The Tactile Spiritual

    My father was a librarian, an archivist, and a rare books collector. I grew up surrounded by books which were a hundred years older than I was nestled beside stacks of long-defunct short-lived Irish literary magazines, many of which were never digitized. My father would open his latest find to the copyright page, explaining why this particular object had value (not of the fiscal variety). The book was a link in a chain, a talisman of a continuum. Within the crush of shelved books he always knew where to find the one he wanted. In the middle of a discussion he would slowly get up, walk to a shelf, pull out a book, and read the relevant passage. 

    An example. In the late 1990s, my sister Jean and I went to Ireland to visit my younger sister Siobhan in studies overseas. While Siobhan was in class, Jean and I drove west and stopped at Clonmacnoise, an old monastery complex in ruins on the banks of the Shannon River in County Offaly. We had been there as kids but this trip was in November, off-season, and the expanse was deserted. We wandered along the sloping hills, weaving through the tilting lichen-encrusted Celtic crosses and slabs of ancient graves. The river snaked by below us, green grasses pushed up on the sides, melting into the water, no visible shoreline. Something about the river’s surface and the flatness in which it rests is oddly dizzying. On a clear day the sky is perfectly reflected in the water and the world seems upside down. I got vertigo.

    Once home, I told my father about the strange Clonmacnoise-illusion. He stood up, crossed to his bookshelves, scanned the titles briefly and then pulled out a volume. It was Seamus Heaney’s recently published Opened Ground: Selected Poems, 1966-1996. He flipped the pages briskly then read aloud in the gravelly voice now faded to an echo in my brain:

    The annals say: when the monks of Clonmacnoise
    Were all at prayers inside the oratory
    A ship appeared above them in the air.

    The anchor dragged along behind so deep
    It hooked itself into the altar rails
    And then, as the big hull rocked to a standstill,

    A crewman shinned and grappled down the rope
    And struggled to release it. But in vain.
    ‘This man can’t bear our life here and will drown,’

    The abbot said, ‘unless we help him.’ So
    They did, the freed ship sailed, and the man climbed back
    Out of the marvelous as he had known it.

    My father gave me his copy of Opened Ground and I still have it. I also have little trinkets clustered on the windowsills — an angel made of twisted metal, a broken music box, a tiny piece of clear beach glass — all given to me by people I love. Remembering is a tactile experience. 

    In Joachim Trier’s film The Worst Person in the World, in 2021, Aksel (Anders Danielsen Lie), a man dying of cancer, struggles to explain himself to his ex-girlfriend Julie (Renate Reinsve). “I grew up in an age without Internet and mobile phones,” he tells her. Julie gives him a look that I, a Gen-Xer, know well. She is sympathetic, but there’s a little bit of something else there, almost embarrassment at his nostalgia. Aksel sees the look on Julie’s face and his smile is sad. He continues:

    I sound like an old fart. But I think about it a lot. The world that I knew has disappeared. For me it was all about going to stores. Record stores. I’d take the tram to Voices in Grünerløkka. Leaf through used comics at Pretty Price. I can close my eyes and see the aisles at Video Nova in Majorstua. I grew up in a time when culture was passed along through objects. They were interesting because we could live among them. We could pick them up. Hold them in our hands. Compare them…I spent my life doing that. Collecting all that stuff, comics, books. And I just continued, even when it stopped giving me the powerful emotions I felt in my early 20s. I continued anyway. And now it’s all I have left. Knowledge and memories of stupid, futile things nobody cares about…

    I, too, think about it a lot. Before the internet, you had to collect things, especially if you were interested in movies, books, and music.

    The concept of ownership has been transformed. We no longer expect ownership to be permanent. You can purchase a movie on a streaming platform, but you are beholden to the platform’s landlords. If they want to dump the movie it’s gone for you, too. If a movie is not streaming, good luck finding it. (Same goes for my father’s undigitized Irish literary magazines: what treasures were in those pages, lost to us forever?) And so I evangelize for owning stuff. Do not trust a corporation with anything that matters to you. With every advance in technology, things are lost. They (there’s always a “they”) want us to believe that everything is now available with the internet. It’s a lie. 

    The feudal system survives and not only in memory. Much of human history was lived by people who did not own the land they worked. They were enslaved, or in perpetual crushing debt. Today’s overlords do not see the value in regular people being able to make a living, having a place to live, or even enjoying some leisure time. 

    Nostalgia was once considered a clinical disease, listed and discussed in medical journals in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A combination of the Greek nostos (home) and algos (pain, distress), it spices up a lot of great art. James Joyce’s nostalgia is different from F. Scott Fitzgerald’s. L.M. Montgomery wrote twenty novels, starting with Anne of Green Gables in 1908, and all of them granted her return to Prince Edward Island where she spent her childhood. 

    Turning back the clock is impossible, but technological advancement forces erasure. You — if you were around — gave up your collection of vinyl and CDs and transferred everything to iTunes, not realizing that in so doing you were giving up your ownership. You scanned and uploaded your decades of photos to one of the storage platforms, perhaps not realizing at the time that when, say, Flickr tanked, your entire archive vanished into the maw of defunct technology.

    In 2024, Apple launched a new ad for the iPad Pro in which a giant press crushed a number of objects: a piano, children’s toys, a statue from antiquity. The most sinister aspect of that ad release was Apple’s shock at the public’s universal rejection of it. People recoiled. Apple believes that the human population is on board with an iPad Pro replacing Michelangelo’s David. They think we don’t value pianos. The ad was helpful intel. It showed us how they really think.

    Near the end of his life, my father was so ill he stopped being able to speak. Those dark days are a blur. I can’t say for certain the following anecdote was our last conversation but I know by the date it was close to the end. My mother and I sat up with him all night. His pain was excruciating. At around 5:30 in the morning my father spoke. He told me to get a book from the top shelf. “It’s all Shane Leslie books up there,” he managed to say. I reached up and pulled down book after book. He had me open each book to the copyright page. “No, that’s not it.” “That’s not it.” Finally: “That’s the one.”

    It was a hardcover copy of Shane Leslie’s book The Passing Chapter, from 1934, a biting attack on the collapse of English culture following World War I.  My father held the book, and pointed to the copyright page, as he had done so many times in his life. “St. Ignatius” was stamped there, and he said that meant it was owned by a Jesuit (of course) house in Ireland. When St. Ignatius dismantled its library, rare book collectors had a field day. After showing me the copyright, he carefully turned to the title page. This was really what he wanted to show me. An epigraph from King Lear was printed under the title:

    The weight of this sad time we must obey;
    Speak what we feel and what we ought to say.
    The oldest hath borne most; we that are young
    Shall never see so much, nor live so long.

    My father pointed at the epigraph and had me look closer. There in pencil was a marking: “and” in the second line was crossed out, replaced with “not.” A month from his death, he chuckled and whispered, “Here’s this Jesuit — he hasn’t even gotten into the book yet — and he notices a typo on the title page …”

    And what a typo! “Speak what we feel not what we ought to say” is totally different from  “Speak what we feel and what we ought to say.” “And” prioritizes polite niceties. “Not” does not. What you “ought” to say has no place in the “weight” of a “sad time.” It is the difference between living deeply and refusing to do the same. Perhaps my father understood the note would be balm for me in the difficult years to come. Maybe that is why he wanted me to see it.

    After my father’s death, his massive book collection was organized for donation to his alma mater Boston College by his best friend, Barry Scott, a rare book dealer. Barry told us that if there was anything with personal meaning for us we could just put it aside. The only book I wanted was the copy of The Passing Chapter with the Jesuit’s penciled correction.

    My father had multiple copies of the book and I looked through them all but none of them were The One. Where could it have gone? I finally had to admit defeat. I never found the book. It’s taken on a bit of a mystical meaning for me, like it vanished with my dad, once he showed me what he needed to show me. The gift wasn’t the object. The gift was my father’s mind, his appreciation for a one-word editorial change and the deeper meaning that it italicized, and also his certainty that I would appreciate it, too. In a chaotic world, where memories are monetized, where ownership is meaningless, where objects are crushed by a giant metal press and we are supposed to call it progress, a ghost book I can no longer put my hands on is even more of a precious object. Its tactility is spiritual.

    I have sometimes wondered if I imagined that early morning conversation with my father. Or imagined the book. But no. I know that book existed and now you know about it, too. And I just can’t believe none of this matters.

    Cloud Hoarders

    For nearly a decade, Clean House television host Niecy Nash would start each episode standing on a stoop or in a driveway to introduce “the show that rescues families from a cluttered home.” In a series of cuts rich with delightfully harsh commentary (“how did two little ladies make such a big mess?”) her team turned barely functional spaces into livable homes. The message was clear: clutter is wrong, it is embarrassing, and it is no way to live.  

    Today clutter creeps beyond the home. We are constantly bombarded with digital clutter — emails, texts, and voice messages from every realm of life. And we create our own, snapping photos or jotting down notes, likely with the intention of allowing these creations to “sit” in seemingly infinite “spaces” in perpetuity, mostly out of sight and mind. When we run out of storage space, companies are more than happy to trade gigabyte-sized slices of The Cloud for dollars, and so our digital footprint swells. We may have people like Niecy Nash to save us in the physical world, but who is coming to rescue us from our digital stuff?  

    To classify someone as a digital hoarder is a challenging exercise. Without the physical junkyard, it is difficult to distinguish between excessive and normal twenty-first-century accumulation. An unexpected event helped me begin to see the physicality of my own digital footprint as something resembling clutter; it disappeared.

    On the morning of the Great North American Eclipse in 2024, I woke up to find that all my digital files were gone, in what felt like a fitting cosmic event. After a few moments of panicked research, I learned that I had been a victim of a process known as offloading — an unintuitive term that “frees” my files from the confines of a $2,000, three-and-a-half-pound machine. The process has good intentions; laptops come with a set amount of storage space, some of which is needed in order for basic machine functionality and the rest of which stores the same files that might be sent to The Cloud, such as photos and documents. My laptop had nearly run out of storage and so, in an effort to help keep my device functioning, Apple had copied some of my data from my laptop to The Cloud and then removed my own copy, which is why I no longer saw my files. 

    Practically, no data was lost; it was as if a company had moved most of my stuff to a storage locker for me to free up space to dance around my home. But as I tried to understand all that I had lost, I couldn’t recall even a fraction of what I had been storing on my laptop, let alone what lived in the additional 871.72 gigabytes of data that I had spread across three accounts in The Cloud. My amnesia reminded me of conversations that Niecy Nash had with embarrassed homeowners who couldn’t recall the contents of overflowing closets. When I did start to go through my folders and files, I found items both meaningful and utterly useless. It took me as long to find old photos shared by my now-deceased grandmother as it did to stumble upon a flimsy high school resume.

    How did I let my digital home get so messy, so full of meaningless items? Part of the blame surely rests on the gatekeepers of The Cloud themselves. The word “cloud,” a brilliant marketing coup cooked up by tech companies, paints a powerful image. In 1994 an advertisement for AT&T introduced The Cloud in much the same way many of us picture their namesake; peaceful and expansive, dotting clear skies, of the fluffy cumulus variety. Thanks to that word, when I try to visualize my digital self in a room that needs decluttering, I am instead transported to an idyllic, expansive view seen through the oval of an airplane window. 

    To cleanse my imagination of this conception, I attempted to visualize my data as approximately one hundred eighty-five standard single-layer DVDs (for those who can still visualize them), four hundred thousand photos, or nearly eight hundred thousand books of approximately five hundred pages each. This is not just a theoretical exercise — ultimately the digital is physical. Data lives on real tangible pieces of metal alloy excavated from Earth, but knowing that isn’t enough to rewrite my relationship to things I never experience in physical space. 

    The way I do experience digital items is likely part of the problem. It is as simple as navigating to a website in my browser (for me, Google Drive) and clicking on a document icon, the same way I might pick up a paperclip. Behind the scenes things are a little more complicated: my browser makes a network request to Google, which then performs a series of tasks like validating that I am in fact Julia, fetching the document metadata (i.e. discovering who owns the document, who has access), loading it from storage, and then streaming it back to my browser. Technically the document is never even in my possession (unless I download it or configure offline viewing) in the same way that the paperclip is; it remains in Google’s possession and any edits I make get sent to Google servers where they apply my changes.

    But I need to be able to picture where my files are actually, physically, stored, to start to understand my own clutter scale. I am on the East Coast of the United States, so my first guess is (relatively) local; several Google data complexes in Virginia, South Carolina, or Ohio. To get on the grounds, in the building, and on to the server floor would require authorization through many checkpoints — what Google describes as a “6-layer deep” security model. So instead, I take myself on a Google Maps tour of just one of them, in Moncks Corner, a suburb of Charleston, South Carolina. It is home to approximately thirteen thousand people, the historic Santee Canal, a Piggly Wiggly grocery, and a sprawling Google data center campus. According to Google Maps, the campus has streets with names like The Faster Way, The Users Way, and Reboot Road. It is here, in one of possibly seven data center buildings (according to Aterio, a real estate insight company), behind an anti-climb fence and under around-the-clock security watch, that my high school resume likely spends its days. Nor is this the only copy of a document that has not been accessed in over a decade. In order to make good on its promise that data is available 24/7, Google, and other companies that offer storage in The Cloud, usually keep multiple copies in different locations around the country or world.

    That is The Cloud. It is made up of hundreds of millions of square feet scattered across cities around the world in places like Changhua County, Taiwan; Fredericia, Denmark; and Quilicura, Chile. It lives in campuses with servers stacked in neat towers the height of a human, or even taller, casting perpetual green light on concrete floors (at least according to the virtual tour, which requires no authorization to visit). Perhaps it should be more fittingly named The Data Bunker: to store data in The Cloud is to store data on countless machines in locked-down facilities, likely echoing with a soft hum, communicating with others around the world on countless tasks beyond retrieving my stored documents.

    Visualizing my data in The Data Bunker is a good start, but it still leaves more questions than answers; am I taking the equivalent of one, two, or three boxes in a single server rack? What number is equivalent to a minimalist apartment and what number is closer to a family home littered with relics? This matters because data centers are resource guzzlers, relying on vast amounts of electricity to keep things humming and millions of gallons of water to keep things from overheating. Understanding that the prolonged life of an old document plays even a small role in the environmental health of our planet should be enough to make me consider pressing the delete button.

    But it also matters because what we choose to keep should mean something. That which we cherish enough to hold on to through time can become an extension of the self, representative of our experiences and values, and what we leave of ourselves for future generations. When we default to keeping everything, we risk hiding gems in the mass. This is easier to see in the physical world than the digital one, as it was for a woman on Clean House, whose deceased grandmother’s treasured hat collection became a significant feature of her home only after decluttering the closet that they were buried in. For anyone who knows the feeling of a thumb tired from prolonged scrolling through saturated photo albums, or who cannot easily access one of the likely small number of emails that have truly made them smile, this should be something to consider.  

    Changing our relationship to digital things isn’t easy, but by imagining it as a metastasizing heap of incalculable, forgotten junk and occasional treasure, we become more cognizant of the real tangible limits of what feels like infinite storage space. Tech companies make it all too easy for us to expand the space we take up without ever considering why or what we are keeping and what it means to do so. Perhaps we can rely on the guidance of organizers like Marie Kondo and her call for things to “spark joy” in order to become more intentional about our digital closets. The cost of failing to do so is both a fractured relationship to our memories and a less livable planet within which to make them. Our stuff remains our responsibility whether we can see it or not. It is our job to clean house. 

     

    In Search of the Leisure Class

    If you want a surefire way to incite hostility on social media, I suggest flaunting the fact that you work nights and weekends — or complaining about those who do. The sea of humans will suddenly part before you into two angry mobs: the workaholics, who are prepared to sacrifice their lives at the altar of capitalism, and the restaholics, whose highest ideal is slacking off and who seethe with resentment at those ruining the curve. Or so the two groups understand one another.

    Do we work in order to rest, or do we rest in order to work? Neither answer is very appealing. Working in order to rest sounds like a paraphrase of Freud’s death drive: as though, in an ideal world, we would just be sitting quietly, motionlessly, imitating corpses. Resting in order to work suggests the equally depressing thesis that the goal of a human life is to become a well-oiled cog in some kind of machine, a tool for the use of the leviathan called society. 

    We need to work, because survival demands it, and we need to rest, because work is tiring, but are those two possibilities really exhaustive? Isn’t there a third state — one that we don’t need but freely choose? 

    When I teach book ten of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, I explain to the students that if they want to understand Aristotle’s concept of leisure — scholē — they need only look in the mirror. As students, they are leading scholastic lives, which is to say, lives of leisure. They balk at this: it might be true that the Greek word scholē is the source of the English “school,” but they cannot see how a lifestyle centered around grades and exams and being forced to read chapter after chapter of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics could count as leisurely. 

    Like the workaholics and the restaholics, my students fail to leave room for a third possibility: when they deny that school is leisurely what they really mean to deny is that school is restful. And they are right about that, even on a capacious understanding of rest, one which extends well beyond sleep to include everything they classify under “self-care” — exercise, meditation, “me-time,” therapy, unplugging — as well as humor, games, trivial amusements or hobbies, vacations, and all those activities whose attraction lies in being “fun.” School is not like any of those things; it might sometimes happen to be calming or relaxing or amusing, but it is not that way essentially. 

    But school is also not like work, not even if we have a capacious understanding of “work,” inclusive of training for work. We forget almost everything we learn in school, and even if we didn’t forget it, little of it would be useful to us in our jobs. Some people claim that school trains you in “analytical skills” or “critical thinking”; others say it instills the obedience and the conformity and the submission necessary for most modern jobs. If school does those things, it does them behind the scenes, while you are busy learning not how to be submissive or critical but how to understand calculus or economics or the causes of World War I. Just as playing video games would not be work even if it turned out that (unbeknownst to the players), it trained someone to have fighter pilot reflexes, school is not work even if you do end up with some abilities that are relevant for work. 

    Aristotle is not stymied by our chicken-egg problem. Faced with the work-rest cycle, he sees a clear teleological winner: fun and relaxation are all for the sake of returning to work, and the reverse is simply not the case.

    Now to exert oneself and work for the sake of amusement seems silly and utterly childish. But to amuse oneself in order that one may exert oneself, as Anacharsis puts it, seems right; for amusement is a sort of relaxation, and we need relaxation because we cannot work continuously. Relaxation, then, is not an end; for it is taken for the sake of activity. 

    Aristotle chalks up our affinity for relaxation to the lamentable fact that mortal beings are incapable of continuous activity: we need to take breaks from doing what matters to us. A person who worked in order to relax would be getting the proper order of things backwards, like a person who cooks dinner in order to go grocery shopping again. We shop in order to cook, and not vice versa. Likewise, if we see a person working, then relaxing, then working, and so on, the charitable interpretation, says Aristotle, is to assume that she is relaxing in order to get back to work. Relaxing activities may, at times, feel more enjoyable than the work they relieve us from; nonetheless, proclaims Aristotle “no one would live for the sake of trivial amusements.” The point of life can’t lie in the breaks we take from it. 

    But now consider work — and I am using the word broadly, as a catchall to describe both what happens in the office and also all the various forms of biological or social necessity that show up in our lives as problems needing to be solved. Getting young kids dressed in snow gear, deciding which chores to do in what order, maintaining a friendly face at a social gathering: those can all be forms of work. Work is activity that manages constraints and tradeoffs to pursue goals of social value — which means the story can’t end there. The question remains: what are we working for? The answer cannot be more work, because that simply postpones the question, much less rest, which is done for the sake of work. There must be a human activity that is done for its own sake, and this activity has got to serve as the teleological lynchpin of the whole system. Aristotle calls it “leisure,” or scholē.

    What is leisure? The phrase “leisure time” is familiar enough, as is the fact that there is a big difference between having to spend such time on business or chores or other needful activities, on the one hand, and getting to indulge in an entertaining or restorative respite from activity, on the other. We can use leisure to work and we can use leisure to rest. What is less familiar is that there is, in addition, a native use of leisure as leisure. Aristotle speaks of a “serious” or “zealous” (spoudaios) use of leisure. We use our leisure in a serious way when we don’t convert it into work, as the workaholics do, or into rest, as the restaholics do. 

    The serious use of leisure, according to Aristotle, is what life is all about. He says that the reason we put servants in charge of our household is leisure: “[the steward] is procuring leisure for the master, in order that he may not be hindered by necessary cares and so shut out from doing something that is noble and befitting.” Ignore the elitism for now — we will come back to it in a moment. The insight here is that the point of being elite and aristocratic and rich is leisure: “you must have regard to wealth, in order to secure leisure.” Wealth is not valuable for itself, and being elite and aristocratic are not valuable for themselves. There is something they are for. That is why, if legislators have to choose between the two, Aristotle’s instructions are clear: “And even if the legislator does not care to protect good men from poverty, he should at any rate secure leisure for them when in office.” 

    I think that we cannot help but read these passages of Aristotle through the lens of Thorsten Veblen. In The Theory of the Leisure Class, he writes: 

    From the days of the Greek philosophers to the present, a degree of leisure and of exemption from contact with such industrial processes as serve the immediate everyday purposes of human life has ever been recognized by thoughtful men as a prerequisite to a worthy or beautiful, or even a blameless, human life. In itself and in its consequences the life of leisure is beautiful and ennobling in all civilized men’s eyes. This direct, subjective value of leisure and of other evidences of wealth is no doubt in great part secondary and derivative. It is in part a reflex of the utility of leisure as a means of gaining the respect of others, and in part it is the result of a mental substitution. The performance of labor has been accepted as a conventional evidence of inferior force; therefore it comes itself, by a mental short-cut, to be regarded as intrinsically base. 

    Leisure activities, according to Veblen, are a signal of social status; they are performed in order to show off one’s membership in the (superior) group of people who have been freed from manual labor. My conspicuously wasteful consumption of time demonstrates to others that I am the sort of person who counts as better or nobler or more honorable simply on the grounds that I do not need to work. 

    When I describe education, or academia, or humanistic learning as calling for “leisure,” people routinely ask me to pick a different word; they tell me that “leisure” sounds elitist. That suggests to me that Veblen is currently winning the battle over the word. Still, I don’t think he can win the war over the concept. Although Veblen insists that he is not making the mistake of conflating leisure and rest —

    …the term “leisure”, as here used, does not connote indolence or quiescence. What it connotes is non-productive consumption of time. Time is Consumed non-productively (1) from a sense of the unworthiness of productive work, and (2) as an evidence of pecuniary ability to afford a life of idleness

    — in fact he is making exactly that mistake. Leisure, as Veblen understands it, involves a distaste for work, and, far from being easy or relaxing, often involves a difficult and elaborate performance of idleness. But if the third thing involves constructing a certain kind of appearance of the second thing, it is not really a third thing. It is just another version of the second thing. Yes, sometimes the freedom from work is wasted, either in idleness, or in the performance thereof, but isn’t there another possibility? 

    Veblen has glued “leisure” to “class,” thereby tainting the former word with elitism. For an antidote, consider John Maynard Keynes’ position: in his essay “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren,” he predicts that within a century increasing productivity due to capitalism will solve “the economic problem” — of subsistence — with which human beings have (almost) exclusively occupied themselves. The result, he thinks, will be a massive reckoning: when people only need to do, say, fifteen hours of work in a week, what will we do with the remainder of our time? Notice that if we cut down on work time, we will also cut down on how much time we need to spend resting and recovering from work, so the leisure problem grows in both directions. Keynes describes the aristocrats of his own time as the canaries in the coal mine:

    It is a fearful problem for the ordinary person, with no special talents, to occupy himself, especially if he no longer has roots in the soil or in custom or in the beloved conventions of a traditional society. To judge from the behavior and the achievements of the wealthy classes today in any quarter of the world, the outlook is very depressing! For these are, so to speak, our advance guard — those who are spying out the promised land for the rest of us and pitching their camp there. For they have most of them failed disastrously, so it seems to me, those who have an independent income but no associations or duties or ties to solve the problem which has been set them.

    Keynes is no more pleased than Veblen by the sight of the deliberately wasteful customs by which the aristocracy signals their ability to engage in them. But unlike Veblen, Keynes did not take such behavior to illustrate the inherent impossibility of using leisure well. He admitted that people had not yet found a way to “solve the problem which has been set to them,” but was optimistic about our prospects: 

    I feel sure that with a little more experience we shall use the new-found bounty of nature quite differently from the way in which the rich use it today, and will map out for ourselves a plan of life quite otherwise than theirs.

    Keynes was writing in 1930 — in the year after the stock market crashed he begins his essay, “we are suffering just now from a bad attack of economic pessimism” — so it has been almost a hundred years since he made his predictions about the two problems. Neither one seems to be coming true. We have not solved the economic problem — most of us work more than fifteen hours a week — and we have not solved the problem of how to use leisure, either. The straightforward explanation is that the first problem is harder to solve than Keynes anticipated, and thus we haven’t even properly encountered the second one. When I reflect upon the economic history of my own family, I come to doubt this theory.

    My parents, my sister, and I immigrated to the United States in the 1980s, refugees from communist (and antisemitic) Hungary. We arrived in New York City with very little, but my parents were extraordinarily hardworking and thrifty. I remember one time my dad and sister and I were out for a walk in Central Park — usually it was my dad who took care of us on weekends, because my mom, in addition to her day job as an oncologist, took on a second job as the doctor at the maximum security prison on Riker’s Island — and we came across someone who was handing out free samples of yogurt. My dad made us circle around multiple times, and I think each of us ate at least four samples of yogurt; such was the allure of free food. My mom bought one queen-sized comforter for my sister and me, because that was cheaper than two twin comforters. She cut it in half, lengthwise, and sewed up each one with a raggedy stitch. My parents worked and worked and worked and slowly made their way up in the world, moving often, having two more kids, exchanging a small apartment for a small house, then a small house for a bigger one, and next for one with a pool. The richer they got, the less thrift they had to employ — I still remember the thrill of getting my own drink, instead of having to share with my sister — but the one thing that never changed was how hard they worked. If they had been happy with what counted, in Keynes’ day, as a decent standard of living — a radio, a gas stove, a few changes of clothes — my parents could have worked far less than they did.

    Even rich people choose to work quite a lot. We have become wealthier than Aristotle ever dreamed we would, yet we do not buy ourselves much of what, according to him, wealth is for. The more wealth we have, the more desperately we seem to hunt for ways to convert leisure into work or rest. Some economists accuse Keynes of underestimating how much people like both working and spending money. Tyler Cowen writes that

     It may well be that a significant proportion of individuals have kept on working as much as they have because a) they really enjoy earning and spending money, and b) they consider their jobs to be relatively attractive ways to invest their time and energy. In that case economic progress would in fact seem to translate into very real forms of human satisfaction. 

    But that does not really answer Keynes’ question, which is: why haven’t we found anything we like more? 

    Are we caught in a work-rest cycle where we force ourselves to work harder, so as to spend more money, so as to work harder, intentionally exacerbating the economic problem (“rising standards of living”) so as to delay our confrontation with the leisure problem?

     

    Aristotle did us the favor of pointing the spotlight at the concept of leisure, and the disfavor of failing to turn that spotlight on. I’m going to be blunt and claim that Aristotle’s descriptions of leisure activity — what you are actually doing when you are at leisure — borders on incoherent. Aristotle is not given to Platonic flights of fancy; to the contrary, he is usually refreshingly sensible, so when he tells you that the paradigmatic use of leisure is disembodied thinking which takes only itself as subject matter — thought thinking itself — you know he has stumbled into some tricky territory. I understand what thinking is when you are thinking about something so as to accomplish some end, but I do not understand what it is to be thinking only of thinking. (What is the second thinking thinking about? The first thinking? Is this supposed to be a circle of thinking?) Thought thinking itself is, supposedly, in Aristotle’s theology, what God does, or rather, what God is, and you are certainly at leisure when — (literally only) God knows how — you imitate that. Aristotle calls this “contemplation,” and he says that when you engage in it, you participate in the divine activity that moves the universe. I do not know what this means, and I have doubts whether even Aristotle did.

    As evidence, consider Aristotle’s life. Embarking on a detailed naturalistic study of every animal under the sun. Comparing tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Researching spontaneous generation. Refuting Platonism about mathematics. Cataloguing the various kinds of error in sophistical argumentation. Inventing logic. Role playing a battle with someone who denies the law of noncontradiction. Exploring the ways in which actuality is prior to potentiality — and vice versa. Lecturing to others about all of these topics. Tutoring Alexander the Great. None of these activities are thought thinking itself, they are all thought thinking about something, and accomplishing something. 

    Because contemplation epitomizes the serious use of leisure, Aristotle declares the contemplative life to be the happiest possible life a person can live. So why didn’t he live one? Why did he choose, instead, to live an intellectually productive life of inquiry, argumentation, discovery and education? Aristotle’s God outputs nothing: why didn’t Aristotle imitate that? 

    I think that we have to assume that work was Aristotle’s best shot at leisure. His intellectual efforts yielded contemplative moments when, caught in the beauty of a sudden realization about dolphins, or logic, he could feel that he was approximating the divinely perfect leisure activity. And this can be generalized to other kinds of work: when we view our work not in terms of what we can exchange it for — survival, or money — but instead simply take pride and pleasure in a job well done, that is leisure rearing its head in the world of work.

    It is one thing to demand pure leisure and another to seek after the type of work or rest that we hope will, at least occasionally, take a leisurely form. If we make room for impure leisure, we will suddenly find leisure everywhere around us. When someone doesn’t want to do just any job in order to survive but insists on finding what she will consider “meaningful work,” she is saying that she wants her work to be (at least somewhat) leisurely; likewise, when someone resists “guilty pleasures” of entertainment in order to engage with something she finds challenging, she is demanding leisure in her rest time. The home is a place where we do tedious chores, and a place where we enjoy simple pleasures and needed rest, but it is not only those things. Sometimes we manage to spend time with families in a serious and energetic way of which we can be proud. 

    The work-rest cycle is the solution that we developed for our old problem, the economic problem, and it stands to reason that we would repurpose it when confronted with the newer problem, the leisure problem. In lieu of finding a third thing, we retool and offset, balancing out the overly instrumental form of “contemplation” available to us in the context of work with the overly passive form of “contemplation” available to us in the context of rest. Demanding that our work be rewarding and engaging and that our vacations be learning experiences may be the best that we can do, at the moment, to steer in the direction of what Aristotle called “serious leisure.” If you look around you, however, you will see that our best is not good enough.

    We are living in unleisurely times. The internet and phones and social media offer up many insistent work-like demands on our attention, many rest-like temptations for entertainment, and few opportunities for leisure. Social media alternates between occasions for worry and outrage, on the one hand, and the promise of relief — in the form of humor, cute pictures, and the mindless scroll — on the other. Between working ourselves up and calming ourselves back down, we have created a loop that forecloses the possibility of leisure. 

    The opinion pages — where we go to take a break from the news — have exploded, competing with one another for your attention by scolding you for your lapses of attention. The message of most op-eds is, “you cannot justify no longer paying attention to whatever this op-ed is telling you to pay attention.” Fearmongering, hatemongering, worrymongering — these are all ways of laying claim to attention. The claim that something has failed to have received its allotted share of concern keeps coming at me from surprising new places, and the form of praise that encapsulates our era is: underrated. The internet is always whispering to me, “what are you overlooking?,” launching me on a quest to shift my attention to a worthier target. 

    Academia, once the proper home of leisure, is now the place where we play whack-a-mole with the ever elusive “gap in the literature.” Is something understudied? Is there some topic we don’t talk enough about? Have we failed to pay enough attention to some time, place, or group? Do some voices need to be uplifted? Being constantly on the lookout for what we are not seeing creates an anxious, neurotic, even paranoid mood — the opposite of being set free to explore the world of ideas.

    Those who are deeply impressed by the world’s structural injustices — against black people, or trans people, or poor people, or fat people, or indigenous populations, or nonhuman animals — often describe themselves as “tired.” I can well believe it. Constantly attending to what you’d be a bad person if you stopped attending to sounds exhausting. But it is important to distinguish what a plausible claim to tiredness can justify — namely, a concession that one has done enough of “the work” — from anything having in any way to do with leisure. You may deserve a break, but you can’t deserve the leisurely use of that break. When you make serious use of leisure, you don’t treat it as a relief from anything. 

    The serious use of leisure is intrinsically inegalitarian and intrinsically ruthless. The person who is to use their leisure for leisure is necessarily disengaged from the plight of those unfortunate enough to lack it. Notice that even if suffering and misfortune were evenly distributed among humans, the serious use of leisure would still be inegalitarian, as long as that distribution were not perfectly time-synchronized. While you are at leisure, you ignore their suffering; when it is their turn to be at leisure, they will ignore yours. Those at leisure are neither embroiled in the struggle nor resting up so as to rejoin it. They have opted out of the struggle, too busy enjoying their lives to allow themselves to be pained by the fact that others cannot. To an activist, this indifference is unjustifiable. 

    A different flavor of unleisureliness is to be found in the ethos of the tech world, which valorizes an optimistic, can-do, progress-oriented, problem-solving attitude. Let’s cure disease, let’s extend human life, let’s simplify online payment, let’s make everything faster, cheaper, and more efficient — and let’s compete to get to be the ones who get to do these things. The backdrop to this world is the talent tournament, because so many aspects of it are structured as a series of competitions to enter later stages of the competition. Venture capital asks: can you prove that you have what it takes, that you will give your all, that you are presently a future winner? Whether one views this sector of the economy cynically, as being at bottom just an expression of unmitigated greed, or as sincerely seeking improvements in the human condition — probably there is some of both — the overall tenor is one of nonstop instrumental activity, a hubbub of busyness and scurry and conspicuous productivity. 

    Though tech founders talk the talk of “vision” and “creativity” and “innovation,” they have a tendency to confuse medium-sized ideas with big ideas. Increasing human lifespans is a medium- sized idea, decarbonization is a medium-sized idea, blockchain and smartphones and social media and ChatGPT are all medium-sized ideas. The idea that a technology like blockchain — which allows for strangers to transact in the absence of a centralized authority — could make possible a new form of social organization is the idea of a big idea, but you haven’t got the big idea itself until you specify what that form is and explain why it is good. One can dream of a future in which social media, for example, facilitates instead of impedes deep human connection, but a dream is different from an idea. If ChatGPT improved to the point where we wanted to count what it was doing as “thinking,” that would still only be a medium-sized idea. If ChatGPT could engage in leisurely thought, that would be a big idea. A big idea is not the kind of idea that wins competitions, because a big idea has no peers. 

    The social justice activist conscripted into a forever war against the forces of oppression and iniquity has something in common with the tech founder piously sacrificing on the altar of progress and innovation: neither understands leisure. But if leisure is so difficult to appreciate, can we really be sure it is something that we want? I think the answer is yes.

    Derek Parfit noticed that, on a utilitarian calculus, if given the choice between a world with many poor people and one with few rich people, we should choose the former as long as the number of poor people is large enough, and as long as their lives meet the (fairly low) threshold of being worth living. He called his conclusion — that we should trade our wealthy, prosperous society for one teeming with people living just on the edge of subsistence — “repugnant.” But he doesn’t say why it is repugnant. I think the intuition of repugnance marks the fact that something inside of us is attuned to the value of leisure, and feels a deep resistance to allowing the world to be drained of it. Effective Altruism, which typically denies the repugnance of the repugnant conclusion, is a philosophy of leisurelessness: while you were at leisure, three babies drowned. If you are only allowed to take breaks from altruism so as to do more altruism, there is simply no room for leisure. 

    Having disparaged Aristotle’s account of pure leisure, let me point out that we can learn a lot about leisure from what he says on other topics. For example, on selling or eating eyeballs: 

    One can use each thing both for its natural purpose and otherwise, and either per se or again per accidens, as, for instance, one might use the eye for seeing, and also for falsely seeing by squinting, so that one thing appears as two. Both these uses are due to the eye being an eye, but it was possible to use the eye in another way — per accidens, e.g. if one could sell or eat it. 

    Aristotle thinks that there is such a thing as the native use of an eye as an eye — we can call this “pure seeing” — but he also wants to grant the possibility of impure forms of seeing. Squinting is still seeing, even if it is not the perfect kind of seeing. And then there is simply treating the eye as a means to some other end in disregard of its native use altogether — when one sells it or eats it. These uses are not “due to the eye being an eye;” they are not any kind of seeing.

    What Aristotle says about eyes, I want to say about time. One can use time for external ends, working joylessly under possibly miserable conditions for the sake of mere survival, and using rest merely as a way of recuperating from and forgetting work. That way of using your time is like selling the eye or eating it. One can also use time in a way that imperfectly reflects its native use, when one pursues rewarding and engaging work and when one spends one’s rest time in the sorts of guiltless pleasures that make a person proud to have pursued them. That is like squinting. Aristotle’s point is: eating the eye and squinting with it are not the whole story, there has to be a third thing you can do with the eye, with reference to which we understand the other two, and that third thing is seeing. We should believe in the possibility of pure, undistorted leisure for the same reason that we believe in the possibility of pure, undistorted seeing. And that means there must be such a thing as a use of time that is not structured by external pressures but solely by the engine of our own efforts and desires, something that human beings do with their time when it is truly their own. Yet Aristotle didn’t know what that was, and I don’t know what it is, and you don’t know, either. And this, to quote Keynes, is a “fearful problem.” 

    You might reply: yes, but at the moment there is a more fearful problem, namely Keynes’ economic problem. Before we worry about how we might be misusing our leisure, we should worry about all the people who aren’t anywhere close to having any. That reaction is empathetic, but it is also evasive. George Orwell once observed that “every revolutionary opinion draws part of its strength from a secret conviction that nothing can be changed.” Serious concern with injustice means not indefinitely deferring the question of what one will do after it is eliminated.

    In the Marxist utopia, “it is no longer labor time that is the measure of wealth, but rather disposable time.” But how should we dispose of it? That quotation from Marx’s Capital appears in Martin Haggelund’s book This Life, which celebrates the prospect of a world in which we “reduce the necessary labor of society to a minimum,” so that people can have as much “socially available free time” as possible: 

    We can affirm as a feature of our freedom that all the members of the household now have more time to lead their lives: to pursue their education or chosen profession, to connect with people who matter to them, to engage in sports or dancing, to observe nature, to read or paint, to learn new skills, or to engage in some other way with the question of what they ought to do with their time.

    Haggelund cannot be accused of wholly ignoring the question of how to use one’s free time, given that he lists some possible uses, and goes on to grant that merely having the time to “engage in some way” with the question “cannot guarantee” that the way will be “productive.” But he doesn’t explain why the uses that he cites are good ones and not just his own preferences, or what “productive” means, possibly because “there are no given answers to these questions of our practical and existential identity, which is why the actualization of freedom requires that we have the time and the material resources to engage them as the demanding questions that they are.”

    I am not sure what Haggelund means by “no given answers” or “existential identity” or “the actualization of freedom,” but I fear that what he is really saying here is that there is no way to solve Keynes’ second problem, the problem of free time; that each person just has to come up with a way — any way — to dispose of his time; and that the name for these inventions is “freedom.” If that is indeed his view, he is in esteemed company: in the past century, many philosophical houses have been built on the foundation of existential despair. 

    Everyone understands the economic problem as a social problem, and just about everyone thinks that gradual collective progress on it has been, and is continuing to be, made. If individual human beings are to survive, if the species is to sustain itself into the future, then we must work together both to acquire knowledge, and to create the institutions and technology and laws that support our continued shared existence. That much is obvious. What is less obvious is that the problem of free time is also a social problem, one on which we can also make real progress, over time, if we work together. The problem of leisure is both harder and more social than the economic problem: whereas surviving on your own is difficult, finding meaning on your own might just be impossible. 

    When it comes to the problem of leisure, I believe the battlefield has shifted. Perhaps in 1930 the idle rich aristocrats were “our advance guard — those who are spying out the promised land for the rest of us and pitching their camp there.” Today’s idle rich, however, have no cultural significance. No one even knows who they are. The prominent rich people in our world are obsessively hard-working; they are the rearmost part of the rear guard. I return, thus, to my initial assertion, which is that today it is the students who are on the front lines. Scholē means school. At any rate, that is what it ought to mean.

    Imagine that we go back in time and inform Keynes of the upcoming higher education explosion: in a hundred years’ time the number of students in higher education in the United Kingdom will rise by 5,000 percent, although the total population will not even double. His response might be to credit us with a creative approach to the leisure problem: “Ah, I see! Instead of bringing work hours down over a lifetime, you have given people four years of intense leisure early in their adult lives.” How sadly mistaken he would be.

    At a recent event on campus, about a hundred of my undergraduate students were gathered together and one of them said: “Let’s be real, the reason we’re here is to get a job.” Everyone nodded. But if you “have to” go to college to get a decent job, that makes school work-like. Enemies of higher education are likely to make the opposite complaint, which is that it is too rest-like. They are eager to paint students as deadbeats who could be doing something more productive with their time. Recall when Ted Cruz disparaged “that slacker barista who wasted seven years in college studying completely useless things…” or when Rick Scott, then the governor of Florida, declared that “we don’t need a lot more anthropologists in the state… I want to spend our dollars [on] STEM… so when they get out of school, they can get a job.” Similarly in Britain, Rishi Sunak declared that “too many young people are being sold a false dream… a poor-quality course… that doesn’t offer the prospect of a decent job” and Nigel Farage instructed that “uni should be free for STEM… For the rest, folks, too many of you are going to university. You’d have been better off learning trades and earning real dough.” These sentiments have been echoed by politicians and education ministers all over the world. College education has become the epicenter of our discontent over the rest-work cycle, occupying a place in the culture wars that would have been unthinkable in Keynes’ day. And yet, as much as we are at each other’s throats over education, I think we might not be disagreeing enough.

    When did everyone decide to accept the premise that the goal of college is to make students more productive? Even the defenders of the humanities object only to a narrowed understanding of “productivity,” insisting that college trains you for more than just a job — it prepares you for being a democratic citizen or being a cultured person or leading a fulfilling life. Not even the champions of humanism consider the possibility that college might not need to be construed as a preparation. Instead of thinking of humanistic learning as a prequel to real life, what if we conceived of it as real life? What if college is scholē? 

    Leisure, it must be sadly or angrily recognized, is not a large part of life for most people. Some people do not go to college, and some of those who do go to college do so under exceptionally unleisurely circumstances. Even students lucky enough to have a paradigmatically scholastic college experience will go on to spend most of their lives outside of school.  Am I saying that they are all necessarily deprived of serious leisure?  Not necessarily, not any more than someone is necessarily deprived of artistic experience outside museums. But there is a reason why, when people engage in serious leisure later in life, they often think of themselves as “going back to school.” We dedicate a place to some value not because you cannot find it elsewhere, but because the task of finding it is hard enough to warrant specialists.  Students are supposed to be the specialists. If you find this suggestion absurd, I challenge you to improve upon it. The problem of leisure is upon us, and it is not going to solve itself. Someone has got to be on the front lines. If not the students, then who? Do you prefer the landed gentry? 

     

    My oldest child was four or five years old when I first started taking him to museums. I struggled to get him to pay attention to the paintings — he would just rush past them — so I developed the following strategy. I would pick a painting and tell him, “In this picture, there is a secret. It is our job to figure out what it is.” When this worked, we would spend a long time staring at the painting, discussing what was unusual about it, floating various theories of what its secret could be, and walk away with a sense of pride: it had yielded its treasures to no one in the room but us. 

    We live all our lives in the museum of reality, rushing past blurry wonders until one day someone forces us to stop. We find ourselves gathered together in a group in front of one of the paintings, and there is someone who tells us: “here, there is a secret.” And then we find we can look for a long time, with a look that is energized instead of sated by what it finds, so that the more we see the more we want to look, because what seemed like a surface turns out to hide a whole world behind it—or none of that happens, and we go through the motions of cooperating with the group, bored and disaffected and impatient to keep moving. Perhaps this was not the painting for us. School does not always work, but when it does it works by tapping into a source of human energy and motivation that is, if not bottomless, at least as profound as the reality it seeks to know.

     

    Poems by Rosanna Warren

    Divination I

    God god god I heard the word

    rattling and buzzing in the cubicle

    of the elevator car, thwacking the walls

    and rebounding as it rode 

    relentlessly up and down in the School of Theology

    every day, every evening, season after season;

    it escaped, too, down the fluorescently dazzled linoleum halls

    when the door slid open, it dizzied into seminar rooms

    and offices, befuddled blue books and tenure reviews.

    And sometimes the small, dry exoskeleton,

    two parched consonants and one shriveled vowel, lay

    on the elevator floor before the janitor

    swept it up. But a new

    god-word always flitted in and resumed the hurtle,

    the bluster, the thrum, by which we knew

    business would survive, livelihoods were

    assured, and we would keep being pestered

    by an alien vocable no one could seize on the wing

    and which might, in an instant, sting.

    Divination II

    But what to do with the body—

    the body in the city, bare buttocks on Third Avenue,

    flesh in morning light, a human crouched

    in the gutter, shitting—having nowhere else—

    face hooded, just the pale sagging melons exposed as trucks

    clank past:

    “There be many that say,

    who will shew us any good?” The

    pavement glints under my feet. Glamour

    streaks the East River, whorls

     in conflicting currents. I am at odds

    with myself. Above us soar

    glass and steel towers, brute vertical rule,

    crypto-ledgers piercing poisoned air:

    Moloch’s this furnace. And the molten prayer.

     

    The Cabin (Partita)

    With the power out, we worked

    by candlelight, you setting

    mousetraps with peanut butter dabbed

    and the metal bar

    hinged back and balanced

    not to snap your fingers, I asquint

    over my notebook, trying to form

    letters in the near-dark. Which is how we

    work, even in electric light. A shadow 

    nibbles the mind: will your numbers

    line up to catch the conjecture, will my

    words touch anything alive? In the

    solstice pit of December

    you climb to the attic where you play

    the Bach partita on the frigid keyboard until

    your fingertips bleed. Art isn’t meant

    to comfort. But

    it can bring us into the hot

    real: the rare, the treasured

    shock when the notes line up and then

    flip upside down reflecting

    perfectly as if they remembered

    a conjecture backwards. When I wake

    deep in the night,

    moonlight lies across the meadow as starkly as snow.

    And it is snow.

     

    Against Nuclear Stoicism, or the Wisdom of Fear 

     

     

    “May you burn in hell like you are going to burn here.”

    — Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, upon ordering a massive nuclear strike on the Soviet Union at the conclusion of a Pentagon nuclear war game in 1983 

    For eighty years, the world has lived with the knowledge that a small number of nations have it in their power, in an instant, to commit genocide, to destroy civilization, and to eradicate most forms of life on Earth. In the main, international society has accommodated itself to this fact of the nuclear age in much the same way people accommodate themselves to the fact that they might be run over by a car, bitten by a shark, or attacked by an ax murderer. These events are all possible, of course, but none is felt constantly to be likely or imminent, and so each occupies space in dark precincts of the mind, emerging only occasionally through an act of the subconscious or when called forth by a tragic news report or a popcorn horror show.  

    For the average global citizen, this coping mechanism is both understandable and necessary. For what is someone in Gabon, or Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Russia, or Pakistan really to do? Even in the United States, the successes of the peace movement of the 1980s had to do only with how many nuclear weapons the country would have, whether it needed to keep testing them, and where it would put them. Not trivial matters, to be sure, but matters that still had very little to do with what makes nuclear weapons so catastrophically dangerous. It is not, after all, strategy — numbers of warheads, projectile throw-weights, the placement of delivery systems, or their targets — that suspends humankind on the cliff-edge of oblivion. The danger isn’t physics and it isn’t politics. The danger is that nuclear restraint is a miracle, and the world is choosing to believe in it.  

    In the early 1700s, a teenaged David Hume became captivated by the moral philosophy of the Stoics. Not satisfied simply to improve his intellect by consuming the works of Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, he determined also to put their teachings into practice  — to follow their instructions about how to achieve happiness through the mastery of emotion and the honing of virtue. And so he embarked upon training his mind, living simply and exercising rigid self-restraint, engaging in deep introspection, and otherwise seeking to cultivate his ability to reason such that it would inure him to the pains and pleasures of life on earth. As he reported in a lengthy retrospective missive in the mid-1730s, this experiment not only cured him of his attraction to ancient moral philosophy, but also convinced him that the Stoics’ theory of human nature was bollocks. He had not emerged happier or more virtuous, as had been the promise. The victory of the rational over the emotional, in his experience, was Pyrrhic. 

    This realization awoke in Hume the conviction that there was a need for a new theory of human nature, one on which a philosophy of how to live well could be built — a philosophy that, contrary to Stoicism, did not believe that happiness required negating corporeal sensations and internal passions, but that instead gave them their due. And so he set about to produce a “science of man.” He would use newly emerging techniques of scientific discovery — experimentation and observation — to uncover and explain the relationship between feeling and reasoning. This empiricism, he believed, was the necessary foundation for philosophy to have any chance of pointing the way to human happiness. 

    The outcome of Hume’s inquiry was A Treatise on Human Nature, which he produced in his twenties. In it, Hume concludes from his own experiences together with his observations of the experiences of others, that reason and emotion are not severable from each other. What it is that humans experience as reason is the product of what they have felt, are feeling, and anticipate that they will feel. These feelings first are immediate sensory experiences, or what Hume calls the “violent passions” — fear, joy, anger, love, and so forth. They then are rendered down, through memory and reflection, into such “calm passions” as morality, sympathy, compassion, and justice. 

    These passions, violent and calm, he says, are the forces that move people to act. Reason on its own, unmatched with a passion, is inert. It can identify facts and make associations, and so it can calculate which actions are more or less likely to make a person sad or happy, to satisfy greed or generosity, inspire fear, or call forth pride or shame. But reason alone cannot impel action; it cannot offer the purpose, only the means. And so, he says, reason “is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” 

    Hume thus patently rejected the ancients’ assumption that reason and emotion are in constant battle with each other, and that virtue is achieved and happiness is the reward when reason wins. And while he passed no judgment on the righteousness of it, he did consider instances in which it was the calm passions that motivated action to be evidence of “strength of mind.” Like the Stoics, however, Hume acknowledged that it was common for it to go the other way round — for the violent passions, which are felt immediately and vividly, to overpower the calm. This fact of human nature meant that strength of mind was not a talent to be exercised but a craft to be practiced; absent cultivation, the calm passions are too easily overrun.  

    In 1945, the United States of America detonated two nuclear weapons over Japan, the first over Hiroshima and the second over Nagasaki. The extent and the duration of the devastation that those weapons caused was not immediately clear. It has since become very much so. The horrors that the people in those cities experienced remain terrifying because what happened to them then was minor compared to what the world’s nuclear arsenals can make happen to anyone, anywhere, now. 

    Many of the scientists who built those first two atomic bombs and some of the policymakers who directed their use concluded from Hiroshima and Nagasaki that no reasonable person could consider nuclear weapons anything other than a last resort. They are weapons, that is, for employment only in extremis, when the population for which a leader holds ultimate responsibility is at imminent risk of being politically overtaken or physically destroyed — and perhaps not even then. Indeed, in his final State of the Union address, President Harry Truman — the same man who had made the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and to dramatically expand the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and to create thermonuclear weapons — told the nation that “the war of the future would be one in which man could… destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations. Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men.” 

    This essential conclusion, however, arrived at by the person most intimate with the responsibility for the use of the bomb, is absent from the eighty-year history of official U.S. nuclear strategy. That history is instead a record of how analysts, policymakers, and military officials have attempted to convince potential adversaries of precisely the opposite. For eight decades, the United States has tried to make the world believe that the United States can wage nuclear war; that in certain circumstances it will wage nuclear war; and that it will win nuclear war. An adversary so persuaded, the logic goes, would not dare attempt an attack against the United States, or any other state to which it has extended its protection. This is the theory of nuclear deterrence that the United States has implemented through a sequence of nuclear strategies — decisions about how many nuclear weapons the United States should have, of what types, where they should be placed, and what they should target— since 1945. 

    Like all strategies, the nuclear kind are at least nominally designed to solve a problem. Between 1945 and 1949, the practical nuclear problem was one of anticipation. There was very little doubt that the Soviet Union would build its own arsenal of nuclear weapons, it was just a matter of how quickly. The goal of American nuclear strategy, therefore, was to ensure that the United States, for as long as possible, would have more of them. This strategy succeeded; for years after the first Soviet demonstration of nuclear capability, it did, indeed, have fewer of them than the United States  — though fewer was still plenty. 

    The more nettlesome problem thereafter was to figure out where these weapons fit in American defense strategy — the ways in which and the purposes for which the United States would use the threat and application of violence to secure the homeland and protect the nation’s vital interests abroad. Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations puzzled over whether to treat nuclear weapons as occupying a special category and therefore being something apart from regular, conventional weapons, or whether such treatment reflected a layperson’s artificiality more than it did a military reality. Eisenhower settled the matter by determining that there were two immediate problems that the American nuclear arsenal, and only the American nuclear arsenal, would solve. The first was to defend the United States against the possibility of a nuclear attack. The second was to remove any temptation for the Soviet Union to invade Europe. The USSR, at the time, was bristling with soldiers, airplanes, tanks, and other means of land advance that the United States and its European allies simply could not match. 

    The solution was that if Moscow did either, then Washington would respond by dropping nuclear bombs on the Soviet Union itself. The United States would implement a strategy of “massive retaliation.” This strategy, based as it was on the threat not of initiating but of responding, required the United States to be able to strike back even after absorbing an attack itself — to have a secure second-strike capability. If the Soviets thought they could destroy the U.S. nuclear arsenal with a surprise “glorious first strike,” however, then Massive Retaliation was a massive misnomer. It would have no deterrent effect and in fact might tempt Moscow to try for a knock-out blow. 

    Massive Retaliation thus turned wholly on making Soviet leaders fear that launching a nuclear strike would guarantee receiving one. To achieve this in implementation, American nuclear forces were designed to have four characteristics meant to degrade the Soviets’ confidence in their ability to destroy the full complement of American nuclear weapons. First, they would be defended against attack. In the great plains the United States built an expansive network of silos — cavernously deep tubes made of heavily reinforced concrete and covered by multi-ton blast doors  — within which its land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were suspended on massive shock absorbers. 

    Second, American nuclear air forces, its long-range strategic bombers, would be dispersed across the country and kept in a perpetual state of readiness. This imperative of rapid deployment was taken so seriously that some aircrews lived underground, in “mole-holes,” an arrangement that would allow them to scurry directly from quarters onto the taxiway and into their airframes for speedy takeoff. 

    Third, the United States would have nuclear-armed submarines constantly roaming under cover of the globe’s three-hundred-and-twenty-one million cubic miles of salty, murky, noisy, rocky, and vastly deep ocean water. And finally American nuclear forces —  the “strategic redundancy” of the triad of ICBMs, bombers, and submarines — would be plentiful. Together, these characteristics would confront the Soviet Union with a set of targets that were numerous, widespread, defended, mobile, and hidden.

    By the time Eisenhower left office, the United States had fielded its first of what would grow to forty-one ballistic missile submarines, initiated development of more than 1,000 ICBM silos, maintained a fleet of more than 1,500 strategic aircraft and amassed upwards of 18,000 nuclear warheads with which to arm them. Although the warhead stockpile has changed in size and composition over time, the basic contours of the structure that began with Eisenhower, the nuclear triad, has remained solidly in place ever since.

    One could be forgiven for thinking that this complement of bombs, rockets, airframes, and underwater vessels, which provide the United States with as much confidence in its second-strike capability as it is possible to have, surely was then and remains now an adequate and durable approach to securing the United States against all external threats. And yet between 1960 and today there have been successive rounds of intense academic and political debate about whether the United States does, in fact, have enough nuclear capability and, if so, how it can prove it. 

    Under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations the having and the proving were bundled into what has been called the strategy of “flexible response.” Although analysts and historians have since demonstrated that “flexible response” was more rhetorical than actual — the Department of Defense did not, in fact, reshape its nuclear war plans to be less massively retaliatory and more flexible and responsive — it did reflect a growing suspicion that massive retaliation would not solve the problem of the day. That problem was not the possibility of a glorious first strike or sudden invasion of Europe, it was the probability of inglorious first bites — Soviet incrementalism, salami tactics, and small territorial incursions that were contrary to American interests but that would hardly merit an all-out nuclear response. 

    Flexible response, therefore, was meant to offer policymakers options for nuclear use that were more proportionate to a range of potential offenses than reflexive and indiscriminate destruction of military and urban industrial targets and, with them, population centers would be. The intent was to arrive at more reasonable alternatives that, by merit of being more reasonable, would make the Soviets less likely to transgress in the first place. What the doctrine of flexible response began in theory the Nixon administration extended into practice in a pursuit of reasonableness that they called the doctrine of limited nuclear options (LNO). By the time Nixon and his team entered office, the United States had amassed 30,000 warheads in sizes that ranged from an artillery shell to a massive gravity bomb. The core of America’s nuclear capability was located in the United States, with intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers distributed around the country. But its fingers were buried in Europe — the continent was home to more than 7,000 U.S. nuclear weapons — and its toes in Asia, which housed nearly 1,000 of them. So, too, were American nuclear-tipped missiles constantly winding through the global bloodstream on quieted submarines. 

    LNO didn’t seek to reshape the body of this arrangement, but it wanted to substantially rewire its central nervous system. It sought to change what the American arsenal targeted and how the decision to fire on those targets was made. The point of massive retaliation had been to enable uncontrolled nuclear disaster; the point of LNO was to enable controlled nuclear disaster. Under massive retaliation nuclear war was a cascade of dominoes, a rapid gravitational progression toward an inevitable cataclysmic conclusion. The Nixon administration wanted LNO to be a game of chess, with leaders making sequential choices over time, and the final outcome the product of negotiation through extreme violence. And so LNO invested in improving the accuracy of delivery systems and sought to change operational plans to give decisionmakers more discretion over which weapons to fire, on what targets, and when.

    Although subsequent presidential administrations made adjustments around the margins and added their own rhetorical flourishes to its name, the essential concept of LNO has been a persistent feature of American nuclear strategy ever since. Each president from Nixon forward, that is, has accepted the premise that fighting nuclear war will be like playing a chess match. And together they have bet trillions of American taxpayer dollars on the belief that the leaders of all other nuclear-armed states accept that premise, too. 

    Hume was just as inclined to apply empiricism to other fundamental spheres of life — commerce, politics, ethics, and social order — as he was to human nature. Central to his treatment of each was his insistence that belief, whether in a promise of payment for work completed or in a threat of punishment for breaking the law, arises from the conjunction of thought with feeling as shaped by experience. To be believed, that is, a promise or a threat must provoke a passion. Thus Hume believed a person is moved to sign a contract only when past experience generates the feeling of trust that it will be paid. And threats of consequence for breaking the law motivate compliance through the apprehension generated by the experience of having seen punishments carried out.  

    Although he largely left the matter of religion alone, Hume makes this argument most sharply in his discussion of miracles. A miracle, after all, is definitionally abnormal. A departure from the expected. A breach of order. Therefore to believe in a miracle is to believe in an occurrence that is contrary to all human experiences, except as reported by a small few. The inevitable conclusion, then, is that to believe in a miracle — all miracles, not just particular ones under particular conditions — is unreasonable. This is so because those who are not themselves witness to the miracle have only the testimony of others upon which to rely. And no matter how reliable, how serious, how consistent a person that witness might be, his testimony must be taken in context with the volume of experiences — the millions of contrary observations, repeated throughout history — that are “against the reliability of the report.” For Hume, no person’s reputation for honor, honesty, or integrity can overcome this test. Belief can only accord with the steady weight of experience.

    The theories of flexible response and limited nuclear options were efforts to address the central dilemma of nuclear weapons, which is that they aren’t very useful for anything other than annihilation. The scientists, strategists, and military officials who ushered in the atomic age recognized this fact early on. But rather than satisfy themselves and the policymakers they counseled that these weapons could only be used as an insurance policy — that their possession was the closest any state could have to a guarantee of not suffering surprise attack or invasion — some of them determined instead to resolve the dilemma. They wanted to make the case that nuclear weapons could, in fact, be useful for defending allies, and even for prevailing in lesser conflicts of interest.

    This drive to tame nuclear weapons and bend them to political will found its expression in game theory, a field of study that had been gaining traction among economists since the 1940s. In 1954, the RAND Corporation, the defense research and analysis outfit, introduced the discipline into military matters as the “Theory of Games of Strategy,” in a monograph entitled The Compleat Strategyst. Game theory is obsessed with solutions. More specifically, it is obsessed with winning solutions, whether winning means not doing worse than the status quo, accruing gains in absolute terms, accruing gains relative to an opponent, or decisively defeating that opponent. Game theory proposes that these winning solutions are discoverable through the elaboration of chains of logical if-then reasoning. It quantifies what decision-makers value — which outcomes they desire and which they disdain; it maps, as a decision tree, the courses of action available to each actor given the courses of action chosen by the other, and it represents how likely each outcome is to occur, given the possible combinations of those choices. 

    The argument for game theory in nuclear strategy is that it is the method through which the “priestly mathematical activity of the professional scientist” (as it is described rather cheekily in The Compleat Strategyst) can provide policymakers with a purely rational guide to action. So long as decision-makers are scrupulous in following its mathematically derived moves, uncontaminated by emotion, the guide will direct them towards winning solutions: the right decisions to make, given the decisions already made by, and in light of the next steps available to, the opponent. What stoicism prescribed as the path to human happiness, game theory prescribed as the path to nuclear victory. Adhering strictly to its logics, undistracted and unimpeded by the passions, game theory would, for the president with the great misfortune to have to ask, answer the question of whether it was better to bomb Minsk or Magnitogorsk in response to a Soviet attack on Tokyo or Toledo. 

    The answer to this and many other such questions — and there were many, given that the United States and the Soviet Union had interests that bumped up against each other all around the world — would dictate which weapons the United States would need to have, and where it would need to put them, to make the tree’s branches available to the President in the event of war. These choices concerned which U.S. nuclear forces to posture and where they would be visible to the adversary; the Soviet Union generally knew where the United States was putting its warheads and which areas of Soviet territory those weapons put at risk, and the United States knew the same about Soviet forces. This mutual knowledge, together with public and private pronouncements of policy, strategy, and doctrine, were to be used by both sides to anticipate what the other could do and to prepare to impose a punishment if they did it. This meant that each side could calibrate its own moves to keep wars from escalating beyond a few, limited nuclear detonations to all-out nuclear exchange. 

    Converting nuclear dominoes into nuclear chess, in other words, could be achieved through sterile quantification, ruthless rationality, and careful step-wise progression through an intricate sequencing of threats. All policymakers needed to do to prevent Armageddon was to follow mathematical instructions about what to threaten and when. So long as they did, the United States could prevent nuclear war or, if it came to it, get out of one with a winning solution. 

    This promise of control, nestled in protective math, is nonetheless battered by an ocean of corroding experience. The whole history of U.S. nuclear strategy is a record of nonperformance. All that holds each intricate construction of threats together is the testimony of a small number of officials, some of whom are people of honor, honesty, and integrity and others not, who claim they will do something that none of them has ever done. And no person, taking this testimony in context with the steady weight of experience, the millions of contrary observations that are against the reliability of the report, could reasonably believe it. The only reasonable conclusion, in fact, is that nuclear restraint doesn’t have anything to do with U.S. nuclear strategy at all, that the carefully pruned decision trees with branching equations and calculus-laden leaves, this whole anti-empirical business of nuclear stoicism, is bollocks. 

    What that leaves as the solution to the world’s nuclear problem is the solution that human nature reveals intuitively and viscerally: fear. Fear, in the first instance, that the terror and suffering and death inflicted upon the people of Japan will be inflicted upon one’s own. Fear, in the second instance, that even if a first strike is survivable, the war will not in fact be controlled and there will be a next strike, and a next, and a next. Fear that the actual human beings in charge in the moment — Kim Jong Un, Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, Benjamin Netanyahu, Narendra Modi, Asif Ali Zardari, Emmanuel Macron, and Keir Starmer, and those who will follow tomorrow — will have their calm passions overrun by their violent ones. Fear that the reasonableness of American nuclear strategy really is nothing more than a laughable fiction, because nuclear chess, no matter how rationally played, doesn’t come to much if just one participant succumbs to the urge to make the dominoes fall. 

    Hume often and rightly is credited with having advanced the application of empiricism in domains that for centuries had been dominated by metaphysics. But this alone is insufficient to explain his lasting influence not just on philosophy, but on almost every discipline in the social sciences, from moral psychology to anthropology to economics and political science. More than the application of a new method, what distinguishes Hume, what gives his works this special breadth and durability, are the conclusions to which his use of that method led. 

    From Hume comes an account of human nature that reflects the reality of living in bodies that are embedded in and constantly experiencing the world. His is an account that opens the door to philosophies of the good life that do not demand the constant, arduous, and in his experience far from rewarding attempt to make feeling — sensation or emotion — subordinate to logic. By elevating the passions to be co-equal with rationality, giving the motivational “why” to reason’s mechanical “how,” Hume suggests that the good life can only ever be achieved through their partnership. More than this, however, his work suggests that it is the mutual dependence of feeling and thought that make it possible to act in ways that are intrinsically human and, if one so chooses, humane. 

    The idea that the more than 5,000 nuclear warheads and almost 1,000 delivery vehicles in the nation’s nuclear arsenal might not be enough capability, that the United States needs to prepare to make more, to have more, and to prove it, is again gaining traction in Washington. Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and his nuclear hints and allegations during its course contribute to a general unease about nuclear affairs. But the primary driver of renewed complaints about the inadequacy of the American nuclear arsenal is China. 

    China entered the nuclear club in the 1960s as a minimalist, creating and maintaining the smallest possible nuclear force needed to ensure it could strike back if it was struck first. In 1990, China was estimated to have approximately 200 nuclear warheads. In 2010, it was estimated to have approximately 200 nuclear warheads. In 2016, it was estimated to have approximately 200 nuclear warheads. In 2020, it was estimated to have between 200 and 300 nuclear warheads. In 2024, it was estimated to possess approximately 600, and what was then called the U.S. Department of Defense predicted that by 2030 it will have 1,000.

    China’s recent nuclear expansion, of course, did not occur in a vacuum. Since the latter years of the Obama administration, the U.S. national security apparatus has been increasingly captured by the view that China is aggressive and of malign intent — toward Taiwan, toward its neighbors, and toward the United States of America. This was not a position invented from whole cloth. China had spent the prior decades making significant investments in modernizing its military by increasing the number and sophistication of its planes and ships, advancing the technologies behind its command-and-control infrastructure, and reorganizing and retraining its forces. 

    The first Trump administration, recognizing that American military dominance in East Asia was no longer assured and disliking that fact, pointed the limousine of state firmly in the direction of confronting China as a strategic rival. The Biden administration stepped on the gas. Between 2016 and 2024 the United States generated multiple national security and defense documents identifying China as an adversary. It imposed tariffs on trade and export controls on advanced technologies. The then-Department of Defense oriented itself around preparing to fight a war over Taiwan, and U.S. officials regularly shuffled through East Asia, the small islands of the Western Pacific, and Europe to enlist allies, partners, and friends into the effort. The D.C. establishment engaged in debates, sometimes with an unseemly relish, about whether this was the dawn of Cold War 2.0 and about what needed to be done to win it. It did not seem dismaying, to some, that the bad old days might be here again. 

    Yanking off the dust cover and ginning up the Cold War engine to crank out new game- theoretical solutions to nuclear problems surely appeals to a wide constituency — to the professional researchers and strategists inside and outside of government who will be paid to do the gaming and the theorizing, to the defense industries that manufacture the bombs and the next generation of platforms to get them where they will need to go, to the policymakers who take comfort in being able to offload onto the branches of a decision tree some of the weight of responsibility for choices about nuclear employment, and to the citizen who is reassured by the thought that the people in charge know what they are doing. 

    But China’s nuclear arsenal is a responsive force. It is not, as had been the Soviet Union’s, designed to hit first. It is designed to hit last. And so its sizing should not be expected to be static but rather elastic; what Beijing holds in its arsenal should be expected to change as its perceptions of the likelihood of suffering a first strike change. It should be expected to continuously calculate how much of an arsenal it needs to secure its second-strike capability to make sure it can keep fear alive. 

    The United States could very well choose to do the same. But giving fear its due and making it the center of nuclear strategy produces only a policy of moderation, one that says that in a world in which nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented the country must have enough of them, and that enough of them can be enough. And so it galvanizes neither the nuclear abolitionists nor the nuclear maximalists, and has no direct constituencies unless one counts remuneration to the small number of reporters and authors and artists — the late William Langewiesche, Kathleen Kingsbury, W. J. Hennigan, and Katherine Bigelow notably among them — trying valiantly to remind Americans of just how very afraid they really ought to be.  

    Attachment to the myth of nuclear stoicism, to the idea that nuclear decision-making achieves its highest form when it is game- theoretical, exsanguinated of the passions, is a tragedy. It is the fig leaf that pretends to prevent the eye from seeing that in nuclear war what is logical is also profoundly inhumane, and that what is humane is only so because it is emotional. So, too, has the pretense of nuclear stoicism made the atomic age grievously wasteful. Treasures have been ill spent. Environments have been contaminated and people harmed by nuclear tests and nuclear runoff and nuclear accidents. Talent and ingenuity and even genius have been frittered away devising how nations can most efficiently destroy one another rather than on how to tend to the health, wealth, and well-being of their own citizens. Presidents, premiers, and prime ministers have lit diplomatic capital on fire negotiating the placement of missiles in wealthy nations rather than on figuring out how to get food to the famine-stricken in poor ones. 

    And it has allowed generations of policymakers not to take responsibility for the unconscionable hubris of a nuclear strategy according to which attempting to perpetuate America’s political ideology, however cherished it may be, could one day justify the premeditated murder of millions of people as it has already justified the knowing endangerment of humankind. A trite litany of sins perhaps, but being trite makes it no less true, and certainly no less shameful.

     

    Up to the Gate of Mercy: With Celan at Columbia

    In the spring of 2024 I taught a comparative literature class at Columbia University called Unland: Writing Utopias. The word Unland is a neologism of the German-Jewish poet Paul Celan, from his poem “Hawdalah” from 1963. Unland, in my reading, could refer to a decimated postwar geography that is no longer recognizable as itself. It could refer to the ghoulish moral transformation of a polity like Germany, whose population had become “unpeople” (Unmenschen) — people who commit heinous acts and deny them, who are haunted by their crimes. The German word alludes to the Greek etymology of utopia, ou topos, a no-place that is ever-emergent, unconnected to any existing political entity. Unland struck me as connoting a tentative “not yet,” a place in formation, like the nascent State of Israel in 1963 and perhaps more aptly like poetry, a place where one exists as if “dreamed.” Here one can convene with murdered friends and family, parlay with an inscrutable divinity, hold and cherish words independent from their worn-out everyday use. Through this sacred intentionality the post-Shoah poet grasps for scraps of healing in the face of unspeakable loss. The poet in the rubble strives for new realms, where contradiction hangs together, where life and justice are honored, while at the same time casting critical, even satirical aspersions at the apocalyptically failed politics of the present. 

    In other classes I taught, Celan appeared in the context of German postwar writers, in a larger arc of German-Jewish writing from the Enlightenment to the present. But in this class I relished the opportunity to place Celan in a culturally heterogeneous and transhistorical context, in which science fiction mingled with highbrow literature. We read speculative writers whose depiction of reality was touched by dystopian or utopian alterations, who found refuge in writing itself as a realm suspended from the invariable violence of the real world to which they respond. Touching off from Celan’s poem, we read The Castle by Franz Kafka, “Uqbar, Tlön, Tertius Orbis” by Jorge Luis Borges, and works by Georg Büchner, Shakespeare, Theodor W. Adorno, Italo Calvino, Ursula K. Le Guin, Stanisław Lem, Samuel Delany, and Donna J. Haraway. 

    I found the syllabus to be one of the most rewarding and intriguing I had ever taught, and I had a sensitive and highly engaged group of eighteen students representing many academic disciplines and countries of origin. After teaching in Columbia’s Core curriculum I found it gratifying to work closely with texts by Kafka and Celan, paying careful attention to the violent antiJewish context that shaped their writings, while also engaging both of them as “world” writers who set formal and thematic precedents for writers in many languages. Celan, as I was coming to see him, offered a unique link between canons that were deeply Jewish and deeply Western. He was not a Jew who had shed his “accidental” biography in order to join a wider discourse; rather, the precision and subtlety of his Jewish references, the delicacy of his language, and the necessity for clear context about the Holocaust seemed to make his writing more rather than less universal. 

    Yet the spring of 2024 was one of the most challenging and painful semesters I ever spent in a university setting. As the war between Israel and Gaza worsened in the Middle East, Columbia’s campus became a global flashpoint for its vociferous protest movement, whose organizers possessed a newfound faith, in the wake of the brutal Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, that “anti-colonial” violence was not only justified, but a most effective tool for bringing a just future to Israel-Palestine. In addition to the protest movement, the university’s administration was under scrutiny for its failure to set a tone of civil, compassionate, and informed discourse, at a moment when students connected to all sides of the war were in deep pain. They pursued a strategy of police crackdowns that incensed the university community and escalated the conflict between protesters and the administration. 

    On April 30, 2024, this escalation came to a head when activists forcefully occupied Hamilton Hall, the home of my department at the time, draping a banner that renamed the building for Hind Rajab, a six-year-old girl who had been killed by the Israeli military in January. Banners were unfurled from all sides of the building, including “Free Palestine” written in English and Arabic, “Intifada,” and “Glory to the Martyrs: Tortuguita Vive, La Lucha Sigue,” referring to the police killing of Manuel Esteban Paez Terán, an environmental activist in Atlanta. The police presence was high around campus, and an atmosphere of chaos, confusion, and joy spread through Morningside Heights. There was a feeling that the orderly rule of the university had been breached and, for a short while, the protest movement had wrested control. 

    Around 3 PM that afternoon, I stood at the corner of Amsterdam Avenue and 116th Street, steps from my office in Deutsches Haus, and looked on dumbstruck as a crowd of some three hundred protesters congregated at the base of Hamilton Hall outside the campus gates and erupted in ecstatic cheers as a masked protester appeared on the roof with a billowing Palestinian flag. Helicopters circled above and dozens of newscasters documented (and helped to comprise) the spectacle. 

    That evening the New York Police Department was called in for a massive evacuation, with many hundreds of officers in full riot gear. Students who came to see me later in the week expressed deep fear, even trauma, from having witnessed a swarm of police envelop the campus and the SWAT team break down the doors to Hamilton Hall, throwing flash grenades and — as we later found out — accidentally firing a bullet. Around this time of the semester we had been reading The Futurological Congress by Stanisław Lem, a dystopian satire of totalitarian police violence in the face of earth’s crippling overpopulation, including bombing campaigns that drop drugs to neurologically wire the population to experience happiness. 

    From this point onward, the social and infrastructural fabric of campus was so torn that it was impossible to teach as usual. Classes had been moved to Zoom and many students were no longer coming to campus. The precarity of my position as a fixed-term postdoctoral lecturer was intensifying as I navigated the anemic job market: I hesitated greatly, given my conflict-averse temperament and my disappointment in the university, to lead a frank or revealing discussion with my class about the conflict in the Middle East and on campus. Events featuring Israelis and Palestinians in conversation had been vigorously protested. A few months earlier the Boycott Divestment Sanction movement had called for the boycott of a prominent grassroots movement of Palestinian Israelis and Jewish Israelis organizing in opposition to the war in Gaza, the occupation of the West Bank, and the Hamas captivity of Israeli hostages in Gaza. Friends seeking to bring members of this group to Columbia decided to do so only on an unadvertised, invitation-only basis, out of fear that a publicized event would attract disruption and condemnation. 

    I held several strange “hybrid” sessions, with a group of students on the screen and a group at the table in our windowless basement classroom. Around this time one of the leaders of the most active protest group, Columbia University Apartheid Divest, was expelled from campus for one of its members saying, on camera, “You’re lucky that I’m not just going out and killing Zionists.” It was then that I decided, reluctantly, no longer to avoid the subject and to hold a discussion with my class, to share some of my own views, which I had not often seen expressed by faculty or campus leaders. I knew I had students in the course with a range of perspectives — some active in the protest movement and some not. After the encampments had been created one student wrote to me to plead that we move the class to Butler lawn in solidarity (“It’s time to take a stand,” he exhorted). I felt respect, admiration, and even affection for this eclectic group, and for the seriousness they had brought to our discussions of challenging, often abstract texts. 

    With reference to Kafka and Celan, I tried to explain the metaphysical and political significance that the creation of the State of Israel holds for most Jews, including me, while also expressing my profound reservations about the way that Israel was conducting the war, and my anger toward the cynicism, opportunism, and religious extremism that propelled the governing coalition. I expressed concerns with the protesters’ explicit and implicit appeals to violence, and I emphasized that refusing to stand in solidarity with them does not mean that one is complicit with war crimes in Gaza, or that one doesn’t care. I emphasized that the language used by protesters is consequential; that I felt the need to cultivate a new and productive language — perhaps connected to the poetic dimension of Unland — that can allow roughly seven million Jews and seven million Palestinians,  in some configuration, to peacefully share a land. In my view, the callous language from Columbia protesters risked inflaming and entrenching the wounds of violent conflict. 

    I was surprised by how sensitive and open my students were, how genuine their questions and observations were, as if they had begun to absorb our writers’ delicate approach to language. A Jewish student thanked me profusely for my words, particularly on the importance of careful nonviolent language. I was approached by several students who had been involved with the protests, including the person who had implored me to “take a stand” but had become increasingly disillusioned by the movement’s militant tone and incendiary actions. My words seemed to have opened up a space for them to voice their discomfort. One student expressed dismay that in order to enter the protest encampment, guards demanded that visitors pledge that they “are not Zionists” and that they are “committed to the liberation of Palestine.” She was thinking especially about the exclusion of Zionist-identifying friends who she strongly disagreed with but valued as interlocutors. Some of the students, I am sure, were confused or angered by what I had said. But my general perception was that it was a relief (rather than another burden) to air and discuss these issues.  

    It was disconcerting to me that even with the multiyear humanities Core Curriculum, and with some of the world’s leading experts on Israel-Palestine on faculty, members of the Columbia community seemed to hold such a flat understanding of the historical and cultural meaning of Zionism. Columbia takes pride in the rigor, the nuance, and the heterogeneity of its discourse, and in the wake of the murder of George Floyd in 2020 the humanities underwent a period of profound self-reflection, resulting in a commitment to greater representation, context, and sensitivity toward oppressed and marginalized peoples. As much as I learned during that period — and as much as I appreciated the attempts at greater inclusivity — I harbored reservations that the charge toward representational parity was being conducted with a sense of moral panic, even cynicism. At their worst, the sweeping interventions in the humanities approached literature as a flat conduit for sociological and historical information. The preoccupation with categorizing texts by their author’s identity — something we know, and that we know we know — risks losing touch with facets of the text that we continuously do not know: their multifariousness, their emergent and retrograde tendencies which reveal themselves across time, their fundamental mystery. 

    Throughout those years, Jewish experience, the history of the Shoah, and the intellectual history of Zionism were not considered worthy subjects for inclusion or “rehabilitation.” Outside Jewish studies, the concept of Zionism was not allotted anything close to the wild multifariousness that, for instance, Derek Penslar elaborates in his fine book Zionism: An Emotional State — as an ideology that continues, like many ideologies, to shift meaning over time, and can simultaneously span from far-left binationalism and Jewish fascism, fervent religiosity and staunch secularism, political and cultural forms of self-determination, and often odd mixtures of these poles. 

    I was also not confident that students had a robust understanding for the massive and violent antisemitism that Zionism developed alongside in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Throughout my years as a graduate instructor at Columbia, I felt increasingly less confident that students would come into my classes on German language and literature or my first-year Core Humanities classes knowing basic details about the murder of European Jews during the Holocaust. My subjective impression was that this knowledge was decreasing during the roughly ten years I taught at Columbia, from 2015 to 2024. 

    This knowledge gap felt especially conspicuous in Core Humanities classes where, in 2021, significant syllabus changes had been instated to remediate the “Great Books” with representation by female, LGBTQ+, African American, Asian American, Latin American, and Arabic Islamic authors (a strategy that I felt was at once necessary and dubious). Kafka, added as a representative of “East European Jewry,” was included in the overstuffed syllabus, but many instructors remarked that they did not understand why he had been chosen and that they were dropping “The Metamorphosis.” An executive decision soon followed to drop Kafka, leaving this version of the class with no Jewish authors, and no reference to the Shoah. (And, of course, no Kafka!) In 2020 a faculty petition that helped to catalyze these sweeping revisions bore down on the “Judeo-Christian” bias of the curriculum, a sentiment that I believe was common, in spite of the fact that the course sequestered the Hebrew Bible as a precursor text to Christian and Western literature. In my experience, the Core provided instructors-in-training and their teaching community with only a few resources to identify and engage with anti-Judaism, specifically in readings from the New Testament and Augustine, and generally in relation to the supersessionist teleology of the syllabus, which synthesizes the Greek tradition with the Hebrew Bible. 

    Over the four years I taught Literature Humanities, I added Celan’s poem “Death Fugue,” from 1948, which, in its grave juxtaposition of two women, the Aryan-Germanic-Greco Margarete and the Hebraic Shulamit, and in the historical context necessary for studying it, was the only text that challenged and undermined the christological Greco-Hebrew synthesis. In the late spring of 2024, as I navigated topical discussions with my upper-level Unland seminar, I also played Celan’s haunting recitation of “Todesfugue” for my first-year students in the Core, which ends with the unforgettable lines: 

    your golden hair Margarete

    your ashen hair Shulamit

     

    dein goldenes Haar Margarete
    dein aschenes Haar Sulamith

    Shulamit, a stand-in for the Hebraic tradition, finally and ironically, in the wake of unfathomable death, gets the last word. Celan referred to the poem as an “epitaph,” a grave for those who had none, including his mother. Yet in my reading — and one that especially emerged with my Core students, who had studied both the Song of Songs and Goethe’s Faust: Part One — the story of Margarete and Shulamit is not closed. The absence of punctuation makes us think about what could have been between these female-personified traditions, and what could yet be. 

    By including Celan’s poem — perhaps the greatest work of literature to emerge from the Shoah — I hoped to render legible the violence that had been committed against Jews in the catastrophe, and the legacy of antisemitism, but also to ask about how we can rewrite the relation between the Greco-Christian and Jewish traditions. Is there any way that Margarete and Shulamit can come into relation in a manner that is not determined through violent hierarchy? Can one find the possibility for an authentic relationship between these traditions, one that now must frankly acknowledge the mass violence committed against Jews? The figures of Margarete and Shulamit echo the centuries-old anti-Jewish archetypes Ecclesia and Synogoga, two women incorporated into Christian iconography from at least the fifteenth century onward to reinforce the inferiority of Judaism. Synogoga is typically depicted as a promiscuous ugly woman, often with a broken staff, bending against the crowned, glowing, and golden-haired Ecclesia, representing the righteousness of Christianity.

    Faust: Part One and the Song of Songs were two other texts that had been taken out of the curriculum, but I continued to teach them, at least in part for how they set up our reading of Celan. Margarete, in Faust: Part One, is of course a female victim of male violence, someone who is catastrophically manipulated and misled by Faust. Shulamit of the Song of Songs is also a female character who is abused, who is beaten by the “watchmen of the walls” of Jerusalem, whose sexual chastity is smugly policed by her brothers. Both texts can plausibly be interpreted as sympathetic portraits of women striving for sexual autonomy in the face of brutal and hypocritical male chauvinism, which operates on a personal and social level.

    These literary connotations invite links between the Jewish Shulamit and the German Margarete; they indicate a shared thread, one that invites new points of connection. The histories of these women hint at a female solidarity that cuts across violently imposed racial and ideological categories, suggesting alternate ways that stories can be told; connections that can be broken or linked. Like the geographical metaphor of “Meridian” that Celan later took up, the women are points that can be brought into relation variously. However much the poem rebukes the canon, represented by grim references to Bach, Goethe, and the Bible, at a moment of seemingly irrevocable historical violation, the ending leaves a gaping ambiguity — a faint sense that the attempt to hold these archetypes in relation cannot and must not be in vain. 

    “Don’t Split off No from Yes,” Celan would later write, a sentiment that is perhaps already incipient in “Death Fugue,” which accompanies its resounding rebuke of anti-Judaic canonicity with an aura of uncertainty, a refusal to give up on tradition as a site for ever new relationships, ever new (and perhaps ever unfulfilled) connections. The poem lays bare the violent governing binary of German and Jew, yet it also refuses to capitulate to this binary, tentatively imagining different ways in which these identities could be (or could have been) configured. 

    My German department was not much stronger than the general curriculum in its engagement with the Holocaust, the history of anti-Judaism, and the rise of Zionism in the German-speaking sphere. The Jewish German experience was not always but frequently subordinated to the Marxist and anti-fascist tradition, the legacy of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German humanism, or discourses such as affect studies, media archaeology, and, increasingly, environmental humanities. Over my years of doctoral study there I was mentored by professors who modeled delicate close reading, made the pleasure of reading and critical thinking feel contagious, and indelibly conveyed how much literature matters. Yet I was concerned that, as a whole, the department tended toward a redemptive reading of German culture, regarding the Nazi era either as noncentral to their intellectual interests or an aberration from an intact German critical theory-humanist legacy. My readings of Celan, whose writings are anything but intact — fragile, skeptical, in a shaken multilingual German — drew me ever further afield from the department, and from a coherent German language tradition. My feeling was that positive Jewish theology was frowned upon; Judaism was invited when it fit into existing canons and agendas, often as an identity-card that lent moral weight to the critique of fascism, or anti-humanism.

    A figure such as Gershom Scholem, the German-Jewish-Israeli scholar of Jewish mysticism and a titanic cultural thinker and critic, was never taught, in spite of having produced an extensive body of German-language philosophical, theological, and literary-critical writings. However Zionistic or theological his ideas, Scholem in my opinion should be considered as part of the same intellectual milieu as his friends and interlocutors Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno, rather than an aberrant appendage on this club. I was told by a professor whose perspective I valued immensely that Benjamin’s late-life turn to theology was a metaphor, not to be taken literally, and perhaps also a sign of his despair, an implied intellectual lapse. Benjamin and Adorno were figures who were embraced at Columbia, and with abandon, as long as they were engaged as predominantly secular, left-associated Jewish critics. By leaving Scholem out of our syllabi, our faculty missed an opportunity not least to explore a crucial aspect of Benjamin’s writings; and more largely to understand how Zionism and a commitment to Jewish tradition emerged within the context of German literature and thought. 

    By the time the department’s graduate students had erupted into a fevered, hectoring anti-Zionism in the spring of 2024 — demanding statements and petitions from their faculty — I couldn’t help but feel that this was a volatile return of the repressed, the politicized eruption of a taboo topic. Had Jewish perspectives, including a frank and nuanced account of the cultural history of Zionism, been more thoroughly integrated into the curriculum — perhaps a responsibility for German Studies — we might have found pathways to a more constructive and inclusive mode of activism in the aftermath of October 7, and amid ongoing Israeli violence.

    After the police raid on Hamilton Hall, emails from the administration about university policies were scattered and incoherent. No one knew if we were supposed to cancel finals or keep them. For the last seminar of my Unland course, I decided to hold class as a picnic in Morningside Park. While it was not originally on the syllabus, I taught selections from Paul Celan’s posthumous volume Zeitgehöft, or Homestead of Time, from 1976. My intuition was that these poems could contextualize aspects of Zionism but also model a different mode of political and interpersonal discourse, one that relished slowness, allowed pain to resonate, and invited space for contradiction. Zeitgehöft includes poems written in the aftermath of a trip to Israel in October 1969 and in reference to the love affair that had taken place on this trip with Ilana Shmueli, an acquaintance from his native Czernowitz whose family escaped Romania for mandatory Palestine in 1944. Several of my students had already left New York City. It was a still Thursday morning with a clear blue sky. After eating fruit and bagels, we sat in a circle and quietly started to work through the packet of poems. 

    Celan’s oeuvre is marked by at least two historically and politically resonant extramarital affairs, one, toward the beginning of his career, with the Austrian poet Ingeborg Bachmann, the daughter of an early member of the Austrian National Socialist Party, and later, shortly before his death, with the Israeli poet Ilana Shmueli. Celan’s correspondence with each of them, published posthumously, reveal the great extent to which his poetry was composed in the intimate context of these relationships. In an early poem dedicated to Bachmann, “In Ägypten” (“In Egypt”), the speaker seems to suggest that an erotic connection to a “stranger woman” is necessary for memorializing murdered Jewish women, represented by the biblical names “Ruth, Noemi, Miriam.” Now, in preparation for his trip to Israel, Celan explores what kind of memory — what kind of poetry — is (or is not) possible in an endogamous romance with an Israeli woman from his birthtown of Czernowitz. 

    Shmueli and Celan reconnected in preparation for his trip to Israel, his only one, where she served as a metaphysical and touristic host, especially in their walks around Jerusalem. Their letters, and the poetry they exchanged, reveal a powerful yearning, but are marked by a sense for the relationship’s inherent impossibility. Writing shortly after returning to Paris from Israel, Celan suggests an oscillating ability to give himself over to their love: “I wanted to start a longer letter, to warn you, about me and about us — but then your face appeared, as I saw it in Jerusalem and in Neve Avivim, and I know: what brought us together is a first and primary thing — Your face, Ilana. Your Jewish face. Your face.” Perhaps an indication of his mental unwellness, he conveys longing matched with reticence.  

    Celan’s reservations echo Adorno’s concerns about whether someone can “live after Auschwitz,” erotic passion serving as a metonym for life itself. Giving oneself over fully to love could be understood as a betrayal of the murdered dead. On the other hand, this formulation to Shmueli, emphasizing an Erstes und Vorerstes, a “first and primary thing,” indicates exactly the kind of singular Jewish affiliation that a thinker such as Adorno (or Derrida) would eschew. Both of them challenge a unified “first thing,” Jewish or otherwise — something that Celan clearly longs for, even if he is incapable of embracing it. 

    As several scholars have noted, Shmueli becomes for Celan a proxy for the State of Israel itself. His hesitancy in regard to their relationship can perhaps be understood as analogous to a general hesitation toward Israel as a site of Jewish manifestation. In formulations that, at worst, essentialize myriad modes of Judaism, Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin has argued that the advent of the State of Israel is a betrayal of the longstanding Jewish orientation toward withheld messianic promise. “Exile,” he writes, “is what distinguishes Jew and Christian, indeed the Jew who is loyal to his exile negates the claim that the world has entered into the age of Grace and salvation…choosing to be a Jew is the same as choosing exile.” In such a view, the Jewish state erroneously reconfigures a perennial messianic horizon as the material and historical present. For Raz-Krakotzkin and the other post-Zionist and anti-Zionist “exilists,” “choosing exile” is an essential imperative of Judaism. From this perspective, the mainstream Jewish embrace of political Zionism could be seen as a betrayal of something fundamental about Jewishness. This is an ideology that tips Judaism closer to Christianity. 

    In his attraction to Shmueli, and to the terrain of Israel, Celan reveals the strong appeal, even the importance of manifestation. Even if Celan tends towards “choosing exile,” his poetry also explores post-exilic Zionist Judaism as a legitimate mode of expression. This understanding is apparent in expressions like “your Jewish face,” written to Shmueli, but also in words like Sabbatglanz (Sabbath-radiance) and Wimpel (pennant), a German-Yiddish wordplay that connotes the orienting, tentatively national masthead pennant of a ship, as well as the Jewish ritual cloth band that swaddles a circumcised infant or a Torah scroll. An affinity for Jewish nationalism can also be heard in his taciturn address to the Hebrew Writer’s Association in Tel Aviv, which expresses “a thankful pride in every green thing planted here that’s ready to refresh anyone who comes by” and “joy in the newly earned, self-discovered, fulfilled word that rushes up to strengthen those who turn toward it.” 

    Celan’s writing thus entails an unusual and interesting ideological ambiguity. Its various articulations of irrevocable exile make his poetry appealing to strong critics of Zionism, such as Derrida. At the same time it has a decided interest in Jewish materiality; it engages with, even partakes in the symbolic imagination of Zionism in ways that distinguish it from a principled, coherent embrace of Jewish diasporism. 

    Poetry, for Celan, is a site that holds contradictions. In regards to the Zionist imagination, Celan sought to uphold the figurative and liturgical potential of Jerusalem, in accompaniment to its political rebuilding. As a poet, Celan is not apophatically committed to the figurative Jerusalem (and the withheld messiah), against the materialism of Zionism — the position that has become increasingly popular among American Jewish Studies academics and Diasporist critics. His inclinations are oscillating, and he finds room for multiple paradigms simultaneously.

    In the context of conversations about Zionism in the aftermath of October 7, 2023, I see this as an unusual, and unusually valuable approach, one that honors the Jewish attraction to Zionism while also keeping in mind the dangerous and corrosive effects of tipping a theological paradigm of the withheld messiah into one of manifest reality. What seems most salutary to me is Celan’s passion for unresolved attraction rather than firm conviction — for impulses, thoughts, feelings, tendencies, explorations, hauntings, wavering along a spectrum, rather than hardened, didactic principles. The poetry is remarkable for the way that it combines thinking with feeling, conviction with not-knowing. 

    However much there is to praise about Celan’s approach to the notion of Zion, his writing to and for Ilana Shmueli is flagged by the same male prerogative that wounded Ingeborg Bachmann, and which she protested in several strident unsent letters. Here his writing takes on an especially problematic dimension, as the male question of whether the divine promise of “Israel” can ever be embodied is pursued with Shmueli’s female body as conduit. Responding to Celan’s lines in a love poem — “es stehn / die Geträumten für / die Mitternachtsziffer (the dreamed ones stand for / the midnight numeral)” — Bachmann asks, “Sind wir nur die Geträumten? (Are we only the dreamed ones?),” possibly reading: don’t we also have bodies? Are we not selves whose boundaries remain intact, in spite of so much poetic dissolution? Are you not obligated to attend to me as a woman, as a human being, as a writer? In the case of Bachmann and Shmueli one wonders if a particular woman, the object of Celan’s creative imagination, can withstand the pressure to stand in for any independent metaphysical anchor that affirms life. Is there room for Ilana as a complete, human interlocutor — one who shares the male lyric subject’s boundlessness — or can she only ever serve as a metaphysically charged foil for the poet?  

    THE POLES DIE POLE
    are within us, sind in uns,
    insurmountable unübersteigbar
    while we’re awake, im Wachen,
    we sleep across, up to the Gate wir schlafen hinüber, vors Tor
    of Mercy, des Erbarmens,
    I lose you to you, that ich verliere dich an dich, das
    is my snow-comfort, ist mein Schneetrost,
    say, that Jerusalem is, sag, dass Jerusalem i s t,
    say it, as if I were this sags, als wäre ich dieses
    your whiteness, dein Weiß,
    as if you were als wärst du
    mine, meins,
    as if without us we could be we, als könnten wir ohne uns wir sein,
    I leaf you open, for ever, ich blättre dich auf, für immer,
    you pray, you lay du betest, du bettest
    us free. uns frei.

    The poem “Die Pole,” translated here by John Felstiner, was written in November 1969, part of a suite of poems composed in Paris after Celan’s return from Jerusalem. Felstiner interprets the poles as “all the opposites pulling at [Celan] — female/male, sexual/sacred, present/past, Israel/France, passion/reason, love/loss, free/unfree — ” In German as in English, poles connote charged opposites, in electricity and magnets, but also of course the (magnetically charged) nodes of the planet, which are crucial for navigation and orientation. These poles seem to create an untenable tension, one that is “insurmountable,” yet poles in the plural also connote balance, a dialectical force. This balance is impossible to configure “while we’re awake,” in the conscious world, the world of deliberate action and literal language, of “light” that pressures phenomena into complete knowability. But Celan implies that these wrenching poles — personal, political, and psychological — hang together with some kind of balance in the sleep-world of Jerusalem. 

    The sleep that allows “the dreamed ones” to be dreamed is now associated with the Unland of Jerusalem, especially the Gate of Mercy, Sha’ar Ha’Rachamim in Hebrew, a stone-shut gate on the eastern wall of Jerusalem’s Old City that is associated with the arrival of the messiah in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic tradition. It is the filled-in gate that you see clearly from across the top of the Mount of Olives. The Gate of Mercy is a bizarre site that is at once indelibly physical — such that it can be fought over and won — and metaphysical, as in several traditions it links the world as it is to the world beyond. Christians and Muslims generally believe that this is the gate through which Jesus arrived to Jerusalem in the lead-up to his crucifixion, on a donkey, to the adulation of Jerusalemites. In the Islamic tradition, there is an association between the eastern wall of Jerusalem and the “Last Day.” The Arabic name for the gate, Bab al-Rahmah, symbolizes a gate in paradise, or an entry to Mercy. An alternate Arabic name means “The Gateway to Eternal Life.” In the Jewish tradition, this is the gate through which the messiah will enter when he arrives in Jerusalem. The historian and geographer Zev Vilnay mentions, in his Legends of Jerusalem, the famed Jewish traveler Petahiah of Regensburg, who visited Jerusalem in 1187 and left a Hebrew account of his travels.

    At Jerusalem there is a gate, and its name is the Gate of Mercy. The gate is full of stone and lime. No Jew, much less a gentile, is permitted to go there. One day the gentiles wished to open this gate, but the whole of Palestine shook from one end to the other, and there arose a great tumult in the city until they ceased. There is a tradition among the Jews that the divine Presence first departed through this gate, and that by the same gate the divine Presence will return…

    In the story of Rabbi Petahiah — his name means “God opened” — the Gate is associated with the precursor and successor of historical time; it is a means through which our entire temporal framework is bracketed. 

    In a way that echoes parables of Kafka or Agnon, the story indicates a rumbling, violent power associated with an untimely attempt to open the gates. Humans, the story seems to suggest, must not hubristically dismantle the blockages. They comprise our worldly existence, which is altogether threatened when we attempt to clear them. And yet this is a physical location that implies an end to the order of the world as it is; in which the imagination of divine Mercy, a Paradise that is unattainable in the world as we know it, becomes so palpable as to form a presence, one that can shake reality at its foundation. In Celanian fashion, the gate is a stoppage that paradoxically implies an opening, and vice versa. The Gate takes us up to the limits of human experience, exhorting us to hold multiple realities in simultaneity. These realities are blocked from one another yet abut one another so closely that slippage could occur unexpectedly, even unknowingly. 

    Celan’s odd use of prepositions and lineation emphasize a blockage that is never, almost, and always an opening. “Wir schlafen hinüber, vors Tor;” “we sleep across, up to the Gate.” The German adverb hinüber implies a passage over, a crossing to the other side. This is also the etymology of the Hebrew word ivrit, which became the name for the language itself, related to avar, a crossing or a traversal, which could refer to Abraham as a migrant who constitutively crosses over the Euphrates river. Hinüber colloquially is associated with a passage into death, an appropriate connotation given the Gate of Mercy’s connection with the “Last Day” and the end of times. 

    Celan’s Hinüber unavoidably implies crossing, yet the successive preposition vors indicates a motion up to the seemingly blocked gate. Here we have been merely taken to the gate’s edifice — the crossing of hinüber was perhaps a crossing that preceded the Gate, that only took us to its edge. The combination of the two prepositions leaves us with the strange impression of the Gate remaining both blocked and crossed. This is accentuated by the enjambment of Tor / des Erbarmens, as if Mercy almost does not come. The splitting of the two prepositions echoes the Gate of Mercy’s two blocked doors, which are traditionally the Gate of Repentance and the Gate of Mercy, implying a procession in and out of this Gate to Paradise; a ritual rhythm for crossing the uncrossable. 

    Shmueli and Celan avoided visiting the Western Wall of the Temple Mount complex. She writes that Celan referred to “too much sacredness” in regard to the sites that they did not visit, including the Western Wall. Celan’s reference to the Gate of Mercy strikes me as a surrogate reference to the Western Wall, whose symbolism risks a dangerous conflation of liturgy and territorial nationalism. Yet the Gate of Mercy is nevertheless a physical holy site located in post-1967 occupied East Jerusalem. Celan shifts the onus from locations that are fraught with Jewish national significance to one that has an array of messianic symbolism in all the Abrahamic traditions. The Gate of Mercy is material and political, yet it offers room for the messianic to remain withheld. The implied shift from the Western Wall to the Eastern wall of the city betrays a different orientation from mainstream Jewish nationalism, one perhaps associated with a rising, unknown possibility that crosses between Abrahamic faiths.

    Reading with my Columbia students in our exterritorial classroom in Morningside Park,  the poems were not mere cultural documents of Zionism, used to expand students’ historical understanding of this movement at a time when it was grievously, even perniciously maligned (although perhaps they did serve this function in that they allowed students to understand, experientially, the spiritual significance of the state of Israel for a Holocaust survivor who finds few scraps of hope and meaning in the postwar period). As deeply ambivalent poetic documents, the texts are not an endorsement of Zionism, neither from the 1920s of Celan’s childhood in Romania, the late 1960s of his visit to Jerusalem, nor the war-torn 2024 in which we encountered them. Celan circles around Zionistic images, seeking nourishment and buoying solidarity, while also eyeing them with suspicion. 

    These poems, and perhaps “The Poles” in particular, simply do not fit into the binary categories that were constructed daily on campus that spring: Zionist/anti-Zionist, terrorist/genocidaire, antisemite/social justice fighter. Students had been encouraged to see Zionism and anti-Zionism as a simple matter of right and wrong. The poems open the possibility for multiple simultaneous timelines, multiple simultaneous narratives of suffering. They invite and model how to hold a belief but also to step outside of it, to counter it, to approach a phenomenon from several angles at once, with varying degrees of proximity and sympathy. Moreover, like the tentative solidarity implied between Margarete and Shulamit, the poems beckon for threads that cross between poles and allow for configurations that eschew today’s broken dyads.

    Reading against the backdrop of the raging, lethal, and seemingly unceasing bombardment of Gaza, and the seemingly hopeless fate of the scores of Israelis held hostage, I was inclined to treat the poem as offering a messianic alternative to worldly Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian suffering. Like Yehuda Amichai’s poem “Why is Jerusalem Always Two?,” “The Poles” is today impossible to read without thinking about East and West Jerusalem, Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalem. Writing about another poem in the series that plays with the image of the Gate of Mercy, Galili Shahar suggests that references like the Gate of Mercy are shadowed by the Israeli “security barrier” that bisects Palestinian villages and segregates Palestinians and Israelis. “The cry of the poem, the prayer for an opening…is now also associated with these fences and barriers.” Shahar has described the unspoken “third person” of Arabic that appears when German and Hebrew are at play, implying that Celan’s work — so attuned to presences and absences — holds a latent invitation to consider the Palestinian perspective, one that must now be fulfilled.

    The messianic dream world that Celan associates with the Gate of Mercy demands a poetic imagination, one distinct from the world of waking thoughts — of statements, arguments, the will to semantic fixity. This is a world of “wandering words,” of words that hold open their capaciousness — their capacity for hope, for refuge, for endogamy, for exogamy, to be weaponized, to have magic and healing. These are words that we find when we sleep hinüber, when we sleep across to the other side. These are words that cross divides and poles, but they remain within a determinate political state — the territorial location of the Gate of Mercy. Yet Israel-Palestine and specifically East Jerusalem could well be deemed an indeterminate political state, one associated with Abrahamic mythology. The Gate triggers a religious imagination in which tribal and historical distinctions are maintained but can dissolve into ever new formations. 

    The poles “are in us”: they are in our human communities, our tribes, but they are also in each of us readers. They can be insurmountable, even the prerequisite for violence, if we think only in the logic of separateness, of the daytime, of wakefulness. But there is a mysterious and poetic capacity for them to mingle, through a closed gate that is not really a gate. The gate is associated with God’s mercy, a mercy that allows the violence of human distinction to be released. The Gate allows us, somehow, to maintain the aspect of distinction that gives us meaning, while relieving the aspect of distinction on which violence is propagated and received. Like Celan’s neologism Atemwende, or Breath-turn, a breath that returns, waking and sleeping must continuously circle and accompany one another. The goal cannot be to only live awake, or to only live in possibility, asleep, but for the shadow of each realm to challenge and accompany the other. 

    In the aftermath of October 7, 2023, I see these poems as subtly (yes, too subtly) imagining a shared Palestinian and Israeli society. This shared society is a possibility that is as tangible and present as stone, yet as closed shut as the gate of Mercy.  Another poem that refers to the Gate is “Der Königsweg” (“The Kings Way”), translated into Hebrew as Derekh HaMelekh. In addition to its monarchical association, the Hebrew connotes an ideal way of living, perhaps in the sense of the Tao Te Ching, an ancient mystical Chinese text that Celan read closely in German translation. Like the elusive Tao, the King’s Way is “hinter der Scheintur,” or “behind the shine-door, or apparent-door” — meaning it is perennially inaccessible, blocked behind the bricked Gate of Mercy. Yet “behind the door” could also indicate just over there, almost present, about to be with us. 

    THE KING’S WAY behind the shine door, 

    in front, deathed

    round by its counter-

    sign, the Lion sign,

     

    DER KÖNIGSWEG hinter der Scheintür,

    das vom Gegen-

    Zeichen umtodete

    Löwenzeichen davor, 

    The “Scheintür” is a door that appears to exist (and does not), but it is also a “shining” door, a royal door poised at the threshold of new realms, and new secrets. The King’s Way, in its Taoist sense, has many connotations, of holding memory and presence bound together, of a speech that does not “split off no from yes.” It also connotes a polity where the distinctions that predicate Israeli and Palestinian violence have softened. The realm of poetry, love, and memory is, through the Gate of Mercy, woven into an interdenominational hope that the world as it is, ravaged by violence, can be otherwise. Life must find a “counter- / sign [Gegen- / Zeichen] ” —  another realm to accompany it, to enrich and to goad it, to not let it sink into the merely literal. 

    While there is disagreement about dating the present-day Gate of Mercy, it is generally thought to have originated in the late Byzantine or early Umayyad period, in the sixth or seventh century. The standing structure is presumably sited on a similar location as the gate that holds messianic significance for Christians of the Second Temple period, and to Jewish legend preceding that time. One archaeologist has argued that the current structure is sited on top of another gate that could be seen if the entire area was excavated. The notion of a (closed) Gate with messianic associations that covers over another unknown gate could uncannily echo the layers of language in Celan’s poetry, where German often stands on top of or adjacent to Biblical and modern Hebrew. This relationship is oppositional and obfuscatory, but the archeological proximity could imply a connective point, a site of confluence. 

    The Gate of Mercy archaeologically echoes Celan’s irritating yet productive polysemy. It is indeed a double gate, whose messianic doubling is mirrored in two material portals. In the case of Celan’s Jerusalem poems, I believe that Christian and Islamic messianism, and Christian and Islamic claims to Jerusalem, are invoked as a co-presence with the Jewish claim, in a way that invites new models for political cohabitation and new orientations that move beyond sacred ownership. The messianic realm is associated with a poetic language that both allows for and abrogates distinction. The line “als könnten wir ohne uns wir sein,” or “as if without us we could be we”, often seen in an erotic context, could also be understood as a reorientation toward tribal identities — a hypothetical in which we lose our distinguishing marks yet keep them. 

    Celan acknowledges the human importance, even the existential necessity, of both cherishing identity and remaining aware of how identity propagates violence. In a poem that is regarded as his most Zionistic, “Denk Dir,” or “Just Think,” written after the Israeli victory in 1967 and broadcast on Israeli radio, Celan uses the problematic German word Heimat, which connotes a territorialistic sense of home. “Just think: / the Peat-Bog Soldier of Masada / makes a homeland [Heimat] for himself, most / ineffaceably,” Here ostensibly Hebrew soldiers are praised for recovering Heimat, a celebration of Israeli victory that has unavoidably ominous Germanic overtones.

    Celan is too aware of the pernicious connotations lingering in nearly all words, and the lingering residue of the Third Reich across the entire German language, to use a word such as Heimat in a Jewish nationalist sense without keeping in mind its link to the most murderous instantiations of German nationalism. This is not to say that Celan compares Israelis to Nazis in a one-to-one, literal way as his acquaintance Erich Fried did (something he greatly took issue with), or in the manner one finds common on anti-Israeli activist posters after October 7.  He creates a set of unresolved associations around words which connote their different possibilities, one of which, in the case of Israeli Heimat, is the possibility for identitarian and territorialistic violence. Few writers that I am aware of were able to follow the Zionist imagination so deeply, to partake in a sense of Zionist political and metaphysical refuge, while also remaining outside it — not only with ambivalence, but with suspicion, even grave fear, of what nationalism can devolve into. The frame of mind that these poems cultivate is not one of righteous and indignant anti-nationalism, nor can it be one of tribalistic pride and belonging. The poetry has meanings that are both manifest and withheld. It takes on new resonance in relation to the beliefs of its interlocutors, and in relation to an unfolding legacy of European and Middle Eastern violence. 

    Celan’s poems attempt a language where contradiction remains possible, and, hopefully, from this language, a reality where contradictions can coincide. But as with the Scheintür, it is not clear if such a language can ever be siphoned into in the real world or if it must remain a painful, tantalizing dream. 

    In their slow, cryptic style, as the sun shone on our circle in Morningside Park, the poems enabled a different discourse, one attuned to the sacredness and the consequentiality of language. This was, if only very briefly, an instantiation of the King’s Way that lies behind the Scheintür — a way that I found my young students leading. The King’s Way, in Morningside Park at least, occurred in a circle, with the poems seemingly shining out of the middle, through everyone’s different, confused questions; we peeled off lines, almost like the delicate layers of an onion. The discussion was nonlinear in its spatial blocking but also in the sense that the poems were not “accessed;” they were ambiguous configurations that we skewed in different ways. This group included students who had participated in the Gaza encampments and others who had been disturbed by language emanating from the protest movement.

    In a creative reflection, one student described the experience of reading Celan in the park, using a roman numeral dating taken from Lem’s Futurological Congress — a dating that chronicles the protagonist’s journal entries after his brain has been surgically inserted into a new body, which wakes up years into to the future.

    2 V 2024: Jess and I walk to Morningside for our make-up class where we are discussing selected poems by Paul Celan. The weather is perfect. Warm, summery, and picturesque. After a quick bite, we all gather on the picnic blanket, and Professor Parks has printed out the poems for us to look at. I sit, listening, chiming in when I feel like I have something to say, but most of all just existing. It is the first time I’ve felt truly present in weeks (months?). It’s my first time in Morningside Park and it’s beautiful. There’s a slight breeze and not a single cloud in the sky. The commotion from the previous days seems to have faded in this moment and things are still. I don’t understand a lot of what Celan’s writing about, but I don’t think that matters too much. If you had asked me what I thought or perhaps hoped Columbia was going to be like when I was first accepted, I believe an image like this one would’ve come to mind.

    This was the last class I taught at Columbia. The student’s reflection corroborates my profound belief in the capacity of poetry to create experience at a moment when the university gates were literally locked. What happened around the poems felt like a small opening, a window into what study, community, and reading can be. The gathering embodied Celan’s notion of a “missed encounter,” between a semester that was and a semester that could have been, or could yet be.

    Celan’s poems did not pick a gated lawn, did not take a side at Columbia in 2024. But neither were they silent. They were attuned to the unprecedented scope of Israeli and Palestinian suffering and loss in 2023-2024, and to the Jerusalem of seemingly insurmountable divides. They were documents of Zionism, demonstrations of what Israel meant to someone who survived unthinkable catastrophe and arrived there in 1969, looking for threads of life to hang on to. The poems challenged us to expand and rethink the scope of how we approach Jerusalem; to invite many co-present Jerusalems, sacred and profane, material and figural, Jewish and Palestinian.

    The lived, relational dimension of teaching, of reading in a circle: in the classroom beneath the sky, history is present but it does not overdetermine the poetry’s meaning. We keep trying to figure out what’s going on, keep finding possibilities for words that seem to speak in ever new ways. This is a poetry that calls its readers into a sustained not-knowing as a mode of experience. At the same time it calls us into a relation of commitment — to ourselves, to others, to healing the ongoing wounds of history. 

    La Dolce Vita

    Sometime during the year 1337, the Sienese painter Ambrogio Lorenzetti began planning one of the most innovative works in the history of European art. Frescoed on three of the four walls of the executive council room of the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena, the painting is huge — almost twenty feet high and a hundred and twenty feet in total length. It is even more colossal in ambition than in scale. The picture is the first naturalistic landscape in Western painting, and the first detailed cityscape. It also portrays a number of allegorical personifications of virtues and vices. Taken together, all these elements combine to provide one of the most acute depictions of the contrasting characteristics of tyranny and justice ever made. The earliest known title for the painting is Peace and War, but today it is commonly referred to as the Allegories of Good and Bad Government. What it has to say is still pertinent today — alas, especially today — almost seven hundred years later.

    The painting has three sections, each corresponding to one wall. The central portion depicts an allegory of Good Government. It is an intricate representation consisting of some sixty figures, chief among them personifications of Justice, Peace, Concord, and Commonwealth. On the wall to the right is a picture of the blessings of Good Government; we see the city of Siena and its countryside flourishing; people are at work, study, and play; and a watchful personification of Security flies above in the sky. By contrast, on the wall to the left is an allegory of Bad Government and a portrayal of the destruction it brings. There the central allegorical figure is Tyranny, who holds court among vices, including Pride, Greed, Anger, Fraud, Cruelty, and Divisiveness. In this picture, Justice is shown cast down, and Siena is coming apart. Buildings are aflame, crime is in the streets, and Fear hovers over it all. 

    A poem running along the bottom of the frescoes, supplemented by scrolls with inscriptions held by Security and Fear, and two short texts below Peace and Tyranny, explain the meaning of the images, in case the viewer was in any doubt. Under the rule of a just government, citizens as long as they respect the common good will be free to go forth and pursue the life they seek. They can achieve the good life; the poem calls it the dolce vita — one of the earliest known uses of the term. By contrast, under tyranny, “Justice is bound,” “each seeks only his own good,” and “the land lies in waste.” Quoting the Book of Wisdom, an inscription in the central allegory of Good Government dictates the frescoes’ major command: “Love Justice ye who govern on earth.” These words were meant to instruct the council members who sat in the room — the so-called Nine — as well as all other citizens of the city.

    It is in the details that the image comes to life, and its analysis of justice and tyranny gains strength. Near the center of the Allegory of Good Government, for instance, stands a group of twenty-four men. They vary in age, from young to old, and we can see by their clothes that while all are well-off, they come from different professions; the group includes merchants, physicians, knights, judges, and a law professor. Each of the men holds with one hand a cord that runs between them; this cord extends from the personification of Justice at the upper left in the image, down to Concord (which literally means “with cord”) below her, and then across the picture to the allegory of Bene Comune at the upper right, a bearded figure sitting on a throne like a king, and flanked by the Virtues. This venerable man represents Commonwealth or the Common Good, and he is also meant to personify the city and government of Siena. 

    The metaphor that the bond of Concord was what held society together was an ancient one, going back to Cicero and Augustine, and it was still much discussed in political treatises in fourteenth-century Italy. The poem below the painting explains that the twenty-four men represent the “animi molti” who together make the Common Good the ruler. It is standard in English to translate animi molti as “many souls,” but as Gabriella Piccinni stipulates in Operazione Buon Governo, her excellent book on the frescoes, in Italian the word animo means mind, not soul, and has connotations of understanding, opinion, or thought. What we see therefore is a group of men of different stations and many opinions who all voluntarily agree to live in concord for the sake of peace and the common good. When we do so, promises the poem, “every public benefit ensues — useful, necessary and pleasurable.”

    The poem invites viewers to turn their gaze to the right wall to see what the republic of Siena can look like in this blessed state of peace and abundance. The captivating picture that occupies this wall is naturalistic in detail but idyllic in mood. It divides evenly into two sections. At the left is the city of Siena, easily identifiable by the presence of several landmarks: the cathedral, with its distinctive dome and campanile in green and white marble; the tower of the Palazzo Pubblico, which is shown under construction, as it was at the time; and the southern gate of the city, the Porta Romana. The streets of the city are spacious and filled with light, and the buildings are brightly colored in rose, lavender, and silvery grey. Shops are open for business: we see weavers and wool merchants, a goldsmith, a shoemaker, a grocer. Snuggled between the stores there is a window into a classroom where a professor is instructing students, who are concentrating on what he says. 

    It is a city alive with pleasure and delight, not just industry and commerce. In a piazza in the foreground, nine young women in long flowing dresses are dancing and singing; in the background a group of men are playing a game (damage to the painting makes it impossible to say whether it is dice or something else); and near the left edge of the picture a bride is riding on a horse to her wedding, accompanied by a small cortège. The loggias and windows of the apartments above the streets are decorated with flowers and adorned with marble columns and beautiful tiles. One apartment has a pet bird, another a cat, adding to the air of domestic bliss.

    The view of the countryside at the right in the image is equally rich in lovingly observed details. We see merchants and farmers bringing their wares to sell in the city; workers in the fields, sowing and threshing wheat; men hunting with crossbows to keep the rabbit population down in a field of grain; someone is fishing in a stream. In the background there are vineyards scattered over the rolling hills, and carefully depicted buildings: a country inn; a villa with a pergola; a small hamlet; a church and a few castles in the more distant elevations. The land is observed with so much care, you can even see changes in the color and the composition of the soil, depending on which side of a hill, or how close to a stream, the ground lies. The countryside in the Allegory of Bad Government is likewise depicted with assiduous attention. Damage to the wall sadly makes this section difficult to read; still, we can see that the land is barren; villas are burning; and the sky is dark and grim.

    Nothing like this had ever been painted before. Compare, for example, the depiction of the city in Giotto’s fresco The Exorcism of Arezzo, part of the mural cycle in the basilica of San Francesco in Assisi. In that picture, the artist portrays the city from outside the walls; no streets are depicted, and the simplified buildings are shown squished together in an impossible tumble. Or look at the landscape in Simone Martini’s fresco of the soldier Guidoriccio riding on horseback to two castles in the Sienese countryside. This was painted in the early 1330s, in the Sala del Mappamondo in the Palazzo Pubblico — literally on the other side of the same wall from Ambrogio’s frescoes — and yet there the representation of the land is nearly devoid of any distinguishing features. No fields, vineyards, workers, hunters, hamlets, streams, and so on. 

    Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s pictures are works of staggering creativity, and of staggering preparation, too. The elements of his frescoes are so varied and finely described there can be no reasonable doubt that he spent many days or weeks going around Siena and the countryside making hundreds of preliminary drawings. If true, as I think it must be, it would be the first time in the history of European painting where we can confidently infer that an artist studied en plein air directly from nature. The practice by which painters from Leonardo to Cezanne trained themselves began here.

    Born in Siena around 1295, Ambrogio Lorenzetti was celebrated as a genius of the first order who greatly expanded the boundaries of the visual arts. He was said to be a brilliant draftsman (alas, none of his drawings survive). He was praised for his almost single-handed invention of the depiction of the ephemera of weather — we catch a glimpse of this in the decorated band above the Allegory of Bad Government where there is a personification of Winter, who is shown as a man who stands in thickly falling snow and holds a snowball. Lorenzetti also made the most important explorations of the pictorial representation of space in the fourteenth century; indeed, the image of the streets and the buildings of Siena in the Allegory of Good Government was the most accomplished use of perspective before Masaccio’s frescoes in the Brancacci Chapel in Florence nearly one hundred years later. And Lorenzetti also had a gift for the portrayal of interior states of mood and thought. In the first history of Italian art, written by the Florentine sculptor Lorenzo Ghiberti around 1450, he praised Lorenzetti’s capacity to convey “fervor . . . anxiety . . . breathlessness . . . fear” and other intense emotions.

    In the Allegories of Good and Bad Government, Lorenzetti’s power of characterization is especially evident in the figures of Tyranny and the Vices. They are hybrid creatures who mix human and animal features in fearful combinations. Tyranny has horns and tusks, and is crosseyed, owing to its excessive self-regard. Cruelty is threatening a child with a snake. Vanity is bedecked in pearls and silks and stares into a small gold mirror to admire its blond hair. Anger is a centaur-like beast, holding a dagger and a stone, which historians see as a reference to the potential for street violence by mobs and factions. Betrayal has in its lap a strange animal, whose front half looks like a lamb, but whose tail is that of a scorpion. Greed carries money bags, clamped shut, because it never spends. And above the head of Tyranny flies Pride, the central vice. In the place of the scales of Justice, it has in its left hand the yoke that formerly held it under control, and the yoke swings unbalanced, one end higher than the other, to emphasize Pride’s essential difference from Justice. Directly below Pride, on the same axis, we see the real personification of Justice, bound, afraid, and thrown to the ground beneath Tyranny’s feet. Rape, torture, kidnapping, murder, and robbery take place nearby.

    Ambrogio Lorenzetti was said to be highly learned, and at least once in the records of a governmental meeting he was praised for his wise counsel. Yet modern historians are unanimous that he must have had guidance in devising the complex program of the Allegories of Good and Bad Government. It has been argued that the most likely candidates for this role were the panel of legal experts who were at that moment also advising the government of Siena on a new draft of its constitution. These included several professors of law and two men identified in documents as “judges and professors of civil science” — an astonishingly early use of the term. This hypothesis seems persuasive, since a preamble to the new constitution these men were drafting contains imagery and language similar to that of the anonymous poem under the frescoes. 

    One may wonder why the government of Siena felt it needed a new constitution as well as a new series of frescoes reminding the members of its executive council and other citizens of the dangers of tyranny and the duty to love justice. To suggest an answer, we must look both at recent history of the city and the changes in political theory around 1300. 

    The city had enjoyed self-rule since around 1125. It was the nobles who first obtained political rights, but with the rapid increase in wealth and population, “the people” (“il popolo”) also fought for inclusion in government. In 1287, after a long series of struggles, a new system of sharing power was established, known as the regime of the Nine, which featured an executive council of nine governors who served in two-month terms, and a general assembly of as many as 450 citizens who served for one year. Participation was limited by profession, income, and social standing. By law, only merchants of “middling” wealth — a broad definition then as now — could serve on the executive council of the Nine. All others were barred, not only the poor but also lawyers, doctors, artisans, guild members, and the nobles, including the largest landowners and the richest bankers in the city. These groups, however, could participate in the general assembly, although half of its seats were reserved for members of “the people.” These rules were meant to constrain the predominance of the nobles, some of whom were vastly richer than everyone else — it has been estimated that four noble families owned twenty percent of the total wealth of Siena. Moreover, in Siena as elsewhere in Italy, the nobles were seen as the main source of societal disorder, owing to their attacks on the poor as well as their endless vendettas against one another. Modern historians have often referred to the Sienese government as an oligarchy and a plutocracy, but these words tend to oversimply a complex reality whose details are not fully understood. Yet it is generally agreed that Siena under the rule of the Nine enjoyed a period of relative peace and stability.

    In the Middle Ages, Siena was a boom town, whose explosion in wealth arose largely from silver-mining and banking. It was a happy combination since the silver, once minted as coin, became capital and could be loaned out by Sienese banks throughout Europe. But in the fourteenth century both industries began to contract in Siena. The yields of the mines grew more unpredictable and the city’s preeminence in international finance began to slip. The Sienese firm of the Bonsignori family was once the largest bank in Europe, but it ran into trouble in 1298 and collapsed in 1309. Other Sienese companies, too, had to close in the following decades. There were also conflicts over political representation, as the nobles and others sought a greater place in government in 1315, 1318, and 1325.

    In 1338, moreover, at exactly the same time that Lorenzetti was finishing the frescoes, there was a run on the banks in Siena. This was triggered by the outbreak of the Hundred Years War, which led investors to fear that the huge loans by Sienese banks to the French and English kings would never be repaid. Some got their money out in time and suddenly had huge sums to invest or spend. Others got nothing. There was also a crisis in managing the city’s debt. The government of Siena, while dedicated to the interests of business, also fervently believed in doing good works, by supporting art patronage all over the city, as well as helping the poor and misfortunate in countless ways, and other public projects. These many endeavors, against the background of economic uncertainty and constant troubles over food supply — an endemic problem in premodern Europe — led to considerable speculation and inflation. Some of the rich got immensely richer — we hear of wealthy women in 1338 paying absolute fortunes for luxurious handbags. But many others struggled as rarely before.

    The great experiment in representative and republican government had begun in the cities of Tuscany and Lombardy around 1100, but everyone knew that it had a fundamental weakness: a tendency to factionalism. Violent struggles for political control plagued city life throughout the peninsula. Street battles were common, and the losers sometimes were killed or exiled and had their houses burned to the ground. To avoid such wearying chaos, many cities eventually chose to give up self-government, and instead be ruled by a signore, often a count or a duke, like the Visconti in Milan or the d’Este in Ferrara. Yet Siena, like Venice, tried a different path: to have an elite who governed, in principle at least, for the common good. This was the ideal under strain in the 1330s, and tyranny was the feared outcome, should it fail. It was this threat the Sienese magistrates had in mind when they commissioned Lorenzetti’s mural cycle.

    To understand the program of the frescoes, it helps to remember two points. First, that in fourteenth-century thought the contrast between tyranny and good government centered not so much on constitutional form — monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy — but rather on whether the rulers worked for their own benefit or for the common good. If a government truly sought the common good, it was by definition good, whether it was one person, a few people, or the many who ruled. Conversely, a government was a tyranny, no matter what form it took, if it did not seek to rule for the benefit of all. It was with this principle in mind that Bartolus Sassoferrato, one of the most important authorities on political philosophy in mid-fourteenth century Italy, could write that Siena was legitimately governed, even though only a small number of citizens held office.

    Moreover, the frescoes express a relatively new idea about the purpose of government: that it should serve to help human life flourish on earth, not just in heaven. The efforts in self-government that began in Italian city-states in the 1100s, permanently transformed political thought in Europe, and eventually around the world. Many of the principles of civil life that we take for granted were first clearly enunciated in Italy in this era, including popular sovereignty, personal freedom, the right to property, freedom of speech, and the separation of church and state. As is well known, these developments in the ideals of liberty greatly accelerated following the rediscovery and translation into Latin of Aristotle’s Politics in the 1260s. 

    The study of this work by Thomas Aquinas and his pupils and followers, chiefly Italians, changed the basic idea of the role of government. Previously, it was seen as a necessary evil, rooted in the fallen state of mankind, whose sinful nature required oversight and restraint. But in the wake of Aristotle and Aquinas, philosophers began to argue that the purpose of government was to help mankind achieve its full human potential — in the words of Dante, to obtain “happiness in this life.” Among the exponents of this new attitude were Bruno Latini, Dante’s teacher; Ptolomy of Lucca, who was both Aquinas’s confessor and the prior of the Dominican convent of Santa Maria Novella in Florence in the early fourteenth century; and Marsilio of Padua, author of the Defender of Peace, which was completed in 1324. The dolce vita depicted in Lorenzetti’s frescoes is an attempt to show what such happiness could look like.

    There is often a tendency among modern historians to emphasize the place of Florence in this advance, no doubt owing to the importance of Dante, and later Leonardo Bruni, Machiavelli, and Guicciardini, for political philosophy. Yet it would be a mistake to overlook Siena, which in the fourteenth century was described by the great jurist Cino da Pistoia as a “city of ideas.” A profound concern for freedom and good governance was a long tradition in Siena. It was there — or to be more precise, in the country hamlet of Rocca d’Orcia, some forty miles southeast of the city — that “equality, justice, and liberty” were first invoked as a trio of interrelated rights. This occurred in a Charter of Liberties that freed the serfs in 1207 — eight years before the Magna Carta. Government documents in fourteenth-century Siena still regularly expressed its commitment to justice, equality, peace, concord, liberty, and protecting the poor from the predations of the rich. 

    It was also likely in Siena around 1288 that one of the earliest translations of Giles of Rome’s On Good Government was made. This astonishing book — De Regimine Principum, to give its Latin title — has been described as among “the most widely read books” and “the most successful attempts at mediating Aristotle’s moral and political philosophy” in the Middle Ages. It was enormously popular: hundreds of copies survive in Latin as well as in French, Italian, German, and Castilian translation. Giles of Rome — sometimes also called by historians Aegidius, Egidio Romano, or Egidio Colonna — had a brilliant career: he was a pupil of Aquinas; the tutor to King Philip IV of France; the head of the order of Augustinian Hermits; the Archbishop of Bourges; and advisor to Pope Boniface VIII. He also lived in Siena in 1295. 

    While there can be little doubt that the men who devised the program of the Allegories of Good and Bad Government knew this book, I do not mean to use it as a key to decode the pictures. Instead I want to draw attention to it because it serves so well to illuminate the general terms of the discussion of tyranny, justice, and good government in early fourteenth-century Italy. The following remarks are based on the late thirteenth-century Italian translation. I have not read it in Latin; I do not believe an English translation exists. 

    The first thing to note is that the author describes the book as a work of political science — scienza della politica in Italian — which must be one of the earliest uses of this term. Another is that while Giles of Rome is a staunch defender of monarchy, he does so because of its putative capacity for justice and the defense of the common good, rather than appealing to tradition or some divine right. Moreover, following the example of Aristotle, the political unit that he most often describes is the city, not the realm, province, or kingdom. Whereas in the Bible, cities are often seen as entrepôts of evil, for Giles they are the polity wherein citizens can best attain their full humanity. The book is a paean to the city and civil life. 

    Invoking the authority of Aristotle, Giles says that cities should be arranged and governed to obtain several specific goods for its citizens, the first of which is to have “joy and pleasure” (“goia e sollazzo”) — the dolce vita, indeed. This can be most readily achieved in a city because humans are by nature social animals, and it is there that you have the best chance for exchange and companionship, a source of great cheerfulness. Cities also encourage mutual defense, the growth of families through marriage, the growth of wealth through trade, and other benefits. “Therefore,” Giles writes, “if someone asks you what a city is, tell them it is nothing other than a gathering of people brought together to live well and virtuously, according to law and reason, and to have a perfect and sufficient human life.” 

    To promote these ends, a good ruler or government must ensure that the people “have the things which are necessary to happiness, which are three things: knowledge, virtue, and material wealth” (“scienze, virtù e beni temporali”). For this reason, he continues, the ruler must make sure that the realm is full of many wise people who are knowledgeable in different fields (“diverse scienze”), and that the population is well educated. If the ruler does not seek this outcome, this alone is enough to determine he is “not a king but a tyrant.” 

    The book is full of passages contrasting the characteristics of a king and a tyrant, so that the reader will be prepared to tell them apart. One astonishing section (book three, chapter nine) is dedicated to the theme of the actions which a real king undertakes, but which a tyrant only pretends to do. Item number one is that the king “must procure the common good . . . and must spend the resources of the realm for the benefit of the people; this the tyrant pretends to do but doesn’t do. Instead, he gives gifts to flatterers” and spends money on things that bring no benefit to the people. The second characteristic of a real king is he “guards the wealth of the country and the common good, but the tyrant does the opposite; that is to say, he takes goods from others and does not guard the fiscal and moral integrity [“drittura”] of the country.” Another is that a good king never dishonors, dispraises, or scorns his subjects, but a tyrant does. 

    The next section of the treatise, which Giles says is loosely based on book five of Aristotle’s Politics, concerns the steps that a tyrant takes to stay in power. For example, the tyrant wants his subjects to be so foolish that they do not know what he is doing, and therefore he kills the learned and destroys the schools. He also “wants to make his subjects poor so that they will be too busy making a living to think about organizing against him.” By contrast, says Giles, a real king “loves and takes care of the learned and supports the schools and studies in his land, and wants that the subjects to love one another . . . nor does he want them to be poor, but rich.” Giles sums up his analysis thus: “Those who rule for and desire the common good . . . create good government . . . but those instead who aim for their own good and not the common good are tyrants.” 

    Similar ideas can be found in other contemporary treatises on government by the likes of Ptolemy of Lucca, Marsilio of Padua, and Bartolus of Sassoferrato.  It was common wisdom in the fourteenth century. And it was in the same spirit that verses from the poem that accompanies Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s Allegories of Good and Bad Government declare (in this modified translation by Julian Lubbock):

    Turn your eyes to admire Justice,

    You who govern…

    Look how many benefits flow from her,

    And how sweet and tranquil is the life

    Of the city where this Virtue,

    More resplendent than all others, is maintained. 

    She guards and defends 

    Those who honor her, she feeds and nourishes them;

    From her light are born

    Rewards for those who do good,

    And she punishes the wicked as they deserve….

    But where Justice is tied up 

    No one ever accords with the common good

    Nor keeps things in line,

    Therefore, Tyranny triumphs….

    Tyranny hounds out those intent on good

    And summons each one who intends harm.

    It always protects

    Those who use force, who rob, who loathe peace

    Whence the entire territory is laid waste.

    …and as a result, 

    Where there is Tyranny there is great mistrust,

    War, pillage, treachery and deceit.

    Defend against Tyranny

    And spur your mind and your intellect

    Always to hold each citizen subject to Justice

    So as to avoid certain harm,

    And overthrow tyrants.

    Whosoever tries to destabilize Justice

    Shall be for his actions

    Banished and shunned

    Together with every one of his followers,

    So that Justice may be strengthened

    For the sake of peace.

    Despite the crisis of the 1330s, and then the Black Death in 1348 (which killed half of the population of Siena, including Ambrogio Lorenzetti), and the replacement of the Nine with a more broadly based magistracy in 1355, and a pair of political crises in the fifteenth century, the republic of Siena survived for another two hundred years. May we do as well, and for longer.

     

    In Darkness

    If they show me stone and I say stone they will say stone.

    If they show me wood and I say wood they will say wood.

    But if they show me blood and I say blood they will say paint.

    If they show me blood and I say blood they will say paint.

    Translated from the Hebrew by Leon Wieseltier

     

    We Need Robert Frost

    A boy is out doing a man’s work with a chainsaw, when his sister comes to call him in for supper. Suddenly, the chainsaw leaps and cuts deep into his hand. The boy looks at the bleeding gash and begs his sister, “Don’t let him cut my hand off— / The doctor when he comes.” But before long the boy’s pulse begins to drop: “Little, less,” soon “nothing.” And the boy is dead. There’s “no more to build on there,” so his family turns away: “And they, since they / Were not the one dead, turned to their affairs.” 

    That is the narrative that Robert Frost unfolds in “Out, Out —” and it is, I believe, emblematic of his understanding of life. Danger is everywhere; the darkness is always crowding in. You cannot rely on others to sustain you. They have their own lives to live, and they return to them readily, no matter what sorrows might befall you. You have only one pillar of sustenance in this world: yourself. Frost elaborates his view of the world with considerable art.

    In the long run, I think that Frost will prove to be our most consequential and most read twentieth-century poet. Though interest in poetry overall is dwindling and rather rapidly, Frost continues to draw readers and top-flight critics. Adam Plunkett’s recently published Love and Need: The Life of Robert Frost, for example, is a deeply thoughtful blending of reflections on Frost’s life and his work. It testifies eloquently to our culture’s need to continue reading and brooding on the poems of this profound and often misunderstood man. 

    Born one hundred and fifty years ago, Frost writes the poetry of the isolated and often threatened individual. He is our prophet of post-Emersonian self-reliance, our most inspired chronicler of its joys and of its costs. Whitman, the greatest of democratic poets, writes memorably about the joys of being in groups. He loves the collective, the mass, the everyday. Frost doubts all groups. In “Neither Out Far nor In Deep,” he describes people looking blankly out to sea: they cannot look out far or in deep, “But when was that ever a bar / To any watch they keep?” Most people and most crowds are numbly uncomprehending; they offer little or nothing to the individual. But the individual does have the power to go his own way and sculpt a life worth living outside the rule of the majority. In his best poetry, Frost shows how to live a self-reliant life far from the noise of the crowd. He also is committed to showing what self-reliance can cost. Nothing is got for nothing in Frost’s world, and though self-reliance has its joys, it also comes at a price.

    We know Frost as a New England poet and a poet of rural life, though he was born in San Francisco and lived for some time in the city of Lawrence, Massachusetts. Eventually he moved north to farm in New Hampshire and Vermont. Frost had a difficult time getting his early work published. When he was nearly forty he finally found an appreciative editor, and a group of literary allies (including the very unlikely Ezra Pound) in England. Frost returned to America in 1915 and thrived. He won the Pulitzer Prize four times, and was poet in residence at Amherst, Michigan, Harvard, and Dartmouth. He read — or tried to read: the glare of the bright winter sun defeated him — at John F. Kennedy’s inauguration. He went to Russia as a goodwill ambassador for the United States, and apparently charmed Nikita Khrushchev. Frost died in 1963 at the age of eighty-eight, having written well into his final years, and reigned consistently as the best loved poet in America. He could also be what Lionel Trilling, in a revisionist speech delivered in the presence of the poet, called a “terrifying poet.”

    Frost is a poet for all seasons, but he is especially apt now for those of us who are weary of the current forms of collective identity. We look around and see that the joy that Whitman found in groups is no longer readily had: groups now are acrimonious, conflict-ridden, nasty. The happiness that Whitman found in collective life is hard to locate, if you can find it at all. But we do have another path. Enough of the romance of community, which can curdle quickly: the freedom that democracy dispenses to the individual can also be vitalizing if we know how to use it. Whitman taught the way to general happiness: it is free, unguarded. Its emblem is the open road. Emerson, whom Frost greatly admired, launched the discourse of the free if beleaguered democratic individual. In essays and addresses such as “Self-Reliance” and “The American Scholar,” he wrote the prose of the independent man or woman, though he could not, despite his efforts, write the poetry. That had to await the next century. A hundred years and more after Emerson’s great period in the 1830s, Frost came along to do precisely that. Frost can teach us what it might feel like day to day, to follow one’s own path, go one’s own way. For those who do not care for the present-day pressure to join, profess, represent, and conform, Frost can be a resource and an inspiration.

    Frost’s world is constantly dangerous; rarely does anyone in it care about you and yours. “Out, Out — ” is an allusive title. It refers to Macbeth’s famous speech after his wife dies of guilt and grief:

    Out, out brief candle!

    Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player 

    That struts and frets his hour upon the stage

    And then is heard no more. It is a tale

    Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury

    Signifying nothing.

    Obvious allusion is not common in Frost, though his work is drenched in the English poetic tradition, as Plunkett demonstrates; and so an open allusion to Shakespeare, and to what may be his darkest speech, carries weight. For Frost this is what life is, or too often can be. And if this is the case, what is to be done? 

    In “Acquainted with the Night,” Frost finds himself walking disconsolately down city streets late:

    I have been one acquainted with the night.

    I have walked out in rain — and back in rain.

    I have outwalked the furthest city light.

    I have looked down the saddest city lane.

    I have passed by the watchman on his beat

    And dropped my eyes, unwilling to explain. 

    Then the walker hears a cry from far away. He pauses hopefully. But alas, the cry is not meant for him. It is not sounded to call him back or say goodbye. Whatever he has left broken behind him will stay broken. No one comes to save him from his sorrow. No one comes because no one ever comes. It is up to you to do what you can to help yourself.

    A life of solitude has its pleasure (we will get to those), but it also creates fear and longing. In “Desert Places,” Frost stares off into a “blank whiteness of benighted snow / With no expression, nothing to express.” His world has gone as inscrutably and frightfully white as Ahab’s whale. Salvation? Solution? There is none ready to hand. All Frost can say is that this is familiar territory: “I have it in me so much nearer home / To scare myself with my own desert places.” Frost’s comfort is that he possesses “a violence from within that protects us from a violence without,” to cite his rival Wallace Stevens. 

    The writer whom Frost most admired was almost certainly Emerson; but his chosen philosopher was Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer took his understanding of life from Buddhism: life is largely pain. And pain hurts far more than any pleasure pleases. “Pleasure is never as pleasant as we expect it to be,” Schopenhauer declared, “and pain is always more painful. If you do not believe it, compare the respective feelings of two animals, one of which is eating the other.” Frost would probably nod in assent. 

    Is there anything to be done to mitigate a life largely defined by pain? Whitman’s answer — merge ecstatically with the democratic mass — was never on the table for Frost. He knew himself to be different. He speaks of “the exception I like to think I am in everything,” and though he seems to be boasting, he is also aware of the vulnerability that the sentiment entails. He would surely have concurred with an observation that I heard Harold Bloom make frequently, “He who would be all in himself risks becoming nothing in himself.” Put off by the poisoned and futile group life of our day, in which people too often define themselves through hatred and opposition, any number of us will end up choosing the path that came naturally to Frost, the path of the individual who tries to live on and find meaning on his or her own.

    Religion cannot solve Frost’s problems for him. Though he respects Christianity — probably as Schopenhauer does, for its tragic view of life — he could never conform to an institutional or catechismic faith. He cordially disliked T. S. Eliot, who he thought relied too heavily on religious consolation in his poetry. “I play euchre,” Frost said. “He plays eucharist.”

    So what is there for the solitary individual unmoored from the traditional stays and props? To begin with, you can go off and make something. Frost called his poems momentary stays against confusion. He was speaking not on behalf of the reader but on behalf of the poet. You make something that is sturdy and well-crafted and resilient. You capture the play of human speech; you find just the right metaphor; you round the work off with a dose of wisdom, however ambiguous it may be. Frost particularly wished to be praised for his power to make metaphors: he wanted to be applauded for his capacity to be reminded of this by that, of that by this. The chainsaw story sends him to Shakespeare; climbing a tree delicately in “Birches” — “I’d like to go by climbing a birch tree, / And climb black branches up a snow-white trunk / Toward heaven, till the tree could bear no more . . .” — recalls what it is like to fill a glass to the top and then, ever so slightly, over the top. A white spider on a white flower takes him to Aquinas’ argument about how the perfect design of the world proves the existence of God. A bounteous woman reminds him of a graceful silken tent standing alone and poised in a field.

    To keep confusion at bay and the night from taking over, you make things, well-formed, useful things. Frost was not referring only to poems: he made that clear. He said that to make a horseshoe, with perfect symmetry, tough and durable, was a kind of making that could hold off confusion. Make things, make them right, and you put darkness at bay and maybe do a little good in the world.

    You should also hold onto what gives you sustenance. In “Two Tramps at Mud Time,” a pair of ragged men emerge from the woods while Frost is chopping wood. He reads their minds: they want to do his job for pay. But Frost will not hand over his axe. Thoreau observed that he hoed beans to get sustenance, but also to cultivate tropes for his writing. The farm and the chores that sustain it are practical necessities for Frost, but they also provide him with substance for his art. Frost writes about country life — farming and husbandry — because he feels deeply that rural life is where reality is most potently concentrated. “My object in living,” he proclaims near the close of “Two Tramps,” “is to unite / My avocation and my vocation / As my two eyes make one in sight.” My students are often disappointed when it becomes clear to them that Frost is not going to give up the axe or even hand a few charitable dollars to the men. But in Frost’s world you need to take care of yourself, for no one — at least no one creditable — is going to provide for you. It’s not that Frost does not feel the social sting of not handing off his axe. He does. It’s just that such a gesture makes no sense in his fragile but competent individualist world. 

    There is a recorded clip of Frost reading a hyperbolic poem about putting away resources for old age. The poem is called “Provide, Provide,” and it’s a fable about a one-time starlet, called Abishag, “the picture pride of Hollywood,” scrubbing stairs in old age to get by. Do not let it happen to you, Frost says. 

    No memory of having starred 

    Atones for later disregard

    Or keeps the end from being hard.

    Better to go down dignified

    With boughten friendship at your side

    Than none at all. Provide, provide!

    After he’s done “saying” the poem — Frost never recited his verse or read it aloud, he “said” it — he pushes his face toward the camera and remarks, with dark gusto, “Provide, provide — or someone else will provide for ya. How would you like that?” Someone else being your neighbor, the town, the government. 

    Frost takes another memorable swipe at groups and groupthink in “Departmental.” Ostensibly it is a poem about ants, and in particular the death of one ant, the noble forager Jerry McCormic. “The word goes forth in Formic / ‘Death’s come to Jerry McCormic.’” (Calling ant-talk Formic is a marvelous touch, no?) The disposal of Jerry’s body is cold and standardized:

    Will the special Janizary

    Whose office it is to bury

    The dead of the commissary.

    Go bring him to his people. 

    It is all routine, all unfeeling. Jerry is an anonymous creature, characterized only by his work, not mourned for when he passes but submitted to a scripted interment. How much is Jerry’s fate like that of the human factory worker, rendered faceless by the industrial machine? His funeral protocols “[C]ouldn’t be called ungentle / But how thoroughly departmental.” 

    The factory worker: in “A Lone Striker,” Frost tells the story of a man locked out of the factory gates when he is late for work. He doesn’t immediately reject the factory and its regimented (ant-like) life. But as he stands outside waiting, a fresh impulse takes him, and surprising both himself and the reader, he considers taking off for the woods:

    He knew a path that wanted walking;

    He knew a spring that wanted drinking; 

    A thought that wanted further thinking;

    A love that wanted re-renewing.

    Nor was this just a way of talking

    To save him the expense of doing.

    With him it boded action, deed.

    Note that the lone striker is not a member of a union, striking for better wages and conditions. He is striking for freedom and for no one other than himself. At the end of the poem, he seems on the verge of discovering it.

    The lone individual — the one who says no to the ant-life of groups — can find joy in beauty, though Frost’s idea of beauty is not entirely conventional. Schopenhauer believed that beauty saved you from inner turbulence by creating a contemplative calm. You could stand and stare at a landscape or a painting for hours and achieve some manner of ease. For Schopenhauer, life was walking a fiery path: beauty gave you a cool spot to rest, for as long as you could sustain your gaze. But Frost loves, and brilliantly evokes, transient beauty. Listen to him praising a hillside thaw:

    To think to know the country and not know

    The hillside on the day the sun lets go

    Ten million silver lizards out of snow!

    As often as I’ve seen it done before

    I can’t pretend to tell the ways it’s done.

    It looks as if some magic of the sun

    Lifted the rug that bred them on the floor

    And the light breaking on them made them run.

    The poet claims that it is the sun that makes the magic here, but it is the poet who knows to compare the shimmer on a snowy hillside with the glow of lizards running wild. 

    Beauty passes in Frost, and even at its most dramatic it submits to constraints. It’s as though Frost were somewhat suspicious of beauty and joy. The more transient the beauty, the more Frost loves it. Consider the short and quite wonderful poem “Blue Butterfly Day”:

    It is blue butterfly day here in spring,

    And with these sky-flakes down in flurry on flurry

    There is more unmixed color on the wing

    Than flowers will show for days unless they hurry.

    But these are flowers that fly and all but sing:

    And now from having ridden out desire

    They lie closed over in the wind and cling

    Where wheels have freshly sliced the April mire.

    The blue butterflies are magnificent, more vibrant even than the spring flowers will be. Yet their magnificence lasts only a short time — blue butterfly day. Soon they are folded over, clinging to the mud. The poignancy of this portrait of transience brings to mind the classical Chinese poets and their blossoms. 

    Beauty is splendid, but sustain contact with it too long and you will inevitably be left vulnerable. You become mesmerized and can be taken unawares. Life is dangerous, life is fraught, as the boy in “Out, Out — ” learns. Frost commends vigilance: there is too much out in the world that can ruin you if you are besotted by its wonders. In Studies in Classic American Literature, a book that has itself become something of a classic, D.H. Lawrence observes that “the essential American soul is hard, isolate, stoic and a killer.” Frost is no killer, and though he is often hard he has a capacity to open himself up, albeit cautiously, to beauty. But “isolate and stoic”: that is Frost to a T. 

    What about love? You might, if you are very fortunate, find one other person to share your solitude fruitfully. (Frost often thought that he had found such inner companionship in his formidable wife Elinor.) Frost wrote some wonderful love poems, the best of which manage to be both joyful and prudent. Prudence, of course, is not a common theme in the poetry of love. Perhaps the most touching of them is “Putting in the Seed,” a sonnet (Frost wrote many of those) that runs this way:

    You come to fetch me from my work tonight

    When supper’s on the table, and we’ll see

    If I can leave off burying the white

    Soft petals fallen from the apple tree

    (Soft petals, yes, but not so barren quite

    Mingled with these, smooth bean and wrinkled pea),

    And go along with you ere you lose the sight

    Of what you came for and become like me,

    Slave to a springtime passion for the earth.

    How Love burns through the Putting in the Seed

    On through the watching for that early birth

    When just as the soil tarnishes with weed,

    The sturdy seedling with arched body comes

    Shouldering its way and shedding the earth crumbs. 

    Anyone with an acquaintance with gardening will recognize the feelings that infuse the poem. In the springtime, people fall in love with planting, and with imagining the bounty to come. It is the time of hope for the gardener, before pests or bad weather interfere with the dream of plenty. Frost himself was a gardener and knew the passion for growing well.

    Yet the poem is about more than gardening. “Putting in the Seed” is also about the act of love, putting in the seed that leads to pregnancy and birth. But “Love burns through the Putting in the Seed”: life begins with sex, passion inspired by love. (Note the quasi-metaphysical capitalization of the central terms.) But love continues on past the moment of lovemaking, into the days of pregnancy, when husband and wife together wait for the birth. And then comes the seedling, the child, sturdy and strong, “shouldering” away the earth crumbs. The poem, then, is about fidelity. The husband is there for the act of love, yes; but he will remain there through the pregnancy and on to the birth. The transformation that his wife undergoes will not rattle or alienate him. Love will abide into the future. This is a marriage poem, about a love that goes beyond simple passion into regions of care, compassion, steadfastness, and respect. 

    But Frost was also the author of a stingingly bitter marriage poem, “Home Burial” A newly married couple’s child has died, and the death has put them horribly at odds. Amy, the wife, is mourning her child furiously, and she makes it clear that her grief will never stop. Her husband, unnamed in the poem, is a practical countryman, who cannot understand the depths of Amy’s grief. “What was it brought you up to think it the thing / To take your mother-loss of a first child / So inconsolably — in the face of love?” He thinks that his wife’s grief arises from conceit and over-refinement. Amy finds her husband crude, empty, hopeless. The poem is composed with grim conviction. For the strong individualist, like the husband in the poem, marriage can provide some succor, but it can also be a trap, a chainsaw waiting to jump.

    The poem that seems to me most completely to capture Frost’s view of life is called “The Most of It.” In its way it is an anti-marriage poem. It is an allusive poem, with a submerged mythical theme. A man finds himself alone in the world, not unlike Adam before Eve. He is lonely. He cries out in frustration and sorrow, but all he hears in response is an echo. He wants more. He cannot live with a mere reflection from the world. He wants what he calls “counter-love, original response.” He wants Eve, or someone like her, someone who will give him more than “copy speech,” and talk to him in an idiom of her own. But he never gets it. The kind of Romantic love that helps a poet like Shelley burn imaginatively through received feelings and thoughts, and discover, if only fleetingly, a paradise on the other side of them, is not available to our man.

    What he sees instead is a shape plunging into the waters on the opposite bank. It makes its way toward him, and emerges,

    Instead of proving human when it neared

    And someone else additional to him,

    As a great buck it powerfully appeared,

    Pushing the crumpled water up ahead,

    And landed pouring like a waterfall,

    And stumbled through the rock with horny tread,

    And forced the underbrush — and that was all. 

    Not a woman, not Eve, but a magnificent buck, that appears as though in a dream-vision and then is gone. Our Adamic individual is left alone.

    Yet he does receive something. Or as he puts it in another poem about the unlikelihood of fulfillment: “For once, then, something.” He receives the buck, who is potentially an image of majestic self-reliance. Adam can embrace that vision of himself or he can go on pining. To save himself, and affirm his solitary dignity, he is going to have to learn to read in the way that Frost commends. He is going to have to see a metaphor when it arises and understand how far he can ride it out. As Frost says in Education by Poetry, “Unless you have had your proper poetic education in the metaphor you are not safe anywhere. Because you are not at ease with figurative values: you don’t know the metaphor in its strength and its weakness. You don’t know how far you may expect to ride it and where it may break down with you.” Our protagonist will have to begin by seeing that nature has offered him a potentially illuminating image, if he is ready himself for such an illumination — if he can then understand what he can make of it. He will need to grasp and embrace his solitude, even if he wishes things were otherwise. 

    The poem’s title, “The Most of It,” can be puzzling. The most that we can even be given in the way of consolation — a warning of a limit? Or, as I would prefer to read its inexplicit meaning, Make the Most of It, in the old American phrase. Can our man do so? Can he read the metaphor that life has offered him? And then can he live it out, taking some joy in his solitude? Can he be satisfactorily alone in the world, savoring the beauty of nature and the dignified, difficult pleasures of work? Is his life a diminished thing for the lack of others? Not, I suspect, if he knows what his path is and how to follow it. 

    Frost steps into our militant age of groupthink and tribal rage and makes a path for the individual who does not care for any of it. Make sturdy useful things; contemplate beauty in nature, but not for too long; consider marriage, but acknowledge the dangers; learn to be at home in the metaphor, and when the image arises that embodies your fate do not be afraid to embrace it. Take the hits as they come, for they will come. Chart your own course, cut your own path, to the best of your abilities; and be prudent and wise. Learn to rely on yourself and do for yourself. Think twice before you surrender the axe.

    The Rise and Fall and Rise of American Publishing

    I knew the jig was up when one day, in the fall of 1995, my boss and publisher Peter Osnos asked me to lunch. I was then editorial director of Times Books, an imprint of Random House. Previously, I had been publisher of Hill & Wang, a nonfiction division of Farrar, Straus & Giroux. I’d had some success during my years there in the late 1980s, publishing Innumeracy by John Allen Paulos, Hill & Wang’s first bestseller since Elie Wiesel’s Night in 1960. Wiesel’s slim and scorching account of his torment at Auschwitz and Buchenwald had been rejected by more than fifteen American publishers before Arthur Wang took it on. It was not an immediate success despite glowing reviews. Over time, however, it would sell more than ten million copies and become a central text in the world’s moral education, such as it is. Paulos’ polemic pressing the case for mathematical literacy was unlikely to find similar favor, especially given the one-hand-clapping review buried in the middle of the New York Times Book Review. Yet to my surprise it vaulted to the upper echelons of bestseller lists all over the country, including the Times, largely, I came to believe, because of its brevity — it was more essay than full-length jeremiad — written with engaging wit, and so it didn’t feel like homework. It did a lot to help many people overcome their allergy to numbers.

    My phone was soon ringing with offers from other publishers, who perhaps felt I had some mojo, some secret sauce, that might help them out. They offered to double my salary and to give me the keys to their respective bank vaults so that I might dangle larger and more substantial advances to authors whose books might similarly sell well. Plus giving me a larger playing field to run around on, with all the presumed market clout that a larger, more corporate concern might provide. I took the bait. What could go wrong? 

    There I was, on the eve of publishing a revisionist history of the American Revolution by Theodore Draper, one of the most independent and formidable historians in the country, a public intellectual avant la lettre, a man I had long admired and whose defenestration of the Iran-Contra scandal I had published at Hill & Wang. His new book was the work of a lifetime of study, just over five hundred pages of brilliantly argued scholarship, an original account of the causes and nature of the revolutionary process that resulted in the final rupture with England and, as Draper put it, in a struggle for power, whatever its ideological conceits. I rounded up praise — read: blurbs — from a clutch of worthies, including R. R. Palmer, Esmond Wright, Edward Countryman, and even Gore Vidal, who had long ago anointed himself an expert on American history. He called it a book written “with an acuity and balance worthy of the late (and until now unequaled) Richard Hofstadter.” I arranged a paperback edition with the head of Vintage Books at Random House, to follow our hardcover. Our first printing was ten thousand. The pump was primed. I was excited.

    Osnos waited until dessert to deliver the bad news. He said that, going forward, we could no longer publish the Drapers of this world. First printings of ten thousand copies were killing us. It was our obligation to find books that could command first printings of forty, fifty, even sixty thousand copies. Only then could profits be had that were large enough to feed the behemoth — or more precisely, the more refined and compelling tastes — that modern mainstream publishing demanded.

    It was a dark moment, but still I was game, except for the sad fact that almost never had I — or Osnos — acquired books that warranted such large printings. To be sure, we had published books that had “done well,” going back to press, some in numbers that ultimately far exceeded sixty thousand copies sold. But, I pointed out, if such a principle were raised to the level of dogma, none of the several books that were then keeping Random House fiscally afloat — Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, John Berendt’s Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil (eventually spending a record two hundred and sixteen weeks on the bestseller list, and adapted into a film by Clint Eastwood), and Joe Klein’s Primary Colors (published anonymously and made into a movie by Mike Nichols in 1998) — would ever have been acquired. None had been expected to be a bestseller, and each had started out with a ten-thousand copy first printing.

    Osnos would soon decamp to start an independent press called PublicAffairs, and I accepted an offer in late 1996 to edit the Los Angeles Times Book Review, one of only three separate Sunday sections devoted to books left at the country’s major metropolitan dailies. Four years later, I organized and published a symposium on the state of American publishing. More than thirty distinguished editors (Robert Gottlieb, Robert Loomis, Jason Epstein, Robert Weil, Marian Wood), publishers (Alberto Vitale, André Schiffrin, Richard Seaver, Roger W. Straus Jr.), literary agents (David Black, Sandra Dijkstra, Morton L. Janklow, Gloria Loomis, Betsy Lerner), and booksellers (Andy Ross, Barbara Meade, Douglas Dutton) participated. They represented both mainstream trade publishers (Alfred A. Knopf, Random House, Simon & Schuster) and independent houses and university presses (W. W. Norton, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, Seven Stories, Harvard, Oxford, Walker & Co., The Overlook Press, Verso). Today a third of the respondents are no longer with us. The important, and stinging, question remains: Is their publishing world still with us? Or has the business — which, like all cultural enterprises, has effects beyond its own profits or losses — evolved beyond recognition, for better or for worse? 

    When, in that Pleistocene era, I invited a broad spectrum of industry veterans to share their individual and collective wisdom, the twenty-first century had just begun. It was plain that for some time several issues had been plaguing those of us fortunate to work as midwives to the birthing of books. None of us were naïve. We had always known that working at the intersection of art and commerce was inherently fraught. Publishing had always required an admixture of idealism and cynicism. Many were temperamentally Chicken Littles, fearing that however difficult the old ways of acquiring and editing and selling books were, the new ways were worse. The Golden Age, as usual, was in the past — a time synonymous with our youth — and of course we were convinced that it had been much better. (And there were, we soon discovered, some good reasons for thinking so.) The future was now fast upon us, and whatever else might be said about it, we knew one thing: it would not include us. 

    We had entered a new world of painful — even, for many, unimaginable — challenges. Among the more acutely distressing trends were the conglomeration of nearly everything, a sovereign obsession with the bottom-line and the pressure to reap short-term profits, and the near-universal enrollment in the junk cults of celebrity, sensationalism, and gossip, which made it harder for publishers to successfully maintain a commitment to literature and the public discourse — to be a serious publisher. Complicating the picture even more was the advent of electronic technologies that threatened to significantly transform old ways of both producing and distributing books. The swift rise of Amazon was a critical factor, transforming the landscape of bookselling, putting to the sword hundreds if not thousands of independent bookstores even as Jeff Bezos built with a single-minded determination both admirable and appalling a digital juggernaut that made it possible for millions to gain access at remarkably cheap prices to a more diverse array of books than ever before. Bezos got big fast and was soon able to dictate the terms of the entire trade. Publishers reeled. And so did the noble bookshop owners. By 2010, the number of bookstores in the country fell from a high of about four thousand in 1990 to fifteen hundred. (Thirteen years later, against all expectation, it had rebounded by about 1,000 bookstores.) 

    The rise of digital communication and book-buying caught Hollywood’s imagination and swiftly became the basis for a hit movie, Nora Ephron’s You’ve Got Mail, a glamorous tale of the unglamorous reality of the independent American bookstore. Worry deepened that these trends would alter even how people read. The growing proliferation of screens raised the specter that the habits of attention necessary to absorb extended narrative — the new term “long form” was itself an expression of the jitters — would fall victim to the seductions of a culture hostage to velocity and instant gratification. The patience necessary for the lasting pleasures of a more contemplative, slower approach to both knowledge and entertainment was at risk.

    Perhaps it was delusional on our part, but optimism dies last. We felt ourselves to be a species defined by our opposable thumbs and an inherent need to tell each other stories. For this was the principal way in which we extracted meaning in an otherwise inchoate world. Surely technology could not destroy or replace this essential human quality. We might debate the many ways the industry had resisted opening itself up to the stories of others and what should be done about it. We could argue about how a world of ostensible privilege and presumed entitlement had too often shaped who got to be the “gatekeepers” — another shibboleth of digital culture, though of course it applied most precisely to Bezos and Zuckerberg and the other tech mandarins — of our literary culture. We might decry the dismal fact that American publishers, with notable exceptions, had long been allergic to translating works from other languages. We might blame the manifold failure of our experiment in public education to advance literacy so that we now have an electorate in which fully half are unable to read at a level higher than fourth grade, thus enfeebling the very idea of an informed citizenry that is so essential for a healthy democracy. 

    Book people are nevertheless temperamentally given to a persistent idealism even while constantly complaining that everything is doomed. Almost uniformly they will insist that any glass filled halfway with water (or more likely, vodka) is half empty, but they will behave almost without exception as if it were half-full. They live to hear a new story by a new writer, or a fresh gloss on an old truth. The main worry, as the late Marian Wood, a veteran of many years in New York publishing, insisted to me in early 2001, wasn’t “the conglomerate or a celebrity-hungry culture or the technology, or the idiocies of the last thirty years. The biggest problem is keeping reading alive as a passion — and finding ways to reach those passionate readers with the news of a great new writer.” The renowned Robert Gottlieb, who died at the age of ninety-two in 2023, told me: “Every few years since I’ve been in publishing — that’s since 1955 — we’ve been told that it’s all over. There’s always a new reason: remember ‘The medium is the message’? Meanwhile books go rolling along. The very golden age that young and middle-aged people are looking back at so romantically was forcefully (and frequently) described to me by Alfred Knopf as ‘the age of the slobs’ — for him, everything after 1939 represented the death of publishing. I thought he was mistaken then, and I think today’s doom-criers are mistaken, too.”

    The venerable literary agent Georges Borchardt is still working at age ninety-seven. When I met with him not long ago in his Manhattan office, he saw no reason to revise his sober assessment rendered a quarter of a century earlier, reminding me that good and daring writers had almost always had a hard time getting published by big established houses, long before the mergers and the conglomerates came into being: “William Faulkner was turned down by the legendary Maxwell Perkins (Scribners); Elie Wiesel was turned down by the original Knopf (Mrs. K herself); Samuel Beckett was turned down by just about every publisher in New York. Both Wiesel and Beckett were then picked up by small publishers with little capital, but good instincts, Hill & Wang and Grove Press respectively.” (Borchardt represented both writers.) “So put me in the camp of the guardedly optimistic.” It was inspiring to have pessimism dispelled by someone who has seen so much. 

    Still, twenty-five years into the new century, something has changed; an ill wind is blowing through publishers’ suites. One wonders if those rosy sentiments are more a treasured conceit — editors and publishers have always mythologized themselves — than an unsentimental acknowledgment of a more disturbing reality. The big surprise is less the manifold ways in which Brobdingnagian publishing has come to dominate the ecosystem of publishing generally, but — this is the good news of our day — the consequent and unexpected resilience of an entire galaxy of small independent publishers. You would have thought that as big publishers battened on economies of scale, merging back-office bureaucracies, outsourcing entire departments of copyeditors, shedding aging (and expensive) staff, and kicking an entire generational cohort to the curb, the result would be leaner, more efficient, more profitable publishing machines ever more deft at discovering the quirky writers whose daring imaginations would be well served by publishers skilled in the alchemy of promotion and marketing. More: that as the big companies merge and consolidate the small fry would be snuffed out, deprived of oxygen, unable to compete. But you would be wrong. 

    With conglomeration came cowardice. Turns out, mass wasn’t synonymous with class. A culture of timidity soon set in among the corporate overseers, and invertebrate behavior quickly became a striking hallmark of the merger mania that characterized much of mainstream publishing dealmaking and practice. (Beyond the economic realm, one must not forget the shabby fear with which mainstream publishing greeted the fatwa against Salman Rushdie.) Most publishers began in the first half of the twentieth century as the black sheep of their rich families: Horace Liveright, Roger W. Straus, Jr., Barney Rosset, to name only a few. One example tells the larger story: Bennett Cerf and Donald Klopfer founded Random House in 1927 and bought Alfred A. Knopf in 1960 and Pantheon the following year. Four years later, in 1965, they sold it to RCA and then RCA, in turn, sold it in 1980 to Si Newhouse’s privately owned Advance Publications for between $65 million and $70 million in cash. Newhouse ruled the roost for eighteen years and then sold in 1998 to the private German multinational conglomerate Bertelsmann, which paid a reported $1 billion, making Bertelsmann a publishing Goliath. Fifteen years later, in 2013, Random House and the Penguin Group combined because of a deal between Bertelsmann and Pearson, the parent companies of their respective publishing houses, a response to the threat posed by Amazon. Other publishers followed suit, the French company Hachette buying Little, Brown, the German firm of Holtzbrinck absorbing Farrar, Straus & Giroux, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation swallowing HarperCollins, and the global private equity and investment firm of KKR gobbling up Simon & Schuster, leaving today just five corporate empires dominating the American publishing landscape. Corporate raiders made out like bandits; authors and editors not so much. 

    To be sure, opportunism and market agility are among the requirements of a successful business. But fear hollows out the good kind of opportunism, and mainstream publishers grew wary of alienating readers and found themselves cleaving to the familiar, the safe bet, the tried-and-true. A certain predictability set in; and, as ever, smaller publishers — independents who had almost no money — were less encumbered and therefore nimbler and more willing to take on risk. Kris Kristoferson was right: freedom’s just another word for nothing left to lose. Big publishing blew itself up, and much of its current predicament is the result of self-inflicted wounds, prompting the emergence of an arcadia of small publishing houses, many of which display all the qualities of imagination and taste and pluck which largely elude the established firms. 

    Today, thanks to a concerted campaign to discover and publish a wider array of voices, more representative of America’s changing racial and ethnic demography than had been permitted in the past by a publishing elite hostage to its own class and racial and ethnic origins, more writers from every corner of the country and the world, ostensibly reflecting a greater range of human experience, are being published than ever before. But this politically inspired expansion has also prompted a politically inspired contraction. The politicization of American publishing — from both the left and the right — has become more pronounced in recent years. All the self-congratulation and the virtue-signaling that often accompanies the appearance of this or that new novelist cannot disguise the fact that the stories that are told in many of these new books, especially those peddled by the mainstream houses, no matter the ethnic or racial origin of their respective authors, seem mainly to be chapters in a single tale of trauma, survival, and resilience, testimonies intended to keep open the wound of victimhood whose suppurating nature is seen as a sign of moral authenticity. 

    A new orthodoxy has arisen. As David Rieff points out in his incisive and important book Desire and Fate (recently published by a small courageous house in London called Eris and distributed by Columbia University Press), we live today in a therapeutic culture in which the idea of trauma has become central. Rieff worries that “we are entering a Woke version of the Victorian Age, or post-Hays Code Hollywood, in which censorship will be the norm, not the exception” and suspects “that the increasing consensus that a writer or an artist’s moral character, and political and increasingly racial and gender bona fides, should determine whether they are published or exhibited, celebrated or ignored, will grow stronger, not weaker in the decades to come.” Rieff denounces the “ecstatic philistinism of identity politics” and locates its origins in the “old axiom of small-town White Protestant America — ‘If you don’t have something nice to say, don’t say anything at all’ — a trope that has now been “redeployed in the service of supposed emancipation and reparation.” The use of “sensitivity readers” by publishers to assure them that nothing heretical or insensitive (heretics are always insensitive!) appears in their books, that characters and language that might offend are expunged from publication, is common, as is the proliferation of “trigger warnings.” There is, Rieff concludes, “a new kind of politicized moral prudery sailing under the flag of anti-racism and inclusivity (not to mention under medicalized fetishization of trauma) to impose the claim that only morally defensible art is acceptable art.”

    Rieff’s book is likely the most intellectually sophisticated and rigorous critique of “wokeness” that we will have, but by now the anxiety is hardly his alone. One hears it also in the book trade. “We all know the elephant in the room,” the literary agent Andy Ross and former owner of the great Cody’s Books in Berkeley told me. “It goes by the name of ‘cultural appropriation.’ It supposes that authentic fiction demands the writer can only write in the point of view of characters of the same sex, race, or ethnicity as the writer. It’s become a tyranny. It’s dangerous to speak out against it. When you do, you get accused of things like ‘literary colonialism’ or something like that. Everybody in publishing agrees, but nobody will do anything about it or even talk about it out loud. I’m glad I don’t represent Arthur Golden, a Jewish guy who wrote a wonderful novel in 1997, a bestseller, Memoirs of a Geisha. It would never be published today.” In our culture now, like seeks only like, and only like can speak with any authority about like. We know only what we ourselves are. We have permission to write only about ourselves and people like us. Fiction has been inundated with “auto-fiction.” Authenticity is the supreme literary value, when in fact it is not an aesthetic value at all. Can there be a prescription more discouraging to the imagination than this? 

    This is not an entirely unprecedented debate in American letters. It is useful to recall, for example, the controversy that erupted in 1983 over Famous All Over Town, a novel of Chicano life, by one Danny Santiago. Hailed by the New York Times as “a classic of the Chicano urban experience” and by the Dallas Times Herald as the work of an author with “a voice rich with barrio talk and a comic touch” and by the street-wise Richard Price as “utterly seductive. . . funky, cocky, innocent, cagey and at times screamingly funny,” the book’s author turned out not to be who he said he was. He was unmasked by John Gregory Dunne as his former landlord and friend Daniel James, not Chicano at all, a Yale graduate and past member of the American Communist Party and middling Hollywood screenwriter whose career had tanked and who had been so frightened by being blacklisted that he resorted to using a pseudonym to get over his writer’s block. “The idea of an Anglo presenting himself as a Chicano, I found troubling,” Dunne confessed. He felt that “this particular kind of literary deception could, if discovered . . . have unpleasant extraliterary ramifications.” James, however, insisted that as Danny Santiago he was “so much freer” to write and it was under that guise that he was able to publish the stories that would become his novel in Redbook and Playboy in 1971, including one called “The Somebody” that was chosen in Martha Foley’s annual collection, Best American Short Stories. 

    The identity police were aroused. Philip Hererra, the editor of Nuestro, a champion of Latino writers who had published one of Santiago’s stories, was outraged: “We were deceived. We were led to believe that Danny Santiago was a Mexican American. Clearly, he was not.” Alvin Poussaint, Harvard’s resident progressive psychiatrist, joined the chorus of denunciations, saying that “by implying it was written by a Mexican, it gave the book an authenticity it simply did not have.” Others rose to James’ defense, including many Latino writers. Thomas Sanchez, for one, author of both the bestselling Zoot-Suit Murders and the acclaimed Rabbit Boss, a novel that through an act of gifted literary ventriloquism gives voice to four generations of Washo Indians in the California Sierras, declared that “I don’t care who writes a book — a man, a woman, a cat or a dog. They say you shouldn’t judge a book by its cover. Well, you shouldn’t judge it by the author’s ethnic or cultural background.” 

    Dunne, Herrera, and the others got it backwards. Surely it is a tribute to the scope of a writer’s imagination if he can create a world not his own, if he can persuasively write not within difference but across difference. Madame Bovary, c’est moi, Flaubert thrillingly proclaimed, in defiance of the writer’s confinement to his inherited circumstances. There is an old and honorable literary tradition of writing in somebody else’s lane. Besides, are we not all traveling in humanity’s lane? 

    More recently, in 2020, the publishing world was roiled by the controversy over Jeanine Cummins’ novel American Dirt, a story about the calamity that befalls a Mexican mother and son who slip the noose of a drug cartel and seek refuge in the United States. Cummins, a white woman of Irish and Puerto Rican extraction, sold the book to Flatiron, a division of Macmillan, for a reported advance of seven figures, received early praise from Stephen King and John Grisham, and saw her book become an Oprah Book Club smash hit, selling more than four million copies in nearly forty languages. But Oprah, the supreme voice of conventionality, spoke too soon. To the author’s astonishment and the distress of her publisher, American Dirt was excoriated by more than one hundred and forty writers who signed an open letter calling the book “exploitative, oversimplified, and ill-informed, too often erring on the side of trauma fetishization.” These were not literary objections. Condemned for its alleged caricatures of Mexico, and despite Cummins’ wistful and not altogether savory admission that she wished that someone “slightly browner than me” had been the author, she was unable to avoid becoming, as she put it, an “example of the white supremacy problem in publishing, as a part Puerto Rican woman from a working-class background.” In reality, of course, it was she who had sought to tackle “the white supremacy” problem by writing a book that tried to transcend all such extra-literary considerations. 

    Among the commissars of publishing, Cummins took a beating. The battle over American Dirt was so bruising that she was unable to write for a year. (Her new novel, Speak to Me of Home, appeared last spring.) Ordinary readers didn’t care about the disputations; they bought the book by the millions. Yet her public shaming had a chilling effect on many agents and authors. A curtain of fear descended, and you could feel the dread especially in the corridors of corporate publishers who dared not admit what had become common knowledge: that they were operating according to certain ideological and sociological constraints. Despite their market clout, they worried about provoking the wrath of the Red Guards of Woke. For all the chest-thumping triumphalism of the new dispensation, ballyhooing the enfranchisement of voices previously excluded from mainstream publishing, what was striking was the unacknowledged conformism of the stories now being championed. 

    Less noticed was the long retreat among mainstream publishers, with, as ever, notable exceptions, from the highwater mark of an earlier period to publish works of serious history and daring, even offensive fiction. Following the Second World War and the subsequent expansion of American colleges and universities as the Baby Boom generation reflected the country’s growing middle class, publishers were quick to seize the opportunity to expand their publishing programs. The growing archipelago of institutions of higher education and public libraries helped underwrite this growth. In 1953, Jason Epstein founded Anchor quality paperbacks at Doubleday, while three years later Harper & Row started Harper Torchbooks, both imprints making classic works of history, literature, philosophy, and criticism popularly available to ordinary readers. Other publishers (Beacon, Meridian, Norton Library) followed. A taste for the serious was encouraged. In 1953, for example, Random House was happy to publish the recondite journals of the sixteenth-century Jesuit Matteo Ricci, one of the first Westerners to visit Japan. Today doing so would be considered commercial suicide and never mind the intellectual glory. Such a book would be consigned to the ghetto of the university presses, deemed (not altogether wrongly) to be of interest only to scholars and specialists. And so we must award plaudits to the university presses — many of them beleaguered by parent institutions that have increasingly lost faith in the intrinsic significance of core humanities curricula — who have taken up the slack of the trade houses’ reluctance and have been publishing many important works of history with all the editorial scrupulousness and marketing zeal that such books require. 

    History as a category has suffered especially, and those publishers still committed to bringing out serious works of history complain bitterly. A case in point is the Penguin Press’ recent publication of Ian Buruma’s fine book The Collaborators, a forensic exhumation of three morally complicated lives in imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and occupied Netherlands. The book was acclaimed in America’s few remaining review publications — but the book bombed, selling only slightly more than 1,000 hardcover copies. The number was so disappointingly small that the publisher decided against bringing the book out in paperback. And this is not an exceptional circumstance in today’s unforgiving market. A recent visit with a former longtime editor at Alfred A. Knopf with decades of experience editing many of the nation’s most distinguished historians confirms the disobliging sales reality: readers are neither reading nor buying history in the numbers needed to make such publishing profitable. Buruma, of course, is a well-known writer, and at least his book made it into hardcover. What about all the gifted but less celebrated historians whom the trade houses ignore and can no longer imagine publishing in hard cover or soft? (Rest in peace, Ashbel Green.) 

    Perhaps this was to be expected. Americans have long suffered from a collective historical amnesia. Our politics are hobbled by our refusal to understand the manifold ways in which history, as was once famously said, weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. Americans have long cleaved to the conceit that history, insofar as it was deemed important at all, was more hindrance than help in our presumed unstoppable march to the munificent future. Optimistic, pragmatic, impatient, inventive, generous (when they are not other things), Americans have refused to be held hostage to the past, or even to be interested in it, believing America to have burst its bounds. The cost of such myopia is large. It enfeebles understanding, promotes false and ugly nostrums of all kinds, and licenses the infantilization of public debate. But the interest in facts has always taken a backseat in our culture to the easier and more seductive approach whose pleasures have tended to arouse a lasting echo of enthusiasm among a broad public, an approach best articulated by the reporter Maxwell Scott in that great mythmaker John Ford’s film The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance: “When the legend becomes fact, print the legend.” It is one of the more sinister American slogans. 

    The death of publishing, like the death of the novel, is an evergreen prediction. But the obituary is always premature. Neither the specter of AI nor the widespread and growing illiteracy of an alarming chunk of the public, nor the cowardice of all too many mainstream publishers, is enough to dim the passions of the word-addicted and the book-besotted. The current proliferation of small and independent publishers (I work at one of them) is remarkable proof of a thriving commitment to the written word, the serious written word, and even to the tactile pleasures to be had from the book as object. Kate Gale, the founder and intrepid head of Red Hen Press in Pasadena observes that “books run on thin margins; it’s not the oil business. Yet writers like Percival Everett cup their hands over their keyboards to deliver stories and poems, and we who work in the independent press world, we press on. It was never about money, it was about story, the long game of reading a manuscript and saying as I did just yesterday this story about a creek and a girl has me. I am with this girl by the creek beaten down, getting back up again. As we do in this industry.” 

    The list of these blessed and stalwart publishers continues to lengthen. The roll call includes Grove Atlantic, New Directions, City Lights, Tilted Axis, Beacon, Europa, Other Press, Faber and Faber, O/R, Two Lines Press, Melville House, Akashic, Verso, Milkweed Editions, Graywolf, Transit Books, Archipelago, PM Press, Ren Hen Press, Taschen, Copper Canyon, Zone, and, not least, Wiley & Sons, family-owned since 1807, an unrivalled record of independence in the American publishing industry, and W. W. Norton, not exactly a small press but the country’s only employee-owned press. Many are regional in nature, devoted to this or that interest, to one literary, political, or cultural tendency or another. Some have owed their survival, in part, to the largess of federal institutions such as the National Endowment for the Arts, now under ruthless assault by the Trump administration; others, to private philanthropy. Many would find it hard to thrive without continued reliance on their nonprofit status. But these fragilities notwithstanding, they exist. There is a feistiness that refuses to fold. One is tempted to say that, despite all the challenges, we may be entering a renaissance of independent publishing, remarkably nimble and business savvy, intellectually curious and culturally indispensable; and the corporations be damned. This may well be enough to keep despair at bay. 

    Poems by Haris Vlavianos

    Niccolò Machiavelli
    (1469–1527) 

    To my son

    I still remember Hedley Bull

    his slow, regular footfall

    in front of the podium;

    the sudden way he would look up

    and turn his handsome head to us

    before asking in that droll Australian accent:

    “Gentlemen, it all hinges on the meaning of the word virtù. 

    Bacon, Hobbes, Adams, Strauss, Skinner —

    they each provide an interpretation.

    What’s yours?”
    I knew in a few months he would no longer be with us.

    (Riddled with bone cancer

    he continued teaching

    with the assistance of daily morphine injections.)

    I also knew 

    out of all the political philosophers we were studying
    that semester

    this one was my favorite.

    I raised my hand

    he gave me the floor:

    “Without virtù, even though a ruler may gain an empire 

    he will fail to attain gloria.

    If I had to choose between Scipio Africanus and Agathocles

    I’d opt for the first, no question.”

    Pleased, he smiled and continued: 

    “It’s all too easy to create utopian communities;

    it’s a lot more difficult

    to truly come to grips

    with harsh political realities.

    We have spent enough time on Plato and Augustine’s

    ‘What is as it ought to be.’

    Let’s turn to Thucydides 

    for he remains key.”

    Machiavelli survived that spring.

    Next semester, Adam Roberts 

    (hired in Bull’s place)

    was not as charitable to the Florentine.

    As he sets his sights on deconstructing 

    the “realist school” in lecture after lecture

    I kept thinking about one of our final sessions with Bull:

    “Could someone

    who wrote such poems and plays

    whose writing was so elegant

    whose thought, so sharp and lucid

    possessor of a sense of humor

    truly lack all morality and ethics?

    When we speak of him 

    why do we allow the scarecrow created by the Catholic Church

    to carry the day?”

     

    When he was very ill and homebound

    I had gone to visit him one night

    and he gave me a volume of 

    Machiavelli’s Letters

    which includes one addressed 

    to Francesco Vettori

    his “benefactor” (10 December 1513)

    written while he was living in exile

    at his country retreat outside the city

    (the Medicis had returned to Florence, you see).

    After describing his daily work on the farm

    he eagerly turns to the coming of evening

    and his study

    where he is writing  

    his “little work” On Principalities

    (later to become The Prince)

    at which point he observes: 

    “And because Dante 

    says it does not produce knowledge 

    when we hear but do not remember 

    I have tried to remember

    what a great man once said to me.” 

     

    Same here, caro Hedley.

    Sofonisba Anguissola
    (c. 1532–1625)

    To my daughter

     

    Because she was a woman 

    no one  

     — neither the Vatican nor the Medicis, the Sforzas

    and the respectable condottieri  — 

    commissioned of her 

    the religious or historical paintings

    that were the exclusive domain

    of the male artist. 

    Perforce she turned to portraiture.

     

    She, of course, exacted her vengeance

    for in one of her self-portraits

    the one housed today

    in Poland’s Łańcut Museum

    she paints herself 

    painting the Virgin embracing the holy infant.

    Despite her poise

    her somewhat irritated expression 

     — as if having burst uninvited into her studio

    we are interrupting her finishing touches —

    throws into relief

    the courage and determination

    even Vasari acknowledged.

     

    After an eventful life

    she settled in Palermo with husband number three

    painting portraits 

    for the next forty years.

    She was now so famous

    artists like Rubens and Van Dyck

    visited her

    to see “the brilliant woman”

    in the flesh.

     

    Van Dyck’s painting

    of the now elderly Sofonisba 

    (almost ninety-two at the time)

    still survives.

    She looks at the young painter

    much like Michelangelo

    must have once looked 

    upon her twenty-year-old self

    at their first meeting:

     

    “My dear Anthony

    we artists strive

    to immortalize 

    a few traces of life 

    before our unfurling shadows 

    veil it all in oblivion.

    I wonder in the future

    what will people think

    when they see my work?

    Perhaps that I was a woman

    who spent her life fleeing her prison cell

    and shaking off the dust

    stifling her soul.

    You, however, as a man

    what do you know of dust?”

    Desiderius Erasmus
    (1466?–1536)

    Theologians lost their night’s sleep 

    pondering portentous questions:

    Why had God chosen to incarnate Christ 

    as a man, not a woman

    or, for that matter, a donkey?

    But how was a donkey-Christ to preach the Jewish law?

    Or perform the miracle of Cana?

    Thoroughly amused by this scholastic nonsense

    Erasmus wrote In Praise of Folly

    during his second sojourn in England 

    to entertain his friend Thomas More.

    (Lacking the Dutchman’s humor

    the latter eventually lost his head

    whereas Henry VIII likely had more than his fair share

    for he was playing tennis

    when the executioner brought down the ax 

    on More’s “very short neck”).

     

    In one of Oxford’s second-hand bookstores

    (I must have spent over twenty hours a week on Turl Street)

    I found one of Erasmus’ travel letters

    (to my knowledge

    the only scholar with the audacity 

    to teach at both Oxford and Cambridge).

    I could not find a single fault with it:

     

    “English girls are divinely pretty and have a most admirable custom:

    When you go anywhere on a visit the girls kiss you. 

    They kiss you when you arrive. 

    They kiss you when you leave. 

    They kiss you when you return. 

    If you are lucky enough to get a taste of those soft and fragrant lips 

    you will long to spend your life in that blessed land.”

     

    While Erasmus was exchanging kisses with English girls

    the teenaged Luther was conscientiously studying

    The Summa Angelica by Angelo Carletti di Chivasso,  

    which twenty years later

    (along with the latest bull of Pope Leon X)

    he would toss into the fire

    in Wittenberg’s central square

    exclaiming as he did so:

    “the burning of sinful books

    is an age-old custom

    in Germany.”

     

    Undeniably true.

    Four centuries later

    this “age-old custom”

    still held strong.

    And books were not its only victims.

    Haris Vlavianos‘ forthcoming collection Renaissance will be published by World Poetry Press. These poems were translated by Patricia Barbeito.

    Secretaries of the Invisible 

    “I am no more than a secretary of the invisible thing.” Czesław Miłosz begins one of his poems with this evocative declaration of artistic vocation. In this spare statement, the poet abandons any pretense of authorship in the conventional sense and presents himself as a vessel, one who listens inwardly and transcribes what he cannot claim as his own. The image is metaphysical, drawn from a lineage of writers who serve something higher than craft or culture, something closer to sacred obligation. Among the few who recognized this rare calling and lived its demands with equal gravity was Thomas Merton, the monastic contemplative who saw writing as a form of listening and language as a possible bridge to the divine.

    In “Secretaries,” Miłosz evokes a quiet community scattered across the globe. These fellow scribes do not know one another, and perhaps never will.

    Secretaries, mutually unknown, we walk the earth

    Without much comprehension.

    There is a tender humility here. These mysterious and diligent figures are possessed by a duty to record what has no fixed origin. They receive fragments, phrases that begin in the middle or trail off into uncertainty. They are faithful to what comes, though they may never understand what it means. Their labor is characterized by humble devotion.

    This sense of transmission deepens in “Ars Poetica?” in which Miłosz wrestles more urgently with the demands of his calling:

    I have always aspired to a more spacious form

    that would be free from the claims of poetry or prose,

    and would let us understand each other without exposing

    the author or reader to sublime agonies.

    Here the poet yearns for a language that does not distort reality for the sake of literary fashion. He dreams of a form capacious enough to accommodate the full weight of experience without exaggeration or disguise. The “sublime agonies” he speaks of are the wounds that authentic encounter inflicts: the cost of genuine transparency between souls, the pain of being truly seen and of truly seeing. This is a longing for a deeper sincerity, a mode of expression that neither conceals nor flaunts, but clarifies without inflicting such wounds. What Miłosz calls “a more spacious form” finds its echo in Merton’s yearning for a contemplative language free from violence — both artists seek words that heal rather than wound, that open rather than close.

    In “Ars Poetica?” Miłosz elaborates further on the burden of the secretary’s task. 

    The purpose of poetry is to remind us   

    how difficult it is to remain just one person,  

    for our house is open, there are no keys in the doors,   

    and invisible guests come in and out at will. 

    What I’m saying here is not, I agree, poetry,  

    as poems should be written rarely and reluctantly,   

    under unbearable duress and only with the hope  

    that good spirits, not evil ones, choose us for their instrument.

    To write poetry, in Miłosz’s understanding, is a spiritual practice, a response to pressures that move beneath the surface of ordinary perception.

    Thomas Merton would have understood this calling and its attendant burdens instinctively. In his journals and letters, one discerns the same search for unguarded language, a mode of speech not marred by pretense. As a poet Merton wrote to reveal what could only be discovered in solitude. For him, words were vessels of reverence. He believed the truest writing arises from stillness and must preserve something of that stillness if it is to be believed. In No Man Is an Island, Merton describes the paradoxical power of creative work as transformative and self-effacing: “Art enables us to find ourselves and lose ourselves at the same time.”

    In their remarkable correspondence across continents — one writing from a monastic cell in Kentucky, the other from intellectual exile in California — Miłosz and Merton recognized in each other this same fidelity to the unseen. Merton found in Miłosz’s work the same refusal to domesticate mystery that characterized his own contemplative practice. Miłosz discovered in Merton’s letters a kindred spirit who understood writing as a form of prayer. The spiritual terrain they shared was unmistakably intimate, marked by the same willingness to serve as conduits rather than creators.

    When Miłosz writes in “Secretaries” “how it looks when completed / Is not up to us to inquire, we won’t read it anyway,” he articulates a rare trust in the work as something independent from the self. The poem, once written, belongs to a deeper order, one that resists the hunger for evaluation or finality. This surrender is faith by another name. It reflects a refusal to dominate what one has received, and a willingness to let it pass on into the world without being possessed or explained.

    Such submission characterized Merton’s spiritual life as well, who declared that “true contemplation is not a psychological trick but a theological grace. It can come to us only as a gift, and not as a result of our own clever techniques.” His best writing holds space for bearing witness to that which exceeds the intellect. In passages such as this one from his journal The Sign of Jonas — “There is in all visible things an invisible fecundity, a dimmed light, a hidden wholeness. In the visible world around us, there is a glory that is greater than anything else that can be seen, but this glory is not visible except by faith and by the interior light of wisdom” — we witness the secretary at work, transcribing what arrives from the margins of perception. The language is precise yet porous, faithful to an experience that cannot be fully captured yet must be attempted.

    Both men practiced an ethic of restraint that in our time appears quite radical. They did not chase acclaim, nor did they try to simplify their vision for popular understanding. Their fidelity was to the unseen, the unspeakable, the barely intuited. With his characteristic humility with regard to language and mystery, Merton put it this way in Thoughts on Solitude: “No writing on the solitary, meditative dimensions of life can say anything that has not already been said better by the wind in the pine trees.” In a culture that mistakes noise for substance and demands constant visibility, their example offers a different possibility, that of writing as resistance to the tyranny of the seen and the immediate, as a way of preserving space for what cannot be commodified or consumed. And “Secretaries” and “Ars Poetica?” invite us to think of poetry as a form of ethical transmission, where the goal is beyond self-expression, a spiritual self-emptying that is an offering. They speak for those who serve in obscurity, who give without expectation of recognition, who understand their task as larger than their own literary ambitions.

    Miłosz and Merton belong to a consecrated company. Through them, we are reminded that writing may still be a sacred act. When it is done without possession, without pride, without explanation, it becomes a form of listening. And in that act of listening, something of the invisible may enter the world. As Merton wrote, “The deepest level of communication is not communication, but communion. It is wordless. It is beyond words, and it is beyond speech, and it is beyond concept.”