Fitzgerald’s Follies

    In The Praise of Folly, in 1509, Desiderius Erasmus personified folly as a goddess. She develops the thesis that folly is good and that it is deserving of praise. Folly remarks on her own ubiquity — since we all, the wise and the unwise, live in folly’s grip. “Fortune herself,” Folly tells us, “the directrix of human affairs, is so thoroughly of a mind with me that she always has been most hostile to the wise.” Socrates figures repeatedly in The Praise of Folly, his life a spectacle of wisdom turned to folly. Socrates is the wisest man in a city said to favor wisdom, and after being put on trial for no actual crime he is compelled to commit suicide. This exemplary teacher is executed — absurdly — for corrupting the morals of the young. His gift for wisdom had been a death sentence.

    To make her case, Folly must go beyond the claim that folly is inescapable. She offers two separate explanations for its intrinsic worth. She contrasts “the mischief of wisdom” to “the enchantment of folly,” an enchantment that can resemble delirium — “for I fill the mind with a sort of perpetual drunkenness; I glut it with joys [and] dear delights.” In the end, folly is an incitement more to art than to inebriation. Poets are “of my faction,” Folly observes; “destroy the illusion and any play is ruined.” Illusion is art and art illusion, a fortunate state of affairs, for from art comes folly’s sweetness and its ability to enchant.

    At the highest reaches of folly there is love. Though Erasmus pokes fun at the self-importance and the pieties of theologians and clerics, he emphatically does not equate folly with nihilism or wisdom with hypocrisy. “The attribute of wisdom is meet for God alone,” Folly concludes. Always at hand, undivine human folly merits forgiveness. Folly is “so acceptable to the heavenly powers that forgiveness of its errors is assured, whereas nothing is forgiven to wisdom.” Folly furnishes the reason and the motive for love, and “he who loves intensely no longer lives in himself but in whatever he loves.” Folly is divinely generous. The more one “can depart from himself and enter into the other [through the folly of love], the happier [one] is.”

    Folly has a unique purchase on F. Scott Fitzgerald’s biography and a unique purchase on his literature. Fitzgerald is the most foolish of American writers. He was foolish in his successes, throwing away his time and talent on short-lived celebrity and on lucrative ephemera, chasing the dollar and compromising his immense talent. He was not less foolish in his many failures. His two finest novels, The Great Gatsby and Tender Is the Night, were commercial flops. He himself fell into penury in the 1930s, his wife Zelda having descended into madness. Fitzgerald overdid something to which Erasmus’ Folly admits — that she had been raised up and nourished by Bacchus. Fitzgerald’s alcoholism constrained his literary output and led to his premature death at the age of forty-five. The adult Fitzgerald could not take care of himself.

    We do not associate Fitzgerald with anything like wisdom literature. He never wore a beard, that “ensign of wisdom,” according to Erasmus’ Folly. He could not be confused with Tolstoy, who did have a beard and who broached the biggest and the best questions, boldly titling a novel War and Peace. (Fitzgerald’s first novel was This Side of Paradise, in which this side of paradise — a phrase from a poem by Rupert Brooke — is more or less a brilliant undergraduate career at Princeton University.) Fitzgerald did not even write novels of ideas. He was no Thomas Mann, no communicant with the philosophical heavyweights, no worldly interpreter of high politics. Until his death, Fitzgerald agonized about not being sufficiently educated or well read. He never graduated from Princeton, and it bothered him. 

    In The Great Gatsby, the book that will always define him, Fitzgerald expends marvelous prose on a small and insignificant man. It is a perfect novella to depict the dreams, the extravagance, the alleged greatness of a bootlegger whose golden girl got away. Gatsby lacks any guiding wisdom. He lacks gravitas. The incognito protagonist, he lacks a real profile even in his eponymous novel. He is an empty vessel of social climbing and romantic longing who embraces the folly-filled tawdriness of his cultural moment. Gatsby is the boy who never outgrew high school, not to mention college (which he falsely claims to have attended). His shallowness and frivolity would have made him a bit player in War and Peace, a petty officer. Or Tolstoy would have chosen to transform Jay Gatsby, to reform him, leading him through a moral awakening. Tolstoy would not have left Gatsby’s folly intact, as Fitzgerald is very willing to do.

    According to Edmund Wilson, Fitzgerald’s friend and later his literary executor, Edna St. Vincent Millay compared Fitzgerald to “a stupid old woman with whom someone has left a diamond.” A similar image occurred to John Dos Passos: “when he talked about writing his mind, which seemed to be full of preposterous notions about most things, became clear and hard as diamond.” Fitzgerald fretted about wasting his diamond-like literary talent on the literature of immaturity, or he was sensitive to the accusation of doing this. In 1934, in an unpublished preface to Gatsby, he wrote of being “kidded half haywire by critics who felt that my material was such as to preclude all dealing with mature persons in a mature world. But, my God! It was my material, and it was all I had to deal with.”

    Without cultivating an aura of wisdom, however, the beardless Fitzgerald did write wisdom literature. He wrote it not by denigrating folly, not by dismissing it, and not by treating folly as peripheral to wisdom. Folly and wisdom must be twinned: “one never attains to that renowned wisdom,” Folly stipulates in The Praise of Folly, “which the wise themselves call the citadel of happiness, except by taking Folly as guide.” Folly and wisdom conjoin, and, as Erasmus shows, proximity to folly can be the same as proximity to poetry, to the poetic impulse that silhouettes Fitzgerald’s better writing. Folly is also (as already noted) the path to love, the stimulus to love, and on love Fitzgerald could be austerely wise, as he is in The Great Gatsby. Gatsby is a virtuoso of the counterfeit, a cipher almost, who loves Daisy with a shocking sincerity and force. The heartless, loveless souls around him have wealth and a solid social position, and little else. 

    Fitzgerald’s wisdom literature took some time to materialize. First he had to live through different seasons of folly; he had to assimilate a poet’s rigor as a stylist; and he had to reflect on wisdom as such, which he did most cogently in the letters that he wrote to his daughter from 1933 to 1940. An intimate of folly, an intimate of wisdom, Fitzgerald slowly figured out how to translate the spiritual possibilities of folly into enduring art. Published in 1925, The Great Gatsby was a feint in this direction, but the full translation came almost a decade later in Tender Is the Night. It recounts the mistakes of a man who travels from emotional abundance and professional distinction to the purgatory of self-defeat and loss. The novel’s wisdom resides not in the tale it tells; the tale is too edged with folly for it to impart wisdom directly. The novel’s wisdom resides instead in the novel’s style, in its manner of telling the tale. Foolish protagonist, foolish life, wise narrative, wise novel. Not by accident does this saddened novel abound in love and poetry. These are the bequests of folly, which demand a measure of wisdom to be perceived, internalized and cherished.

    Scott Fitzgerald was an imperfect father. Often absent, he was self-absorbed even by the standards of ambitious writers, and his alcoholism affected his daughter directly. It damaged her father’s health and must have been terrifying to behold. Already in the 1920s alcoholism accrued to the Fitzgerald myth, a myth that lived in the public domain, and by the 1930s this myth dovetailed with another myth — of Fitzgerald’s diminishment, of his loss of stamina, of his fading from the scene and not writing. It was his destiny to have become a relic of the Jazz Age. In Fitzgerald’s biography, the motif of squandering is omnipresent — squandered youth, squandered literary potential, squandered time. Fitzgerald embeds this motif in his fiction, though in his letters to his daughter he consciously inverts the motif of squandering that haunts so many of his novels and short stories. With acuity of expression and without rhetoric, Fitzgerald tries to get his daughter not to squander her life.

    The biographical dimension to these letters is only minimally interesting. Fitzgerald was a worried, moralistic, and sometimes preachy father, one of millions. The literary dimension to these letters is far more enriching, for they document his preoccupation with wisdom. His paternal persona was conservative yet un-Victorian. Fitzgerald, who did not want conventional domesticity for his daughter, wanted her to feel the impress of duty, a prerequisite for feeling the impress of art. “All I believe in in life is the rewards for virtue (according to your talents) and the punishments for not fulfilling your duties, which are doubly costly,” he informed his daughter. Wisdom proceeds from virtue, and wisdom takes on two separate guises in these letters: the willingness to work hard and the achievement of a writing style. (Fitzgerald’s daughter was an aspiring writer in the 1930s, when he wrote his letters to her.) Style symbolizes something so consequential for Fitzgerald that it could be a cognate for grace. It is achieved not by transcending error but by leaving oneself susceptible to feeling.

    Throughout his letters, Fitzgerald implies a complicity between his daughter and himself. Both of them are foolish. Touching on some minor point, he notes that “like me you will be something of a fool in that regard all our life.” Painfully, Fitzgerald places his daughter within a fallen family. He and her mother should never have married. “I knew she [Zelda] was spoiled and meant no good to me,” he confesses. “I was sorry immediately I had married her . . . . The mistake I made was in marrying her.” He criticizes Zelda for “trying to solve all ethical and moral problems on her own, without benefit of the thousands dead.” Fair or unfair, this criticism reveals the door to wisdom in Fitzgerald’s eyes, which was the vocation of art and the vocation of reading. One enters it through an ambitious apprenticeship to “the thousands dead,” to the books they wrote for us. Put in academic terms, one enters it through the humanities.

    Time and again, Fitzgerald pleads with his daughter to love labor. “Please work — work with your best hours,” he exhorts. Reflecting on work, he writes that “wiser people seem to manage to pile up a reserve,” their wisdom being their foresight and their work. These injunctions take Fitzgerald to an arresting bit of self-criticism, and they encapsulate the strenuous wisdom he is trying to defend: “What little I have accomplished has been by the most laborious and uphill work, and I wish now I’d never relaxed or looked back — but said at the end of The Great Gatsby: ‘I’ve found my line — from now on this comes first. This is my immediate duty — without this I am nothing.’ ” The this here is the accomplishment. By “line” he means the choice to write real literature rather than to write for commercial reward. The this repeated three times is also — and more fundamentally — the work itself, the sitting at the desk, which (because true art is at issue) cannot be other than laborious and uphill.

    The work Fitzgerald praises in these letters is not tied to marriage or money or status, preoccupied as Fitzgerald could be with each of those subjects. He grudgingly argues for “some calculated path . . . to find your way through the bourgeois maze.” He then hastens to add, “if you feel it [your way] is worth finding.” It may not be. The bourgeois maze is hazardous. Echoing Thoreau, Fitzgerald outlines the precarity of wisdom in a society bent to industry: “Once one is caught up in the material world one person in ten thousand finds the time to form literary taste, to examine the validity of philosophic conceptions of himself, or to know what, for lack of a better phrase, I might call the wise and tragic sense of life.” One does not labor for the bourgeois maze and the burdensome material world. They are obstacles to the formation of literary taste, to the philosophical reckoning with self and, by extension, to a life wisely lived.

    Folly and wisdom mingle in these phrases and in these letters. By the wise and tragic sense of life Fitzgerald meant “the thing that lies behind all great careers . . . the sense that life is essentially a cheat and its conditions are those of defeat, and the redeeming things are not ‘happiness and pleasure,’ but the deeper satisfactions that come out of struggle.” Fitzgerald refers here to Shakespeare and to Lincoln. We are cheated by our mortality, by the obtuseness and malice of others and by our own foolishness. “To say ‘I will do valuable and indispensable work,’ ” and to do so against the grain, “is the part of wisdom and courage.” The work that is indispensable is more than the mere effort to write or to be an artist. It culminates in the painstaking acquisition of a style, not a pose and not a trademark but an internally excellent prose style. Work yields a style that wells up from within. “What you thought and felt,” Fitzgerald tells his daughter about the movement from living to writing, “will, by itself, invent a new style.”

    Fitzgerald was born with a gift for prose. In and after college, possessed of his gift, he gained a keen understanding of the literary marketplace. He had gone to college across the river from the center of American publishing. The Fitzgerald legend of the 1920s, of the man about town, arose because he was shrewd enough to construct it. Its constituent elements were: easy, accessible prose; well-made novels and short stories that had a flavor-of-the-month aspect to them, dispatches from a new generation; staged photographs and news stories that asked readers to associate the elegance of the author and of his wife Zelda with his fiction. This is the recipe of American celebrity more typical (with a few twists) of Hollywood. It is not atypical of American fiction — face, reputation, personalized relationship between the public and the famous individual. (It became more typical of writers under the impact of Fitzgerald’s legend.) In the 1930s, Fitzgerald’s friend and rival Hemingway would eclipse him by using the same tools of celebrity. Fitzgerald was at home in the Jazz Age, when conspicuous consumption and hedonistic excess were more in vogue than political zeal, self-styled manliness, or personal sacrifice. He was temperamentally too well suited for frivolity.

    Fortuitously, Fitzgerald never gave up on folly. One could imagine an alternative biography for him. He could have jettisoned his earlier self. He could have bid farewell to dissipation, a favorite word of his, and embarked on the journey of a wise man. Perhaps he could have evolved into an engagé writer of the 1930s, another Steinbeck documenting in bleak, hardened prose the travails of the Great Depression. Or he could have elaborated a “late style,” going where the wisdom-loving Tolstoy eventually went — away from illusions and away altogether from the gamesmanship of fiction. When he graduated from writing literature, Tolstoy mostly authored pamphlets and tracts on the moral and social improvement of society. Fitzgerald could have headed back to the Catholicism of his youth. Like Graham Greene or Flannery O’Connor, he could have woven Catholic notions of good and evil into his novels and short stories, and after the parties and the drinking and the meandering this could have been his badge of maturity. Yet Fitzgerald, who had so many ways to become older and wiser, seemed only to grow older.

    Skirting the pretense of wisdom, Fitzgerald the writer also had to escape the glibness of his early books and short stories. This was the laborious and uphill work that he mentioned to his daughter. His non-glib literary style would incorporate the antipodes of wisdom and folly — simultaneously lush, seductive, stylish and sober, subdued, meditative, moral. The style itself had three layers. First was an expository prose that channels poetry, that in its cadences comes quite close to being poetry. Second was the incorporation of literary modernism, which ennobles contradiction, tying contradiction to beauty. Third, Fitzgerald borrowed a narrative device from Joseph Conrad. This was to run a story through a narrator, to hold it at arm’s length and to orient it through a retrospective gaze, as Conrad had done in Lord Jim and Heart of Darkness. Thus could folly, the story, be regarded by wisdom, the narrative voice, an encounter that mandates a prose style as amenable to folly as it is to wisdom. It mandates a prose style of intricacy and complexity.

    In his letters to his daughter, Fitzgerald brings up Shakespeare and Ecclesiastes as poetry that she should read. Most of all, Fitzgerald writes to her about Keats. He conjures himself as a reader studying Keats’ “Ode to a Grecian Urn” until he “caught the chime in it and the exquisite mechanics.” Chime is a musical reference, and this word signifies an essential element of Fitzgerald’s prose style, its undergirding of poetry. (“Tender is the night” is a quotation from Keats.) From Keats and many others, Fitzgerald adopted his preoccupation with the sound and rhythm of words and with their coloration, a musicality of the word. The result is a prose style that is fabulously suggestive, with little intellection in it and without anything point blank — prose melodies drawn from the lyrical description of people and places. The chime that Fitzgerald heard in Keats is not there on the silent page. It sounds in the reader, awakening the reader to a private and subjective performance of feeling and meaning.

    Poetry instills music in prose, and as a model Keatsian poetry is minimalist. The words chosen — the machinery assembled by the poet/mechanic — have a delicate economy. Prose can wander if it is left to its own devices; it can pile up; and no author knows this better than the one who is paid by the word, as Fitzgerald often was. Dostoevsky wrote long novels in part out of financial need, and formidable as Dostoevsky the novelist is, he is not a first-rate prose stylist. He, like Fitzgerald, could churn it out. In his best writing, however, Fitzgerald was highly deliberate about his words — a kind of deliberativeness, of carefully chosen diction, that one associates with Keats. Imitation of poetry gave him the power to fold diverging moods into a phrase, an image, a word. Only the mechanics of poetry could generate a prose style that tolerates the diverging moods of folly and wisdom.

    Keats died in 1821, more than sixty years before Fitzgerald was born. Bits and pieces of the Romantic era entered into the Fitzgerald myth — Fitzgerald as the Byronic hero whose heart was tortured by love and who died before he should have; but in his prose style Fitzgerald was not a throwback. Rather than reviving Romanticism, he immersed himself in modernism. Though he never wore the mantle of an avant-garde experimentalist, he nonetheless extracted his stylistic tools from modernism: the evocation of a surreal world shaped and shadowed by the human psyche, and the eagerness to convey all that is discordant in the modern city and in the modern person. The tension and the energy of Fitzgerald’s prose style arise from his aesthetic of juxtaposition. Strange as it is for Gatsby to be trivial and great at the same time, a prose style attuned to the irreconcilable can express contradictions with clarity, and it can make them real. A modernist style freed from rationality brought Fitzgerald to the heart of the (not especially rational) interaction between folly and wisdom.

    Joseph Conrad inspired Nick Carroway, The Great Gatsby’s narrator. Without Nick, The Great Gatsby would have been a society novel like the ones that Fitzgerald had already published, This Side of Paradise and The Beautiful and the Damned. With Nick, The Great Gatsby becomes the mirror and the image in the mirror, the story and the memory of the story, the thing and its opposite. Nick’s sobriety and moralism are modified by Gatsby’s recklessness and shameless self-creation. Old at heart, Nick is a cautious Midwesterner who cannot condone the Eastern luxuries. Described by Nick, these luxuries are the novel’s archetypal attributes, the reason so many bars and clubs have been named after Gatsby. Conrad’s method of storytelling prompted Fitzgerald to operate in the shadows, between narrative and narrator, and in this space Fitzgerald’s style came into its own. It could convey the wish to be at the party and the regret that one was there, the wish to recall it all in detail and the wish to forget that it ever happened. A supple Conradian style helped Fitzgerald turn ugliness into beauty. The beauty proceeds from the folly, while the ugliness is what wisdom sees. For all its sheen and supposed glamor, The Great Gatsby is a critique of rich Americans and of the ugliness for which they are responsible.

    Tender Is the Night exceeds The Great Gatsby. It synthesizes the three elements of Fitzgerald’s style, employing a varied poetic range — ode, elegy, sonnet, epic, tragedy, satire, confession, ballad. Its modernism is self-evident. In Tender Is the Night, Fitzgerald makes a constant claim on freedom of language; its words very often struggle free from their conventional uses. Modernism also furnishes the organizational scheme for Tender Is the Night, a story broken into pieces: middle, beginning, end, beginning, middle. Gaps and disjunction dominate Fitzgerald’s canvas, and Tender Is the Night employs a Conradian narrator, one who goes unnamed. The novel’s narrative voice is omniscient and skilled at prose-poetry, the imperturbable and godlike voice of wisdom. The tale of human folly is entrusted to this voice, which without surprise, without outrage and without rancor seems to expect folly to run its usual course, and so it does.

    Starkly cautionary, Tender Is the Night is inviting to moralists. Dick Diver, a Rhodes Scholar, has been blessed with good looks, intelligence, willpower, and charm. He becomes a psychologist, a scholar and practitioner, marries a wealthy patient and slowly starts to lose his life’s thread. He finds himself in thrall to money, to leisure, and to drink. The scholarship trails off and the marriage unravels, Dick having fallen in love with a movie star, for whom he is simply one of a hundred youthful adventures. As many of his friends succumb to midlife despair, Dick follows along. His wife leaves him for another man, and he is banished less by poverty than by rootlessness to upstate New York. His ex-wife, who now and then pretends that “his career was biding its time, again like Grant’s in Galena,” knows that he is lost for good. Dick has traveled a cosmopolitan path to obscurity, to the nullity of a life in which everything significant has been mismanaged. The thief who stole his own promise, Dick is a fool who receives a fool’s comeuppance.

    Tender Is the Night upholds an elaborate architecture of folly-wisdom. Much as the novel might attract moralists, it is not moralistic. Its architecture has two planes, or consists of two relationships — between narrative consciousness à la Conrad and story, and between style and narrative consciousness. The filter for a story about fools (Dick is not the only one) is a narrative consciousness of luminous wisdom, neither naïve nor especially sorrowful, and a wisdom rigorously uninvested in condemnation. The wisdom of the narrative consciousness interacts with the novel’s style and with the novel’s high poetry. The interaction casts up an insight into mismanaged lives, which is that their folly can be restorative. The beauty in these lives — in all our lives — would not be there without the folly. Dick Diver’s folly is to have loved two women, both of them wrong for him. A wisdom of retrospect clarifies his every misstep, while the folly invests his mismanaged life with richness and with love. Dick’s folly, Tender Is the Night says to us in its style, corresponds to that which is best in him.

    Without being obtrusive or even very noticeable, the narrative voice regularly steps outside the story. It comments on its characters and on their evolutions. A knowing and unconfused voice, it wavers between sociology and philosophy, peering far beyond the characters’ passions and misdemeanors. The voice reminds the reader that, though it is set in France, Tender Is the Night is an American story, harboring American meanings, one of which concerns wisdom. As Dick says about Rosemary’s mother, “She has a sort of wisdom that’s rare in America.” The narrative voice confirms this rarity, suggesting that power and money and modern times, “the enormous flux of American life,” have fused into a mass unconsciousness. Americans are heedless, and they think they can get away with being heedless. The narrative voice observes a “tall rich American girl, promenading insouciantly upon the national prosperity.” Enjoying her paradigmatic prosperity, this American girl walks with insouciance, handmaiden to the unexamined life.

    Lacking cultural depth, Americans disappoint the narrative voice in Tender Is the Night. This is especially true of Americans in Europe. The narrative voice editorializes about a group of bored American tourists: “no stimuli worked upon them, no voices called them from without, no fragments of their own thoughts came suddenly from the minds of others, and missing the clamor of Empire they felt that life was not continuing there [in rural France].” Tocqueville, who worried about democracy as a dissolvent of nuance and therefore of the individual, could not have improved upon this description of American restlessness. Fearing the silence of their own solitude, they hope to mistake the thinking of others for their own thoughts. The narrative voice makes a similar point through Rosemary, who is American in her way of being unwise. She was “accustomed to seeing the starkest grotesqueries of a continent heavily underlined as comedy or tragedy, untrained to the task of separating out the essential for herself, [and] she now began to feel that French life was empty and stale.” (In a notebook entry in 1924, Fitzgerald wrote that “I’ve talked so much and not lived enough with myself to develop the necessary self reliance.”)

    Dick Diver and his wife Nicole come close to separating out the essential for themselves. The novel begins in 1925. The war is over and the Great Depression nowhere in sight, as Dick and Nicole summer with their gifted friends, living lavishly on the Cote d’Azur. The narrative voice explains that the “Divers’ day was spaced like the day of the older civilizations to yield the utmost from the materials at hand, and to give the transitions their full value.” No tragi-comic grotesqueries for them — not there, not then. They have made leisure civilized and rarified, “representing externally the exact furthermost evolution of a class, so that most people seemed awkward beside them.” In the word externally is the clue to the story. Internally, Nicole is still a psychiatric patient, still suffering from an abusive father, and internally Dick is unwell. He is wasting himself, looking back occasionally “with awe at the carnivals of affection he had given, as a general might gaze upon a massacre he had ordered to satisfy an impersonal blood lust.” 

    Underneath, Dick is yet another unwise American. As such, he wills himself past success and money and into the endless night of failure. His degeneration elicits no harshness from the narrative voice: it begets tenderness, even if the narrative voice does not indulge Dick. He is romanticized in the novel’s opening pages for the sake of contrast, so that his hell might be maximally dramatic. What the narrative voice tells us — with emphasis — is that Dick’s fall is his fault. No natural or external disaster covers him in misfortune. His folly is his erotic cluelessness, undeniably the same thing that Fitzgerald saw in himself and stated to his daughter — “the mistake I made was in marrying her [Zelda].” I made. The mistake I made, which is the mistake Dick makes twice in Tender Is the Night, is less the mistake of marrying then of falling precipitously in love. A modest two mistakes and the promising young man has reduced his life to “a perilous accident,” and to an accident that he is too weak and too unwise to survive. The peril and the accident expel him from the paradise — from the south of France in 1925. The novel’s narrative conscience is too stern to pity Dick for any of this.

    Dick goes astray in love, the narrative voice persuasively argues. Simultaneously, the novel’s style teaches us that Dick lives most expansively and most wisely in his love. The folly pushing his love forward undoes him, and it also makes him, robbing him of his self-discipline and revealing to him that life is poetry and poetry life. The contest between wisdom and folly plays out in this manner, back and forth, back and forth. Given Fitzgerald’s reverence for style, his genius for style, it cannot be said that wisdom triumphs over folly in this novel. Folly comes closer to triumphing over wisdom. It goes where wisdom cannot. It prospers where wisdom cannot. It enlivens in a manner that wisdom cannot. Adult life comes to fruition in the food for thought that folly gathers for wisdom. The wisdom would be pointless without the folly, antiseptic and unnecessary. Where wisdom is by nature astringent and melancholic, folly can be liberating and gorgeous, for folly recklessly affirms and acts and creates. In Tender Is the Night, its vast potential is realized not in narrative, not in character portrayal, and not in philosophizing about life and fate, but in the singular domain of literary style. 

    Two examples demonstrate folly’s splendor in Tender Is the Night. The first is the moment Dick falls in love with Nicole (around the time of World War I). She is a rich American girl and his patient at a Swiss sanitarium, and she is not at all insouciant. He tries to resist her, cognizant of being her doctor and of her being unwell, intuiting something of his eventual fate. He cannot resist, and “the impression of her youth and beauty grew on Dick until it welled up inside him in a compact paroxysm of emotion. She smiled, a moving childish smile that was like all the lost youth in the world.” The novel elaborates on this smile: “she smiled at him, making sure that the smile gathered up everything inside it toward him, making him a profound promise of herself for so little, for the beat of a response, the assurance of a complementary vibration in him. Minute by minute the sweetness drained into her out of the willow trees, out of the dark world.” 

    This passage unites detail, rhythm, and metaphor into a verbal medium at once meticulous and lyrical. It has the insistent motion, the grammar and the diction, of prose. There are pauses but not breaks. As in poetry, though, each syllable and each sound is calibrated for musical effect, the “compact paroxysm of emotion” doubling as a compact paroxysm of multi-syllabic accents. Metaphors fuel the climactic last sentence, a polished gem of expository prose. The willow trees donate their dolcezza to Nicole, and the world’s very darkness is drained away by her moving childish smile, less an enticement than a painterly image of love itself. It is all a poet’s homage to folly, for Dick happens to be making the worst mistake of his life. Yet his loss of self-control causes the world’s darkness to dissipate. Dick has enough folly within him to receive Nicole’s smile, while she passes — minute by minute — the world’s sweetness from the willow trees through herself to him. She is not robbing him of anything: she is bestowing the logic of beauty on his existence. Not to have experienced this moment would have been a mistake more grave and more enervating than the mistake Dick will make by marrying her.

    The second example concerns Rosemary, the femme fatale from Hollywood. Dick is married to Nicole; they have two children; and Rosemary is much younger than Dick. She is an object of desire who adores him and who is obviously not right for him. Again he cannot resist. Again he gives in. They cross a line in Paris — not quite into adultery but away from probity. It is the mistake that will definitively destroy Dick, the worst transition of his adult life, the point of no return, the cardinal error. Beset with emotion, Rosemary and Dick ride in a taxi with “no time to cry, and lovers now they fell ravenously on the quick seconds while outside the taxi window the green and cream twilight faded, and the fire-red, gas-blue, ghost-green signs began to shine smokily through the tranquil rain. It was nearly six, the streets were in movement, the bistros gleamed and the Place de Concorde moved by in pink majesty as the cab turned north.” Dick is turning onto a long series of false paths and dead ends.

    A study in foolishness, this passage lays bare the transformative power of love. They are traveling — Dick, Rosemary, Nicole, and their Parisian companions — from entertainment to entertainment. No one is sober, all of them are along for the ride. Paris is just a stage set to them. Dick and Rosemary enter another world in the taxi, falling “ravenously” on themselves, a world that seems an impressionist watercolor, a zone of magical adjectives, each quite simple and yet riotous in their profusion. A twilight that is green and cream fades into the city’s vibrant night. The forgiving tranquil rain distorts the fire-red, gas-blue, ghost-green signage into a shining smoky light. The majesty (pink or otherwise) cannot have been perceived by the two lovers, who are lost in their rapid embrace; the majesty is within them. They are the Paris twilight in movement. They are the taxi as it voyages through the Place de Concorde. Not-quite-consummated desire and the lights and bistros and ambient people of Paris get transformed (by means of an extraordinary style) into a set-piece work of art. This rampant aestheticization comes alive not against but through Dick’s folly, and not to have experienced this moment would have been a wounding and terrible mistake.

    Dick’s downfall, when it comes, has less to do with his ruined marriage than with his eventual inability to love. He is left with night and no signage, no Paris, no bistros. The denouement comes in Rome, where Dick and Rosemary meet and finally sleep with each other. It is “not a wild submergence of the soul, a dipping of all colors into an obscuring dye, such as his love for Nicole had been.” In Rome, Dick is flirting with emptiness instead of folly: “if he had to bring all the bitterness and hatred of the world into his heart, he was not going to be in love with her again.” Leaving Rosemary behind, Dick goes out to drink and is utterly miserable: “there seemed nothing to do but to go back to the hotel and lie down with his black heart.” “A vast criminal irresponsibility” burning inside of him, he continues drinking, gets into fights, and demeans himself. Dick does not progress from folly to wisdom in Tender Is the Night. He loses his capacity for folly and acquires no wisdom in the process. To be bereft of folly is to be bereft of wisdom, something akin to emotional suicide. Nicole, by contrast, wills herself into becoming healthy. She initiates an affair with a French aviator and, having been too serious in the past, she claims the laurel wreath of folly. Dick is left to contend with his black heart entirely on his own.

    Christian Gauss, Fitzgerald’s favorite literature professor at Princeton, once quipped that Fitzgerald resembled all three Karamazov brothers. He had an ascetic and spiritual side like Alyosha; he had a quizzical-philosophical-moral side like Ivan; and like Dmitri he was a hedonist. Fitzgerald may have contained multitudes, but whoever he was as a person, however riven or broken, he was not at all fractured or schizophrenic as a writer. His prose style synthesizes, it combines, it harmonizes, and on the printed page Fitzgerald could be — without cacophony — Alyosha, Ivan and Dmitri Karamazov. The harmony stems from the tonalities of his prose style, an impeccable harmony of the surface. This harmony is palpable and audible in Tender Is the Night, though it is a novel of depths. Precisely because the surface, the prose style, is so wondrously in harmony, the all-in-one Karamazov craziness of Fitzgerald the artist could be given free reign. In Tender Is the Night, chaos could be chaos and madness could be madness, and because of the laborious and uphill battle undertaken to find the right words, the right rhythms, the right images, and the right metaphors, neither chaos nor madness devolve into artistic bedlam. Fitzgerald applied a poet’s pen to the fabrication of a novel that must be twice as long as Gatsby, and a novel about people who themselves contain stubborn multitudes.

    Fitzgerald, who would not have disputed that folly is folly, indecorous and potentially lethal, uncovers the dignity of folly in Tender Is the Night. This dignity is not pleasure, not the desire to be entertained, not an addiction to the clamor of empire. Folly often brings pain and can easily issue in indignity, as it does for Dick. Dick humiliates himself with Rosemary by giving in to her allure, forcing himself into the role of the desperate older man. Folly’s dignity is more subtle and less familiar: Erasmus spelled it out in detail. Folly can coincide with intoxicants — wine, poetry, heroism, love — wisdom being meted out only to God. Intoxicants consumed to excess are poisons, and (with the possible exception of love) they are also temporary in effect. So, too, are they bound up with the dignity of a life well lived, that preoccupation of philosophers. Folly’s dignity inclines toward wisdom, and at the pinnacle of wisdom stands the ideal of a life well lived. Ivan Karamazov, the philosopher, should have learned more from Dmitri, the hedonist, who himself has everything to learn. In search of dignity, Alyosha is too young — in The Brothers Karamazov, the first volume of an intended though never completed trilogy — to understand that dignity and folly can and should be paired.

    In 1940, after Fitzgerald’s death, Zelda wrote a letter to Gerald and Sara Murphy, friends of the Fitzgerald’s, and to Harold Ober, Fitzgerald’s literary agent, that captures the dignified dichotomy of folly-wisdom in her husband’s life and art. In it, she described grieving for “his devotion to those that he felt were contributing to the aesthetic and spiritual purposes of life — and for his generous and vibrant soul that never spared itself, and never found anything too much trouble save the fundamentals of life itself.” He never took control of the fundamentals. In his incapacity, in his folly, he did not spare himself, he spent himself, without ever pulling back from the folly of an error-filled life. The merciless fundamentals did him in, but not before he discovered the aesthetic and spiritual purposes of life, a discovery that added up to no organized set of propositions, no immortal dialogues on justice or the soul, no tractatus philosophicus, and no theories of any merit. The discovery of these purposes, present just beyond the literal meaning of his words and most searchingly just beyond the words that make up Tender Is the Night, was contained, as it might be in a novel by Flaubert, within the style. In its quicksilver instability, this style wears the noble mask of wisdom, wearing it graciously and sincerely. Beneath the mask is the face of folly, which can approach and approximate wisdom. When it does, folly is wisdom with a human face and a human heart.

    Mourning Negative Space

    My estranged father’s death did not affect me as I had expected it would. I had been informed just two days before his passing that he was gravely ill. On the windless drive from France to Germany, somewhere in Belgium on the Sunday before the American elections, I was told he had died. My husband was driving us through a thicket of slow cars. He was the first person to hear me say it after receiving the phone call. “He just died.” We were three hours away. Our GPS predicted we would arrive at the hospital in Cologne where we expected to find him sedated by 6:43 PM. I had been looking out the window and my recollection now is of a mildly sunny pastoral view, like those from my childhood train trips through the flat corridors between Paris and the other side of the Rhine where he had lived since I was a teenager. 

    Just the previous week I had been told he did not want to speak with me or even see me one last time after receiving his terminal diagnosis. But his wife had offered me the option to visit him during his final drift from consciousness. Perhaps he would recognize me or even be roused to speak. A close friend of his predicted he had been clinging to life so he could have a final visit with me. I was told my visit might ease his passing. 

    The whole saga was bizarre. How could this man, whom I had not spoken with or seen in more than a decade, be dying? I had been in a state of apprehensive terror over the prospect of another Trump term, and hardly had the bandwidth to brace for another looming cataclysm, even for the passing of my father. It is hard to imagine the death of a man who bathed you and played with you as a child, made your favorite foods and told you when putting you to bed that he loved you; the death of a man who kept secrets from you, who hid whole lives from you while you grew up, who would invite his young graduate students to his living room and have affairs with them in the home you shared. There had been many lies and even more omissions that I would learn of over the years, so much that explained my mother’s outbursts throughout my childhood. 

    My estranged father was a mild mannered and gentle man. He would cry occasionally, and rarely raised his voice. This made the rare occasions when he had violent outbursts towards me even more disturbing. I recall with special clarity the time he beat me with a walking stick till it broke. 

    I had been playing with dolls while wearing one of my mother’s handbags over my shoulder. I cannot remember if I was also wearing her heels at the time. He came into the room, and asked me to hurry up or else we’d be late. “Get up now!” he shouted, which startled me. I began to put away the dolls and the toy tea set — it was aluminum, colored powder pink with magenta borders and I think some white rose patterning. I walked towards him in the doorway with my mother’s handbag swinging from my shoulder. He yanked it off as I passed and I asked, “Why did you take that off? I want to keep it.” He put the handbag down on a bench near the door.

    While he looked for his keys I picked up the bag and restored it to my shoulder. Enraged, he grabbed a wooden walking stick and struck me hard across my back with it. I screamed in pain and shock, and fell to the floor. He loomed over me and repeated the violence all over my body. I was shaking with terror and each strike felt as though it was cutting through my skin, which the bruises later would confirm. He had never hit me before. No adult had. I had always been the studious and obedient child. A primary school teacher had once told my parents that when boys pushed or hit me on the playground, I would never fight back. My parents said that the teacher found this passivity confusing and disturbing.

    The stick could not bear his wrath and it snapped mid-assault. He threw it down. He walked out of the door, and drove off in his car leaving me on the entryway floor. I was alone in the house, shaking and crying. After what felt like hours I relocated to my bed. Later I told my mother everything, and in tears she reassured me that I would never be staying with my estranged father again. Though he apologized profusely for what he had done, I felt numb listening to him as he explained his anger at himself and his shock at his own actions. On some level of consciousness it was clear to me that he had beat me because of the handbag, the dolls — that he had beat me because I was a girl. A girl, without the body to match.

    He had often seen me play with dolls or dress up in my mother’s accessories, and the most I could ever detect in his expression was a mild discomfort. Other children would mock me or ask in confusion why I played with dolls. Sometimes if someone was coming over while I was staying with him, my father would hide the dolls. “They don’t understand why boys play with dolls, and they will laugh at you.” 

    At about four or five, having never heard of gay people, or queer identity, and never having seen a person in drag, I began to find it uncomfortable to be referred to as a boy. It was deeply confusing for me. When I played house, I always wanted to play the mother.

    In the early months of kindergarten, I remember walking past a few teachers, two women and a man, and saw them looking towards me and laughing amongst themselves. My cheeks burned and a cold chill that I can still feel rippled through my body as I walked towards them, heart pounding. The man was swaying his body in an exaggerated way to mimic how I moved, and waving his hand to caricature my femininity. The women were both laughing. As they walked towards me their expressions shifted from mirth to warm smiles. They didn’t know I had heard them. “Are you not going to the playground?” one of them called out to me. I rushed to my desk in the classroom, relieved to discover no one else was there. The shudder of shame came over me and the chill gave way to a cold sweat. I wept. Why had these teachers, one of whom was my own, mocked me as so many of the children in my class did! 

    Usually the teachers would reprimand the other children for teasing me, and mine would intervene when the boys hit or pushed me to the ground. A boy once kicked me for no reason. I was just walking toward the swings, and as I fell a rock slashed my knee. The pain was sharp. Blood stained my pants. I started to scream at the sight of so much blood. The bully himself was stunned. A teacher called my parents, and I needed to be taken to a clinic where I was given stitches. The scar is still there, a permanent reminder of that day. “Why don’t you hit these boys back when they hit you?” my mother implored her child, whom she mistook for her son, her voice breaking with frustration and remorse and — what I only later could decipher in her expression — fear. Unlike most of the scars in my life, it has remained visible. 

    It would have brought me immeasurable relief to have understood who I was as a child, and to have known that children like me existed and that we were born this way. The affirming care I received as an adult was essential. It relieved a distress that had been a part of me since I was old enough to be self-aware. As early as seven or eight, I remember wondering when it would all change down there for me, even though at that age I could not remember having seen anyone else naked. My parents were concerned, but not as concerned as certain doctors who recommended running chromosomal tests on me to see whether there was something “wrong.” 

    At my father’s hospital I felt like I was moving out of time as I walked out of the elevator and down the corridor. There my estranged father’s wife stood, waiting to let me into his room with tears in her eyes. Regulation required her to remain there while I was in the room with his body. As I caught a glimpse of him, covered in a white linen sheet, it was suddenly like the numerous times when I would walk into his room when he was asleep, either to tiptoe and collect something, or to wake him up for some reason. There was no sound of him snoring, or even breathing, and that was different, but it seemed to me that he could still just be asleep. The nurse came in and said something to his wife in German, which I could not make out, other than it sounding like permission for me to approach him. “You were very dear to him, so you should know you are also very dear to me,” his wife said to me after a few minutes.

    How do you mourn a negative space?

    Night and Golden Stuff

    The Met on a cloudless Tuesday afternoon was not too crowded (the Vermeer room was empty for five minutes — a record, in my experience). We came to Rembrandt first. I entered his art with a helping of Malraux to guide me. He had written that Rembrandt was a brother to Dostoevsky and “one of the few biblical poets of Western Christendom, and that is why his painting, which does not illustrate his poetry but expresses it, encountered bitterer hostility than Franz Hals had to face.” His poetry “expresses” his painting — again that primal word. I hadn’t been able to make that connection even on the day I read Malraux — I had to see it myself, in person. Here were the familiar six late period paintings, ending with the vaunted Self-Portrait from 1660 and beginning with Aristotle Contemplating a Bust of Homer (The Toilet of Bathsheba is just before it) and going to Hendrickje Stoffels, then to The Standard Bearer, before the Woman with a Pink, and finally Man with a Magnifying Glass. What they all share is that burnished background chiaroscuro, so the figures — often in dour or dark garb, save Aristotle — emerge from the plane of the canvas like Ezra Pound’s words in Canto XVII:

    Flat water before me,
    and the trees growing in water,
    Marble trunks out of stillness,
    On past the palazzi,
    in the stillness,

    This image of Venice is perhaps unsurprising. This poetry might not express Rembrandt’s painting, but it portrays it.

    While looking at these paintings assembled in a certain trajectory, I came to see the haunting of Rembrandt by Rembrandt and the reverse-haunting of myself in the similarly dark portraits hung in a local faux Mexican fast-food restaurant of my youth, a chain called Zantigo. It held half-swarthy, half-kitschy paint-by-numbers works with a host of subjects similar to Zurburan and Velazquez — particularly the former, a key cog in my fossil record, as his large dark (six and a half foot-long) St. Francis of Assisi in His Tomb hung in the Milwaukee Art Museum, a bejeweled though rare trip of youth. Velazquez and Rembrandt have overlapped in the greater world in the centuries following — Malraux: “Idealized faces, realistic faces, Raphael, Rembrandt, and Velazquez were grouped together, in one collective style.” The Rembrandt paintings in the Met don’t have much in common (save the background) except as a series that New Yorkers may come to know. The sailor sea-blue wall backing makes a difference in the presentation (all the European paintings in the museum have color schemes for the specific country of origin). What goes on when I see the Rembrandts at the Met is hard to perceive, but put the words of Malraux in the atmosphere next to them and changes ensue. In the opening of his Museum Without Walls, he observes: “Inevitably in a place where the work of art, and at a time when the artistic exploration of the world is in active progress, the assemblage of so many masterpieces — from which, nevertheless, so many are missing — conjured up in the mind’s eye all the world’s masterpieces. How indeed could this mutilated possible fail to evoke the whole gamut of the possible?” The paintings compete with one another. So much of the Rembrandt six comes across from what is not there in the other more realist portraits in the room: works by Hals and de Hooch and Flinck, with a couple of quiet Dutch still-lifes by Maes, plus a “follower” of Rembrandt’s more intriguing canvas.

    When one looks long enough at a painting things emerge, say the squarish parcel of canvas with a more slick-grained patch of black just above Aristotle’s head that is fairly impossible to see in reproductions. This glaze is a major part of the painting — in a dark honey way it highlights the exigencies of the emotional power of line and coloring that seem to be contained in the clothes, the hat, and the withered, though still strong, face of one great man contemplating another (in stone) — the ruffle of his enormous shirt lending weight to a human body that the bust lacks (Malraux: “Rembrandt showers his [figures] with light so as to raise them above man’s estate”). The massive bunchy folds of the garment (off-white off the black of his torso) suggested something else grand and uncommon. Though the man is Aristotle, he is no Aristotle that we have ever imagined — he is dressed in seventeenth-century Dutch clothing. So he is simultaneously in and out of time — himself and more and other. But this eventually gave way to another painting, a smaller one, the portrait of Hendrickje Stoffels — it was at this picture that I looked most during the visit, though I did not know who she was. I just kept gazing at her face, which isn’t so much looking as floating forth caught in some commotion, but standing in to show herself to the viewer like few other figures can — a fresh degree of love.

    One cannot fully grapple with Rembrandt until our hairs get stippled with gray and our face has been under the sun for fifteen-thousand days. Helen Cixous details Rembrandt’s subterranean ways: 

    Where does Rembrandt take us? To a foreign land, our own.
    A foreign land, our other country.
    He takes us to the Heart. [. . .]

    — A scene by Rembrandt (let’s take a family scene, or a scene like this one, a scene of “corporation”), what gives it its force — by which it takes us, pushes us, pinches us, caresses us, is, beyond courtly war exchanges — beyond pretenses, codes . . .
    — that it always occurs at the same time in the cellar in the cave or in the forest, in these great and somber prehistoric cathedrals where our colors, our drawings stir, where attraction and repulsion shine, like lanterns in our obscurity. It is there (to the bottom) that Rembrandt leads us. Taking the red staircase, down to the bottom of ourselves, under the earth’s crust,
    This world is full of night and of golden stuff. The stuff of night is a clay. A mud. It is still moving, imperceptibly.
    No landscape and no “furniture” either. Instead of furniture, “shelving,” “shelves” of color. Bands, brush strokes.

    I often don’t know what I’m seeing until I read another’s words on the image before me. Cixous is more than generous in this regard. Malraux keys in the overall, Berger details the emotions, and Cixous nails the landscape, which is “no landscape.” “It is there (to the bottom) that Rembrandt leads us. Taking the red staircase, down to the bottom of ourselves, under the earth’s crust” — this is why I could not get a full sense of Rembrandt until fifty — how do you know at twenty-two that the bottom of ourselves is under the earth’s crust?

    The War on Foreign Students

    When Rümeysa Öztürk, a 27-year-old Turkish student, was snatched off the street by masked plainclothes police officers and put in the back of an unmarked car, she wasn’t marching on the streets of Istanbul protesting Turkey’s authoritarian president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. She was walking in America in broad daylight, about to meet friends for dinner in Somerville, Massachusetts. Ozturk’s “crime,” so far as anyone can make out, is to have co-authored in March 2024 an op-ed in a student newspaper criticizing Tufts University’s unwillingness to divest from companies with ties to Israel. After the article’s publication, Rümeysa Öztürk’s name and photo were published on the website Canary Mission, which documents individuals who “promote hatred of the USA, Israel and Jews on North American college campuses.”

    For months now the Trump administration has been ramping up its cynical war against freedom of speech under the guise of combating antisemitism on college campuses. In his “Executive Order to Combat Anti-Semitism” of January 30, President Trump promised to deport Hamas sympathizers: “To all the resident aliens who joined in the pro-jihadist protests, we put you on notice: come 2025, we will find you, and we will deport you. I will also quickly cancel the student visas of all Hamas sympathizers on college campuses, which have been infested with radicalism like never before.” During a visit to Guyana on March 27, Secretary of State Marco Rubio bragged that the administration had cancelled over three hundred student visas thus far. “We do it every day, every time I find one of these lunatics,” he stated. In May, the Trump administration revoked Harvard’s certification for accepting any students from abroad.

    At the time of her detainment, Rümeysa Öztürk was a Fulbright Scholar on an F-1 student visa completing a doctoral program for Child Study and Human Development. She had previously completed an M.A. in Psychology at Columbia University. She is exactly the kind of student the United States ought to covet, not reject. And yet for exercising her right to free speech she was arbitrarily detained outside her home, put in the backseat of a car, and then, in violation of a court order, flown over fifteen hundred miles to an ICE detention center in Louisiana. “It’s fully constitutionally protected speech, no crimes at all,” said Esha Bhandari, an ACLU attorney who is representing Öztürk. “If this is allowed, anyone could be punished for anything they say.”

    I came to the United States in 2007 as a foreign student. I could hardly believe my luck. Like everyone else who grew up in the 1990s in northern Europe, my cultural upbringing was decidedly America-centric: American television, American music, American books. In high school I had a poster of the Brooklyn Bridge on my wall; I would lie beneath it on Saturday mornings reading Saul Bellow and listening to Thelonious Monk, dreaming of one day living in an American metropolis. And suddenly I was there: first in Miami, then in New York. On my morning commute to classes I would crawl out of the subway at Union Square and walk down Fifth Avenue. Every morning, without fail, I turned to see if the Empire State Building was really there behind me.

    One of the many reasons the ongoing assault on educational institutions and students’ civil liberties is so heartbreaking is because it is a betrayal of the very ideals many of us not born here most associate with life in America: openness and tolerance. Why would any American want to tear up the admiring image of America abroad? Contrary to the claims of conservative culture warriors, American campuses, in my experience of a handful of them as both a student and an adjunct professor, are largely inclusive and reflective spaces in which students are prepared for the responsibilities of democratic citizenship. And yet we should not let the current administration’s brazen actions delude into thinking things were fine before. It was former Columbia University President Minouche Shafik who permitted the New York City police to enter campus and brutally conduct mass arrests of student protesters last year. And neither should concern about political and intellectual insularity and dogmatism at colleges and universities be dismissed out of hand. Everyone stands to benefit from an educational environment in which free thought and free speech is actively encouraged.

    But let’s not delude ourselves: the Trump administration’s attack on universities and students is no misguided plea for educational reform or viewpoint diversity. It is a nihilistic attempt to sow fear and chaos, buoyed by a decades-long campaign by the right to undermine American institutions of learning. “The professors are the enemy,” as Vice President Vance said in 2021, echoing Richard Nixon. This folkish, nativist dislike of anything cultivated or foreign makes international students easy and obvious targets. According to the Associated Press, more than 1200 foreign students have had their visas inexplicably revoked since March, leaving them at risk of deportation. Following court challenges and resistance from federal judges, the administration abruptly reversed those terminations and instead issued new guidance expanding the reasons international students can have their legal status terminated.

    The release of Rümeysa Öztürk on bail on May 9 offers hope — for now. Clearly, this administration will go to extraordinary lengths to bend the American justice system to its will. In the meantime, many foreign students have left the country. And why not? The process of applying for and being granted a student visa is intimidating enough as it is. I could never quell a flutter of anxiety every time I traveled back to Copenhagen for the holidays, all too aware of holding a non-immigrant visa that did not guarantee me a right of entry at the border. But the great good fortune of receiving an American liberal education was more than worth it. It played a significant part in my later decision to become an American citizen and participate in the public life of my adopted country. John Dewey’s claim that “a society transforms uninitiated and seemingly alien beings into robust trustees of its own resources and ideals” has always held a special resonance for me.

    I was therefore shocked, and deeply saddened, by my own sense of relief when my youngest sister recently decided not to apply to American colleges. I told her I thought it was a wise decision under the circumstances. How many other young people like her, or like Rümeysa Öztürk, have reached similar decisions? If ever America was exceptional, it was in part because young people from all over the world aspired to come here and study. No longer, I fear. The Trump administration has put students on notice. The damage done is incalculable. We are all the poorer for it.

    The Other Obliteration: 
A Report from the West Bank

    In August of last year a video was posted on X by the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem in which four masked settlers, three of them wielding clubs, can be seen walking onto a Palestinian man’s land. One settler, wearing a sheet of white cloth tied around the lower part of his face, is recorded insisting that the land, and therefore the home and the herds on it, had been bequeathed to him by his forefathers to whom God had given it millenia earlier. The Palestinian owner of the land and the home and the sheep says, in English, “What do you want?” The settler replies, also in English, “I want to dance with you, man.” The Palestinian says, “I’m not your bitch.” The settler replies, “You look sweet. You are my bitch. And you look sweet. You look so sweet.” And then he walks menacingly around the man in a circle before saying “I would be happy to sit with you in jail someday. I would be happy. You know Sde Teiman? Sde Teiman!” And he continues, in Hebrew, “Rape in the name of God, as they say. Understand? Rape in the name of God.” And then he makes a kissing noise before the video goes black. 

    The settler was referring to the violence committed by Israeli prison guards against inmates in the detention center at Sde Teiman, an Israeli military base in the Negev. One of the horrors perpetrated was systematic rape. (B’Tselem published a report which revealed that detention centers were used as “a network of torture camps for Palestinians.”) The settler speaking in the video is named Shemtov Luski. The Palestinian he was threatening is Hamdan Ballal. You may have heard of him. Earlier this year he stood on stage at the Dolby Theater in Los Angeles to accept an Oscar for the documentary film No Other Land, which he co-directed. You may have also heard that on March 24, 2025, Ballal was brutally beaten by an Israeli settler and some Israeli soldiers. The settler kicked his head “like a football” while attacking his village. That settler was Luski. After the attack, Ballal was charged with “throwing stones at Israeli soldiers,” arrested, and held for twenty hours blindfolded on the floor beneath blasting air conditioning. Luski was not charged with any crime of any kind. 

    Ballal told CNN that each time new soldiers rotated onto guard shifts, they would kick, punch, and beat him with a stick. Ballal doesn’t speak Hebrew, but he could hear them saying his name and the word “Oscar.” From this he surmised what anyone who has been in Israel since the Academy Awards ceremony has seen for themselves: Israelis are extremely angry about the movie that he made. “I realized they were attacking me specifically,” Ballal told reporters after his release. No doubt he was right in his assumption, but that doesn’t mean that the treatment he received was rare or unusual. After all, he didn’t have to win an Academy Award for Luski to attack him the first time. 

    On the day that Ballal was released — his face marked with bruises and his shirt spattered with blood — an Israeli activist named Dafna Banai had driven to Palestinian villages in the West Bank delivering food and water to Palestinian shepherds and their families so that they would have something with which to celebrate Eid al-Fitr. (Owing to crushing poverty, exacerbated by conditions since October 7, food is hard to come by in the West Bank, and water even more so.) After she returned home, Banai told me that “every single family I saw had at least one person in it who was severely injured by settlers. Every single one. I saw cracked skulls, I saw broken arms.” 

    Israeli settler terrorism is hardly a new phenomenon. Banai, for instance, has been going into the West Bank for over two decades to protect Palestinian shepherds from Israeli settler violence. And as soon as she started regularly practicing this form of activism it became evident to her and her colleagues that Israeli soldiers and police officers were not interested in doing anything to stop the settler violence. “Our job is to protect Jews, not Palestinians,” one soldier told Banai in the early 2000s. 

    But over the past few years, and accelerated dramatically since Donald Trump won the American elections in 2024, the Israeli government has been using settler terrorism as a tool to push Palestinians off land in the West Bank. The government has been pioneering a new strategy for Palestinian displacement, utilizing what they call “agricultural farms” or “shepherding outposts.” The strategy is simple and effective. The Palestinian shepherds live in the open fields of the Jordan Valley because their herds require grazing lands. As a consequence of the requirements for raising their livestock, they control more land than just the land on which their houses were situated. Settlers, in collaboration with the Netanyahu government, realized that they could do the same thing: they could construct these shepherding outposts next to Palestinian shepherding villages and force out the Palestinian inhabitants through terror tactics while also controlling the land radiating out from their outposts. 

    Before this strategy was implemented, the primary tool for displacing Palestinians in the West Bank was what we now call lawfare, organized by right-wing Israeli lawyers and often funded by their American allies. The subject of Ballal’s film was precisely this kind of legal oppression: the film details the past twenty years of legal disputes about Masafer Yatta, a village in the West Bank which the Israeli government claims can be legally destroyed to use the land as a live-fire military training zone. In a country in which the highest law in the land is written by and for Israelis, the Israeli court system hardly ever results in legal victories for Palestinians against the Israeli government. But why waste years litigating the case in court and incrementally destroying the villages when one can simply employ “shepherds” to terrorize Palestinians until they leave of their own volition?

    A few days after I arrived in Israel in early March of this year, I drove the short distance from my apartment in Yafo to Ramat Gan to meet Dafna Banai. She is a small, fiery woman with decades of experience as an activist — an “angelic troublemaker,” to borrow Bayard Rustin’s phrase. Banai goes to protests and makes posters for them: she was among the first group of activists who held up photographs of the children killed in Gaza at the anti-war protests in Tel Aviv, a seemingly small gesture but with such enormous social implications that the police immediately banned the posters and then were forced to lift the ban. Most of Banai’s activism takes place out in the fields and the villages of the West Bank. She is a member of the various ragtag groups colloquially called Protective Presence. Its members are volunteers, most of them Israeli Jews, who go in shifts to different Palestinian villages in the West Bank and keep watch so that Israeli settlers will not attack the Palestinians who live there. 

    I accompanied Banai on one of her missions. The drive from Ramat Gan to the checkpoint in the West Bank took about half an hour — only thirty minutes reach an alternate reality. In the thinking of diplomats and pursuers of peace, the West Bank was supposed to be the ground for what would one day be a Palestinian state. Now the highway on the Palestinian side of the checkpoint is punctuated with enormous billboards in Hebrew beckoning settlers to build houses and settle the land. Banai and I visited three villages that day — Duma in the mid-Jordan Valley; Bardela, in the upper eastern part of the Valley close to the Jordanian border; and Ras El-Ein, all the way down at its southern tip — and these billboards greeted us at every point. 

    At the beginning of our drive it wasn’t clear to us whether it would be possible to enter any of the villages that we hoped to visit. Since October 7, the Israeli government has been erecting gates at the entrances of most of the Palestinian villages in the West Bank and locking them without warning, so that their residents cannot drive out and cannot plan in advance to be picked up by a car on the other side of the gate that descends without notice. This is a kind of incarceration. Duma was still gateless — at the start of the war the Israeli government had blocked Duma’s entry road with an enormous boulder which had since been moved — but it was always possible that entry would be somehow barred. 

    At regular intervals we could see small white buildings atop distant hills. These were the Israelis’ shepherding outposts, the nuclei of what were intended to become enormous suburban residential Jewish neighborhoods, which we also spotted, though more sporadically. Each small white hut houses a family and a settler “shepherd,” whose job is to use his own herd, provided by the Israeli government, to muscle out the Palestinian livestock. Every shepherding outpost is also outfitted with a drone — the first thing the “shepherd” does in the morning after prayers is fly the drone to locate the closest Palestinian shepherd — and ATVs (all-terrain vehicles) which they are allocated to drive into Palestinian neighborhoods. These were the violent men I had seen in the videos. And most of these huts are stationed on a hill surrounded by what are now fields of tall grass. Every single one of those empty fields once abutted a Palestinian village, the residents of which had been forced out. All of the grazing land that had grown back into the undulating fields through which we were driving testified to the successful eviction of Palestinian shepherding villages and the steady eradication of Palestinian culture and life. 

    Within the first half hour of our trip, Banai’s phone buzzed and she tapped the green button on her car’s touch screen. A sweet, raspy male voice spoke in Arabic on the speaker system. “Hussein!” Banai smiled. She and the man chatted back and forth, jumping from Hebrew to Arabic — both are fluent in both languages. From the half of the exchange that I could follow, I surmised that this man was waiting for us in Duma. Banai explained after hanging up that the man on the phone was Hussein Dawabsheh. Israelis who have never met a Palestinian may recognize his name, because in July 2015, settlers firebombed the home of Hussein’s daughter Rahem, while she, her husband Sa’ad, and their two children were sleeping inside. One child, Ali, burned to death. He was eighteen months old. His father died days later, and Rahem died of her injuries five weeks after the attack. The remaining child, Ahmed, was adopted by Hussein and lives in the house towards which we were driving. While Hussein came and went from the court proceedings of the terrorists who had attacked his family, a group of Jewish settlers jeered and taunted him in Arabic: “Where’s Ali? There’s no Ali. Ali is burned! On the fire! Ali is on the grill! Where is Rahem? Where is Sa’ad? Too bad Ahmed didn’t burn too!” At about the time Itamar Ben Gvir was invited into Netanyahu’s government, it was reported that he had attended a settler’s wedding at which celebrants printed out photos of Ali and took turns stabbing it with knives. 

    Over the decades that Banai had been volunteering in the West Bank, she and Hussein had become close friends. “It’s Ramadan, so my grandson is sleeping,” Hussein told me in Hebrew after welcoming us inside. He and his wife keep the fast during the holy month but insisted on making us tea, which we drank in their living room beneath an enormous photograph of their murdered daughter and grandson. There was a gentle kindness in Hussein’s eyes and voice that juxtaposed grotesquely with the horror that destroyed so much that he loves. 

    After draining the last of our tea we drove from Duma northward to Bardala, which is encircled by a newly paved road. This is another strategic innovation: the Israeli government has paved the road very tightly around the village, cutting off its inhabitants from the grazing lands that its shepherds depend upon, and then had made it illegal for the Palestinians to cross the road. Banai expects that the same method will be repeated in other villages; years of experience have taught her that once a strategy is deemed effective it is rapidly institutionalized. Bardala’s gate was open and we drove along the unpaved main road (it is illegal for Palestinians to pave new roads) towards the broken Palestinian water pump (it is illegal for Palestinians to fix their water pumps). On the way we stopped at the townhall so that Banai could say hello to the mayor. He greeted her warmly and began explaining animatedly in Arabic that the Israelis had given him notice that he must demolish the newly built second floor of his home, for which he did not secure a permit, or they will tear down his entire house.

    Next we visited Bardala’s single Palestinian water pump, which has been dry for years. It stands as a physical testimony to one of the most debilitating and effective Israeli methods for immiserating Palestinians: dehydration. In summertime the Jordan Valley simmers at an average of a hundred degrees fahrenheit. Water is essential for the Palestinians and for their herds, and the Israeli state has made water maddeningly difficult to secure. Israel has criminalized Palestinian hydration in many ways, and most of them have been in place since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967. All the water in the West Bank is managed by Mekorot, which means Sources, Israel’s national water carrier, which is not a private company but a company owned by the Israeli government. In November 1967, months after Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, the state issued Military Order 158, which stipulated that it was illegal for Palestinians to construct any new water installations, extract water from any new source, or develop any new water infrastructure without a permit from the Israeli army. Palestinians are also not permitted to deepen existing wells without obtaining a permit. These permits are all but impossible to obtain.

    Israel also controls the collection of rainwater in the West Bank. Palestinians are not allowed to build rainwater cisterns without permits. Existing Palestinian cisterns, pipes, and wells are routinely smashed by settlers with impunity, and Palestinians are prohibited from fixing the damaged infrastructure as well. The Israeli settlements next door, and sometimes inside Palestinian villages, over-pump to provide water for settlers, who enjoy green lawns and swimming pools next door to the yellowing Palestinian fields. On a daily basis the average person in a Palestinian shepherding village consume twenty-six liters of water a day, whereas the average Israeli in both the West Bank and the rest of Israel consume an average of two hundred and forty-seven liters of water a day. Thirty-six percent of all Palestinians in the West Bank have access to running water on a daily basis, while one hundred percent of the Israeli citizens living in the occupied territory enjoy that basic resource. Bardala, unlike most of the villages in the West Bank, once had a working pump because it sits on top of a natural reserve of water. Its residents are lucky that there are nearby springs which they can visit when the army does not cordon them off. 

    Banai had promised a Palestinian shepherd that she would visit him in the fields inside Bardala — the ones within the village that Palestinians could still use for grazing. But on our drive up the hill towards the open grass, a white SUV with an Israeli flag flying on its roof whipped around in front of us and cut us off. Four men in Israeli military uniforms, each with an enormous gun slung across his chest, got out of the car. The menacing bunch brandished their guns at Banai and insisted that it was illegal for us to be there. She repeated several times that this was nonsense — she knows her way around the place as well as the thicket of regulations that apply there — but the men merely gripped the guns and repeated themselves until she finally desisted. They followed behind and escorted us all the way out of the village and onto the main road.

    On the way from Bardala to Ras El-Ein, Banai pulled onto a gravel path and drove up a steep hill at the top of which were the remains of what had once been a village. Banai explained that many of the villages that she used to visit were destroyed after their inhabitants finally capitulated to settler demands and fled. But the village that had once stood on this hill was one of only two that she had actually watched being dismantled by its residents. Banai saw an old man weep on the ground. He said he would rather die on the hill than leave it, that he had been a shepherd all his life and he could do nothing else. Finally, though, he had been dragged along with the rest of the village to the closest city with space for them. There the families that had lived side by side for so long were divided up into the different neighborhoods where they could find housing. Now they languish there along with all the other unemployed and impoverished city dwellers, hungry, poor, but farther at least from the settler terrorists’ reach.

    When we arrived at Ras El-Ein, an Israeli lawyer from a human rights organization was sitting in a circle surrounded by Palestinian shepherds, one of whom was translating on behalf of the rest. The day before, settlers had invaded the village, stolen its herds, and attacked one of the men present. The lawyer dutifully wrote down his account and then packed up and left — presumably back across the checkpoint, a universe away, a world where rights are recognized, where human beings have legal resources — she drove to a world with a future. 

    Dafna Banai was in Tel Aviv on Independence Day in 2001, when she read a story on the internet of a little Palestinian girl in a village in the West Bank. All of the villages in the West Bank at that time — the Second Intifada was raging — were in total lockdown, but this little girl had a disease that was causing sudden and terribly painful convulsions. Word got around that she was suffering but could not get medications or medical treatment because of the lockdown. She was, Dafna read, screaming in pain. 

    Banai followed the story obsessively all day. At the time she had resolved never to go into the West Bank because she did not want to be an occupier, and because the conditions in the West Bank — the visible inequality, the double society, the apartheid — are so evident and so grotesque. She did not want to assert her own superiority before the law by going into the Palestinian territory in which, due to her Jewishness, she has more rights than the people who live there. So she stayed still. The hours heaved from one to the other, and towards evening she got word that former Prime Minister Shimon Peres’ assistant had been briefed about the Palestinian girl’s situation and that he had sent an ambulance to take the girl for treatment to the closest hospital. Dafna closed her computer for the evening, and the first message of the next morning alerted her to the fact that when the ambulance arrived the girl was dead.

    The shock exploded the sensible rationalization which had kept Banai from crossing the Green Line. A week later a friend of hers, named Yakov Manor, called to tell her that somebody in the same village in which the girl had died needed medications and that he, Manor, had acquired them and needed a partner to make the delivery. (Protective Presence volunteers always go in groups of at least two, for protection and for witness.) Banai agreed to accompany Manor on what would become the first of many such excursions into the West Bank. The pair waited at the edge of the village for the residents to come and pick up the medications, and while they waited a settler in a pick-up truck spotted them. He drove up next to them and asked, “Are you okay? Do you need help?” The pair told him they were fine and that they needed nothing, so he asked what they were doing there. They explained and he promptly opened the door to his car, drove forward and then quickly backwards, so that the door slammed into Yaakov and knocked him over. Then the settler jumped out of the car, pulled out rifle, pointed it at Dafna and said “I’m going to kill you.” She passed out. When she came to, she heard the settler shooting at the Palestinians who had by then arrived to retrieve the promised medicines. Nobody was hurt, and the settler got into his car and drove away. Years later Banai saw a photograph of him in the newspaper and read that he had been arrested for murder, but escaped abroad.

    That day changed Banai’s life. The first two years after Banai started her work she would talk about the debilitating conditions in the West Bank incessantly. Surely the knowledge would operate on others as it had operated on her! But it was still possible for her to live just a short ride away from an entirely different and cruel universe. Most Israelis live that way, that close. All this information is certainly available to them, but they do not want to know it, just as they want not to know that their country has waged a genocidal war on the people of Gaza for the past year and a half. And then there are the Israelis who insist upon knowing but cannot bear to stay, with the weight of that knowledge reasserting itself afresh each day. Living the way Banai and her colleagues do risks living in a state of protracted pain verging on hysteria. Such stress and strain are not sustainable: hysteria brings nobody closer to a solution. Indeed, these crimes were conceived by their perpetrators calmly, they were crafted by politicians with clear eyes, level heads, and complicated maps and budgets. Of course the radicals are useful to the bureaucrats, but the radicals do not write policies, they merely carry them out. Every single recounted action committed by an Israeli settler, soldier, or police officer in the West Bank was the implementation of a policy, the result of planning. The settlers, as so many activists and experts have repeated to me, are the arm and the face of the Israeli government in the West Bank, just as the military is in Gaza. 

    Since December 2024, following Trump’s victory the month before, a committee within the Israeli government called the “Higher Planning Council” has been convening weekly — as opposed to quarterly, as it had before — and at each meeting it approves the construction of anywhere between several hundred and over a thousand new housing units for Jewish neighborhoods in the West Bank. In the first three months of this year, Israel approved more housing units than it had in all of 2024. As of the end of April 2025, 15,190 units have been approved just this year. Thanks to Bezalel Smotrich, the Higher Planning Council no longer requires approval from the Minister of Defense in order to accelerate unit construction. Meanwhile, in the same period, at least ninety-five percent of all Palestinian building permit applications are rejected. Before 2016, an average of ten units were approved for Palestinians per year. But between 2016, after Trump’s first victory, and 2020, after Biden’s, Palestinians submitted 2,550 building applications, of which only twenty-four were approved.

    In this premeditated manner Israel has seized at least 786,000 dunams of land — fourteen percent of the West Bank’s total area — over the past three years. Since 2022, seventy percent of all land seized by settlers has been taken under the pretext of these grazing activities. Settlers have spoken publicly and explicitly about this strategy. As Ze’ev Hever, the executive director of the Israeli settlement organization Amana, put it in a settler newspaper in June of 2023: “Our primary goal is to maintain open land. Our key tool for achieving this is the agricultural farms, [he means the shepherding outposts] which span an area 2.5 times larger than the combined area of all settlements.” Between 1996 and 2023, a total of seven outposts or “agricultural farms” were established each year in areas B and C of the West Bank. (Land in the West Bank is divided into Area A, under the control of the Palestinian Authority; Area B, under the joint control of the Palestine Authority and the Israeli government; and Area C, which accounts for sixty percent of the West Bank and is under total Israeli control.) And in the three years in which seventy new “agricultural farm” outposts have been approved, sixty Palestinian shepherding communities have been dismantled.

    As Banai showed me on the ground, Israel has been busily paving new roads across the West Bank which Palestinians are prohibited from crossing. Hagit Ofran, a specialist from Peace Now’s Settlement Watch program — a woman who knows more about settlement expansion than virtually any person outside of the government — estimates that these roads now block Palestinians from thousands of acres of land. Hundreds of illegal roads have been paved over the past year — over 114 kilometers — in order to facilitate settlement expansion in areas B and C of the West bank. Until recently most of the shepherding outposts have been in Area C, but settlers are beginning to encroach on Area B as well. In 2024, at least fifty-nine were built, at least eight of which are in Area B — the area controlled by both Israel and Palestine.

    These roads run like veins over much of the terrain, and they are the most visible evidence of the fact that the settler terrorists in the videos which circulate online are not vigilantes whose crimes are merely tolerated by the Israeli government, but emissaries of the government sent to the region to do its inhuman work. Ofran has reported that, since the war in Gaza, for which most of the reservists in the country have been called for service, every single settlement now has reserve soldiers who operate as an armed militia. These are the soldiers in the videos who accompany the settler shepherds on their attacks.

    On the drive back from Ras El-Ein to Tel Aviv, Banai’s daughter phoned. They chatted on speakerphone about family plans. When she hung up Dafna told me that her daughter is a psychiatrist and that she has been volunteering to work with survivors and families of victims of the Nova Festival, the site of the greatest atrocity among the Palestinian atrocities of October 7. Then she paused and said she had thought a lot about leaving Israel and moving to Berlin, so that her children and grandchildren would not have to grow up under a racist and violent government. (There has been a 287 percent surge in Israelis leaving the country since October 7 — nearly eighty-three thousand left in just the 2024 calendar year.) But she knew that wherever she went she would be thinking about this land, and the farther away she was the less good she could do. 

    Dafna Banai’s sober strength thwarts the ugliness on all sides. It is comforting to pretend that only anti-Semites care about the welfare of Palestinians, and that only anti-Semites accuse Israel of apartheid, of occupation, of genocide, or whatever other words you think fittingly characterize all you have just read. Maybe that seems true in Manhattan, but Hussein Dawabsha does not live in New York, and neither does Smotrich, Ben Gvir, Netanyahu, or any of the other relevant actors and victims. Zionism demands that we fix our eyes on Zion, and learn to understand that the settler terrorist who proclaims his right to rape in the name of our God is a deadlier enemy than the non-violent keffiyeh-clad students on university campuses, no matter how despicable their prejudices may be. 

    The Israeli policy toward the Palestinians is a policy of political, cultural, and physical obliteration. Right now Gaza is rubble and the West Bank is pockmarked with settler terrorist outposts. But in ten years, if this Israeli regime succeeds, all of Gaza and the West Bank will look like Efrat, a suburban town over the Green Line in the West Bank which, forty years ago, was condemned as illegal by international bodies, but today is globally recognized as de facto part of Israel and cherished as a model by religious Zionists everywhere. That is what total obliteration looks like. It is invisible. Not even the rubble remains. The tanks in Gaza and the gun-gripping settlers will be replaced by bourgeois families with Acuras and swimming pools (complete with guns in the pool house, of course), unless the boring work of political victory is mastered by liberals in Jerusalem and Washington. The settlers are forming their committees. So should we.

    Kulturkampf on the Potomac

    There is perhaps no more reliable measure of the health of a political order than the degree of autonomy that culture enjoys within it. Culture, high and low, may be construed as the sum total of the feelings and the values of a society as they are expressed by means of beauty (or by their opposite, if that too is an aesthetic ambition) — the spiritual life of humanity as it submits to form. Breakthroughs in culture, including strictly formal breakthroughs, have been breakthroughs in human freedom. That is not because anything and everything needs to be said and shown, though a case can be made for such wanton laissez-créer, but because the decision by artists to exert their skills upon inner and outer materials that have not yet been the subject of such exertions multiplies the evidence of what human spirits can accomplish when they are unfettered and their powers of creation are left alone. Even people who cannot hear the structure of a Coltrane solo can hear the freedom in it (and learn from it that there is no contradiction between freedom and structure). 

    Culture generally advances by means of shock, which is its method of expansion and enlightenment. The shock eventually becomes platitudinous as the innovation is accepted and acknowledged to have been a gift, an enlargement of a horizon that was in need of enlarging. Our understanding of life has often been heightened by works that were once regarded as blasphemous. Consider the ravishing amorality about love in Così fan tutte, or the genitals of Christ that Michelangelo painted on the wall at the Vatican. If you could consider them, that is: not long after Michelangelo died a colleague of his, acting on the ferocious criticism that the master’s voluptuously neo-pagan figure aroused, painted them over with the image of a loincloth, for which he became known as “the breeches-maker”; and a direct line runs from this orthodox rectification to, say, the refusal of the Corcoran Gallery in Washington, D.C., to host the Robert Mapplethorpe show in 1989, a capitulation to pressure from a breeches-maker from South Carolina named Jesse Helms. 

    But danger is culture’s middle name. Freedom promises the giving and taking of offense. Umbrage should be welcomed as evidence of liberty. The only safety that a polity owes its members is physical safety. Too many people now mistake censure for prohibition; but when I criticize what you say, it has nothing to do with your right to say it. Go ahead, be wrong. You are free to err, as am I. And please say it all, so that I may know where we stand. And pardon my antagonism, but the unpleasantness of our exchange must be endured for the sake of mature self-governance. Civility is a fine practice, but not if it represents an early form of self-censorship, or an avowal that comity is our most cherished ideal. 

    The rules by which culture operates are its own and nothing else’s; or so they should be. Even when cultural expressions are difficult or obscure, they add to what we know and do not subtract, and the same is true of the most rudimentary three-chord love song that enhances the oldest emotion in the world. Who ever made out to Verklärte Nacht? And the intrinsic independence of the imagination — except from its own internal distortions and blockages, which are owed to its confinement in the early circumstances of a particular psyche — is the exhilarating equivalent of the intrinsic independence of the mind. Many thinkers, most trenchantly Moses Mendelssohn, have shown that, strictly speaking, belief cannot be compelled. You cannot force someone who does not agree with your opinion to agree with it; you can only force him to pretend that he agrees with it, and thereby produce not a convert but a hypocrite. In some circumstances this hypocrisy is a clandestine heroism. (The annals of the Spanish Inquisition, and of the crypto-Jews that it created, abundantly document this doubleness, which is a characteristic feature of life under tyranny.) External conformity is not internal conformity unless there is internal agreement, which cannot be imported from outside, when force stupidly attempts to do the work of persuasion. This is true even now, when the technological instruments of manipulation and demagoguery are staggeringly strong. 

    The problem, the crisis, the tragedy is that the impotence of power before the inner lives of other people is not generally welcomed by those with consolidated power. They do not grasp why culture cannot be directed or legislated or decreed. They are offended by whatever will not bow and bend. After all, the autocrat’s most precious verification that he has made it to the top is the constant sensation of the supremacy of his will. And so the history of authoritarianism is riddled with political campaigns against cultural liberty and cultural diversity. These campaigns, indeed, are one of the first signs that a dictatorial regime, or a would-be dictatorial regime, has arrived. 

    The essential multiplicity of cultural expression, which can serve as an engine of tolerance, stands as a formidable obstacle to the uniformity that autocratic (and theocratic) regimes desire. They harbor a top-down fantasy of perfect consensus. Their intellectuals’ screeds against “relativism” are at bottom complaints against the limits of political power in matters of belief, against the failure of absolutists to impose absolutism. Shouldn’t it be enough that they are in exclusive possession of the truth? If there is only a single truth and only a single authority, what is all that other noise? Silence it! Or better yet, bring it into line — synchronize it with power. 

    One of the most central, and most swiftly implemented, concepts of Nazi ideology was Gleichschaltung, which means synchronization, regimentation, integration, coordination — the unification of disparate elements in government and society under a single ideological description, so that all diversity and dissonance is banished and smoothed out into a seamless and coercive general will that reflects the ideals of the regime and nothing else. As soon as it had the power to do so, the Nazi regime applied the concept to the German civil service, which had to be synchronized racially, and to German culture, which had to be synchronized with the official standards — reactionary, anti-modern, Volkisch — for art. In Lingua Tertii Imperii, or The Language of the Third Reich, known as LTI, the dazzling analysis of the Nazi vocabulary that he composed in 1957, having lived the entirety of the war in Germany and documented it secretly in his diaries, the philologist Victor Klemperer noted that the word Gleichschaltung “is so horrendously representative of the basic attitude of Nazism that it is one of the few expressions accorded the honor of satirization” both by clergymen and cabaret performers. He recalled a tour guide in a forest telling his group “that they had now been gleichgeschaltet with nature, a remark which earned him a round of applause.” Klemperer was especially struck by the dehumanizing effect of the term, by “its tendency to mechanize and automate” individuals with its strident insistence upon the dissolution of distinctness. 

    The coordination of culture with power did not begin or end with the Kulturkammern of the Reich. And with this allusion to the Third Reich I do not mean to wade into the swamp of analogies, the touchy terminological debate about what sort of authoritarianism has dawned in America. There are more urgent things to discuss. Trump is certainly not Hitler, but then Hitler was very distinguished in his field. It is odious enough that Trump is Trump. Yet it does not seem inaccurate to say that we are witnessing the emergence of what Karl Dietrich Bracher called “the total leadership state,” as we come to be ruled by the leader’s executive orders, his doctrinaire but also arbitrary edicts. And there is no denying that one of the earliest abuses of Trump’s power in his second term was his immediate and thoroughgoing program of cultural synchronization — at the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, at the National Endowment for the Arts, at the National Endowment for the Humanities, at the Smithsonian Institution, at the Institute of Museum and Library Services, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (including the Kennan Institute), at the Library of Congress, at the libraries of the military academies (in Annapolis Mein Kampf is in and Maya Angelou is out), at libraries across America, at National Public Radio and the Public Broadcasting Service, at government websites that provide a “woke” account of American history (read: a recognition, and even a celebration, of the incontestable fact that America is not all white, as established, say, on the Pentagon website, with its putatively “woke” documentation of Jackie Robinson and the Tuskegee airmen), at Arlington National Cemetery (graveyards are important repositories of culture), at the Voice of America and other information agencies, and of course at the universities, where a war against higher education has been peddled as a war against anti-Semitism. (Imagine, defending Jews by denouncing intellectuality! Thanks.)

    Trump — or more precisely Trump’s Sharpie, his little black scepter — has nullified debate in American governance. There are screaming matches in the halls of the West Wing, but there are no sophisticated discussion of policy options beyond a collective nodding of docile heads at every statement of the president’s preferences, and the only thing that stands a chance of reversing a policy is a change in the president’s poll numbers or in his mood. Otherwise it is all a heavy shower of diktats: the potentate scribbles his strange EKG-like (or better, lie-detector-like) signature and then displays the document as if it were written on ancient parchment, and then the sycophants around him scurry to execute, and that is the entirety of the executive branch of the American government. The legislative branch, which is half supine and half impotent, is a disgraceful sideshow. The entire plot of American government is now the president versus the judges, and all the other discourse does not matter.

    Trump’s cultural encyclicals attempt to bring cultural institutions into line not only with his exclusionary opinions but also with his philistine tastes. Yet the violation does not lie in the president’s philistinism. It lies in his authoritarian assumption that his own tastes should have any pertinence whatsoever to the nation’s culture. Who gives a damn what he likes? But powerful people (and rich people) like to believe that their tastes should rule. Dictators and other creatures of power have always been literary and theater and film and music critics, sometimes with disastrous consequences. They care deeply about entertainments and their social effects, and are acutely mindful of the power of images and words to ridicule and to subvert. It is one of the most counterintuitive but reliable facts of political psychology that the people with the most power are the people with the thinnest skin. Authoritarians are often afraid, and unlike the rest of us they can banish their fear by banishing its causes. Iconic figures fuss about icons (and some of them have had religious or secular institutions to do this for them posthumously). Frightened kings are dangerous but they are also funny. There is something delicious for the rest of us, who enjoy no extraordinary protections against life’s perils, that the conceit of invulnerability heightens every intimation of vulnerability. One almost feels sorry for them, the big shots behind so many layers of safety, who cannot abide even the slightest disturbance. Still, the rule must be: the more power, the less pity.

    Nothing ruins an autocrat’s day so much as the discovery of a limit to his power. He prefers, and even expects, to wake up omnipotent. And so, as the fantasy of presidential omnipotence (“the unitary executive” is the chin-stroking euphemism) invades the realm of American culture, it is important to proclaim throughout the land that political authority confers no cultural authority, just as it confers no religious authority. There is no president of culture. The domain of politics is a secular domain, a material domain, an immanent domain, a domain for the common defense and the general welfare and nothing more — a site for citizens and not for souls. Introduce the soul and you introduce trouble. Politics, and more specifically political office, is incapable of providing answers about the meaning of human life. When it seeks to do so, when it practices what was briefly known thirty years ago as “the politics of meaning,” when it intrudes upon the purposes of art and philosophy and religion, upon the purposes of culture, a great warping occurs. 

    Our political leaders are not our pastors or our teachers, except in the unlikely event that they show signs of genuine wisdom, and even in those rare Lincolnian circumstances their influence beyond politics is owed to qualities of their person and not to qualities of their office. Their personal ideals of life deserve to command no fealty, though they may inspire assent. When an attempt is made to impose them upon us, officially, de haut en bas, we owe them, or their purveyor, a sustained effort at refusal. This disjunction is more established in the case of religion, where the president’s personal savior may be just a kindly ancient carpenter to me, but it holds also in matters of culture. A program of cultural synchronization reflects a deep contempt for culture, a denial of its irreducible significance (which is itself a highly contested proposition now, as the reactionaries reduce it to metaphysics and the progressives reduce it to economics), a false assertion of commensurability, and sometimes an early warning of oppression. 

    A Washington tale. In 1985, Ronald Reagan gave a state dinner for Rajiv Gandhi. The entertainment was a recital by Mstislav Rostropovich, the renowned Russian dissident cellist who was beloved in the capital. Reagan was a consummate vulgarian, and it came as no surprise that he fell asleep during the master’s concert. There is a droll photograph of the president in the front row dreaming in black tie. The important point, however, is that he invited music that bored him — that he did not mistake his own taste for the best taste, or for an appropriate cultural response to an august occasion. He recognized a good above himself and wished to represent his country with it. (I recall my perplexity a decade or so later, when I learned that the entertainment at a state dinner at the Clinton White House would be Whitney Houston — was she really the best we could show the world? — but the dinner was for Nelson Mandela on his first visit to America as a free man and the president of his country, and so anything about that event could be joyously forgiven.) 

    A love of the low does not warrant a demotion of the high. Must popular culture devour everything? Is it too absent from contemporary life? A decade ago I committed an act of generational treason — I knew only one or two people guilty of the same betrayal — when I was revolted by the award of the Nobel Prize in Literature to Bob Dylan. That, too? He has written imperishable songs, and even a few art songs, but literature is literature, and literature of the more exquisite and more exigent kind is inadequately honored. There must be a place in posterity reserved for the likes of J. M. G. Le Clezio, the 2008 laureate in literature, whoever he is. I rather like the fact that I never heard of him.

    Popular culture, long may it flourish, has become an imperialist enterprise. Trump has his own cultural roots: he is the product not of business or politics, but of professional wrestling, beauty pageants, reality television, and metropolitan Roy Cohn-like mob worship. Yet the problem for American culture is not that he is a vulgarian. The president would have no right to impose Schoenberg on the nation, either. His aesthetic judgements must be completely irrelevant. (As are mine, which is one of the reasons that I rise to defend the inclusion of Maya Angelou in libraries. From the perspective of cultural freedom, she is no better or worse than Wallace Stevens.) One of the most essential characteristics of culture is its dispersal: it travels as far and as wide as the technologies of communication will allow. It is everywhere and it has many capitals. There are no central authorities, at least none that can be justified on cultural grounds or as boons for culture. 

    “The democratization of culture” is an old slogan about the praiseworthiness of open societies, but it invites some intellectual pressure. It must not denote a process of levelling in the name of equality, so that “elite culture” comes to be scorned and we wind up in the Caesarist predicament in which we find ourselves now. Equality is a political notion, not a cultural one. The democratization of culture is achieved not by its popularity but by its ubiquity — by the ever-increasing availability of more levels of culture to more strata of people. This dream of universal accessibility, hindered perhaps by the market but never by the state, is in its way a system of merit, as it exposes as many expressions as possible to as many people as possible, so that all of the latter can judge all of the former for themselves. This is how the late Mario Vargas Llosa put it in 2002:

    It is necessary to democratize culture, but that also has its risks, if that means that we make ideas banal in order to make them accessible to everyone. That is not democratizing culture but rather corrupting it and replacing it with a caricature. The democratization of culture can only be understood as the creation of conditions that facilitate and promote access to culture for those who are prepared to make the necessary intellectual effort to enjoy and enhance their lives through culture. And democratization should ensure that everyone should have this opportunity.

    Opportunity, or oxygen. Culture is a challenge, not a compliment. Moreover, the mental effort of which Vargas Llosa speaks may not be rewarded with edification or affirmation; culture makes no promises, except for the promise of non-trivial expanses of time. So many of our confusions are owed to a spurning of intellectual work — to spiritual sloth. Is it “elitist” to prefer artists who set themselves more difficult goals and proceed to meet them — to prefer Shostakovich to Prokofiev, or Sinatra to Manilow, or Hopper to Wyeth? And is it “populist” to deny the significance of actual differences in talents, so that they matter less in the evaluation of art than provenances? In Trump’s Washington, the answer to the latter question is yes. We are presently governed by the untalented and the incurious and the ineducable, who tastes have been hallowed in their own eyes by their throbbing sense of their own marginality. (It is the oldest comedy in town: the marginalized of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.) 

    I know, I know: the prevailing taste among the liberal mandarins of culture also do not reflect only the finest aesthetic ambitions, as the travesties of the art market regularly demonstrate. They have their pets, too. When I read the New York Times, I begin to wonder whether there is a mediocre black artist in all of America. But the liberal cultural institutions are not remotely as exclusionary as Trump asserts, or as he plans to make them become. Trump’s refusal to respect the limits of the realms, and so many of the glories within them, is of a piece with his inability, a sociopathic deformation, to recognize any boundary or standard outside himself to which he must answer. He liked Cats, so let them eat Cats. (His vice president is on record that in Ohio they do.) As if any political liberal or cultural highbrow ever set out to deprive the republic of Cats.

    We are all a little tacky in our tastes; pity the person without guilty pleasures in the arts. There is something cold and hard about the Adorno-driven literature on “mass culture,” about the “culture industry” industry: mass culture is, in actuality, what delights many millions of people, who take away stimulating and enchanting ideas about life from works that are not by Debussy. Vulgarity is often a close cousin of vitality; and the homogenizing pressures of the entertainment executives notwithstanding, not all its emotions are counterfeit. For this reason, it has a strong claim on the sympathy of humanists. I melt at the sound of the Five Satins and Little Anthony and the Imperials and Dion, and gladly drop whatever I’m doing at the sight of The Girl Can’t Help It and (shame on me) Pootie Tang; I remain weak for Rihanna, though a little grumpy about her low musical productivity; I find respite in Jason Statham’s affectless campaigns for justice; nearly any page of Dumas and Haggard and Sabatini and Cain and Elmore Leonard is good enough for me. Art Garfunkel’s Central Park rendition of “Bridge Over Troubled Water” is forever a tremendous experience, and there are moments in Andrea Bocelli’s Milan version of the theme from Gladiator that sound to me like the greatest song Puccini never wrote. And so on. 

    But I hasten to stipulate that my own pleasure is not the only pleasure there is. An open society is a society that always includes and even encourages bad taste. I mean, other taste. For years I have had to live with venerations of Norman Mailer and Katharine Hepburn and Jerry Seinfeld and Keith Jarrett and Beyoncé and Anselm Kiefer and Stephen Sondheim and Wes Anderson; I have suffered, but so be it. For wherever one parks one’s brow, everything will be found. The plenitude is the point. And snobbery at whatever level (Hank Williams? Are you kidding? Lefty Frizell!) (Tennstedt’s Mahler? Are you serious? Horenstein’s!) is an attempt by people with no respect for their own uncertainty, and no patience for the formation of their own tastes, to hide a perfectly understandable state of confusion behind the anxious enactment of a specious clarity. Cultural snobbery is social intimidation disguised as artistic discrimination. 

    If I can hear the symphony that I wish to hear, it does not bother me at all that in the theater next door people are swooning over Hamilton. Let a thousand tickets bloom. This is not to say, of course, that there are no distinctions of aesthetic quality between people’s pleasures. Tolerance should not have the last word on artistic standards: like equality, tolerance is a political concept, not a cultural one. Within and between all the levels of culture, there must be criteria of better and worse, and these criteria should be thoughtful and even philosophical, and of course may be contested. I admire the man who notices that the harmonies of the Righteous Brothers are lovelier than the harmonies of Crosby, Stills, and Nash, and that the formlessness of Ornette Coleman is more rigorous and more soulful than the formlessness of Albert Ayler, and that Grace Hartigan is a bore but Lee Krasner is not, and that (with the exception of Mahalia Jackson’s “Trouble of the World”) John Stahl’s early film of Imitation of Life is deeper than Douglas Sirk’s later one, and that Spohr’s chamber music is an utter delight but Schubert’s chamber music is — well, obviously. A denial of aesthetic distinctions should not be allowed to take shelter behind an argument for pluralism. Anyway, the president’s plan is to abolish any pretense of pluralism, within and between the cultural forms, on grounds that have nothing to do with artistic considerations. The scandal is not that Trump’s favorite acts may play the Kennedy Center: book them, and let the box office render its verdict. The scandal is that the targets of his biases (please give a thought to the Trocks!) may no longer play the Kennedy Center, which is a soft form of censorship.

    The titanic struggle between “populism” and “elitism” is disfiguring our culture as well as our politics. Trump’s lowest-common-denominator plan for the Kennedy Center, his proposed usurpation of the high by the low, is designed to strike a decisive blow against the takeover of the entirety of American culture by us over-educated pinheads and our coterie tastes. But the stereotype is ludicrous. A bit of empiricism is in order and I have done some research. I have made a brow-driven study of the Kennedy Center honors. Between 2010 and 2024, they were awarded to Merle Haggard, Jerry Herman, Paul McCartney, Oprah Winfrey, Barbara Cook, Neil Diamond, Sonny Rollins, Meryl Streep, Buddy Guy, Dustin Hoffman, David Letterman, Led Zeppelin, Herbie Hancock, Billy Joel, Shirley MacLaine, Carlos Santana, Al Green, Tom Hanks, Sting, Lily Tomlin, Carole King, George Lucas, Rita Moreno, Cicely Tyson, the Eagles, Al Pacino, Mavis Staples, James Taylor, Gloria Estefan, LL Cool J, Norman Lear, Lionel Richie, Cher, Reba McEntire, Wayne Shorter, Hamilton, Earth, Wind, and Fire, Sally Field, Linda Ronstadt, Sesame Street, Dick Van Dyke, Garth Brooks, Joan Baez, Debbie Allen, Joni Mitchell, Bette Midler, Lorne Michaels, Berry Gordy, George Clooney, Amy Grant, Gladys Knight, U2, Billy Crystal, Barry Gibb, Queen Latifah, Dionne Warwick, Francis Ford Coppola, the Grateful Dead, Bonnie Raitt, Arturo Sandoval, and the Apollo Theater. Alongside these artists, the award was presented to Bill T. Jones, Yo Yo Ma, Natalia Makarova, Martina Arroyo, Patricia McBride, Seiji Ozawa, Martha Argerich, Carmen de Lavallade, Phillip Glass, Michael Tilson Thomas, Midori, Justino Diaz, Tania Leon, and Renee Fleming. 

    An arduous process of quantification — I mean counting — yields this: sixty-one “popular” artists, fourteen “classical” artists. Admittedly the rubrics are imprecise and the hierarchies are vexing. Where do Sonny Rollins and Wayne Shorter belong, aesthetically speaking? Surely not with Gloria Estefan and Lionel Richie. (Jazz is always the art that defies the categories.) Millions of people who admire Yo Yo Ma have never heard his versions of Bach’s solo suites for cello. Film is indubitably a popular art, but the man who made the Godfather movies is not exactly a pulp artist. And there are no artistic categories in which Oprah Winfrey may be said to have distinguished herself, though she has raised celebrity worship into an art. To be sure, there is no denying that the names of Lee Greenwood and Kid Rock are missing from this roster of immortals, but that is an elitist oversight that will soon be corrected. 

    The conclusion is clear: by 61–14, the lowbrows have it. A wipeout. The president’s view of the Kennedy Center — and I have not discussed the institution’s regular programming — is preposterously incorrect. Demotic tastes — including country music, the alleged soundtrack of MAGA authenticity — have been plentifully satisfied at the Kennedy Center. The institution is not expiring from a surfeit of Ligeti. Yet there is another way to interpret the information that I have just presented. Look again at the list. I have a hunch that in Trump’s coarse head, when he surveys the talent that appears on those stages, there are two other genres that appear alongside the genres of classical and country and rock and rap and jazz and so on, two genres that are more encompassing and less improvisatory: the genres of white music and black music, of white art and black art. Of course those are not genres at all. They are illiberal notions that disfigure both the right and the left. But the salience of such a classification in the mind of the president — comrades, are you still opposed to color-blindness? — is a horror not only for the culture but also for the country. (Lawrence Welk, thou shouldst be living at this hour!)

    Like everything Trump does, his cultural interventions are conceived as acts of restoration, as rescues in an emergency. He is going to make American culture, too, great again — and as in all the other realms, “again” means going backwards, like to coal and to oil. Now, nostalgia is always an important factor in the formation of taste. There is no cultural expression that makes one happy in quite the way that the cultural expressions of one’s youth make one happy. In my own case, I am swiftly brought to joy by the neolithic sound of the Easybeats and Tommy James and the Shondells (the long version of “Crimson and Clover” is a neglected masterpiece) and Mitch Ryder and the Detroit Wheels and the entire oeuvre (we used that term in Flatbush a lot) of the depraved Phil Spector, and by the Rise Stevens recording of Carmen and the Mario del Monaco recording of Otello. (My parents gave me those LPs in their big square boxes and I still recall the moments at Fortunoff’s on Livonia Avenue in Brownsville when they placed them in my quivering hands.) I feel a tingle every time I pass Monet’s Garden at Sainte-Adresse at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, not because it is one of his greatest pictures but because the museum acquired it when I was a boy and the papers made a big deal of it. I raced off to the subway to see it, and I remember thinking: there it is, and if they say so. The rule, then, is that the earlier I heard or saw something, the lovelier it must be. I was completely dead to the charms of Frank Sinatra’s recordings with Tommy Dorsey until I saw the lit-up look on the face of a friend who had grown up with them in Chicago in the early 1940s: the individual bliss of the individual past. There is no aesthetic aura like the aura of memory, though the latter cannot confer the former. So backwards is an inevitable and dependably magical direction in the appreciation of art. (There is also the backward gaze required by the stewardship of tradition, about which Trump cares nothing.) If only Fred Trump had adored Wozzeck!

    Like all reactionary attitudes toward culture, Trump’s Kulturkampf is premised on a static conception of it — or more accurately, on a desire to deny the conspicuously dynamic character of culture and return it to an infinite repetition of the entertainments that existed in the era before the changes of which Trump disapproves. Those egregious changes were social and political as well as cultural, which is why Trump’s priorities in culture may be plausibly interpreted also as an expression of his larger hostility to the civil rights revolution. This sanctified stasis — as if culture was not evolving also in the good old days! — is a source of blindness to the achievements of the present, which would be too obvious to state except that I know cultivated people who have not been to the New York City Ballet since Balanchine died because it will never be that good again, full stop. And strictly speaking, it likely won’t. I was once one of those people, until some years ago I beheld splendid performances by the company, even though Suzanne and Peter were not on stage, and I felt like a fool for my self-impoverishing decades of dogmatism; and even when the dancers danced poorly I could tell the dancer from the dance. (How else could I feel confident in criticizing them? Yeats was wrong about this.)

    Evanescence is an inalienable attribute of the performing arts, even where there are scores and recordings and films. In culture there is no full stop. One must live in one’s time. The aesthetic life is supremely a life lived in the present, because it is comprised of experiences. And there never was a moment or an era in the history of culture, not in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Florence or in early twentieth-century Vienna, that consisted entirely, or even chiefly, of brilliance; the picture has always been mottled and mixed, and incandescence has always co-existed with junk. 

    Trump’s politicization of culture will provoke a response in kind. The left certainly has a long and glittering history of political art. And the spirit of protest has certainly produced masterpieces in all the arts, except that masterpieces are not the point of protest art. Such works are made not to delight, but to persuade; to induce not wonder, but rage. Protest art is contrived to drive the spectator into the street, so as to join other like-minded spectators, whereas the objective of non-political art is not a joining but an individuating. It is contrived to make one shun the public for the private, the sphere of action for the sphere of contemplation. In political art, aesthetic quality matters less than rhetorical efficacy. It is almost pointless to lodge a formal complaint against a work of political art, since it is not primarily consecrated to form. Indeed, beauty in a work of political art is mainly a diversion, a cunning stratagem for glamorizing a doctrine or sneaking it into the spectator’s standpoint under other pretenses. (This was certainly true of the services that the arts performed for the church, and consider also the artistic reputations of Eisenstein and Riefenstahl and Oliver Stone.) And it is never the case that your posters are propaganda but my posters are art. All political art is propaganda, regardless of one’s political sympathies.

    “They won the war, but we had the best songs,” was Phil Ochs’ verdict about the 1960s. He was a wickedly funny and wrenchingly lyrical and ideologically radical man whose work deserves to be liberated from the Dylan hegemony, and unlike many of the protest singers of his time he was also genuinely political. (For many years I welcomed interns to The New Republic by making them listen to “Love Me, I’m a Liberal,” and never mind that it slandered the house creed.) There is no reason not to deploy art in the service of justice, however one defines justice. Happy is the man who has known the exhilaration of singing along in a cause. And of laughing along with others in the ridicule of the powerful, even when the details do not add up. (Who remembers MacBird!, with Stacy Keach as Lyndon Johnson?) Especially given the complete degradation of oratory in our times, principles may be more stirringly represented in melody and imagery — in culture. 

    Beware, however, of mistaking a refrain for an analysis. A stirringly represented principle is not yet a policy. Political art, even when you concur with its politics, is the enemy of nuance, but governance is almost all nuance, at least when it is scrupulously practiced. And the satisfactions of protest, which are considerable, can easily issue in complacence, in an illusion of effectiveness, in intellectual laziness. (Macbird! was funny, and the war in Vietnam was a nightmare, but Lyndon Johnson was not an entirely despicable figure. His signature is on the civil rights legislation.) If ever there was an object of protest who deserved to be depicted grossly, it is Trump: measure for measure, no? But the temptation must be resisted — or indulged and then resisted — lest cultural mockeries be confused for political strategies. Our way out of this vale of meanness lies in votes, not in epithets; in politics, not in culture. What is required of us now is an almost unimaginable sobriety.

    All art is political: is there anybody in America who does not think so? If so, as Ochs used to sing, I wanna see him, I wanna wish him luck, I wanna shake his hand. The irony about the idea that politicized art of one kind must be met with politicized art of another kind is that it misses an even more decisive artistic statement against political power: that art essentially escapes the grip of power, on its own, of itself, owing to its nature, by the force of its intrinsic independence, its ontological autonomy, which is not retracted by the banal facts of its social origins and which thwarts the designs — the synchronizations — of politics. Those who make the case for the political character of art believe that they are elevating it to a plane of necessity that it otherwise lacks, but this is just another sorry instance of the damage that the slavery to history, the politicization of life, does to life. On the day when peace comes and justice with it, art will be exactly as necessary as it always has been, because the material conditions of existence are only some of what we must confront as the souls-in-bodies that we are. Art of the non-political variety, non-politicized culture, is precisely what establishes the terrain on which we may gather the inner resources for sustaining a struggle against the crimes of power. 

    Artists may sometimes need to be liberated, but art never: it begins and ends free. It is beyond the reach of the despots. In our time this was the supreme teaching of the Russian poets under Stalinism. They were unfree people writing as free people; their persecutors, if they did not murder them, or until they murdered them, were no match for them. (And even then . . .) If it is appropriate to reach for the metaphor of martyrdom with which to describe them, then they were martyred for the invincibility of art. Please forgive my fustian: for a characterization of these masters it is the sheerest socialist realism. The most definitive articulation of this unshakeable internal grandeur — a subtle analysis of it and a ringing example of it — may be Andrei Sinyavsky’s essay “The Literary Process in Russia,” which appeared in 1974 in the first issue of Kontinent, an émigré dissident journal that was later translated into English and other languages. Every writer ought to read it.

    I first met Joseph Brodsky in the late summer of 1979 at a symposium at New York University, and by the end of the symposium I loved him. The theme of the discussion was politics and art. I did not yet know that he had an impish streak and enjoyed a passing intellectual perversity, and on that afternoon he, the hero who did hard labor in a Soviet prison camp and was immiserated in a Soviet psychiatric hospital and issued that immortal retort in that courtroom in Leningrad and was forced by policemen onto an airplane into exile — he chose to make a somewhat unexpected argument against the art of protest. I will never forget it. The problem with protest art, he said, was that it was still in thrall to the state. In the thralldom was the servitude. A negative relationship had replaced a positive relationship, but a relationship persisted; and as long as it persisted, in one way or another, the state won. 

    A protester, notwithstanding the morality of his cause, remains trapped within a fate that the state has dictated. For this reason, Joseph declared, the only true protest poem is a love poem. He could imagine nothing more powerful than its sovereign indifference to power. And he recited a short love poem in Russian, which I did not understand. Joseph was not opposed to protests, of course, or to cultural protests, and years later he wrote a bitter protest poem for my pages against American indifference to the atrocities in Bosnia; instead he was insisting severely upon the boundary of politics, and upon the spiritual freedom that precedes political freedom and therefore readies us to confront the abuse of political power. There was nothing unworldly or precious about Joseph’s happy fanaticism about the sanctity of art: we once raised a glass to one of Reagan’s large defense budgets. 

    But now we must also defend the right to protest and the political role of the streets, whatever the cause. There can be no inconsistency here: either we all can march or none of us can. And the delegitimation of protest — particularly student protest, which is as American as avocado toast — is one of the central aims of Trump’s war on higher education. Every admonition against the politicization of culture must therefore be accompanied by a reminder of the nobility of politics, of the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government, or any other oppressive and unresponsive body, for a redress of grievances. The climate of freedom that can be established only by politics affects even the most solitary and apolitical artist. The only politics that protects the apolitical is democratic politics.

    O, for the days when all that impeded the unconstrained experimentations of culture were corporations!

    The Canary, the Historian, and the Ukrainian War

    I have a friend who takes other people’s suffering as her own, and almost physically. When she visited Babyn Yar — the place where Kyiv’s Jews, thirty-three thousand men, women, and children, were shot in the fall of 1941 — she described being torn by excruciating pain. Her experience reminds me of Simone Weil, who died in London in 1943, a year after she left Nazi-occupied France, refusing to eat because of her compassion for prisoners of the Nazi camps. Like Weil, my colleague has mystical experiences. Her health is frail, and she has experienced clinical death. From that time on she has claimed she could see the future. I am a rational person, and normally the last to believe such claims, but there was one episode in August 2021, when we were drinking coffee on a summer terrace in our native city of Lviv, in western Ukraine, when she told me that this was “the last peaceful summer.” She predicted the date when Russia would launch its invasion, erring only by a day. After the war started, she moved to Krakow. I have since met her there, and she told me when and how this war would end. I keep her words to myself, because I do not wish to expose her to derision. I can only say that with the development of events at the front, and after Trump’s victory, her forecast looks very plausible.

    My friend is a poet. In our part of the world, poets are believed to have a gift for prophecy. The greatest of them are even called national prophets. This is in contrast to us, the historians: we can barely deal with the past, so what could we possibly say about the future? Still, historians do have one advantage. They can look at daily events from a historical perspective and reveal long-term tendencies of the past that may be working both for the present and the future. In the 1960s, a group of historians and political scientists at the University of Michigan started a project entitled Correlates of War, or COW. Since then, they have compiled a rich dataset on military conflicts of the past two hundred years. The most significant finding of the project is a general constancy in warfare. There have only been twelve years during this period when a new war did not start — but there has never been a year with no war ongoing. These findings pose a challenge to the literature of “democratic peace,” and its projections of a declining trend in warfare.

    Ironically, one of the most bellicose periods was the end of the Cold War, at precisely the time when Francis Fukuyama published his infamous essay on the end of history. Its last paragraph reads:

    The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.

    Would he have retracted his article if he had been familiar with the statistics of the COW project? In any case, for historians a “return of history” is not a surprise. History neither ended nor returned. It has been always with us, as have its darker themes of mass violence, wars, and genocides. The Russo-Ukrainian war is another proof of this historical tendency.

    This war can be compared with many military conflicts of the past. As a war between a smaller democratic state and a large authoritarian neighbor, it can be compared to the Greco-Persian wars, in which a smaller and more free-spirited tribe of Greeks gained an empire. If we remove democracy from the comparison, then this war is similar to the Finnish-Soviet war of 1939–1940. If we add a colonial dimension, then it looks like the French-Algerian war, or any other war of decolonization.

    When Putin started his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he was counting on a victorious Blitzkrieg — just as Hitler had expected of his Blitzkrieg against Poland in 1939, against France in 1940, and against the Soviet Union in 1941. The facts show that those who start a war tend to lose it. The rate of victory for initiators of inter-state hostilities has been on a constant decline, and now comprises thirty-three percent. The reason for this is that decisions to go to war are often emotional rather then rational, with no real goals and no real appreciation of the war’s ultimate costs.

    After his Blitzkrieg plans for Ukraine failed, Putin resorted to a war of attrition. And here a comparison with the First World War — a classic case of this kind — comes to mind. In this type of war, the outcome depends not so much on what happens on the battlefield, but on who is able to bear the brunt of war longest. Such a war ends not in a military victory but in a collapse. The latter occurs, to borrow Hemingway’s famous remark about bankruptcy, gradually and then suddenly. Collapse can happen not only to one of the parties in the conflict but to all of them. World War I ended with the collapse of the Russian empire in 1917 and of the Austro-Hungarian and German empires in 1918. It may be said that the Russo-Ukrainian war is a competition between two countries for who will collapse first.

    Ultimately, in a war of attrition, the outcome depends on resources. If Ukraine is left on its own, its prospects — no matter how bravely the Ukrainians fight — look bleak, even doomed: Russia has a three-to-four times advantage economically and demographically. But if Ukraine has access to the West’s resources, then Russia’s chances are slim. Russia’s GDP is slightly larger than that of Italy, and comprises only about ten percent of that of the European Union and nine percent of that of the United States. It is not surprising that both countries are looking for allies. Ukraine counts on the West; Russia counts on China, Iran, India, and most recently North Korea. This is not a world war, but a war that is distinctly global.

    Comparisons can also be treacherous. In the summer of 2024, the Center for Applied History at Harvard’s Kennedy School prepared an analytical report on the possible outcomes of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The experts looked for the best possible solutions that could satisfy the national interests of all the belligerents and their primary patron states, i.e. Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and China. Their choice fell on the outcome of the Finnish-Soviet war. Although Finland lost a part of its territory and remained neutral during the Cold War, in the long run it aligned strongly with the West, joining the European Union in 1995 and NATO in 2023. Such a scenario offers a hope for Ukraine’s long-term democracy and self-determination under a similar outcome.

    The authors of the Harvard report, however, ignored an important detail. I refer to Putin’s attitude toward Ukraine. It has the character of an obsession. More than once, he and his spin doctors have stated that Ukraine is a nation artificially created by the West in order to undermine Russia. For this reason, comparisons with the Soviet-Finnish war, or the two similar cases of the Korean War and the division of Germany after World War II, do not quite work. Even Stalin, in his wars with Finland, Germany, and Korea, did not aim to destroy their national identity. Not so with Putin. In this sense, he can be compared with Cato the Elder, who ended his every speech with the words “Carthage must be destroyed.” Or with the current Muslim leaders who set themselves the obsessive goal of destroying Israel.

    In some ways this is an uprecedented war, and the longer it goes on, the less history has anything to say about it. Pavlo Kazarin, a Ukrainian journalist who volunteered for the war in its first days, wrote that he could not watch Hollywood war movies anymore: they did not reflect the realities of war as he experienced them.

    The protagonists of Apocalypse Now were not attacked by guided bombs. The de-miner from The Hurt Locker doesn’t know what tank combat looks like. John Rambo’s position was never hit by a 152-caliber shell. . . . We are the only ones who have ever shot down hypersonic missiles. The only ones who have destroyed long-range radar detection aircraft. No such experience exists in any army in the world — including the US Army.

    Before Russia’s full-scale aggression of 2022, there were futuristic speculations that wars would come to resemble scenes from the Terminator movies. Warfare, it was said, would undergo a transition from industrial war, with the clash of tanks, to war of the information age, when military equipment is controlled by computers via the Internet, with minimal involvement of manpower. The first phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war was nothing of the kind. It looked exactly like conventional modern warfare, with extended front lines, infantry, tanks, and planes. But soon drones brought a change. They now control large strips of territory on both sides of the front line, making close combat virtually impossible and snipers largely redundant. Drones helped Ukrainians to neutralize the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and to compensate for manpower shortages on the ground. The end of last year saw another breakthrough: in a location north of Kharkiv, Ukrainians conducted a ground attack using exclusively unmanned ground vehicles and drones for the first time.

    The war may move to other zones that were previously unaffected. The First and Second World Wars brought warfare underwater and into the sky. Now the sky is no longer the limit. The British philosopher A. C. Grayling warns that as the new space race intensifies, conflict over resources on the moon is all but inevitable. The moon, the New Frontier, may become a new Wild West. And I have not mentioned AI, which is being frantically integrated into the militaries of many countries. It was used in the war in Gaza.

    As the Russo-Ukrainian war drags on and acquires unprecedented features, it seems that history has less and less to say about it. Yet it is important to point out that many things are not new. We used to talk of the Soviet Union as the last empire and believed that with its demise the age of empires was finally over. Now the Russian Empire is attempting to return and reclaim its status as a superpower. The same can also be said about China, its ally. So we may indeed be facing a new age of empires. We also believed that “the short twentieth century,” 1914 to 1989, the era of war and revolution, is over. Ukraine may undermine this conclusion, too. Since the country’s independence in 1991, it has experienced two revolutions and two wars. You might say that Ukraine is stuck in the twentieth century.

    Moreover, the Ukrainian case may not be so exceptional. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has experienced two great revolutionary waves — the “Color Revolutions” of the 2000s and the short-lived Arab Spring in the next decade — as well as the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Gaza. From this perspective, the period between 1991 and 2001 looks like a short respite between two major periods of wars and revolutions, just as the period between 1919 and 1939 was a respite between two major wars. The twentieth century is proving to not be all that short. In significant ways we are still living in it.

    Two paradoxes characterize the current situation on the Russo-Ukrainian front lines. First, since the fall of 2023, the Russian army has overcome a positional stalemate and made a steady advance — but despite tremendous efforts and tremendous losses, it has made no strategic breakthrough. After three years of fighting, the front line is largely where it was at the beginning of the war, and no large Ukrainian city has been captured. Second, the war has entered a stage in which soldiers are becoming harder to send into a battle. An overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian population (88 percent in November 2024) believes in Ukrainian victory — but many if not most of them are not willing to go to the front. The same may be said about the Russians: they support Putin, but they want this war to stop.

    For historians, these paradoxes are not really surprising. They may easily recognize a familiar pattern from the First World War, when after three years of fighting the initial patriotism faded away and military advances had little effect. During the next two years, the front line collapsed, as did the whole European geopolitical order. The latter had been established in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna after the defeat of Napoleon. With all its imperfections, the Viennese system set a historical record. For almost a hundred years, the European continent did not have a major war, and the nineteenth century went into the annals of European history as the longest peaceful century.

    With the end of the Second World War, an opportunity arose to beat this record. Putin, with his aggression against Ukraine, destroyed it. In this war, another geopolitical order is at stake. That order emerged in postwar Europe. In the past, Europe was an exceedingly warlike continent: the two world wars originated there, and it was the Europeans who brought about major advances in military technology. Nowadays, it is hard even to imagine a war between England and France, France and Germany, or Germany and Poland — even though in the past these countries fought each other ferociously. After the Second World War, military conflicts were replaced with the politics of reconciliation. These improvements began with the Franco-German reconciliation of the 1950s and ultimately led to the creation of the European Union, which was defined as a “no war zone.” That was an unprecedented achievement. There had been nothing like it in the past.

    Since the fall of Communism, there was a chance that this “no war zone” could be extended further east. Polish-Ukrainian relations were a test case. In the past, Poles and Ukrainians fought frequently, and in the twentieth century their conflicts over the disputed Polish-Ukrainian borderlands took the form of mutual ethnic cleansings. There were fears that, with the collapse of communism, the Polish-Ukrainian war would resume with a renewed force. In 1969, the Polish poet Czesław Miłosz wrote to Jerzy Giedroyc, the editor of the Paris-based Polish émigré journal Kultura:

    For several years now and especially recently, I have been obsessed with the thought of a coming catastrophe . . . Politically we are facing the growth of nationalisms of the Nazi type. It takes place in Russia, it also takes place in Ukraine and other republics, and it is the same in Poland . . . If that outburst occurs, it will be completely blind, with people slaughtering each other, and the problems of Lviv, the Treaty of Riga etc. will be revived, and this time we are prepared to ultimately perish under the heaviness of that cataclysm.

    Fortunately, this did not come to pass. A solution to the conflict was proposed by Giedroyc. In the early 1950s he suggested that, for the good of Poland, Poles should agree that Lviv is a Ukrainian city. This proposal was so radical that a majority of Poles refused to accept it — for them, it was tantamount to treason. The situation changed when the anti-communist Solidarity came to power in Poland in 1989: Giedroyc’s doctrine served as the basis of its foreign policy. Since then, whoever comes to power in Warsaw or Kyiv — and regardless of any “ups and downs” in their relations — treat each other as allies.

    The “Giedroyc doctrine,” as well as the entire system of postwar European reconciliation, was built on the premise that while there are no just historical borders, the existing borders are best left alone, lest interference with them provoke a domino effect. History should be bigger than applied politics. Hence the “Never Again” slogan of the postwar European system. Nowadays, with the annexation of Crimea and other Ukrainian territories, this humane and pragmatic system is in jeopardy.

    In Putin’s mind, his war of attrition against Ukraine is just another episode in the millennial confrontation between Russia and the West. According to his worldview, the past dominates the present and there is no room for a future other than permanent war. After the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war, we witnessed how this precedent was used by Azerbaijan to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia; and Xi is brooding about Taiwan; and Trump is running his mouth about annexing or buying or conquering Canada, Greenland, Gaza, and Panama.

    Still, there is a basic difference between the language of Trump and the language of Putin. Trump talks about interests, however wildly, but Putin talks about values. On many occasions, Putin and his satraps have claimed that they stand for traditional values against a corrupted liberal West — that theirs is a holy war. In this rhetoric they sound similar to Muslim terrorists. No wonder they treat each other as allies.

    And so this war is not about Ukraine alone. Nor is it even about the global order. It is at its heart a war of values. This gives it a completely different dimension. It is easier to reach a truce when it comes to interests, but it is much harder to strike a compromise when it comes to values. For values, people are ready to go at each other’s throats.

    Values are like air: we cannot see them but they affect all our lives. This is one of the main findings of the World Values Survey, the largest academic social survey project, which has collected data from one hundred and twenty countries over the last hundred years. Societies with secular values that prize self-expression tend to be richer and democratic. Societies with traditional values and an overriding concern about survival tend to be poorer and autocratic. There are many differences between the two types, but the most distinctive difference concerns gender, particularly the status and rights of women.

    When we talk about values and living standards, it is impossible to determine what is the cause and what is the effect — they are forever locked in a “chicken-and-egg” relationship. What matters, however, is that the choices that societies make are to a large extent determined by their past. There are three major historical factors: traditional religious denomination — Protestant or Catholic, Christian or Islamic, and so forth; an imperial legacy; and the presence or absence of communism in the past. All factors combined, as Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have shown, Western countries have fared better.

    With the fall of communism, Russia and Ukraine started from a similar position. They were somewhere between the West and the Rest. In the 2000s, however, their historical trajectories began to diverge. Ukraine tilted to the West and democracy, while Russia sank into isolationism and authoritarianism. In both countries, there emerged a large and educated middle class that stood for political freedom against predatory and corrupted elites, but the outcomes diverged. In Russia, the opposition was either suppressed or forced to emigrate; in Ukraine it came to power in the two Maidan revolutions. The last one, the Euromaidan of 2013–2014, was called the Revolution of Values or the Revolution of Dignity. Those were not empty words. The Ukrainian revolutionaries were risking their well-being, their health, and even their lives for what they saw as the European values of dignity and liberty.

    As a former KGB officer, Putin does not believe in spontaneous mass protests. He managed to suppress them at home, but he failed in Ukraine, despite his persistent interference since 2004. To explain his failure, he came up with the myth that the two Ukrainian revolutions were the result of a Western conspiracy against him and Russia. Putin believes — or wants us to believe — that he is waging a war not with Ukraine, but with the West on Ukrainian territory, in the name of traditional family values against the permissive Western liberal order.

    The values-based character of the war was evident from its first weeks. Back then, groups of Russian mercenaries were reported to have been in Kyiv with a mission to assassinate Volodomyr Zelensky and to destabilize the government. There was a debate among military experts regarding how this plan would affect the war if it succeeded. The consensus was: not very much. Ukrainian army commanders and city mayors acted independently and were not looking to Kyiv for guidance. These were the values of individual autonomy and self-expression in action.

    The Russo-Ukrainian war may be considered a military conflict between a vertical establishment and a horizontally organized society. Among other things, this is reflected in the fact that Ukraine has demonstrated the cutting edge in military technology. Very often these innovations come from private IT companies and other non-state organizations. Owing to their ingenuity, Ukrainians have managed to hold back a stronger and more numerous enemy. It is not surprising that the Pentagon and NATO are watching the Ukrainian experience closely — they are attempting to learn how to conduct a new type of war from Ukranians.

    But the enemy learns, too. Russians, using their advantage in resources, adopt and scale up many Ukrainian innovations. It takes months for this to happen, given the usual slowness of the administrative vertical. And the time lag is important: during those months the Ukrainians invent something new, and the race continues.

    All these stories may arouse skepticism. If Ukrainians are so resourceful, then why do they retreat all the time? Historical studies may provide an answer here, too. They reveal that free societies tend to fight better, but their advantage diminishes as the war drags on. The greater the losses and the suffering, the more survival values come to the fore.

    Values not only distinguish one society from the other; the dividing line also runs within every society. And since the army is a snapshot of the society, this division affects military forces, too. It has been said that there are actually not one but two Ukrainian armies, with two contesting military cultures. One army is trained according to NATO standards and is made up of units that are allowed to fight the way they want to fight. They are able to figure out the best way to use their people and resources and they have the authority, the duty, to improvise according to circumstances. The other one is very similar to the Russian or the old Soviet army, where commanders lack flexibility, strictly follow commands from above and demand that their subordinates follow them as well, without particular regard for rationality or changing conditions or consequences.

    The first army is made up largely of volunteers, often the same people who stood on the Euromaidan. They were at the front from the very first days. Many of them have perished or been promoted to senior officers’ positions; some are burned out after three years on the battlefield and the latest escalations in fighting. In short, their role has decreased, and the second army, the rigid army, has come to the fore. In the end, the conflict looks like a large Soviet army fighting a small Soviet army — and the situation is often saved by an even smaller NATO-like army. This affects the general mood. As a recent survey on Ukrainian concerns about military service shows, initial enthusiasm is being tempered by the reality of a protracted war. Apart from the fear of death or disability, there is the fear of unprofessional commanders, the fear that military equipment would be inadequate or not arrive in a timely manner.

    New realities have forced Ukrainians to redefine their understanding of victory. At the beginning of the war, they regarded victory as a return to the 1991 borders. Now many see it as the preservation of Ukraine as an independent state with international guarantees for its security. This would not be a complete victory. Still, it would be a strategic gain against the backdrop of Putin’s plan to erase Ukraine from the political map altogether.

    To be sure, a large part of the responsibility for Ukrainian failures falls on the Ukrainian leadership, its inefficiency, its corruption, its chaos, and its populism, which does not allow unpopular but necessary decisions to be made. At the beginning of the war, the Ukrainian state enjoyed enormous social trust. Now there is a rift between state and society, and the rift is growing.

    Yet the West also carries its share of the blame for the Ukrainian situation. It does not want Ukraine to lose, but neither does it want Ukraine to win. It fears the repercussions of a Russian defeat, just as in 1991 it feared the collapse of the Soviet Union. Experts say that if the Ukrainians had sufficient weapons and support from the West, they could have won the war as early as 2022. The same goes for the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 and the fact that Ukrainians were slowly losing ground in 2024. The Russian army was able to go on the offensive because the package of military aid to Ukraine was blocked in the U.S. Congress for seven months — from October 2023 to April 2024. According to American officials, by the end of 2024 only about half of the total dollar amount that the United States had promised from American stockpiles had been delivered, and only about thirty percent of the promised armored vehicles had arrived.

    To better understand the importance of this factor, imagine what would happen to the young state of Israel if it were supplied with American aid at the same pace and level as Ukraine. One of the factors in the victory of the entente in the First World War and the Allies in the Second World War was American aid. This was recognized even by Stalin: he admitted that if the United States had not helped the Soviet Union, the latter would not have won its war against Hitler.

    They say that old generals fight wars in the old ways. President Biden was formed as a politician during the years of the Cold War. He believed in the containment strategy that had been central to keeping the peace for nearly seventy years. This strategy was carried over and applied to the current Russian “hot” war — so as not to turn it into World War Three and not to provoke a nuclear attack by Russia. His support of Ukraine was genuine but it lacked alacrity. Yet what worked during the Cold War does not necessarily work in the conditions of a hot war. The strategy of “helping Ukraine for as long as it takes” does not work, because for Ukraine, given its smaller resources, “as long as it takes” can be, certainly by impatient American standards, too long. It is true that Russia is exhausting its resources, and its economic prospects beyond 2025 look bleak. But it would be naive to think that the collapse of Russia is imminent, whereas Ukraine most certainly may collapse. As the Ukrainian proverb says, the dew will burn your eyes before the sun rises. The West, in sum, must move to more decisive action. Otherwise the Western leaders are themselves condemning Ukraine to protracted agony. The signs are not auspicious.

    It is not hard to imagine what would happen to Ukraine if Russia wins. Even before the Russian invasion, there was information about Russian “kill lists.” Their existence has been confirmed since the war started. The people on these lists included teachers of Ukrainian language, literature, and history; journalists, scientists, and writers; priests of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and other denominations that support Ukraine; and public and political figures, chiefs of regional authorities and self-government. What may appear to the West as an exaggerated fear is for Ukrainians a harsh wartime reality, reinforced by the memory of the Holodomor, the Stalinist repressions, Chernobyl, and, most recently, in 2022, the massacres in Bucha, Irpin, and Izium.

    At demonstrations abroad in support of Ukraine, Ukrainians have adapted Golda Meir’s words — “If the Arabs put down their weapons today, there would be no more violence. If the Jews put down their weapons today, there would be no more Israel.” — but they replaced “Arabs” with Russia and “Jews” and “Israel” with Ukraine. It is abundantly clear that many in the West do not care about the fate of the Ukrainians, just as before they did not care about the fate of the Syrians. But unlike the savagery in Syria and elsewhere, the war in Ukraine has a stronger impact on the West and its people.

    For Putin’s war will not end with Ukraine. The degree of his contempt, if not outright hatred, for the West should not be underestimated. Oleksandr Lytvynenko, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, predicted that “having failed to defeat Ukraine in three days in a large-scale war, the Kremlin has passed the point of no return in relations with the West,” and left for itself only the options to “triumphantly win or lose crushingly.” Putin’s has geostrategic plans for the next ten to fifteen years; their implementation is to be accompanied by conflicts of various scales and intensity, possibly with the use of nuclear weapons. (I take this analysis from “A Few Theses on Putin’s Policy: How The Kremlin Thinks and Wages The War,” Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, November 11, 2023.)

    Western intelligence confirms these assessments. The Kremlin could be in a position to attack a NATO member within the span of three to five years. The next most probable targets will be the Baltic States and Poland. This prognosis has been recently reiterated by the EU’s chief diplomat Kaja Kallas. She warned that “We are running out of time. The Ukrainians are fighting for their freedom and ours. They are buying us time.” And Valery Zaluzny, the former commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, went so far as to say that with North Korean forces fighting with the Russians on the front line and Iranian and Chinese weapons flying into Ukraine, a Third World War has already begun.

    To many skeptics in the West, the Ukrainians are crying wolf. But people who are under an existential threat must be believed over those who are not. People who are fighting for their lives generally do not lie. Ukrainians warned about Putin’s plans long before the war. He developed them back in 2008, right after the Georgian-Russian war. According to this plan, Ukraine was to be “punished” by a full-scale invasion if it continued to move out of Russia’s orbit. Most of the territory was to be either directly annexed by Russia or turned into a puppet state. The exception was the western part of the country, which historically is least Russified and Sovietized — it was to be divided between its “former owners,” Poland and Hungary. This plan leaked to the West and was published first in an Italian geopolitics journal, and then reprinted in one of the main Ukrainian newspapers. Putin spoke about this partition plan in 2008 during his meeting with then-Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and then- (and now-) Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. He offered them Lviv.

    Sikorski revealed this offer several years later, when he was out of office. His revelation created a scandal. In Poland, he was asked why he remained silent for so long, and in the West his words were taken as a provocation. Finally Sikorski had to disown his report. But it is worth noting that the British journalist and security writer Edward Lucas insisted that Sikorski was right and that the plan did exist, since he had himself heard of it at numerous off-the-record sessions at security conferences and think-tank meetings. The problem was that Western leaders did not grasp their significance. “Now the West is taking a belated class in practical geopolitics,” Lucas wrote in 2014. “It is an education paid for by hundreds of thousands of innocent Ukrainians, in blood and misery. But the full fee for the course will, I fear, be far greater.”

    Those decade-old words might have been written yesterday. In the very first week of the current war, the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz defined it as a “historic turning point.” Now, three years later, it looks like the turning of this point is proceeding according to the same formula as the Western aid to Ukraine — too little, too late. We are witnessing a situation that is reminiscent of the “springtime of nations” in 1848. Back then, the liberal revolutions that broke out in Europe ended in spectacular failure. As G. M. Trevelyan wrote, it was “the turning point at which modern history failed to turn.” We may face a similar scenario.

    Ukraine is not crying wolf. It is, rather, like the canary in the mine. Outside of Ukraine, many ignore its warnings or are even annoyed by their persistence. Life would be much nicer if the canary would stop chirping. And so they look through a microscope at all of Ukraine’s faults, at its corruption and its past sins, to prove that it is not worth helping. In the eyes of some, Ukrainians are the main culprits behind the protracted hostilities: if Zelensky were only more accommodating, the war would have ended a long time ago! All together, they are ready to sacrifice Ukraine to Putin for their own mental peace.

    They do not believe that what is happening in Ukraine today may happen to them tomorrow. They forget that attempts to appease aggressors do not work. Must one really remind Westerners of the Munich agreement of 1938? That surrender of Czechoslovakia to Hitler did not prevent the Second World War; it accelerated its beginning. This history lesson seems so banal that it feels embarrassing to bring it up. But as skeptics like to joke, humans do not make the same mistake twice, they usually make it three or more times.

    We are living in an era of enormous historical importance in which our politicians usually do not think historically. Their horizons are generally limited to the projected duration of their own political careers. This is especially the case if they, like Donald Trump or Elon Musk, come from fields that are a far cry from a knowledge of history. In their cases, indeed, they evince a contempt for the past and prefer to believe that they are completely without precedent. So they may put the Russo-Ukrainian war on pause, as a discrete matter of policy, but they can hardly stop the looming war crisis. If history has any lessons, one of them should be this: if you see war coming and you are not sure if there is a serious possibility of preserving peace, you would be wise to bet on war as the most probable scenario, and be ready for it. As the Latin adage says, si vis pacem, para bellum — if you want peace, prepare for war. Those words should be translated into every known language.

    The knowledge of history helps us to sort out what is new and what is old in the current Russo-Ukrainian war. This knowledge does not make us feel better. Still, it leaves room for cautious optimism. The revolution of 1848 was defeated, but seventy years later most of the revolutionaries’ demands had become political realities. It took the First World War to make the impossible possible. For war brings not only carnage, but also opportunities. To take constructive advantage of postwar opportunities, you must have a historical imagination.

    It was seventy years after the revolution of 1848 when the first volume of Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West appeared. Since then, the decline of the West has been predicted many times. And still the West is still vigorously with us. Over the last two centuries, it has survived several deep crises, including major wars. Some of those wars ended with solutions that provided an impetus for further social and political development. The Napoleonic Wars ended with the Congress of Vienna, which established the “long peace” of the nineteenth century. Without this peace, the quantum leap of the Industrial Revolution would have been impossible. The First World War brought the final collapse of the old regime, and the Second World War led to the emergence of a large “no war zone.”

    None of these solutions lasted forever, and the time always came for a new crisis and a new solution. The war in Ukraine may be the crisis that the contemporary West needed. Whether the West will take advantage of this opportunity, whether it will recognize the moral and historical lessons of this awful war, is an open question. But Ukraine should be for the West not only a source of anxiety but also a source of hope. Ukrainians are interested in a strong and free West and are ready to work on its renewal. For them, this is not a whim. It is an ultimate need: finally to escape the shadow of Russia, which has a centuries-long historical record of mass repressions and wars. Like the West, Russia also proceeds from crisis to crisis. There is an essential difference, though. Unlike in the West, short-lived attempts to democratize Russia after her defeats in the Russo-Japanese War, the First World War, and the Cold War failed, and ended with protracted periods of reaction by Stolypin, Stalin, and Putin.

    In principle, the Russians, too, should be interested in overcoming their harsh past. But for various reasons they are not capable of doing it on their own. The memorable words spoken by German President Richard von Weizsäcker on the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II could be applied to Russia as well: “May 8, 1945 was not a day of defeat for Germany — it was a day of liberation.” The best thing that can happen to Russia is that it loses this war; if not right now, then in the foreseeable future. This will open up a chance for a new democratic Russia that no longer poses a threat to its own people or to neighboring peoples and will no longer constitute a threat to global stability. The “no war zone” could be extended further east of the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands of the West.

    According to the custom of the genre, an essay such as this one should end with a ringing conclusion. I will not do this. The text ends but history does not. As the war drags on, it is too early to close the book. Suffice it to say that the canary is still singing.

    Ominous Pieces

    A.D.

    My unchristian ancestors: for a lifetime
    they got along without God.
    Though something always happened
    that they had not foreseen. Two world wars,
    the downfall of their city, diseases, or

    what it is like to lose everything — freedom
    stripped from them, twice in a row.
    When unchristian beings (Hitler, Stalin)
    took this only world they had and turned
    it into a trap for millions, into hell.

    They survived, with a good deal of luck,
    though without religious persuasion. No word
    about the hurried prayers in the air-raid
    shelter, when under the sign of revenge, of justice,
    the one with the latest technology
    brought the empty skies crashing down.

    They (the ones who existed) never
    mentioned those fleeting moments
    in which fear dissolved and everyday life
    broke open like a fruit, a brittle fruit,
    that contained more than just seeds, tears, grief,
    and the ecstasies of the little people.

     

    Nazi Party Rally Grounds

    It was a grey February day in Nuremberg. I was due to give a reading that evening, and I could think of nothing better to do with the time until then than to take the tram out to the site where they used to hold Nazi Party rallies. At the reception desk of the Deutscher Kaiser hotel, the young woman who requested that I speak English with her was so put out when I asked how to get there that I withdrew and sheepishly looked for a map of the city so as not to have to consult my cell phone. Not only was I a stranger in this place, but my interest in a location that was rarely sought out by tourists to this medieval city, the city of Albrecht Dürer, seemed strange to her. She looked me up and down, as if I might turn out to be a troublesome guest. In terms of age, I was not unlike one of those Germans who, for obscure reasons, make pilgrimages to places that are taboo for most. And yes, I must admit, it was film images, scenes from the notorious propaganda film Triumph of the Will directed by Leni Riefenstahl, that brought me here. And also curiosity about what remained of this central forum of the Third Reich and its real historical dimensions: the Zeppelin Field, the Congress Hall, the Luitpold Hall, the Märzfeld, the Silbersee (Silver Lake, a name that evoked associations of the fantasy world of Karl May and his Winnetou novels that I grew up with). I wanted to see it all for myself, this massive site built around the Dutzendteich Lake, which still lay on the outskirts of the city at that time.

    How reassuring it was to arrive there at last and find a formula that absorbed everything and steered the inconceivable insanity of National Socialist projection and construction into the reassuring channels of a democratic culture of remembrance. After several stops, the tram halted at the Nazi Party Rally Documentation Center. First impression: you could easily get lost there, the signs lead into a vast area, only a drone could give you the desired overview. You pass through a large parking lot, and only then does it become apparent that the building before you is the huge rotunda of the Congress Hall, the back elevation of an arena that remained unfinished at the beginning of the war in 1939, like so many kilometres of the planned Reichsautobahn. Plus, a surprise for any resident or admirer of Rome: the building turns out to be a remake of the Colosseum in the style of a film set. Shades of Cinecittà, remnants of the set for a Nazi blockbuster mixed with those for a historic film about the fall of the Roman Empire. The inner courtyard doesn’t make much of an impression with its construction site fences and containers of rubble, a garbage-strewn antiquity of yesteryear that was never realized, a shell that is reminiscent of many things — prison yards, stormed fortresses, ruins forever left wanting. Somewhere in the jumble of mock theater boxes and empty rows, it was designed to give pride of place to the speaker’s pulpit for the “Führer.” The whole thing was intended as the theater for a pseudo-parliament — a foretaste of the gigantic meeting rooms planned by Albert Speer for Berlin after the final victory in the capital called Germania. Yet the relocation of the Nazi court to the Reich capital of Berlin was already so advanced at the time that the Nazi Party Rally Grounds only ever had a symbolic function. Ruins by design in every direction, a monumental building abandoned midway; and yet everything testified to the ambitions of the regime’s leaders, their bid to capture the imagination of a physically trained and mentally aligned population with a kind of National Socialist theme park.

    Modern stadium buildings came to mind, arenas of all kinds, from rock concert stages to the Super Bowl fields to be found in major American cities — and one wondered where the mass audience was supposed to go back then. A colosseum in Nuremberg, was this to be the venue for political gladiator fights? On the eve of the war, were the Germans really ready for such grandiose imperial showmanship? The total state remained an irresistible vision until its demise — at least for the Nazis. At the Sixth Reich Party Congress, the one filmed by Riefenstahl, hadn’t Hitler admitted that it was not the state that created the German people,but the other way around, that the people created the state for themselves?

    Wandering about, lost among the open spaces beyond the Great Dutzendteich, or Dozen Pond (nomen est omen!), one began to suspect what all this was conceived to do. The state that was so densely concentrated in the relatively small space of Berlin was here to be given a symbolic parade-ground along with the Zeppelin Field, the so-called March Field, a festival site outfitted with various halls and groves, laid out according to the model of Rome in Augustan times. But by then Germany had become a modern industrial nation, so it also needed a substation, a train station, its own small “Strength Through Joy” city kitted out with a stadium and swimming pool to contribute to the general merriment.

    Laid low by the absurd scale of the place, exhausted, I gave up my inspection at some point. There was just enough time to take a look at Luitpold Hall, where an interim exhibition with pictures and panels instructed visitors about the temporary use of the whole thing at the time, the construction measures and their background. From the deployment of the German Labor Front, the architects and companies involved, to the forced laborers and Russian prisoners of war who were made to toil and die until the futile plan came to an end, everything here was pre-meditated. As is so often the case, history had fragmented, and was presented through individual stories and small erratic objects, the significance and meaning of which a good schoolteacher could unravel if the curriculum allowed. The city of Nuremberg and its museum directors tried to distract the accidental onlooker for the time being with the promise of an eventual and final reappraisal of the whole thing. Meanwhile, next door in the documentary hub, the good folks of Nuremberg courted the audience with evening concerts. Unfortunately, there was no time for Shostakovich and Schulhoff. I had to get back for my reading and was glad that a tram was there to restore me to the main station. At the reading in the Literary House that evening, I did not breathe a word about my excursion into the past.

     

    Spoils of War

    And they almost kidnapped the child,
    the girl with the black braids
    the broad cheekbones, my mother,
    who looked like one of their own,
    a child of the Siberian steppes.
    They would have just taken her with them
    on that dusty suburban street in Dresden
    on their march back to the East,
    just as they took anything with them
    that was not nailed down.
    She was already up on the small horse-drawn cart,
    a princess perched on top of the spoils,
    said the neighbour who ran after her
    screaming and snatched the child
    back from the Russians still screaming
    and cursing. From the victors of the World War,
    lads fond of children and a song.
    They didn’t like screaming women.

     

    What We Knew About Dictatorship

    I do research into dictatorship, said the young woman at the table that evening at her friend’s birthday celebration. That was the invitation to the dance: finally a conversation partner for a serious topic that interested no one else in the group. We establishedthat dictatorships can be divided according to the degree of severity — tryannies and autocracies. It comes down to the cooking time: how long it takes to prepare the dish. We know little about the recipes of cannibals. The longer people stew in a form of rule in which unlimited power deprives them of all natural rights, the easier it is to prepare them socially; particularly coveted is the brain. And it doesn’t take much for neighbors to turn each other into sausage meat, I recalled. At some point, having themselves fallen into the meat grinder of the murderous system, they dig into the frozen soil with their bare hands for edible roots (as in the Gulag). They rummage through the legacies of those who have fallen under the wheel, ensuring that they are utilized to the full (as in Auschwitz). They are ready to cull their fellow citizens, to send them to the gas chamber, into the cold, the fire, even to betray their own relatives, parents, the sick, people on a dying branch.

    Depending on the degree of bedevilment, a distinction is made between three forms of dictatorship: terrorist, trivial mythical (tinnitus-like), and totalitarian. There is not a single dictatorship that has not been based on law, rules of exclusion, even on a constitution, an implicit intergenerational contract. The young bring down the old, the old sacrifice the young to maintain their power until they themselves must be sacrificed before their time — for example, in war. The dictatorship records everyone according to their live weight, every gram of fat is counted in the food allocation. Without ever really asking themselves what happened to them, everyone is silently wondering how they can survive the centrifuge of mass mobilization, of mass management. The failure to speak, the silence of each individual is unmistakable even in the midst of the greatest jubilation — on the wide boulevards, in the lion’s den where they are whipped up by propaganda, in the fascist forums or even simply in the sports stadiums where they cheer on the victory of their own athletes. Dictatorships radiate out from a center of emptiness: a stable source of radiation, permanently sending out negative energies in the form of physical violence. This is, at the same time, also psychological violence, because all the morality consumed by a dictatorship emanates from the totalitarian state; the individual soul weighs next to nothing.

    Dictatorship grows imperceptibly. It is often confused with a medium that is considered the embodiment of all its fears and desires, a leader, a generalissimo, or a chairman, who appears on the scene one day out of the blue and can no longer be voted out of office. Dictatorship does not come from nowhere (whatever the Greeks say about it, and the Romans, and the annals of the Renaissance); for us, the moderns, it comes from democratic elections. A savior is elected, a redeemer in the guise of a party that hovers above all the other parties, “other parties” which the leader then forbids as soon as the populus has elected him. He starts straight in on culture, on the icons, the cooking recipes, the religion. He collects campaign money from those who have the funds and also the hope that the money is better invested with him than in the culture of a thousand opinions, which leads to nothing and only confuses the people. Once he has neutralized all his opponents, he is soon regarded in popular superstition as a benevolent sovereign, takes to stroking children, and is ubiquitous overnight in millions of images, with the help of newspapers and other media, in every size from postage stamps to monumental sculptures.

    What else? I asked her. Dictatorships, she said, have their own way of reckoning time, they can last for a shorter or a longer time, in which the lifetime of the leader plays a certain role. In any case that role is gradually absorbed under the daily overcast skies. False expectations are the binding agent of every dictatorship, barely visible to the naked eye (except under a sociologist’s microscope), interchangeable just like ideology, religion, or policies. It is like in the opera: the song of the chorus swells to fill the stage, but there are moments when the high C of a mortal voice emerges from the wall of sound. In an emergency (martial law, trouble among the cooks, betrayal in the innermost circle), the Iron Curtain is lowered, while the audience sinks into a collective trance. Until the prompter rises from the pit and signals that she has forgotten the text. Then, and only then, it may come to pass that a child appears, suddenly, in the emergency exit. It is looking for its father (shot long ago) or its mother, who has been dreaming of a better future all along, hidden behind a fan.

     

    One-way Street to Jerusalem

    Can anything be learned from anecdotes? This question arises when the experience on which they turn is so striking that it leads to far-reaching conclusions. In exile in America, the director and producer Erik Charell, one of the most successful in his field in the Weimar years, liked to describe a Berlin street scene from the time shortly before Hitler’s accession to power. He was a visitor to an automobile show on Kaiserdamm and got caught up in the crowd in front of one of the halls. Along with the police, uniformed SA men were passing through the crowd with collection boxes. One of the young men was going from person to person with the advertising slogan, “Donations please, donations towards the construction of the one-way street to Jerusalem.” The narrator, who could hardly believe his ears, asked for the snappy slogan, to be repeated to him, and approached the little man in the brown shirt and waited to see if the policeman nearby would intervene in the face of this open threat against Jewish fellow citizens. But he turned away embarrassed. The small incident had finally opened his eyes. From that moment on, he knew: “It’s over.” He left the car show that very moment. Over the next few days he organized his departure from Germany. The image of the one-way street had hit him so hard that there could be no hesitation. There was no question as to the future of road construction in this country.

     

    Gray Mice

    The twentieth century was, among many other things, also the time of collective laboratory experiments. Breeding humans so that they become grey mice, mottled mice, or completely uniform mice was the research goal to which not only the new mass leaders, but also many of the scientists, felt committed. Political views only counted if they could be scientifically substantiated. Entire faculties of racial scientists, behaviorists, and armaments experts were busy whipping the nation into shape. After the apocalypse of a world war that had swept away emperors and kings, many of the liberated subjects longed for a zoological dictatorship. It was the moment for mouse-breeding. A whole nightmare world of order-obsessed mice was released onto the streets, into their future professions: police mice, kapo mice, Gestapo mice, cultural mice, youth and sports mice, stewards and jumpers in all niches of society.

    They did what highly trained and meticulously conditioned mice do: monitor their own kind, ensure that the common mouse-life runs smoothly. It did not occur to them that they could have been something else, that each individual mouse could live in its own way and be happy. No, no, and again no: it was about controlling each other, rounding up men, women, and children and keeping them under strict laboratory conditions, in the glare of the anti-aircraft searchlights, keeping them together and reminding them of the misery of their mouse existence every second of their lives. They weren’t stupid, these mice. Each one of them knew what position they could hold in this new total mouse-state, or that they could make their way for themselves by maneuvering skillfully through the labyrinth of the laboratory.

    Let no one say that freedom did not exist in this system. It was only when the experiments were halted — another world war was necessary to bring that about — that it dawned on some that the conditions under which they were bred had nothing whatsoever to do with the world as such and with the fact of their uniformity. At that moment they were ashamed, as far as grey mice can be ashamed. It appears that their descendants are ashamed to this day. In any case, most have shed their grey and now prefer garish colors and exotic patterns.

     

    German Listeners

    Lübeck looked terrible
    when it was finished, an etching
    by Churchill based on a design
    by Adolf Hitler, recognized by
    Thomas Mann as a fellow artist.
    There was St. Mary’s Basilica.
    It was still standing there
    as if emerging from the smoke
    and next to it an empty portal
    in the light of the postwar sun.
    Lübeck marzipan was what
    my father always wanted
    for Christmas, he liked
    the bitter taste of almonds
    in memory of Thomas Mann,
    whom he liked to read, aloud
    ideally, in the small circle of family.

     

    THE MEAT GRINDER

    Were I a painter, my motif of choice to represent entire phases of world history in this century of my birth which has cast its shadows and its conflicts onto the next, would be a meat grinder. The device that was clamped to the table in my grandparents’ kitchen and used to twist a lump of meat into blood-red strands of “ground” or “minced” meat, even if there was never any sign of grinding or mincing, but always only twisting, until in the end a steel perforated disc produced portions of minced beef or minced pork, depending on the animal being processed. I would have put my motif through the meat grinder.

    Just as the painter Philip Guston finally limited himself to a few recurring forms — hooded figures, shoes, cigarettes, fingers, severed feet, open books — I would have concentrated on this one ugly device, the domestic meat grinder. I would have painted its maw, in an objective or maybe fantastic manner; or, no, as primitively as possible, this mouth-like funnel of cast iron, the belly of the monster torn open and rendered visible with its innards: the screw, the sharp-edged wing-blade. The hand crank with its wooden handle I would have given an especially crude shape: the screw clamp that held the voracious wolf fixed to the kitchen shelf, the desk in the torture chamber, the altar, the butcher’s workbench. Do not misunderstand me: none of this would be done in honour of its inventor, Freiherr von Drais, that quick and keen thinker, Citizen Drais, a democrat of the first hour in Germany, who, in addition to this practical monster-machine, also invented the two-wheeled hobby horse and the speed typewriter. Nor is it part of the quest for an equation to capture the acceleration of everything; the crank-accelerated processing of the mountains of meat into each individual household. Nor the urge for a symbol — yes, that is the right word — for the perennial suffering, the cycle of all flesh, in this murderous century, in which eating and being eaten has taken on something mechanical. Why, then? Simply so as to depict a meat grinder on a pink pedestal against a sky-blue background, a thing that in the end stood only for itself — useful and abysmal in equal measure, and in the most progressive way inconceivably primitive.

     

    The Historyless

    History seldom lands on their doorstep
    with burning car tires, chanting crowds,
    tanks on the prowl, ready to be deployed,
    the turret turned down.
    An Iron Curtain falls, a regime
    bites the dust, they don’t catch on until
    the late evening news.
    Then it’s routine again for a lifetime
    and it’s business as usual
    with the end of school exams, the driver’s license,
    the beach holidays and
    the children’s first teeth.
    Tears time and again
    at every bend of existence,
    sometimes accompanied by insight, rarely
    bringing any comfort.

    In retrospect: often resentment, muffled
    by something like nostalgia.
    That’s not what they wanted, not like that,
    just fell into it by chance.

    Later the arithmetic, they like to do their sums,
    balance sheets of disappointment. The politicians —
    none of them any different from the rest, all corrupt.
    What can we hold onto, culture perchance?
    The annual Christmas party,
    a few brands of car, the success
    of the local football club,
    a few hits belted out
    on karaoke night.
    And suddenly they say: give us
    our history back.

     

    The Button

    One day Franz Kafka sewed on a button. He did it thoroughly, as with everything he did. In his little room in his parents’ Prague apartment, the one that he was afraid to call home, he sat with his legs crossed and struggled with the needle and thread, as a bachelor might. But something kept getting in the way. First, a stork jumped out of the cupboard and wandered across the room; then a large black bird crashed against the windowpane flapping its wings wildly. Then a picture fell from the wall, a view of the old Prague synagogue; then there was a knock at the door and his mother came in, bringing him a glass of milk. Despite all this, he remained focused on his needlework. Indeed, he managed this feat better than many an experienced seamstress. In the end the button was fastened so firmly that you could have lifted not only the trousers, but their owner too, by the button, and slung them over your shoulder. A sturdy removal man would have been quite strong enough.

    Translated by Karen Leeder

    The Enlightenment, Then and Now

    What is the Enlightenment, for us? Are we its heirs, its continuers, its defenders? Or should we acknowledge our distance from it, and try to imagine a different sort of connection to this now-distant past?

    At the present moment, the temptation to identify with the Enlightenment is almost overwhelming. In dark times, after all, few historical subjects exert more allure than one with such a promise of illumination. How inspiring, how reassuring, to think that there was once a moment when reason challenged superstition, when justice promised to overcome power, when the spirit of toleration seemed to prevail over dogmatism and persecution! How tempting it is to think that if only we could reawaken the spirit of the Enlightenment, and rekindle the torches of the philosophes, we might yet dissipate the shadows now gathering around us.

    If those shadows seem especially menacing, it is partly because the Enlightenment itself is currently under explicit attack, and from many different directions. On the left, progressive scholars and activists denounce it as the birthplace of modern racism and the handmaiden of “settler colonialism.” On the right, “post-liberals” and Catholic integralists call it destructive of family, community, and religion. Populists of all varieties decry the faith it promoted in education and science as elitist and evil. If these groups agree on nothing else, it is that the Western world took a disastrous wrong turn sometime in the eighteenth century. They draw a straight line from “Enlightenment” to “liberalism” to “neoliberalism,” as if thinkers who failed even to predict the Industrial Revolution somehow bear responsibility for post-industrial decay.

    But is some sort of “return” to the Enlightenment the answer? In recent years, many prominent intellectuals have made this case, albeit in contradictory ways. In Enlightenment Now, the psychologist Steven Pinker credited the Enlightenment with virtually all human progress since the eighteenth century, equated it with his own brand of technocratic neoliberalism, and argued that everyone would agree if only they overcame some regrettable cognitive biases. The philosopher Susan Neiman, by contrast, in Left Is Not Woke, eloquently identified the Enlightenment with the promise of progressive politics and warned about the hijacking of that politics by “woke” activists hostile to Enlightenment values. The historian and legal scholar Samuel Moyn took an oddly similar position in Liberalism Against Itself, except that for him the nefarious force that has dragged the left away from its optimistic Enlightenment roots is not wokeness but a fearful “Cold War liberalism.”

    Historians, too, have been pressing the case for the Enlightenment’s living relevance, at sometimes inordinate length. A 984-page survey of the Enlightenment from 1680 to 1790 by Ritchie Robertson associates it with the broad cause of “human betterment.” Anthony Pagden’s monumental book on the subject describes the Enlightenment as the birthplace of tolerant cosmopolitanism. And then there is Jonathan Israel, the Stakhanovite hero of Enlightenment scholarship, who, since 2001, has produced nine books on or closely related to the subject totaling 7,886 pages. According to Israel, all the political and social values dear to liberal modernity, including human rights, social equality, sexual equality, and racial equality, were already present in a “radical Enlightenment” that emerged in the seventeenth century in the Dutch circles around Baruch Spinoza.

    But did the Enlightenment even exist? And is this a serious question? In a provocative new book called The Enlightenment: An Idea and its History, the British conservative historian J. C. D. Clark claims that there was no such thing. The various intellectual currents that today go by that name had no real unity or coherence, he argues. Historians and philosophers only started to claim they did long after the eighteenth century, in order to invent historical legitimation for their own progressive reform programs. He notes that the very phrase “the Enlightenment,” with the definite article, did not come into common usage in English until the twentieth century, as a Google Ngram search strikingly confirms. (The German “die Aufklärung” appeared earlier, but also had limited resonance.)

    It is true that mid-twentieth century liberal scholars had strong incentives to find a long and inspiring pedigree for their own beleaguered beliefs. Clark underlines, a little too insistently, the fact that Enlightenment scholarship owes a particularly strong debt to liberal Jews born in pre-war continental Europe (Ernst Cassirer, Peter Gay, Theodore Besterman, Jacob Talmon, Robert Wokler, George Mosse, and others). It is hardly surprising that these men, many of whom fled Nazism, would turn for inspiration to this earlier moment of light, and revere it for helping to emancipate their ancestors from ghettoes. Jonathan Israel, who has continued in this tradition (despite faulting his predecessors for getting almost everything wrong) has stated the core idea clearly: “Jewish emancipation became a realistic proposition from the moment Europe’s former predominantly theological view of the world began to crumble under the impact of Enlightenment ideas.” Still, the Enlightenment was not a Jewish invention, and claims like this can too easily feed the worst sort of conspiracy theories.

    Meanwhile, the idea of the Enlightenment as a coherent movement also owes a considerable amount to two Jewish refugees of a more critical and contrarian bent: Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. But in place of the Enlightenment as salvation, they gave us the Enlightenment as perdition. Their Dialectic of Enlightenment, from 1944, speculated that the horrors of the twentieth century ultimately stemmed from a deadly Western “instrumental reason” that had come to maturity in the eighteenth century. “Enlightenment,” they wrote provocatively, “is totalitarian.” Their book had enormous influence on progressive thought, and it is in part thanks to them that so many scholars today condemn the Enlightenment as a sinister-sounding “project” that bears responsibility for modern racism, imperialism, misogyny, and intolerance of all sorts. The trend has become so popular that currently the best-known adage of Immanuel Kant’s — who famously offered his own definition of Enlightenment in an essay in 1784 — is probably, “Humanity has achieved its greatest perfection in the white race,” which he later abjured, and which in any case had little connection to the main lines of his thought.

    Clark is right to a certain extent. It is absurd to cast the Enlightenment as a single “project,” whether redemptive or malevolent. The canonical writers associated with it agreed about relatively little, and liked few things more than attacking each other, often quite viciously. Their number included atheists, deists, and orthodox religious believers; radical democrats and propagandists for absolute monarchy; proto-socialists and proto-libertarians. Intellectually, their works can be best represented as a Venn diagram with many areas of intersection but no union of all the sets. The Enlightenment was also geographically dispersed, with significant differences between the French, English, Scottish, German, and other national varieties. It is hardly surprising, then, that the Enlightenment’s contemporary defenders can see it in such different ways.

    But historical labels are, by their nature, nebulous and messy. There are always exceptions. There are always contradictions. The crooked timber of humanity — another adage of Kant’s — never fits into neat geometrical boxes, and virtually every commonly accepted label used by historians would fail Clark’s overly strict coherence test. Eighteenth-century writers may not have used the label “the Enlightenment,” but they often described their century as one marked by the triumph of reason and progress. D’Alembert spoke of a revolution “not only in the history of the human mind . . . but also in the history of states and empires.” Diderot praised “philosophy” for “advanc[ing] with great strides” and forcing “authority and precedent . . . to yield to the laws of reason.” Kant declared, “this age is the age of enlightenment.” Edmund Burke, meanwhile, set himself in opposition to what he dubbed, with exquisite sarcasm, “this new conquering empire of light and reason.”

    The fact that the Enlightenment existed, however, hardly means we should place it on a pedestal and worship it idolatrously. Yes, despite the differences between Enlightenment thinkers, we can identify a set of genuinely noble and admirable beliefs to which most of them (though not all) subscribed: the need for freedom of thought and expression, especially in religious matters; the need to judge matters of general interest according to standards of reason, objectivity, and utility; the possibility of historical progress; the illegitimacy of violence in the pursuit of political objectives. But at the same time very few of them had kind words for democracy, which they tended to equate with mob rule. Freedom of speech did not imply freedom of political action. Kant even wrote that the mark of a good enlightened ruler was to say: “Argue as much as you will and about whatever you will — but obey!” And while some denounced imperialism and advocated toleration of cultural difference, in most cases “Enlightenment universalism” meant defining Western Europe as the high point of human historical evolution and judging all other cultures by that standard. Racism and anti-Semitism disfigured the thought of many Aufklärer. Liberal modernity (whatever that means) did not burst forth fully and perfectly formed from the heads of philosophers.

    Nor is it even possible to find a coherent subset of Enlightenment authors who might deserve idolization — a “happy few” who fully professed modern liberal principles. Jonathan Israel has employed this strategy, attempting to distinguish a forward-looking “radical Enlightenment” that inspired everything progressive in the modern world from a “moderate” one that cravenly kowtowed to the European ancien régime. But for all his gargantuan energy and erudition, his ultimately unconvincing thesis has met with one of the most hostile critical receptions of any major recent historical enterprise. According to his numerous and persuasive reviewers, his “radical Enlightenment” is his own invention, not a historical reality. Yes, there were intellectual radicals in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: materialists who denied the existence of God and denounced Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed as the “three imposters”; republicans who opposed monarchy; egalitarians who wanted to overturn the social order. But some egalitarians were fervent Christians, some materialists had no problem with monarchy or privilege, and so forth. There was no single and coherent “radical” party.

    But we do not need to worship the Enlightenment as if it were a god we have failed. Most of the philosophes, despite their often immense self-regard, would have been horrified at the idea. Condorcet, one of the last great Enlightenment writers, asserted that “it is easy to see how imperfect the analysis of men’s intellectual and moral faculties still is,” and predicted that his successors would move far beyond him. Thomas Jefferson memorably asked whether “one generation of men has a right to bind another?” The question has implications for intellectual life as well as politics. We should be free to take from the Enlightenment what we find valuable and disregard the rest — to construct our own twenty-first-century Enlightenment rather than placing ourselves in thrall to an imagined eighteenth-century one.

    As we do so, we should remember that what made the Enlightenment so extraordinary was not just a set of ideas but also a set of practices — not just what was said but also how it was said, and how it was understood in its various social contexts. Far too much of the contemporary discussion of the Enlightenment ignores this point, reducing it to a set of disembodied abstractions. The result is to distort the history and impoverish the analysis. If we wish to construct our own twenty-first-century Enlightenment, and we should, the practices are just as important.

    Start with the basic issue of audience, and how it was appealed to. Before the eighteenth century, key Western works of thought often still appeared in Latin, and even when they were published in the vernacular they tended to employ recondite and difficult language which appealed principally to fellow scholars and patrons. After the eighteenth century, meanwhile, thanks to the development of modern research universities, intellectual life increasingly retreated into the ivory towers. Enlightenment authors, by contrast, wrote principally in the vernacular for a general educated public, and strove to make their works as accessible, as engaging, even as entertaining, as possible. To be sure, they, too, could sometimes produce arcane philosophical and scientific texts; but more often they presented their ideas in the form of stories, novels, plays, dialogues, reference books, essays, and travelogues. Think of Voltaire’s Candide, Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, Lessing’s Nathan the Wise, Hume’s Essays Moral and Political. Even didactic treatises tended to employ a clear and accessible prose style. Baron d’Holbach’s provocative materialist treatise The System of Nature became one of eighteenth-century France’s biggest bestsellers, although it had to be sold illegally, “under the cloak,” because of government censorship. Enlightenment writers wanted to be widely read.

    Audiences, meanwhile, did not just read but became infatuated. They tried to model their lives according to their favorite authors’ instructions, wrote those authors worshipful letters, hunted for every scrap of information they could about them. The historian Robert Darnton gives the example of a French merchant named Jean Ranson who for years bombarded publishers with letters asking for news about Rousseau, whom he, like many others, called “friend Jean-Jacques.” When Ranson married, he wrote that everything Rousseau had set down about conjugal life “has had a profound effect on me, and . . . will serve me as a rule” (perhaps not the best idea, given that Rousseau admitted to having abandoned five children of his own to orphanages). After Rousseau died, Ranson promised to visit his grave and shed tender tears on it. Many other readers reacted in similar ways, with some claiming that after reading the heroine’s death scene in Rousseau’s melodramatic novel The New Eloise they had to take to their beds for days out of grief. One of the first modern literary celebrities, Rousseau himself felt increasingly oppressed by the insistent public attention.

    Readers found it all the easier to get drawn in because they had so much more information available than just the books themselves. In the eighteenth century, for the first time, what we would now call an entire media infrastructure had come into being around authorship and book publishing. Literary periodicals reported on new works and printed stories about writers. They published reviews summarizing and evaluating new books. Printers made cheap engravings of authors available for display in homes. Venues for literary discussion, from officially chartered learned academies to lending libraries to informal societies and café gatherings, all expanded at a furious rate.

    This same infrastructure also made it easier than ever for readers to become writers themselves. Periodicals needed contributors (they also published extensive letters to the editor). Diderot and d’Alembert enlisted hundreds of collaborators for their Encyclopedia, whose length eventually ran to seventeen million words. Darnton has highlighted the plight of the poor but ambitious young men who flocked to Paris in the hope of becoming the next Voltaire, only to end up as “poor devil” hack writers, desperately churning out crude pornography or political libel, or even spying on fellow writers for the police, to earn money. Meanwhile, learned academies throughout Europe sponsored essay competitions whose winners could leap in a moment from obscurity to glory. The most famous case involved an eccentric thirty-eight-year-old failed music teacher who had spent years fruitlessly promoting a new and unwieldy system of musical notation. After seeing an advertisement for an essay competition on whether the progress of the arts and sciences had proven beneficial to society, he boldly answered in the negative, won the prize, and gained immediate fame. This, of course, was Rousseau.

    All these developments were inseparable from rapid and ongoing social and economic change. A warming climate, the end of destructive religious warfare, and furiously expanding global trade — much of it powered by chattel slavery in the Americas — was bringing unprecedented prosperity to Western Europe. The first consumer revolution was underway. Asian spices, porcelain, and tea; American sugar, coffee, tobacco, and textiles, all flooded into European cities. Even modest artisans and shopkeepers could now purchase a wide new range of household implements and decorations, musical instruments, foodstuffs, medicines, religious paraphernalia, clothing — and books. Printed advertising developed, and a new daily practice became part of urban life: shopping. In short, a new sort of public was coming into being that could exercise a new range of choice on a daily basis: choice about what to eat and drink, what to wear, how to furnish homes, how to entertain oneself — and what to read.

    This new range of choice seems so familiar today that it is easy to forget how novel it was at the time, and what it meant to ordinary people to exercise such banal but important forms of personal autonomy. Consumerism, in what the historian William Sewell has called (without irony) “capitalism’s rosy dawn,” was not yet an insidious and exploitative system manipulated by large corporations, but — at least in part — an opportunity for unprecedented forms of self-expression and self-cultivation. Yes, the opportunity was available only to a limited population: urban and relatively well-off. But it was still a much larger population than had previously enjoyed anything similar, and it included women as well as men.

    This was the world into which the Enlightenment was born, and its practices shaped the way writers appealed to their expanding new audiences. These audiences wanted help navigating the brave new world of consumer choice, and they found it in the criticism, advice, and information offered by the new periodicals and reference works. Beyond this, they also wanted entertainment and edification, and the Enlightenment provided it. They did not, however, want preaching or indoctrination, and despite what is often thought, very few of the great works of the Enlightenment offered anything of the sort. Indeed, especially in France, many authors deliberately refrained from advancing any sort of clear didactic thesis at all, opting instead for playful ambiguity. In Candide, Voltaire offers a savage satire of intolerance but concludes with the deliberately elliptical line “we must cultivate our garden.” Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws pivots between endorsing the English constitution and taking the relativist position that countries should choose the government that best fits their climate. Diderot adored the dialogue form, which prompted his readers to evaluate apparently opposing viewpoints. The Encyclopedia allowed readers to follow a trail from volume to volume through the editors’ provocative series of cross-references (most famously in the article “Cannibals”: “See also Eucharist, Holy Communion, Altar”). Voltaire perfectly summed up the spirit of this Enlightenment in the preface to his Philosophical Dictionary: “The most useful books are the ones that are half written by their readers.”

    Even in places such as Scotland, where eighteenth-century intellectual life was less playful (because it was more centered on universities), Enlightenment thinkers mostly took care to write in an accessible manner. Adam Smith, famously, did not simply expound his theory of the division of labor in abstract terms, but led readers to follow his reasoning by offering the example of a pin factory. His fellow Scotsman, David Hume, an admirer of the French salons, wrote that “learning has been . . . a loser by being shut up in colleges and cells, and secluded from the world and good company. . . . Even philosophy went to wrack by this moping recluse method of study, and became as chimerical in her conclusions as she was unintelligible in her style and manner of delivery.” Hume’s own philosophical works, while intellectually demanding, remained clear and engaging.

    Hume insisted that liberating serious intellectual life from “colleges and cells” would have beneficial effects on the public as well. “Must our whole discourse be a continuing series of gossiping stories and idle remarks?” he wrote. “Must the mind never rise higher . . . ?” But for people to benefit, they would have to put in their own intellectual labor, using what they read for the purposes of self-cultivation, and drawing their own conclusions — writing half of the books themselves. In this sense, the Enlightenment was part and parcel of the enterprise of self-cultivation that social and economic change was making possible in the eighteenth century. Kant would describe it as humanity’s emancipation from its “self-imposed tutelage.”

    Not all Enlightenment writing fit this pattern, and as time passed less and less of it did. The idea of letting readers make up their own minds, especially on questions of religion and political authority, did not sit well with established eighteenth-century authorities, especially in Catholic Europe, in parts of which the Inquisition remained a going proposition. (It was not abolished until 1834.) As Enlightenment writing gained popularity, these authorities increasingly perceived it as a threat — indeed, as a unified conspiracy against throne and altar — and moved to repress it. In response, Enlightenment writers themselves turned increasingly rigid and militant and intolerant. “O my philosophes!” wrote Voltaire to his followers in the 1760s. “You need to march in close order like a Macedonian phalanx.” And he scolded them for a lack of zeal: “You bury your talents and are content with despising a monster you should be struggling to abhor and destroy.” When the cranky French cleric Augustin Barruel tried to prove that the philosophes had deliberately plotted to overthrow France’s Old Regime, he found much to quote from in Voltaire’s published correspondence. Later works of the French Enlightenment, such as d’Holbach’s popular but turgid treatises, increasingly told readers what to think rather than prompting them to think for themselves.

    Moreover, absolutist rulers found that they could make use of Enlightenment works that insisted on applying standards of reason and utility to matters of general interest. Frederick II of Prussia, Joseph II of Austria, and Catherine II of Russia all invited philosophes to their courts, flattered them, debated with them, and sought their cooperation. They did so above all because Enlightenment ideas justified their campaigns to exert greater control over established churches and social elites, and not for the purposes of promoting toleration and equality. The point was to weaken domestic opposition, and to make autocratic regimes more powerful and efficient. In the end, these sovereigns mostly treated their visiting philosophes as hired help. “I shall have need of him for another year at most, no longer,” Frederick wrote about Voltaire. “One squeezes the orange and throws away the peel.”

    And we should remember that even when the Enlightenment did prompt readers to reflection and self-cultivation, the results still could be pernicious. One infamous French academic essay competition invited participants to explain why Africans had dark skin. Some of the entries veered off into the far extremes of racist speculation. Enlightenment natural science emphasized that humans did not represent a separate creation, but in many respects belonged to the animal kingdom. Although the idea represented a fierce challenge to Christian beliefs, it also encouraged speculation about the differences between human races, which slaveowners in the Americas jumped upon to justify holding people of African descent in bondage or civic subordination. One of the French revolutionaries most influenced by Enlightenment writing, Emmanuel Sieyès, speculated about breeding humans with monkeys to create a race of natural slaves.

    In sum, putting the Enlightenment back in its social and cultural contexts, looking at practices as well as ideas, makes it much harder to celebrate it simply as the birthplace of an admirable liberal modernity. The Enlightenment contained multiple tendencies, both laudable and deplorable, both constructive and pernicious. As already noted, it was not a single thing. Horkheimer and Adorno’s intellectual heirs are not wrong to see some danger in the Enlightenment, although they mistakenly conflate this danger with the Enlightenment as a whole. The abuse of reason, instrumentally and otherwise, should not be mistaken with reason itself.

    If we decide to draw as we please from the eighteenth-century Enlightenment to construct our own Enlightenment, we should not neglect what we can learn from these contexts — what we can learn from its practices. In our own world, increasingly dominated by social media and video and podcasts, it is as important as ever not to keep serious learning “shut up in colleges and cells” — cordoned off in university echo chambers where the faculty only hear each other talk. It is all the more important to find ways of engaging a larger public in a serious manner, and using every available genre and medium to do so. And all the more important to do so in a way that encourages people to seek the answers for themselves and to undertake the work of their own cultivation. This is not asking too much, even now. A liberal society cannot flourish without the confidence that its members can do the work of Enlightenment themselves, as best they can.

    On Skin Color and the Individual

    In memory of Albert Murray

    I am what might be called an integrated black man. Many of my friends are white, and I live in a mostly white neighborhood; my long marriage is an interracial one, my grown children are biracial. I offer these facts neither as a lament nor as a boast. They are simply facts. Born in the 1960s, I am a member of a generation who grew up in the wake of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination and, more importantly for me, in the light of his message of openness, his call to judge one another, if we must judge one another, as individuals. That is how I have tried to live my life. In an era of the greatest divisiveness of my lifetime, what I am saying may sound hopelessly naïve, and, indeed, a few of the public responses to my work have included that word among other critical ones — one reader declared that I was merely “singing kumbaya,” another that I was speaking “nonsense.” I am not complaining. To write about so-called race is to invite an especially vehement and personal kind of criticism. The criticism has done nothing to change my view, which is that for black people to judge white people on the basis of their whiteness, however understandable that judgment may be, is to fail to grasp the most important lesson of slavery and its continuing aftermath: that the way we treat others must not depend on skin color. I will hold this view as long as I have a head to hold it in.

    Yet I am vividly aware that this belief in the importance of the individual is not, by itself, an adequate response to the racial challenges that we face, for two reasons. One is that this belief may seem not to take into account the sheer enormity of what was done to people of color in this country in the past, as well as its implications and ramifications for the present. The other is that this belief may have the effect of entrenching people in comfortable indifference to ongoing problems. But my purpose here is to point to two ways in which this belief in treating people as individuals can serve as a radical tool for understanding history and for addressing the challenges we face today.

    Thankfully, when it comes to American slavery, no equivalent of the Holocaust-denier movement appears to have gathered steam (which is not to say that it never will). So far no one is claiming that slavery did not happen — only that its effects on black people were not entirely bad, that the enslaved learned useful skills, to cite one argument of the Ron DeSantis crowd. I want to sidestep that argument, which is ridiculous on its face — roughly comparable to a man’s saying that, yes, he beat his wife, thereby teaching her self-defense — and widen the lens to include not just slavery and discrimination themselves but what was done to justify them, which is the true source of the trouble that plagues us to this day. A visitor from outer space, told about American slavery and left to observe the current reality, might ask why so many white people have contempt for black people rather than the reverse (not that the reverse isn’t also true — I will come to that in a bit); and the answer to the space alien, ironically enough, is white people’s egregious violation of their own sense of morality.

    The impetus for slavery was economic. In order to square America’s slavery with the Christian beliefs of most of America’s citizens, it became necessary for religious figures, scientists, politicians, educators, newspaper editors, editorial cartoonists, and others, like men coming together to push a stalled car, to put all of their energy into advancing the notion that whites were superior to blacks intellectually and (more irony) morally, and that whites were the rightful beneficiaries of the condition that Americans never tire of celebrating, that is, freedom. A measure of the resounding and tragic success of this campaign was that so many white people’s sense of identity came to rest on that belief in their superiority.

    Whatever disrupted the white sense of supremacy was considered a threat, an attack. That was true during slavery and for a century afterward, and among some whites it is true today. Hence the Tulsa massacre in 1921, in which whites decimated a thriving black business community; hence the white woman depicted in Bliss Broyard’s memoir of her father, One Drop, who researched her lineage and was reduced to tears by the discovery of her black ancestors (Broyard’s father, Anatole Broyard, was a distinguished book critic at The New York Times who passed for white); hence, as well, the way some reacted to Barack Obama’s election with the feeling of betrayal that a man might have if his wife ran off with his brother. This sense of superiority was enshrined in law, encoded in every detail and nuance of cross-racial interaction. Underneath it all, no doubt, like the pea under twenty mattresses in the fairy tale, was a feeling of guilt, remote but still felt — but one of the paradoxes of human nature is how guilt midwifes the vilest of acts.

    The black victims of these acts can easily be thought of as one undifferentiated, and thus not quite human, mass. Focusing on such people as individuals, however, helps us to think about the actual experiences of these victims, each one a real human being with hopes, emotions, and people who loved them, and to consider, at the human level, what these experiences meant. Pain is supremely an individual feeling. No essay, no book, no series of books could capture every instance of blacks’ suffering due to racism, so I will cite only one. Think of a woman who was owned by others and forced to breed human beings; think of a woman in your life — your mother, wife, sister, daughter, favorite aunt, friend, lover, yourself — and imagine her having no say in who had sex with her, or how, or when, or whose children she carried and gave birth to. Such a woman was my great-great-great grandmother.

    Speaking of individuals, let us consider one individual in the present. As a boy, I was raised in the bosom of a loving family and never once got into trouble with the law. I had the benefit of a college education, and today I live in an area that is as safe as a city neighborhood can be, one that does not provoke an aggressive police presence. I have a driver’s license but drive very rarely and thus have never been stopped for Driving While Black. I am polite — to a fault, some would say — and do not make a habit of arousing people’s ire, whatever those people look like. While I love my whiskey, I have imbibed no illegal substances to speak of, and I have certainly never sold any, not least because I have never had to do so; I have never had a lot of money, and at some points in my life I have had very little indeed, but even in those moments I was spared the bleak choices facing those for whom the legal economy simply has no place, so that I have not once run afoul of the law for drug-related reasons and been subject to the inequities of the criminal justice system.

    Consider, in short, that I am probably as protected against racism as it is possible for a black man in America to be. Now consider that over the course of my life I have been followed out of stores, chased by a police car, told by an officer with his hand on his pistol to put my hands in the air, addressed with a nasty slur on the street, in a bar, and via email, told that I could not rent an apartment, greeted by police who were called after I was spotted at the door of my own residence, prevented from completing a job application, stopped by a cop who told me to quit following a group of women I had not noticed before then, told on the morning a job ad appeared that the job had been “filled,” stopped by a security guard on a college campus where I was a visiting writer, and I’ve forgotten what else — all for one reason, and perhaps I do not have to tell you what it is. My point here is that if these things have happened to me, we should consider what has happened to other black people in contemporary times. Better yet, read about the individual stories of flesh-and-blood individuals such as Trayvon Martin, Eric Garner, Sandra Bland, and the others whose skin color became their lethal fate.

    Now here comes the tricky part. It is difficult for black people to go from being immersed in thoughts of anti-black racism to considering the ethics of their attitudes toward whites. For many, the thought would simply never arise, and many others would not see the need or the benefit. It is a lot to ask of a historically oppressed group, one that continues to face discrimination and its attendant psychological burdens in the present, to bring objectivity and fair-mindedness to their encounters with representatives of the group that oppresses them. To be honest, I sometimes wonder why I care about this issue as much as I do, whether it means that I am just a strange person or have suspect motives, and I cannot say with perfect certainty that neither of these factors plays a part. I can say, with equal honesty, that I am not a self-hating black man who is prejudiced against other black people, as I have been accused of being. Do I, though, simply want to justify the life path on which my interests have taken me, in others’ eyes if not my own?

    That path led from the all-black neighborhood in Washington, D.C., where I grew up, to a mostly white college in the Midwest, the very first college to contact me, one that had what I wanted: a writing program. Certain that so-called race would be unimportant on a college campus in the post–civil rights world of 1981 (yes, I know), I thought nothing of being surrounded by so many whites. I held onto my high school friends, and I made new black friends, but I also made a slew of white friends, and that extended, eventually, to my dating life. I sigh, thinking of those friendships. One of my favorite memories from those years — really, from any years — is of staying up all night with a black friend, my roommate during our semester in London, drinking wine and gin and laughing our damn heads off in an upstairs room in the home of our host family, who were out of town. A white female friend still recalls the time I ran to her dorm room after she phoned me upset over a young man she was dating. Those friends and I still think of one another lovingly, even if, in some cases, we talk only sporadically. Our bond is eternal: we were young together.

    One of my black friends from that time, who is gone now, had the experience in high school that I had in college, of having a mostly white group of friends. If I discovered white people in college, he discovered black people — the tightly knit and frankly separatist group who lived for the most part in a dorm called African Heritage House (and who were deeply skeptical of me). “These black people here got their shit together,” I heard him say once, and for a time — which did not last for the rest of our college years — he put distance between himself and whites. For better or worse, probably some of both, I never went through that kind of rebellion, maybe in part because I grew up around black people who had “their shit together.” No, my rebellion, if it can be called that, was of a different sort and, unlike my friend’s, seems to be permanent. While I happily celebrate my black heritage, I also rebel, if only in my mind, against the importance that everyone attaches to skin color, and I rebel against those — and they are white as well as black — who feel there is something odd about me because of the way I have lived my life. I am not insensitive to those judgments, and perhaps I have internalized them to some degree, but something deep in me also shouts back, Am I crazy, or are all of you?

    The question may or may not be rhetorical.

    Perhaps a black person would have to be a little crazy, or at best hopelessly naïve, not to be wary of certain situations. I have a desire to tour large swaths of the country by car, but I am very leery of some of the people I might encounter on such an adventure. Most black people I know, including me, will look through the window before entering an unfamiliar bar or restaurant, scanning for brown faces, just to make sure we are not unwelcome. This kind of wariness is a tradition for us, a part of survival. These are not examples of what I mean by judging whites on the basis of their whiteness — and, by extension, judging blacks who associate with them. Here, rather, are examples. Another black college friend of mine told me that a black man visited his apartment, saw a picture of my wife and me on the wall, and wanted to know, “What’s up with the brother and the white chick?” To my friend’s lifelong credit, he replied, “That’s my brother and sister-in-law.” Then there was the flak that Darius Rucker of Hootie & the Blowfish got for making music with white guys. Such examples, and they are numberless, may be trivial and harmless in themselves, but I am troubled by the narrowness and provincial nature of the attitude they suggest — an orientation that defines blackness not by what it is but by what it must not become, as if blackness were mortally threatened by mere contact with the infamous “Other,” like the Wicked Witch of the West doused with water. Are we that fragile?

    I have digressed. Perhaps, as I was saying, some part of me simply wants to justify my life. But I also believe, deep in my heart, that the bulk of what I feel is something else.

    It is natural, even commendable, to want to protect and support one’s own, whether that means one’s immediate family or the people who look like oneself and thus have many of the same life experiences. No reasonable person would dispute that. We would think amiss of a father who did not care what happened to his children. Black people, including me, have great respect for a black person who stands up for them. And yet there is a sense in which to stand up for one’s own is to stand up for oneself, and while I admire this, there is something else I admire, too.

    If we are not careful, society can become one interminable game of Us and Them, and if Team Us is perpetually outnumbered and on the losing end, life for its members can be a never-ending effort to correct this imbalance. But this game is not all there is, because there is, or should be, more to life than self-defense and survival. I have in mind such things as pleasure, love, friendship, a sense of purpose, and another item I would sneak onto the list, which is the desire to be the best versions of ourselves. Many turn to religion for this; others of us do not see the need to enlist God in the effort. For me, being my best self has a very particular meaning. It means not placing my skin color over my own humanity, especially since others, some of whom wear badges, seem only too happy to do that for me. It means not judging others on the basis of superficial characteristics. Does this not sound like something we were all taught early in our lives? And is not skin the most superficial of all our traits, as in the phrase “skin deep?” It also means treating others, all others, as I would like to be treated. How I would like to be treated is with forgiveness, with the understanding that I intend well even when I don’t do so well.

    This brings us back to white people. I have known many in my life, some casually, some well. To be sure, those I have known might be called — if I am using this term correctly — a skewed sample, since I move in liberal circles. It has been my experience that most of the white people in those circles — by no means all — have good hearts and mean well, even if their experiences do not necessarily give them the insights that others of us gain just by walking around with brown skin and kinky hair. I have reached this conclusion, which is based on decades of personal experience, by being open to people as individuals. Can appearances of good-heartedness be deceiving? Of course. Is the most open-hearted progressive white person capable, in a bad moment, of saying something most black people would find objectionable, something that may reveal a questionable attitude? Yes, and I have experienced that, too.

    I have seen the horror on a white person’s face when they realize what they have just said. It is the same horror I feel when I have unthinkingly misgendered a student, the same horror I felt many years ago when I made a joke about the SS to a co-worker who was, as I remembered two seconds too late, Jewish. The horror is often followed by a heartfelt apology. But not always; sometimes there is not even horror. Would I want to keep company with someone who tells racist jokes and can’t be convinced that they are not funny? Or with someone who otherwise will not be made to see his own cluelessness? As some black folks say, Aww, hell naw. (Or as some whites say, Hard pass.) But others respond well to being told that they have crossed a line. I have done this with people whose friendship I value. To the initial unease of one friend, I did it with her father, who responded very graciously. (I had told him I would have a story in an anthology of African-American fiction. He joked, “I didn’t know black people wrote.” I sent him a lengthy list of black writers.)

    Some will say that life is too short to spend trying to teach white folks how to behave. But I want to stress two points here. The first is that life is not only short but also thrillingly unpredictable, and you never know where your words will end up or the impact that they may have. Thanks to a conversation I overheard in a Starbucks, I went the next night to a screening of a film by Bertrand Blier, whose work I now want to explore further — and now you have heard of him too, if you hadn’t before. For a brief time as a young man, I, the son of two postal clerks, had the ear of a former First Lady of the United States, and the most famous and glamorous one at that; she was an editor at the publishing company where I worked as an editorial assistant in the years rights after college, and at one point her office was about ten feet from my desk. I remember talking to this woman about my mother, who was still living then, and I like to think, though I cannot recall, that I passed on some of Ma’s folksy Virginia-bred wisdom.

    The second point is that I would not have been in a position to share my point of view with my friends, to speak words to them that could — you never know — someday end up far from my mouth, had I not been open to those friends as individuals. I lay much of the blame for the divisiveness of our era on our forty-fifth president, whose election (and now re-election) was, to my mind, the worst thing to happen to this country in my lifetime, largely because he has made so many people feel that it’s fine not to give a damn about others. I do not know to what extent the treatment of others as individuals, as a tool for both conveying an understanding of the past and emphasizing what needs to happen in the future, can help put an end to this divisiveness. Nor do I know to what extent individual encounters and personal relationships can have an impact on institutional racism. I applaud the efforts of Black Lives Matter and earlier civil rights organizations to address institutional racism through group-based direct action, but I do know that institutions are made up, in the end, of individuals. And I know that while individuals do not necessarily care about groups to which they do not belong and which, for that reason, may live in their minds only as abstract notions, they care about other individuals, who can serve as their entry points for thinking about the concerns of those groups. This is where my hope lies.

    It was this hope that led me to a small experiment.

    Through social media and email, I asked volunteers to write to me if they had had the following experience: “meeting and talking with someone whose skin color, ethnicity, or sexuality was different from yours led you to consider, in a way you had not before, the experiences of the group to which that person belongs.” Sixteen people responded, thoughtfully and at some length, in ways that underscore, for me, the importance of cross-groups encounters; many of these encounters and exchanges would not have been possible without the willingness, on both sides, to treat others as individuals. In the following paragraphs I paraphrase some of the respondents’ stories and quote a few lines directly.

    A white woman, when she was much younger, asked her late brother-in-law, who was black, if black people use sunscreen. He responded, “Some do, some don’t, just like white people.” That response, spoken without anger or a lecture, was “a brilliant way of getting me to consider that ‘Some do, some don’t, just like other people’ is the answer to most questions about how any group behaves or any group’s preference.” The same woman worked, in the pre–George Floyd era, on publications for a college where a black colleague and friend capitalized the word “Black”; the woman told her colleague that the organization did not cap the word, but when the colleague explained her reasons, the woman agreed and relayed the explanation to higher-ups, who did not change their minds. This revealed to the woman “the kneejerk response of all of us gatekeepers to just do the same old thing unthinkingly; and then how quickly it all changed, as if there had never been a rule to begin with and all the old reasons we relied on went out the window.”

    A man of mixed black and Hispanic heritage noted that he has friends who are Chinese and gay, and that “their world and experience is so different from that of the Hispanic, white, or black gay men whom I know. Based on what they have told me, they have it tougher with little to no support.” Another black man came to a similar conclusion, thanks to interactions with Asian friends. A Chinese-American friend, he said, “blew my mind for thirty minutes straight with tales of micro and macro aggressions.” The friend told of riding his bike while carrying takeout food and hearing a white man, in the course of “explaining the world” to his toddler, saying, “That’s the delivery guy who brings us food ” — words that left the friend “literally dizzy with rage.” The black man learned that Asians “are on the receiving end of a particular kind of dehumanizing that I’ve never experienced in white liberal spaces.”

    Whites who responded also told of realizing from individual encounters what other groups — blacks in particular — experience. One white woman wrote that a friend of hers, a black woman, confided that she is leery of being friends with white women because she doesn’t know if those women simply want to have a black friend. Another white woman, accompanying her daughter’s fifth-grade class on a trip to Ellis Island, watched the white kids “happily looking up their ancestors on computers” while the black kids “just sat on the steps with their faces in their hands. All they had to look at was a lone and unimpressive map of the slave trade.” The kids who got in trouble with the teacher that day were mostly black, and when the woman told the teacher that “maybe the field trip triggered some resentment,” the teacher refused to hear it. A third white woman wrote, “A black friend ended up in handcuffs when she went to check her mail because the police didn’t expect a black woman to be living in a white neighborhood. I’ve never had that problem.” Still another white woman, who had not been around many blacks while growing up but made black friends as an adult, wrote that “it took some intimacy to progress from the intellectual conviction that human beings are human beings, that racism is a foundational American evil, etc., to losing in my bones a sense of the otherness of Black people. . . . Now that I’ve written this I’m kind of embarrassed about it.” One white man recalled that in high school, he joined a previously all-black music group. His experience of becoming close to the band members “helped me see how being black meant you were less likely to be seen by whites (like me) for who you were. You were simply ‘black.’” A couple of other white people wrote of their surprise on hearing black people celebrate the European parts of their heritage — and of what their own surprise revealed to them about their previous assumptions, which one called “totally stupid and narrow-minded.”

    Several people had their eyes opened by the experiences of spouses or close relatives. A white man wrote of talking to his transgender son and other young trans people and becoming “very conscious that the feeling of being trans is deep-going and genuine, not some fad.” A white man observed that seeing his child’s transgender male friend appear “so much happier and lighter than throughout the years before” made him realize “how right this seemed.” A white immigrant woman who married a biracial/black man in the 1970s was exposed to many instances of racism, such as hearing that the apartments the couple went to see together had already been rented — even though those apartments “had been available when I called 30 minutes earlier.” One white woman respondent was raised Catholic, married a Jewish man, and raised their sons as Jews; the woman wrote of “being able to witness [Jews’] collective identity and faith and then . . . witness their collective fear as well. I’m not sure I had connected those before.”

    All well and good, as Ma used to say. But in one of my books I identified indifference as being at the heart of our troubles surrounding so-called race. The obstacle to equality is not that white people are racist — though of course many are — but that many, perhaps most, simply do not care enough to want to make a change. Indifference is a chillingly powerful force. The testimonies that I have cited above, which come from exposure to the experiences of individuals, are heartfelt, and all of them are stories of personal enlightenment that may lead in some cases to the waning of indifference. But are the feelings that they express of the kind that ever translate into change at the institutional level?

    Here are two more testimonies, which I present to suggest the value of cross-racial exchanges and the potential power of a focus on individual experience. One story is from a white man who directed a creative writing program. He was in charge of hiring guest faculty, mostly through his network of personal acquaintances. “I don’t remember,” he writes, “if I even thought about the fact that most of them were white. At some point a few MFA students talked to me about their frustration with the lack of diversity among the teachers in the program. One Hispanic student told me that in both of the workshops she’d taken so far, her teachers and peers compared her writing to that of Sandra Cisneros, a writer with whom she said she actually had nothing in common — it was just that they seemed to lack a better frame of reference. These conversations really stayed with me and in their wake I completely rethought my hiring practices. This took place before the modern era of DEI bureaucracies, which, whatever their problems, do much to ensure that white ‘gatekeepers’ no longer rely unthinkingly on their personal networks, as I did at first.”

    The second story is also from a white man, who in this case was moved by the death of an individual: George Floyd. What happened to Floyd “made me wake up and recognize,” he writes, “that I couldn’t just let myself rest in my accomplishments and privilege.” He went on to build a startup company called Homesy, which “is designed to lower the barriers to home ownership by creating a data-driven, no-commission network of homesellers, buyers, and real estate–curious people who have faced a history of ‘real estate racism’” — racism that was “supported by the US government in concert with the National Association of Realtors.”

    I want to end with the most important thing I have to say, which is that what I am suggesting is not for the benefit of white people. No, I have others in mind.

    I am at my desk, writing this by hand, using the pen that Ma gave me, in the room where my children used to sleep. My wife now calls this room my office. I suppose it is. Taped to the wall in front of me are handwritten lists of names, including Jackie Ormes, Sam Milai, Mansa Musa, and Ali Ber; there is a sketched likeness of E. Ethelbert Miller, and to the left of that, a postcard reproduction of a work by William H. Johnson. If some or all of these names are unfamiliar to you, I encourage you to investigate them, should you feel so inspired. They all have one thing in common, and they have it in common with the group of people for whom I am writing.

    Near my desk, beneath my hat rack, is my stereo. On days when I am in my office preparing to teach, jazz plays. I hear the mostly wordless eloquence of Louis and Lil Armstrong, Charles Mingus, Eric Dolphy, Booker Little, Joe Pass, Bill Evans, Esperanza Spalding, or Lafayette Harris, and even when I am too absorbed in reading student work to take in every note, I feel sustained by this music, this black creation (whoever is playing it now), this testament to our resourcefulness, grit, imagination, intelligence, and adaptability. I was reared in the black world that created this gift to world culture. I care profoundly about our heritage and our well-being. I want us to be as fine as we can be.

    It Takes So Little

    Thousands of minutes and hours,
    deeds and words,
    specifications,
    delusions,
    mistakes
    without end,
    longing,
    flesh —
    it takes so much
    to create
    a single person —
    that he be,
    that he survives,
    that he feels a hand on his shoulder,
    that others say to him “It is you.”

    And it is so easy for him
    not to be,
    not to be this person,
    to be done,
    to be gone.
    Or for a place that was a home
    to no longer be the home
    that it was.
    It takes so little
    for a home to cease,
    to crumble,
    to return to dust,
    and for a land that was a place
    no longer to be the place
    that it was,
    for a home to fail in it
    and for a person to return
    to its dust.

    So little is required for a place
    once again to not be a home.
    So little is required
    to not be.

    The desire must be so strong,
    so strong the desire to live,
    so as to come back,
    so as to come back to being.

    December 12, 2024

    Translated by Leon Wieseltier