Sheila Heti and The Fight for Art

    On the fourth page of Pure Colour, the fourth and most recent novel by the Canadian writer Sheila Heti, it is proposed that there are three kinds of beings on the face of the earth. They are each a different kind of “critic,” tasked with helping God to improve upon His “first draft” of the universe. There are birds who “consider the world as if from a distance” and are interested in beauty above all. There are fish who “critique from the middle” and are consumed by the “condition of the many.” And there are bears who “do not have a pragmatic way of thinking” and are “deeply consumed with their own.” The three main characters in the novel track with the three types: Mira, the art critic and main character, is a bird; Mira’s father, whose death takes up the middle part of the novel, is a bear; and Mira’s romantic interest and colleague at a school for art critics, Annie, is a fish.

    The bird, the bear, and the fish are the basis for an inquiry into different value systems and the ways of perceiving the world that follow from them. The schema itself evokes a competition-to-the-death: birds and bears both eat fish. But the competition Heti is interested in occurs in the social world, not the natural one. There, conflict need not be fatal, but it remains a significant and even a necessary aspect of social life in modern secular societies. For what defines the three types is more than a matter of personality, or sensibility. It concerns what the philosopher Charles Taylor calls “strong evaluations”: that is, the kind of choices and commitments that individuals living in those societies make to express “the kind of beings we are or want to be.”

    Heti has spoken of writing Pure Colour during the Trump years, and of it being her way of responding to the ambient conviction that it was “frivolous” to be an artist during such a politically charged time. It is appropriate, then, that the central conflict in the book is between Mira, the artistic sensibility, and Annie, the political one. To be sure, the virtues of the fish are not dismissed, and toward the end of the novel Annie offers Mira an impersonal kind of comfort (perhaps the only kind she is capable of offering). Through Mira’s eyes, Heti acknowledges that fish can be driven by a true and beautiful compassion for others, and that sometimes they are the ones who “see the whole picture most clearly.” The novel nevertheless traces a deep and often hostile incompatibility between the worldviews of the bird and the fish. Mira, who sees beauty in the world just as it is, calls Annie a “fixer” because she is always telling people her “own ideas about things; about relationships and the psyche and the world of people, and what it meant to be in a family… meddling in the structure that had been given to humans, as old as a tree.” Toward the end of the book, she envisions finding Annie in the small town where she has gone to help people “repair their collective delusions” and telling her that fixers are “the wrong thing to be.” Annie listens “politely, with a face of cold marble.” Then she tells Mira that she is just repeating patriarchal talking points she learned from her father. “I still think it’s wrong to be a fixer,” says Mira. “That’s rich for you to say!,” responds Annie you, who have never tried to fix anything!” (Italics Mira’s.)

    The majority of Heti’s fiction, and all three of her novels, beginning with How Should a Person Be? in 2012, have been published during a decade in which strong evaluations have trended in one direction: toward that of the fixers. Far from standing for all ways of caring about the “condition of the many” — that is, of engaging in politics — the fixer names an ethos that has become conspicuous on the progressive left in recent years: it appears in Annie’s character as a kind of therapeutic moralism, which takes little notice of the compromise and contestation traditionally thought of as intrinsic to political life. Like many who call for the breaking down of every border and convention, Annie conceives of the lines delineating communities — whether biological, like the family, or political, like the state — as arbitrary and meretricious; all that stands in the way of her utopia is the ignorance and laziness of those who have not read the right books or learned the most up-to-date vocabulary. In her claim that Mira’s criticism is merely the result of her having internalized the patriarchal claims of her father, it is easy to hear the moralists’ characteristic skepticism that any defensible value system besides their own is even possible, much less something to be consciously cultivated.

    Much has been made in recent years about the problem of political polarization, but just as distinctive of the period — perhaps more distinctive, since polarization in American politics is perennial, and inevitable — has been the accompanying encroachment of the ethos of the fixers across the categories of left-liberal society and culture. This includes the categories of art and literature, much as it might seem that aesthetic values would preclude the utilitarian bias at the heart of therapeutic moralism. Dispiritingly, the most common response of contemporary novelists to the encroachment of this ethos has been to submit their manuscripts dutifully to the panels of fixers for judgment, approval and, occasionally, a surely justified censure. “Our art has become exhaustively political, but it is no longer discernibly subversive,” observed the writer Greg Jackson about the literature of the Trump years, “It is what major cultural institutions, foundations, and media organizations find congenial.”

    Heti, while feeling the same pressures as other artists, has chosen a different tack, of which Pure Colour is only the most explicit example. In each of her novels, she constructs a coliseum wherein the bearers of different strong evaluations do battle. The battle is not really a battle; it is more like a conversation, and the setting is of course not a coliseum; rather, the characters talk in bars and hair salons, at poetry readings, and inside a leaf. They talk about grief, beauty, friendship, finitude, blowjobs, the soul, the intimacy of cutting hair, and the ecstasy of buying the perfectly colored lamp. They make jokes and ask a lot of earnest open-ended questions, of each other and sometimes of the universe. But the casual or whimsical quality of these dialogues ought not distract us from the fact that each of them has a winner, and in each the winner is art.

    It may seem like no surprise that Heti, an artist, prefers art. This is why it is so important to read Heti’s fiction as itself in conversation with the moralization of culture that her critics and commentators have more often fallen victim to than managed to identify as one of her main targets. Heti does not ignore therapeutic moralism so much as she engages it within her fiction for what it is, or should be, to the artist: a stumbling block to the creation of genuine art. Perhaps we can learn something from her example about how to emerge from this long season of aesthetic retreat.

    As with so many other things, the Trump presidency accelerated in both speed and vulgarity a process that was already underway in literary culture. Heti, who published her early short stories in McSweeneys, and the first excerpt from what would become her first novel in n+1, began writing in the early 2000s, at what can now be seen as a transitional moment for art and culture. It was not entirely true, as some alleged, that postmodernism ended with 9/11, but it was the case that, for a variety of reasons, a new social seriousness seemed to enter into the literary world around that time. Almost a decade before 9/11, David Foster Wallace had already announced the exhaustion of postmodern irony and alienation, calling for fiction writers to return their attention to the “desperate questions” of human experience. Along with several other writers, musicians, and filmmakers calling for a program of “new sincerity” in art and culture, he would become an unacknowledged legislator of the coming age of conviction.

    But what should artists be sincere about? This is a question Wallace never got around to fully answering before he hanged himself in his California home in 2008. A suggestion that was to prove appealing to the novelists of the following generation, however, had already appeared three years earlier in Benjamin Kunkel’s novel Indecision. Kunkel was one of the founders of n+1, a magazine that played a not insignificant part in bringing political sincerity back into fashion on the young left — in part, as Kunkel’s novel indicates, at the direct expense of aesthetics. The narrator of Indecision is Dwight B. Wilmerding, a 28-year-old pharmaceutical worker who wanders between jobs, romantic entanglements, and self-conceptions, once remarking that he feels “like a scrap of sociology blown into its designated corner of the world.” Then, in a surprise ending, Dwight cures his ambivalence and apathy — and also his romantic frustrations — by moving with a new girlfriend to Ecuador and becoming a “democratic socialist” doing public relations for oppressed workers. It is a reversal of the classic structure of the bildungsroman: whereas the artist’s development typically culminates with him learning to speak for himself, Dwight’s ends with him training his voice to serve his political commitments.

    Kunkel showed how seriously he took his novel’s ending when, in subsequent years, he abandoned fiction and devoted himself to writing long essays on Marxism and political economy. His shift was indicative of a move by many of his generation’s novelists, or would-be novelists, into the genre of the political or sociological essay. Some, like Jonathan Safran Foer, known for writing two bathetic novels about the Holocaust and 9/11, produced two bathetic tracts on animal abuse and climate change. Others, like the founder of McSweeneys, Dave Eggers, started nonprofits, or advertised their new literary projects as an aid to humanitarian undertakings, whether in post-civil war Sudan or post-Katrina New Orleans. Although they embraced a very different politics than Kunkel (as he dove into the history of Marxist criticism of liberalism, they took their cues from progressive NGOs and Nicholas Kristof), these writers followed his example in disciplining aesthetic ambition to sincere political conviction.

    Heti, too, was interested in sincerity, but she pursued it in a different key. She was part of a group of writers who turned to “autofiction” — a genre that blends autobiography and fiction, as the name indicates — as a way to give their novels the impression of having stripped away all pretense and artificiality. Of course, autofiction is still fiction: not everything in it can be assumed to be true, and what appears in an autofictional novel is there because the author wants it to be. Still, the form allowed some writers who had grown disillusioned with the conventions of realism to make a correction in the opposite direction of the postmodern distancing techniques that had proliferated in the 1990s; instead of pulling away, they moved closer in. It was his break with conventional form, said the Norwegian writer Karl Ove Knausgaard, that allowed him to go to the “inner core of existence,” no matter how “small and ugly” were the things he found there.

    That observation is lifted from a review that Heti wrote in 2014 of the second book of Knausgaard’s My Struggle, his six-volume “autobiographical novel.” For Heti, the draw of Knausgaard’s project was the way it pushed beyond “our romantic stories about our lives,” as well as the “consensual safety that fiction brings with it, the presumably ethical veil behind which writers protect themselves from their family and friends.” Where “conventional novels make of life something it is not,” Knausgaard had gone “beyond dignity” to create a “realism that is really real.” The project can be seen as a classically modernist one of using literary form to connect the social and the historical to the personal, and therefore to locate the potential for authenticity in an individual life. But whereas for the early twentieth-century modernists this process had involved elaborate formal and stylistic experiments, the autofictionists of the 2010s eschewed plot and scene setting, gravitating instead toward a style that was casual and conversational, at times even sloppy, in hopes of offering relief from the onslaught of artificiality and “artful” messaging in the broader culture. A corollary could be found in the image that each group conjured of the artist: Joyce’s godly figure, “paring his fingernails” above his “invisible” creation, gives way in Knausgaard and Heti to the author as the fully implicated, sometimes shambolic center of their own story, a non-genius who is constantly remonstrating with themselves for not being a better person, or a more committed artist. Indeed, one of the recurring themes in the autofiction of Knausgaard and Heti is the — often extremely undignified — struggle of trying to write for a living “in an age,” as Heti puts it, “where no one believes it’s God’s work.” It was a form, in other words, for producing novels that were sincere not about humanitarianism, or social change, but about writing.

    Heti’s early short stories, many of them fairy-tale-like parables, collected in The Middle Stories, and her early novella, Ticknor, written from the point of view of the Boston Brahmin biographer George Ticknor, gave evidence of her flexibility as a stylist — when she wants to write refined prose, she can — and for making the ordinary stuff of social life into a kind of absurdist theater. Yet it was not until How Should a Person Be?, her own “novel from life,” published in 2012, that the themes that were to consume her mature fiction come fully into focus. Chief among these themes is the struggle to write amid the multiplying calls for the writer to submit to extrinsic moral and ideological imperatives.

    The inciting incident of the novel is the narrator, also named Sheila, being asked to write a play for a “feminist theater company” in Toronto. Initially balking at the request, Sheila is relieved to find out the play need not be “feminist” so long as it is “about women.” But Sheila’s confusion at the requirement, made by one of the cultural institutions in her city, that her art serve a political agenda — even though it is an agenda she supports — offers a preview of the conflict between aesthetics and politics that occurs over and over in the novel, both between characters and in the conversations they conduct with themselves. Sheila’s friend Margaux, a talented painter, “sometimes felt bad and confused that she had not gone into politics.” Sheila’s friend Ben says he has always wanted to be a theater director but, following a trip to South Africa, is no longer “convinced this is a good use of one’s time.” Perhaps he should be an activist, or write something that “evolves into actual engagement in the world.” (Ben declares that art is a “narcissistic activity,” to which Margaux shrewdly responds, “Even activism is very involved with righteousness, you know.”)

    As for Sheila herself, she admits that for years she had been asking the titular question — how should a person be? — to “everyone I met,” finding that “in everyone there was something to envy.” At times she fantasizes about becoming a painter, or a religious leader like Moses. Yet the appearance of total openness is deceptive. It is not the case that Sheila is genuinely at a loss about who she should be. Unlike Lena Dunham’s Girls, the popular TV series to which it was often compared, How Should a Person Be? is not a journey in search of the authentic inner self. From its prologue to its conclusion, Sheila knows that she is a writer, and should be writing. “It’s time to stop asking questions of other people,” she remembers admonishing herself during a trip to France. “It is time to just go into a cocoon and spin your soul.”

    The comedy and the pathos of the book, and of Heti’s enterprise as a whole, are suggested by the narrative deflation that follows this admonition. “But when I got back to the city, I neglected this plan in favor of hanging out with my friends every night of the week, just as I had been doing before I’d left for the Continent.” The remainder of the novel would not exist had Sheila actually stayed in her cocoon. We follow her as she goes to poetry readings, cuts hair at a hair salon, travels to New York in hopes of becoming famous, fucks a sexual virtuoso named Israel for weeks at a time, becomes obsessed with her friend Margaux, then worries that she has ruined everything by taping their conversations without permission, then reconciles with her over email. But for Sheila, unlike for Hannah Horvath or any other character on Girls, the calling of the artist never leaves her, and never leaves her alone. The novel lingers over her repeated failure to do “what I knew I had to do — leave the world for my room and emerge with the moon, something upon which the reflected light of my experience and knowledge could be seen: a true work of art, a real play.” Not the difficulty of choosing one’s path, but the difficulty of staying on the path that one has chosen, when that path is the path of art — this is Heti’s most persistent theme.

    But why should one choose the path of art? Not every fiction writer in the 2010s — or even all of those who wrote autofiction — had the same answer, and between 2012 and 2018, when Heti would publish her second novel, Motherhood, many seemed to lack answers to the basic question of how anyone could justify choosing art over therapeutic moralism. For reasons of sensibility, training, and perhaps of ego, these writers were not willing, as Eggers and Safran Foer had been, to renounce artistic ambition for political advocacy. But neither did they want to be judged guilty of neglecting the moral urgency of social movements such as Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, and (eventually) the “Resistance” to Trumpism. What to do?

    Especially for those who tended toward autofiction, the goal often became to represent this autobiographical tension in their art. In his novel 10:04, set in New York during the Occupy protests, Ben Lerner promised to take his readers on a journey “from irony to sincerity,” though the narrator’s halfhearted embrace of political activism is signified by his willingness to allow a protester to eat and shower at his house before watching him exit the subway at Wall Street on his way uptown for an art exhibition. By Lerner’s next novel, The Topeka School, published in 2019, it was clear that the sincerity being promised would be applied quite literally to progressive activism. (The book ends with the narrator taking hold of the “people’s mic” at a rally against ICE.) Sally Rooney’s novel, Beautiful World Where Are You, juxtaposes the desires of its two young protagonists, a successful novelist and an assistant editor at a literary magazine, for romance, beauty, and spiritual fulfillment against their guilt about all the people “ground to death in horrific ways” while they went about their lunch breaks. In Christine Smallwood’s The Life of the Mind, the adjunct professor protagonist, having sidestepped an environmental canvasser on her way to the subway, imagines several fruitless conversations with the “raft children” of the future, who have little patience for her defense that her “personality is all wrong for cooperative action.” In Rumaam Alam’s Leave the World Behind, a family dices garlic and prepares book reviews in the Hamptons while a never-specified catastrophe closes in on them, perceived only in fragmented news reports and cryptic text message alerts. (The point, said a reviewer in the New York Times, is that “faced with the end of the world, you wouldn’t do a damn thing.”)

    It is not quite right to call these novels propagandistic: to the extent they advance a political program, it is taken to be so obvious and obligatory as to render any attempt at persuasion superfluous. I am not sure it is right even to call them political. They are certainly politically correct. But their predominant weather pattern is not moral certainty; it is ambivalence. Ambivalence not about the rightness of their political beliefs, but about the rightness of their decision to go on writing fiction in light of those beliefs. They bear witness to the steady advance of political moralism across the categories of left-liberal culture and, progressively, into the minds of the artists themselves.

    The ambivalence of these novels doubtless reflected a genuine structure of feeling for many intellectuals and artists during the Trump years. In interviews, the writers often affected a weary wisdom about the trap of “dogmatic” art, insisting that of course they knew the difference between literature and agitprop. Yet they were just as careful to deny that art should ever aspire to be above politics, and when they were not writing novels they could reliably be found spreading petitions to stop gentrification in Brooklyn, signing their names to open letters opposing Trump’s candidacy for president, or writing op-eds assailing MFA programs for being insufficiently politicized. In the shadow of these books, moreover, there flourished a less ambivalent genre, one far less worried about presenting art as a form of glorified sociology or amateur activism. The controversy in 2020 over the “immigration novel” American Dirt, by Jeanine Cummings, focused on the author’s misrepresentations of her identity while the scandal of the book’s aesthetic nullity went largely unreported; the novelist Lauren Groff, writing in The New York Times Book Review, even praised the novel for being “too urgent” in its moral mission for niceties such as humor, “joy in language,” or “characters who feel real.” On the (slightly) more literary side was Kristen Roupenian’s short story “Cat Person,” in 2017, which strained to blame patriarchy for a college student’s uncomfortable sexual experience with an overweight older man, and became the most shared short story in the history of The New Yorker.

    Arriving in the middle of the Trump years and on the heels of the ferment of #MeToo, which had contributed to the virality of fiction such as “Cat Person,” Heti’s Motherhood is simultaneously her greatest novel and her most perversely misunderstood. The narrator is, again like Heti, a 37-year old writer living in Toronto, in this case deciding whether to have a child. Like How Should a Person Be?, the book was often taken as a statement of ambivalence, for understandable reasons. The protagonist really does appear to be paralyzed by indecision. Yet also like How Should a Person Be?, Motherhood is ultimately less an ambivalent novel than an agonistic one. This time the temptation faced by the artist is not political commitment, but the creation of new life. The guiding question is not whether it is justifiable, or prudent, or morally responsible, for a woman to have a child today, but what decision will allow the narrator of the book to keep faith with her “actual life.”

    The fulcrum of this decision is understood from the beginning to be the narrator’s commitment to being an artist. “One can either be a great artist and a mediocre parent,” her partner Miles tells her, “or the reverse, but not great at both, because both art and parenthood take all one’s time and attention.” The narrator resents the zero-sum nature of this evaluation, but nothing in the book refutes its force. That it is perfectly possible to both raise a child and write novels is beside the point. “Mother” and “artist” are here the names of contradictory ways of being in the world, and each demands, like the monotheistic god, a full and undivided fealty. Miles only says explicitly what a younger version of the narrator had once felt with no less certainty:

    I remember being twenty and seeing several writers on a literary panel on stage — both women and men. They said that of course writing was important to them, but their children were more important. I felt so put off. They seemed so unserious to me. I never wanted to be like that—to have something in my life that was more important than writing. Why would they do that to themselves?

    It is easy to miss, due to the companionability of Heti’s prose, how oppositional this perspective is to the prevailing common-sense view that life in our time is — or should be — a negotiation between different roles to which one can, with the right intentions and time management skills, give equal weight and meaning. Perhaps some of the book’s critics — many of whom betrayed irritation with Heti’s insistence on drawing such stark dichotomies — were not wrong to feel judged by it. But the judgment was not for whatever choice the writer might make — mother or artist? — but for hiding from themselves the depth of the necessary conflict between two different kinds of ultimate commitment. Following a visit to a fertility clinic, the narrator considers another practical way of delaying her decision: she can freeze her eggs. But she judges that this would be like “freezing my indecision,” a sign of weakness. Her goal is to get to the other side of her indecision, not to prolong or mitigate it. But unlike the narrator in Kunkel’s Indecision, she will get to the other side not by committing to democratic socialism, but by committing — or recommitting — to art.

    That there is never much doubt the narrator will choose art over being a mother, and has chosen it before the novel even begins, is therefore not a weakness of Motherhood, as I have heard many readers contend; it is the backdrop for its central drama. The story has its analogue not in sociological essays about work-life balance, a woman’s right to be childless, or the morality of giving birth in the age of climate change — none of which have much bearing on the narrator’s final decision — but in the spiritual autobiographies of monks triumphing over the temptations of sex or lucre. As if to literalize the agonistic metaphor, the narrator compares her wrestling with motherhood to Jacob wrestling with the angel in the Old Testament. To “survive” this wrestling, to have her “life spared,” is not only to resist becoming a mother, but to continue on as an artist. And the novel not only represents this struggle, it is the result of this struggle. “I know the longer I work on this book, the less likely it is I will have a child. Perhaps what I’m trying to do in writing this is build a raft that will carry me just so long and so far, that my questions can no longer be asked.”

    The recurrence of the prayer to stop asking questions from Heti’s first novel indicates the strength of the artist’s aspiration to find peace from the perplexities that inevitably cause her to question the ultimate value of her own activity. The fact that the questions do not stop reflects the impossibility, not to mention the inadvisability, of that aspiration ever being fully satisfied. The cocoon in which the artist spins her soul is not a monastery, and no artist could survive as an artist if she lived locked away from the world’s problems for good. Heti often imagines this dynamic in terms of trying to find the right “distance” from which to view her life. If submission to the social roles of the mother or the activist represents one kind of threat to the life of the modern artist, retreat from worldly temptations represents an equal and opposite threat: on one side, the artist risks disappearing into society, on the other, disappearing from it.

    Motherhood is Heti’s finest novel so far — one that deserves to be considered not as part of the exploding contemporary literature on motherhood, but as a literary parable in the meditative modernist tradition inaugurated by The Trial — in part because she achieves the perfect distance from her subject-matter. The narrator of the novel is close enough to make the personal stakes of the choice she has before her seem real and vital, while she is also far enough away to invest those stakes with an impersonal dimension that outstrips any merely subjective or sociological significance. The style in which she decides the content of her “actual life” indicates the inescapably aesthetic aspect of the choices we all make to shape the composition of our lives as a whole.

    Motherhood also represents an advance in Heti’s thinking about art. The advance comes because Heti takes the temptation of motherhood so much more seriously than she does the temptation of politics. In contending with the good of creating new life, far more than in contending with the (more ambiguous, in Heti’s estimation) good of therapeutic moralism, the artist is compelled to offer an articulation of the equal or greater good of creating new art. And it is in and through the wrestling match between art and motherhood that a new note enters Heti’s fiction, one only barely detectable in How Should a Person Be?. In Motherhood, Heti is inspired to articulate why art can be not only an authentic, a creative, and a beautiful activity, but also a reverent one.

    Early on, the narrator tells us her mother had “cried for forty days and forty nights” when she was born, and that the current book “can be called a success if, after reading it, my mother stops crying for good.” The narrator’s mother, born to Holocaust survivors and portrayed as having conflicted feelings about motherhood herself, had always wanted her daughter to be “a dutiful, humble girl.” But the mother and the daughter have different strong evaluations; they do not agree on the highest things. “She wanted me to be a doctor, like her,” writes the narrator, “when all I had ever cared for was art. She didn’t see what there was to care for in art.” The novel becomes a referendum on whether the narrator can communicate what there is to care for in art to the non-artist who is her mother. Whereas some women feel that they owe their mothers a grandchild, she comes to believe that what she owes her mother is the novel she is writing. “What is wrong with living your life for a mother, instead of a son or daughter?” the narrator asks, and then answers:

    There can be nothing wrong in it. If my desire is to write, and for the writing to defend, and for the defense to really live — not for one day, but a thousand days, or ten thousand days — that is no less a viable human aspiration than having a child with your mind set on eternity. Art is eternity backwards. Art is written for one’s ancestors, even if those ancestors are elected, like our literary mothers and fathers are. We write for them. Children are eternity forwards. My sense of eternity is backwards through time. The further back in time I can go, the deeper into eternity I feel I can pierce.

    Motherhood is not, it turns out, a book about a future daughter, but about a current one. In the novel’s final pages, the narrator describes emailing the manuscript of the book to her mother “in great fear and trepidation.” Then she goes out for a walk and falls down a set of wooden steps. Her mother responds the next morning, blessing the book as “magical.”

    The definition of art as “eternity backwards” is not casual; it returns in Pure Colour, where Heti reprises the role of artist-as-daughter, this time through Mira’s relation to her dying father. Heti does suggest a conflict between being a daughter and being an artist, in a poignant scene where Mira, sitting next to her father’s sickbed, reflects on how she has never been able to love him with the same devotion and certainty with which she loves books. Still, we can infer that Heti does not feel the roles of artist and daughter to be completely incompatible, as she does the roles of artist and mother, or artist and activist. Why? Perhaps it is because being a daughter is backward-looking, an orientation toward one’s parents and through them to the “ancestors,” which is also how Heti pictures art. Motherhood and political activism are, on the other hand, both forward-looking (“eternity forwards”). Whereas the one values the present as the richly inherited product of the past — and thus worthy of remembrance and aesthetic appreciation, if not of awe — the other devalues the present as a (deficient) precursor to a better future, a condition that Heti associates in Motherhood with women who are viewed not as Kantian “ends in themselves” but as merely a “passageway through which a man might come.”

    But is it true that art is really backward-looking? The claim may seem surprising. Heti writes in a modern tradition characterized by formal experimentation and often associated with Ezra Pound’s dictum to “make it new.” Indeed, the preponderance of the advanced literary criticism of the mid-twentieth century was an attempt to cement an alliance between modernist art and leftist, often revolutionary, politics. The apex of this genre came with Theodor Adorno’s essays on Kafka and Beckett, which held that such literature compelled the individual to come to a full understanding of the unbearability of life in modern capitalist society and thus be inspired to rise up against it.

    It is worth noting that, for Adorno, what gave these books their political potential was not any explicit political “engagement” by their authors; it was, rather, their commitment to portraying the world exactly as they experienced it, as artists. Yet however great its interpretive power (and Adorno’s was very great), this style of criticism tended to ignore another important strand in modernist art, which had always been oriented at least as much toward the past as toward the future. The formal innovations undertaken by many modernist writers were intended to preserve those immaterial substances — whether one called it life itself, the remembrance of things past, or the stream of consciousness — that they perceived as being under threat in a rapidly secularizing, industrializing world. One critic described Motherhood as a “talmudic text,” a judgment that might seem to find confirmation in Heti’s acknowledgement that her writing has been influenced by Judaic traditions of debate and questioning. At the same time, the narrator of Motherhood admits that, though she “badly wanted to be religious,” she knows that “God is not true.” Heti can be said to be working in the drift of those modernists who saw their art as the secular vessel for inquiries and energies they could no longer take seriously within a religious framework. The point of making it new was often to preserve something old. “In contrast with those whom we have called materialists,” wrote Virginia Woolf in her essay “Modern Fiction,” “Mr. Joyce is spiritual.”

    When the narrator’s mother in Motherhood calls her book “magical,” she gives another name to what the modernists hoped their artworks could keep from being washed away by the waves of modern disenchantment. Yet if Motherhood is on the one hand Heti’s most convincing statement of her commitment to art as against politics, parenthood, or medicine, it is also a statement that attempts to incorporate her mother’s wish that she become a “humble girl.” This implies that art, like the religion it has endeavored to replace, is not necessarily humble, but that it can learn to be. The way it learns to be humble is through the agonistic contest with other ways of being. Agonism, as a form of struggle, implies respect and even reverence for one’s opponents, as Jacob had for the angel. It means continuously asking how a person should be, not because we lack conviction about the answer but because our convictions will benefit from being perpetually tried and tested against all the available answers. Agonistic art models a way of contending, honorably but also honestly, with the sharp clashes between good and good that occur inevitably in the course of a modern life.

    So Heti’s agonistic novels show how our own convictions — whether we are birds, bears, or fish — benefit from the struggle to assert themselves against the alternatives that animate those around us. But by choosing in her most recent novel, and the one written directly after the confused response to Motherhood, to make her main character an art critic rather than an artist, I think Heti means also to suggest something about what it takes for the artist in particular to make herself understood. Her work broaches the important if rarely asked question of why the cultivation of an aesthetically literate public for art — a public capable of appreciating artworks not merely as a pretext for the discussion of culture and politics — should matter to us today.

    In interviews about Pure Colour, Heti has mentioned a book called Manet and His Critics by George Heard Hamilton, which she finds herself “always coming back to.” Hamilton’s book is a study of the critical response to Manet’s paintings in his time. Much of this response was mocking and dismissive, on the grounds that Manet’s art was narcissistic and undignified, failing the standards of aesthetic inspiration set by his predecessors. Early in Pure Colour, Mira describes a lecture by an “old professor” at her school who, sounding like some of the critics in Hamilton’s study, impugns Manet for choosing a “ridiculous subject matter” and making art that did not edify or “lift up” the viewer. Heti herself has faced similar kinds of criticism, but Manet and His Critics can be consulted for clues not only to Heti’s view of her critics, but also for her view of herself. Manet, as his great literary defenders Baudelaire and Zola insisted, was one of the earliest exemplars of a modernist sensibility that was in the process of emancipating itself from the dictates of both romantic and religious art. Against the demand that his art offer its audience some higher inspiration, Zola recognizes that the modern artist’s job was only “to seek and to see for himself.” Here one can hear the echo of Heti’s discussion of Knausgaard’s enterprise, and by extension her own, as one of finding a form to depict the “inner core” of their experience, no matter how “small and ugly” were the things one might find there.

    That a viewer whose taste has been shaped by conventional standards will have difficulty initially comprehending the virtues of such writing, or painting, explains why the critic becomes such an important mediating figure between the modern artist and the society that both produces and is likely to (at first) disclaim her. The point is not that ordinary people are incapable of appreciating modern art; as the example of Manet shows, they are sometimes better able to appreciate it in the long run than are all but a few critics. Yet the role of the critic in the artist’s own time is still significant. It can prepare the way in the broader public for the cultivation of the values and the virtues that are internal to art as a distinctive practice and a meaningful human activity, or it can discourage them. According to Hamilton, Manet’s critics mostly did the latter, often merely “reiterating the public sentiments” rather than doing anything to “clarify the situation.” The lesson is worth keeping in mind as we struggle to emerge from a period in which our book reviewers, literary prize committees, and publishing houses have too often, rather than showing what it means to make judgments informed by aesthetic criteria, merely reiterated and amplified public sentiments that have nothing whatsoever to do with the internal values of art.

    Late in Pure Colour, driving to see Annie and tell her it is wrong to be a fixer, Mira thinks about Manet. She reflects especially on his still-life Asparagus, appreciating all the things that her professor had denounced: “the simplicity of his expression, the lightness of his touch, the muteness of his colors, how minor a thing an asparagus is.” Beginning by recognizing the qualities that are internal to the painting — color, proportion, and brushstroke — she works her way out from there to the style of character that the craftsmanship reveals: “the perfect balance between carefulness and carelessness.” Then she moves to consider, true to form, the way of being of the creature who had been able to create and invest its soul in such a thing. In contrast to the fixer, who is always “complaining of being tired,” an artist is “driven to make art by the spirit inside them, making an artwork like a signal or flare calling out, beckoning its kin to come near,” she writes, “That is why an artist never tires of their task.”

    It reveals something about our estrangement from a potent aesthetic vocabulary that even Heti’s most thoughtful and sympathetic critics so often praise her as a philosopher or a mystic, as opposed to the quietly crusading artist she has always insisted she is. There are philosophical and mystical elements in all of Heti’s fiction, and much can be gained from examining them; certainly, this is more productive than reading her as a sociological essayist or an ambivalent memoirist. But there is a reason that Heti titled her novel Pure Colour as opposed to Pure Reason, and a reason that the deity she imagines is compared to a painter, who is “most proud of creation as an aesthetic thing.” This is not Moses’s God, it is Manet’s. And it is for this God, especially in times of political temptation, that the sincere artist stubbornly and reverently fights.

    “I want to be able to say anything I wish to say”

    The following conversation took place in Russian in 1995 at Headington House, Isaiah Berlin’s home near Oxford.

    ADAM MICHNIK: What do you consider yourself to be: an Englishman, a Jew, or a Russian?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: I have lived here for seventy years now and people see me as an Englishman. After all, Oxford is the essence of Britishness. But though I have become a bit Anglicized, I am still a Russian Jew. I am a Jew simply because one cannot cease being a Jew, not because I cultivate a Jewish culture or a Jewish tradition. Those are important things; however, we Jews have paid too high a price for them. If I were sure that by drinking this cup of coffee I could, just like that, turn all Jews into Danes, I would do it. I don’t know of a single Jew, converted or not, who is free of anxiety; it is as if all Jews feel a vague sense of unease. There are millions of Jews in the world whose children grow up with such a feeling.Assimilation was not successful. Many Jews cannot assimilate. They are a minority, and minorities suffer, and they strive to be better than the majority. If one lives in a foreign country and doesn’t like it there one can go back to the country one left, either one’s own or the one that one’s parents left. Only Jews cannot do this, because there is no such country.

    ADAM MICHNIK: And Israel?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: For those who were newcomers there, it was not home. True, those Jews who were born in Israel have their home. But Arabs, their enemies, are there too. They force them into war. Then perhaps it is better to live in New York? In any case, I would not be able to live in Israel. I would be unhappy there.

    ADAM MICHNIK: You were born in 1909 in Riga. Leszek Kołakowski, your Oxford friend, calls you in jest “The Great Son of the Latvian Nation.”

    ISAIAH BERLIN: Let’s just say that I am a peculiar kind of Latvian, and that there are no other Latvians like me. I know only a few Latvian words, ‘Kur tu teci, kur tu teci, gailīti mans?’, which means, ‘Where are you going, where are you going, my little rooster?’ — from a Latvian folk song. And ‘Cik maksā?’, ‘How much is it?’ That’s all. But my mother knew Latvian. My nanny taught her.

    ADAM MICHNIK: You come from a well-to-do intellectual family.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: My father was the adopted grandson of ISAIAH BERLIN, who purchased some land in 1862. During the reign of Tsar Alexander II, Jews could buy land. And when the railroads were built, the price of land went up. Berlin became a millionaire. His only [adopted] son married the daughter of a Hasidic rabbi. Because a Jew must be either a learned rabbi or a wealthy man, the sons of wealthy men married the daughters of rabbis. ISAIAH BERLIN did not have any children, so he adopted my grandfather, the son of his sister-in-law. His sister-in-law was really poor. She ran a small shop while her husband spent entire days in the synagogue.

    We lived in Riga, and my father owned forests and sawmills. Timber and planks went west, and my father went with them. He spoke English, French, and German — he had quite a way with his clients. Everything went well and then 1914 came. The Germans were victorious at Tannenberg and it looked as if they might enter Riga. Jews preferred them to the Russians if only because anti-Semitism among Germans was not as overt as in Russia. But my family feared that they would be cut off from their forests, and they went deep into Russia, to a village that belonged to my father’s firm.

    There were peasants there who cut the wood, the old landowner who was slowly dying, and public servants — officers who had not made it to the front, and their ladies in long muslin dresses. In a word, this was the Russia of Turgenev. We picked mushrooms and blueberries in a huge wood. From a child’s point of view, this was an absolute paradise. From there, we moved to Petrograd.

    ADAM MICHNIK: And there you witnessed the 1917 revolution?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: Yes. I remember my father took me out onto a balcony of our house. We lived at that time on Vasilevsky Island, and I saw people with banners that read “Down with the Tsar,” “All Power to the Duma,” “Down with War.” The crowd was not large and suddenly soldiers appeared. My father said: “Soon blood will spill. We’d better not watch.” Then the soldiers started to mingle with the crowd and father said: “It’s the revolution.” The first revolution, the February one, was liberal, and my parents liked it. Aunts and uncles went to the rallies and were entranced. “Kerensky’s wonderful! Lvov’s wonderful! What extraordinary people!”

    In the summer, we went to a small town called Staraya Russa. When we came back to Petrograd in September, I saw the posters of the Provisional Government. It had a multitude of parties — you cannot imagine how many of them there were. I saw young people who were tearing down posters and painting the hammer and sickle in their place. I liked that. My father was not enthusiastic. In general, in our circles, no one, at first, saw anything remarkable about this second revolution. The elevator wasn’t working. Newspapers were not being printed. Half the shops were closed. There were leaders of some sort. Everyone had heard of Lenin and Trotsky. They were always mentioned together as though they were some kind of company or other.ADAM MICHNIK: Lenin and Trotsky Inc.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: Indeed. I believe that Lenin was a fanatic, a dangerous one, though an honest man. Trotsky, however — a terrible hoodlum. And he had to be hanged. Why? I was never able to understand. Perhaps because he was a Jew and one could expect the worst from him.

    There was a strike and the trams were not running. At first the tram drivers’ union did not support the Bolsheviks, but the situation changed gradually until it turned around completely. At the time we were already living in one room, because there was nothing to heat the apartment with. There was only peat. Food was in short supply. I remember standing for hours in line wearing gigantic valenki — soft felt boots — waiting with the adults for I don’t know what. I didn’t go to school.

    My father supplied timber for railroads — under the Tsar, under the Provisional Government, and under the Bolsheviks. No one would touch us. My father was summoned to Section no. 2 at the offices of the Cheka [the secret police] but then he was released. Yet he feared and hated Communism, and he decided to leave. We left in 1920 in a completely legal manner. Since my father was an Anglophile, he decided that we should go to England.

    ADAM MICHNIK: To London?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: No. A friend of my father’s, an Englishman, told him, “Mr. Berlin, we Englishmen do not like towns. We like to live in the bosom of nature.” So my father found a house in a suburb some distance from London, a village in the truest sense of the word, in the middle of nowhere. There I went to school. The only English I knew was a poem, “Daisy, Daisy …” and I recited it in a horrible Russian accent. According to my mother, I used to come home from school crying. But after a month I was already speaking English. Around New Year’s Eve, I acted in an old English play, Babes in the Wood: that is, I became Anglicized.

    ADAM MICHNIK: And then you studied at Oxford?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: I was there for four years, and I graduated from the faculty of ancient and contemporary philosophy and [ancient] history. I enrolled at Corpus Christi College. My grandfather in Riga, a pious Jew, could not understand how I could study in a place with such a name.

    ADAM MICHNIK: Weren’t you ever religious?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: My family was not observant. My parents went to synagogue the same way people go to Anglican church: five, six times a year. When pious Jewish boys went home on Friday afternoon — when the Sabbath began — I remained at school. But I knew I was a Jew. I knew the Bible, and I could read it in Hebrew.

    ADAM MICHNIK: How about Yiddish?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: My grandfather and grandmother spoke “the jargon,” as it was called at the time, and my parents used it in their own circle. I don’t speak or read Yiddish, but I understand about every other word.

    ADAM MICHNIK: Joseph Brodsky, in his essay commemorating your eightieth birthday, wrote that he owed his mental health in large part to people belonging to the Oxford class of 1930. He had in mind you and the poets Stephen Spender and W. H. Auden. Unlike you, those two were very leftist. Spender even belonged to the Communist Party, although he was soon expelled for doubting the guilt of the defendants in the Stalinist trials.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: But he wasn’t really a Communist. He wrote a book about Communists, not a good one. I asked him then, “Why not write a book about us instead?” He said he wanted to start out with something strong, authentic.

    Auden in those days did not acknowledge any traditional norms. He believed, for example, that anyone who made it into history and was not married was a homosexual. “Kant?” I asked him. “Yes, he too, as well as Jung and Descartes. Probably the same with Diaghilev and Stravinsky.” He was a fanatic about this.

    Auden followed his lover to Spain during the civil war. When he couldn’t find him, he went to the Minister of International Affairs and asked, “Do you know where my friend Tony [Hyndman] is?” General Franco’s troops were positioned at the border, but Auden was oblivious to it. He visited the chief of the Communist Party, who was actually a worker, and said, “The Party should adopt a decisive stance on homosexuality.” He was told, “Please get out. At once! You want to tear the Party to pieces.” Can you imagine this worker talking with Auden about the Communist Party line on homosexuality? They threw him out and so he did not even need to resign from the Party officially. This was the end of his Party career, in 1938. But, again, Auden was never really a Communist.

    ADAM MICHNIK: And did you go to Spain?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: No. But I collected money to send packages there. I signed petitions. And I might even have taken part in some kind of rally in support of the Republican government. I was neither a member of the Party nor even a sympathizer.

    ADAM MICHNIK: In all your essays, one can see a love for the Enlightenment. What, according to you, is the connection between the cult of the mind, Jacobinism, the Reign of Terror, and the Revolution?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: Jacobinism in some way derives from Enlightenment thought. The great French intellectuals of the eighteenth century believed in the objective laws of social evolution. They thought that once we discovered them, we would live according to them. And those who did not obey the laws and, through their own ignorance, caused themselves pain, would be isolated. Jacobins thought that the world was drowning in darkness and backwardness, of which it should be cleansed, and that people who were opposed to this must be destroyed. This is the consequence of fanatical rationalism.

    ADAM MICHNIK: In some sense, Robespierre and the guillotine are a peculiar consequence of the Age of Enlightenment.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: The philosophers of the Enlightenment were, on the whole, decent people, for example Holbach, the Encyclopedist. They were against cruelty, against violence, against obscurantism. Against the Church. And in the end, all their opposition led to the Great Terror and the guillotine. Auden told me at one point that there is a straight road leading from Rousseau to the Gulag. But here he exaggerated.

    ADAM MICHNIK: On the other hand, you saw a clear precursor to totalitarianism in Joseph de Maistre, a conservative.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: The world, according to him, is incurably sinful. From the fact that man is the only animal that kills the members of its own species, he concluded that man should be ruled with an iron fist, and for that one needs an authority beyond questioning. This is already fascism.

    ADAM MICHNIK: Can you conceive of conditions under which the Church could defend liberal values?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: Yes, it does so from time to time. But that is not its nature. Custine was right to hold that those who agree with a liberal Catholicism betray it, although of course there are liberal Catholics.

    ADAM MICHNIK: It seems that in Catholicism there is a conflict between values and freedom.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: I would not rule it out. Christianity does not allow stomping over men; nonetheless, Christians always try. This goes back to the Church Fathers. Augustine was the first to decide that one could apply torture to heretics.ADAM MICHNIK: And what was the intellectual climate in England in the 1930s?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: There are no intellectuals in England. There are intellectuals in Russia and in Catholic countries, in Italy and in France, because the intelligentsia was born out of the dominance of the clergy in public life. No one in England would say, “The Anglican Church is our enemy.” Likewise in Sweden, no one would say, “Lutherans are terrible people.”

    Cultural life in England was under the influence not of Communism but of the left. Who wasn’t a leftist? Evelyn Waugh is an exception and he was even more than conservative. He was a fascist sympathizer although he didn’t advertise it. But he contributed to a magazine that published writers from the extreme right with fascist sympathies.

    ADAM MICHNIK: And T. S. Eliot?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: He was a pleasant, placid, slightly conservative poet. While he was greatly respected, he was much further to the right than many realized.

    Towards the end of the war, the poet Archibald MacLeish, who was the director of the Library of Congress, visited England, and wrote an article for the Times about the need to rebuild the libraries destroyed by the fascists. Three days later the Times published a letter from Eliot saying, “My friend Archibald MacLeish holds that fascists allegedly destroyed some libraries. National Socialism exists but it is entirely different from the regime which reigned until recently in Italy and still exists in Spain.” According to him, fascists were decent people. They destroyed Europe? This can’t be! Europe for him was destroyed not by fascists but by National Socialists.

    I knew Eliot personally. He was an anti-Semite, though no worse than others of this kind. After the war, in an article commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the [Hebrew] University of Jerusalem, I wrote: “Jews, of course, are hard to put up with, but one has to tolerate them in a democracy. Plato and Eliot do not agree with that.” Someone sent this article to Eliot. I was in the States at the time, at Bryn Mawr College, and Eliot, who had also lectured there, sent me a very polite letter. “I hope your bedroom is more comfortable than mine was. As far as I can recall, the central heating works pretty badly. I hope it is not too noisy at night and that you are able to sleep peacefully.” And finally: “What you wrote about me is not true. I have nothing against Jews. I am a poet, not an anthropologist. Racial matters do not interest me. The only thing I have against Jews is that they have not converted. They could have converted to Christianity at the time of the Roman Empire, but they didn’t.”

    I responded: “Dear Sir, you should not think that Judaism is just a religion. You cannot say ‘an atheistic Catholic’ or ‘a Godless Baptist,’ but you can say ‘a Godless black man’ or ‘a Godless Jew.’ Everyone knows that being Jewish does not imply only going to synagogue. It is something more.”

    He responded: “I understand you, but you are wrong. Racial matters do not interest me. I have nothing against Jews in Palestine. Anywhere else they will have trouble. When we have more time, we should continue this interesting correspondence.”

    He had been sending me books to review for his journal, the Criterion, but after this exchange of letters he became somewhat reserved and our relations cooled. But as a poet, he was a genius.

    ADAM MICHNIK: What did you think about the future, back in the 1930s?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: That there would be war. All young men like Spender and Auden wrote as if there was a bomb nearby ready to explode at any moment. As if they expected some sort of disaster, something terrible. As if something was approaching that would consume them. Consume all of Europe.

    ADAM MICHNIK: You left Oxford and philosophy for the duration of World War II, joined the diplomatic service, and were sent to the British Embassy in Washington.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: I went there in 1941. My task was to get America involved in the war, and in the end I succeeded!

    ADAM MICHNIK: Perhaps the Japanese helped you a little.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: Certainly. They attacked Pearl Harbor. But there was no agreement between Japan and the Third Reich to fight together. Japan did not have to invade America, but it did. America, and the Catholic Church in particular, did not want to fight at all. Could Roosevelt have avoided the war with Germany? Maybe yes and maybe no.

    ADAM MICHNIK: Were you ever afraid that Hitler would win the war?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: Certainly I was. But the English were not; their main shortcoming is a lack of imagination. Frenchmen calculated that Germany would win, hence they surrendered. But Englishmen simply could not imagine that foreign soldiers could put their feet on their soil. That is why they were not nervous and did not panic.

    Neville Chamberlain did not like Hitler and Nazism, but for him Russia and anti-Communism were decisive. Chamberlain thought: it’s too bad about Jews, it’s unfortunate that Hitler is obsessed with them, but what can one do? After all, he is fighting Communism, and that is what is important.

    This is what many people at the top thought. Most others were unconcerned about such things. For many of them it was hard to believe that there would be war. If it were not for a leader like Churchill, Germany would have occupied England. Somebody else in his place might have proposed to bargain with Hitler. Like Stalin in 1939, he would have thought that it was possible to bargain, for example using Mussolini as an intermediary. It was Churchill who was against this. No matter what others said, he did what he wanted.

    I have always believed in the role of the individual in history. If Churchill had been struck by a falling brick at some point and Halifax had become prime minister, he would have made a deal with Hitler. For a year nothing would have happened, and then Germany would have suddenly invaded England.

    ADAM MICHNIK: I have heard that Churchill liked reading your war reports from Washington.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: That is a myth. My job was to report on the state of public opinion in the United States and about the power structure in Washington. I was a journalist, a chronicler of political moods. The difference between me and an ordinary correspondent was that my telegrams were in code.

    It wasn’t hard work. Americans told everyone everything. There were no secrets, other than military secrets of course. Hence it wasn’t difficult for me to understand what was going on there. The telegrams I dispatched every week made it to the ministers and were also sent to our ambassadors. Churchill received them as well. Undoubtedly he read them, but I don’t think that he talked about them. This much can be said: he knew who I was. His wife, however, had heard of an American songwriter named Irving Berlin, who had given a lot of money to a charitable fund for British children. So when Churchill said that he would like to meet Berlin, his wife thought of Irving. And here began the misunderstandings.

    ADAM MICHNIK: Misunderstandings?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: When they met, the following conversation took place. Churchill said, thinking of my reports: “What, among the recent reports you have sent, is the most important?” Berlin, not understanding a thing, said, “I suppose White Christmas.” Churchill, thinking that he was dealing with a crazy man who, to top it off, spoke with an American accent, said, “What do you mean?” Silence. Churchill’s wife: “We are extremely grateful to you. You do such important things, and now this generous gift.” Churchill, not understanding a thing, said, “What kind of gift?” Silence. Churchill: “Are you going to participate in this year’s election?” Berlin: “You know, sir, until now I never took part in the elections, but now I am not sure about anything.” Churchill: “When do you think the war will end?” Berlin: “Mr. Prime Minister, when I get back to the United States, I will tell my children and my children’s children that the Prime Minister of Great Britain asked me when I thought the war would end.” Churchill: “So you’re an American?” Berlin: “Yes.” Churchill, to his wife: “I told you that this is the wrong Berlin.”

    ADAM MICHNIK: When did you meet Churchill for the first time?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: I ran into him by chance in the White House when he came to Washington. “What you are doing,” he said, “is very important. Please continue.” Later, during the Cold War, I met him at a dinner party in London. We did not talk much, but I remember what he said — that we must decide which to bomb first, Paris or Rome, if the continent is conquered by the Russians. I didn’t like Churchill much as a human being, but if it were not for him, none of us would have survived. I, in any case, would not have.

    ADAM MICHNIK: In your essay “Meetings With Russian Writers” you described your stay in post-war Russia.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: I was sent to our embassy in Moscow right after the Potsdam Conference in September 1945, and I remained until January 1946. The British did not have an adequate staff, so they decided that I should go because I spoke Russian. They did not want me to stay any longer and they offered me a post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I refused mainly because I don’t like to have anything to do with classified information. This presupposes a double life, and I want to be free, I want to be able to say anything I wish to say.

    ADAM MICHNIK: When you were in Russia, you met Akhmatova and Pasternak.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: I arrived on the day of an official dinner in our embassy. J. B. Priestley, a leftist writer, a welcome visitor in the Soviet Union, was the guest of honor. If someone thought that Soviet literature was the conscience of the world, he had to be feted. Priestley was a bit out of sorts, however, during this dinner. Perhaps his visits to the collective farms and factories had tired him out. Besides, the Soviet authorities blocked royalties for translations of books, and he liked money. In any case he left early. I took his place between Tairov, the theater director, and Kornei Chukovsky, the literary historian and translator. Sergei Eisenstein sat opposite me. That day I met a few writers who had not been allowed to see foreigners, but I met Akhmatova by accident when I went to Leningrad.

    ADAM MICHNIK: This, however, was more than an accidental encounter.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: We spent the whole night in her apartment. Everyone thought that something happened between us. Nothing did. We sat in opposite corners of the room and only talked.

    The second time I saw her was right before my departure from Russia. I was returning to England through Leningrad and Finland, so I went to visit her and we talked for some three hours. Then, when she came to Oxford to receive an honorary degree, we spent a week together, but she was angry at me. According to her, there was some mystical connection between us, a spiritual connection, and we should suffer together, though staying apart. And I had permitted myself a vulgar act: I got married. I invited Akhmatova to dinner and she completely froze out my wife. She spoke nicely to me, but I know that she never forgave me — she was a Russian legend, and I had deserted her.

    ADAM MICHNIK: You also wrote about your meeting with Pasternak.

     

    ISAIAH BERLIN: Yes. I went to visit him in his dacha in Peredelkino, and we talked for a long time. Pasternak was an anti-Semite.

    ADAM MICHNIK: In what way?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: At least in the sense that whenever I said the word “Jew,” he shuddered. He knew that he was a Jew and he did not deny it. Heine said somewhere that the Jewish religion is not a religion but a misfortune, and that is what it was for Pasternak, because he would like to have been a blonde, blue-eyed Sadko, a Slavic poet. His anti-Semitism is evident even in Doctor Zhivago. That’s why Ben-Gurion did not want him to be translated into Hebrew.

    ADAM MICHNIK: You had no illusions about the Soviet Union, yet you never spoke about Communism in hysterical terms.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: In Russia, I was followed openly by NKVD plainclothesmen. They did not want to spy on me, merely to intimidate me. I felt that all the Russians I met were simply suffocating. I thought: What should I have done had I not emigrated? Shot myself in the head.

    I knew that Stalin was waging the Cold War, that he imprisoned and even murdered Russian prisoners of war who came from Germany. It was clear that we couldn’t even begin to think about peace, that there could be only something in between: neither peace nor war. However, I did not support the proponents of Cold War rhetoric. I saw it up close, for I was in the States in 1949 when Senator McCarthy was out of control.

    I did not want to think like the professional anti-Communists, because they thought only about how to mount a defense against Russia. But I never thought that Russia would actually go to war, unless the Soviet leaders sensed a weakness in their opponent. Perhaps if the French Communists had come to power, the Soviets might have come to their aid, and maybe even have occupied France. Luckily for us it never happened. I don’t know why, but I was not afraid of it.Even after the Cuban Missile crisis — I was at Harvard then — I did not think that it would come to war — although more than a few Americans believed that World War III was around the corner.

    ADAM MICHNIK: What did you think about the future of Communism back in the 1950s?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: In his memoir Spender gives an account of our conversation at the time. He asked me what was the most pleasant thing that could happen in my life. The end of the Soviet Union, I told him, but of course we will not live to see it.

    Sometime later, I was sitting at a dinner next to Mrs Thatcher. She asked me: “You know everything about Russia. Please tell me when will this terrible regime end?” And I responded that in a place where the secret police number three million, only war can topple a regime. “What pessimism!” she said, very irritated. “How can you judge the situation so badly? How can you even say such things?” Offended, she grew silent. Luckily, it was I who was wrong.

    I have an old childhood friend who is a member of the Communist Party and a professor of history. Two years ago, I asked him, “What is going on with the Russian Revolution now?” “Not much,” he answered: “uncertain country, uncertain times, uncertain people.” You were not saying that during the last seventy-five years, I said. And he said: “Just you wait, there will be nationalism in Russia. And this will be worse than Stalinism.”

    ADAM MICHNIK: And what do you see as the sources of nationalism?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: There is a theory that when you take peasants, who have for generations lived in villages, away from a traditional and patriarchal way of life, and transplant them to the city, they won’t any longer have anything to believe in, hence they begin to believe in the nation. But the Germans were nationalists already in 1807, when there were no peasants in the factories. Nationalism, by the way, is a German invention. I think that in the final analysis nationalism is a result of harm inflicted. Germans held a deep grudge against the French for the harm they inflicted on them.

    ADAM MICHNIK: Do you think that the nineteenth-century divisions between the left and the right hold true today?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: In my opinion, yes.

    ADAM MICHNIK: Perhaps there is another alternative, such as Popper’s open society and closed society.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: But it’s all the same. The open society means liberalism. And the closed, conservatism. Conservatives in Russia are old Communists who want to preserve what was there.

    ADAM MICHNIK: Solzhenitsyn, too, is an opponent of liberalism.

    ISAIAH BERLIN: You know who Solzhenitsyn reminds me of? An Old Believer. Have you seen Khovanshchina by Mussorgsky? You will find there a climate of opposition to everything that is new and liberal. Solzhenitsyn is a monarchist by nature. He wants the Tsar back. He wants the Old Russia with the Tsarist officialdom, the chinovniks. His conservatism and traditionalism are very nostalgic.

    ADAM MICHNIK: What do you think of the wave of conservatism rolling over the world?

    ISAIAH BERLIN: It is a reaction against the failure of liberalism. People become conservative because it is something new for them. Take the United States: they elected conservatives to the Congress, even though they are political hooligans. The same holds for England. Here we have something called the New Right, who are awful people. But the whole post-war liberal world gave people nothing in which one could strongly believe. They need some kind of flame, and because reason does not give it, they were enveloped by boredom and a feeling that life has no meaning. I believe that boredom is the main reason why people go to war or get involved in revolution. The main reason for the events of 1968 was that the students got bored. However, young Poles may not like my advice — that compromise is unavoidable, that there is only so much freedom and so much equality; so much happiness and so much independence; so much democracy and so much tradition. One has to keep things in proportion, or else nothing will hold together. Everything will collapse and you will have to start from the beginning. What young person would want to march under these slogans?

    ADAM MICHNIK: On one hand, we want tolerance, freedom, pluralism; on the other, if we are to fight for our goals we need consistency, courage. This is the paradox of toleration. If I were tolerant —

    ISAIAH BERLIN: you would be sitting with your arms crossed, doing nothing. This is the old story that conservatives speak of: “You liberals believe that there can be different points of view, so when you are the majority, you forbid us nothing. And then we gain the advantage, the scales tip, and we can indeed block you.”

    The idea that there is a paradise of some sort that we will reach in the end, either a liberal paradise or some other one, is an illusion. There are values which people believe in and you have to fight for these very things. Victory will never occur because certain fundamental values are mutually exclusive. The ideal world is impossible to attain. We must, however, do everything to approximate it.

    The Poem of the Beautiful Landscapes

    Why are the landscapes beautiful, and the approaches to the forest at twilight
    drawn to the melody of the pipes warming in your breast,
    and the bluish puddle on the other side of the railroad tracks
    make the tune in your heart tremble and the body yearn to step over its banks
    as if once, on a childhood evening, it walked there…?

    Because every landscape in the world has its souls that were joined to it
    by the finest desires and the sweetness of the heart’s exaltation
    in the days when love rose as if blooming spring and summer together,
    and also in the days of a late-summer tear glistening in the mystery of parting…
    and the ripened fruit reddening in the gardens…

    No landscape is beautiful for itself, in its forest and its river and its well.
    It takes its beauty, in all its facets and luscious scents, abundantly
    from the souls who walk within it the walks of longing,
    and from the jubilation in the blood and the living lyreness of the body…
    With this weave the beautiful souls embroidered this empyrean
    and stamped it with its verdant hues and poured wines of myrrh
    into the feathery softness of its clouds.

    If not for wounds of love
    even unto the gift of blood and the ascension in flames
    for the sake of family, or the honor of throne and temple, or the sanctity of a liberation,
    would there be such twilights morning and evening,
    with the smell and the taste of must mingled in them?

    If not for the grace of bodies and the ideas sprouting in the heart and the head
    about what is beyond them in the world,
    would there be luxuriant trees such as these, or their fruit, or their birds’ nests?

    If not for the gaze of craving eyes with which all of heaven once swelled
    when lovers met, when the heart was lifted to the sky,
    would there be such cubits of water on the other side of the railroad tracks?

    And if not for our incarnations before birth, now vanished from our minds,
    if not for the recollection of the existence of marvelous bodies in a second reality
    which the concepts of our language today cannot capture,
    in which we rested in our cribs as all the moon’s soul spilled onto their little posts…
    in which we grew to the height of fathers’ and mothers’ knees
    until our shoulders became tall, and equal to them…
    in which we journeyed to the end of everything precious and enchanting,
    in which we ate and drank foods and drinks
    more pleasing than the foods and the drinks here and now
    and we wore clothes woven in a way we do not weave today
    whose aroma our nostrils sometimes catch from the garment of a rare man,
    a soul-friend, who has been cast into our midst as if by a miracle….

    Without all this, would there be any desire in the world,
    would any heart rejoice at the end of the day anywhere in the world?
    Would we set out in great ships from one end of the sea to the other
    and tears form in our eyes as if recalling an obscure thing and its fragrance?

    Truly the power of the desire that attacks us suddenly in the present
    is owed to the memory-scents of vistas more beautiful than all beauty:
    when we stroll on boardwalks along the canals in the evening
    or on the warm spreading paths through a red mulberry forest,
    or in the view, filled with desire, through the window of a train
    of a small railway station in a field outside a town….

    Scent-memories of distant furrowed scenes
    which we inhabited in our previous wanderings
    and loved with the love of youth: for all the wines and all the colors
    and all the odors of the flowering landscapes and all the melodies
    of all the instruments were to be found…there.

    So that whoever inhales it, in its sweetness, for a moment has the sensation
    of a rendezvous with a woman who is late, who was no longer expected
    but like a miracle has arrived, in the torrid dusk, redolent of the forest.

    In those landscapes our utterances were like musical notes,
    we can still hear a hint of them sometimes in the most exquisite songs
    and sometimes in the voice of a woman who is with someone else
    but in those landscapes was with us, she was ours —

    We slept in other kinds of nocturnal beds
    made of wood that grows in no garden here,
    we wore clothes of a different fabric
    that our melancholy and discriminating hands occasionally discover
    when they brush against someone’s sleeve: a precious miraculous event in the present….

    If not for those landscapes, what would our life be now?

    Translated by Leon Wieseltier

    Cross Purposes: Polanski and Huston

    We have to understand how movies have taught us to feel. That spell is always waiting to take us beneath the tracery of storyline so that we may plunge into the pit of what the story is about. And why we are breathless to see what happens while wondering if we will ever escape the pit. The picture business says this is fun for all, but lasting spells are more complicated than that.

    It is evening, dusk, at one of the better homes in Beverly Hills. We are in the garden, by a pond. Our guy is there early, waiting, smoking a cigarette. We like this fellow a lot, though we know by now that he can be a chump. He is waiting for the bad man, the pivot of the mystery that our chump has been exploring. And because he got there early, we feel his superior position, and share in it.

    This is added to when the man he has called to the meeting arrives. This second man is older, not far short of elderly; he leans on a cane and his eyesight is not what it was. So then our guy nails the old man, tells him everything he knows. And what he knows is terrible, including the way the older man had raped his own daughter and become father to his grandchild.

    There is talk between the two of them, stealthy and maneuvering, so it seems. But something else emerges in the way the older man declines, in his urbane and polite way, to be ashamed or apologetic. The meeting is not quite what the chump anticipated. Noah Cross is a monster, but there is something serene about him that is entrancing. Really, that is the word. For in the way he admits his crimes and his ambition, this hideous man becomes immaculate. If someone talks sense grammatically in a movie for a couple of sentences in a row, there’s a chance he’ll have us by the throat.

    “I don’t blame myself,” Cross says. “You see, Mr. Gittes, most people never have to face the fact that at the right time and right place, they’re capable of anything.”

    There you are, it’s not even two sentences. But he has us at “Mr. Gittes,” the smoky disdain in “most people,” and the authority we adore. It’s why we are there in the movie dark, because it is a process, a séance, in which we want to pretend that we could do anything. The chump is really very appealing: it’s Jack Nicholson, after all — has anyone ever been more lovable? But Noah Cross doesn’t bother to be even likeable. He has too much command to be needy. That serenity of his comes from running the show. And all our lives at the movies we have been in awe of the show and the way life starts turning over on the screen, better than we have ever known it and understanding our hopeless dream — of being like that.

    You have to admit to what you are buying into in Chinatown. Far from just a clever film noir and a cool 1937, it’s the heart of darkness, and we know that it’s the heart because that is where we live. The conclusion of that movie has evil taking over the town, without a hint of mercy or escape for that daughter and granddaughter. That was a point of dispute between the screenwriter of the film, Robert Towne, and its director, Roman Polanski. Towne had wanted her to get away. Polanski won that argument and took charge of the story. Why not? He knew that being in control was the point of the game. That’s what lost children dream of.

    John Huston (the man doing Noah Cross) was born in Nevada, Missouri, in 1907, an only child, the son of the actor Walter Huston. His parents divorced when he was young, and he traveled with his father, touring in theater, and watching horse races with his mother. He adored his father but had troubles with his mother, and a good deal of ill-health, though it was said that he was a very strong, athletic boy with a willful turn of mind. Like, don’t get in his way.

    He was put in boarding schools, but he believed in learning from life. He had a spell as an amateur boxer; he painted and followed opera; he rode horses and he went after girls. He was a man of the world, and men soon told stories about his adventurous gambling spirit and his recklessness. But some observed that he had a hard, cold streak in him, and a way of needling other people. He had a languid, dreamy way of talking, with a tough laugh. He could go from seeming ugly to inhabiting sunlight, and he seemed to relish that volatility. He saw so much theatre that he absorbed acting as a way of life, and he took it for granted that theatricality always triumphed over the actual.

    He went to Mexico for a time and became attached to that country’s cavalry in an unofficial way. He married and seems to have urged his wife and himself into alcohol. He was in Los Angeles, keeping company with his father. But also as a way of thinking about getting into pictures. In his early twenties, he had stories published in Esquire and American Mercury.

    It was in 1933 that he nearly came to grief. He was in an affair with the actress Zita Johann, and he was drunk while driving her; there was a crash and she damaged her lovely face on the windscreen. Then a few months later, in a car with another woman, off Sunset Boulevard, he struck a pedestrian, and she was knocked thirty feet in the impact. She was killed and it was apparent that Huston had been drinking. Her name was Tosca Roulien, and she was a dancer. He said she had just stepped into the road so that he had never seen her.

    This was ugly stuff and his father moved in to help the son. Nothing is clear now, but the story went that Walter went to Louis B. Mayer, who put pressure on the D. A. so the case was buried. But there were angry pieces in the press and charges for damages. Huston said later that he was traumatized, and he was sent away to London to get out of the heat.

    That was long ago, when Hollywood was a secure kingdom with its own law and order, when a boss could smother scandal if it suited him. And John was reckoned to be a talent with a future: he would one day do pictures for Mr. Mayer at MGM. It would seem artificial to get indignant over this, all these years later, but it happened in a Hollywood where so much was glorified and so much was covered up. As if one could get away with anything.

    John Huston came back from Europe and he was soon putting himself about as a very good screenwriter. He had a knack for knowing how stories could work on screen; it was not hard, with his easy-going drawl, and his visionary eyes, to persuade the system that he could be a director. So he slid his way into being in charge of The Maltese Falcon, with Humphrey Bogart, Mary Astor, Sydney Greenstreet, Peter Lorre and Elisha Cook Jr. Tough deal. That Dashiell Hammett material had failed twice before as movies, so it was a wonder that Huston made it a home run, creamy with talk and innuendo, without any hint of strain, just letting his arms move through the necessary semi-circle and watching the baseball go 410 feet into the sunlight and the crowd.

    All his life John Huston could do home runs like that, making it look easy: you can see the lovely arc of the hit in The Treasure of the Sierra Madre, The Asphalt Jungle, The African Queen, Fat City, The Man Who Would Be King, Prizzi’s Honor and then The Dead, at the end of his life, when he sat there in charge but dependent on an oxygen machine.

    That’s not many home runs, you may say, and it is true enough that Huston also got into some bold but uncertain literary adaptations, films no one else would have attempted — The Red Badge of Courage, Moby Dick, The Roots of Heaven, Reflections in a Golden Eye, Wise Blood, Under the Volcano. Not to mention several films where no one seemed to be directing them — We Were Strangers, The Barbarian and the Geisha, The Misfits, The Bible, Sinful Davey, The Mackintosh Man, Phobia, Victory, Annie. That’s a lot of striking out. But Huston had a batter’s attitude: that if you hit around .300 you were a king. The hell with the auteur theory. A director knew what audiences took for granted: that most pictures were dead long before arrival on the screen. So you forgot about them the way Ted Williams could take an 0 for 4 and feel fine about tomorrow.

    And no one ever said John Huston shouldn’t be getting away with this, because quite clearly he was getting away with it, in the steady faith that ”most people” were stuffed and stupid. He didn’t care.

    Noah Cross in Chinatown was another home run (bases loaded), and the best mainstream picture that Huston ever touched. I have never lost the feeling that, in all his crazed and turbulent life, Roman Polanski had held on and stayed patient in the intuition that one day he’d get someone like John Huston telling Mr Gitttes how the world worked. Every scrappy, diminutive Polish French Jew on the run is waiting for that pitch to hit.

    This is a piece about Roman Polanski, you guessed as much, and you might as well face it. The rest has been setting you up.

    He was born in Paris in 1933, that special year in Huston’s life. His given name at first was Raymond Liebling, and you likely know that his life was terrible, so that you had to come to terms with his insolent smile and the way he carried on. When he was four the father moved them back to his home in Poland, with every good intention, and so they entered on scenes of ultimate dismay. The mother died in Auschwitz. He barely survived the Krakow ghetto or years living on the run, being underground, hiding, lying and doing all the unmentionable things survivors have to do while still looking the camera in the eye at the end of it all and saying, yes, we came through and everything will be all right now, when you know that very little will be all right, or was ever meant to be. “Most people…” He never had self-pity.

    After the war Polanski was in Poland, and he went to film school in an age of furious creativity and brave opposition to Communist authority. He made some brilliant, surreal short films, notably Two Men and a Wardrobe (1958), and he did a graduation project, Knife in the Water, that is so expert you know the kid had something in his bones and blood, a lack of sentimentality, let’s say, that had nothing to do with what a school might have taught him.

    He then made his masterpieces: Repulsion in 1965 and Cul de Sac in 1966, low-budget, black and white pictures based in Britain, the one where a stunned Catherine Deneuve is going mad in a South Kensington flat, and the other where her sister, Francoise Dorleac, watches a group of absurd men turning stupid on a wild shore of northern England. The grasp of psychological cruelty, the pressures of disturbance, the claustrophobia, have never been surpassed in cinema.

    They are still the best things he has ever done, curiously detached from an age when so many New Wave filmmakers were rejoicing at how wonderful cinema could be. Those two films are a macabre, surreal hell, and the hopeless vision they embody is as close to lyrical despair as respectable art house cinema has ever been. It’s not just that Polanski doesn’t like people; he never feels a need to admire them. That is unusual in photography. The use of Deneuve in Repulsion is like a steady condemnation of her numb beauty. The emotional violence creeps up on you, and the superb last shot is like a trap closing.

    Polanski was viewed as “a character,” with an uncanny ability to get his startling films made. He asserted himself, like a tiny man with a knife. But he was easily bored and he began to make films that had less concentration — The Fearless Vampire Killers, What?, and even Rosemary’s Baby. That last one was a famous hit and a turning point, and the result of commercial acumen (Robert Evans at Paramount) seizing on the darkness of those British films, finding another female victim (Mia Farrow), and turning the result into a deadpan wow, a macabre screwball comedy, Bringing Up Baby but don’t look now. The film asked us to believe in the Devil, whereas Polanski had always known that people played that part without horns or brimstone. Malice was enough.

    But Satanic rites were in the air. Polanski’s hectic momentum never stopped. You can say it was rotten luck, and there is a kind of bad luck and good that taunts chronic gamblers. What happened to Sharon Tate was not Polanski’s fault, but it was part of a recklessness that consumed his world. She was his second wife, an intense beauty but not much of an actress, and she was stabbed fifteen times (when eight months pregnant) on Cielo Drive in the hills above Los Angeles. Some said that August 1969 night was the end of the age, but it was one more spasm in the jittery life of Roman Polanski. And if you watch Repulsion again now, it’s hard not to wonder whether those Manson girls had seen it and thought it to be their own movie.

    And then a few years later he made Chinatown, and told Robert Towne that it would be fatuous to give the picture any comfort in its ending. Towne was on the side of Jake Gittes (Jack Nicholson was one of his best friends). But it’s clear now that Polanski was especially drawn to the insouciance and the power of Noah Cross. He knew that was the way the picture world functioned. I mean not just the operational systems in Hollywood, but the secret dynamic in how pictures appealed to us. We are talking about a moment where the bad guys and the ordinary devils were taking over the machine.

    If you want a demonstration of that, just look at The Two Jakes. It was a sequel that Towne wrote and meant to direct, the further adventures of Jake Gittes. But the project came apart for Hollywood reasons, and it ended up being directed none too well by Nicholson. Yet what doomed that follow-up was very simple: it didn’t have Noah Cross this time. And Cross had been as vital in 1974 as Harry Lime in The Third Man — another charming monster, one of the first on screen.

    Then something else happened. On March 10, 1977, at the home of Jack Nicholson in Beverly Hills, Polanski drugged and raped the thirteen-year-old Samantha Galley. No one has denied what happened, though the atmosphere of the occasion has varied in the telling and the imagining. Polanski had been taking the girl’s picture for Vogue magazine and he got into a dramatic swirl where he did the kind of thing people do not do. But which in the age of movies we think about.

    In his memoir, Roman, published in 1984, Polanski described the scene in a chillingly sensual way: “Then, very gently, I began to kiss and caress her. After this had gone on for some time I led her over to the couch… She spread herself and I entered her. She wasn’t unresponsive. Yet, when I asked if she was liking it, she resorted to her favorite expression: ‘It’s all right.’”

    It was unforgivable but casual, and that account is unnerving. He has apologized, and the grown Samantha Galley has sought to dismiss the incident or excuse it because its impact was relatively minor next to the years of publicity that came down. Polanski was arrested and charged. He went for forty days into psychiatric observation and lawyers strove to rearrange the technicalities that had been broken. The charge was reduced from rape to unlawful sex with a minor. Polanski believed there was a binding agreement in place whereby he would get off with time served and a fine or community service. But then he gathered that the judge in the case was going to break the deal, so that he would be put away for a long time to satisfy public shock and vengeance. He likely felt that he had been on the run for much of his life, so he jumped bail and took off for Paris. He lives there still, with his third wife, Emmanuelle Seigner, and their two children. He is eighty-eight, but I haven’t heard that he walks with a cane yet.

    I don’t intend to argue that Polanski is a wronged sweetheart, or a great director. I take the view that his work in exile (albeit in his old hometown) is seldom interesting, or up to his younger self: Tess, Pirates, Frantic, Bitter Moon, Death and the Maiden, The Ninth Gate, and even The Pianist. The last of those is very well done: Adrien Brody got the best actor Oscar, and Polanski was given the best director Oscar. But I think it’s a rather routine Holocaust picture, too eager to be respectable, a weepie, and without the hellishness that was alive in Repulsion. In Paris, he had lost touch with danger, or risk.

    Just to underline the absurdity: twenty-five years after the scandal of what had happened near Jack Nicholson’s pool, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences honored Roman Polanski for The Pianist, though he was not there in person to accept his Oscar as best director. Indeed, as far as we know, Polanski has never returned to the United States, though I put it that way just because I can imagine him being tempted by the reckless gamble of some secret revisiting.

    No, that didn’t happen; it’s just another movie. And it’s more unlikely now in the changed climate in which “Hollywood” is trying to repair itself in our eyes, no matter that it suspects it no longer exists. But in the new orthodoxy of cancellation, Polanski has been rejected from his Academy membership. There have also been claims from a number of other women that he had assaulted and raped them over the years.

    After The Pianist, Polanski made several more unsatisfactory films — Oliver Twist, The Ghost Writer, Carnage, Venus in Furs, Based on a True Story. The Ghost Writer had some fans from the faint intrigue that it might refer to Tony Blair, but it became harder over these years to maintain that Roman Polanski was an interesting director, let alone an auteur.

    So it was more a curiosity, I think, than vindication that in 2019 he delivered a really good and rather old-fashioned film, An Officer and a Spy. This is a retelling of the Dreyfus case, though the film’s central character is Colonel Georges Picquart, the man who did so much to disprove the initial findings against Alfred Dreyfus.

    Some critics have suggested that the film is Polanski’s attempt to say his case resembles that of Dreyfus, but I don’t feel that in the film in any way. Instead, we have a conventional reexamination of the case, with Jean Dujardin very good and steady as Picquart. When I say old-fashioned, I am trying to suggest an interest in history that goes beyond costume and decor into the formality and hypocrisy of a French military structure that ganged up against not just Dreyfus, but also against the possibility of admitting error. It is a film that trusts its story enough not to apply a thick sardonic jam. But this bleakness is there, not far from cynicism, and a trust in the pettiness of most men. It’s a subject that might have attracted the fond, mocking eye of John Huston. And Polanski did it at eighty-five. Such energy comes only from feeling alone.

    The film won the Grand Jury Prize at the Venice Film Festival and then a Cesar for best director, though Polanski did not attend that ceremony because of protests. As yet the film has had no release in the United States or many other countries, no matter that it is a far better picture than so many of the movies that have been boosted in the last few years. I offer it to you in the company of Chinatown, as a fine, grown-up entertainment. I think you’d be impressed.

    Not that a career is overturned by one good picture after so many years. Not that Noah Cross’s granddaughter is going to forget her complicated family tree. But if you appreciate stories of double standards or hypocrisy, you should bear in mind the fact that if you want to stream a Polanski film tonight, you are free to do so, for whatever small charge is imposed. That goes back to Repulsion, to Chinatown, and to the fascinating The Tenant (where Polanski played the victimized lead), but it includes the movies the director has made since the great scandal. In a similar way, Harvey Weinstein is now in prison and in obloquy, and plainly he deserves both. But tonight you can see any and all the films that he brought to the screen, a list that includes Shakespeare in Love, The English Patient, The Wings of the Dove, The Reader and My Week with Marilyn.

    So really it seems odd that An Officer and a Spy is picked out for a Devil’s Island confinement. I can see Noah Cross smiling at the joke.

    So how do you feel about all this? I don’t know what I think — I feel like Jake Gittes at the end of Chinatown, fit to be led away to some quiet retreat where the overwhelmed may watch the light come and go. I believe An Officer and a Spy is a very good film, and one that would do no harm except to the armor of unrelenting moral dignity and the refusal to forgive and forget. I think Roman Polanski behaved hideously — I daresay his faults were more than we will ever know. But he was part of his time, just as he had been so desperate in the early 1940s and so driven beyond the normal state of childhood. I suspect that the plea deal from 1977 was misguided, though I have little doubt that the judge in the case was in grave error in planning to abandon the deal. Inasmuch as he was a gambler, and taught to be that by the savage unfairness of his times, Polanski had the misfortune to live on into an age of retribution and reform. Whereas John Huston took his last breath as a hero and a credit to the movies. I can hear him laughing in the way his father laughs at the end of The Treasure of the Sierra Madre, when all the precious gold dust blows away in the wind.

    That’s the feeling I have been getting at here by picking on words and a dark knowingness from 1974. If you have spent your life thinking about the movies, and being with moviemakers, you cannot overlook the habit of the art and the business to be exploitative, cruel, corrupt, and deeply damaging to the society that grew up adoring moving pictures. That’s not just the measure of what we can call unfair practices, on the casting couch and at the box office, the history of theft, rape, and the alienation of education. It is just as much the ethos that has been created for us. The mythology of white male supremacy, justice and happy endings, when so many movies were exultant in the enactment of impure power.

    Those things have to be corrected, but the issues are so deep-seated that I’m not sure we can still have the movies once we abandon all the unfairness and the impropriety. It is a medium founded in dishonesty.

    That’s why I have asked you to take note of Noah Cross, that easygoing version of the Devil, so calm and collected, as urbane and amusing as John Huston, no longer sure how much money he has but lucid on the reason for having it. He is a very political figure, because his evil and his calm are pledged to one worthy thing: “The future, Mr. Gittes.”

    Cross was not alone in 1974. That was the brief last age of glory in American pictures, and much of it was devoted to making terrible people beguiling. Cross stands between Michael Corleone and Travis Bickle. The latter is deranged, violent, and horribly dangerous, but Taxi Driver cannot disown him. In the same way, Michael in the two parts of The Godfather is much more than a criminal boss. He is presidential, a touchstone of order and organization, a model of bleak reliability. So we are ready to pay homage to him.

    Those three characters stand for a moment in movies when we were finally in allegiance to very bad men who could run the show, and they were all three of them surrogates for their directors and emblems of how the world was going to have to work. It wouldn’t be long before we got a leader who really believed he was a figure in a movie, awful yet lovable, and repeating favorite lines about what he could get away with.

    How to Talk to God

    Batter my heart, three-person’d God; for You
    As yet but knock, breathe, shine, and seek to mend;
    That I may rise and stand, o’erthrow me, and bend
    Your force to break, blow, burn, and make me new.
    I, like an usurped town, to another due,
    Labor to admit You, but O, to no end;
    Reason, Your viceroy in me, me should defend,
    But is captiv’d, and proves weak or untrue.
    Yet dearly I love you, and would be lovèd fain,
    But am betroth’d unto your enemy.
    Divorce me, untie or break that knot again;
    Take me to you, imprison me, for I,
    Except you enthrall me, never shall be free,
    Nor ever chaste, except you ravish me.

    John Donne

    Can “old” poems, written in a vanished culture, be rescued for a contemporary reader, or will their brilliance be lost? I will fasten my hope here on John Donne’s spectacular fourteenth sonnet of his Holy Sonnets, published posthumously in 1633. But what are we rescuing in such a case? A statement? A fragment of autobiography? A portrait? Yeats, the finest poet of the twentieth century, offers an answer that seems to me the true one: a lyric poem is a simulacrum of a succession of human moods, conducting us through their rapid transitions and self-contradictions. The melody of the poem enters the reader invisibly, as if it were a transfusion. Yeats, an intense absorber of English poetry from the fourteenth century to the twentieth, had to ask himself, for his own instruction, what it was about certain past poems that made them endure. Since the passage of time tends to make prose — essays, sermons, philosophies, manifestos — decay, why should we prize past poems at all? Is a poem published in 1633 as outmoded for us as the theology or the science of its era?

    Yeats argues that only one trait of human life is universal and recurrent in all human beings: the experiencing of moods over a lifetime. Our general terms for emotions are boring: “I’m depressed,” “I was so glad.” Experiencing a mood, however, is not boring at all: it is enlivening; it tells us that we are alive. (Robert Lowell observed in a letter that “a poem is an event, not the record of an event.”) Yeats dismisses both intellectual culture and natural phenomena as fundamental sources for poetry, claiming instead that only the moods are eternal, always formidably present everywhere and in all times, and recognized by each generation of human beings. The moods are “fire-born,” generated not from the material levels of earth, water, and air, but from a deathless fire, the invisible energy that sustains life. The moods are neither calm nor obedient: to the soul they are “a rout,” an ever-present and uncontrollable throng of disturbing visitors. Here is Yeats’s tiny two-beat poem on that overpowering and rebellious and memorable throng:

    The Moods

    Time drops in decay
    Like a candle burnt out;
    And the mountains and woods
    Have their day, have their day;
    What one in the rout
    Of the fire-born moods
    Has fallen away?

    Answer: not one. Not a single mood, Yeats believes, has ever been lost from the repertory of personal consciousness, whether registered in human beings or reflected in poems. Contemporary readers recognize without effort every mood in Shakespeare’s sonnets: moods of infatuation, love, disgust, dismay, anger, wonder, meditation; moods sublime and shameful, trivial and tragic, coursing surprisingly in and through our own veins. In “Poem,” Elizabeth Bishop wrote, on seeing an old painting, “Heavens, I recognize the place, I know it!” She had been there before.

    To Yeats, a lyric poem exists because of the poet’s felt compulsion to trace the contour of the complex, invisible, shifting, alarming, and passionate moods constantly pressing on human beings from infancy on, and continuing (unceasing in variety and unpredictable in evolution) until death. The fierce obligation to animate the human moods on paper through a template of sonic form is an urgent one to poets, but they find the task an almost impossible one, since moods are so distinctly shaded in idiosyncratic fashion. My mood of melancholy may bear a “family resemblance” to yours, but it will manifest itself, linguistically speaking, in a different pacing, an unfamiliar scene, a new minor key, legato in lieu of staccato, syncopated rather than regular — and if its conceptual and melodic expression in language does not become an experience for the reader, the poem has failed as the unique internal energy-transfer it must aim to become.

    To rescue a lyric poem of the Western past is to feel how deeply we have already encountered its human moods, although this may be the first time we have seen them illustrated in just this shading, at just this pace, with just this degree of unnerving precision. Poets exhibit a set of moods indescribable by any generality. In a poem we watch a blurred interior contour take on a distinct face, which turns out to be our own: “Heavens, I recognize the place!” At that point we can voice the words as if they have been born in us. The poets may be making distinctions that we have never made, but as soon as the words create a dynamic life in us, we are struck by their accuracy. Shakespeare, for instance, will offer a taunting definition of a certain inscrutable form of behavior, and complex though it is, we shiver and recognize the species of persons who toy with the emotions of others while themselves remaining, in a chilling sense, impeccable. Such a definition, in its obliqueness, is far from one we could have composed ourselves, but as we read Sonnet 94, we miserably recognize Shakespeare’s portrait of such seducers —

    They that have power to hurt but will do none,
    Who do not do the thing they most do show,
    Who, moving others, are themselves as stone,
    Unmovèd, cold, and to temptation slow…

    The pain in the lines transmits a lover’s struggle to express — but in an abstract and impersonal form — his shameful infatuation with a narcissistic deceiver. The sonnet’s oblique concealment of the intrinsic nature and actions of such a person requires us to struggle, like the lover, to ascertain the truth. Recognition of our parallel struggle awakens the poem in us.

    Donne’s Holy Sonnet 14, like Shakespeare’s Sonnet 94, creates within us the experience of a disturbed sufferer. And it therefore provokes puzzled questions: why, instead of simply addressing God as a single deity, do I (as Donne’s speaker, henceforth referred to as “D” to distinguish him from Donne the author) feel called upon by my predicament to address all three “Persons” of the Christian Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, only to revert to a single God after I no longer “need” the Trinity? A modern reader may be unlikely to recall the two contested Christian concepts acted out within the poem: is a human being a creature predestined by a Calvinist God to eternal damnation or salvation, or is he its more humane opposite, a person endowed by the Creator with free will? Modernity has naturalized “predestination” as ordinary causality (historical, biological, psychoanalytic), and as the theology of creation drops out of the modern debate, the reality of “free will” becomes uncertain. Yet the ancient opposition of determinism and free will persists equally in the modern mind: can I free myself from addiction by sheer will? If not, is there any other recourse? D, finding himself inextricably addicted to promiscuity, seeks external aid to cure him. Today D might look for psychological or medical help, but in seventeenth-century England he calls on God.

    As past eras drop away, not only do past concepts (the Trinity, predestination) become extinct, but also, for non-Latinists, there occurs the effacement of etymological meaning. The original English readers of Donne’s circulating manuscripts were highly educated Christians for whom Latin was almost as familiar as English. Such readers would have known that the Latin noun spiritus (as in “the Holy Spirit”) is, in English translation, “the breath,” which, when converted to a verb (“to breathe”) and intensified — as D demands — becomes the poem’s “blow.” Similarly, the Christian reader would have seen the pun by which the Son of God is said to be the Sun. Donne the theologian (see his extravagant later sermons) has perhaps experienced, and certainly analyzed, the complicated and conflicting emotions surging through the speaker of Holy Sonnet 14: the speaker knows the redemptive promise of a virtuous life, but is aware as well of the troubling guilt of persistent wrongdoing, the unrelenting fear of continued sexual addiction, and the defensive excuses usually offered by the addicted.

    Yet almost all commentators have believed (as we can see from the exhausting number of their remarks quoted in the 2008 Donne Variorum) that Donne’s speaker is “praying” to God. That description seems dubious to me. Do we know what Donne would consider a prayer acceptable to God? Yes, we do: in Holy Sonnet 7, a repentant sinner, recalling Saint Paul’s consoling words, “Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound” (Romans 5:20) can feel hope for his own salvation. Imagining the dead on Judgment Day, stationed “there” in the afterlife (when it has become too late to repent), the sinner prays as a penitent, “here” on “lowly ground,” that he will he be “taught “by God how to repent in time:

    But let them [the dead] sleep, Lord, and me mourn a space;
    For, if above all these, my sins abound,
    ‘Tis late to ask abundance of thy grace
    When we are there. Here on this lowly ground,
    Teach me how to repent; for that’s as good
    As if thou hadst sealed my pardon with thy blood.

    This speaker’s humble “Teach me how to repent” sounds nothing like D’s insistent imperatives hurled at God’s ear. Donne-the-composing-author would of course have recognized the difference between the penitent speaker’s acceptable “prayer” (an acknowledgment of sin, with a plea to be instructed in virtue by God) and D’s persistent (and improper) reproaches blaming God for His insufficient effectiveness. Still addicted, still unrepentant, D rails at his putative savior.

    Readers with a hazy sense that any speech addressing God can be called a “prayer” have not understood that no acceptable prayer can reproach God (who is perfect) or can suggest (to a divinity who is eternal) that he alter his actions in time. Rather, a believer’s prayers address a God who is ever benevolent and ever the same. But “As yet” — says D (intemperately calling for an improved future from his silent God) “You / As yet but knock.” Christopher Hitchens sardonically remarked in Mortality that the person who prays “is the one who thinks that god has arranged matters all wrong, but who also thinks that he can instruct god how to put them right.” That epigram exactly sums up what is expressed in the first twelve lines of Donne’s sonnet, while in the last two lines D will discover — in the cleverest way — an acceptable alternative to propose: D will retain the helplessness he has maintained throughout; and God will bring him to salvation without external force.

    Most readers have assumed that it is the “real Donne” — the historical authorial one — who speaks Holy Sonnet 14; he certainly speaks in propria persona within other sonnets. The commentators quoted in the Donne Variorum consistently mistake D’s actual speech-acts by employing in their paraphrases — besides the actual word “pray” — a number of synonyms: “Donne” entreats, beseeches, implores, pleads, and so on. But the speaker of the poem does not perform these religiously acceptable acts: rather, he demands, he reproaches, he insists, he complains, and he consistently represents himself as a victim of God’s inadequate assistance. And is it credible that the authorial Donne is here speaking as “himself,” when the impertinent D apparently does not understand the legitimate ways to address God and the reverent posture suitable for acceptable prayer? (Even the pious person about to pronounce a prayer has to beg God to find it acceptable.) It is the visible disharmony between the Donne who writes the other Holy Sonnets and the protesting “D” who speaks “Batter my heart” that compels a necessary distinction between author and speaker. This is always an awkward procedure because our instinct is to merge the author and the “I” of the poem, but it becomes necessary to separate them whenever there is a discrepancy (as when Donne speaks as a woman in “Break of Day”).

    The historical Donne, author and courtier, was raised during the Reformation in an intensely Roman Catholic family, but later took orders in the English Church and eventually became Dean of St. Paul’s in London. Expert from youth in the diction of faith, he would not have seriously entertained D’s notion that he can harangue God on how to better His actions, nor would he have characterized D’s successive ultimatums as “prayers.” D’s expostulations to God arrive as a torrent of imperatives beginning with explosive b’s: batter, bend, break, blow, burn, and again break. These are not words of entreaty but words of offended entitlement. In one of Donne’s strokes of authorial wit, he exposes the self-serving reason for D’s triple mustering (in his battle against Satan) of all three Persons of the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Resentfully, D has been reflecting “There are three of Them: why are They not more efficacious in battling the enemy? Surely the divine Persons have more available power than Satan!” But the Trinity disappears from the poem when D recognizes how improbable it is that he, the sinner, will receive supernatural reinforcements: he re-imagines the military battle as a single combat with Satan; and once he drops the Trinitarian summons, D always addresses God in the singular (revealing that it was a matter of temporary military expediency to summon the three Persons in his first lines).

    In his mood of rebellion, D demands more successful actions by all three Persons. Yes, God the Father created him, but His creature (now addicted to disobedience and sinful sexual expression) has come to grief. God must (commands D) create a replacement for D’s “old”self and make a whole “new” human being; it would be a mistake on God’s part merely to mend the old one. Since God the Son is (punningly) the Sun, he has the power to burn, to consume the “old” self utterly, making room for the “new” one; certainly he can do better than merely shine. God the Holy Spirit has so far merely deigned to breathe, instead he should blow, as he did in the guise of a “rushing mighty wind” when the apostles came together after Christ’s ascension into heaven: “And when the day of Pentecost was fully come, [the apostles] were all with one accord in one place. And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind, and it filled all the house where they were sitting” (Acts 2).

    But in spite of D’s rising decibels, each person of the Trinity has continued mildly in known ways. God the Father merely mends the damaged being; God the Son will do no more than knock at the door of the heart, not batter it nor burn it with fire; and God the Holy Spirit gently breathes, will not blow the heart’s door open. In Donne’s emphatic arrangement of D’s excited verbs, the desired act always pushes itself into place before the current one:

    batter <—————–knock
    blow <—————–breathe
    burn <—————–shine
    make new <—————–seek to mend
    break <—————–seek to mend
    bend your force <—————–knock
    break <——————seek to mend

    God’s gentle present actions in the second column are “feminized” by their “weakness” vis-à-vis the powerful and explosive masculinity of all the “b” words in the first column. In an impatient argument, D urges his “masculine” verbs on the Trinity as a set of actions preferable to those “weak” ones that God has so far been resorting to. “Batter” the speaker’s heart — with what? A “battering ram,” the weapon that can conquer a city at the end of a siege. D irritably repudiates the feeble single “knock” in favor of troop action. (He has thereby explained his invoking of all three Persons of the Trinity, since a battering ram must be wielded by more than one attacker.) The satisfying resonance of the repeated “b’s” exposes the speaker’s exultation at having piled up (in prospect) so many reinforcements of his army. As D blames God for his own helpless continuation in a sinful state, he does not shame himself by naming his sins, but rather implies that God could nullify any and all sins if He would exert some energetic force.

    Abandoning the hope of a Trinity-staffed battle, after the silent absence of the summoned Persons, D has decided on single combat — a duel with Satan. He imagines himself, in a plaintive simile, not as an actor in battle, but as the victim of an unnamed usurper of the throne of his own terrain: “I, like an usurped town…” His mood becomes one of self-excuse, as he releases a vague explanatory flashback (but one lacking many crucial details): “Once I was a well-governed city, ruled by God’s viceroy, Reason. Then a wicked usurper assumed [but how?] the throne of the viceroy.” The blurred narrative of victimization continues: Reason, the absent viceroy, is now a captive [but whose, and why?]. “The usurpation must have happened” [says D, blaming the viceroy] either because Reason was weak and is now imprisoned or — a far worse concluding speculation — that God’s viceroy has turned traitor, has been “untrue,” and is now a minion of Satan. D claims that his own strong efforts to admit God to the “usurped” city have been frustrated by Reason’s traitorous secession. Would the authorial Donne think to deceive God by such a tale? Of course not. It is the speaker who resorts to self-excuse, revealing himself as a hypocrite, once again blaming others (if not God, then Satan) for his plight.

    As D continues his narrative into the immediate present, Donne-the-author turns the sonnet in a different direction, changing his rhyme scheme to alert his reader. The first eight lines (rhyming abbaabba) had created, in “embraced rhymes,” the octave of an “Italian” sonnet, but the closing six lines adopt a “Shakespearean” sestet, an alternately rhymed quatrain plus a couplet (cdcdee). Such a hybrid form announces a fundamental change in mood from octave to sestet, but we are not yet aware what it may be, although we feel the mood change as the speaker voices a single dejected admission: “Yet dearly I love you.” Still sinning, D quickly takes on a false pathos, asserting in self-defense that although he loves God dearly, and is eager to be loved in return, yet he has waked to find himself dismayingly “betrothed” to God’s enemy, Satan. How can that have happened, apparently without his conscious knowledge? D has voluntarily (if bafflingly) “tied the knot” — as the colloquial phrase has it — in a solemn public promise to marry. By some sorcery, D tells God, he has been betrayed into a contract with a seductive unnamed “enemy.” As usual, D never imputes any agency or blame to himself for his condition: the betrothal has merely “happened” (Donne discloses D’s attitude by the passive voice of “am betrothed,” rather than “I betrothed myself”).

    Donne-the-author must now reveal that D, even after admitting the fact of the sinful betrothal, believes that he cannot extract himself from it, and has not changed his expectation that it is God’s responsibility to free him. Donne points out this truth by D’s voluntary return to the violence of his initial address to God (with the telling repetition of his earlier injunction, break, implying that he is still reproaching God’s inertia). Divorce me! he cries, from the promised marriage (appealing to the Jewish law permitting such action); untie or break that quasi-marital Gordian knot of betrothal. The pitch of the voice rises ever higher as the sinner’s mood worsens. In protest against his apparent helplessness. D bursts out (the vowel echoing the doubly resounding break), “Take me to you, imprison me.” In this histrionic climax, D unwittingly parallels the action he says he desires (“Imprison me)” with Satan’s action as he (supposedly) imprisoned God’s defeated and “captiv’d” viceroy. When a speaker — even unconsciously — wants God to reproduce an action by Satan, that speaker is emphatically not the authorial Donne but rather an imagined (and faulty) sexual sinner.

    Although the poem has been composed of a string of verbs of demand, God has responded to none of them (not even to the “milder” suggestion of untie) and D’s despair has not yet been alleviated by any merciful act. Casting hither and yon for a verb which will move God to save him, D has so far run through a thesaurus of imperatives, always maintaining his own innocence, always making others responsible for his sin or professing ignorance of its cause. Does D sound here like a man praying? “A broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise,” says the Psalmist. Has D, up to this point, manifested a mood either heartbroken or contrite? To the contrary, he has remained wronged and accusatory. He has, in short, not been “praying” (or “entreating” or “imploring” or “beseeching” or “pleading”) at all; he has been rebuking God as too mild in his solicitations of the heart, too weak to prevent the usurpation of the heart-town by Satan, and even too timid to untie the betrothal-knot.

    Though remaining wholly passive, D — after the bitter mood in which he scourges God’s inertia — is enabled to discover verbs which will change his state, will embody the necessary conditions for his restoration to virtue. As before, he expects God to be the active agent of his salvation. However, in the most linguistically “magical” move of the poem, D is rescued by the ability of his former language to mutate. Donne-the-author succeeds in letting D keep his desired passivity as he investigates the possibilities of salvation through etymology and grammar. Language saves D by presenting inspiring new verbs to him, translations into metaphor of his earlier literal claims. “Imprison me!” he has cried, and language (through its authorial tutor, Donne) whispers to him, “You know, there are other versions of the words you are thinking of using: for ‘imprison’ you could more aptly say ‘enthrall,’ since a ‘thrall’ is a prisoner, and “enthralled” means “(voluntarily) imprisoned by enchantment.” The Muse of Language offers an additional counsel: “And for the forcible ‘rape’ (which must have preceded your unwilled ‘betrothal’ to Satan) you could more properly ask God to ‘ravish’ you; the word indeed issues from the same root as ‘rape’ — rapere — but like ‘rapt’ and ‘rapture’ is metaphorical.” At this moment, transmitting the revelations of the Muse of Language, Donne the poet feels, twice, the joy of the mot juste:

                                       for I,
    Except You enthrall me, never shall be free,
    Nor ever chaste, except you ravish me.

    The words “free” and “chaste” cast a light backwards, summing up the whole preceding narrative. By naming the virtues he desires — to be “free” and “chaste” — D confesses his hitherto unnamed sins, which are an enslavement to wrongdoing and sexual promiscuity.

    But how was the magical revelation of the “right language” induced in D the sinner? It was, I think, by the one truth in D’s outburst at the turning-point indicated by the changing of the rhyme-scheme: at that moment D recalls a deep past attachment to God, one still present in memory, which he longs to rediscover. The subduing of mood and the drop of voice in his admission “Yet I love You, and would be lovèd fain” measure D’s subsequent despair when he feels himself unloved and in danger of damnation. That he has remembered, amid his frantic demands, his past happiness when he felt loved by God suggests that in his exhaustion he is taking stock of the better past as well as the wretched present.

    In his blasting cascade of imperatives, D has been driven into a corner where his vocabulary of wrath is exhausted. Recalling his last mood of happiness, turning his face at last to the God he has been excoriating, remembering the past state in which he loved and was loved before sex and rebellion possessed him, and implicitly confessing his sins and his desire to be free and chaste, he hopes to regain equilibrium in a final “steady state”: “I can be free only when you enthrall me; I can be chaste only when you ravish me.” With “ravish” Donne is invoking the metaphorical sense of “rapere” — to abduct, to carry away — as he does in the Holy Sonnet on his wife’s death. Quoting St. Paul’s recollection of “a man” (probably himself) who was “caught up to the third heaven” (Corinthians 12:2), Donne remarks in Holy Sonnet 17 of his young wife that her soul was “early into heaven ravishèd.”

    In the mind of D, as he remembers his happier state, God’s goodness and beauty replace the rival claims of a putatively adult independence and putatively passionate sexual experience. Donne-the-author arranges the final “Shakespearean” couplet in the figure called chiasmus, or “crossing.” In this figure of speech (which always implies a speaker’s intellectual control of his earlier affliction), the etymologically metaphorical verbs become the “outside” brackets, while the “inside” brackets are the adjectives of longed-for virtue — enthrall:free::chaste:ravish. Chiasmus is always a figure of forethought, showing the conscious close of emotional distress. Using “linear” terms of the conditions of his salvation, D would say, “Unless You’enthrall and ravish me, I will never be free and chaste.” Chiasmus, using “bracketing” terms, “locks” the “solution” into the completeness of coming full circle, ratified by the happy discovery of the two metaphorical verbs permitting D to solve his despair while allowing him to regain — without carrying out any activities to save himself — the feeling of being loved by God.

    I can imagine that Donne’s whole poem was generated by his delighted discovery of the particular properties and the grammatical parallels of the verbs “enthrall” and “ravish.” Both verbs require a direct object, and as Donne constructs a scene in which “God” is the agent of these verbs, while D is the direct object, the poet obtains the psychological continuation of his speaker’s desire for passivity. If D were to speak here in the first person, he would have to render the facts in the passive voice: “I am enthralled by You”: “I am ravished by you.” Rather, the Son’s radiant presence (as the “Sun”) is indeed the agent, but not by an act of exerted force: rather, the divine light diffuses itself eternally without needing to effect any isolated action in time. When D laments “Yet I love you” in his bafflement, he has not yet realized that God requires nothing of him except to bask in the “Sun’s” shining warmth (erasing his angry wish that God should “burn” him). War — the first metaphorical axis of D’s sinful state — miraculously, in the warmth of God’s uninterrupted “shining,” recedes from memory; and Love — the second axis — mutates from erotic addiction to agape or Christian love, charity.

    Granted, to understand “Batter my heart” in this century, the modern reader has to search out some aspects of Christianity in an encyclopedia and check the etymologies of two crucial verbs in a dictionary. But the reader is repaid by being thrust through an electric sequence of tumultuous moods, enacting them in person and experiencing them as virtual events. No other poem will transfuse agitation into the reader in exactly these dimensions, this angry and disturbed and excited doubt of one’s own will as a reliable agent of virtue, followed by the vivid sensation that God will not refuse salvation, but will, by a steady infusion of light, transform spiritual passivity into a cherished mutuality of enthralled self and ravished soul. The linguistic journey through moods so violently conducted and so exquisitely rewarded makes the reader see the speaker of the poem as a recognizable mirror of human anxiety and human sensibility. Anxiety and sensibility, never absent from the psyche, will arouse in readers, in the moment of immense final relief of the poem, a voice almost four hundred years old, making a faithful traversal of their own personal troubled and chaotic — but universal and timeless — moods of shame, perplexity, anger, resentment, and love.

    Bière de Garde

    How good it is, to sip a beer
    outdoors, with winter drawing near,
    above the wreckage of a meal.

    How good, before the bill comes due,
    to watch a copper light gleam through
    an ale infused with chanterelle

    and trust yourself to only those
    sensations of the tongue and nose,
    what’s felt, and how it makes you feel.

    A sip held in the mouth evokes
    a golden bloom among the oaks
    and water drawn up from a well

    one afternoon spent near the source
    of happiness, atop a horse
    that now stands idle in its stall.

    These days you keep too much inside,
    but once you foraged far and wide
    through pastures north of Carbondale.

    How fine, that you have faintly caught
    a sour note of apricot
    so deep in the cloudy dregs of fall,

    the past in what has come to pass,
    and cradle in your palm a glass
    of once, a final swig of ale.

    Beulah Land

    Going home means anywhere
    but here, putting aside
    worn grays
    for the bright amber
    of a fall morning.
    No more counting days
    in the clack and steam of laundry.

    With the hush of brakes
    a Greyhound bus
    glides beneath the trees
    and past a shuttered smelter.
    Grisaille shadows.
    Chains of geese.
    A swath of sheepish sunlight

    on foothills south of Zion.
    As day dims
    the windows turn
    to mirrors,
    and the coach hums
    with quiet conversation,
    murmurs into cell phones.

    How might freedom feel
    after seven years away?
    Vibrations through
    the bootheel,
    with a cardboard box
    and bus fare
    to any place but here.

    Last Song

    after Guiraut Riquier

    It’s for the best that I stop singing.
    Songs should come from happiness,
    and lately I’ve felt less and less
    inspired, with my horizon shrinking.
    When I recall my darkest days
    and contemplate a world ablaze
    and dread extinctions of tomorrow,
    who could wonder at my sorrow?

    My fire dwindled long ago.
    I rake the ashes, fitting muse
    for crafting esoteric blues
    from scraps of what I feel and know:
    at dusk, a woodcock on the wing
    tumbles into early spring,
    and yet in verse such things express
    a feeling of belatedness.

    These days, authorities dismiss
    the subtle circuitries of rhyme
    as relics of another time
    or quaint devices that persist
    on shelves of kitsch and curios.
    Why not attempt a work in prose —
    a memoir to mythologize
    my progress through a world of lies?

    We live with gaps, hypocrisies,
    and flights of happiness brought low,
    estranged from what we feel and know.
    As every instrument agrees,
    we live in seasons out of sync,
    a February on the brink
    of never, snow extinguishing
    the first magnolia blossoming.

    This dread has tainted everything:
    each dawn I come to consciousness
    in panic, prickles of distress,
    and clench my teeth. Why would I sing?
    Towhees still propose a slow
    familiar tune, but no words follow;
    this ache of feeling finds no phrase,
    no means by which to mourn or praise.

    After Wyatt

    They slip away, those creatures who
    once caught my eye and ventured near,
    near enough to smell of snow
    as cold lingered in their fur
    and breath warmed my sleeping ear;
    who ate an apple from my hand
    and lounged in sunlight, unconstrained.

    Such old affections slip away,
    all but one, la douce dolor:
    she leaned above me as I lay
    stretched out on the kitchen floor,
    caught within her net of hair;
    then quickened by a passing mood,
    she softly asked, Does that feel good?

    She lingered in my consciousness
    when I awoke, a bit confused
    to find her gone, the place a mess,
    and emptiness come home to roost.
    I wonder if she’d be amused
    to see me settled down, and if
    she still pursues that wayward life.

    Mortifying

    Thirty-five minutes into the movie The Piano Teacher, there occurs an indelible scene. In a dim bathroom cluttered with drugstore label sprays, lotions, and other feeble concoctions designed to fend off decay, a middle-aged woman in a silk robe briskly zips open her pocketbook and removes a folded slip of paper, which she unfolds to reveal a razor blade. Armed with this instrument, she turns around, slips off her flip flops, opens her robe, and sits on the edge of her bathtub with her legs splayed. She moves resolutely but without authority, with a kind of robotic resolve, as if she were complying rather than presiding, mechanically obeying an inner necessity. The camera displays her in profile. A pink hand mirror rests on a ledge by the tub among bottles of various shapes and sizes. She snatches up the glass and holds it out between her knees with one hand, still gripping the blade in the other. Then Erika Kohut, the piano teacher, leans forward intently, carefully adjusts the mirror until she appears satisfied with her view, moves the knife towards her groin, and slices inside herself several times with strained and steady force. A curtain of flat auburn hair conceals all her face except her lips, which are puckered perhaps in pain, perhaps in concentration. She breathes heavily, apparently exerting great effort. Rivulets of crimson liquid spill out of her and into the porcelain basin. Then the mutilation is halted abruptly by banality. “Erika, dinner is ready!” her aging mother, with whom she lives in a cramped apartment, summons her from the other room. “Coming, Mother!” replies the dutiful daughter while snatching a thick menstrual pad from an open bag beside her and pressing it to the wounds between her legs.

    It has been reported that at the press screening for The Piano Teacher at the Cannes Film Festival in 2001, members of the audience guffawed at this scene. Their laughter in response to the self-mutilation just witnessed was as sickening as it was unwarranted — significantly more discomfiting than the blood in the bathtub. If the director, Michael Haneke, had intended the mortification to be funny — he does in fact have a profoundly twisted sense of humor — he should not have cast Isabelle Huppert as Erika. Huppert possesses a ferality which somehow does not mitigate her natural sophistication. And in the scene in the bathroom Huppert is feral in precisely the way that a woman’s hatred of her own womanhood is feral.

    Yes: a woman’s hatred of her own womanhood. It exists, it snarls in our bellies; and Huppert’s peerless performance is among its rare open expressions. She brilliantly communicates in the bathroom scene the gravity of her ferocious behavior. Owing to her marrow-deep conviction, conscious or not, of the significance of that drawn blood, the savagery that Erika Kohut perpetrates against herself is exhilarating. I do not mean to deny that it is also grotesque, revolting, and wrenching. And yet it is at the same time emphatically thrilling in the way that it is always thrilling when a person acts openly upon a perplexing, wounding, and unacknowledged truth. The blood is a shibboleth and the truth that it communicates extends beyond the inner torments of this piano teacher. Her action is symptomatic of the cruel reality that there is a long tradition — longer than most contemporary women know — of womanly self-mortification. Those streams of crimson encapsulate a common and time-honored and baffling compulsion: a woman’s compulsion to attack herself.

    What accounts for this propensity is a mystery, but the evidence for the compulsion is plentiful. Of course, most women, or more women, casually contract or stunt themselves rather than slice and starve themselves. But the slicing and the starving are hardly unheard of, and they are manifestations of the same proclivities, and are emphatically more common in women than men. Women are three to four times more likely to suffer from anorexia and bulimia and to cut than men are. Those numbers are strikingly reminiscent of another grizzly statistic: men are four times more likely to be murdered and to commit murder than women. It would seem that men brutalize one another and women brutalize themselves. (There are holes in such generalizations, of course.) In his learned and compassionate book Cutters, the psychotherapist Steven Levenkron describes these tendencies so well he seems to explain them:

    In the case of girls, they will absorb the blame for most behaviors directed against them. Whether it’s a natural component inherent to femininity, a sense of physical helplessness, or a combination of both, disorders of self-harm, for the most part, affect girls and women. These include cutting, anorexia, bulimia, and other self-harming behaviors. Males, for the most part, tend to externalize blame and emotional discomfort by acting out on others, from street fights to rapes and homicide… While we see crossovers in both genders, the patterns favor the classic models for aggression.

    In ordinary places such as locker rooms, sidewalks, and shopping centers, or in moments of intimate confidence, if you have been paying attention, you will have caught glimpses of forearms riddled with slashes of pale pink flesh, or dark red grooves, thick and deep. The character is familiar: the “fucked up” over-achiever; the type-A freak with a 5.00 GPA and a razor blade in her backpack; or a calorie counter pulled up on her iPhone.

    “Fucked up” is hardly a useful clinical description or a worthy literary appellation, but it is the term that, shamefully, often comes to mind. The reason is that generally we have not bothered to consider her charitably or deeply. We have squandered abundant opportunities to develop compassion for her. To outsiders she seems crazy, even selfish, depriving herself of the sustenance offered her, and forcing her friends and family to agonize over her poor choices. But strictly speaking she has not made choices, and her actions were not catalyzed by mere melodrama. Of all mental illnesses, eating disorders have the highest mortality rate. Between five and ten percent of people who suffer from anorexia die within ten years of developing the disease, and roughly twenty percent die within twenty years. Patients admitted to hospitals for anorexia or bulimia are told outright that they will likely come back, that escape from their own mental cells is practically impossible. Hope is extinguished in these personal purgatories. Yet the contemporary discussion about female self-harm is tinctured with a maddening unseriousness. In the popular imagination the bony, bleeding, scarred young girls are considered hysterical, even ridiculous. “Fucked up” is a terribly unimpressive thing to be.

    The general discussion of these disorders curdles with glibness bordering on contempt in the medical profession as well. When Levenkron first discovered that one of his patients had resorted to self-mutilation, he asked colleagues if they had encountered similar cases. His fellow psychotherapists would respond with chilling disinterest: “Oh yeah, another cutter. They’re pretty sick cookies.” This blasé attitude about cutting and other instances of analogous self-harm is baffling, given the carnage. Perhaps that is the reason so little is known about why women do this to themselves. The platitudinous explanations generally given are as satisfying as celery sticks. It is endlessly repeated that these girls are motivated by a need for control. But what, exactly, have they been deluded into believing that they can control through self-harm? Starvation saps a person of the energy to think clearly, so perhaps they are ceding control as much as gaining it.This so-called explanation is simply a description of a symptom the cause of which remains mysterious and unexamined.

    It is also said that their violent self-mortifications are owed to a pathological desire to be skinny. Perhaps that accounts for some of the violence, but it cannot account for all of it. Women have been starving themselves for far longer than thigh gaps and jutting collarbones have been in vogue. In her classic study Holy Feast and Holy Fast, the medievalist scholar Caroline Walker Bynum shows that since the medieval centuries food and fasting have been central to female spirituality:

    Although women were only about 18 percent of those canonized or revered as saints between 1000 and 17000, they were 30 percent of those in whose lives extreme austerities were a central aspect of holiness and over 50 percent of those in whose lives illness (often brought on by fasting and other penitential practices) was the major factor in reputation for sanctity… most males who were revered for fasting fit into one model of sanctity — the hermit saint (usually a layman) — and this was hardly the most popular male model, whereas fasting characterized female saints generally. Between late antiquity and the fifteenth century there are at least thirty cases of women who were reputed to eat nothing at all except the eucharist, but I have been able to find only one or possibly two male examples of such behavior before the well-publicized fifteenth-century case of the hermit Nicholas Flüe.

     

    The earliest known examples of food-avoidant female saints occur in the Low Countries in the late 1100s. Mary of Oignies was born in 1170, and was renowned for practicing extreme asceticism. She ate no meat, hardly any fish, and subsisted largely on vegetables and bits of bread so old and coarse that the morsels would draw blood while scraping the roof of her mouth. Her biographer, James of Vitry, asked her how it was possible that her fasts and her frantic sobs (she cried when meditating on Christ) did not cause crushing headaches. She answered: “These tears are my feast; they are my bread day and night; they… feed my mind rather than emptying and afflicting my head, they bring satiety to my soul.” Many female saints experienced communion with God as food itself, and during ritualistic intervals they could not stomach ordinary food. Upon receiving an unconsecrated host, Mary of Oignies vomited and then washed her mouth to obliterate the aftertaste. During the last year of her life, Margaret of Ypres (1216-1237) could swallow nothing but the eucharist. Juliana of Cornillon (c.1192-1258) practiced extreme fasting and as a teenager craved the eucharist and preferred prayer to food. When her caretakers endeavored to persuade her to eat, she insisted that “I want better and more beautiful food.”

    These women, and there were many more, are our spiritual ancestors. Of course, not every teenager who starves herself is straining for spiritual transcendence, but they aren’t merely maladjusted adolescents, either. Something significant and deep is at work. It is a mistake to consider these two types, the starving saint and the scarred woman, as essentially distinct. What they share is fundamental: womanhood.

    Erika Kohut, broken and brazen, cuts at her womanhood directly. She attacks the inheritance that coerces her to raise the blade. Women often torment their bodies, but it is rare for a woman to acknowledge through this peculiar violence that her womanliness itself inspires this brutality. Something about womanhood, some obscure quality or conditioning, predisposes her to conceive of herself as an enemy, or as a prison — something to be tamed, or wrestled into submission. In that gut-twisting scene Erika attempts female castration, as if trying to break free from a self-sabotaging parasite that lives in and off her. Her attempt is strikingly ineffectual. She does not exhibit relief the way cutters do when physical pain, delicious as dopamine, releases them from psychic torture. But Erika is attempting an impossible exorcism. She does not evidence relief because relief is not attainable. (Elsewhere in the film her continued difficulties as a woman are made crushingly clear.) There is no effective method for disentangling the strains of self that are harmless from those that she must expel. For there are — enmeshed, inextricable — two selves: the self attacking and the self attacked; the girl whose body has grown beyond girlhood and rebelled against her, and the woman. They are inseparable; a single life.

    Erika Kohut’s violence is freakish because of its extremity and its brutality. But there is a cornucopia of related behaviors to which we have become inured. Erika radically exemplifies something grotesquely ordinary. Women tend or are taught to contract themselves, to starve or mutilate their bodies or their minds. Shrinking is a woman’s business. Constant social and cultural training, implied and overt, prepares us to take up this self-undermining practice. It is painful to blunt ourselves, but it keeps us from operating at full strength, and that is a possibility we fear and cannot countenance. Women have been taught not to permit themselves to be intimidating. To paraphrase Colette, a female genius indulges in self-denial.

    Not all women carry razor blades in their pocketbooks, of course. But the extraordinary can teach us about the ordinary. It is useful to study the extreme cases, the freaks, the fanatics, the swollen iterations, to better understand the rest. In The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James considers only religious extremists in order to understand the religious temperament. His reasoning is compelling: inflamed essences and hyperbolic expressions are useful because in them the essential is exaggerated in a manner that makes it easier to detect and therefore to understand all the instances of a type: “we learn most about a thing when we view it under a microscope, as it were, in its most exaggerated form.” Erika’s attack is exaggerated, but her exaggeration makes manifest what is commonly the case. 

      But why is it commonly the case? What is it about the prospect of womanhood that inspires such fear and repulsion, a terror so great that a girl would choose to deprive her body of the energies that would catalyze and sustain menstruation, breast development, childbearing hips, and flowing hair? Where does the horror come from? Is it justified?

    In 1954, five years after The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir wrote a novel that was never published in her lifetime. It appeared only a few years ago and was translated into English by Sandra Smith in 2021. It is titled Inseparable, and in it Beauvoir tells the profoundly affecting story of a remarkable young girl, Andrée, through the eyes of her beloved friend Sylvie. As Andrée matures, her exceptionalism grows more apparent. This becomes increasingly unbearable for those around her, particularly her mother, an exacting Catholic woman who can tolerate erratic or conspicuous behavior in young girls, but not in young women. This story schools us in an age-old truth about the history of womanhood in society: it is a terrible thing for a woman to be special. Andrée deserves a prominent place in the annals of womanly mortification.

    ​Andrée Gallard and Sylvie Lepage meet in school in Paris when they are both nine years old — still young enough for Andrée’s gifts not to inspire envy or contempt. She is easy to admire, evidently precocious, irreverent but too young yet to be perceived as impudent or intimidating. There is a gripping, unsettling aura about her. She isn’t socialized the way the other girls in her class are, she “didn’t use the tone of voice she should have when talking to a teacher… [and] she walked with the confidence of an adult.” 

    Andrée introduces herself to Sylvie by explaining that she had started school a year late because two summers earlier she had been “burnt to a crisp” while roasting potatoes over a campfire. Her dress caught fire and the flesh on her thigh was burned straight through to the bone. Andrée tells this story with an air of impatience, bored at having repeated it so many times. Throughout the novel she demonstrates this same inhuman (or superhuman) disregard for physical pain — a warning that she is capable of seriously damaging her own body. She lacks the fear of physical suffering that paralyzes healthy, ordinary people. Madame Gallard relays another example of the same disregard when she tells “the story of Andrée’s martyrdom” to Sylvie’s mother:

    The cracked skin, enormous blisters, paraffin-coated dressings, Andrée’s delirium, her courage, how one of her little friends had kicked her while they were playing a game and had reopened her wounds — she’d made such an effort not to scream that she’d fainted.

     The extremity of this story inspires admiration and even awe in Sylvie, who feels suddenly as if nothing remotely interesting or important has ever happened to her.

    Sylvie had been a model student, top of her class in her first year. She maintains her perfect record, but she studies and reveres the contempt that Andrée harbors for the platitudinous and respectable ideas that the teachers at their conservative school spoon down the young girls’ throats. Throughout the long year spent lying flat on her back while her charred flesh bubbled and grew back, Andrée had read voraciously and developed opinions about fictional and historical figures and eras about which Sylvie knew very little. “Many of these opinions were subversive, but given her young age, the novices forgave her. ‘That child has personality,’ they said at school.” But how long before “personality” becomes “problematic”? How long until a forceful girl becomes a troublesome teenager, and then a dangerous woman?

    Sylvie’s love for her friend is pure, deep, and clean of jealousy or intimidation, as genuine friendship always is. She is aware that Andrée is exceptional, different in kind, that she possesses a power Sylvie cannot understand, and she revels in that knowledge.

    What gave her the greatest prestige in my eyes were certain unique characteristics whose meanings I never understood: when [Andrée] looked at a peach or an orchid, or if anyone simply said either word in front of her, Andrée would shudder and her arms would break out in goosebumps; those were the times when the heavenly gift she’d received — and which I marveled at so much — would manifest itself in the most disconcerting way: it was character. I secretly told myself that Andrée was one of those child prodigies whose lives would later be recounted in books.

    After summer vacation, when she and Andrée are separated for the first time since their meeting, Sylvie suddenly realizes that Andrée has inspired such intense love in her that she cannot bear to live without her. It is the most mature experience her young life has so far afforded.

    As the two girls grow, Sylvie’s love remains the only love which Andrée will ever receive that deepens rather than weakens as she becomes more formidable. Already by their second year together, the teachers have grown weary of Andrée’s wit and transgressiveness. She has by now recovered from the burns and is spirited and healthy. The stronger and more vivacious she becomes, the less likable she is. That first year she was manifestly weak, physically compromised, and this feebleness made it easier for others to conceive of her as needy rather than threatening. By now their concern has evaporated, and so has their patience. “They found her contradictory, ironic, prideful; they reproached her for making snide remarks. They never succeeded in catching her being downright insolent because Andrée carefully kept her distance, and that was perhaps what irritated them the most.” Generally, when young girls behave badly, their teachers depend on their mothers to rebuke them, to sound alarms about reputation and to instill within them the importance of appearances. But Madame Gallard indulges Andrée, and so there was little the teachers could do.

    ​Unlike Sylvie’s mother, Madame Gallard does not put much stock in the opinions of the schoolteachers. She does not hector Andrée about what the neighbors might think if they see her walking about the streets alone, or whether the other little girls call her odd or rude. At first it seems that Madame Gallard is much more permissive than the mothers Sylvie has come to know in Paris, but eventually Sylvie recognizes with foreboding that “her smile hid a trap,” and that Andrée’s evident freedom came at a price. Andrée is the second of seven children and is expected to care for her younger siblings and to participate in endless religious and familial duties, all enshrouded in piety. The social responsibilities that other girls her age must fulfill are in her case dwarfed by something of greater significance: God’s will and the sacrifices that it necessitates.

    Andrée willingly makes these sacrifices, which are fueled by the love that she feels for her family generally and her mother above all. That love is ferocious. The intensity of her filial passion is commensurate with the rest of her burning spirit, and greater than her mother can conceive or even deserve. For, tragically, Madame Gallard loves Andrée the way she believes a good Catholic mother ought to love one and all of her children, rather than in a way that is particular to Andrée and reflective of her difference, her impressive peculiarity. Andrée knows this, and it breaks her heart. She will be punished by a society that cannot tolerate exceptionalism in women — a punishment often exacted by other women.

    Madame Gallard knows that as Andrée gets older, her independence will shrink. She permits her freedoms early, when they are unimportant, and when they will not hinder her from submitting to tradition and loyalty. When Andrée reaches adulthood she will be expected to marry a man of her parents’ choosing, and renounce the individuality that she had been at liberty to cultivate. But Andrée understands none of this. In their second year of school, when her responsibilities to her family had only just begun to intensify, she tells Sylvie that she is “tired of being a child.” She imagines that the tightening fetters are features of childhood, and so she longs for adulthood. But she has it backwards: they will get tighter as she gets older, the more womanly she becomes, the farther she develops from prepubescent innocence. She is not afraid yet, but she will be.

      The parable of the strong young woman and her unjust destiny continues. Sylvie has an epiphany about the terms of Andree’s existence when she observes her in her father’s library in the country. There, amid the complete works of Joseph de Maistre, the writings of Louis Veuillot, and the photographs of Andrée’s bearded ancestors, Sylvie sees clearly for the first time that Andrée is shackled in place by the inherited past: “Amid all those austere gentlemen, Andrée seemed out of place, too young, too delicate, and, especially, too alive…. I had often envied Andrée’s independence; suddenly, she seemed a lot less free than I was. Behind her, she had this past; and around her, this large house, this enormous family: a prison whose exits were carefully guarded.” Andree’s vigorous soulfulness suddenly seems too weak to withstand the pressures of tradition and the expectations of family. Andrée never stood a chance.

    Achingly, Sylvie recognizes that Andrée is complicit in her own imprisonment. In Steven Levenkron’s book, he describes a precocious daughter who is dispossessed of her own childhood because her parents expect her to shoulder parental obligations at a young age. Such a child believes that if she fails to play the role set for her, she will forfeit her parents’ affection. The child internalizes the anger that should be healthily directed at the parent, for fear of squandering the dregs of love that have been allotted to her. This case describes Andrée well. She longs for a larger horizon and at the same time believes that her aspirations are treasonous and sinful. She plays both mother and child in the tribunals of her imagination, both rebelling and scolding herself for her rebellion.

        Sylvie goes on to study philosophy at the Sorbonne. There she befriends the brilliant Pascal Blondel, whom she introduces to Andrée, and the two immediately kindle to one another. He is the first believing Catholic who has succeeded in earning Andrée’s admiration and who does not encourage her to abandon her gifts in the name of religious zeal. Hungry for assurances that her powers are not essentially wicked, Andrée applies Pascal’s forgiving theology like balm to her inflamed and confused self-conception: “‘If He has granted us His gifts, it’s so that we will use them,’ [Pascal] often told her. These words filled Andrée with enthusiasm; you would have thought that an enormous weight had been lifted from her shoulders.’’

    Andrée had absorbed from her environment the conviction that the expression of her individuality was itself a sin. She, like Simone Weil, another brilliant woman who attended the Sorbonne at the same time Simone de Beauvoir did, believed that humility was the highest calling and a religious responsibility. “Humility is the refusal to exist outside God,” Weil wrote. “It is the queen of virtues. The self is only the shadow which sin and error cast by stopping the light of God, and I take this shadow for a being. Even if we could be like God it would be better to be like muck which obeys God.”(Dying in exile in a London hospital in the summer of 1943, Weil starved herself to death, though there is some debate about whether her refusal to eat was an expression of solidarity with occupied France or the result of illness.) This form of faith, which similarly torments Andrée, is not gendered. Pascal, too, believes that hubris is a sin. But though philosophical belief is universal, the personal interpretation of it and its absorption into an individual psyche is particular; and so Andree’s relationship with the problem of humility and hubris differs from Pascal’s. Unlike him, Andrée is predisposed to interpret her gifts themselves as hubristic, as deplorable indulgences of pride, and to hold herself accountable to God for every instance of their cultivation. It is difficult for her, as it is difficult for many women, to justify aspirations to excellence and distinction. Andrée reminds herself often that her mother never does anything for herself but dedicates all her time to others, and she believes that it is her duty to do the same. (This is reminiscent of the medieval women saints in Bynum’s study, for whom feeding and healing others comprise the essence of their religious devotion.) Andrée suspects that she is capable of greatness, and that consciousness itself is, in her mind, incriminating. She longs to live fully and to renounce absolutely — both with equal vehemence.

    These internal contradictions will tear Andrée to pieces, and she will respond to them the way women so often have responded to them. When Sylvie visits her in the summer, she notices immediately that Andrée has grown very thin. One of the young Gallard sisters murmurs to Sylvie that “Mama tells her off, but she doesn’t eat a thing.” Andrée’s duties have metastasized beyond bearable proportions, and they have succeeded in crushing her spirit. She confesses to Sylvie that she prays every night that she will die in her sleep. Andrée reports that Madame Gallard has discovered that she is in love with Pascal. Sylvie is not worried, insisting that Madame Gallard will find Pascal beyond reproach since he is a Catholic, but Andrée explains despairingly: “a love match is suspicious.”

    Meanwhile the social responsibilities that Andrée had more or less evaded have at last been demanded of her at full force. Andrée bakes pies, sets and clears tables, takes the twins on outings, and makes small talk at parties. Madame Gallard trains her daughters, the way women have always trained one another, to keep things running, to plug the interstices, to conduct the business that men neither notice nor think to perform, and to do it in a whisper. These standards are imposed upon women by other women for the sake of men. And the competence that results, the gentle and practical intelligence, the tasteful self-restraint, is wholly devoid of prestige. Andrée must cultivate it, but she will not be honored for it. This is training for a life darting from event to event, paying respects at funerals, organizing charity sales, birthing, calming, and marrying off children, setting guests at ease, and facilitating or performing cleanups — a life of manners and mores, a life of duties, not victories. There is no glory in this work, and it is all that is permitted of her. With each task, each tender directive, it is pounded into Andrée’s battered heart that if she loves her family truly and responsibly then she must renounce herself. It is a poisonous, merciless lesson.

    Andrée despises the mindless labor, she has contempt for her own station, but she loves her mother and so plays the role to perfection for as long as she can bear it. Finally, though, the moment of violent self-mortification arrives. One day towards the end of the summer, she is instructed to chop wood before taking her sisters on an outing — a task that she dreads. In the shed she deliberately cuts her foot with the ax, certain that the wound will deliver her from the asphyxiating chores. “I couldn’t stand it anymore,” she whispers to Sylvie.

    A few days into her convalescence, Madame Gallard reports that she will not oppose her relationship with Pascal as long as the two get engaged immediately. Pascal refuses, arguing that they are too young to speak of an engagement. Madame Gallard decrees that Andrée cannot remain in Paris and mandates a two-year-long exile to Oxford, far away from Sylvie’s influence and Pascal’s stimulations. Pascal concurs, and tells Andrée that her desire to be in the same city as him is an expression of corporeal weakness, that it is sinful. Andrée, ever susceptible to accusations of sin and shame, internalizes his castigation and repeats it to Sylvie like a dutiful marionette: “They’re right, and I know that very well. I know very well that yielding to the flesh is a sin: I must avoid the temptations of the flesh. We must be brave enough to face the facts.” Sylvie listens with swelling horror. She knows that Andrée cannot bear such a prolonged separation from the people she loves.

    A week or so before her scheduled eviction, Andrée visits Pascal’s house and asks to speak to his father. In a feverish fit she begs him to accept her, not to hate her, and asks again and again why he is against her. Pascal, who recognizes her voice from the other room, calls a taxi to take Andrée to the hospital. Madame Gallard forwards a telegram to Sylvie the next day explaining that Andrée has been delirious all night. Four days later she dies. The last thing she said to her mother was, “There’s a problem child in every family: and that’s me.” Andrée is buried in her family cemetery in the country, to decay for eternity alongside the bones of her triumphant ancestors. Sylvie attends the funeral, paying respects for the last time to the greatest love of her life. She notices bitterly that Andrée’s “grave was covered in white flowers. In some strange way, I understood that Andrée had died, suffocated by that whiteness. Before leaving to catch my train, I placed three red roses on top of those pristine flowers.”

    Inseparable is based on the true story of Simone de Beauvoir and her closest childhood friend, Elisabeth Lacoin. Elisabeth Lacoin, or Zaza, as Simone called her, died two weeks before her nineteenth birthday, after falling in love with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a fellow student to whom Simone had introduced her. According to Zaza’s doctors, she died of viral encephalitis, but the circumstances of her death were just as mysterious as those of Andrée’s in the novel. In the introduction to Inseparable, Beauvoir’s adopted daughter Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir confides that if one were to ask Simone what had caused Zaza’s death, she would have said that “Zaza died because she was extraordinary. She was assassinated; her death was a spiritual crime.” Simone recounts Zaza’s story in her autobiographical work Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, but Inseparable is the only book dedicated entirely to Zaza’s tragedy.

    It is difficult for a young girl to forgive herself for being extraordinary. It is difficult for an extraordinary woman to spare herself. The conflicting loyalties that strangle Zaza are familiar. They are structurally the same as the contradictory conceptions of proper femininity that revive like multi-headed hydras in every generation, preying on the special ones, the ambitious ones, the glittering ones, the odd ones, the high achievers who long for control over their own fate, for the authority to grant themselves permission, or the authority to snuff out the elements within them that rebel. Thwarted in their spirits, they overpower themselves; they are quick studies, trained through guilt to become self-saboteurs.

    Is it outrageous to draw parallels between Zaza’s short life and the lives of contemporary women? After all, since her burial in that dusty graveyard there have been several tsunamis’ worth of feminist victories. Haven’t we made progress? Or, as an exasperated interlocutor put it to me recently, “what more can feminists possibly want?” (This remark was made before a woman’s right to choose was imperiled.) Isn’t the fate of Andrée and Zaza a thing of the past? Is a woman who is afraid of womanhood merely a coward, or out of touch? Have the emaciated adolescents lining the high school hallways not gotten the memo? Shouldn’t they just see a doctor? Didn’t they hear about #MeToo, and wasn’t #MeToo the most recent in a long sequence of battle cries, each one a little more triumphant than the last? Why on earth are we still talking about this?

    ​These questions betray a fundamental misunderstanding. Feminism is a political movement. It operates primarily in a single realm of human life — the political realm. The nerve endings and muscles that it has developed are effectual or not, clumsy or not, exacting or not, within that realm. The movement ought to be judged according to the progress it has eked out through political means. But most of life takes place outside the realm of politics, and so there are many realms of life in which feminism has no teeth. Second-wave feminism insisted that “the personal is political,” and the Women’s Liberation Movement adopted that slogan because it wanted to persuade women to draw political conclusions from their own grim experiences. Yet that slogan, like all slogans, was intended more to be effective than to be truthful. History has proven it wrong. Since the 1960s political liberation has strengthened, but personal liberation remains illusory. The reason is simple: the emancipation of the soul from its inherited demons cannot be accomplished by Congress or the courts.

    The personal is not reducible to, or contingent upon, the political. Today (and for all time) this bifurcation hermetically seals off the realms in which a woman is encouraged to be an aggressive Girl Boss from the realms in which she is shamed (by herself as much as anyone else) for asserting her autonomy. In The Second Sex, Beauvoir lucidly described this confounding inevitability:

    The advantage man enjoys and which manifests itself from childhood onward is that his vocation as a human being in no way contradicts his destiny as a male… for a woman to accomplish her femininity, she is required to be object and prey; that is, she must renounce her claims as a sovereign subject. This is the conflict that singularly characterizes the situation of the emancipated woman. She refuses to confine herself to her role as a female because she does not want to mutilate herself; but it would also be a mutilation to repudiate her sex.

    Women who battle to smash the glass ceiling by day (and are feted for doing so) find themselves mysteriously compliant when confronted with a Tinder date’s odious demands and expectations. Suddenly these women cannot permit themselves to disappoint a stranger. (There was more dignity in complying physically with God’s demands, or in disappointing Him.) In these two realms, they are trying to fulfill contradictory roles: the role that feminism set for them, and the role that their womanhood imposes on them. Feminism is emphatically not the same thing as womanhood.

    And so it should not surprise us, it should not strike us as antiquated, that a daughter of the twenty-first century is just as likely as Elisabeth Lacoin to extinguish herself. Why hasn’t feminism taught her otherwise? Because that is not what feminism can do. Feminism can advocate for equal pay, but it cannot convince the women in the boardroom that they deserve to be there. The movement cannot teach a woman to like or admire or respect herself. It cannot eliminate from the consciousness of a young girl the stifling certainty that achieving proper womanhood will always mean developing a virtuosic capacity for self-denial, for self-abnegation, for self-mortification. Each new generation of girls is remorselessly inducted into this repressive sisterhood. Failing to equip ourselves, our daughters, and our sisters, with the capacity for emancipation, for inner emancipation, is not a feminist failing: it is a human one.

    The War Has Happened

    It is a dreary world, gentlemen.

    GOGOL

    The most consequential event of our time, I pray, will be the heroism of the Ukrainians. Here are men and women fighting and dying for liberal democracy. It was beginning to seem as if such a thing were no longer possible. Worse, no longer desirable. Here in the West, Jeshurun waxed fat and kicked. We have just been through years of contempt for liberal democracy, and the great disparagement is hardly over. We have been told that everything bad in our age is the fault of liberalism, or worse, neo-liberalism, whatever that is. It has been blamed for just about all the unhappiness in the world; and so the peddlers of a new happiness gloatingly call themselves post-liberal, on all sides of the rotted ideological spectrum. Sometimes one has to rub one’s eyes in disbelief at the intensity of the hatred for liberal democracy: do these fools really understand what they are saying? And then Vladimir Putin, with perfect candor about his lack of scruple and an inhuman absence of shame, attacked Ukraine. The question of his motivation is murky, like everything about this dead little man; there are those who attribute his war to strategic considerations and those who attribute it to mystical ones. Yet Putin’s objective could hardly be more plain: it is to stop the spread of liberal democracy, which in recent years has been exhilaratingly identified with the political evolution of Ukraine. Like his Soviet predecessors, Putin fears nothing more than sharing a border with freedom, which has a way of getting through barbed wire.

    One of the most striking features of the discussion about the war in Ukraine is how little the anti-liberal left and the anti-liberal right have contributed to it. The left does not support Russia, of course; but it does not support American support for Ukraine either, at least not with its customary relish. What the Ukrainians can expect from the progressives is an airlift of thoughts and prayers. I suspect that what really outrages them about Putin’s invasion, even more than its war crimes, is that it might beget an increase in the American defense budget; or worse, a revival of “the Washington foreign policy establishment” and “the Washington elite,” by which they mean anybody who holds a view contrary to theirs. This is populism as national security policy. In recent decades progressives have been more fascinated by Islam’s martyrs than by liberalism’s martyrs. They certainly do not look favorably upon the new activism of American foreign policy that has been engendered by the Ukrainian war. In their view, American foreign policy should be nothing more than a commemoration of the Iraq war unto the end of time. Our disgraceful retreat from Afghanistan was celebrated as precisely such a tribute to our post-Iraq wisdom. And now Putin comes along and spoils things. Just when we thought we were out, they pull us back in! (In fact, the conjunction of events was not a coincidence: our flight from Afghanistan made the moment auspicious for the Russian aggression.) In the curious logic of left-wing isolationism, the danger of Putin’s imperialism is that it may beget American imperialism, since all American interventions are by definition imperialistic. Putin has played into LBJ’s hands, if you see what I mean. And so here is Frantz Fanon, I mean Pankaj Mishra, warning that “Putin’s atrocities in Ukraine have now given” that aforesaid establishment “an opportunity to make America seem great again.” (No, not seem; be.) And here is Glenn Greenwald solemnly reporting Noam Chomsky’s remark that “fortunately” there is “one Western statesman of stature” agitating for a diplomatic solution to the war. That saving giant of diplomacy is Donald J. Trump. The spectacle of Chomsky’s degeneration is delightful.

    As for the post-liberal right, they are stuck with their admiration of Viktor Orban, who is stuck with his admiration of Vladimir Putin. They all deserve each other. In Poland, at least, even the post-liberals, including some of the prophets whom certain American reactionary intellectuals revere, have been clear about their opposition to the Russian war, but then Poland, for the obvious reason, has always been especially wakeful about Russia. Yet even as the horrors in Ukraine abound, the poisonous post-liberal vapors proliferate. A few months ago I came across a piece by Patrick Deneen, one of the most important thinkers that Hungary has produced, in which he discussed the thought of Augusto del Noce, a twentieth-century Italian Catholic philosopher who wrote probingly about modern atheism, which he interestingly called “natural irreligion.” Deneen said that “Del Noce saw further and better than most of his contemporaries that the great totalitarian threat of our age emanated not ultimately from the dictatorships of so-called communist regimes of the Soviet Union or China, but from the unfolding liberal logic of the West.” A bit of explication: Stalinist Russia and Maoist China were “so-called communist” because communism, in the teaching of the right-wing post-liberals, was at bottom liberalism. Really. Deneen posted that sentence about the totalitarian threat of the West while the Russian troops were massacring Mariupol. They were committing those atrocities, and many others, precisely in the name of the ethnonationalism and the anti-liberalism that these Western reactionaries have been urging upon us. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the writings of these Western ingrates, and for my sins I have read a lot of them, look to me like little more than a symptom of the decadence that they deplore.

    The West has found a teacher in Volodymyr Zelensky. He is stripping the banality from the truths that we hold to be self-evident; teaching us what we already know but have demoted to cliché and the inertness of civil religion; refreshing our sense of the beauty of our dispensation, all its current grotesqueries notwithstanding. He is a new kind of contemporary hero: the fighting liberal. He has the authority of his courage. When we assist him in his fight for liberal democracy, we are returning the favor. No such figure has emerged out of Europe since Havel, though it is doubtful that Havel could have presided over the management of a war. (How is it that both of these moral leaders came from the theater? Rousseau would have been baffled.)

    In 2014 I spent many hours in Maidan, the central square of Kyiv, or rather in its ruins. It was the charred scene of one of democracy’s finest battles. The place had been instantly turned into a memorial to the protestors who were murdered there. There were candles everywhere, in brightly colored holders that contradicted the bleakness of the scene. There were flowers, photographs, posters, crosses, and yellow-and-blue flags. The pavements were torn up, and tires were piled high in black towers that served as barricades. Fires caused by the government’s onslaught had blackened the surrounding buildings, which were also scarred by the bullets of police snipers. There were tents in which demonstrators from the “revolution of dignity” stubbornly lived, refusing to retreat from the scene. It was an honor to stand there. Even secular people have holy grounds. I might as well have been in the streets of Paris in 1871, or at Garibaldi’s spedizione. The impression was indelible; it melted me and steeled me. Before I went to Kyiv, I believed that I was headed for a city that aspired to be a Western city, and that I was going there to applaud its aspiration. When I arrived in Kyiv, I recognized my mistake. Kyiv already is a Western city. There is nothing aspirational about its openness, its pluralistic vitality, its reforming energy. To be sure, it was still in the middle of a struggle; the old order, authoritarian and corrupt and oligarchic, will not gently quit history’s stage. But the forces of freedom — in a place such as Maidan one learns to use those words without irony or sophistication — seemed to be winning. If they had lost, Putin would not have attacked.

    Were we prepared, intellectually and operationally, for Putin’s war in Ukraine? We must consider this question carefully, because we are not headed for a halcyon age. In our conflicted country, there has been only a single consensus in recent decades. It is that the United States should shrink its station in the world, that it must no longer loom so large, that it needs to “reduce its footprint” and “play the long game,” that it must adjust its ends to its means, that for itself it must come first (and then brook no seconds), that American leadership is more of a problem for the world than a solution. All the parties, each for their own reasons, concurs in these miniaturizing propositions, which became known as “responsible statecraft.” Occasionally they would just come right out and say it, as when the despicable J. D. Vance declared that “I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another.” Spoken like a true hillbilly. But there are many other foreign-policy hillbillies, alas, some of them denizens of the Acela corridor and even of Aspen, who harbor a similar indifference to the fate of countries and peoples beyond our borders. Those whose consciences do not permit them to openly express their callousness prefer to call themselves “realists.” Realists almost always advocate the same positions as isolationists, except that their op-ed pieces are longer.

    The ethical phoniness of realism found its perfect avatar in Barack Obama, who draped Elie Wiesel’s language over Henry Kissinger’s policies. The war in Ukraine is substantially the consequence of the moral and strategic timidity of Obama, who opened a strategic vacuum in the Middle East that Putin quickly proceeded to fill and thereby to inaugurate the contemporary (and until then, unlikely) resurgence of Russia. It is important to recognize that the strategic vacuum was made possible by a moral vacuum: if it had been the policy of the United States that, one way or another, with force or without, with allies or without, we would not stand idly by the genocide in Syria, we would have retained a regional position that might have kept Russia at bay. Obama’s apologists refer to his timidity as a respect for complexity. As someone who is in the complexity business myself, I can testify that sometimes we abuse the idea. Realists have a condescending way of believing that people who disagree with them are unaware of the facts, that only they, the wised-up members of the panel, know the score. They like to point out that a course of action is difficult and has costs, though usually it is a course of action of which they disapprove on other grounds. Every decisive historical action is difficult and has costs. Even us bloodthirsty interventionists know that. But justice — the word never appears in the discourse of realists, except in their “to be sure” sentences — requires that we not be daunted. We may fail and we may make mistakes, but at least we can live with ourselves; and more important than whether or not we can live with ourselves, since the suffering of others is not primarily about us, other people can live.

    In individuals, we regard the unwillingness to help, to come to the rescue, as a flaw of personal character. Is the same selfishness in collective action a flaw of national character? In individuals, we regard the secession from one’s surroundings, the withdrawal from effective participation in one’s world, as a personal disorder. Is the same truncated relationship to reality in the collective a national disorder? Is isolationism psychotic?

    Oh, for a little American hubris.

    We need to overcome our appetite for futurist indignation. During the years of ISIS, one could not escape the observation, offered always with astonishment, that here was an eighth-century caliphate in the twenty-first century. Amazing! Well, no. Everything that takes place in this moment is of this moment. We must see the entirety of the world in which we live. We chose to regard ISIS as an anachronism because it comforted us. Religious violence, we needed to believe, is not typical of our times, but a relic of earlier times, a florid exception to the Whiggish linearity in which we wallowed. We denied the intractability of history, the persistence with which certain features of human experience survived past the enormous changes that we were busily exalting. We were so dazzled by the discontinuities that we belittled the continuities. History offended our futurist excitement. Obama liked to play the man from the future. He pronounced that the important foreign policy challenges for which we must now prepare ourselves are Ebola and climate change. Meanwhile the world around him was becoming more and more Hobbesian, with aggressions and savageries to match the traditional ones. As he, and a great many other mandarins, enjoyed the globalist cool, the world was turning increasingly local and increasingly Westphalian, which is to say, it was becoming more familiar to those who bother about the past. In his first campaign Obama once said, in one of his many reassurances that the Russians were too weak for us to worry about them, that “you can’t be a twenty-first century power and act like a twentieth-century dictatorship.” But you can. In significant ways the twenty-first century still is the twentieth century. (In our domestic tribulations, too.) Stephen Kotkin was right when he recently argued, and showed, that “the Cold War never ended.”

    After Antonio Gutteres, the Secretary General of the United Nations, toured Bucha and its bodies, he remarked: “The war is an absurdity in the twenty-first century. The war is evil.” He was half-right. Bucha is now one of the capitals of modern barbarism, alongside Urumqi, Rakhine, Aleppo, Srebrenica, Nyarubuye, Lidice, Guernica, and the rest. But evil is not absurd, and to call it absurd is to evade its force. Absurdity is a category of logic and art. Evil is an inalienable feature of the history made by human beings. It has a logic of its own, which is why it creates its intellectuals and its mobs. If only falsehood were always absurd! The war in Ukraine is not absurd, because it is evil. One of the reasons that we were intellectually unprepared for the war in Ukraine is that we spent decades exalting newness and declaring old things obsolete. Here is another example. In 2010, the Obama administration released its defense budget, a “reform budget,” along with a new security document. Since many military appropriations were to be cut, people assumed that the cuts were driven by fiscal considerations. But the cuts were of a piece with a new conception of national security. They were driven by historical and strategic concepts. The document announced that land wars were a thing of the past, and that henceforth we could accomplish our military objectives mainly with Special Ops and drones. It was a fine document of the anti-Iraq-war ethos, and completely deluded. The new strategy was lauded for its moral superiority: fewer innocent civilians would be killed by such more precisely targeted operations. (Of course this inevitably led to the objection that the lower toll made the use of force more likely, so that limited strikes, too, lacked legitimacy, which by my lights leads directly to the brink of pacifism, or at least to a revival of the Kellogg-Briand nonsense, which anyway was already taking place.) But you cannot conquer territory, or hold territory, or expel an enemy from territory, from the air or like thieves in the night. And here is the war in Ukraine, mile after mile of it, town after town, to disprove all this advanced strategic illusion. We are sending heavy weaponry to the Ukrainians because there is no other way for them to expel the invader. History can be trite, which is how it readies us.

    It was stirring to watch the reception of the Ukrainian refugees in Poland and the other Eastern European states. When was the last time that we saw refugees warmly welcomed and no controversy attached to their plight? Then I remembered my Syrian friends and the travails of their community in its own flight. I imagined how they must have felt when they saw all those hugs and smiles in Przemysl and elsewhere. In Europe, you see, Ukrainians are not exactly the other. (That is what scares Putin.) There is nothing wrong with helping people who are like oneself, but it is not the most exacting test of one’s compassion.

    We wasted so much time in the long prelude to the Russian invasion. While Putin was amassing a vast force near the Ukrainian border, we argued with ourselves about the likelihood of war. Those who contended that war was coming, based on the incontrovertible evidence of Putin’s massive preparations for it, were regarded as the hawks, when in fact they were the realists. The doves, though these terms are coarse in these circumstances, insisted upon more diplomacy. They thought that pushing the elevator button again would make it come faster. Diplomacy became a kind of placebo for people who were not in the mood for another conflict that would in some way, hot or cold, involve us. American officials protested that a diplomatic solution was possible even as Putin’s tanks started rolling. One of my favorite errors of the Obama administration made its appearance in the Biden administration: the off-ramp. Remember, we have been here before. Putin’s current invasion is the third act of his protracted war on Ukraine: in 2014 he stole Crimea, and soon afterward he launched a separatist rebellion in Donetsk and Luzhansk, which in the aftermath of his recent failure to take Kyiv he is now attempting to complete with his own troops. During the Crimean crisis, which strictly speaking was not a crisis at all, since Putin stole it with impunity, Obama kept talking about the need to find Putin an off-ramp, a way out, as if the role of the United States was to be sagaciously helpful to Russia so that it could learn from its mistakes. (I was reminded of this misplaced magnanimity when a Democratic congresswoman recently said that the American task now is “to craft a win for Putin.”) But Putin was not looking for the off-ramp. He was, quite plainly, looking for the on-ramp. He found it and he took it. He has been taking the on-ramp in Ukraine for most of a decade. And anyone who knows that there is an on-ramp knows that there is an off-ramp. If they do not avail themselves of it, it is because they have a different itinerary in mind. Anyway, the option of turning around and going home is always there: other, equally proud states have done so, such as France and the United States. Putin is in Ukraine because he believes that Ukraine is his, Russia’s, its “near abroad,” or Novorussiya; and that therefore he need not restrain himself from destroying its democratic experiment. “We’ve sought to provide possible off-ramps to President Putin,” Secretary Blinken said in March. “He’s the only one who can decide whether or not to take them.” But then he added, immediately, and with an admirable alteration in tone: “So far, every time there’s been an opportunity to do just that, he’s pressed the accelerator and continued down this horrific road that he’s been pursuing.” Meanwhile the Ukrainians themselves have not bothered about the ramps. They have been courageously attacking the highways.

    Re Putin and religion: I was reading a Hebrew poem, published in 1940, about the “Winter War,” the Russian invasion of Finland in the previous year, which in some respects reminds one of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The poet referred to a strange incident that was reported by a newspaper in Stockholm. It appears that Finnish pilots flew sorties over Leningrad in which they dropped hundreds of little Bibles on the city, “because they believed it would have a decisive influence on the spirit of the Red Army.” Imagine! Putin, meanwhile, has a Patriarch in his pocket. “We have entered into a struggle that has not a physical, but a metaphysical significance,” Kirill has cravenly intoned. The religious heroes of the war in Ukraine are the Ukrainian clerics in the Orthodox Church who have turned against their Muscovitepontiff for being a slaughterer’s stooge.

    The United States responded slowly to Putin’s “special operation” because we were not mentally ready for it. We have caught up, certainly, but it always feels like catch-up. A great power — and we are one, whether we delight in it or not — cannot be always reactive. For a long time now, too much of American foreign policy has consisted in crisis management. In a world accelerated past the point of reflection, this was somewhat inevitable; but still resistance must be offered. The name of that resistance is strategy, or geo-strategy, or grand strategy. A few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union I was sitting with Walter Laqueur, a wise and erudite man, and one of the first analysts to write books about “Putinism” and the rise of the new Russian right, and he remarked that it had been a long time since he had heard the word “strategy” in Washington. “Geo-strategy,” he said, “has been replaced by geo-economics.” This was certainly true of the booming 1990s, but he was alarmed by more than the economicist interpretation of foreign affairs. His words have haunted me. The meaning of strategy is an infamously complicated subject, and the co-existence within it of empirical and moral elements, of facts and purposes, the integration within a single “intellectual architecture” of all the dimensions of warfare, is hard to pin down. What I mean by it here is only this: a prior understanding of what we want, and why. This understanding must be developed quite consciously as a historical plan, as a program for action and a standard for readiness. It should not be confused with the intellectual frameworks that we possess before events happen. It is, in fact, a challenge to those frameworks, which usually are little more than attitudes or moods or prejudices drawn from recent experience. A strategist is not indifferent to circumstances, but he is not a slave of circumstances either. He has a calling to shape and mold and alter a reprehensible or disadvantageous order, and an intense sensation of agency, and a certain pleasure in the exertion of intelligent will. He is comfortable with the proposition that power exists to be used. He recognizes the difference between flexibility and reactiveness; he is not rigid, but he is also not winging it. The problem, of course, is that a historical plan is a blueprint for time, but time does not stand still. There will be contingencies and emergencies that will allow no delay, if a response is to be effective, and they will require more than impulsiveness and improvisation.  If you tarry in response to a genocide, for example, you have not understood the nature of the challenge. Surprise is inevitable, but shock is unforgivable. Our preparedness starts in our imagination. (Obama was a peculiar case: he was good at strategizing, whatever the merits of his strategy, but bad at reacting.) Does the United States have a grand strategy? In the culture of endless repeal in which our politics now takes place, our partisan seesaws of doing and undoing, can the United States have a grand strategy? One of the primary conditions of strategy is constancy. But is anything that we do any longer durable? The problem is not, as George Kennan and Henry Kissinger liked to insist, democracy, or the impact of domestic opinion upon planning. It is, rather, the debasement of our democracy into what seems to be a permanent condition of unsettledness, our hot-headed unreliability about precedents, our infernal volatility. If we need to reduce the erratic nature of our public life, it is not least because the era is rapidly approaching in which we will find ourselves in great power rivalries of unclear but significant duration. Indeed, the era has already begun. Strategically speaking, the resurgence of Russia may be a sideshow to the ascendancy of China, but sideshows can last generations. The Soviet Union lasted seventy years — a blip in the arc of history, but not in the fate of many millions of people. I am not convinced that we are yet up to the task. The proof is in our platitudes. Until our withdrawal from Afghanistan, we spoke constantly of “the forever war.” Of course there was nothing interminable about it, as we eventually demonstrated. The important question was not its length but its wisdom. If a particular use of American force is morally and strategically justified, and there were ferociously different views about Afghanistan, then we must develop a new talent for patience and learn to think (as the economists say) secularly, or else we will condemn our actions to futility from the start. One of the lessons of our retreat from Afghanistan was that America can be waited out. (There is also the matter of costs, but the number of dead Ukrainians and Russians in only the first few months of combat should provide some context for the human costs that we suffered in Afghanistan, which was 2,401 dead in twenty years.) In any event, “the forever war” was swiftly replaced by a new platitude, which is that we must beware of getting into “a new cold war.” It is past time to put some intellectual pressure on this slogan. For a start, a cold war is preferable to a hot war. More importantly, our destiny is not entirely up to us: if Russia or China behave towards us (or our allies) in a hostile manner, then we are in a cold war with Russia or China. And so we already find ourselves in two cold wars. We can choose, of course, not to fight them, and hide between our oceans; but thankfully we have not made that choice, even if we are still profoundly uncomfortable with the accurate description of these global realities. Anyway, there is nothing to trouble our sleep about being the most powerful adversary of the most powerful tyrannies. Except that we must not sleep! The term “cold war” has become a term of imprecation, a dystopian word, because the Cold War, I mean the one that took place between 1946 and 1991, is erroneously remembered as an unprincipled contest between two deranged nuclear powers who went around the world committing crimes and abuses. It was nothing like that, though we did commit our share of crimes and abuses. It was an honorable struggle against totalitarianism that over many decades was conducted more or less firmly and more or less rationally and in stirring consonance with our principles; and every decent man and woman should tremble at the thought of what life everywhere would have been like if we had lost.

    Biden is ringingly correct when he says that the future will be characterized by a struggle between democrats and autocrats. But is this a worldview or a strategy? It all depends on what he does about it.

    In The Atlantic, where everything can be found, an American historian argues that World War II does not look the same when seen from an Asian standpoint. I do not doubt that this is so. In Asia, quite obviously, the anti-fascist powers were also imperialist powers. The implication of this colossal fact, according to the author of the article, is that we must retire our moral understanding of the war. It was not a war between good and evil. It was “a lethal collision of self-interested rivals.” The author even writes admiringly of a notorious Indian nationalist who escaped to Germany and raised an Indian force to fight alongside the Wehrmacht and later alongside Japan against British India. For him, “this wasn’t an invasion but a liberation.” Good for him. But why should the enlargement of our understanding about the Asian theater distort our understanding of the European theater? The Indian viewpoint about the war in South Asia does not refute the European viewpoint about the war in Europe, or the Jewish viewpoint, or the viewpoint of the resistance fighters across Europe who, even in societies rife with collaboration, were animated by the certainty that their enemy was evil. If the experience of Indians was different from the experience of Europeans and Americans, then the experience of Europeans and Americans was different from the experience of Indians. The rule of particularity and partiality applies to all, and the one cannot be used to discredit the other. (And Japan did not exactly fight the war with the impeccability of just war theory.) Yet the moral delegitimation of World War II, like the moral delegitimation of the Cold War, is attempted not only for the sake of a sounder historiography. It has also a policy purpose. The ultimate warrant for the principle of American interventionism, the decisive historical prooftext for the view that American power can be a force for good in the world, is World War II. Take it down and the withdrawalist program for American foreign policy is complete. Persuade people that even “the good war” was a bad war and they can serenely repair to their gardens, where most of them already are.

    What is the outcome that we seek in Ukraine? An end to the conflict is not a sufficient objective. The most urgent thing about a conflict is not always to end it as soon as you can. (I am not speaking about a nuclear conflict, but the anxiety about nuclear war was skillfully stimulated by Putin to disrupt Western enthusiasm for Ukraine, and in some quarters it worked like a charm.) A “sovereign, independent Ukraine,” as Blinken put it, looks to me like the proper goal, though it is finally the Ukrainians who will formulate the acceptable terms for the cessation of hostilities. If I were them, I would not rest until the removal of every Russian soldier from their soil. When Secretary of Defense Austin declared that “we want to see Russia weakened to the degree it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” I cheered. Putin started a vicious and unprovoked war against the civilians of a sovereign state that poses no threat to him except insofar as it seeks to join the community of liberal democratic nations, and thereby he showed himself to be a menace whose capacity for cruelty and recklessness we need no longer speculate about — an active and genuine enemy. In the years prior to his resort to his army, he was tireless in his intrigues and interventions in the democratic processes of the West, which we tolerated. His invasion of Ukraine has also exposed the startling mediocrity of the Russian military. And so Austin was right to suggest that a weak Russia is within our interest and within our grasp, and that we are not ourselves in search of the off-ramp. But Austin’s statement disturbed people who regard every expression of American toughness as a slippery slope to Baghdad. In the New Yorker, for example, a jittery reporter noted that “U.S. officials now frame America’s role in more ambitious terms that border on aggressive.” Aggressive! We have vowed not to send a single American soldier to Ukraine. Biden repeated this promise over and over long before the war began. (I wondered why, as a tactical matter, he would make such a promise to Putin. But he was not making it to Putin, he was making it to the progressive wing of his party.) What the Biden administration has splendidly done — with extraordinary quantities of heavy weaponry, and with intelligence, and with increasingly pitiless sanctions, and with its “ambitious” rhetoric — is display seriousness and steadfastness in its support of a just cause. Given the lameness of American foreign policy in the Obama and Trump years, this should be a reason for rejoicing. We are not only reacting, we are also acting. It is finally time for an adversary to be nervous about us.

    The professionals call the problem “escalation control.” I do not mean to make light of it. There are risks that we must beware. But surely escalation control cannot mean that we never respond with greater strength, especially in response to an escalation on the other side. There are escalations of degree and escalations of kind, a great many instruments with which to change the course of a conflict or determine its outcome. Not all of them are crazy, and not all of them lead directly to armageddon. We must be prudent, but we must not be played. Even Raymond Aron, the most powerful advocate of prudence in modern times, once remarked that “prudence does not always require either moderation or peace by compromise, or negotiations, or indifference to the internal regimes of enemy states or allies.” Aron’s variety of prudence, as he demonstrated in his long life of political philosophy and political engagement, was decidedly vertebrate. Too often in recent years American prudence decayed into American passivity. I miss the days when we were feared. They overlapped with the days when we were trusted.

    When bad actors anywhere in the world gather to plan an invasion or a repression or an expulsion or a genocide, does anyone at the table intervene with the question, “But wait — how will the Americans respond?” Does the prospect of American power any longer stay any villain’s hand?

    As a matter of historical record, America has “projected” its power abroad for many reasons, not all of them laudable; but the only state in the modern world that made dictators and murderers think twice, or go slow, or surrender, was the United States. (I exclude the Soviet Union in World War II, because it was a murderous dictatorship that helped to defeat a murderous dictatorship.) If there are to be obstacles or impediments, they will have to come from us.

    Closely related to the question of escalating is the question of being “provocative.” In the run-up to the war, while we were arguing among ourselves about its likelihood and Putin was gathering his forces, we should have been sending arms to the Ukrainians — sophisticated arms, lethal arms. The realists among us warned that this would provoke Putin. It turned out soon afterward that he required no provocation; he was pre-provoked. The Ukrainians knew this. In truth, any close student of Putin’s behavior could have known this. The same hesitation had been expressed in the persistent opposition about the expansion of NATO since the 1990s, which came down to the view that in the name of our national security we need to respect Putin’s “perceptions.” People used to say the same thing about the Soviet Union — that we needed to understand the subjective roots of its foreign adventures, since it was “expanding because it felt encircled.” In a famous sentence of the Long Telegram in 1946, George Kennan suggested that “at bottom of [the] Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is [the] traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” But who was intending then — who is intending now — to attack Russia? Surely there are limits to the therapeutic approach to states and statesmen. How mistaken do “perceptions” have to be before we cease to respect them in our planning? And if the “perceptions” are fantasies of aggression and domination and extermination, then conflict is more likely, and we must have less forbearance about them. NATO is a purely defensive alliance that was formed when the nations of Western Europe had good reason to organize for their own defense. They still do: it is not a trivial point that none of the countries that Putin has attacked were in NATO. Ukraine poses no military threat to Russia. Neither do Poland and the Baltic states. Meanwhile Putin, by military and cyber and other means, has been attacking countries large and small. Many people have lost their lives to Putin’s paranoia, which is a clinical term for “perception.” This same hesitation about active American measures in Ukraine was advocated during the debate about American military support for the besieged state in the 2010s. Those of us who argued for the dispatch of lethal weaponry to the Ukrainians were not dreaming that they would march triumphantly into Moscow. (We also had no idea that they would perform as brilliantly on the battlefield as they now have done.) We wished only to raise the costs on Putin’s aggressions and to prepare the ground for a political process. We were accused of irresponsibly poking the bear. But the bear poked us. The unfortunate consequence of such prevarications is that we are often tardy in our operational thinking.A story about escalation control: Two men have been condemned to death. They are lined up against the wall as the firing squad gets into position. Their hands are bound. Before they are blindfolded, the captain of the firing squad approaches them and asks if they have a last request. One of them asks for a cigarette. The other turns to him angrily and says, “Don’t make waves!”

    I was in Paris during the first week of the war. It was the most important week in European history since that delirious week in the autumn of 1989, when the Berlin Wall was brought down. It was, indeed, a kind of mirror image of that week — the antithesis of delirium, which is sobriety. The very air was sober. (In Montparnasse such a change registers rather sharply.) I could feel the European shudder. In conversations with friends and strangers, there was a sudden gravity, a somber acknowledgment that the holiday may be over. A struggle was at hand. In Robert Kagan’s terms, Venetians were talking like Martians. The salient emotion was not fear; it was anger, and then determination. The intensity of popular solidarity with Ukraine was palpable. Extraordinary things began to happen. Germany brought to a close the entirety of its post-war national security policy and raised its defense budget. I never believed that anything could morally offend the International Olympic Committee, but even it sought a way to punish Russia. Almost nobody looked back regretfully on the expansion of NATO. NATO acquired a new pride, as people to the east were now sacrificing their lives for their dream of belonging to it. It also acquired a new salience: in the first months of the war it was impossible to avoid the impression that Europe was leading America. This was in part the result of the loss of European confidence in America during the Obama and Trump years, but it was nonetheless wonderful. And even more wonderful was to watch us, the Americans, finally get up to speed. Eventually the Biden administration began to act with a magnificent decisiveness. The magnitude of our assistance to Ukraine, and its spirit, has been historic. (I wish that we had worked out a transfer of aircraft as well. Maybe we will.) As Stephen Kotkin concluded, “the West has rediscovered its manifold power.” At last! And American popular support for our government’s efforts has so far been running high in the polls. Who cares about the “performativity” of all the Ukrainian flags one sees in the windows and on the internet? “Performativity” is an important element of culture, and for now American culture is championing the good fight. But for how long? It is never safe to bet on American attention. Still, whereas no society can, or should, be maintained in a permanent condition of apocalyptic excitation, perhaps we will come out of this crisis with a more lasting tension about the enduring realities of the world.

    Whenever I visit Ukraine, I mourn, and not only for Ukrainians. My origins are there, and they are bloody. In the summer of 1941, in a forest near Boryslav, in western Ukraine, or Galicia, where my mother’s family lived and owned oil wells, a pogrom was committed by local Ukrainians against local Jews, and she, at the age of twenty-two, was among the Jews tasked with collecting the mutilated corpses and arranging for their proper burial. They included her uncle Elimelech. I drove by the forest and past “our” rusted derricks on my way to Schodnica, the small town where her large clan lived, and where, in a makeshift room dug out beneath a barn, she survived the last year or so of the war, under the protection of Poles who had worked for her father in the oil fields. After I satisfied myself that I had located the gentle slope on which her house once stood, and completed my inner convulsions, I went back to Lemberg, or Lviv, where I sought out the high school that she attended. (In Lemberg she saw Josephine Baker!) It took me two days to realize that I was using an outdated Hapsburg-era map, and that Zygmuntowska Street was now Gogolsa Street. The head of the school welcomed me warmly and took me to a room where some physical remains of my mother’s gymnasium — pennants, stationery, and so on — were framed and respectfully exhibited. At a nearby synagogue, once renowned for its murals, I prayed like a good son and then kicked around in the trash — the place was being renovated, I’m not sure for whom. In the trash I discovered a book. When I dusted it off, I was thunderstruck: it was Job — an edition of the Book of Job, two hundred and some pages, published not too far away in Zhitomir in 1872. Its end-pages were covered in Hebrew and Polish scribbles in a beautiful hand, and it came with the commentaries of Rashi and a certain late nineteenth-century rabbi named Shmuel Sternberg from the nearby town of Vinitsiya, who prefaced his commentary with a remarkable introductory essay in which he quarreled with modern non-Jewish Biblical critics as well as medieval Jewish Aristotelians, and displayed enormous literary sensitivity to the sacred text. The hounded volume also came with fire stains and water stains. I rescued it. It is now my Ukrainian Job.

    Years later, when I went to Kyiv, the same shadows accompanied me. Around the corner from my hotel was a huge equestrian statue of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, the seventeenth-century father of Ukrainian nationalism and one of the most reviled figures in Jewish history. His successful war against the Poles included some of the most hideous atrocities in the annals of anti-Semitic violence. This is from a Hebrew chronicle of 1648, about what befell Jews in the region of the Dnieper River: “Some of them were flayed and their bodies were thrown to the dogs. Some of them had their arms and legs cut off and they were thrown onto the roads, where wagons rode over them and horses trampled them. Some of them were buried alive. Children were slaughtered in the arms of their mothers, and many children were torn into pieces like fish. Pregnant women were cut open and watched their fetuses crushed. Other pregnant women were cut open and a live cat was placed in their bellies, which were then sewn back up, and their hands were cut off so that they couldn’t remove the cats from their bellies.” When I was growing up I knew Jews for whom “Khmielnitsky” was still a common curse word. And here was the hetman on a pedestal, in monumental bronze. To further upset my Jewish heart, I was told that the nineteenth-century building before which the statue stood, painted oddly in pink, was the courthouse in which Mendel Beilis was tried for ritual murder in 1913. Passing the statue and the courthouse, I walked down a steep cobbled street toward the old city, and along the way, directly across from the house where Bulgakov was born, I encountered a stall selling antiques from the Great War, including Nazi helmets and a slightly tattered waistcoat with a yellow star pinned to it. I could have had the yellow star for three hundred dollars. I was more inclined to spit.

    Yet I was there, along with some like-minded friends and comrades, to offer my support — I gave a few speeches and press conferences — to the noble struggle of the Ukrainians for liberal democracy. There was Khmielnitsky, but here was Maidan. There were moments when it was too much for my mind to hold. The plurality of loyalties can sometimes hurt. I knew all the arguments against the tyranny of collective memory, and against collective responsibility, and against historical inevitability; and the history of my own people vividly demonstrated the benevolent effects of liberal democracy and its Torah of rights. How can a Jew not support democracy? Yet how can a Jew surrender his skepticism about historical metamorphosis? I made a point of meeting many Ukrainian Jews, old and young, from all walks of Ukrainian life, and asking them for their assessment of their situation. Every one of them, including officials of the community who knew both the government and the democracy movement, responded with unalloyed confidence about the future. They knew the same history that I did, and they lived there. Who was I to contradict them? I had always believed in the possibility of progress, as every member of every minority must, or else they may fulfill their own fatalism. For Jews, there were always only two paths out of the persecuting world: democracy and Zionism. They are the two epic experiments in Jewish emancipation, the two great historical alternatives to the European bargain, which was autocracy punctuated by magnanimity and helplessness punctuated by happiness. I had yahrzeit for my father in Kiev, and I found myself reciting the kaddish with an unexpected élan. During this war, the embrace of the Ukrainian struggle by American Jews has been thrilling to behold (even the Israeli government, which never misses a chance to seem small, finally got it right); it represents, among other things, a poignant overcoming of memory by morality. The past always provides reasons for ethical relaxation, especially the past of once-oppressed groups, which is rich in occasions for anger; but they are wise who refuse to mistake the betterment of their conditions for a betrayal of their traditions.

    Hope, because it is premised on uncertainty, is perfectly compatible with vigilance; but there is a certain kind of vigilance, an expectation of the worst that crosses the line into morbidity, a prior weariness that is not so much an inference from reality as it is an interpretation of it, that destroys hope. The first requirement for political leadership, and for political participation, is an immunity to despair.

    This morning the Director of National Intelligence told Congress that “we assess President Putin is preparing for a prolonged conflict in Ukraine during which he still intends to achieve goals beyond the Donbas.” She added, “Putin most likely also judges that Russia has a greater ability and willingness to endure challenges than his adversaries.” About this he may not be wrong, at least as regards us. The Ukrainians can give us lessons in how not to relent. The important reckoning now must be with the history of our credulity, with the poverty of our geopolitical imagination, with our national lassitude about what lies out there. The war has happened. Those words, la guerre a eu lieu, gave the title to an essay that Merleau-Ponty published in Les Temps Modernes in October, 1945. Its subject, in the aftermath of the victory, was the mentality of the French on the eve of the conflict, which in his view left them ill-equipped for the perils of their time. “Events kept making it less and less probable that peace could be maintained,” he wrote. “How could we have waited so long to decide to go to war? The reason was that we were not guided by the facts. We had secretly resolved to know nothing of violence and unhappiness as elements of history because we were living in a country too happy and too weak to envisage them. Distrusting the facts had even become a duty for us. We had been taught that wars grow out of misunderstandings which can be cleared up and accidents which can be averted through patience and courage. We lived in a certain area of peace, experience, and freedom, formed by a combination of exceptional circumstances. We did not know that this was a soil to be defended but thought it the natural lot of men. From our youth we had been used to handling freedom and to living an individual life. How could we have learned to commit our freedom in order to preserve it?” There is pain in the philosopher’s words. He is not scoring political points. When he writes that “our standards were still those of peacetime,” he is a little elegiac, and he certainly is not mocking happiness and peace. But he is also insisting that a society has cognitive responsibilities. Nothing will determine its fate more than its ability to see clearly, and then not to flinch at what it sees if what it sees is really there. The first readiness is mental readiness.

    Gender: A Melee

    The king was pregnant.
    Ursula K. Le Guin, The Left Hand of Darkness

    It turns out the supply-side cheerleader George Gilder was more correct than not when he forecast, in the poignantly titled Sexual Suicide in 1973, that women playing at being men would spell the collapse of Western civilization and probably the social order itself. What he meant by sexual suicide was “the abolition of biological differences between men and women” — in his day, feminists demanding paychecks and forcing men to do housework, and thereby selfishly violating the pact they were supposed to be upholding with nature. Nature had endowed humankind with different sorts of bodies, from which different social roles followed: motherhood for some, breadwinning for others. Nature did not intend men to clean toilets! Or women to go to work, needless to say. It wasn’t just childbearing that society required from women; as the morally superior gender we were also meant to dragoon reluctant men into playing patres familias, according to Gilder, luring them into domestic cages like lion tamers at the circus, civilizing their beastly sex drives into socially productive ones. If we shirk the task, everything falls apart. Gay liberation was thus another sore spot in Gilder’s catalogue of contemporary woe, a world where women’s charms held no sway and male carnality thus ran amuck.

    How vulnerable the “primacy of the biological realm” would turn out to be, how tenuous its hold on the species if each of us had to pledge fealty to the gender binary to keep civilization afloat. How confident can nature’s defenders really be in the selling power of this story? After all, alarm bells aplenty have rung over the last half century yet have thus far failed to herd those renegade female factions back into their kitchens.

    And look around now! Gender is more of a clusterfuck than ever, and yes, civilization’s destruction indeed looms nearer: birthrates have dropped below replacement rates around the globe, down four percent in the United States in 2020 alone. Male breadwinner families are on the extinction watch list. And the damned liberationists still aren’t happy. Today’s gender vanguards — trans activists, the “genderqueer” — want to sever the link between biology and gender entirely, letting men become women and women men, surgically acquiring penises and cooches, rebranding important body parts with gender neutral language (“front hole” for vagina), not to mention poisoning innocent children with cross-sex hormones and puberty blockers. (Far more patriotic to mow them down with assault weapons, at least according to the child welfare experts of the GOP.) Some members of the younger generation want to abolish gender entirely, demanding the whole English language be revised to accommodate them and their impossible-to-remember pronoun preferences.

    Where gender distinctions blur, monsters seem to lurk, like those snarling creatures at the edge of the world on sixteenth-century maps warning sailors away from the abyss. I was thinking about the monster problem recently while reading an interesting history tracing the relation between the invention of endocrinology and the growing demand for gender reassignment treatments. Called Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender, from 1995, it opens with the author, Bernice L. Hausman, a mostly lucid writer, confessing in the book’s preface that she’d been pregnant while revising the manuscript, and was “perhaps one of few expectant mothers who worry they will give birth to a hermaphrodite.” I was therefore not surprised when the book takes an anxious anti-trans swerve in its epilogue, though prior chapters provide fascinating facts about the discovery of glandular therapies in the late nineteenth century. This includes the story of a researcher named Charles-Édouard Brown-Séquard, who in 1889 found, by injecting himself with canine (or possibly monkey) testicular tissue, that what would later be called testosterone had sexually rejuvenating effects in men. Thousands of men were soon arranging to have themselves likewise injected, though whatever rejuvenation followed was later thought to be a placebo effect — the testes don’t actually store testosterone, it turns out.

    If commentators as disparate as Gilder and Hausman are, in their different ways, a little panicky about the gender system collapsing, if both envision nature-defying creatures (feminists, hermaphrodites) snapping at them from the abyss, then we’re in the realm of what the fairy tale expert Marina Warner calls the monstrous imagination. Aroused by scenes of chaos and emergence, it mirrors our lack of understanding back to us in the form of menacing hybrids, typically depicted as scary inhabitants of dark underworlds. Among the chaotic emergent things no one much understands (especially these days) is gender, despite everyone supposedly having one. Yet what is it, where does it come from? Certainties abound, yet somehow they keep changing. With Western civilization itself a rickety boat navigating these tumultuous waters, perpetually about to sail over the edge into some posthuman future, no wonder the conversation gets a little shrill.

    Revolutions are threatening, and what Hausman calls the “new forms of being human” that emerged in the twentieth century were revolutionary, especially once “hormones” — so named in 1905 — were extracted (from glands) and then synthesized, leading eventually to new possibilities in gender reassignment procedures. Oddly — though maybe this is just the usual blinkers of an academic with nose pressed to her own research subject (in this case, transsexualism) — Hausman fails to mention that the ability to synthetize hormones also led to the development of birth control pills, first marketed in the United States in 1960, which prevent ovulation in women. It strikes me as weird that Hausman doesn’t see that far more widely implemented gender-altering technology as part of the same story, also ushering in new ways of “being human” for roughly a hundred million women worldwide. (Estrogen both figures in hormonal contraception and feminizes men who wish to change sex.) Maybe her pregnancy made her less attuned to this aspect of the narrative, but it’s hard to think of anything more consequential for natal females than the ability to effectively control fertility, which radically contested the existing gender regime, not to mention fundamentally transforming the experience of heterosexual sex. (See under: Sexual Revolution, The.)

    But how did the old regime manage to uphold itself in the first place when it disadvantaged so many? Conservatives will tell you that gender comes from nature and sits firmly on top of biological sex; these sexual differences are imagined to be binary. But this binary was always rather imaginary — the incidence of intersex babies was always higher than was generally acknowledged. Doctors made capricious medical decisions and interventions to assign those babies to one sex or the other, precisely because gender ideology dictated that binary gender had to be preserved. (Apparently intersexed babies are as common as red hair.)

    In other words, a certain bad faith seems to come with this territory, by which I mean a refusal to know what you know. Look at Gilder, famous for touting the very economic policies which crushed the single-paycheck family that Sexual Suicide was trying to corral America back into. The signature program of these guys (The Bell Curve author Charles Murray was another of the big guns) — suppressing wages and cutting taxes for the rich, shifting income shares from workers to capital — was a program so successful we’re still living with the consequences. Everyone’s seen the stats about upward redistribution of wealth in the last half century, and the gap keeps widening. As Gilder must know, it wasn’t feminism that catapulted women into the labor market in the 1970s, it was stagnant male wages, post-industrialism, and the expansion of the service sector; and then came the economic hits of Reaganomics. When labor was winning, as it had been before 1973 (a bad year, between an oil crisis and a recession), a middle-class household could survive on one income, not the two or more that are now the norm for vast swathes of the country, often sans benefits.

    But why not finger-point at feminists, those sexual gargoyles, chewing up men and spitting them out, though between the union busting and the job exports, capitalists were doing a lot more chewing and spitting than women ever managed, not that we wouldn’t have enjoyed it. Oh, and the declining birthrates? The majority of those recently surveyed in the United States cite childcare costs as the foremost reason not to procreate, along with climate change, another of free market capitalism’s great accomplishments. (France, the EU country with the highest birthrate, also funds eighty percent of childcare.) Obviously blaming women, homosexuals, and pornographers for macroeconomic shifts is a better yarn. Behind the monstering process lies an appetite for thrilling perversity, Marina Warner observes, for “lurid scenes of other people’s sins” — titillating even while they purport to condemn. (Speaking of titillation: along with feminists Gilder has a peculiar animus about sexologists, who come up frequently, though they can, admittedly, be creepy.)

    What if we were to put it as a question instead of an answer: why has the traditional gender order lost so many adherents these days? A less hysterical version of Gilder’s laments may be found in Francis Fukuyama’s account in The Great Disruption: in his telling, late capitalism no longer required gender differentiation for the technology and knowledge-based jobs that a post-industrial economy needed to fill. Women didn’t suddenly rise up and demand economic independence — Fukuyama goes so far as to call feminism an epiphenomenon of the information society, a symptom of social disruption and not its driver. The explosion of late twentieth-century liberation movements — the sexual revolution, second wave feminism, gay liberation — that freed individuals from the tethers of traditional norms and morals were likewise sparked by the transition to a post-industrial society.

    Capitalism smashes things while ushering into existence all sorts of new human freedoms. (Economic equality unfortunately not among them). If the male-female binary is losing its grip on the human psyche as a social organizing principle, and the premise that gender roles are rooted in nature has been crumbling for the last century, the causes are obviously multiple: an increasing focus on personal fulfillment, the decline of patriarchal authority that accompanied men’s declining economic fortunes and women’s economic independence, and resulting changes in the family structure. Or go back further: as Eli Zaretsky points out in Capitalism, The Family, and Personal Life, the gender order has been breaking down since Freud unwittingly hastened its demise by undoing the “knot that tied the sexual instincts to the difference between the sexes.”

    My point is that maybe feminism and transgenderism aren’t separate stories. Maybe the rising reports of gender dysphoria and plummeting birth rates aren’t separate stories either. There have always been people who did not fit easily into normative categories but were herded in by threat and force, and who are increasingly breaking loose. Because yes, the old structures are ever more enfeebled, unable to demand fealty. Conformity to their dictates is waning. For some that spells catastrophe, for others it’s a circus of possibility. Paul B. Preciado, author of Countersexual Manifesto and Testo Junkie, billed by Vice as a “punk trans philosopher,” says that “we’re transitioning from being a society which is organized by sexual difference.” We’re moving from a binary gender and sexuality regime “to a new and different regime that has yet to be named.” In other words: if endocrinology makes bodies malleable, and families instill (slightly) less repression this century than in previous ones, why not explore those possibilities instead of bemoaning the situation? Preciado suggests regarding gender disobedience as a model for social transformation. Why not start implementing “A Day Without Gender” in schools, hospitals, homes, museums and see what happens?

    Gilder obviously wasn’t wrong that paychecks and the sexual revolution gave women more access to what had traditionally been male prerogatives. (As to whether these were or are “freedoms” is a more complicated discussion.) But the question that Gilder and followers never get around to is this: if capitalism no longer requires gender differences (and soon will barely require workers at all, except for really shitty or “public-facing” jobs), why is it up to the rest of us to keep upholding these differences? What’s in it for us?

     

    That the snarling creatures at the edge of the gender abyss were once feminists now sounds quaint, since for today’s gender liberationists (trans activists, “enbys,” intersectionalists) the feminists are toothless and mainstream, also complicit in monstrous historical crimes. At least four books with “white feminism” in the title were published in 2021 alone; the term is not used with approbation. In the updated version of the story, white women are the ones responsible for electing Donald Trump — even those who voted or worked for Bernie — and will forever be saddled with the humiliating label “Karen” as payback.

    In another twist, weirdly it’s now feminists — well, a certain breed of feminist, mostly the dreaded white ones — wielding the “nature” card, demanding that the old binaries be kowtowed to, otherwise monsters will get us. In Gilder’s iconography of gender catastrophe, the monsters were women in pants; in the updated version they’re wearing skirts, but disaster still beckons. J.K Rowling has been mounting alarms about the monsters in skirts — that is, trans women (assigned male at birth but who identify and live as women), who are supposedly haunting women’s bathrooms and changing rooms, intent on sexually assaulting natal females. None of this has been great for her brand, but she seems undaunted. Among Rowling’s fears are that if gender self-identification laws go into effect in the United Kingdom, trans people will be allowed to change the gender on their birth certificates without going through the previous gauntlet of psychiatric diagnosis and permission, and then any man who says he identifies as a woman would be able to get a Gender Recognition Certificate and state sanctioned access to gender-segregated facilities.

    To inject a bit of reality into this anxious morass, the fact is that no one is stationed at the changing room entrances and public bathrooms checking birth or gender certificates now, so how would banning gender self-identification keep trans people out of non-state-run segregated spaces? There are, to be sure, no shortage of vigorous informal policing mechanisms not infrequently inflicted on trans people who don’t sufficiently pass muster (are “clocked” as the wrong sex) in civic spaces, gender-segregated and not. Among the pernicious things about Rowling’s statements is the likelihood of them empowering other women to make scenes when in proximity to anyone whose gender presentation is not to their standards, people who just needed somewhere to urinate when out for the day.

    In a statement articulating these anxieties, Rowling revealed that she was herself a survivor of domestic abuse and sexual assault, citing this history as a reason for opposing gender reforms. She regards herself as a vulnerable party in the emerging gender order. Yet she doesn’t appear to have been assaulted by a trans woman or a man masquerading as a woman. Then why shift responsibility for male violence against women onto trans people who, it is widely acknowledged, are disproportionately victims of violence and harassment themselves, especially when forced into facilities that don’t align with their chosen gender? Rowling did acknowledge that the majority of trans-identified people pose no threat to anyone, yet the gender self-recognition movement was still “offering cover to predators like few before it.”

    Are there really legions of roving trans women predators out there attacking other women, aside from “problematic” Brian De Palma homages to Hitchcock? (Dressed to Kill is the locus classicus — spoiler alert: the psychiatrist did it.) Like Rowling, the feminist philosopher Kathleen Stock seems to think so. Until recently a professor at University of Sussex, Stock voluntarily resigned her post in 2021 saying that she had been subject to bullying and harassment because of her views on transgender identity, and indeed, there had been a student campaign calling for her dismissal. Even her receipt of an OBE — Officer of the Order of the British Empire — was protested by over six hundred fellow philosophers, though a counter petition signed by two hundred philosophers supported her, or at least supported her academic freedom to say what she wanted about gender.

    Reading Stock’s essay, “Ignoring Differences Between Men and Women is the Wrong Way to Address Gender Dysphoria,” from 2019, it’s easy to see why she’s controversial. Things start out reasonably enough, with Stock delineating the difference between what she calls “sex eliminationists” — those who argue there’s no difference between biological women and trans women because biological sex isn’t a meaningful category — and “gender eliminationists,” who hold that distinctions between men and women aren’t meaningful, and we should treat all humans the same. From there things become, to my mind, exceedingly fuzzy. Stock argues that because “there will always be some social stereotypes about the sexes that remain programmed in our minds, if only because they correspond to statistically recurrent empirical truths about biological men and women,” then the most we can reasonably hope for, when it comes to damaging social stereotypes, is to be “gender critical” — “consciously critical of the particularly damaging social stereotypes we collectively uphold, aiming to replace them over time with better and more socially useful ones.”

    This slides rather fast from social stereotypes to empirical truths. I find myself wondering how Stock, a lesbian active in LGB organizations, can speak so confidently about the empirical realities of gender, while mysteriously oblivious about how recently so-called experts defined a reality in which homosexuality was a pathology — psychological in origin and thus, notoriously, “fixable.” Or one where women were unsuited to the professions. Nothing is less stable (or empirical) than social stereotypes about gender, as anyone who reads a work of history or anthropology knows. The traits associated with one or another gender bounce around and reverse over the centuries and between cultures: sometimes men are the more sentimental ones, elsewhere women; men are the lustier ones, no actually it’s women (amoral and multi-orgasmic); and so on.

    Where I have some sympathy for Rowling and Stock is that the political interests of sexual minorities (gay people), gender minorities (trans people), and feminists (Stock and Rowling are both speaking as feminists) do not always align. While you might be a trans lesbian-feminist, some trans-identified people are also quite attached to the kinds of binary gender distinctions that some feminists would like to abolish. Natal women and trans women have different health and reproductive issues. I don’t think natal women need to hold onto some proprietary definition of womanhood, but there are political reasons, in the current political climate and with abortion rights under threat, to acknowledge that biological womanhood disadvantages biological women in ways that will always defeat equality if not addressed. (Trans men, too, can get pregnant and require abortions.) In any case, no one has to be monstered. Nor does cisgender (not being trans) need to be a slur, or “cishet” a synonym for clueless, nor “older generation,” though no doubt these disagreements are generationally inflected. But even lumping “cis” women (a term I don’t love) into one pile overlooks a lot — for instance, pro- and anti-abortion cis women see their interests very differently. Race complicates things even more.

    Trans men and trans women are also not always allies. In fact, the age-old war between the sexes has lately been transposed to intra-trans disputes, with trans women calling out trans men for transmisogyny on Twitter. A trans man I know recently accused certain trans women in our circle of being “hard core bros until like a year ago” and moving through the world expecting the same privileges while moaning about being victims of institutional sexism. The intra-trans tensions broke into public in 2020 in the academic journal Transgender Studies Quarterly, when trans theorist Jack Halberstam reviewed trans theorist Andrea Long Chu’s book Females: A Concern (in a piece funnily titled “Nice Trannies”) and accused her of being the Allan Bloom of trans studies, while having “a deep antipathy” to trans men and butches. (Chu was recently appointed book critic at New York magazine.)

    Personally I’m more interested in political alliances than in gender- or identity-based ones. Clearly identity doesn’t in itself predict anyone’s political affiliations or savvy. A surprisingly high percentage of trans people surveyed — 36% — were Trump supporters in 2016, according to a peer-reviewed study a year later in the journal Politics, Groups, and Identities, to choose one of many available examples. Trying to make sense of this, the study’s authors explain that one of the unifying themes in Trump support was anti-feminism; a big way that the GOP has attracted adherents is by signaling that rejecting feminist positions is part of what it means to be a Republican.

    The trans versus feminist tensions are hardly new: open warfare was long ago declared between the brand of feminist some label TERFs (“trans exclusionary radical feminists”) and the trans community. (Stock and others regard TERF as a slur and insist on “gender critical” as the correct label.) This often unpleasant standoff commenced with a vicious little tract published in 1979 by the radical feminist Janice Raymond titled The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male, which argued that trans women are closet patriarchs who want to colonize women’s bodies by parading all the worst stereotypes about them. In the decades since, trans women were often excluded, in not particularly kind ways, from feminist spaces, because feminists such as Rowling declared themselves vulnerable parties, at risk of assault by trans women who came equipped with inborn male aggression despite presenting as women.

    Natal men may indeed perpetrate the majority of the violence in the world (though it’s been argued that female violence takes more hidden forms, for instance violence against children), but the majority of men are not violent. It’s men, in fact, not women, who are far more often the victims of violence. The week that everyone was talking about the Gabby Petito murder case (the missing travel blogger who turned out to have been killed by her fiancée) and the grim prevalence of missing women, the FBI annual murder statistics for the previous year were released, according to which roughly four times more men were murdered than women (14,146 men, 3,573 women, 35 gender unknown). Obviously women are subject to violence by men, frequently their husbands, boyfriends, and exes, but men are vulnerable to violence by men, too. (As are trans women, especially sex workers, assaulted by straight men who can’t own up to attractions that might make them, in their minds, “gay.”) Somehow we prefer telling stories about endangered cis women.

    Stock, along with Rowling, also seems bent on shunting blame for male violence onto trans women. Stock offers the case of a pre-operative trans woman named Karen White who sexually assaulted two female inmates while housed in a British woman’s prison. Described by her neighbors to The Guardian as “volatile and violent,” White was also a convicted pedophile on remand for grievous bodily harm, burglary, multiple rapes, and other sexual offenses. Does Stock think White is a typical trans woman? Is this even typical cisgender male behavior? Stock seems to think yes. Arguing against those who say that excluding trans women from women-only spaces is analogous to excluding lesbians from women-only spaces, Stock counters that there’s no “analogous pattern” of lesbian aggression comparable to patterns of male violence. In other words: trans women are men and must shoulder the blame for male violence. And one violent trans woman is a pattern.

    Is this intellectually honest? I don’t think so. As someone pithily tweeted about the sorts of fears circulated by Rowling and Stock, “The reason predatory men aren’t becoming trans to prey on women? It’s a lot easier to become a cop.” In other words, we panic selectively. Reports not infrequently surface about mothers doing violence to, sometimes even murdering, their children. To date there are no attempts to ban motherhood. We see those episodes as anomalies, though non-anomalous enough that there are laws and (generally understaffed) child protection agencies, and of course a thriving memoir sub-genre devoted to abusive mothers. But motherhood is also supposed to be the “natural” condition of things, thus maternal abuse, no matter how many cases a year surface, is always an exception. Whereas an isolated case of a violent trans women is a pattern.

    Let me press a little harder on the maternity analogy. Both Rowling and Stock worry that transness is contagious, and young girls will get the idea that changing genders is a good solution to the inherent problems of being female. But all our ideas about gender are contagious — that’s how culture works — including deep seated ideas such as “maternal instinct.” Except that it’s not an instinct, it’s a concept that arises at a particular point in history, circa the Industrial Revolution, just as the new industrial-era sexual division of labor was being negotiated, the one where men go to work and women stay home raising kids. (Before that everyone worked at home.) A new story arose to justify the new arrangements: that these roles were handed down by nature. As family historians tell us, it was only when children’s actual economic value declined, because they were no longer necessary additions to the household labor force, that they became the priceless little treasures we know them as today. The romance of the child didn’t get underway for the middle classes until the mid-nineteenth century (it was well into the twentieth that child labor laws went into effect). It also took a decline in infant-mortality rates for mothers to start regarding their offspring with much maternal affection. When infant deaths were high, maternal attachment ran low. It was only as families began getting smaller — birthrates declined steeply in the nineteenth century — that the emotional value of each child increased, which is where we find the origin of contemporary ideas about maternal instincts and fulfillments.

    All I’m saying is that what we’re calling a “biological” instinct is a historical artifact and a culturally specific development, not a fact of nature. An invented instinct can feel entirely real. I’m sure it can feel profound. As can the kinds of fears and vulnerabilities that Stock and Rowling are leveraging. But if we’re getting empirical, let’s acknowledge that childbirth has killed far more women than murderous trans women ever did, though I suppose the sentimental premise is that all those dead mothers died fulfilling their gender destiny, not defying it. The point is that a lot of behind-the-scenes conceptual labor goes into establishing the “naturalness” of gender, not to mention the vulnerability of gender critical feminists.

    As far as nature goes, the reverence for it is pretty selective. We’re happy to take cholesterol blockers, mood elevators, and erection enhancers as needed without worrying whether it’s what nature intended. The other day a pig kidney was transplanted into a human. Technological possibilities on the horizon include uterine transplants for sterile women, which raises the possibility of uterine transplants for trans women — maybe eventually for cisgender men too. Why not? Humans have always made it their business to conquer, alter, and repurpose nature — and then to invent monsters lurking at the crossroads.

    Not surprisingly, Rowling’s and Stock’s brand of panic-mongering soon became fodder for the fringe right in America. In July 2021, QAnon followers staged two weekends of violent protests in Los Angeles after a customer at a Koreatown spa (Instagram handle: “Cubana Angel”) filmed herself complaining vociferously to the manager about a trans woman supposedly using the jacuzzi in the woman’s area of the spa. “He’s a pervert,” shouts Cubana, “waving his penis and testicles around!” The sight was traumatizing for her. “His dick is out!” says Cubana’s friend, voice trembling. “His dick is swinging left and right!” She repeated the word “swinging” so many times it led me to wonder if these were rehearsed lines. “What about women’s rights?” shrieks Cubana, as the manager patiently tries to explain that California’s Civil Code prohibits businesses from discriminating against anyone on the basis of gender identity or expression. “We’re concerned about women’s safety,” yells Cubana. “We’re gonna take it worldwide!”

    Which is exactly what happened: the video went viral. Tucker Carlson aired a segment about it, the first of seven on Fox over a week. Antifa showed up to protest the QAnon protesters, evangelicals and the Proud Boys showed up, a reporter was clubbed, protestors threw smoke bombs at cops and pepper sprayed each other, riot cops fired projectiles and beanbag rounds into the crowd. Amidst all this, reports appeared in Slate, The Guardian, the L.A Times, and other liberal outlets suggesting that the report about a trans woman in the spa was likely a hoax, and according to a spa employee there had been no trans patrons with appointments that day.

    But the story turned out to be more complicated. According to the journalist Jason McGahan, who tried to untangle it five months later in Los Angeles Magazine, there actually was a (possibly) trans person in the spa that day. Police issued a warrant for 52-year-old Darren Merager for indecent exposure; Merager does have a penis and is a convicted sex offender. But is Merager actually trans? It’s unclear — he or she seems to have a female driver’s license, though until recently was identifying as male, according to acquaintances, and McGahan isn’t sure which pronouns he or she uses. Is Merager a predator? He/she has a criminal record for theft, but it appears that his/her previous sex crime arrests were for exhibitionism which, according to the psychoanalytic view, typically does entail wanting to be caught. (Robert Stoller calls these scenarios “scripts” in Observing the Erotic Imagination.) In this view, exhibitionism is a pathology of gender identity, not a sexual behavior. The motive is courting humiliation and punishment, not getting off sexually. It’s a (not very successful) remedy for gender dysphoria, not predation.

    Still, there it was, a penis in the woman’s pool. Did this put natal women at risk? It is the case that many (or most, or lots of) cis women have been socialized in ways that can make the sight of an exposed penis in non-private settings feel alarming. Perhaps that will someday change, though I don’t imagine such feelings are exactly voluntary — any more than gender dysphoria or compulsive exhibitionism is voluntary. But once again, to what extent is it possible to be intellectually honest about the distinction between an anomaly and a pattern? Perhaps it’s not, especially when there are competing interests and clashing vulnerabilities at stake. Especially when titillating monsters hover — and Merager made a wonderfully convenient one — feeding the “appetite for thrilling perversity.”

    Why is gender such a melee? Can’t it be a comedy instead of a tragedy, a playground and not a police state, with room for experiments and transformations? You don’t have to be some sort of pomo-structuralist to think that no one knows what gender is or where it comes from. Clearly all we have are stories about gender and sexual difference, which shift with the winds, the centuries, and political-economic contingencies. Why not see gender the way we do other human variables — personality for instance, capacious enough for thousands of permutations and infinite mutability?

    “Smash the family!” feminists used to declare. Look around: it’s smashed. As far as who done it, it’s not that big a mystery — could Gilder and cohort not see its demise up ahead when they tanked wages and trashed the safety nets? They were so caught up in their deregulatory zeal that they couldn’t imagine the S&L crisis, the housing bubble and evictions, Enron, and the opioid epidemic. No, the only thing they wanted to regulate was gender!

    Yes, capitalism breaks things while ushering in all sorts of great new personal liberties — expressive individuality, your very own idiosyncratic unconscious, unisex clothes. It brings whatever you want right to your door at all hours (if you’re among the lucky “haves”). Shopping for things, including identities, is the great modern consolation. Is having a gender identity — another recent development in the annals of modern selfhood — a trap or a freedom? Yes.

    To those who fear trans women in the ladies room: make sure to pee before you leave the house. Those immutable laws of nature you’re attempting to enforce today will be dust tomorrow, and soon enough so will you.