and then hides in one of the stadium facilities.

    It is almost the city center here, but it is absolutely quiet. It could be any other cold spring day in a deserted park: no signs of war. Like a time capsule.

    March 12, Saturday

    The air raid sirens wake us up again very early this morning. We all have a special app for air raids on our smartphones now, and the sound is awful. S is afraid, and Roman makes up a story for her, about a small brave bear who travels to Baryshivka, a village near the summer house of his parents. Baryshivka was bombed yeaterday. Roman’s parents talk to the neighbor who looks after their cat, urging him to use their food storage in the house. Their village is cut off from food supplies for now. We all fall asleep soon, but S has a bad dream. I feel her shiver.

    March 15, Tuesday

    A sunny day. It smells of March, but not as it was last year. The fragrance is of the past, when I was a teenager. I believe this is because fewer people are using their cars now: the price of fuel has risen, business has slowed down, and the air has become again as it was when we were poor. The old city center is almost a cup, a lowland, partly open and partly encircled by hills. All its smells are more intense, as I learned after moving to windy Kyiv.

    People sit in cafes, but no one is relaxed. I took a photo of the wall of the yard we went to with S a year ago. The same playground, the same wall, a different March.

    March 17, Thursday

    I meet a friend of a friend for coffee: a lovely American-Israeli journalist. Almost everybody around us in the café speaks English. She asks me if she could hug me when I have to go, and we laugh about how quickly we have all forgotten about Covid.

    March 18, Friday 

    Russian missiles hit Lviv for the first time, the facilities near the airport. It’s a sunny and cold day.

    I think to myself that from now on I can never think of Lviv as my own special experience. Any Lviv story is now overshadowed by the thousands of stories of those who found shelter here.

    March 23, Wednesday

    We meet with Lida and Vlodko Kaufman and discuss our plans for a big exhibition of contemporary Ukrainian art to be shown in Lithuania, Poland, and maybe France and Austria — a retrospective of a kind, mixing old and new.

    Kaufman was one of the founders of Dzyga back in 1993. When I started to work there in 1998, I was overwhelmed by my proximity to a living legend, though as a journalist I had written about his work earlier. Already at that point he was celebrated by the writers I admired. Later I was deeply honored to write commentaries for his various projects. He would bring a pile of trash to the gallery and announce that it would become his new installation, or he would show some new paintings, or he would try to explain the idea of a performance. As I would produce a text about it, he would exclaim: “Oh, that’s what I mean!” A stranger overhearing us would have thought that we were mad. What Kaufman taught me in the process was priceless: he managed to explain the few seconds of ecstasy he lives through during a performance, the elusive magic that an artist may capture if he or she is very lucky. He prepared me to recognize and to welcome those moments of selflessness that nothing in the world may give us but art. I would never have written my first (and last) novel if not for him.

    And now we discuss how to present Ukrainian artists to the public in Europe, when that public is finally ready to look more closely at what was under its nose all this time. I must admit that in retrospect I’m a little bitter: even as I enjoyed my work in Dzyga, I was not able to grasp how valuable the art, the music, and the people were back then. But as the world became global for us too, and I’ve seen a bit here and there, I realize that what was happening in Ukrainian culture back then was unique. And almost no one mentioned it. Kaufman talks about how Malevich and Archipenko were appropriated by Russians, and about their roots in Ukrainian contexts, and about the many more artists still unknown to the world, a whole invisible universe that survived the oppressions and the occupations of the past. As he speaks I wonder whether I know how to tell the world a story about the magic that I remember myself.

    Roman’s parents left for Vinnytsia, their native city. No air raids today.

    March 24, Thursday

    We go to a playground with S, the one we used to go to last year. But it is full of people now, mostly newcomers it seems. On our way home S asks, “Where is my home?” She is tired, and probably is asking how long it would take to get home, but it sounded desperate.

    March 26, Saturday

    I was coming back from a coffee with Elliot, a journalist for Time, when the air raid siren went off. It feels different in the city center, where we hear the voice urging us to get to shelters. The wind rose, almost a storm. The touristy horse-and-carriage passed by in a hurry. It is a strange combination, an air raid siren and a cabbie in Habsburg-era costume, his carriage decorated with gilded patterns.

    I hear an explosion, then another, when I go up the street not far from home. The distant explosions catch me on the top of the hill, and I see the thick black smoke quickly covering half of the sky behind the familiar hill on the far side of town. I call Roman: he has taken our girl for a walk and the blast was even more distant on their side of the hill. On my way I meet Yurko coming back home with his kid, both totally cool.

    The rockets hit the oil depot on the other side of the city, less than a mile from my godmother. She said their windows were intact, but the fires were raging and the black smoke was everywhere.

    March 28, Monday

    Our trumpeter performs again in the backyard.

    We have a long walk with S to Stryiskyi park, a beautiful nineteenth-century park with dramatic ravines, a pond with swans, pseudo-Romantic ruins, springs, and a greenhouse. One of the few prewar Polish monuments that survived the war is here, a monument to Jan Kilinski, a hero of Kościuszko’s anti-Russian uprising. The whole park was named after Kilinski when it was established, but everyone called it “Stryiskyj” even before Soviets, and the old name prevailed. My mom used to take me there when I was S’s age. We lived close by then, and we live close by now, just on the other side of it. When I was little I didn’t know how unique our street was, with its upward spiral of remarkable early twentieth-century buildings. I also didn’t realize how unusual the street on our way to the park is, a dark ravine between two high slopes with the buildings over our heads.

    How does a landscape determine who we are? The back of our building faces the hill. Not only does it confer upon us the privilege of a huge green backyard with fruit trees, which were once my overgrown magical woods when I was little; these days it also provides us with a sense of safety. We never go to our basement shelter, the hill protects us, as if we can hide from the bombings in the folds of the landscape.

    You can’t explain Lviv until you explain the landscape. First, the river. The Poltva once gave life to the city, but it was buried beneath its streets in the nineteenth century. Now it is the municipal sewer system. The central prospect and Lviv Opera House stand on what was once the mainstream. Our building stands on the bank of what used to be one of the Poltva’s tributaries, now a busy and noisy street. The pedestrian and transport arteries of the city repeat the course of the underground river. We somehow feel the streams under our streets: even S spins in her sleep to adjust to the flow of the underground river.

    We connect the dots of the familiar locations when we see them from the top of the neighboring hill, especially now, when the trees are not green yet. In a few weeks, when the foliage is thick, we will use our inner Google maps. Mine is especially rich with pins these days. I can point to a building with a kitchen full of smoke and Taschen albums where I was happy in 1996, sitting with my new friends, both dead now. Or to a building where a boy lived with whom I was hopelessly in love in 1992, and the nearby yard where we used to try our first cigarettes with my friend, who left for New York. In my private chronology, different blocks are different worlds. But a single missile can wipe away all the nuances of these worlds, and turn the whole terrain, crowded with miniature scenes and characters as in an illuminated manuscript, into a mash of ruins.

    A landscape also means a lot for an army. If I’m not mistaken, it is one of the primary considerations of military thinking: “take the heights.” The landscape is what they see on their maps, but it is different from mine, which is dotted not with targets but with memories.

    S is busy with her ice cream when we run into Yaroslav Hrytsak, whose book I’m reviewing, taking a walk in the company of other people from Kyiv whom I know, including my colleague from the Soros Foundation. I am unexpectedly happy to see them all, and when they leave I realized why. These days our life in Lviv, filled with foreigners and high ranking guests, is dream-like, in that you meet people where they are not supposed to be. Only it’s war, not your brain, that oddly reshuffles them.

    March 29, Tuesday

    I woke last night terrified for no reason, and soon the air raid siren went off. S woke up too and she snuggled me.

    We had two more air raids today, one of them as soon as we went for a walk with S. On our way back I made up a story about monsters we must hide from. I don’t know how else to explain to my daughter why we must stay at home. I also realize how fortunate we are: we are not hiding in a shelter. I’m making a chocolate pie during an air raid, and recalling many texts that were written by frightened people like me: on the curbs of wars, on the safe side of catastrophes.

    April 1, Friday

    We went with Lida to Genyk Ravsky’s exhibition at the Dzyga Gallery, one of my favorite places in the world. We noted that it’s been a quarter of a century since its opening. Dzyga is a part of the former Dominican monastery. The narrow medieval street, called Virmenska for the Armenians who lived there for centuries, ends at the gallery’s doors, but the gallery hall is a prolongation of the street, just under the arch, which was painted black twenty-five years ago. The scene is usually full of people sitting in the gallery café.

    Genyk Ravsky is one of the first artists who was involved in Dzyga. I remember him from the old days in a leather jacket and long hair, looking like one of the rock musicians who loved his paintings (he played also, but I was too young to witness it). Genyk used to mix pop art with classical images, to put jeans on the characters of the Iliad. I guess it was a mark of those times and that milieu. Now he is in Territorial Defense. Lida would later send me a photo of him in the gallery when he managed a day off: in a military uniform, with unusually short hair.

    There are many photos along the stairs to the second floor, where our office once was. All the photos are black-and-white all are by Vilya, the eccentric photographer who died fourteen years ago, one of the regulars of the old Soviet underground scene — not glamorous at all, like his photographs. He was already quite old when our nightclub in the basement of the Lviv Puppet Theater had its heyday. He was so poor that sometimes he didn’t have film in his camera, though he pretended to take photos anyway. But his photos preserved the era for us. Here is Junko, the rock musician. He was roughly my age, now dead. Frankly, he always had a kind of a mark on him: both a mark of genius and of death. I remember he had a small volume of Rimbaud in his backpack when I first saw him, and he also looked like Rimbaud. I mentioned this in my novel. When I saw him for the last time, at Maidan on the day after the shootings in the government quarter, and learned that he escaped the massacre, I felt immense relief: if he survived that, he would live. He died soon after. Listening to the songs that his band played in the late 1990s, I marvel at how original and progressive they managed to be, a galaxy away from the mainstream music industry. If Junko and his band had lived in London or even in Bristol, they would have become global stars. I see also the ghosts of many other musicians, writers, and bohemian types, and of course of Marek himself, a father figure for them even if they didn’t know it. All of them are gone now. I reflect that Lida and I are among the few survivors, and it has nothing to do with the bombings. Some people die because their environment is too harsh and unresponsive, because they don’t feel that they are needed.

    Our club was in the basement, and this accurately reflected the status of Ukrainian culture at that time, even when the state was nominally “ours.” The people in the photos were mostly marginal for their own TV and media, even in Lviv. My perfectly Ukrainian first editor, a nice guy, approved my pieces about Dzyga and Ukrainian rock musicians without much enthusiasm, encouraging me instead to get interviews with the Russian actors who were regularly touring in Lviv.

    Now most Ukrainians spend time in basements of another kind — the opposite of the basements of my youth, the workshops of musicians and sculptors, cafes and clubs. Why do I feel that there is a connection?

    April 3, Sunday

    I noticed that Lviv used to annoy me when my mind was all about the future, but now I have surprisingly intense flashbacks, an urge to visit the sites of my student years. When planning, and thinking about the future, is not an option, the past dominates the mind. As one door shuts, another opens.

    April 5, Tuesday

    Olesya Ostrovska-Lyuta, the director of Art Arsenal, the huge national art center in Kyiv, wrote a Facebook post that perfectly captures what I feel these days. Olesya calls herself a bureaucrat, but in fact she is one of the most profound intellectuals I know. She is my age, also from Lviv, but she left early and graduated university in Kyiv. She wrote that after the first shock of the war her mind was crowded with reminiscences:

    These visions come one after another. I’m kind of wallowing in them, telling them to family and friends. I enjoy recalling small details, rolling a memory of an air temperature or light in my head.

    Maybe that’s exactly what happens to an old person, when she slowly departs from reality, immersing herself in her own vanished world instead. Maybe that’s how our mind reacts to a boundary experience, which in my case is the shocking reality of war and the risk of death, and in the case of old age is an approaching transition to nothingness. And so you feel as if you are swimming in a soft fog of your own stories, there is just you and the world that has passed by, and thus has lost its acuteness, has become amicable, like a grayish anesthetic substance. Maybe this is how we cope when approaching the frontier of the unknown.

    We stay late at a playground, it is dark when we leave. We leave almost simultaneously with another parent, who is obviously not from Lviv, and I wish him a good night. Again I feel like I’m cheating: because of my shabby winter clothes in April (a cold April, but still) they may think that I am one of them, that like them I return to a rented apartment with uncomfortably high ceilings, strange smells, and a chilling uncertainty. Whereas I’m coming back to the apartment I grew up in.

    April 14, Thursday

    I take S to a meeting with my colleagues in the Institute for Culture Strategy to discuss the exhibition we are planning. We put up a name already: “Ukraine. Unmuted.” S causes only minor damage at the office.

    Then we go to a playground at the top of the steep street on the hill of the Citadel. Just above us is one of the Citadel towers, now turned into a five-star hotel. Most of the people descending the metal stairs from the hotel and down the street speak English.

    An elderly man with a small, cute dog starts a conversation with a janitor. The two seem to know each other. The older guy speaks Russian, trying to switch to Ukrainian. He gives some intangible impression of wealth, as some people do: it was easier to spot in our part of the world when imported clothes were a sign of privilege, but I can detect it even now, when the same brands are worn everywhere. They discuss the area, and the man with the dog turns out to be immersed in his memories: he points to the fancy hotel and says, “That used to be a Torture Tower. When we were kids we found bones here all the time.”

    I know what he means. The Citadel was a concentration camp, Stalag 328, during World War II, mostly for prisoners of war. About 140,000 of them died there.

    Built in the 1850s as Austrian fortifications, the four towers and cantonments for the garrison were supposed to protect the city. The idea came after the Austrian army used the hills to batter the Polish uprising in Lviv in 1848. In Soviet times the territory of the Citadel was closed, but some of my classmates boasted that they had explored its bunkers. There were some military facilities there, and, they said, the KGB too. (The headquarters of the KGB was on the opposite side of the hill, on my street.) Since my school was just in front of another slope of the Citadel hill, I stared at the other death tower during my boring classes. Most of my classmates lived nearby: in Soviet times children attended the school nearest to where they lived. This was the Russian school, meaning that instruction was in the Russian language, quite natural for the city center. The elderly guy likely went there, too. It is possible that he brought his children there, and that I knew them.

    Our school was a sort of citadel as well. It used to be an unofficial obkom school, meaning that the children of the local Communist authorities went there. It was renowned for its math teachers, who were so good that their students could enter elite Moscow universities. (They didn’t help my math skills any.) We were isolated from the roiling political and cultural Ukrainian life just a few blocks from our building. I remember that the teachers were once concerned for our safety because a huge anti-Soviet rally was taking place in the city center.

    I don’t quite remember when the Citadel was opened to the public, certainly sometime in the late 1980s or early 1990s. For a while my dad had an office in the former Austrian cantonment. When I was fifteen, I went there with friends. Though it’s in the heart of the city, encircled by nineteenth-century streets from every side, it was a separate world, like a summer camp. The view from the ground of that death tower, then abandoned, was breathtaking.

    Today I watch a group of teenagers cross the playground, heading up to that place. The girls wear heavy makeup, exactly as I did when I was their age. I overhear them talking about the war. They will hide from it there, as we used to hide from the challenges our parents faced and the 10,000% inflation of 1993.

    We follow them. As we walk, I tell S that I spent a lot of time here when I was little. “Were you little, mommy?” she asks skeptically. “And I was once big,” she says firmly. “Will you be little, mommy?”

    “I will.” I’m proud of myself, the mother of a natural born Buddhist.

    April 25, Monday

    A heavy rain catches us on our way home. My daughter is happy, jumping into every puddle. The rain is brushing the blossoms off the trees when an air raid starts. And immediately the blinding sun shines. The air raid siren yowls. I look back and see a huge rainbow across the sky. In a universe such as this, no one should judge anybody for dancing at a funeral.

    May 1, Sunday

    I’m 44 today. Eleven years ago on this day I was buying the first bottle of brandy as early as 11 am. It was for a traditional morning rock concert in the inner yard of the city hall, organized by Dzyga. A long line early in the morning for a rock concert on the first Sunday of May: this was another mark of the city. It was also my farewell; I would leave for Kyiv soon afterward, and I mostly remember that May as endless walks and drinks with my friends. Today I use the opportunity to walk alone and take some of my old routes.

    Two days ago Kyiv was hit with missiles again, including a residential building not far from our home. It’s too early to go back.

    Every Monday morning I finalize the weekly overview of the news from Ukraine. I sort out the dispatches about attacks, about the killed, the tortured, and the raped, to include all that is important for the security of the Central European region. I do it cold-bloodedly. But I may burst into tears seeing sun streaks on a familiar roof, or young grass in an abandoned lot, or a splash of audacious green in a backyard behind the narrow front door.

    I think again about how a landscape shapes you: it’s easier to believe that the world is full of miracles when you know that a dirty, dark, and uninviting entrance may hide a magic garden behind it. A person accustomed to walking in a flat city gets a particular idea of time, her time is linear, as block after block is left behind, becoming the past. But keeping several hills in your sight simultaneously, several distant areas at once, makes it easier to connect different eras in one’s mind — to feel the past, which is never dead, and not even past.

    About thirty years ago, every day on my way to school and back, I passed by the Citadel, the KGB, and the notorious prison on Łącki, now the Museum-Memorial of Victims of the Occupation Regimes. At that time I did not know that during “the first Soviets” in 1939-1941 it was the NKVD prison where up to a thousand people were tortured and killed. Polish girl scouts were raped there in the way young girls, almost children, have now been raped in Bucha, Borodyanka, and Irpin. Unlike the Russian soldiers near Kyiv, the Soviets came back. Maybe some of those soldiers picked up their grandchildren at my school. Anyway, they owned the city because of what was done in 1939, and then in 1944, and then later. But the city in its turn owned their children and grandchildren, at least the many of them who became hippies and underground artists. The city owned those who came here during the urbanization of the 1960s: unlike most peasants who switched to Russian as they moved to a city, in Lviv they were sticking to Ukrainian, and eventually turned it into a stronghold of the Ukrainian movement.

    I need this city even after I die. I need it to lie on the abandoned concrete slabs, warmed by the sun, at Citadel hill, just as I did in 1993. I need it to hang out in the Jesuit gardens, the beloved park of little Stanislaw Lem, just as I did in 1995 with the grandchildren of those who pushed his family out of the city. I need it to listen to music and poetry under the walls of the Dominican monastery as the sun still shines, because it is June, the enchanted June of 1997. I wish I could somehow do that before I become little again.

    War and the Liberal Hegemony

    Why did the United States intervene in the Second World War? The question is rarely asked because the answers seem so obvious: Hitler, Pearl Harbor, and what more needs to be said? To most Americans, World War II was the quintessential “war of necessity.” As the late Charles Krauthammer once put it, “wars of choice,” among which he included Vietnam and the first Gulf War, are “fought for reasons of principle, ideology, geopolitics or sometimes pure humanitarianism,” whereas a “war of necessity” is a “life-or-death struggle in which the safety and security of the homeland are at stake.” If World War II is remembered as the “good war,” the idea that it was “necessary” is a big part of the reason why. The enemies were uniquely wicked and aggressive; Americans were attacked first; they had no choice but to fight.

    This perception of World War II has had a paradoxical effect on the broader American foreign policy debate. On the one hand, writers of an anti-interventionist bent rightly perceive that the war’s reputation as “necessary” and therefore “good” has encouraged Americans to believe that other wars can be “necessary” and therefore “good,” too. (Krauthammer believed the “war on terror” was also one of “necessity,” and Richard Haass put the Gulf War in the “necessary” category, and in 1965 even David Halberstam and The New York Times editorial page believed that American intervention in Vietnam was necessary.) On the other hand, anti-interventionists are not alone in believing that, even if World War II was necessary, the circumstances were unique and therefore irrelevant to subsequent foreign policy discussions. There will never be another Hitler, and the idea that a foreign great power (as opposed to a terrorist group) might launch a direct attack on the United States seems far-fetched even today. World War II thus stands apart, bracketed from further relevance, as perhaps the only widely agreed “necessary” foreign war and therefore the only “good” foreign war that the United States has ever fought.

    But what if even America’s intervention in World War II was not “necessary,” as most Americans would define the term? What if it, too, was a “choice” that Americans made, based on calculations not so different from those that produced the later wars of choice in Iraq, the Balkans, and Vietnam?

    Those many Americans who opposed American involvement in Europe and Asia in the late 1930s and early 1940s certainly did not believe the war was necessary. This was not because they were ignorant of the potential risks posed by Hitler and the Japanese Empire. The America First Committee, a group that combined corporate elites such as the chairman of Sears Roebuck with scions of the eastern establishment such as Joseph Kennedy and Chester Bowles, launched itself in September 1940, three months after the unexpected conquest of France by the German blitzkrieg. Its founders understood the implications of France’s defeat. They not only believed but predicted that Britain would be the next to fall, leaving the United States without a single meaningful ally in the European theater. (The bestselling author Anne Morrow Lindbergh wondered whether it was “courage” or “stupidity” that made the British fight on.)

    With Japan on the march on the Asian continent — Japanese forces, having conquered much of China, invaded Indochina three weeks after the Committee’s founding — Americans in the fall of 1940 faced the real possibility of a world in which Europe and East Asia, along with the Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Western Pacific, could soon be dominated by a trio of militaristic dictatorships (Mussolini’s Italy being the third.) This was the moment — arguably the nadir of the future Allies’ fortunes — when the America First movement took its stand against further American aid to the victims and prospective victims of Nazi and Japanese aggression. Just a few weeks earlier, after the British evacuation at Dunkirk, Winston Churchill gave his famous “we shall fight on the beaches” speech, with its concluding prayer, mingled with reproach, that, “in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might,” would come “to the rescue and the liberation of the old.” That was precisely what the American First movement aimed to prevent.

    The anti-interventionists’ main practical argument was that even in those direst of international circumstances, American security was not immediately or even prospectively threatened. By virtue of its wealth, its strength, and, above all, its geography, the United States was effectively invulnerable to foreign attack. Those who held this view were not benighted cranks, nor even the well-respected men and women who led the America Fist movement. It was conventional wisdom among the nation’s leading foreign policy and military experts in the late 1930s. Respected analysts such as George Fielding Eliot concluded, after “a detailed consideration of America’s strategic position and military requirements,” that American security was not in danger from any European power so long as it maintained an adequate navy. This was also the view of self-described “realists” of the day, a new breed of professional foreign policy and military experts who prided themselves on what Eliot called “realistic thinking,” the “banishment of altruism and sentiment” from their analysis, and “single-minded attention to the national interests.” Yale’s Nicholas Spykman, one of the founders of the school of “classical realism,” argued that with “the European neighbors of the United States … three thousand miles away” and the Atlantic Ocean still “reassuringly” in between, America’s “frontiers” were secure. So long as the United States maintained a strong navy capable of protecting its shores and so long as bombers’ cruising radius remained less than four thousand miles, the Atlantic and Pacific would remain “the chief elements in the defense of the United States.”

    Hanson Baldwin, the military editor of The New York Times, explained in detail what an attack on the United States would require.

    Under fire from bomb and gun, soldiers and heavy equipment would have to be transshipped to small boats from the transports anchored offshore. Then the small boats would have to make a landing through the surf. Once on the hostile beach, the enemy would have to struggle to get their tanks and field pieces off ramp-bowed landing boats onto the beach under shells and machine-gun fire, their only support, their carrier-based aviation, and the guns of their warships.

    This proved a prescient description of the D-Day landing in 1944, but at the time Baldwin meant to show how unlikely it was that a foreign power would or even could launch an invasion of the United States. In the same spirit Senator Robert A. Taft, no one’s idea of a yahoo, argued that no foreign power “would be stupid enough” to try to land “troops in the United States from across thousands of miles of ocean.” A Council on Foreign Relations study group in February 1940 concluded that “no one believes that an actual military threat to this country exists, even if Britain and France were to be conquered by Germany.” Although some, such as Spykman, began to change their minds after the fall of France, most did not. Herbert Hoover denied that American security depended on the outcome of the war in Europe. The victor, if it was Germany, was not going to turn around and “attack 130,000,000 people 3000 miles overseas, who have a capacity of 10,000,000 soldiers and 25,000 aircraft.”

    Not only was a foreign attack on the United States physically unlikely if not impossible, the anti-interventionists argued, but it was also avoidable if Americans simply attended to their own affairs and stayed out of the other great powers’ business. Neither Germany nor Japan had any reason to risk bringing the United States into the war. And the United States had no reason to stand in the way of nations seeking to expand their territory and spheres of influence. Most Americans agreed that the United States had no vital interests in Europe or Asia. At least that had been the dominant assumption of American policymakers throughout the 1920s and Franklin Roosevelt’s first term.

    After the Pearl Harbor attack and the subsequent declaration of war by Germany, many of the anti-interventionists did not change their views. War had come to the United States not because Tokyo and Berlin had sought it, but because Franklin Roosevelt, departing from the policies of his predecessor Herbert Hoover, had interjected the United States into distant quarrels. While the great majority of Americans regarded Pearl Harbor as a treacherous act of “infamy,” the anti-interventionists made themselves unpopular by insisting, in the words of Arthur Vandenberg, that the United States had “asked for it.” The Roosevelt administration’s “dogmatic diplomatic attitudes” had driven the Japanese “needlessly into hostilities.” After all, as Hoover put it, if the United States insisted on “putting pins in rattlesnakes,” it should expect to get bitten.

    The anti-interventionists’ arguments were not as weak as they are often portrayed. In retrospect it is clear that the Japanese would have preferred not to go to war with the United States, certainly not in 1941 but perhaps ever. Japanese military leaders did not even believe they could win a war with the United States absent divine intervention or a failure of American will. As the anti-interventionists pointed out, the Japanese would not have attacked Pearl Harbor had the Roosevelt administration not attempted to use its economic and diplomatic influence to try to block or slow Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland (and had Roosevelt not decided to place the U.S. Pacific Fleet there as a supposed deterrent).

    And if Japan had not attacked when it did, Hitler would not have declared war on the United States when he did. In 1941 Hitler was actually trying to avoid pulling the Americans fully into the Atlantic war, despite Roosevelt’s deliberately provocative and aggressive expansion of the U.S. Navy’s role. There is some evidence that Hitler may have intended to go to war with the United States eventually. In 1941, while preparing for the invasion of the Soviet Union in June, he had ordered plans for constructing a “big battleship navy,” likely for use against the United States. But such thoughts were shelved when the initial invasion of the Soviet Union bogged down and settled into a war of attrition.

    With the war a stalemate with Britain in the west and Russia in the east, any German assault on the United States was likely years off and left the United States plenty of time to watch and to prepare. Even staunch pro-interventionists such as Henry Luce acknowledged, as late as February 1941, that no one could “say honestly that as a pure matter of defense — defense of our homeland — it is necessary to get into or be in this war.” Even if “the entire world came under the organized domination of evil tyrants,” it was “quite possible” that the United States “could make itself such a tough nut to crack that not all the tyrants in the world would care to come against us.” If Americans did enter the war, Luce argued, as he hoped they would, it would not be because the war was “necessary” as a matter of “survival.”

    The anti-interventionists were also right to point out that American policy had turned against Germany and Japan well before the latter were in any position even to think about an attack on the United States. The critical event in that regard, the fall of France, did not occur until the summer of 1940. Prior to that, most observers regarded it as impossible that French forces, dug in behind their Maginot Line, could possibly be overrun by an as-yet largely untested German military. Yet Roosevelt began bringing American influence to bear against Germany as early as 1937, after Japan’s full-scale invasion of China but before Hitler had committed any act of aggression at all, when he labeled Germany, Italy, and Japan “bandit” nations that needed to be isolated and quarantined like a disease. Thereafter he worked to modify the neutrality legislation that had prevented him from helping Britain and others; he enacted an increasing array of economic sanctions against Japan; and he brought the U.S. Navy into the Battle of the Atlantic as a belligerent in all but name. Were these steps necessary to the defense of the American homeland? Certainly not in any immediate sense. If anything, as the anti-interventionists argued, they brought the threat of war closer, a possibility of which Roosevelt was aware and which gave him no pause.

    Why, then, did Americans start sticking pins in rattlesnakes in the late 1930s, increasing the risk of war, before any direct threat to American security had materialized? The answer had more to do with belief and ideology than with raw assessments of German and Japanese military capabilities. Roosevelt and many other Americans concluded that the Nazi regime was dangerous well before it had committed any act of external aggression. As Hugh Wilson, the one-time American ambassador to Berlin, observed, fears about Germany’s course began immediately after Hitler’s ascension to the chancellorship in 1933. That year brought early signs of the coming persecution of Jews as well as celebrations of book-burning in the squares of German cities and towns, which people in the West found disturbing.

    But it was the infamous “night of the long knives” in 1934 that shocked the liberal world. As Ambassador Wilson noted, the Nazi’s murderous purge “profoundly” affected the “attitude toward Germany of every man of politics in Europe and of most of them in our own country. The temper of Europe toward Germany changed from indignation and exasperation to fear and horror.” The fears grew as the Nazis consolidated control and began the systematic persecution of Jews and other minorities. For many American observers, the turning point came in the fall of 1938 after the mass persecution and killing of Jews in what became known as Kristallnacht. Even more than the Munich settlement six weeks earlier, which Roosevelt privately condemned but publicly praised, Kristallnacht convinced Roosevelt and others that, as the historian John A. Thompson has put it, the Nazi regime could never be “incorporated into a stable, norm-governed European order.” That perception shaped American policies going forward as Hitler rearmed and began working more aggressively to overturn the Versailles settlement, but its origins preceded those efforts.

    Not only could such a regime never become part of a stable liberal peace, but in the eyes of many Americans, especially liberals, the very nature of the regime guaranteed conflict. Most liberals believed that because Germany and Japan were “totalitarian” states, they would never cease their struggle against democracy and liberalism at home and abroad. As the critic Lewis Mumford put it, the fascists could not co-exist with “the ever-rising, ever-recurrent forces of civilization.” Their “propulsive system of beliefs” would drive them onward until the world was “made over in the fascist image.” In 1937 the American diplomat George Messersmith insisted that what was occurring was a “basic clash of ideologies” and that the dictators were embarked on “a long road” that must end in an attack on the United States. Roosevelt spoke for many when he divided the world neatly along ideological lines, insisting that unlike nations “devoted to the democratic ideal …autocracy in world affairs endangers peace.”

    These theories echoed Americans’ ideological preferences going back to the founding era, but they were, nevertheless, only theories. As a practical matter, Germany and Japan might not ever find the circumstances propitious for launching an attack on a United States that was, indeed, substantially invulnerable. In his State of the Union address in January 1939 — months before Germany’s invasion of Poland — Roosevelt barely talked about national security per se. He talked about belief and principle. “There comes a time in the affairs of men,” he told Americans, “when they must prepare to defend, not their homes alone, but the tenets of faith and humanity on which their churches, their governments and their very civilization are founded. The defense of religion, of democracy and of good faith among nations is all the same fight. To save one we must now make up our minds to save all.” Roosevelt’s most arresting image was not of a German invasion or massive bombing raid, but of a democratic America isolated in a world of dictatorships. In a speech at the University of Virginia following the fall of France, he warned Americans that they were at risk of becoming a “lone island” in a world dominated by the “philosophy of force,” “a people lodged in prison, handcuffed, hungry, and fed through the bars from day to day by the contemptuous, unpitying masters of other continents.” Among other concerns, Roosevelt and others worried that the United States could not long survive as an open, free-market, democratic society in such a world, that confronting the dictatorships over the long term would require a controlled economy and limits on individual freedoms.  This was also just a theory — did free market capitalism and individual liberties die during the long Cold War? — but it reflected a timeless American anxiety.  It was just another way that American. policy was shaped more by matters of belief and ideology than by tangible measures of threat.  Roosevelt and other Americans believed that preserving American democracy — the ultimate American “interest” — required a global balance of power that favored liberalism.

     

    The nascent school of foreign policy realism was appalled at the “giddy” moralism and emotionalism that, in Charles A. Beard’s words, prevented Americans from dealing “with the world as it is.” Hugh Wilson, a senior member of the “realist” camp at the State Department in the 1930s, observed of Americans in general that “our most certain reaction to the stimulus of a piece of news from a foreign land is to judge it ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ ‘righteous’ or ‘unjust’… we instantly assess it by a moral evaluation based on our own standards.” This moralistic approach had “poison[ed] our relations with Japan,” and with the Nazis as well. The historian and critic C. Hartley Grattan complained that such “powerful currents of emotion and opinion” had led Americans to “throw cold reason out of the window.”

    For the realists and other anti-interventionists, accepting the world “as it is” meant accommodating historical shifts in the global balance of power, not fighting them. In one of the seminal works of realist thought, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, published in 1939, the British diplomat and intellectual E. H. Carr defended Neville Chamberlain’s concessions to Hitler at Munich on the grounds that the “change in the European equilibrium of forces,” that is, the growth of German power, made it “inevitable that Czechoslovakia should lose part of its territory and eventually her independence.” The American diplomat George F. Kennan, then serving in Prague, agreed that Czechoslovakia was “after all, a central European state,” and its “fortunes must in the long run lie with — and not against — the dominant forces in this area.” Carr argued that if dissatisfied “have-not” powers such as Germany were bent on changing the existing system, “the responsibility for seeing that these changes take place … in an orderly way” rested as much on the defenders of the existing order as on its challengers. Americans, of all people, should respect “the right of an able and virile nation to expand,” Charles Lindbergh argued. As for Japan, the journalist Herbert Bayard Swope, winner of the first Pulitzer Prize, maintained that “sixty-three million people living on rocky islands” had “the right to exist,” and if their existence required expansion, “then why forbid Japanese expansion to follow natural lines?”

    To do so was more than a mistake, the anti-interventionists believed. It was immoral and contrary to American traditions and principles. Americans’ refusal to accept the world “as it is” amounted to a form of imperialism. Even if the United States managed to defeat Hitler “after many years” of brutal war, Taft warned, it would just be the start of an open-ended American commitment to European peace and security. American forces “would have to police Europe or maintain the balance of power there by force of arms.” If Roosevelt’s commitment to the Atlantic Charter was to be taken seriously, the historian Howard K. Beale ominously observed, then the “victorious Anglo-Americans” were not just going to have to “maintain democracy by armed force on the Continent of Europe and then ‘police’ that Continent.” They were also going to have to establish and defend the “four freedoms all over the world.” This would require “an Anglo-American navy large enough to establish ‘freedom of the seas’… on all the oceans of the world.” For Beale and other anti-interventionists, this was a prescription for “unadulterated imperialism.” The famous Christian pacifist A. J. Muste worried that “we shall be the next nation to seek world-domination — in other words, to do what we condemn Hitler for trying to do.” The Germans, Beale argued, would probably regard “Anglo-American ‘policing’” much as Germany’s victims in Europe now regarded German occupation: they might even call it “slavery.” Beale did not want to see “a German imperialism” replaced by an “Anglo-American world imperialism.” He did not want the United States to “dominate the world.”

    The vast majority of Americans, of course, would have denied any such intention. They saw their actions in purely defensive terms. They preferred to believe they were responding to an unprovoked attack from Japan and an equally unprovoked declaration of war by Germany. Once these were dealt with, once the aggressors had been defeated, most Americans likely assumed their nation would return to something like normalcy again. Indeed, in what would become a central paradox in American foreign policy going forward, most Americans probably thought that they were fighting a war precisely so that they might return to the relative passivity of the interwar years or the decades before World War I. A few internationalists talked about shouldering global “responsibilities,” and that may have sounded like a good thing to some, but few Americans believed they were engaging in a massive reshaping of the world, exerting hegemony, imposing a liberal order, or even establishing the United States at the center of world affairs.

     

    But whether they understood it that way or not, the United States was imposing its preferences on a resistant world. Americans were engaged in hegemonic behavior, perhaps not on behalf of themselves, but on behalf of liberalism, which to their opponents amounted to the same thing. Whatever else Germany and Japan were doing, and however unpleasant their methods, they were attempting to break free of the restraints of an Anglo-American world order they had no part in establishing, which did not serve their interests as they perceived them but, on the contrary, was created specifically to constrain them. The Versailles settlement, which the United States had played a central role in shaping, had made Germany a “have-not” power, and the Washington Naval treaty, with its Nine-Power agreement on East Asia, had attempted to clamp a lid on Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland. The Germans and Japanese were thereby denied an empire and the regional sphere of interest that the other great powers enjoyed. And now, as Germany and Japan attempted to break out of the cage of these postwar peace agreements and resist the liberal hegemony, the United States once again roused itself to slam the cage door shut.

    It was not unreasonable to ask what gave Americans the right to decide that it was unacceptable for Germany and Japan to enjoy the same kind of regional dominance that the United States enjoyed, or to acquire the kinds of empires that Britain and France had acquired over the previous three centuries. The Japanese made this argument repeatedly, claiming to seek only their own version of the Monroe Doctrine. Many Germans, too, and not just Hitler, believed that Germany required the kind of room to grow — the “living space” — that the United States enjoyed in abundance, thanks to its own past aggressions on the vast North American continent. Roosevelt could not even claim, as Wilson had in the lead-up to the First World War, that he was defending American neutral rights, since Hitler had been careful to avoid attacks on American shipping. So whether they had right on their side or not, Americans simply insisted, by dint of their power, that the liberal hegemony be preserved and strengthened and the international balance of power remain favorable to the liberal powers.

    That, in the end, was what American intervention in World War II was about, and it was also what World War I had been about. If either war could be regarded as “necessary,” it was not to defend the United States against an immediate threat, but to restore the kind of liberal order in which Americans preferred to live and which seemed to provide the greatest degree of protection against possible future threats.

    Americans roused themselves to defend the liberal hegemony not because they were eager to make a “bid for world supremacy” or because they feared being supplanted as the world’s “Number One power,” as the historian Stephen Wertheim now argues, echoing the charges of the America First Committee and other anti-interventionists at the time. Americans had for most of the twentieth century consistently and deliberately avoided taking on such a role. They had not been jealous of British and French world leadership prior to World War One, and they would have preferred to see that leadership resumed after the war rather than take on the responsibilities of global “leadership” themselves. When they emerged as the world’s dominant power after World War I, they did not seek to exploit it but pulled back from exercising it.

    American diplomacy in the 1920s had aimed at establishing a framework for international peace that would require little if anything of the United States: the Washington Treaties governing naval arms levels and outlining the terms of an Asian peace; the Dawes Plan which aimed at bringing economic stability to Europe; the Kellogg-Briand Pact which aimed to codify international strictures against aggression. In the late 1930s it was not with eagerness but with resignation that so many Americans who had once abjured any significant international role decided that, with the evident failure of these efforts, there was no choice but to place the United States at the center of world affairs. Suddenly, there was much talk of America’s “world responsibilities,” a concept most Americans had rejected throughout the two decades after Versailles.

    Americans had simply changed their minds, both about the nature of the threats out there and about America’s role in addressing them. Just a few years earlier, intellectuals such as Walter Lippmann and Reinhold Niebuhr had abandoned their World War I idealism and interventionism for a postwar cynicism, or “realism,” or, in Niebuhr’s case, Marxism. Lippmann by the end of the 1920s had begun arguing that the United States “should withdraw from all commitments.” Now, he and the others reversed course again. Like Senator Harry Truman, who had discarded his own anti-interventionist views after Munich and Kristallnacht, they believed Americans’ failure to accept “our responsibility as a world power” had led to the catastrophic breakdown of the postwar world.

    But the line between assuming “world responsibility” and exerting hegemony was a thin one. As Roosevelt put it, “destiny” had made Americans heirs of European civilization, and “fate” now compelled the United States “to assume the task of helping to maintain in the Western world a citadel wherein that civilization may be kept alive.” Niebuhr wrote of “the obligations which we owe to the community of nations … as inheritor and custodian of the standards of justice of western civilization.” It was America’s fate, Lippmann argued, to give to “the world of the future that order under law which Rome gave to the ancient world and Britain to the world that is now passing away — that order under law in which alone can freedom prevail.”

    Vandenberg once warned that when it came to intervention in world affairs beyond America’s shores, there could be “no middle ground.” It was “either all the way in or all the way out.” There was much truth in this. It was one thing when American foreign policy was limited to defense of the Western hemisphere, which by itself was an assertion of regional hegemony. But once the United States took on the goal of defeating the autocracies and re-establishing the ascendancy of the liberal world order, it was reasonable to ask where American commitments and obligations stopped. In 1943 Roosevelt set as America’s goal “to organize relations among nations” so that the “forces of barbarism can never again break loose.” This was not the United States as offshore balancer of last resort. It was the United States as proactive defender of an international liberal order. As Roosevelt saw it, the events of the interwar years had proved that “if we do not pull the fangs of the predatory animals of this world, they will multiply and grow in strength — and they will be at our throats again once more in a short generation.” Such a view of the world and America’s responsibility seemed likely to involve the United States in not a few foreign conflicts — none of which were likely to be “wars of necessity” in the sense that American security was directly threatened.

    American realism itself underwent a critical transformation as a result of World War II. Prior to the fall of France, self-described realists of the day had not believed American security would be threatened even after a German victory on the continent, and many realists continued to believe this right up until the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was only after the fall of France that some realists began to suggest that the United States had a vital interest in preventing the emergence of a hegemon in Eurasia. (Realists later promulgated the myth that the founders shared this view, but they too were guided primarily by belief and ideology: in the early 1790s, Hamilton feared Revolutionary France and favored an outright British victory, whereas Jefferson feared victory by the British monarchy and favored Revolutionary France.) Although rarely commented on, this was an extraordinary redefinition of American vital interests. To insist that no power should gain hegemonic control in Europe or Asia was tantamount to insisting on American global hegemony, since the essential prerequisite to American international primacy was precisely the absence of such a “peer competitor.”

    Nor should it be surprising that an American policy aimed at preventing the rise of a plausible challenger to the liberal order might lead to conflicts only tangentially related to that goal — such as preventing a communist takeover of southeast Asia or a hostile takeover of Middle Eastern oil fields. The degree to which American hegemony became baked into the common understanding of America’s “interests” was most notable in Richard Haass’ argument that the first Persian Gulf War was a “war of necessity.” The notion that the United States had a vital interest in the sovereign independence of Kuwait, a one-time Iraqi province, would have struck pre-World War II anti-interventionists as beyond absurd. Only an America that regarded its role as the defender and promoter of a liberal world order could possibly regard the liberation of Kuwait as a matter of “necessity.”

    All of which should raise questions about how useful the distinction between “wars of necessity” and “wars of choice” really is, especially for a nation that enjoys the degree of invulnerability that the United States has. It could be argued that no war is ever actually necessary, not even wars of self-defense. Realists such as George Kennan and Neville Chamberlain believed Czechoslovakia was better off not resisting German conquest, after all. The Japanese entertained hopes that the United States might not fight after Pearl Harbor, that the enormity of the task would be too daunting for a flaccid, selfish, unheroic people like the Americans. Given that the United States was not even threatened militarily when it began to take sides against Germany and Japan in the late 1930s, World War II could only be considered a “war of necessity” because the United States chose to take upon itself the defense of a liberal world order.

    It is not unusual for people to claim to be acting out of necessity.  For one thing, it relieves the otherwise unavoidable moral burden of wielding power.  One is forgiven much when one has no choice. Americans prefer to regard themselves as simply reacting to the provocations of others, even when they are at least equal participants in the confrontation. They have been taught that to try to shape the world to make it more accommodating to their physical and ideological needs is “imperialism.” Yet that is what all great powers do when they can, and the United States, perhaps alone among the great powers of history, has done it with the voluntary collaboration of many other nations and peoples. Instead of insisting they had no choice, Americans, with all their flaws, can be relatively proud of the choices they have made.

    The World as a Game

    What is a game? Ludwig Wittgenstein famously chose this nebulous concept to illustrate what he meant by “family resemblance,” where the individual members of a class can be determined to fulfill no necessary and sufficient conditions for admission, and instead only share some traits with some others in the class, others with others. Yet we can at least identify two types of game, which seem not just distinct from one another but very nearly opposite. One class of games, which includes peek-a-boo, charades, and musical improvisation as representative instances, is characterized by free expressivity. It is the manifestation of what Friedrich Schiller called the Spieltrieb, the “play-drive,” which is innate in all human beings insofar as they are free. The other class includes chess, fencing, and wargames as its representative instances. If there is still some dose of freedom operating in this sort of game, it is freedom under severe constraints. The purpose here is to win, and one does so by means of strategy aforethought. In such games, serendipity and spontaneity are disadvantages. While some such games may, like Schillerian free play, be “fun” (especially when you win and the other guy loses), at their outer edge they shade over into a domain of human endeavor that has little to do with leisure at all. At their most serious they can determine the fate of the world.

    It is this latter sort of game alone that machines are capable of “understanding.” Strategy games, in other words, are essentially algorithmic. A good portion of the history of computing has been dedicated in fact to training machines up algorithmically in such narrow domains as chess, then Go, and more recently a full array of natural-language processing tasks. This training has facilitated the gradual progress of the machines from domain-specific “weak artificial intelligence” — the ability to master all the possible moves within a given narrow field — to something at least approaching “general AI” — the ability to competently execute the whole range of tasks that we associate with human intelligence.

    Yet curiously, as the machines draw closer to this peculiar ideal of humanness, the society they have been brought in to structure has grown correspondingly more inhuman. As the scope of algorithm-based applications in social reality has expanded over the past decades, we have by the same measure been conditioned to approach ever more fields of human life as if they were strategy games. The technology was honed in such narrow domains as chess and video poker. By the 2010s it had come to shape public debate as well, in the transfer of the greater part of our deliberative efforts to social-media platforms that are, in effect, nothing more than debate-themed video games, where one racks up points in the form of likes and followers by “gaming the algos,” just as one racks up points in Super Mario Bros. by smashing turtles. Soon enough algorithms bled out from behind the screen too, and began to transform the three-dimensional world of labor, first in “disruptive” app-based companies such as Uber, where gamified structures determine each “move” a driver makes, and then in domains such as warehouse work, where the laborer might never have used an app before signing up, and might not have understood the revolutionary significance of the top-down imposition of gamified structures for the measurement of his work productivity.

    Finally, the development of social-credit systems for the algorithmic measurement of the civic standing of individuals living under authoritarian regimes extends the gamification process to the entirety of social reality. Life becomes, quite literally, a game, but emphatically not the kind of game that is expressive of our irreducible freedom. On the contrary, the spread of gamified structures to the entirety of life has brought about the near-total eclipse of the one sort of game by the other, the near-total loss of a distinctly human life of Schillerian free play, and the sharp ascendancy of a machine-centered conception of play: play as strategy, as constraint; the extremity of play where it shades over into never-ending high-stakes work and struggle.

    It is against this background that we must understand the recent popularity in some circles of the “simulation argument,” according to which all of reality is, or is likely to be, an algorithmically structured virtual system of essentially the same sort we know from our encounter with video games such as Pac-Man or Minecraft. This is by now an argument with a bit of history behind it. The philosopher Nick Bostrom has been promoting it for a few decades, and by means of it has gained the attention of such tech mandarins as Bill Gates and Elon Musk, who unsurprisingly are attracted to the idea that the world itself resembles the very products that they are in the business of selling.

    The “simulation argument” has more recently been taken up by the philosopher David J. Chalmers in his book, Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy. It is worthwhile to consider this work in some detail, because it is a rich document of our gamified world. The “technophilosophy” that it expounds is perhaps the clearest expression yet of a new sort of hybridism between industry and the academy, in which it is decidedly the first member of this unnatural pair that forms the head of the resulting beast. Philosophy, while in its most enduring expressions always stands apart from the era in which it emerges, also has a long history of subordinating itself to whatever appears in its day as the biggest game going, as the most dazzling center of concentrated power and influence. Once it was theology, then it was science, now it is Big Tech, whose ascendancy required the prior work of the scientists even as it now operates independently of any faithfulness to truth-seeking and has nothing other than capital accumulation as its logic and life-breath.

    Before turning to Chalmers’ central claims and arguments, some interesting characteristics of our moment are revealed in his style and method. It is instructive indeed to see what gets through the filter of the big trade publishers these days. One striking feature of the prose in this particular work is that even though the book includes a special online supplement that presumably may be opened in a browser window right next to a search engine such as Google, it presupposes no shared background knowledge whatsoever between author and reader, nor any ability or motivation on the part of the reader to undertake a quick search that would supplement any informational gaps. Thus Plato is “the ancient Greek philosopher Plato,” and Queen is “the British rock group Queen,” headed up by “lead singer Freddie Mercury” (identified a few lines later as “Mercury”). The opening of Chapter One seeks to draw the reader in by making the most profound questions of philosophy appear close to home, by reference to what must be for the author a treasured lyric from Queen’s hit “Bohemian Rhapsody”: “Is this the real life? / Is this just fantasy?” Now that the tone has been set, the philosopher seeks, as best he can, to flesh out the backstory. “These questions have a history,” he writes. “Three of the great ancient traditions of philosophy —those of China, Greece, and India — all ask versions of Mercury’s questions.”

     

    Such a framing is significant beyond what it reveals about one man’s musical taste. Rather than understanding pop-cultural artifacts such as “Bohemian Rhapsody” as lying at the end of a tradition of romance ballads, faintly echoing that tradition’s themes in words whose large and original meanings have been mostly forgotten, we are instead invited to see pop culture, or at least the pop culture of Chalmers’ childhood, as the pinnacle of tradition, as bringing to its fullest expression what could only be more crudely attempted in centuries past. Here it is the past that asked “Mercury’s questions,” rather than “Mercury” channeling that past with only dim knowledge that this is what he is doing. And this order of things, which characterizes Chalmers’ approach to philosophy in general, largely obviates any need for him to dwell on what I, for my part, take to be the total debt that our present conceptual possibilities owe to the historical legacies that shaped them.

    In the book Chalmers dispenses with style and metaphor in order to speak in plain language, indeed in the simplest sentences possible. But this is not a clarification, it is a conceit which does not really free him, in the way he might hope, from the perceived pitfalls of a more stylish language. For in truth his whole project rides on unacknowledged metaphor: a captivating image of reality taken for an account of reality. The simplicity of his style confers upon Chalmers’ argument an unearned air of realism, and emboldens him to push for conclusions unmoored from the evidence of history and anthropology as if they were plain common sense. This is how the analytic tradition in modern philosophy has long operated: through the abjuration of “erudition” in favor of “straight talk,” the rejection of the properly humanistic disciplines, embedded in centuries-old traditions, in favor of pandering and “relatable” pop-culture references from Star Trek, Black Mirror, and Queen.

    Thus do analytic philosophers deliver their truths in the mode of naïveté, though they are not of course the first philosophers to do this. Descartes (“the French philosopher René Descartes”) worked his way into this mode too, if only as an exercise of so-called “radical doubt” in the first of his Meditations, pretending that he never learned any truths from any book or authority, even though what follows in the next five Meditations is rich with the learning that he could only have received under the tutelage of the Jesuits, with whom he studied, among many other guiding lights, Saint Augustine (“the North African saint Augustine”). As far as I can tell, Chalmers, by contrast with Descartes, is a true naïf, “just some guy,” as Keanu Reeves’ Neo memorably describes himself in The Matrix — one of Chalmers’ touchstones, naturally.

    We get an intimate sense of the scope of this philosopher’s inner life on nearly every page. Here he is, for example, describing himself at leisure: “During the pandemic, I’ve… met up once a week with a merry band of fellow philosophers in VR. We’ve tried many different platforms and activities — flying with angel wings in Altspace, slicing cubes to a rhythm in Beat Saber, talking philosophy on the balcony in Bigscreen, playing paintball in Rec Room,” and so on. There is a well established pattern in analytic philosophy, to which Chalmers has conformed in his career with something almost approaching grace, by which the refusal to put away childish things helps to establish the aura of a certain kind of philosophical brilliance. I have been told by someone who once shared a vacation home with the renowned analytic metaphysician David Lewis that the reading material he brought along for the summer consisted entirely in a giant stack of magazines for model-train hobbyists. When asked by my informant why these toys interested him, Lewis glared back as if the answer were self-explanatory.

    The pop-culture encyclopedia on which so much recent analytic philosophy has drawn yields flat-footed examples at best, and at worst it betrays a cavalier indifference to the depth of the subjects it grazes. It is, in a word, slumming. Now I am generally the last person to condemn “appropriation.” Who could possibly make sense of the unpredictable and scattershot and often demagogic way in which calls are made for switching out terms of art deemed to be “problematic,” or to have been originally deployed in another cultural sphere from which it is allegedly not ours to borrow? A perfectly anodyne-seeming term can be targeted for elimination — recently I observed a philosopher catching heat from another philosopher for hosting a podcast called “Unmute,” which was seen as an ableist belittling of the hearing-impaired — while another term that appears, at least to me, far more open to criticism just keeps going, year after year, in innocent ignorance of its huge semantic charge. Consider, for example, the use in analytic philosophy of the figure of the “zombie.” This is a use that precedes Chalmers, but that he did more than any other to make familiar in his book, The Conscious Mind, and that he continues to deploy in Reality+. Of course I see no particular problem with the figure of the zombie in American mass entertainment since the mid-twentieth century. I recognize that George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead belongs at least to some sort of canon, and I have myself enjoyed Jim Jarmusch’s recent spoof of the zombie genre, The Dead Don’t Die. But the genre in question is what is sometimes called “exploitation,” and it seems to me that if philosophy should not distance itself from this genre altogether, it should at least be cautious about deriving its thought-experiments from it.

    What is the zombie genre exploiting, exactly? For one thing, it exploits its audience, enticing the viewer into a few hours of thoughtless titillation that could also have been spent in edifying contemplation; for another, it exploits a complex system of folk-beliefs and practices, in this case one that developed over the centuries among the African diaspora of Haiti, and does so without acknowledging any of the depths of experience or the internal cultural logic from which these beliefs and practices emerged. For Chalmers, a zombie is simply “a complete physical duplicate of a conscious human being [or animal], with the same brain structures but no subjective experience.” He acknowledges that this is essentially the same thing as what Descartes called an “automaton” (“Descartes thought that dogs were mere automata, or zombies”), but he cannot resist the lure of the new, or the temptation to break with history.

    Some contemporary philosophers attempt to make this figure of thought more precise by calling it a “philosophical zombie,” but what this misses is that the character from Haitian folk-belief is already itself philosophical: it is a representation by which a group of people make sense of and navigate the world. The folk-belief in zombies is not only, and not principally, concerned with the bodily zombie of interest to analytic philosophers. Their zombie is only half of the story; there is also the corresponding soul zombie, which an evil priest keeps in a bottle throughout the duration of a corpse’s interment, and then deftly opens up under the corpse’s nose in order to bring it halfway back to life — quickened enough to do the priest’s will, and most importantly to work the fields in some living person’s stead, but not enough to remember who it was before or to contemplate its unhappy plight. Belief in zombies is thus heavily dualistic. It is not that there remains for the zombie no locus of subjective identity, only that this stays under the priest’s control while the body, also under his control, is elsewhere. The theory seems to have emerged, as it is not hard to imagine, in the encounter of Roman Catholicism, ancestral African beliefs about body and soul, and the grueling inhumanity of slave labor.

    The idea of the separability of body and soul in fact has a long and complex history in both European and African folk-belief, and race is thematized with surprising frequency at many of this history’s key moments. In 1690, for example, the French Jesuit Gabriel Daniel published a satire of Cartesian dualism under the title Voyage du Monde de Descartes, which tells the story of an African servant in Europe who falls asleep while sitting in a field under a tree. A white maiden has been dishonored nearby, and a lynch-mob sets out to find the culprit. Little do they know when they find the servant that he is also an adept of the secret art of the Cartesian sect, by which an initiate can go out as his body sleeps for a little ambulatio animae, traveling around the earth and even into outer space as a disembodied soul. The mob kills what it takes to be the boy but is in fact only a “zombie.” When the soul attempts to return, it finds it has no corporeal home to return to, and so it floats around as a specter, and ultimately befriends the disembodied soul of the long-deceased Descartes. It is at least possible that Daniel is drawing on some knowledge of the proximity of Cartesian dualism to what by the end of the seventeenth century may have appeared as a distinctly racialized cluster of folk-beliefs, of the sort that would later be associated with the figure of the zombie.

     

    None of this is to say that there is anything misguided about the particular thought-experiment analytic philosophy enjoys contemplating, but only that the choice of the zombie as this experiment’s vehicle reminds us of the limitations intrinsic to a philosophical tradition that considers, say, the oeuvre of George Romero part of its general culture, its universe of references and illustrations, but not, say, ethnographic reports from rural Haiti, or indeed the profoundly learned anthropology of the Jesuit intellectual tradition.

    While it is simply naïve to start a reflection on zombies as if they were invented from scratch in twentieth-century American popular culture, it is positively self-defeating to start a reflection on the prospect that reality is itself virtual as if the very notion had to await our current VR technologies in order to be entertained. Perhaps under pressure from editors to give hasty shout-outs to non-Western ideas — the sort of shout-outs that are now de rigueur in Anglophone philosophy, which congratulates itself for being “inclusive” and then goes right back to doing what it would have been doing anyway — Chalmers duly catalogs in his book not only Nāgārjuna’s Buddhist anti-realism about the external world, but also the famous dream of Zhuangzi (in which the Chinese philosopher believes himself to be a butterfly), as well as the even more famous account of dreaming provided by Descartes. In this mechanical nod to the history of philosophy (in the book’s acknowledgments he provides a long list of the historians of philosophy who helped him to execute the nod) he seems close to recognizing that our brains themselves, for about eight hours a day, furnish us sufficient material for philosophical reflection in the remaining sixteen on the possibility that reality is in some way virtual. Chalmers even acknowledges early on that “[a] dream world is a sort of virtual world without a computer.” But soon enough this concession to the timelessness of the problem in question gives way to a bold claim of the problem’s novelty: “any virtual world,” we are now told, “involves a computer simulation.”

    The possibility that we come pre-stocked with the sort of experiences generally thought to be novelties of the era of VR goggles looms as a threat to the entire project of what Chalmers calls “technophilosophy.” He writes that “we haven’t developed dream technology as thoroughly as we’ve developed VR technology, so Descartes’ dream argument is less affected by technological change than his illusion argument. (The latter argument concluded that Descartes’ own mind is in fact awake, but is being systematically deceived about the existence of an external world by an “evil genius.”) But it is not at all self-evident what ought to count as “dream technology,” and an older and more capacious approach to the philosophy of technology, as distinct from Chalmers’ technophilosophy, never lost sight of the fact that tekhnê, in its original sense, included not only gadgets and other objects of human invention, but also, crucially, practices. And in this sense it is important to note that “dream technology” has in fact been well developed in certain places and times: practices for the collective interpretation, social processing, and pragmatic management in waking life of dream experience.

    In cultures where such dream technology is developed, it is typical to find very different philosophical commitments concerning the objects and beings encountered in dreams, and concerning the relation of these objects and beings to those encountered in waking life. The most common view of what dreams are, if we consider them from a cross-cultural and trans-historical perspective, is that they are either as real or more real than waking life. Significantly, the urgency of proving that this is not the case takes hold as a central task of modern philosophy, as in the work of Descartes, at precisely the moment when European missionaries, some of whom are in Descartes’ own epistolary network, are encountering groups of people, in the Americas for example, whose practical rationality is largely governed by experiences had in sleep. Descartes is anxious to contain these experiences, to keep them cordoned off from the waking life whose basic constituents — the self, God, the external world — are alone worthy candidates for his project of epistemological foundationalism. This is indeed one way of going about things, but it is not the default way of humanity.

    Repeatedly, in fact, what Chalmers takes to be the default way of humanity turns out to be only a local road taken by modern philosophy in the centuries since the scientific revolution, often in an effort to remain faithful to the apparent implications of key scientific discoveries. But this faithfulness has frequently gone far beyond what is actually implied by science itself, and has forced modern philosophy into accepting as the default account of reality commitments that fall apart under scrutiny. Chalmers arrives on the scene at the moment when this falling apart is becoming impossible not to notice, and interprets it as evidence for philosophy’s linear progress, rather than philosophy’s return to other widely available and well-tested alternatives. This is particularly clear in his evocation of the current moment’s “fall from Eden.” Thus he reflects that “rocks in Eden were Solid, full of matter all the way through without any empty space. They had an absolute Weight, which did not vary from place to place.” But now, subatomic physics has forced us to throw out this model. “People in Eden had Free Will,” similarly. “They could act with complete autonomy and their actions were not predetermined.” But now, physics and neuroscience together have significantly challenged this belief.

    What is missing here is any acknowledgment that this Eden was never long-lived and never universal. The belief in irreducible external matter and the belief in free will come with distinct local histories, emerging originally as answers to specific contextual problems (as, in the case of free will, accounting for the causes of sin). And so when Chalmers suggests that a further instance of the fall is currently transpiring, from an idea of reality as inherently physical to one that acknowledges the virtual as well, one cannot help but wish for further genealogy and elucidation of the supposedly Edenic stage of the representation of reality which is supposedly now coming to a close.

    And now to the heart of the matter. What is the nature of the increasingly widespread contention that reality may be “virtual”? A great deal in our culture and our society hangs on the answer to this question. In Chalmers’ book, the argument sets out from the observation that we, today, have become adept at running simulations of many things, from possible chess moves to possible pathways and chronologies of early human migration from Asia to the Americas. We simulate paleoclimates and the possible pathways of future climate change. We simulate hydrodynamic flow and the risks of nuclear escalation. We also simulate regions of the world, from, say, a digital model of Paris in 1789 to the Amazon rainforest. In time, it is reasonable to anticipate that we will have a fully immersive model of the entirety of the observable universe. In scientific research, in defense initiatives, and in leisurely gaming, we as a species have begun digitally to reproduce the world into which we have been cast, and even to generate new possible worlds that have the power to reveal to us the general form of the future.

    Now, you might anticipate that as world-simulations become increasingly fine-grained, they will begin to include not just individual human beings but also the smallest details in the constitution of these human beings, notably the number and the arrangement of their individual neurons. But if these are simulated faithfully and exhaustively, supporters of the simulation argument contend, then they are likely to come to have the same conscious experiences as would be had by the neurons of a physical brain. Given our own tendency to run huge numbers of simulations for anything in the physical world that is of interest to us, it is reasonable, the argument in turn holds, to suppose that any beings in “base reality” (that is, the physical reality in which simulations are generated) that develop the ability to run fine-grained simulations of human brains will bring into being vastly more simulated human beings than human beings who ever existed in base reality. That means, we are told, that if you find yourself thinking, and experiencing your life as a human being, and you acknowledge the possibility that our descendants may develop the ability to run exhaustively detailed simulations of their ancestors, it is highly probable that your own thinking is the thinking of a simulated human being and not of a human being in base reality.

    This conclusion rests on a few fairly substantial presuppositions. One of them is what Bostrom, in an influential article in 2003 entitled “Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?,” calls “substrate-independence.” This is the view, widely but not universally shared among philosophers of mind, that the organic substrate in which human consciousness is realized is a contingent and not a necessary condition of this consciousness, which could just as well be realized in a silicon substrate, or in a substrate of toilet-paper rolls and string, or in anything, really, that faithfully reproduces the organization of the neurons in the brain. One implication of substrate-independence is that it would be in principle possible for each of us to “upload” our consciousness into a computer and thereby to achieve immortality.

    If substrate-independence is not true, then the simulation argument is a non-starter. This is indeed a big if, and you might think that anyone who offers a version of the simulation argument would also feel compelled to make a convincing case for the truth of the claim on which it depends. But Bostrom simply presupposes it, a move that might be excused in an article in the name of succinctness. Chalmers, for his part, dilates in his tome on every question of interest to him, often repeating the same basic claims several times — and yet the argument that he offers for the substrate-independence thesis is hasty and unconvincing, and sometimes seems to be one he would rather not have to make at all.

    Early in the book the technophilosopher states the case for the consciousness of simulated beings (or “sims”) hypothetically: “At least if we assume that a simulated brain would have the same conscious experience as the brain it’s simulating…”; “Under reasonable assumptions, … sims will have conscious experiences that are the same as those of the nonsims they simulate.” His fifteenth chapter, called “Can there be consciousness in a digital world?,” seeks finally to justify these “reasonable assumptions” — but it consists in a short introductory section telling of an episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation in which the philosophical problem of the android Data’s contested consciousness is explored, which is followed by a section entitled “The problem of consciousness,” in which Chalmers summarizes the philosophical contributions of his previous book on the philosophy of consciousness, in which he argued that “no explanation of consciousness in purely physical terms is possible.” Chalmers does not reject this view in Reality+, though it does seem to be in some tension with the simulation argument: if base-reality consciousness is not to be explained by existing fundamental properties of the physical world, then it is not clear, at least to me, how we can be confident that a computer-based model of the structures we find in the physical brain will be conscious. If we don’t know what the relationship between the physical brain and consciousness is, we would seem to be on even weaker ground in attempting to account for the relationship between a simulated brain and consciousness.

    But Chalmers quickly sets the “hard problem” aside and moves on to another section, called “The problem of other minds,” in which he runs through the familiar problem of skepticism about the consciousness of other biological beings such as humans and non-human animals. When it comes right down to it, for all we know it is not just machines that lack qualia — inner subjective states, something it is “like” to be them — but other humans and animals may lack them as well. We have no access to the inner experience of other beings, and so in a strict sense other naturally generated minds leave us with the same problems as artificially constructed “minds.” But this problem is not directly relevant to solving the more narrow question of the possible consciousness of AI systems, and in this section again the philosopher of virtuality postpones the promised answer to the question that serves as this chapter’s title. We finally get to the heart of the matter in the penultimate section, “Can machines be conscious?,” and in a short coda entitled “Consequences.” The stakes are high: without substrate-independence, you will remember, the entire simulation argument fails to get off the ground.

    So, then, can machines be conscious? Chalmers focuses on one type of machine: “a perfect simulation of a brain, such as my own,” that is, a brain simulation that is “a digital simulation running on a computer.” The initial attempt to characterize such a simulation has a troubling air of circularity to it: “How would simulating a brain work?” Chalmers asks. And he answers: “We can suppose that every neuron is simulated perfectly.” Alright, one wants to say, but how does it work? Chalmers acknowledges that it might not work: some believe, after all, that consciousness is not an algorithmic process at all. But even this obstacle, he supposes elsewhere in the book, might be got around eventually by simulating it, whatever it is, on an analog quantum computer, when, and if, such a technology becomes available. But how again, now, using known technologies, would a simulated brain work? In what appears to me a startling bit of legerdemain, Chalmers moves from an apparently sincere concern to answer this question to what I take to be a reiteration of the presumption that a simulated brain would work (that is, would be conscious), and then proceeds to tell us what “one big advantage” of such a simulated brain would be (that “it raises the possibility that we might become the machine”), and, next, to tell us his preferred strategy for going about such a simulation (“the safest way to become a simulated brain is to become one in stages”). But this strategy for “gradual uploading” is not an argument for the view that uploading is possible. It is a proposal for how to go about testing, someday, whether it is possible or not. And this is all we get in the way of an answer to the question: “Can there be consciousness in a digital world?”

    Beyond the simple non-delivery of the promised answer, there is a troubling conflation of two different kinds of models of the brain. Chalmers begins the penultimate section of Chapter 15 proposing to discuss a particular kind of machine, namely, again, “a digital simulation [of a brain] running on a computer.” But then he goes on, with the example of gradual uploading, to describe something that looks a lot more like the successive removal of cells from the actual brain and their successive replacement by implants that “interact, via receptors and effectors, with neighboring biological cells.” Now, it might well be possible to preserve the full functionality of a biological brain when it is partially, or even perhaps entirely, replaced by physical implants that do the same job as brain cells or neurons. But this does not seem to me to answer the question whether a separate computer simulation of a brain — separate in the same way that a computer model of, say, the hydrodynamics of a river is separate from the river — could become conscious. In the case of brain implants, there is a clear respect in which the artificial implants are “like” the cells they replace, and in which both the artificial and the natural entities share in the same approximate nature, notwithstanding their distinct causal histories. In the case of the computer simulation, it is not at all clear to me that the simulated brain cell, even if it is a limit-case atom-for-atom simulation, shares the relevant properties with the biological brain cell, such that we may be able to anticipate that it is capable of facilitating consciousness — no more in fact than we might anticipate that a computer-based hydrodynamic model of a river, if it were to reach a sufficiently fine-grained degree of accuracy, would become wet.

    That is just not something we can expect to happen inside a computer, no matter how much the computer is able to reveal to us about wetness, and I have seen no real argument that consciousness is relevantly different from wetness in this regard. Until I see such an argument, I must withhold a commitment to substrate-independence, and this means that I am also going to decline to take the simulation argument seriously, since it depends entirely on substrate-independence in order to work. Or at least, as with creation science and other similar deviations, I am going to take it seriously as a social phenomenon, and try to understand its causes, while refusing to take it seriously on the terms it would like to be taken.

    Though we are both philosophers, Chalmers and I belong to different discursive communities, and most of my criticisms here (though not the criticism of his discussion of consciousness), I recognize, may be considered as “external” to his project as he conceives it. Ordinarily I believe projects should be criticized on their merits, according to the aims and the scope that those who undertake them have chosen. But in this case I am motivated by a concern about what gets to count as philosophy, and why. Although I am a philosopher, my preoccupation with such things as the ethnography of folk-beliefs about revenants has led to a general perception among my peers that I have strayed from the discipline, that I have let too much of the actual world seep into my thinking, that I have wandered off into mere “erudition,” a term that is always used by analytic philosophers as a back-handed compliment to signal that the erudit in question is cultivating a lesser skill, one that compensates for the lack of any natural aptitude in what really counts: the art of rational argumentation and distinction-making. And so the result is that what gets to count as philosophy is often generated in a vacuum, ignorant of its sources, of the contingency and localism of what it takes to be its self-evident starting-points, and destined to be as ephemeral as the pop-culture that nearly exhausts its universe of references.

    Chalmers may well be living in a simulation, but not the one that he imagines. He is simulating for himself a world that is not inhabited by scholars and critics adept at exposing the ideological forces that shape a given historical era’s conception of reality; a world not inhabited by anthropologists and the people who inform them of models of the world inspired by objects of particular cultural value just as the video game inspires Chalmer’s model; a world in which there are no other ways of representing reality than those of a highly specialized caste in the learned institutions of Europe, India, and China, the latter two admitted as full members of the philosophical community only recently and begrudgingly, and at the expense of other traditions that could now more confidently be cordoned off as “non-philosophical.” Ideology yields simulations too, and the highest goal of the philosopher, now as ever, ought to be a search for “signs” that might lead us out of this simulation. These signs will not be “glitchy” cats that walk by, revealing their virtual nature as a result of some defect in the program, but rather doubts that might arise, for example while reading a pro-VR book such as Reality+. A philosopher who has no interest in even acknowledging the way in which ideological structures shape our worldviews has no business presenting himself as an authority on the question whether the world is a simulation or not.

    Somewhat surprisingly, Chalmers favorably invokes Jean Baudrillard’s well-known postmodernist explorations in Simulacra and Simulations, which appeared in 1981. It is likely that this work entered Chalmers’ universe of references primarily because it was, famously, featured as an Easter egg in an early scene of The Matrix. Lily Wachowski, one of the pair of the original movie’s creators, claimed in 2020 that the film was born of “rage at capitalism,” while the critic Andrea Long Chu would a year later make the case that the film is an allegory of transgender identity (an identity both Wachowski siblings would claim some years after the film appeared). But plainly these are high-theory retrofittings upon what was in its original form mostly a piece of standard-fare science-fiction fun, in which the Baudrillardian flourish adds or explains next to nothing. And in any case the extent of Chalmers’ use of the French theorist involves little more than a technical distinction that Baudrillard makes between simulation and representation.

    It is ironic that Baudrillard should find his way at all into a book arguing that physical reality itself may be a simulation, since Baudrillard’s concern was with the way in which our picture of social reality is shaped and mediated in large part through media technologies. His famous (or notorious) declaration that “the Gulf War did not take place” was not, by his own lights, a denial that anyone actually died in Iraq or Kuwait in the early 1990s, but only that the idea that a typical American, and perhaps a typical European, formed in association with the phrase “the Gulf War” was excessively shaped by media forces, particularly the new uninterrupted onslaught of images on cable news networks such as CNN. And when you understand a war to be something that happens on your screen rather than in the world, this significantly constrains your capacity to arrive at a mature and sober analysis of war’s moral and human costs. Baudrillard’s analysis of simulation drew him toward the conclusion that our attachment to digitally mediated images of reality, an attachment that is pushed on us by the profit-seeking interests of the media companies, fundamentally weakens our ability to engage critically with reality itself. He was an enemy of simulation. He would have considered the “simulation hypothesis” — that what we think of as reality is in fact a virtual world of the sort with which we are most familiar from our screen- or goggle-mediated games — to have been a resounding victory for the forces of which his work is meant to be a condemnation. It is hard to think of any idea that would more gravely damage our sense of reality than the idea that it is virtual or simulated.

    The gamification of social reality is a political matter, and not, in the first instance, a metaphysical one. To conceptualize reality as a whole on the model of the algorithmic gaming technologies that have so enraptured us in our own age is to contribute to the validation of a particular form of social reality: namely, the model of reality in which gamified structures have jumped across the screen, from Pac-Man or Twitter or whatever it is you were playing, and now shape everything we do, from dating to car-sharing to working in an Amazon warehouse. The “simulation argument” is nothing but an apology for algorithmic capitalism.

    The spirit of this new economic and political order has extended from Chalmers’ philosophical writing into other para-academic projects, most notably the social-media network PhilPeople.org, which he co-directs with David Bourget, and which largely duplicates the structures of Facebook or LinkedIn for a global network of professional philosophers. As if to demonstrate the great distance that AI has yet to traverse before it achieves anything that might be called “intelligence” in a non-equivocal sense, I have more than once had to write to PhilPeople to request that false information in AI-generated stub profiles of me be taken down. Still today, there is a stub that appears to indicate that I am an “undergraduate” at Eastern University. There is no accounting for this, nor evidently, given that it is still there, any human being willing to be held accountable.

    Such a landscape of artificial stupidity, in which there is a glut of undifferentiated information and misinformation issuing forth from machines that could not care less about the distinction between the two, is, much more than the possible dawning of machine consciousness, which is the real story of our most recent technological revolution. That we human beings are compelled to submit to the terms and the constraints laid out by thoughtless machines — for example that we are expected to groom and update AI-generated stub profiles of ourselves that we never asked for in the first place, lest misinformation about us spread and we “lose points” in the great game of our professional standing — is, quite obviously, an encroachment on our freedom, and therefore, again, an encroachment on the one sort of play by the other. Play is now left to the very youngest of us: those too young to understand what screens are, too young to discern the world that lies behind and beyond them. Adolescence begins, perhaps, when we learn to channel our innate playfulness into competition. The comprehensive gamification of adulthood, in this light, has the condition of permanent adolescence as its corollary.

    PhilPeople is in the end a boutique affair, greatly overshadowed by such large-scale projects as ResearchGate, Google Scholar, or Academia.edu, which aggressively metricize scholarly output, and effectively transform the assessment of a scholar’s work, even of a philosopher’s work, into formulae so crude that even a machine, even a dull vice-dean with a background in business administration, can understand them. Universities now regularly take such metrics as the number of downloads an open-access article has received to be decisive for promotion and tenure, and there is no reason not to expect, in such a gamified landscape, that soon enough professors up for advancement will respond to this absurd predicament by paying an off-shore click-farm for bulk downloads of published work. In time we might expect to outsource the work of both scholarship and scholarship-evaluation to the machines, which would really just be the perfection of a system already emerging, in which the only real job left is the work of managing our online profiles, while the machines do everything else.

    If you wish to set yourself up in this world as a poet, your plight is substantially the same as that of a scholar: you create an account on Submittable, “the social impact platform,” and you manage it. You also have to write some poems at some point, of course, but what can poetry hope to be in the age of “streamlined social-impact initiatives so you can reach your goals faster,” as Submittable describes itself? In nearly every domain of public life in which I have any investment at all, I also have an online portal to it, and automated messages telling me that I need to update the information in my portal. In most of these domains, the activity in these portals is being tracked, and is taken as an ersatz measure of my commitment to the domains themselves. My experience is limited, admittedly, but I have trouble believing they are not representative of our contemporary situation, and that if I were a truck driver, or a restaurateur, or a cosmetician, I would be doing much the same thing as I am in my actual life: updating my passwords, checking my stats, pumping my metrics — feeding the machines.

    That these are the real challenges of our current technological conjuncture, rather than, say, the search for glitchy cats that might show us the way out of the Matrix, is a sober fact that at least some professional philosophers are prepared to acknowledge. Daniel Dennett, great influence and inspiration for Chalmers, has been increasingly outspoken in the view that we should not be wasting time speculating about the dawn of conscious machines when this time would be much better spent coming up with practical policy measures to ensure that machines be prevented from encroaching into distinctly and irreducibly human spheres of existence. Other philosophers are interested in the serious dangers of algorithmic bias, where machines that lack consciousness nonetheless discriminate against groups of people, with no awareness that this is what they are doing, and no accountability for doing so; and the even more serious dangers of algorithmic defense systems, where machines that lack consciousness are imbued with the gravest responsibility of all, one that they could fail as a result of a simple technical malfunction, and once again with no real accountability. Sober philosophy, in sum, recognizes our human responsibility as the makers and stewards of the machines, rather than imagining that our entire reality is a virtual simulation produced by a machine.

    At least some readers might expect a book co-written by Henry Kissinger and former Google CEO Eric Schmidt (along with Daniel Huttenlocher) to be more susceptible to ideological infection than a book about technology written by an academic philosopher. But these are strange times, and I must grudgingly report that in their recent work The Age of AI and Our Human Future these authors are surprisingly lucid about the actual challenges that we face at present. This lucidity extends both to practical risks and to philosophical questions about the nature of the new systems that create these risks. For them, AI’s ability to process information about aspects of the environment that remain undetected by human beings fundamentally transforms the nature of several domains, notably warfare, as it adds a tremendous element of incalculability. But this information-processing capability is in the end only a further development of the same sort of computation that machines have been doing for many decades now, since they first began to be trained up on the rules of checkers and chess. No matter how far and wide their training extends, the ability of machines to process a wide range of moves more quickly and exhaustively than a human being ever could is by no means an indication that they are moving towards any sort of intelligence, let alone consciousness, of the sort that human beings experience. Indeed the fact that they are so much better at processing certain bodies of information should itself be taken as an indication that they are not at all doing something comparable to what we are doing in our imperfect, limited way. Information-processing, no matter how vast, is not the same activity as judgement.

    It is the presumption that human beings are, in their nature, algorithmic “problem-solvers,” as Karl Popper was already saying in the 1950s, that leads to such poorly thought-out efforts at the integration of machines into human society as we are seeing in the present day. Already in the early 1960s, Norbert Wiener discerned the most serious challenges of the digital revolution, where simply training machines to execute evidently minor tasks already awakens threats that can be foreseen in their concrete form, and forestalled in good time, only with great difficulty. “To turn a machine off effectively,” Wiener warned, “we must be in possession of information as to whether the danger point has come. The mere fact that we have made the machine does not guarantee that we shall have the proper information to do this. This is already implicit in… the checker-playing machine [that] can defeat the man who has programmed it.” Our greatest challenge today is not that machines may gain consciousness, and still less that we are ourselves conscious machines, but that the machines may defeat us, and do not require consciousness in order to do so.

    The real prospect of our total defeat arose in the middle of the twentieth century at the same moment that we began to take strategy games, even such trivial pastimes as checkers, to be paradigmatic models of the core endeavors of human life. The intellectual historians of the last century regard “game theory” as one of its great achievements, but it is past time that we regard it critically and recognize the poverty of its understanding of human motivation and human action. We have conferred too much prestige upon games, just as we have mistaken algorithms for play. We should be highly wary today of anyone who continues to take games, even such trivial and seemingly harmless pastimes as the VR-mediated fun of Rec Room, as any sort of key for grasping the human difference and its place in our fragile and frightening world.

    |||to|||name|||every|||one|||

    1.
    three hundred nameless
    walk
    holding names behind their backs
    bone to bone
    muscle to muscle
    let us stretch their memory between our lines

    2.
    saved by death from life
    name yourself
    mouth-holes stare

    3.
    outside, it’s not death that whitens with bones in the leaves of trees
    you look closer
    but indeed, it is death
    outside, it’s not death that blooms in the branches of trees
    you look closer
    but indeed, it is death
    outside, it’s not death that sings a birdsong in the white branches in the white blossoms of trees
    you look closer
    but indeed, it is death

    4.
    death
    that has saved so many from life
    name everyone by name
    the mouth-hole of death stares

    5.
    not the bones of earth
    not the blood of heaven
    not the voices of war
    we
    no one’s

    6.
    and who is our memory about
    everyone
    and our words about no one
    about everyone
    our bones are muscles and blood about no one
    about everyone
    hair’s falling out nails split cheeks sink into mouths
    no one’s

    7.
    bone to bone
    blood to blood
    death to death
    poetry
    for no one for everyone
    grips the blood the bones the water in the tap the sand on the temple the fingers the nose the jaw every skull grips the hem like burrs asks to carry it to the better times carry it at least in the mouth of one in the mouth of the three hundred nameless
    I look closer
    but indeed, it is a war
    for no one
    to everyone

    Translated by Valzhyna Mort

    night forty-eight

    1
    I wear a second-hand country a second-hand city apartment bed pillow blanket
    ability to walk across a park without checking under my feet without checking over my shoulder
    but Poland is not safe
    Lithuania is not safe
    Germany is not safe

    2
    I wake up from loud conversations behind the wall fuss jostling banging of doors
    I think
    /// there we go, the war is here too ///
    I roll over I try to fall asleep knowing
    that Moldova is not safe
    Romania is not safe
    Estonia is not safe

    3
    every night now I see the same dream
    in the dream I go to work in the morning
    I return in the afternoon
    I wash dishes I wash clothes I cook dinner I read books I go to bed
    and even in this dream
    Latvia is not safe
    Georgia is not safe
    Finland is not safe

    4
    to help myself fall asleep, I do simple exercises
    1) I imagine two solid walls between myself and the window
    2) I imagine myself behind a heavy metal door in front of which stands an oak armoire
    3) I double-check my food supplies my drinking water and the contents of my emergency bag
    because
    Slovakia is not safe
    France is not safe
    Italy is not safe

    5
    having not found any safe areas on the map
    I wait out the war
    —
    in the second-hand time

    Translated by Valzhyna Mort

    An Open Letter to an Enemy of Liberalism in My Native Land

    Dear Professor Legutko,

    Early this year, when Russians were positioning their troops along Ukraine’s borders and liberal democracies were debating what it all might mean, I started reading your books. I have heard that they are influential in Poland, and I am concerned about the weakening of liberal democratic commitments in our native land and more broadly in East Central Europe. Would their political identity, their liberal commitments, prove strong enough in what seemed like a new confrontation with Russians authoritarianism? It is a rather disturbing question to ask about Poland and Hungary, and to a lesser degree about other former Soviet satellites, only thirty years after the fall of communism.

    A lot has been written lately about the possible reasons for this weakening, and for the contemporary appearance in the West of “post-liberalism,” but I decided to explore the issue by studying the work of Ryszard Legutko, your work, the work of a declared Polish anti-liberal, a philosopher, an educator, a former minister of education, a politician of the ruling illiberal Law and Justice party, and a member of my own generation. In our lives we have witnessed the same events — the student protests in 1968, the Prague Spring, the workers’ protests of the 1970s, Solidarity and martial law. We have read the same books, we have heard the same people. I was exhilarated by Poland’s, and the region’s, attainment of democracy in 1989, a benevolent revolution that I considered a perfectly natural and logical development. You, on the other hand, believe that adopting democratic liberalism was our homeland’s gravest mistake. You also claim, provocatively and rather counterintuitively, that liberalism, or liberal democracy, which has always been rightly regarded as communism’s eternal enemy, is in fact communism in disguise. Liberalism, in your view, is communism that is actually winning!

    I was not sure what I expected to gain from reading your books. Keeping a vigilant eye on the enemy of everything I believe in? But attending to counter-narratives, even distasteful ones, can be instructive. An unapologetic liberal, I was prepared for a strange voyage. I was not wrong. When I was halfway through your book The Cunning of Freedom, Russia invaded Ukraine. Illiberal authoritarianism was on the march and liberal democracies were rapidly mobilizing. (I must note here that when you spoke before the European Parliament you condemned Moscow’s invasion in the strongest terms.) Glued to a TV, I became distracted and irascible. So many lives, all of them so similar to our own, were being destroyed, so much pain inflicted on real human beings, in the name of antiliberalism. Still, I kept reading.

    In the foreword to your book The Demon in Democracy, John O’Sullivan, the British conservative commentator and erstwhile political advisor to Margaret Thatcher, tries to convince us that what you mean by liberal democracy is not liberal democracy at all. It should be called by an altogether different name, perhaps “liberal-democracy.” It is certainly not liberal democracy “as it was understood by, say, Winston Churchill or FDR or John F. Kennedy or Ronald Reagan. That was essentially majoritarian democracy resting on constitutional liberal guarantees of free speech, free association, free media, and other liberties needed to ensure that debate was real and elections fair.” Liberal-democracy, on the other hand, is ideological, “liberationist,” and does not hesitate to restrict the freedom of persons and institutions “from parental rights to national sovereignty.” It is, in other words, precisely what conservatives denounce as “leftist” or “progressive” liberalism. Whereas the “classical liberalism” of fundamental human rights, open debate, and governments of, by, and for the people, is, for O’Sullivan, just fine.

    Your repeated complaints against feminism, the “enormous privileges” of homosexuals, the “persistent attempt to deconstruct family,” multiculturalism, the general decline of public and private morals, the loss of self-restraint and shame and the sense of duty, all have a distinct odor of right-wing bigotry. But your ambition goes much further. All these modern abominations, you claim, are not excesses or aberrations of liberal life. They are, in your interpretation of them, direct and unavoidable consequences of the very essence of liberal philosophy. Yes, your enemy is the same liberalism that O’Sullivan so gallantly defends — the liberalism of human rights, equality, and individual sovereignty. Liberalism, and with it liberal democracy, is poisoned at the root, in the fundamental and faulty premises of Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Mill. The whole intellectual and political structure created by the Enlightenment is, according to you, only now reaching its full potential, which is also its final undoing. You have your own version of the end of history.

    You are not original or alone in your post-liberalism and your counter-Enlightenment. We have heard similarly hostile judgments about liberalism, and about modernity, and about the Enlightenment tradition, since the beginning of liberalism itself. Today they can be found in the works of academic anti-liberals such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Adrian Vermeule, and Patrick Deneen. Liberalism’s cardinal sin, they claim, was Locke’s concept of the “state of nature” — a hypothetical condition of perfect liberty, pre-political and pre-social, to which every human being aspires. But in the course of history various forms of governments, aided by religion, have imposed upon this naturally free human being piles of arbitrary restrictions and obligations that hamper and distort his natural capacities. To liberate the human individual and allow him to reach his full potential, every form of human association, every stricture and obligation, needs to be rationally examined, reduced to actual necessities, and legitimized by popular consent — the hypothetical “social contract.” In your view and the view of other antiliberals, this was a revolutionary idea that struck at tyranny — but also destroyed everything that was good and useful in the pre-liberal and pre-modern world.

    In order to fulfil its goals, liberalism, according to the account of the post-liberals, became the fierce enemy of the intricate network of traditional interhuman relations, “social hierarchies, customs, traditions, and practices that had existed prior to the emergence of the new political system,” of the very concept of human rootedness and continuity. Nothing old was allowed to stay in place. Everything had to be invented anew. Nothing was to be accepted on faith, except perhaps liberalism’s own holy creed, which includes the concepts of innate human equality and inalienable human rights, which you and your comrades denounce as an absurdity without philosophical or theological justification.

    According to this narrative, which you repeat almost verbatim, liberalism is in a state of constant and relentless war against the remaining bastions of tradition — local communities, the family, and religion — replacing them with its own artificial constructs. Freedoms needed to be regulated, lest they interfere with other freedoms. Liberalism benefitted from a reluctant and misguided need to be led to the light. Hence its ever-intensifying social engineering, its justifications of the coercive function of a supposedly minimal state — its continuous politicization of, and interference with, all aspects of human life, including the most private ones. Instead of the “natural” self-discipline and restraint that reigned in the pre-modern world, which was accepted, apparently without objection, by grateful members of all classes and estates, we got a multiplicity of laws and regulations imposed by distant, anonymous institutions. This process, started over two centuries ago, is yielding more and more dreary results — “absurd” feminist ideology, sexual candor and freedom, unlimited rights to abortion, genderism, euthanasia, and legislation against domestic violence and hate speech, which allow “further drastic intervention by government and the courts in family life, the media, public institutions, and schools.” Oh, and also the “transnational” homosexual movement that has grown so influential that one can no longer entertain a “harmless” “faggot joke.” (You actually said that!)

    Liberalism, in your intimidating and exaggerated view of it, is a hyper-ideology that coopts both the right and the left: welfare state advocates and free market fundamentalists, identitarians and globalists, radical environmentalists and greedy industrialists — they all bow to the same liberal idol. Gathered in its temple “the socialists and the conservatives are unanimous in their condemnations: they condemn racism, sexism, homophobia, discrimination, intolerance, and all the other sins listed in the liberal-democratic catechism.” (Where are the bold, free spirits ready to defend racism, sexism, homophobia, and the rest? You know exactly where they are.)

    Tolerance and pluralism are also liberal ruses. “One simply cannot put a Christian, a Muslim, a socialist, and a conservative into an individualistic/egalitarian framework and expect them to be Christian, Muslim, a socialist, or conservative in the standard sense of the word,” you instruct. “Two loyalties — one particular to one’s own community, and the other to an infinitely open system — cannot be reconciled.” If two loyalties seem too many to you, dear professor, then you know precious little about the complexity and the richness of actual human identity. Moreover, the individualistic and egalitarian framework is probably the only framework in which you can safely put such different people together. Communities that exclude loyalty to other communities, or even limit contacts with those outside the community, do exist, but they are a rarity rather than a rule, and they are certainly not a model of social peace. The liberal framework, by contrast, tolerates and protects such exclusive communities, as long as they do not interfere with other communities or do something nasty to their children. Consider the flourishing in liberal America of the Amish, who are much praised by Patrick Deneen.

    In your view, freedom is a limited commodity that should be meted out judiciously. Some people clearly deserve more of it than others. Citing Aristotle, you remind us that some of us are born to be slaves and some of us to be masters. You contend that by extending freedom to some groups we must take it away from others. This does not add to the general pool of freedom. “Imposing the liberal system of freedom,” you complain, “requires that the disadvantaged receive more free space while the privileged have a certain amount of it taken away from them.” (I am reminded of Anatole France’s ironic observation that “the law, in its majestic equality, forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.” And also of your utterly unironic observation that “it would be true to say that both a beggar and a Rockefeller, if left alone, would have exactly the same freedom to sleep rough or spend their vacation in Hawaii….”) All this, you say, leads to social engineering, “for instance upgrading women and blacks while restraining patriarchy,” just as “encouraging homosexuals has meant limiting what has been called ‘the monopoly’ of heterosexuals in all areas of life.” You have a strange way with empathy. I conclude that in your view it is better to leave the advantaged and the disadvantaged exactly as they are.

    In your account, liberalism is an aggressive and expansionist force. It moves forward “relentlessly,” “annihilates internal criticism,” “hunts down old, incorrect rights,” “ruthlessly imposes liberal-democratic patterns on everything and everyone.” It conquers new territories “as if under a single well-structured and well-organized command following a superbly devised strategy.” Very frightening! Liberalism lures and corrupts by its false vision of an easy life — entitlements without obligations, no striving for moral merits, no need to justify claims, dignity possessed without moral achievement, by the very fact of being born. As a result, the denizens of liberal democracies have more and more rights but less and less freedom, which naturally breeds alienation and anomie. Despite its apparent vibrancy, therefore, life in a liberal democracy is lackluster and dull. Liberal art has been dehumanized; its literature is “speaking about nothing”; the rhetoric of diversity is “masking expanding uniformity.” In the liberal world “there is neither conversation nor poetry.” (Where have you lived?) Luckily, however, the whole liberal project is nearing its end. Liberalism’s energies are almost spent, and it is entering a final crisis — which is entirely its own fault.

    It is certainly true that in the name of liberalism we must allow, and even encourage, the criticism of liberalism — and so I hasten to say that it was indeed unfortunate that in 2019 your lecture at the Alexander Hamilton Forum at Middlebury College was canceled after student protests. That is emphatically not the liberal way. Freedom of speech is always a two-way street. The more of it there is, the better prepared we are to respond to our opponents. (I understand that eventually you were able to speak to a political science class at Middlebury.) You are also right to caution against accusing everybody who takes issue with liberal democracy of crypto-fascism. But your own work does not make it easy to enforce such a distinction. It is hard to ignore some of its disturbing, indeed odious themes — the rejection of individual human rights, the repudiation of tolerance, the dream of an organic and homogenous Gemeinschaft with little room for ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities.

    I detect something personal, something pre-intellectual, in your denunciations of liberal democracy — a visceral recoil from its uncontrollable scope and variety. It seems to make you profoundly anxious. You write that your doubts about liberal democracy started during your first trips to the West in 1970, when you discovered that liberals were reluctant to condemn communism in unambiguous terms. Was that the main thing that you noticed about the West? Your observation, by the way, was incorrect: many of the most ferocious Western adversaries of communism were liberals. But the hesitation that you detected in certain left-wing quarters made you speculate, and you came up with a theory: that there are deep affinities between the two systems. And this led you to the wild conclusion that liberalism sets itself the same goals that communism does. Both are future-oriented and both are “progressive,” that is, both promise the constant betterment of the human condition — at a price, of course. Both are engaged in intense social engineering and social coercion to create nothing less than a new society and a new human being. Both are hostile to communities, families, and religions. (Though for you only one religion really matters.) Both are millennarian cults that strive for the ultimate victory, for the apotheosis of history.

    Yet liberalism is worse than communism, in your view, because it is more clever: it achieves its goals without resorting to overt coercion, to anything as coarse as the Gulag and the KGB. It even allows you to publish your anti-liberal books! (Have you ever read Herbert Marcuse?) Liberalism is so insidious that, unlike communism, it has never openly claimed to struggle towards some ultimate future of harmony and bliss, for the sake of which even genocidal atrocities are justified. Unlike communism, which is so obvious, liberalism never maintained that its vision of history has been scientifically, that is unquestionably, proven and beyond discussion. Yet you are not fooled. You have decoded the reality beneath the appearances. You know that we must await the hour when the mask will fall, and the totalitarian nature of liberal democracy will become visible to all.

    If this is the truth that you have spent the best part of your career proving, I pity you. But again I must wonder what is eating at you. During you first visits to the West, you must have stumbled among the post-1968 leftists. This was practically inevitable. I remember my own first visit to the West — to London — in 1969, in the sophomore year of my English studies. In order to obtain a passport and a permit to travel, one had to produce a notarized invitation from someone abroad who would solemnly promise to pay for your upkeep. Who would take such a risk? Unless you had close and generous family in the West, you had to find a person, a friend of a friend, sometimes a total stranger, to sign the papers, with the silent understanding that it was a fiction and that you will not be a burden. In my experience, the people most likely to do so were the rebellious leftist types who, not unlike us, found a thrill in flaunting bureaucratic regulations. They were the curious ones who came backpacking to Eastern Europe to check it out for themselves. They visited our student clubs, came to our drinking parties, engaged in endless discussions, and invited us to backpack across their countries. Once we got there, they sometimes let us sleep on the floor in their dingy apartments with their Che and Mao posters. They were totally misguided in their politics, but they were awfully nice people. They were wrong, but they were free.

    I still remember my exhilaration when I set foot in London. Raised in a rather conservative and overprotective Polish family, I found myself for several eventful weeks completely on my own, immersed in a world that was strange but oddly recognizable — dense, vivid, constantly throwing me off balance yet never letting me fall. I walked through posh and shabby neighborhoods, sat with hippies in Hyde Park, watched multigenerational Indian families picnicking on the grass and little African boys practicing cricket on the pitch. I followed with amusement a march of somber-faced bearded members of the Young Communist League of London. I hitchhiked in a tiny car packed with jolly itinerants who must have been British travelers, and I stayed with hospitable Ukrainian emigres whose wartime past I preferred not to investigate.

    It was hardly a vacation. I came with a hundred pounds in my pocket — a fortune, if you had to buy it on the black market. I slept in strange, unhealthy places. I washed dishes in pubs and painted houseboats on the Thames. I worked on a demolition site supervised by a Polish foreman, who showed the most extraordinary disregard for his workers’ safety. All the time I entertained the absurd idea that absolutely nothing bad could happen to me because this was the world is as it should be. I was naive, of course, and I probably put myself in a lot of danger, but nothing bad happened and I returned to Poland with a clear idea of what the “normal world” is. I decided to recreate it internally, or in the close circle of my friends. We were not rebels, dissidents, conspirators. We were just ordinary people trying to live ordinary lives, that is, to express ourselves freely without nervously looking around, to possess “forbidden” knowledge as if it were the most natural thing. Once, on a bus in Warsaw, a stranger reproached me for reading in plain sight a book of unmistakably samizdat provenance. I looked up at him in genuine astonishment. What could be wrong with reading a book?

    Perhaps my approval of liberal democracy — for us it was simply democracy — was also pre-intellectual. I kindled instinctively to it. Political choices, as the Polish poet Zbigniew Herbert once remarked, are frequently a matter of taste.

    What strikes me most in today’s antiliberal narratives is their conviction that for over two centuries Western civilization flourished (and sometimes withered and flourished again) in a fog of misconceptions. To claim that everything humanity did in that vibrant, creative, often turbulent era was the result of a huge philosophical error, of certain wrong premises laid down in the eighteenth century by a handful of philosophers, is to deny the abundance of history and human agency. Were we so easily fooled, and for so long? And what would happen if we really tried to undo that fantastic fallacy and returned to the truth, returned to… what exactly?

    You blame the philosophers of the eighteenth century for their revolutionary theories. I, too, have a reverence for ideas, but one does not have to be a Marxist to see that some non-ideological factors played a role in the great historical transformation. The history of ideas is not the whole of history. There is also the history of economics, society, technology, science, human geography. Momentous changes were happening in all those realms at that time. They caused political upheavals and religious wars. Sometimes the ideas came later. Locke wrote in the aftermath of Cromwell’s Civil War, the regicide of Charles I, the Restoration, and the Glorious Revolution that ushered in constitutional monarchy in Britain. His philosophy expressed what was probably on the minds of many people. Liberal political principles started to take root, first in the Anglo-Saxon world and then in all corners of the Western world, not as a doctrine imposed from above, but as a response to the demands of the emerging new world. It was not the only response, but its success was hardly a matter of historical accident or of the machinations of “liberal elites.”

    The people whom we call the fathers of liberal thought were not always the most rigorous thinkers and they did not usually exert themselves too much to create elegant, abstract philosophical systems. (The conservative thought of the same period did not exactly cover itself in rigorous glory, either.) Liberal thought draws from many, sometimes contrasting, sources: anthropological optimism (man is rational and capable of freedom) and anthropological pessimism (man is endlessly corruptible), rationalism, empiricism, religion (mostly Protestant Christianity), natural law, a dash of utilitarianism. Liberal philosophers, especially those in the English tradition, often smoothed out the seams by referring to observable facts and to common sense. Bertrand Russell (definitely not one of your heroes) saw this piecemeal, empirical approach of the English liberal thinkers as their great advantage. Liberalism’s loose structure leaves a lot of room to improvise, and it requires constant thinking, debate, compromise, and partial solutions. There is no political doctrine that provides less immediate and total gratification than liberalism. Moreover, I cannot name a single liberal politician who would quote Locke, or Mill, or Kant while proposing, or opposing, a policy or a law. Doctrinal purity is the least of their concerns. Their — our — liberalism is a framework of general ideas that supports a system of constantly evolving institutions, procedures, and legal solutions — a matter of messy practice rather than immaculate dogma.

    Many of the ills of contemporary liberal democracies that you list are real, and they are subject to constant liberal debate, in which common sense sometimes wins. Many of your allegations are familiar anti-liberal exaggerations, sometimes repeated in good faith also by liberals, and it is impossible not to notice that they almost inevitably come down to sex. You and your ilk peddle the strange view that liberals are at bottom hedonists, inveterate pleasure-seekers, philosomatoi, body-lovers, obsessed with sexual indulgence. At this point you put down Plato, Aristotle, and Mill and reach for dusty old issues of Playboy. The emancipation of the body from “the old moral teachings” and the triumph of sexuality has annihilated, in your view, “all hitherto existing moral hierarchies that made sexuality subservient to higher goals.” Sex has been “transformed into a powerful instrument for creating collective ideologies that regulate life’s most private aspect,” with two great victories: “legal abortion and homosexual rights.” Same-sex unions are “as good or as bad as the group marriage of several men and several women,” and equally undermine our attachment to the monogamous unions of one man and one woman.

    Who are these libertines? I wonder where you actually encountered this orgy of license and abandon, this wholesale rejection of the “traditional” family. In Krakow? I must have been hanging out with the wrong crowd. My own experience of liberal life has made me think that a medieval peasant must surely have had more fun, including carnal fun, than my constantly overworked, stressed, hurried, deadline-obsessed friends from the educated middle class. The 1960s, please remember, were a long time ago; we are no longer young and that world (insofar as you portray it at all correctly) is gone. There is something, well, queer about the way sex keeps coming back as the perfect metonymy of everything that has gone wrong in liberal democracy. Isn’t a sex-obsessed analysis of society an intellectual kind of sex addiction?

    Can a society survive without virtue, excellence of character, self-control, and a sense of duty? Obviously not, and the liberal world is no exception. Not long ago, in these pages, Samuel Moyn wrote about the central role of duties in liberal theory and practice. That was not only because duties are necessary to safeguard our rights, but also because rights are necessary if we want to dispense our duties properly. Moyn observes that in recent decades the subject of duties seems to have fallen out of liberal discourse. In my own experience, the situation “on the ground” may not be so dire. The spirit of civic self-organization, activism, and voluntarism — all requiring a strong sense of duty — is as alive as ever. A free and self-reliant individual seeking his own version of eudaimonia, or flourishing, does not need to be a selfish hedonist. (Call me provincial, but I do not know a single person who would fit that description.) It is past time for you, and other sentimental communitarian post-liberals, to notice that individuals form associations for common purposes. They belong to groups and they support causes. They are generally not Dionysian monads. You would be surprised at how often the pursuit of happiness means the pursuit of the happiness of the other.

    The spirit of uncoerced duty, of excellence of character, of a willingness to sacrifice — virtue in the most classical sense — is on plain view in Ukraine, which is fighting for its liberal life. So is barbarity and the viciousness of liberalism’s enemies. We are witnessing the perennial danse macabre of the best  in humankind with the worst. I now see, on live television, pictures from my parents’ war stories: women and children lumbering through fields of broken stone and glass, families huddling in shelters, civilians of all ages training for combat against professional soldiers, housewives storing Molotov cocktails. It is Warsaw in 1939, and the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943, and the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, with some striking anachronisms. The neighborhoods in Ukrainian cities that have been leveled by Russian bombs look exactly like the neighborhoods in which I grew up. The same dreary socialist classicism, the same anonymous concrete apartment buildings, now in ruins. The exodus also looks familiar, just like my future mother must have looked walking out of Warsaw after the fall of the Uprising — women and children, vulnerable and scared — they are still walking, this time with roller suitcases and cheerful school backpacks. They stream into all the neighboring countries, but mainly into Poland. Poland has accepted over two million refugees. To put it in proportion, it is as if twenty-four million people descended on the United States within a few weeks. But this is not a relationship between a victim and a protector, between a supplicant and a charitable helper. After all, Ukrainians also do something for Poles and the rest of Europe. They are our protectors. Taking care of their women and children is the least we can do. That, too, seems to be obvious to Poles — Poles and Ukrainians, together.

    There is a lot of close, entangled, and mostly unhappy history between the two nations. An intimate bond often led to bloodshed, most recently during the horrid Volhynian Massacres in 1942, when the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was brutally cleansing ethnic Poles from Ukrainian lands in the hope of establishing a Ukrainian state under Hitler’s protection. (Hitler had different plans.) Between 50,000 and 100,000 thousand Poles, mostly civilians, including women and children, were slaughtered, as well as many Jews, and also Ukrainians who tried to protect their neighbors. Poles retaliated in kind, killing 10,000 to 30,000 Ukrainians. The Germans, who occupied the territories at that time, stood by and watched. “Hatred grew into the hearts and poisoned the blood of brothers,” wrote the nineteenth-century novelist Henryk Sienkiewicz about an earlier epic bloodletting, the Khmelnitsky uprising in 1648. There seems to be no trace of that poison now.

    Am I like the hapless, pedantic Settembrini in The Magic Mountain, haggling, on the eve of the Great War, with the Hegelian-Marxist anti-liberal Naphta, a Polish Jew schooled by the Jesuits in Spain? Settembrini stands for reason and enlightenment. He is a decent and likable man, but Thomas Mann, his creator, equipped both of the interlocutors in the grand debate with telling human defects. Naphta is beguiled by death and is clearly uncertain about his identity, including the Jewish identity that he tries to conceal. Settembrini, a man of great passion, fears the power of human emotions and tries to push them out of his world. He wants to ignore everything that is irrational, dark, dangerous, or sublime in the human soul. He finds music politically suspect because it lifts the spirit too high, beyond the reaches of reason. Obviously he does not want to hear about metaphysics.

    In this regard he exemplifies a liberal characteristic that is often criticized: its preference for “the mean” at the expense of greatness, its indifference — or hostility — to metaphysical strivings. Man’s spirituality is not one of liberalism’s concerns. And so it can appear small and pedestrian and boring. In his review of Mein Kampf, George Orwell noted that while capitalism and socialism (Orwell’s creed was democratic socialism) promises mainly a gradual improvement of material conditions, Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini offered their followers the rapture of pain and the ecstasy of struggle. Hence their immediate, and disastrous, appeal. One can object that Churchill, too, promised “blood, sweat, and tears,” but they were not his ultimate goals — they were a way to win the comforts and the banalities of peace.

    There are those who claim that Vladimir Putin also harbors such an authoritarian grandeur — that, influenced by the ideas of a twentieth-century Russian fascist mystic named Ivan Illyin, he truly believes in a celestial and divine soul of Russia, and in its holy mission to convert and sanctify the rest of the world. Myself, I think this flatters him with too much spiritual depth, but it is indisputable that metaphysical language is present in Putin’s propaganda. If only Ukrainians, seduced by liberal materialism, would renounce their Western error and return to the holy Russian womb! This may require a dose of purifying violence, a common sacrifice to restore a common spirit.

    The mystical streak runs deep in Russian political tradition. In 1831, when Russian troops were bombarding Warsaw and finishing off the Polish-Lithuanian anti-Russian uprising that inspired (among other things) Chopin’s “Revolutionary Etude,” the great Russian poet Fyedor Tyutchev waxed metaphysical in comparing Poland to Iphigenia as she was sacrificed by Agamemnon “for the breath of fair winds”:

    Pierced by your brother’s arrow,

    fulfilling destiny’s pronouncement,

    you fell, single-tribed eagle,

    onto the purifying fire!

    Believe the word of the Russian people:

    your ashes will be preserved by us in sanctity,

    and our general freedom,

    like the phoenix, will be reborn in them!

    (translated by Frank Jude)

    The Poles were not impressed by such grandiose sanctification, and neither, it seems, are the Ukrainians. Governments should stay out of transcendental preoccupations. Imperfect human laws have more quotidian tasks. One thing is certain about liberalism: it does not lead to religious wars. But having said this, I wish Settembrini would allow himself to enjoy music. It would, ironically enough, make him a better liberal.

    In the days of our youth in Poland, some of us dared to challenge our “socialist civics” teachers by asking an impudent question. How come “bourgeois democracy,” the infamous system of exploitation and suppression of the working class, has not yet succumbed to the inner contradictions described by Marx? Whence its durability? Why do its citizens seem to be thriving materially and culturally — with better cars, better food, better movies, and generally with a more colorful, rich, varied, and exciting existence than in our gray and ascetic world? With communist parties legal, active, and sometimes even participating in governments, citizens could easily send the bourgeois parties packing.

    As a rule, the answer that we were given was curt and threatening. It was that we had succumbed to Western propaganda. We watched too many Western movies and listened to too much Western music. In fact, they told us, the West is nothing like that. There is unemployment, and racism, and widespread crime. What we mistake for the good life is a materialistic façade meant to deceive and enslave people, to turn their attention away from their loneliness, their alienation, their inner poverty. For Western freedoms are meaningless. The system owes its continuity to its control of everything, including human minds. This is what Marx called “false consciousness” — a deceptive system of ideas, beliefs, and habits that creates a veil of obfuscation which prevents people from recognizing their true condition.

    Today’s anti-liberal criticism on the right accepts this Marxist narrative almost without modification. The resilience of liberal democracy troubles the “post-liberals,” and so they predict its imminent downfall. But still they need to explain its apparent resilience, its continued attractiveness. Why does liberal democracy enjoy the support of the very people whom it has purportedly enslaved? Why are its fundamental and systemic flaws not more obvious to those who live with them daily? Why are millions still trekking from illiberal countries into liberal countries, and not the other way round? You, Professor Legutko, admit that “alternative political models have not been drawn or even seriously considered, and the effectiveness of the regime is still impressively high.” But why?

    Your answer sounds oddly familiar to people such as ourselves, who were educated in communist schools. You admit that liberal democracy is “perfectly tailored to the aspirations of the people inhabiting it,” and that the human model that it promotes “is perfectly tailored to the opportunities offered by the political system and to the aspirations enhanced by it.” It would seem, then, that free people have created a system that suits them best. But this cannot be, since it is a wrong system — and so this can only mean that the people living in this system are not really free, or do not know how to use their freedom. How can they be free? They have departed too much from the ideals taught by the ancient philosophers and religions. They are too far gone in the liberal lie. And so they are in urgent need of being saved from themselves. Yes, false consciousness! Nothing here is real. Everything is an illusion. Everything is its opposite. As you write, “pluralism means monopoly; diversity — conformity; tolerance — censorship; openness — ideological rigidity.” Our teachers, and Orwell too, would have been proud.

    You wonder why, after the fall of communism, Poland and the rest of East Central Europe, “as if charmed by powerful but invisible political magicians,” settled for liberal democracy. After all, the huge moral mobilization represented by the overthrow of communism should have culminated in something more profound and spiritual, something that would contain “classical metaphysics, morality, and Christian religion,” something that would have reflected Poland’s unique historical experience. You see post-communist Poland as a slavish imitation of the West induced by an intellectual inertia, by a “contagious” concept of historical inevitability, or, worse, as the result of brainwashing by Poland’s “liberal elites” and conniving by former communists eager to establish a system that would allow them to retain some of their privileges. (Where else would they feel at home if not under a regime similar to communism?) But you do not despair. In your view, the opportunity for redemption may not be entirely lost. People are waking up and voting against the liberals in Hungary and Poland, and soon perhaps in the rest of the region. The trend may even have pan-European consequences. Anti-liberal, or post-liberal, or illiberal parties in your part of the world — the only such parties that actually hold power — may give a much-needed boost to their comrades in West. Some of your fellow anti-liberal politicians even speak openly about Poland’s mission of re-Christianizing Europe.

    Not sharing your misgivings about liberal democracy, I see the post-communist transformation of Poland as both natural and welcome. It is true that the struggle against communism in Poland, and probably in other East-Central European countries, appeared to many people as more of a moral battle than a political one. Yet if high-minded and general language was preferred by the anti-communist dissidents, it was partly, but not entirely, for strategic reasons. After Solidarity’s initial and quite unexpected successes — the strikes spreading like wildfire and forcing the government into an unprecedented dialogue — there was confusion about what exactly the workers should demand. At first their postulates were mainly economic and labor-related, but under the influence of opposition intellectuals they gradually expanded into the social and cultural sphere. It was quite obvious that the proposed changes would gravely curtail the communist monopoly of power. It was hard to predict, however, how far the changes would go and what the new hybrid arrangements would look like. It is safe to assume that most Poles, if asked directly, would have said that they wanted to live in a “democracy of the Western type,” but in those days such an outcome seemed a rather remote possibility. Something unfamiliar was happening, something that should not have been possible, and it was better not to be too specific in one’s plans, or even in one’s dreams.

    As a result, a language of lofty imponderables dominated the public discourse: truth, dignity, honesty, respect, solidarity, fraternity, national identity, and of course “Christian values,” were affirmed loudly by nearly everybody, including anti-clericalists. The Church was a much-needed ally in the struggle, providing spiritual and material assistance, and liberals responded with good will. (There was even a rash of baptisms and church weddings among people who had lived happily without them.) On the liberal left’s side, the textbook of this rapprochement was Adam Michnik’s book The Church and the Left, which appeared in 1977 (and years later in English). But this may have given the wrong impression about the intellectual and political realities. For some Western conservative commentators, such as George Weigel in The Final Revolution, published in 1992, the Church’s struggle with communism was a millenarian battle with the “tyranny of politics.” It was what Weigel saw as “the human turn to the good, to the truly human — and, ultimately, to God.” You would have thought that Solidarity’s program was wholly cribbed from the Sermon on the Mount, that it was less about the form of government than about the shape of the human soul.

    After the crackdown on the anti-communist opposition and the declaration of martial law in 1981, it was no longer possible to believe that the system would be vanquished or transformed by righteousness alone. Something new, as yet unknown but quite specific, would have to appear in its place. In the midst of the repressions, there was a pervasive sense that by resorting to military force the system has written its own death sentence. It had no more arguments left. It was a junta, and juntas do not last forever. “You can win a fight with a bayonet but you cannot sit on it,” was the slogan of the day.

    The breakthrough in 1989, and the quick collapse of the remnants of communist power, confronted Solidarity and other anticommunist movements in the region with the urgent task of translating their victory into political institutions. Ideological differences, kept in check under communism and martial law, came to the surface. There was, indeed, an abundance of ideas. Should Solidarity constitute itself as a political party? One of many, or perhaps, at least at first, the only one, if strictly pledged to internal democracy? Or should the new dispensation be based on local citizens’ councils or worker’s committees, like those that ran strikes and negotiated deals with the authorities before martial law? Should the government-controlled economy be privatized, or marketized and kept in the hands of state, or ceded over to workers’ collectives? There were also the programs of radical nationalists, and Catholic integralists, and monarchists. There was even the Party of Beer Lovers, with its own utopia of replacing vodka with good beer as the staple of Polish social gatherings. In many circles, mainly on the left, there was a longing for something called “anti-politics,” which the Hungarian writer Georgy Konrad defined as the domination of civil society over the political elites, or, in his own words, “the emergence of independent forums that can be appealed to against political power; a counterpower that cannot take power and does not wish to. Power it has already, here and now, by reasons of its moral and cultural weight.” But finally, to the disappointment of some and the relief of many, it came down to parliamentary democracy and constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. Liberal democracy triumphed not by the suppression of the alternatives or the clandestine plots of the elites, but the way it always triumphs — by being the most acceptable, or the least objectionable, to the largest number, including its own opponents.

    What happened later was more problematic, owing not to liberalism’s intrinsic shortcomings but to specific circumstances in East Central Europe. These were countries with very weak liberal traditions. They had only a scarce familiarity with the problems that liberalism elsewhere had to work through, sometimes repeatedly, during its history. Liberal democracy came to Poland and other post-communist countries fully cooked and ready to serve in a late twentieth century version, to the absolute delight of many and the uneasiness of equally numerous others. The former group had long cultivated their “Western” identity in defiance of communist political and cultural pressures. The latter group had responded to the same pressures by falling back on traditions, extended families, national history, and the Catholic Church. They also considered themselves Europeans, but their concept of Europe was sometimes vague and antiquated. Under communism both groups coexisted, treating each other’s peculiarities with a good dose of forbearance. Under democracy, they often found themselves on the opposite sides of political divisions, treating each other with growing impatience and hostility. They were free to fight bitterly over the high political and cultural stakes.

    Culturally conservative Poles were disturbed by some of the manifestations of instant political liberalism — gay pride parades and women’s pro-abortion protests (often under deliberately provocative and offensive slogans), sexual education in schools, including instruction about gender identity and non-standard sexual orientations, and harsh media attacks on the Church for its sexual scandals and political overreach. The response of the liberals was often contemptuous and dismissive: this is how things are done in the civilized world, end of discussion, and whoever does not agree is a bigot, a chauvinist, a religious fanatic, or a moron. (Students of contemporary American liberalism will recognize this phenomenon.) “The nation is so stupid!” I have heard that on many occasions from my liberal friends. It always reminds me of Brecht’s famous poem “The Solution”: wouldn’t it be easier if you dissolved the people and elected a new one, more to your liking?

    One should not underestimate the role of economic dislocations after the collapse of the communist planned economy, which often overlapped with a sense of cultural marginalization. The main factor of liberal instability in Poland today seems to be cultural rather than economic. Quite a lot of Poles live happily, comfortably, and a bit overconfidently in the modern, and sometimes post-modern, culture. But quite a lot of Poles are ill at ease in it. Those two cultural constituencies grow more and more distant; they do not talk to each other and they have no common language. As a result, the fabric of the relatively young Polish liberal democracy is fraying. This development, of course, is not unknown in the West. The “basket of deplorables” language is carefully avoided in public speech, but the contemptuous sentiment persists. In this sense, Eastern Europe may indeed hold a lesson for the West as an example of a problem that needs to be acknowledged before it grows too big to solve.

    Illiberal parties in East-Central Europe benefit from this dilemma by stirring and channeling social fears and resentments. How illiberal are they? Both the Fidesz Party in Hungary and the Law and Justice Party in Poland have solidly liberal antecedents. Fidesz, under the leadership of the young democratic activist Victor Orban, was the hope of Hungarian liberalism in the 1990s. The Law and Justice party harkens from the more conservative wing of the Solidarity movement. Their drift to the far right was largely opportunistic — the filling of a political vacuum left by a series of missteps by the left and left-centrist governments that preceded them. They position themselves as defenders of “European Christian traditions” against the purported threat of “Islamization” and “neopaganism.” They present themselves as protectors of the family from the double threats of feminism and LGBTQ “ideology.” They are morbidly oversensitive about national sovereignty and have strong anti-EU elements. At home they try to curtail opposition media — in Hungary much more successfully than Poland — by financial means and by manipulating media ownership laws. Most importantly, they tamper with judicial independence by packing constitutional tribunals and supreme courts with political sympathizers, and defying the European (though not American) tradition of a depoliticized judicial nomination process.

    Yet the opposition in both countries are far from impotent. Independent opposition-leaning media remain vocal, especially in Poland, and vigorous political debate is continuing. Non-governmental organizations of various stripes remain active, and fundamental human rights are generally protected. Even “reformed” constitutional tribunals and courts sometimes decide against the governments’ policies. National and local elections are conducted regularly, and international observers deem them generally free and fair, although marred by the politicization of the media and the governments’ deployment of administrative resources on behalf of their preferred candidates. There are no political prisoners.

    The continuing electoral success of those parties, despite their impressive list of failures and the glaring lack of charisma in their leaders, is helped in no small degree by the divisions in the opposition, which in Poland still fails to realize that dismissing forty percent of the electorate — the Law and Justice voters — as uncivilized and dispensable is not a winning strategy. It is laughable to credit these tacky right-wing parties with some bold vision of a new post-liberal order, but it is equally wrong to present them as fully authoritarian, dictatorial, or even fascistic. These are seriously imperfect democracies, but it is offensive and impertinent to compare them to Putin’s Russia or Lukashenka’s Belarus.

    And yet I do not wish to make light of the concerns that the rise of illiberalism provokes in these countries and in the wider world. There is a historical basis for alarm: the liberal traditions in these countries are weak, and there is a lack of respectful and patient debate about liberalism’s problems and paradoxes. (Some, of course, are too far gone in anti-liberal hatred and ignorance for any civilized debate.) I am quite confident that no one in today’s Poland would deliberately relinquish the liberal freedoms that they have come to take for granted. But many Poles may fail to distinguish between liberalism’s core elements and its accidental, transitory, and debatable manifestations. They may watch with satisfaction their governments’ creeping and calculated antiliberal interventions without realizing that sooner or later their own freedoms may be at stake. Cultural dissonances can push them beyond the point of no return. This is also in evidence today, for slightly different reasons, in some “mature” liberal democracies. Putin has been exploiting our unaddressed cultural dissonances for quite some time.

    My dear professor, we are already quite far from an academic philosophical discussion. But you are far from being a disinterested seeker of truth. You are a politician representing your party in the European Parliament, a party that is slowly and methodically dismantling the liberal checks on power. You are, to quote Marx again, a philosopher who wants to change the world instead of just interpreting it, to lead us boldly “beyond the liberal-democratic horizon.” But where, exactly, do you wish to lead us?

    Revolutionary anti-liberals of old were quite specific in their remedies. Liberalism is finished, it’s communism or fascism now: this was the anti-liberal refrain of the 1930s. Today’s anti-liberals are more cautious. When their books approach their conclusions, they grow vague and elusive. No, they concede, they cannot propose an alternative. Not yet. But an alternative will emerge and it will be a good one. It will preserve all the good sides of liberalism and erase all the bad ones. It will be something entirely new, because liberalism cannot be improved, it can only be replaced. And the new dispensation may turn out to be an old one, a restoration of some kind. It will teach us true freedom by re-establishing its proper meaning, by reviving traditional virtues, by reintroducing the metaphysical dimension to our social life, by returning us to the long-forgotten ambition of achieving spiritual greatness by political means. Your American colleague Deneen lamely admits that the ideal post-liberal system may one day be called… liberal. In the meantime, let us, the right thinkers, stick together, study the classics, give testimony to the truth, despise the secular modernist liberals, and sooner or later one of us will come up with a heroic idea.

    Not to dismiss the appeal of utopian thinking, but once in a while we need to return to the serious world of political reality. In the old days, when our backpacking leftist friends from the West maintained that Soviet communism is not a “true thing,” we pointed out that it is the only real thing. Today, the only real alternative to liberal democracy is illiberal authoritarianism. It seems, in fact, to be on the rise. For years, Putin’s Russia has been playing the same role toward the illiberal parties in Europe that the Soviet Union used to play for the communist parties in Europe. It has been gathering them under its wings, supporting them with money and disinformation campaigns, nudging them into positions most favorable to Putin’s geostrategic plans. (The Polish Law and Justice party seems to be an exception to the rule, despite sometimes echoing some of Putin’s anti-liberal and anti-Western rhetoric. Poles have coddled Orban, and the Polish Prime Minister has met with Le Pen and Salvini, but it is only fair to note that Law and Justice has not joined them in their pro-Russian position.) Like the Soviet Union of old, Putin’s Russia is always on the lookout for the disappointed and the dissatisfied, for clueless fellow-travelers, for useful idiots. And like the Soviet Union of old, it finds them.

    Your views, Professor Legutko, and the views of other antiliberals, cannot be discussed in a vacuum. They have concrete consequences. They are used by autocrats who wish to weaken liberal democracy not in order to replace it with something better, but to seize, solidify, and maintain their own power. Their visceral fear of liberal democracy is not philosophical, it is existential. We see this today with the utmost clarity in Ukraine. In a sense, Putin is right. Ukraine does pose a mortal threat to his regime, not because it plans to march on Moscow but because it chooses to pursue its own liberal future. The victory of Ukraine could spell the end of Putinism. And Ukraine’s defeat would trigger truly frightening consequences in Europe and elsewhere. That is why Ukrainians have been fighting our war, a war for the version of history that you would like to cast away. History has not ended, which means that everything is still possible, but at this moment in history it is liberal democracy that has provided us with the largest scope of freedom and the lowest level of coercion in human history. It may also be the only protection we have against the authoritarianism and the autocracy that has reappeared on the historical stage. Old demons are back. It is not the “demon in democracy” that we have reason to fear.

    The demon in democracy: you end your book of that peculiar title with a sigh of resignation. Perhaps, you admit, the story of liberal democracy does express the “basic truth about modern man who, after many adventures, downfalls and ascents, exultations and tribulations, after following many chimeras and surrendering to many temptations, finally arrived at the accurate recognition of who he is.” You say it with regret and with disappointment. No further change in our condition will be possible, except for the worse. We have revealed our true nature and its name is mediocrity.

    I refuse to succumb to your gloom. During my life as a denizen of liberal democracy I have seen my share of mediocrity, but also enough creativity, and even heroism to believe that our story is far from over. And are there no mediocre people on the post-liberal right? Are you all visionaries and supermen? Anyway, mediocre people, however you condescendingly define them, also have rights and are also worthy of respect. As I write this, the Russian offensive in Ukraine has stalled. Ukraine has been defending itself longer than Poland did in 1939 and will outdo France in 1940. We are in for a long, dark, tense period, with Poland once again on the front line of defense. You and your comrades have nothing to contribute to this defense. It will be won or lost by the moral mettle of Western liberalism. It is the strength of our convictions, the ones that you have haughtily repudiated, which will decide the outcome.

    Liberal democracy has won similar confrontations before. I really do not see anything else — certainly not your ugly and illusory post-liberal order — that can take its place.

    A Dangerous Desire to Do Right

    War begets war: it is an old truism, and internecine wars — of the type twice fought on American soil — typically have their antecedents in prior wars. Consider our Revolutionary War, whose cri de coeur was “no taxation without representation.” But how often we overlook that Britain imposed these heightened taxes on the colonists to service debts from the French and Indian War. Consider our Civil War, which was fought to preserve the Union and abolish slavery. But how often we overlook that what upset the balance between free and slave states were territorial acquisitions made during the Mexican-American War. This pattern extends also to the key personalities of these conflicts, who first appeared on the historical stage in the prior war — George Washington, who at the end of the French and Indian Wars was a minor officer of mixed reputation who had once surrendered to the French, and Ulysses S. Grant, who mustered out of the army not long after the end of the Mexican-American War. When Robert E. Lee surrendered to him seventeen years later at Appomattox, Grant reminded Lee that they had met once before, in Mexico. General Lee, who had been a colonel in that first war, apologized; he could not recall having ever met Grant.

    A recent raft of commentary — from articles to books to endless cable news segments — has asked whether the United States is headed toward another civil war. Anxiety about the subject grips us. Could our divisions metastasize into war? We watch the trend lines: increasing income inequality; racial resentments; hyper-partisanship; outbursts of violence. Which of these could prove combustible enough to incite a war? In recent years an alarming number of Americans have been moved to protest, to riot, and even to engage in insurrection. And like our Civil War and our Revolutionary War, the propellant that turns civil discord into civil war may not exist in our current discontents, but rather in our last war, which was fought far from our shores.

    “The baby boomers turn is over,” said Marine Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Scheller as he stared into the camera. “I demand accountability, at all levels. If we don’t get it, I’m bringing it.” His video, posted to Facebook, immediately went viral. He recorded it at his desk in Camp Lejeune the day after a suicide bomber at Kabul International Airport’s Abbey Gate killed thirteen American service members and over 170 Afghans. In his nearly five-minute-long post, Scheller lamented the Biden administration’s handling of our withdrawal from Afghanistan and called out senior military leaders, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, Commandant of the Marine Corps General David Berger, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. “People are upset because their senior leaders let them down, and none of them are raising their hands and accepting accountability or saying, ‘We messed this up.’” But Scheller’s remarks went one step further than a simple demand for accountability. He went on to quote Thomas Jefferson, who said that “every generation needs a revolution.”

    When I finished watching the video last August, I wasn’t certain what to make of it. My first instinct was to categorize it as a rant. If it wasn’t clear already, after the bombing at Abbey Gate it became evident that the Biden administration had handled the evacuation of Afghanistan with an exceptional degree of incompetence. Emotions remained raw, so a rant — even if inappropriate and perhaps even illegal when delivered by an active-duty officer — seemed understandable. Upon further reflection, however, I slowly came to realize that what I had watched was something else: an act of self-immolation.

    Before his swift relief by senior officers that same day, Scheller held battalion command. The Marine Corps is very selective about which officers it grooms to become battalion commanders; the fact that Scheller held that job means that he was — until recording his video — well-regarded, a Marine with a future in the Corps. Furthermore, Scheller was seventeen years into a twenty-year career. At twenty years he would have been eligible for retirement at half his base pay with other benefits, such as healthcare for life. It took him exactly four minutes and forty-five seconds to throw all that away. Scheller is a husband and a father. Why did he do this?

    Before last year’s cataclysmic withdrawal, Afghanistan was not a place, or an issue, most Americans cared about. In 2018, according to Rasmussen, 42 percent of the country couldn’t even say whether we were still at war there. Over the past two decades, the war in Afghanistan was waged by an all-volunteer military and funded through deficit spending. Unlike other wars, there has been no draft and no war tax. It is often said that while America’s military has spent the past twenty years at war, America itself has been at the mall. This has led to a massive civil-military divide.

    The botched Afghanistan withdrawal, in which many active duty as well as retired military members received hundreds of phone calls and texts daily from their Afghan allies who were being left to fend for themselves against the Taliban (and who have already suffered at the hands of the Taliban in the months since our retreat) only deepened this sense of alienation among many who had served. One need only look back through history — from Caesar’s Rome to Napoleon’s France — to see clearly that when a republic couples a large standing military with dysfunctional domestic politics, democracy doesn’t last long.

    These are the exact conditions that exist in the United States today, in which we are witnessing a politicization of the American military with few precedents, from General Mark Milley marching across Lafayette Park in his fatigues with former President Donald Trump, to the congressional testimony of senior officers — on everything from January 6 to right-wing extremism to critical race theory — becoming fodder for late-night cable news anchors who seek to position those in uniform on one side or another of the Democratic-Republican divide. Our military is, historically and ostensibly, an apolitical organization, but this has never meant that military members do not have political views. Of course they do. Yet the military stays out of politics because its highest authority is a civilian one and to voice political opinions publicly is to question that authority. And so as it pertains to politics, our military practices a code of omertà. Scheller’s video broke that code.

    The Marine Corps is a small community. As a lieutenant, Scheller served in 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (or 1/8, as we call it) a year after I did. I received his video from a friend, a lieutenant colonel who also served in 1/8. And one of the two infantry battalions guarding Kabul International Airport during the Afghanistan withdrawal was 1/8, too; that commander was a classmate of mine at Quantico. The all-volunteer military, the men and women who have fought two decades of war, has become increasingly insulated from the broader American culture. We all know each other, but fewer and fewer Americans know us.

    The model of the citizen soldier which characterized the American military for generations has become replaced by a professional soldiering class, one that is increasingly closed, insular, and living in its own atomized reality — just like the rest of America. A military identity that segregates itself from American life (identitarianism being de rigueur these days) should concern us. As divisions cleave citizens apart, it is not unreasonable — indeed, it is prudent — to believe that those same divisions could cleave some in our military apart from the civilians they serve. This will be dangerous.

    Our military remains apolitical because its involvement in politics would threaten to subvert the supremely democratic principle of civilian control. Civilian control over the military was written into the Constitution by its framers as one of the many measures that divided powers. Article II, Section 2 states, “The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States when called into the actual Service of the United States.” By vesting ultimate authority into a single civilian in the chain-of-command, the Constitution safeguarded against a military that could find itself at odds with the society it served.

    Still, the words in the Constitution are only sufficient if they exist within a culture that values civilian authority. Although that civilian authority has never broken down entirely, there have been moments when the military has tested its civilian leadership — from Lincoln with General McClelland to Truman with General MacArthur to Obama with General McChrystal — and always civilian authority has trumped military authority, exactly as the framers of the Constitution intended. But the more dysfunctional our politics become, the more cravenly our partisans behave, and the further military culture deviates from civilian culture as we rely on a professional soldiering class to fight our wars, the more stress we place on the barrier between military power and civilian power. It is a barrier that has allowed the United States to exist successfully in a condition that should otherwise be a contradiction: we remain both the world’s leading democratic power and the world’s leading military power.

    The first presidential election I witnessed as a member of the military was George W. Bush versus Al Gore in 2000. I was in college, a naval ROTC midshipman, and on Election Day I remember asking a Marine colonel who was a visiting fellow at my university whether he’d made it to the polls. In much the same way one might say “I don’t smoke” when offered a cigarette, he said, “Oh, I don’t vote.” His answer confused me at the time. He was a third-generation military officer, someone imbued with a strong sense of duty. He then explained that as a military officer he felt it was his obligation to remain apolitical. In his estimation, this included not casting a vote on who his commander-in-chief might be.

    Although I do not agree that one’s commitment to remain apolitical while in uniform extends to not voting, I would over the years come across others who abstained from voting on similar grounds. That interaction served as an early lesson on the lengths to which some in the military would go to steer clear of politics. It also illustrated that those in uniform have, by definition, a different relationship to the president than civilians do. As that colonel saw it in 2000, he wouldn’t be voting for his president but for his commander-in-chief, and he didn’t feel it was appropriate to vote for anyone in his chain of command. As it turned out, the result of that election was contested. Gore challenged the result after Florida was called for Bush, and the dispute went all the way to the Supreme Court between the election and the inauguration, by which point Gore had conceded.

    There are many ways to contest an election, some of which are more reckless and more unseemly than others, but our last two presidential elections certainly qualify. In 2016, Democrats contested Donald Trump’s legitimacy based on claims of collusion between his campaign and Russia. In 2020, Republicans significantly escalated the level of contestation around the election with widespread claims of voter fraud, which ultimately erupted in rioting on January 6.

    Today, as is well known, dysfunction runs deep in American politics. While the images from January 6 remain indelible, the images of entire cities in red and blue states boarded up in the days before the 2020 presidential election should also alarm us. If contested elections become the norm, then mass protests around elections will also become the norm, and if mass protests become the norm, then police and military responses to those protests will surely follow. All sorts of fundamental firewalls in our politics and government will fall. We will find ourselves in a Constitutionally twisted and socially inflamed new normal, in which the boundaries that form the structure of a democratic republic will collapse. Little progress has been made to circumvent this cycle of contested elections in which we are trapped, with the most recent attempt — the January 6 commission’s investigation — receiving only tepid support in Congress.

    Destructive complexes are not new in American life. In his farewell address to the nation, President Dwight Eisenhower issued a famous warning: “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.” Eisenhower, who in his military career had commanded Allied forces in Europe against the Nazis, delivered those remarks in January 1961, at the height of the Cold War, which had led to a drastic militarization of American society. In the more than sixty years since Eisenhower’s address, the term “x-industrial complex” has been used to describe the self-justifying and self-perpetuating nature of various industries — medicine, entertainment, and education, to name a few. But it is the political incarnation of that juxtaposition that we are most dangerously mired in now. Just as the military-industrial complex threatened to undermine democracy in Eisenhower’s time, the political-industrial complex threatens to undermine democracy in ours.

    An analysis published in 2020 in the Harvard Business Review by Katherine Gehl and Michael Porter describes this systemic threat succinctly: “Far from being ‘broken,’ our political system is doing precisely what it’s designed to do. It wasn’t built to deliver results in the public interest or to foster policy innovation, nor does it demand accountability for failure to do so. Instead, most of the rules that shape day-to-day behavior and outcomes have been perversely optimized — or even expressly created — by and for the benefit of the entrenched duopoly at the center of our political system: the Democrats and the Republicans (and the actors surrounding them), what collectively we call the political-industrial complex.”

    This political-industrial complex includes not only legions of campaign staffers, pollsters, consultants, and other party functionaries, but also media (both traditional and nontraditional) that inspire division because division keeps people engaged, keeps eyeballs on screens, and so drives profit. While average prime-time viewership across the top three cable news channels had fallen by roughly a third from 2008 to 2014, the advent of Donald Trump’s candidacy and election caused viewership to soar, with CNN posting nearly $1 billion in profits in 2016. In the lead up to the 2020 presidential election, Fox News became the highest-rated television channel during the prime-time hours of 8 to 11 p.m. This wasn’t just on cable news. It became the highest rated channel in all of television. There was a time when higher numbers of citizens watching the news would have been regarded as a positive sign of greater civic engagement. But this is not such a time. There is something degraded and ferocious about the new partisan engagement that makes these numbers not edifying but troubling.

    The effects of this political-industrial complex extend far outside politics. Politics now devours everything. Today, nearly every facet of life falls somewhere along the left-right political spectrum. Every question we ask ourselves is shot through the lens of politics. During the pandemic, for instance, I desperately wanted my elementary school-aged children to be in the classroom, with their friends. But even such an expression of paternal care about what I believed was best for my kids could have been mistaken for a declaration of ideology. When speaking to other parents, did this fervent desire to see my children in the classroom, even as we grappled with the coronavirus, make me look like a Trump supporter? A Republican? The most dispiriting aspect of the pandemic, aside from the suffering and the dying, was surely the way even the virus was immediately politicized.

    I am also a veteran. When I tell my military buddies that prisoners of war should never be slandered and that convicted war criminals shouldn’t be trotted out as national heroes, do they assume that I’m also a fan of the Green New Deal? A Democrat? Again, the tyranny of politics. It is the universal filter. Indeed, the politicization of American life is swiftly becoming total, with virtually no thought or action existing outside the realm of partisan sorting.

    In 1939, when America was emerging from the throes of the Great Depression, our military ranked nineteenth largest in the world, standing behind Portugal. World War II, and the Cold War that followed, epitomized what theorists call “total war,” in which every facet of a society is mobilized. This was a departure from centuries past, where nations typically waged “limited war,” relying on professional armies instead of the widespread enlistment of its citizenry and means of national production. One consequence of total war is that even non-military parts of society become military targets: manufacturing, agriculture, energy, even civilian populations. By the time Eisenhower delivered his address, total war had reached its zenith, as the development of civilization-ending nuclear weapons had made the human race’s continued existence contingent on a precarious doctrine of “mutually assured destruction” between the United States and the Soviet Union.

    We now live with total politics; and one way to measure our current state of “total politics” is to look at the ballooning economics of presidential campaigns. In the presidential election of 1980, spending by Republican and Democrats combined totaled $60 million ($190 million when adjusted for inflation). In 2020, filings show that the election cost $14.4 billion, which represents a 75-fold increase in spending. Just as the military-industrial complex fed off the U.S.-Soviet conflict in the Cold War, the political-industrial complex feeds off the left-right conflict. If the military-industrial complex led us into a paradigm of seemingly perpetual warfare with shifting and at times incoherent objectives (Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan), then the political-industrial complex has led us into a paradigm of seemingly perpetual campaigns in which our political class needs divisive issues to fight over more than it needs solutions to the issues themselves — crucial issues such as gun control, immigration, and health care.

    Our passions are being inflamed and manipulated for profit by a political-industrial complex that feeds off our basest fears of one another. Our experiment in democracy has worked when it appeals to the best in us, as opposed to the worst. Eisenhower recognized this, and it was that instinct in each of us he appealed to as he closed his farewell address: “Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.”

    And if we do become a community of dreadful fear and hate? In the Cold War, failure meant mutually assured destruction through nuclear war. It was an outcome that, fortunately, never arrived, though it is instructive that Eisenhower’s farewell address came a little less than two years before the Cuban Missile Crisis, the closest humanity has come to a thermonuclear exchange. Today, we sit on a different sort of precipice. Are we entering an era where we hold elections in a nation so hopelessly divided that neither side is willing to accept defeat? In a democracy, that is the truest form of mutually assured destruction.

    This takes us back to the question of politics and the military, and to that colonel I knew in college and his conviction to stay out of politics. Increasingly, in military circles, this view seems to have fallen out of favor, particularly among senior retired officers. In 2016, for the first time in recent memory, we saw large speaking roles doled out to prominent retired military leaders at both parties’ national conventions. This trend has accelerated in recent years, and in the 2020 election we saw some retired flag officers (including the former heads of several high commands) writing and speaking out against Donald Trump in prominent media outlets, and others organizing against Joe Biden’s agenda in groups such as Flag Officers 4 America.

    The United States military remains one of the most trusted institutions in our society, and so support from its leaders has become an increasingly valuable political commodity. If this trend of increased military polarization seeps into the active-duty ranks, it could lead to dangerous outcomes, particularly around elections, and specifically a presidential one.

    Holding contested elections is like driving drunk. The drunk driver goes to the bar, has one too many, and often makes it home safely. They convince themselves in the morning that the night before wasn’t that bad, that they can hold their liquor. Typically, a safe return will only reinforce the drunk driver’s belief that they can get away with a little irresponsible behavior at the bar; that is, until they wrap their car around a telephone pole. Many commentators have already pointed out that it is likely that in 2024 (or even 2022) the losing party will cry foul, and it is also likely that their supporters will fill the streets, with law enforcement, or even the military, called in to manage those protests. In short, it is likely that we will soon be driving drunk again.

    There are, of course, many ways we could wrap our proverbial car around a telephone pole. When gaming out the pitfalls of future contested elections, it’s worth imagining one alternate outcome to the 2020 election: a narrow Trump win. This scenario seemed most likely to involve the military in dangerous ways. And it is a pattern that could repeat in subsequent contested elections with different players so long as the current political climate endures.

    Imagine if Trump had won in 2020 by a narrow margin — say, the same margin by which Biden won. Prominent voices on the left had already questioned the wisdom of conceding the election, so it is quite likely that had Trump won in anything less than a landslide, national-level Democrats would have questioned the legitimacy of the vote. The interregnum between Election Day and the Inauguration would have seen recounts and legal challenges, and the election outcome would not have been settled in a single night. Under these conditions, it is also likely that major protests would have occurred in American cities, including Washington, D.C. Canyons of boarded-up windows in the capital already attested to business-owners’ fears of a Trump reelection and the inevitable protests that would have followed. In their scope and their passion, these protests would have equaled if not exceed those of the summer before. Biden supporters might not have stormed the Capitol, but they would have assembled, and Antifa or their equivalents would have been among them. Lafayette Park certainly would have filled, likely in much the same way it filled in the summer of 2020, in chaotic and at times violent ways.

    Voices on the right would call for these protests to be broken up. Senator Tom Cotton would likely reprise his calls from the summer before, in which he had encouraged Trump to evoke the Insurrection Act and deploy federal troops on American soil to restore order. The limits of Trump’s patience would be breached as thousands of protestors shut down Lafayette Park, to say nothing of protestors in New York shutting down Fifth Avenue in front of Trump Tower.

    One can imagine General Milley and his colleagues at the Pentagon counseling patience. And one can imagine Trump’s response: What are these generals good for? All they do is lose wars. They certainly don’t know how to win an election. Under such conditions, it is not difficult to imagine Trump calling up Marines from Camp Lejeune and paratroopers from Fort Bragg. After all, this isn’t without precedent. During the riots in Los Angeles in 1992, with which these protests would draw comparison, Marines from Camp Pendleton were mobilized to stop the violence. More recently, after Hurricane Katrina, President Bush deployed a battalion of Marines to New Orleans, a unit that had just returned from Iraq. (I happened to be part of that deployment, and that battalion was the aforementioned 1/8 in which Stewart Scheller served.)

    Had Trump won narrowly in 2020, none of the above would have been improbable; indeed, it would have been likely. So then what happens? Let us imagine those several battalions have now arrived in Washington, and that one of them is under the command of a charismatic Marine lieutenant colonel. He is a decorated and esteemed veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is popular among his troops, who trust him. Like most any battalion commander, including Stewart Scheller, the fact that he holds command attests to his solid record and reputation within the Corps. The climate in Washington is explosive. Our lieutenant colonel orders his Marines to stay off social media, but politics are now total and so impossible to escape. Protestors carry signs that read Not My President, but what does this mean for our lieutenant colonel and his Marines? They are following orders that are predicated on the legitimacy of that president, yet they have major political leaders — to include, I would imagine, the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate — questioning his legitimacy and thus the very legitimacy of their orders.

    Specific orders soon come for our lieutenant colonel. When the protestors break yet another curfew, he and his Marines are ordered to clear out Lafayette Park, a repeat of the much-derided actions of the summer before. But those protests had been different. In the aftermath of the murder of George Floyd, their cause was social justice, a far more amorphous set of aims. Now, however, you are either with us or against us, the president is either legitimate or illegitimate. Americans, including our lieutenant colonel, are being asked to make a very binary choice.

    Clearing out Lafayette Park means batons, tear gas, and, most despicable of all, rubber bullets. Like Lieutenant Colonel Scheller, our lieutenant colonel harbors resentment toward those in power. He isn’t a partisan, but he knows it doesn’t feel right to aim a rifle at his fellow citizens. He has been to war, sent there by the politicians and the politicized flag officers whose decisions have misspent the blood spilled by him and his comrades. These politicians and flag officers have since retired and made exorbitant sums sitting on the boards of defense companies, or setting up lucrative Netflix deals, or signing contracts as cable news contributors in which they lecture others on democracy while making more in a month than he has in his entire retirement account. Like Lieutenant Colonel Scheller, our lieutenant colonel has reached his limit. But unlike Scheller, he isn’t sitting behind his desk at Camp Lejeune when it happens. He is standing in front of one thousand frightened, confused and heavily armed Marines who trust him a lot more than those elites issuing their orders. When the order comes to clear out Lafayette Park, our lieutenant colonel refuses. And when he refuses, his Marines also refuse. In today’s America, a soldier’s loyalty to his general—or his colonel—might be a little understood as a political force, but it is a political force that as far back as the Roman legions has dissolved democracies.

    Our lieutenant colonel doesn’t simply refuse his orders. He goes a step further. He approaches the leaders of the protests in Lafayette Park. He believes that the protestors have a right to peacefully assemble, and he plans to secure that right. And so he asks the leaders of the protest, “Where would you like my Humvees?”

    The Democrats hail him as a hero (in the mold of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman) and call for other officers to refuse their orders. The right condemns him as a traitor (even though they were quick to laud Lieutenant Colonel Scheller) and call for his court martial. Our lieutenant colonel becomes a lightning rod, and his actions set off a chain reaction within the U.S. military. If Democrats and Republicans cannot agree on the legitimacy of the president, and if they are calling in the military to arbitrate this dispute, for those in uniform the very action of following an order now confers legitimacy on one side or another. Everyone who wears a uniform is being forced to choose. And they do, disastrously so, because when military members become partisans, they take their equipment with them.

    That question, Where would you like my Humvees?, is one that every citizen should fear. If America ever did descend into another civil war, the weapons that would decide it are not sitting in the gun lockers of Oath Keepers or Antifa deadenders; they are sitting in the armories, the motor pools, and on the flight lines of hundreds of American military bases.

    BC If the result of the above scenario sounds implausible, ask yourself whether any of the incremental steps do. We have seen violence in Lafayette Park reach levels of intensity that required the president’s evacuation by the Secret Service to a secure bunker in the White House. We have seen our leaders contest the last two elections. Already both parties are laying the groundwork to contest the 2024 election with controversies surrounding voting rights. If another contested election leads to violence in America’s streets, it is quite possible a president of either party could evoke the Insurrection Act. Those troops would then have to face off with protestors. What would be the result?

    After I served in Afghanistan and Iraq, I covered the war in Syria as a journalist. It is often forgotten that the refusal of Sunnis in the military to follow the orders of Bashar al-Assad was determinative in pushing that political crisis into a civil war. When the military there splintered, the defecting elements took their tanks, their guns, and their jets with them. Obviously we remain several steps removed from that sort of instability. But cautious speculation has its uses: it can be critical in heading off conflict, particularly as the forces our politicians are playing with couldn’t be more combustible, and they are playing with these forces in the presence of two conditions that could cause events to spin out of their control.

    The first of those conditions is the already discussed civil-military divide, particularly in the context of a lost war. Disillusionment and the veteran experience often attend one another. The end of a war — particularly a failed war — heightens these feelings of disillusionment. From George Washington (a major) to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (a lieutenant colonel) to Napoleon Bonaparte (a second lieutenant) and Adolf Hitler (a corporal), these revolutionary figures all got their start in the army of the old regime and, at one point or another, could be categorized as disgruntled veterans. If revolutionary embers are blowing, a large contingent of disgruntled veterans represents a massive pile of kindling.

    The second of those conditions are divergent realities — our grave nation-wide cognitive crisis. Today, according to Reuters, approximately a quarter of all Americans believe that Trump is the “true president.” This is not only an ideological certainty; they are certain also about their facts. If you extrapolate that number to our military, it means roughly 345,000 men and women in uniform do not believe in the legitimacy of the current commander-in-chief. Whether those people are right or wrong doesn’t matter. What matters, from the standpoint of social stability and social peace, is that they believe it.

    A similar divergence existed in our last civil war, in which one half of the country believed the Constitution allowed for their secession from the Union while the other half of the country believed in preserving the Union at all costs. Indeed, the issue of secession and its legality was a widely debated issue in the decades leading up to the Civil War, a contested issue analogous to abortion or affirmative action today. David A. Strauss, a scholar of constitutional law, has observed that

    before the Civil War, there was a lively and inconclusive debate over whether the Constitution permitted states to secede. There is no longer any such debate; the issue was settled by the Civil War. No one today would seriously advance the position that the Constitution permits secession, at least the kind that the Confederacy attempted. Where is the text that settled his question? The answer, of course, is that this question, like other important constitutional questions, is decided by something other than text.

    One reality triumphed over another, not because it was proven illegitimate in the minds of those who believed it, but because it was defeated on a battlefield. After the war, the mythmaking of the Lost Cause focused on certain aspects of the Southern cause (states’ rights) over others (slavery), so much so that the term “states’ rights” evolved into a racist provocation in subsequent fights against desegregation. Yet this doesn’t change the fact that many Southerners truly believed in the defeated view of reality. They believed that their first allegiance was to their state as opposed to the federal government, and that their state legislators had the right to secede; and if those duly elected legislators did secede, their obligation as southerners was to fight in defense of their state. The fact that neither side ever agreed (and in some cases continue to disagree) on what the war was fought about simply demonstrates why the war was fought in the first place.

    Most famous among those who believed that his allegiance belonged to his state was Robert E. Lee. By the standards of that time, Lee enjoyed an impeccable reputation. In 1861, he was President Lincoln’s first choice to command the Army of the Potomac, an appointment that Lee refused because, as explained in a letter written to his sister, he could not “raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home.” By the end of the war, in defeat, Lee’s thinking had changed somewhat. In a letter written to President Andrew Johnson, requesting a pardon, Lee remarked: “True patriotism sometimes requires of men to act exactly contrary at one period, to that which it does at another, and the motive which impels them — the desire to do right — is precisely the same.” Lee then evoked his great hero, George Washington. “At one time he fought against the French under Braddock, in the service of the King of Great Britain; at another, he fought with the French at Yorktown, under the orders of the Continental Congress of America, against him.”

    Those who would discount Lee’s motives as malicious treason, or discount those who doubt the legitimacy of the last election as malicious perpetrators of “A Big Lie,” create caricatures of their ideological counterpoints at the expense of understanding their worldview. It would be reckless to discount that worldview, particularly if one wishes to triumph over it. It is a worldview sincerely held by one-quarter of our fellow citizens, many of whom serve in our military and have their own political values and passions, like all other citizens.

    The threat the military represents to our democracy is not — as is too commonly asserted — a monolithic one, in which the military will act as an ideologically homogenous entity in accordance with the orders of its senior officers. The true threat from the military will occur as a consequence of a collapse of our politics, in which the legitimacy of the chain-of-command, from the president down, falls into question. We glimpsed this possibility in January 2021, when General Milley went outside his chain-of-command to assure China through backchannels that the election results would be honored despite President Trump’s statements to the contrary, and that the military remained under steady control. Did such back-channeling make Milley a hero or a traitor? It depends on who you’re asking.

    If one-quarter of our military believes that the current president is illegitimate, it is entirely plausible that under certain conditions they, like Lee, might believe that “true patriotism” requires them to act against a president whose legitimacy is being questioned. The threat to the republic is not a military split between those who are on the right side of history and those who are on the wrong side. The true threat is a military whose ranks split between divergent realities, divergent facts, divergent public philosophies, in which those on either side — like Lee, or Grant, or Washington — are possessed by a dangerous “desire to do right.”

    And the Bleat Goes On

    Wait long enough and every enjoyment is eventually placed on the altar, gussied up, and sanctified. Rock ‘n’ roll lyrics were once a readymade source of ridicule, regarded as gibberish written by and for bubblegum brains and blasting out of transistor radios to drive mom and dad mad. The late-night television host Steve Allen, equipped with Clark Kent glasses and a quipster’s fast draw, did a routine where he read aloud the lyrics of a popular pop song as if performing a poem at the 92Y in full authorial pomp. Most of the kinescopes from his show have been lost in the ghostly landfill of time, but Allen’s goof on Gene Vincent’s “Be Bop a Lula” circa 1956 somehow survives on YouTube, as Allen invites the studio audience and viewers at home to drink in the song’s simple beauty: “Be bop a lula, be my baby/bop a lula…I don’t mean maybe.” It was all in the timing, and Allen knew just when to pause for pregnant effect.

    Allen, a classic postwar liberal who jousted with William F. Buckley, Jr. on Firing Line, didn’t harbor hostility toward rock and roll, even though he was much more of a piano-tickling jazz guy; he was simply making sport of its conventions, much as he mimicked the hothead apoplexy of newspaper letters to the editor, and most of us wisenheimers who grew up with Mad magazine went along with the gag. But there were others watching in the cavernous dark of rec rooms across the land who took rock and roll more seriously, more protectively, and resented its being picked on. Allen’s mock-mimicry lodged in their craws as Exhibit 1 of the adult condescension toward the passionate, unfettered joy of rock and roll. These old gassers just didn’t get it! Rock and roll, it was righteously felt, would have the final say and the last laugh. Demographics were on its side. On our side, if you were a teenage baby boomer ready to stampede into tomorrow.

    It took awhile, but a counterblow was struck. It seemed a soft counterblow at the time, not a ringing manifesto, but it resonated nevertheless. In 1969, the pioneer pop journalist Richard Goldstein edited an anthology titled The Poetry of Rock, a choice floral arrangement of rock and folk-rock lyrics that was published as a slim Bantam Books paperback that fit neatly into a jeans pocket or small purse, like Kahlil Gibran’s The Prophet, only groovier; it was the perfect everyday companion for English majors, pop fans, and studious aspiring songwriters of a sensitive nature, a sizable cohort back then. Goldstein had been miffed by Allen’s professorial buffoonery — “I recall being pretty pissed off with Steverino then for his dishonest presentation of rock,” he states in the introduction — and here was the rebuttal. “I do not claim that these selections constitute a body of ‘undiscovered’ poetry. This is no pop-Ossian. But I do assert that there is an immense awareness of language, and a profound sense of rhythm.”

    The timing of The Poetry of Rock couldn’t have been more propitious. By 1969, rock had largely lost its “and roll” and strengthened into a four-letter word of cultural prowess, a raised fist demanding to be reckoned with. Essays such as Richard Poirier’s controversial “Learning from the Beatles” in Partisan Review in 1967 and Albert Goldman’s reveille call “The Emergence of Rock” in New American Review in 1968 had elevated the status of rock, and the first ponderous stirrings of Dylanology rumbled through the forests, thickening in time into an academic industry. Woodstock Nation had become a kingdom of the imagination, a muddy, momentary Camelot. Although undertaken in an underdog spirit, The Poetry of Rock spoke to the cresting countercultural moment and went into multiple printings, earning a spot in the pop-studies curriculum and pride of place on countless dorm room bookshelves next to Stranger in a Strange Land and The Harrad Experiment.

    Thumbing through The Poetry of Rock today makes for a wistful ride in the wayback machine, the book’s graphics and fonts a garden of hippie nostalgia, its contents a reminder of how prophetic Goldstein’s anthology choices were. From Chuck Berry, “America’s first rock poet,” the idol of us all who “sang about an America of pure motion and energy” (“In a Chuck Berry song, you couldn’t tell the girls from the cars, and some of the best marriages ended up in traffic court”), to the flossier troubadours, social prophets, flower-power bards, and asphalt-jungle serenaders represented here, a pantheon takes shape. Each inductee benefits from Goldstein’s elegant inscriptions — deft, evocative, and seldom guilty of over-salesmanship. “The Supremes sing like satin,” he writes in the citation for Holland, Dozier, Holland’s “Baby Love”: “The lines move in even strokes, like a pendulum. You can sense the ebb and flow of feminine hips behind that gently rocking refrain.” He catches the inherent contradiction of the Rolling Stones’ “Lady Jane,” “a chivalric ode against a tinkling dulcimer” that is sung (tongued?) by Mick Jagger with his usual lewd larceny. He’s also quite sharp on how Lennon-McCartney contrive an enigmatic vignette out of the snug nest of “Norwegian Wood.”

    Fittingly, The Poetry of Rock finishes its survey of the hidden subtleties of the hit parade with a peer into the abyss titled “The End,” the nightscape tour guided by Jim Morrison, lead singer of The Doors, Lizard King, and leather-sheathed shaman whose musky voice seemed to resonate from his majestic crotch with a swell of reverb echo. Not everyone was captivated by his charismatic ooga-booga. “Jim Morrison sounds like an asshole,” decreed Robert Christgau, the Dean of American Rock Critics, who recently celebrated his eightieth birthday. Christgau also deemed Jimbo a bad poet, and it’s hard to disagree when he cites pearls such as “We need great golden copulations” and “Death and my cock are the world.” Yet the Morrison mystique endures a half century after his death, and not only because of the erotic, vampiric aura of his persona that would inspire the classic Rolling Stone cover line “He’s hot, he’s sexy, and he’s dead.”

    It also endures due to what one might dub the Rimbaud Factor, the proto-myth of the poet as a young, incandescent, self-destructive, genius-propelled comet of orphic utterance — a Romantic hand-me-down from the revolutionary age of Shelley-Keats-Byron. Born in 1854, Arthur Rimbaud was the precocious rebel who joined the Paris Commune at the age of sixteen, flipped the table on French Letters with Illuminations and A Season in Hell, was shot by his fellow poet and lover Paul Verlaine (a bromance gone bad), and, trading in a life of words for the pursuit of money, action, and exotic locales, shipped off to Africa to seek his fortune as a mercenary and a gun-runner. Considering the embroilments that followed, he should have stuck to vers libre. But had he done so, he wouldn’t have become the live-fast, die-young aspirational/inspirational legend and action figure, a category in America that had been reserved for the likes of Billy the Kid and James Dean until rock matured enough to erect shrines for its early departed.

    Bob Dylan admitted in his memoirs that reading Rimbaud as a teenager rang his bells, but apart from a close call with a motorcycle accident that temporarily took him out of circulation, it was clear that Dylan was a long-hauler for whom death and Dionysus held no siren allure. Morrison, however, consciously modeled himself on the human cannonball side of Rimbaud, busting through the doors of perception to pursue “the derangement of all the senses” through the heavy bombardment of music, movies, drugs, sex, poetry, and incantation. It’s a lot to take on, even without the police looking for any excuse to arrest you for public indecency and the music press beginning to snarl, and Morrison beat a strategic retreat that turned out to be fatal. Like Rimbaud radically uprooting himself from the literary soil, Morrison removed himself from the fame and clamor of the rock scene and shifted to Paris in 1971, dying under murky circumstances in a bathtub of a probable heroin overdose at the age of 27. Morrison’s grave at Pere Lachaise cemetery became a pilgrimage site for hordes of Americans paying homage, including Patti Smith, another Rimbaudian on a mission.

    The publication history of Morrison’s poetry, prose poetry, and spoken word seances set the template for the posthumous engorgement that has become more the norm for lyrics collections. The first books, The Lords — Notes on Vision and The New Creatures, were self-published, small press titles later incorporated into one volume by Simon and Schuster that tallied a tidy 144 pages. A third, An American Prayer, was also published in his lifetime. The death-cult industry and discipleship demanded more and, augmenting the memoirs, reconsiderations, documentaries, and movie biopics (The Doors, directed by Oliver Stone at his most Oliver Stone-ish), were additional troves of poems, aphorisms, transcripts, and unfinished projects that stuffed the turkeys of the two-volume Lost Writings of Jim Morrison: Wilderness in 1988 and The American Night in 1990. But too much is never enough, not when the faithful and famished cry out for more, and in 2021 up from the catacombs rose The Collected Works of Jim Morrison: Poetry, Journals, Transcripts, and Lyrics, a multimedia compendium that included family photographs, a full-sized reproduction of his Paris notebook, the shooting script for a never-released film, and a recording of his final poetry reading, along with audio renditions of Morrison’s work by Patti Smith, Tom Robbins, and Liz Phair. The only thing missing was a shroud bearing His image which glowed in the dark.

    The Collected Works were touted by the publisher as “immersive,” but immersion is a dicey proposition. It can do a disservice to the artist undergoing preservation, blurring and burying the original bold strokes — the signature moves — under a grainy mass of bone fragments, nail parings, napkin scribbles, false starts, fizzled experiments, and memorializing blab. (As Wilfrid Sheed wrote of James Agee, this scavenging represents the quest to find the hidden clinching evidence of Greatness: the missing sonnet.) Distance enables us to see and hear and mentally frame more clearly than an archival tour of the mothership. I grew up with The Doors. Their first two albums were long drives into the night with laconic touches, and nearly everything that came after was blubber and drift. The bluesier Morrison tried to be, the blowsier he looked and sounded, and his poetic scratchings were a hit and miss proposition where the misses prevailed. The Lost Writings bear this out.

    This is the curse of completism: the a-critical desire to leave no scrap behind, so as to enable the construction of a sacred grotto or shiny monolith that can sink under the density of its own motley debris. It’s especially perilous for the reputation of an enfant terrible who outlives the outrage stage and spends decades professionally releasing product to keep the name and brand solvent: too much incriminating evidence is left behind. Lou Reed, a student and protegé of the brilliant, bedeviled poet, critic, and fiction writer Delmore Schwartz, first made his scowling mark as the lead singer and songwriter of the Velvet Underground (the house band of Andy Warhol’s Exploding Plastic Inevitable), introducing a street argot, caustic sneer, and gender-bending insouciance into rock lyrics that established the unbeatable standard of New York snottiness, a source of municipal pride. The snottiness became less of a signature trait with the passing years, especially after Reed romantically partnered with choppy-haired multimedia spellbinder Laurie Anderson; he practiced tai chi and dined at macrobiotic restaurants without ever being credibly accused of turning mellow. When Reed died in 2013 he had become a crusty institution, the Harry Dean Stanton of gravelly gravitas, and many New Yorkers were taken aback by how deeply they mourned.

    Reed himself was too cantankerous to be canonized, but his oeuvre could be propped up for posterity. Posthumously updated from an out-of-print edition, I’ll Be Your Mirror: The Collected Lyrics of Lou Reed has an authoritative heft and imprimatur. Six-hundred-and-seventy-nine pages thick, it houses an ample apparatus: a preface from the oracle himself; introductions by Martin Scorsese (who divulges that Lou auditioned for the role of Pontius Pilate in The Last Temptation of Christ — now that would have been a trip) and the critic and biographer of Delmore Schwartz, James Atlas; remembrances from guitarist Nils Lofgren and Laurie Anderson; and a comprehensive discography. The lyrics of the gritty ditties and croonier tunes from the early albums are here — “Walk on the Wild Side,” “Sister Ray,” “White Light/White Heat,” “Pale Blue Eyes,” “Sweet Jane,” “Rock ‘n’ Roll” (with its inspired rhyming of “computations” and “amputations”) — and somehow manage to maintain their identity and integrity despite the accumulative tonnage of dreck, filler, dopey sentiments (“I found a reason to keep living, and the reason dear is you”), dippy rhymes (“You scream, I steam, we all want Egg Cream”), body-horror frissons (“Pus runs through matted hair”), dubious provocations (such as “I Wanna Be Black,” whose white-bread narrator wants to have natural rhythm and shoot twenty feet of jism), florid theatricals (dozens of pages expended on Reed’s Edgar Allan Poe tribute “The Raven,” with its promise of “No Nosferatu, Vincent Price or naked women here…”), and an appendix of Miscellaneous Songs that includes an ode to “Gravity,” which, get this, is “pullin’ us down.”

    All this fodder and more, and for what, for what? It doesn’t do Reed any good, piling everything in. Lyrics reclining flat on the page can’t compete with the Lou-ster trotting them through their paces to the squall of guitars and the drone of former bandmate John Cale’s viola, and Reed’s vocals themselves dwell in a lesser dimension than the monochromatic hypnotics of the Velvets’ chanteuse and unholy ghost, Nico. Reed may have written the words to “I’ll Be Your Mirror,” but Nico’s interstellar transmission made the song forever hers. And who other than Nico could have made “All Tomorrow’s Parties” sound ominously near to a battle march?

    Even with musical stars who began as poets, such as Patti Smith and Leonard Cohen, the initial words on the page usually become superseded by the husky voice in the microphone and put into harness, becoming part of the soundtracks in our heads. I first came across Patti (forgive the familiarity but we intersected too often at CBGB’s for formal pretense) through her poetry chapbooks that could be found at St. Mark’s Bookstore or prominently placed next to the cash register at Gotham Book Mart, alongside Henry Miller’s The Death of Mishima and numerous Edward Goreys. Seventh Heaven, that one I still have. Also WITT, whose cover photo featured Patti at her most Falconetti-ish. I have both the American and French editions of The Night, her poetic duet with Television’s Tom Verlaine (her former boyfriend, who took his last name from Rimbaud’s volatile sidekick), which might bring me a sweet return on eBay if I were ever in a financial pinch or simply mercenary. These handy little bibles carry flashback associations for me (St. Marks Church poetry readings, Anne Waldman standing on one leg like a stork as she chants her poems, Allen Ginsberg plodding the East Village), lines that still reignite, intimations of future glory — unlike when I behold the handsome paperback of Patti Smith: Collected Lyrics 1970-2015, which enscrolls the lyrics to Horses, Radio Ethiopia, and subsequent Patti Smith Group albums. It’s a more austere collection than Lou Reed’s catch-all, yet likewise directed at the already devoted — the Church of Patti, for whom Just Kids is scripture. It’s difficult to imagine anyone picking up this book on impulse — the literary world has been impoverished by the lack of impulse buys — and getting zapped by a rogue stanza, ready to run off and seek fresh possibilities. The song lyrics to Horses etc., like so many rock lyrics, seem “poetic” without actually being poetry, too proclamatory to insinuate themselves like a private communication. When she sings “Pissin’ in the river / watchin’ it rise,” we wonder and worry how full Patti’s bladder might be.

    Not every rock lyric collection functions as a hymnal. Some serve as songbook memoir (see the Foo Fighters’ chief pilot Dave Grohl’s recent The Storyteller: Tales of Life and Music) and/or showbiz seminar, a tradition that goes back to the songwriting team of Betty Comden and Adolph Green recounting the backstories and performing their most beloved Broadway show tunes. The late super-syllabic musical theater marvel Stephen Sondheim elevated this approach into a masterclass, presenting a guided tour of his wizard’s workshop with Finishing the Hat and Look, I Made a Hat. The Sondheim duo, collected in a slipcase edition titled Hat Box, may have supplied the inspiration for the blockbuster, best-selling double whammy of Paul McCartney: The Lyrics, edited with an introduction by the poet Paul Muldoon, its volumes split alphabetically from A-K and L-Z, and weighing in at 8.6 pounds, a few ounces heavier than Hat Box. Together, they’d make a swell pair of yoga blocks.

    It is a measure of the bountiful good will that McCartney has accrued for over half a century that the size, extravagance, and aggrandizement of The Lyrics are not seen as an expression of ego but a gesture of generosity: fan-service on a galactic level. It’s a charm offensive from a performer whose charm bears a Cary Grant stamp of eternal youth. Open up either volume at any page and the factory showroom new-book smell welcomes you like an old friend. McCartney’s gregarious reminiscences of how the songs were stitched together or spontaneously took wing are full of mundanities and memorabilia — references to Nivea cold cream and crystal radio sets in the gloss on “Eleanor Rigby” — that remind us how even in the mod brashness of the Swinging Sixties, Beatles music was ingrained with filmy nostalgia, gray weather, and an almost Dickensenian domesticity. Alternating with the pull into the past of “Penny Lane” and “Strawberry Fields Forever” was an antic absurdism inspired by Lewis Carroll, Edward Lear, the Goon Show (Spike Milligan, Peter Sellers, et al.), and Peter Cook that found its way even into a hoarse-shouting, high velocity guitar-grinder like “Helter Skelter,” whose lyrics were based on the Mock Turtle’s song from Alice in Wonderland and subjected to woeful misinterpretation by Charles Manson. Most of McCartney’s post-Beatle output has the peppy tunefulness of cheerful busywork, but it seems churlish to expect more from pop’s roving ambassador of good vibes.

    As poetry, most of McCartney’s lyrics wouldn’t survive serious examination — as when he compares “distractions” to butterflies buzzing round his head (ahem, butterflies don’t buzz), or rhymes “neurosurgeon” with “nothing urgent” (egad) in “Temporary Secretary” — but as a boomer artifact the double volume brings us full circle to Goldstein’s The Poetry of Rock. Here, too, Chuck Berry is hailed as a poet for whom the automobile was the all-American freedom chariot, love wagon, and status machine. “I know there’s a theory that rock and roll couldn’t have existed without the guitars of Leo Fender, but it probably couldn’t have existed without Henry Ford either. I’m thinking of the relationship between the motorcar and what happens in the back seat. We know that people shagged before the motorcar, but the motorcar gave the erotic a whole new lease on life. Think of Chuck Berry ‘riding along in my automobile.’ Chuck is one of America’s great poets.” The success of McCartney’s The Lyrics has prepared the runway for the upcoming publication of Lyrics by Bryan Ferry, the lead singer and finger-snapper of Roxy Music and Wading in Waist-High Water: The Lyrics of Fleet Foxes, the latter an indie folk band with a complicated history that needn’t detain us. Where it will all end, knows only God.

    Of course, the greatest vindication of Goldstein’s crusade to crown rock lyrics with laurel was the awarding of the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2016 to Bob Dylan, who reacted with his usual hazy aplomb, bless him. To many high-minded kibbitzers, this honor was the final rude slap to the face of Philip Roth’s Nobel hopes, but an equally strong case could be made that Leonard Cohen was the more deserving candidate if the druids of Stockholm were determined to anoint a cross-pollinating itinerant entertainer: a genuine poet, meticulous songwriter, elegiac novelist, thinking person’s sex symbol, and every inch the craggy Jewish sage and dharma bum Dylan is. The compact Everyman edition of Cohen’s poems can be read as a thing unto itself, whereas a dutiful slog through the 688 pages of Dylan’s The Lyrics: 1962-2012 (which leaves another decade of new material yet to be gathered from the hayloft) at best re-acquaints you with the live-wire magpie modernist phrases and Waste Land imagery of his first electric Bringing It All Back Home/Highway 61 Revisited/Blonde on Blonde glory run, where the amphetamine rush of the words were lashed to “that thin, wild mercury sound” achieved in the studio.

    As poetry, Dylan’s songs don’t repay scrutiny; their effects are mostly wrought from the musical and nasal delivery, his coyote cunning. When Dylan salutes the outlaw John Wesley Harding for traveling “with a gun in every hand,” you wonder: what is he, an octopus? How many hands does he have? And you could butter your biscuits with the cornball platitudes of Nashville Skyline. It’s unlikely Dylan will be read in the future as a poet, but he will be studied as an epic phenomenon, a traveling medicine man embodying and enriching the American mythos on the last legs of its Whitmanesque voyage. It’s a testament to his tireless, restless nature and vocation that in November he will bestow upon us a treatise titled The Philosophy of Modern Song, or as I prefer to think of it, Bob Dylan’s Guide on How to Write Songs Real Good. In it he intends to lift up the hood of songwriting and show us the nuts and bolts of songwriting, the tinkering required to get things right. Beaming from the cover of Dylan’s book in all of his pomaded radiance is the now deceased, eternally irrepressible Little Richard, the lyrics of whose “Long Tall Sally” can found on page 21 of The Poetry of Rock. If all of this smacks of ancestor worship, well, why not? Respect your elders, kids, and someday you too may be immortal.