9 Poems

    Yehuda Halevi

    Nine Poems

    Yehuda Halevi (c. 1075–1141) was the Hebrew poet who culminated the startling period of Andalusian cultural production that Jewish history calls the Golden Age. In a moment of symbiosis in Islamic Spain from the eleventh to the twelfth centuries, Hebrew poetry flowered as it had not since the Bible and would not again until the modern era. A courtier-rabbi class arose serving Muslim rulers, steeped in their Arabic language and culture. The men of this new Jewish elite adapted Arabic poetics to Hebrew, including quantitative meters and a purist approach to the lexicon, while adopting Arab poetry’s embrace of secular alongside religious verse.

    Halevi was born on the frontier between al-Andalus and Castille, possibly in Tudela, while it was still under Muslim control. As a teenager he went south to Granada, where he rose to prominence as one of the finest Hebrew poets of the age. In addition to over eight hundred extant religious and secular poems, he wrote (in Arabic) The Kuzari, an important work of Jewish philosophy that challenged the rationalism that was ascendant in the Jewish thought of the period. He was also a successful physician and merchant who moved, in the increasing political instability of the period, between a number of communities, including Lucena, Seville, and Christian Toledo.

    Late in his life Halevi repudiated Andalusian cosmopolitanism and prepared for a rare and dangerous pilgrimage to Palestine, which he undertook shortly before he died. His poems from this period are known as his Shirei Tzion (Songs of Zion), and they reflect the “mystical geography” (in Hillel Halkin’s phrase) laid out in The Kuzari, which holds the Land of Israel as the site of utmost Jewish holiness. While many modern thinkers have claimed this work of Halevi’s as proto-Zionism, it resists such retroactive categorization. The scholar Raymond Scheindlin has argued persuasively that Halevi was following the period’s Islamic pattern of the mutawakkil, an ascetic withdrawal from society and dramatic altering of one’s life.

    In keeping with their Arabic models, the Golden Age poets wrote for the most part a highly, almost extravagantly, ornamental verse. Their work is sonically lush with alliteration, assonance, and interwoven consonants and vowels; and syntactically dense with double and triple puns, homonyms, and other wordplay. It is also written within elaborate formal constraints in a Biblical Hebrew which layers it with intertextual references to that canon (as well as the contemporary Arabic poetry on which it is modeled). It thus presents an extreme case of the inadequacy of translation in general. 

    My particular focus as a translator is on the sound, or what poets like to call the music, of this poetry. As a poet reading these poems I experience above all an utter reveling in the materiality of language. My goal is to create versions that approach some of this sonic richness. In this light I have chosen the music over form and precision of content. I aim to render this music as immediate as possible, and so I sometimes adapt archaic images and terms to ones with more resonance in contemporary language.

    Dan Alter

     

    [Beloved did you forget . . . ]
    Beloved did you forget how you slept between my breasts
    & why have you sold me forever into chains

    Didn’t I chase after you once in an untamed land
    Mountains & sand, Dead Sea & Sinai my witnesses

    You had my love & I was your desire, so how
    Can you share out my riches without me?

    Pushed into Seir, forced toward Kedar,
    Turned in the furnace of Greece, abused in the bond of Iran

    Who besides you could set me free
    Who but me, so caged by hope?

    Lend me your strength,
    I will give you my tenderness

    [Oh homeland don’t 
you wonder]

    Oh homeland don’t you wonder on your captives,
    who call to you, the ones left of your pastures

    From seaward to sunrise, tree-line to barrens,
    calling from far or close by from all sides 

    Call of a captive of desire, who sheds tears like dew
    on Hermon’s peaks, & longs to let them fall on your mountains

    When I wail out your torment I’m a hound, & when I dream
    your homecoming has come, I’m strung with your songs

    My heart beats to Beth-El & louder at P’niel
    & Makhanayim & every point your pure ones touched

    Where the holy nearness filled your winds, your maker
    opened your windows to the windows of skies

    & only God’s glow for your light, no
    sun moon or stars to illuminate you

    I would let my last breath spill out right where
    the divine spirit overflowed your chosen ones

    You’re the royal home & the holy seat & how
    have servants sat down on your heroes’ thrones?

    If only I could wander in the places
    God was shown to your envoys & seers

    & who will make me wings & I will range
    with my heart in pieces between your ragged peaks

    I would fall to my face on your ground & thrill
    to your stones & feel your sweet dust with my fingers

    & then standing on my ancestors’ gravestones,
    I’d be stunned in Hevron how your finest are buried there

    I would cross your forests & terraces & pause
    in awe at the Gilead ridgeline where Moses was buried

    His & Aaron’s burial mountains, those two huge
    lights shining on you, showing you the way

    Living breath — the air of your soil, & myrrh fragrance
    the grains your earth, & honey-flow for your rivers

    It would soothe my mind to go shoeless, naked
    in the waste & ruins that were your shrines

    Where your ark was hidden away, where cherubim
    stayed in your innermost chambers

    I’d shear off my hair grown in devotion, curse the years
    in unclean lands that fouled your most devoted

    How fine can the food on my plate taste when I see
    your young lions dragged along by dogs?

    Or how will daylight sweeten my eyes, while
    I watch crows carry away their kill of your eagles 

    Slow now, cup of suffering, ease up, my belly
    & soul are swollen with your bitterness

    When I remember Jerusalem straying, I drink,
    & her fallen sister Samaria, & I drain it

    Zion loveliest crown, how you weave love & grace
    as of old & your friends’ souls woven through you

    Those who smile if you’re at peace & ache
    at your desolation & weep for your shattered pieces

    From a captive’s pit yearning for you, each
    in his place bowing toward the arches of your gates

    Your numberless herds driven out & scattered
    from mountain to hilltop but your fence-lines not forgotten

    Who cling to your fringes & fight to climb
    & grasp onto your date palms’ canopies

    Could Babylon & Egypt ever match you, their hollow
    prayers compare to the gemstones you told truths with?

    Who will compare to your nobles & holy men,
    your chanters in the temple, singers in the choir?

    False-god kingdoms will fall & be gone — your force
    is forever, through the generations your jewels

    God sought you for a home, & joy to a human who
    has chosen, draws closer, to dwell in your courtyards

    Joy to one who awaited, arrives, lays eyes
    on your light dawning & your sunrises burst upon him

    To see your chosen thriving, to thrill in your joy
    as you come back to your long-ago bloom

     

    [West, this is your wind, wings]

    West, this is your wind, wings      perfumed with balm & apple
    You come from the trader’s warehouses,       not the storehouses of wind
    You lift the swallow’s wing calling me to freedom      like the fragrance of just-picked aloes
    How we all long for you, by whom      we ride a few boards over the sea
    Please don’t ease off your touch on the ship      when day catches up or settles down
    Level the depths, spread the sea open,       don’t stop until you reach the holy mountains
    Rebuff the easterly that thrashes up the seas      until the waves seethe like a pot boiling over
    But what can the wind do, bound in God’s hand,       now restrained, now he sends it?
    My only wish: in the hand of the One on high      who raises high mountains & makes the win

     

    [In distances a dove]

    In distances a dove strayed into a forest
    lost, not knowing how to recover

    Hovering, wings swinging spun
    wheeling circles around her beloved


    Counting down the millennia to redemption
    but her figuring leaves her dumbfounded


    Having suffered for her lover long years
    of wandering, soul exposed to the grave

    Saying I will no more remember his name
    but it lights in her heart like flame:


    Why would you be her enemy, her beak
    parted for your salving spring rain


    She believes to her depths, turning from despair
    whether she’s raised up or suffers by him

    Let our God come, no longer silent
    fire rising on all sides of him

     

    [Gently, with your soft waist]

    Gently, with your soft waist but heart      hard, gently with me, I surrender.

    Straying only with my eyes, my heart      pure but my eyes drunk on you.

    Let those eyes gather roses      & lilies where they grow together

    in your cheeks, from which I rake fire      to fight fire & if I’m thirsty find water there.

    I would sip the red lips glowing      like coals, & my moth tongs. My life

    suspends between those crimson lines      but with sundown my death comes. Then

    I find only nights with no end where once      was no midnight for days, time

    was in my hands like clay & constellations      spun like the potter’s wheel.

     

    [Cry out, forest, for a cedar]

    Cry out, forest, for a cedar, for one
    who waited for daylight, but night fell. 

    No, I didn’t know the Seven Sisters
    could die with him, & the morning star.

     

    [Lately with winter rains]

    Lately with winter rains      the land has nursed on a cloud like a baby
    or like a bride shut in by the cold      longing for days of love,
    hours of touching, until spring      comes to ease her aching heart.
    Dressed in flowerbeds of gold & brocade      the way a girl thrills
    at her clothes as she changes      & shares them with everyone.
    Day by day the hues go      amber to ruby to pearl,
    turning pale or green & then      reddening as if kissing.
    So beautiful I wonder      if they’re stars stolen from heaven.
    At dawn we come where the trees lean      with wine & our hearts flaring,
    wine snow-cool to the fingers      that lights fire inside us
    rising from its jug like a sun      to flow into our fine glasses.
    As we stroll under the garden’s shade      it laughs at a rain shower weeping,
    smiles when a cloud cries shaking off       droplets like a burst necklace,
    savoring the swallow-call like liquor      or when the dove behind leaves
    tells a secret like a singer       swinging her body behind a screen.
    How I miss the breeze of those dawns      where my friends’ scent lingers,
    wind which sways the myrtle, wafts      its fragrance to them far away
    lifting & lowering the branches      as palm fronds clap along to bird song.

     

    [She, washing dresses]

    She, washing dresses in the rain
    of my tears, then spreading them in her sunlight

    to dry, has no need of springs with my
    two eyes, nor sun, given how she shines. 

     

    [My heart is in the east]

    My heart is in the east, while I’m in the far west
    how can I savor the food in my mouth?

    How make good my pledges & vows, with Zion
    tied down by Edom & I’m in Arab bonds?

    As easy to leave all the fineness of Spain
    as it would be sweet to see the ruins of the Shrine

    The Adults in the Room

    I was a liberal before I knew what the word meant, before I had read a word of Locke, Mill, Berlin, and Rawls, before, in fact, I knew anything about the world at all. Liberalism was not a political idea; it was a family loyalty, born in the blood, and it became a way of life. We liberals commonly tell ourselves that, unlike the far right and the far left, we reach our beliefs through a rational inspection of the world as it is, but I didn’t get my ideas that way. I didn’t form my convictions through a critical evaluation of evidence about life as it actually was. I was born a liberal. 

    My parents were liberals, their friends were liberals, and my father worked for thirty years for liberal governments in Canada. Some of my earliest memories are political: at the age of five, in 1952, watching the Republican convention with my parents on the first fuzzy black- and-white TV we ever owned. My parents were Canadian diplomats in Washington, and they were for Adlai, not Ike, and like their American friends they were horrified by McCarthy, the scowling Republican bully who presided over the Senate Army hearings. So before I knew anything at all, pretty much as soon as I could stand up and put on my own clothes, the label had been sown into the shirt on my back.

    While other kids had baseball or hockey stars for heroes, mine were Jack and Bobby Kennedy, Bayard Rustin, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Rosa Parks. By the age of twelve, I was copying Jack Kennedy’s mannerisms. I couldn’t do the Boston brahmin accent, but I could put my hand in my blazer pocket, with my thumb down the front seam, the way he did. By the time I was twenty-one I knew by heart Bobby Kennedy’s improvised speech in Indianapolis on the night of King’s assassination, to comfort a shocked and grieving black crowd, quoting Aeschylus about the “awful grace of God”. In those terrible months of spring and early summer in 1968, when both King and Kennedy were murdered, I campaigned for Pierre Trudeau, bringing delegates over to our side in the tumultuous five ballot struggle at the convention that elected him leader of the Liberal Party and then traveling with him on the cross-country campaign that elected him Prime Minister in June 1968. I was twenty-one years old. Bliss it was in that dawn. It was the only political campaign I have ever been part of where we knew we were going to win, the only question was by how much. It was also the only political campaign where I saw what winning meant. Two nights after his victory I was invited out to Harrington Lake, the Prime Minister’s country residence, to dine with him and one of his then current girlfriends. Instead of exhilaration, there was exhaustion in Trudeau’s eyes, and I thought I saw fear too, in his dawning realization of what it meant to hold power. 

    My heroes may have been Americans, but my liberalism was Canadian all the way down. Liberalism prides itself on its cosmopolitanism, but in truth all liberalisms are local, since, as the man said, all politics is local. Canadian liberalism had all the self-congratulatory earnestness particular to a small official elite, to whom my parents belonged. It was a managerial doctrine of moderation appropriate for a small country, with no imperial destiny like its neighbor next door, but instead trying to muddle through, holding together a continental nation-state the size of America but with a tenth of its population in a harsh but beautiful landscape where, as Margaret Atwood said a long time ago, the name of the game was survival. 

    Yet, in its muddling way, Canada did more than survive. In the surge of postwar prosperity Canadian liberalism did some great things, a new national flag, a new constitution and charter of rights, a new immigration policy, a national pension and a national health care program. The canard that liberalism never dares to take on big enemies is false. To make all this happen, liberal governments had to take on provincial governments, resurgent Quebec nationalism, and vested interests coast to coast, chief among them the pharmaceutical companies and the doctor’s lobbies. So I grew up with a liberalism that knew how to fight. It was unafraid to tame capitalism and to “socialize” medicine and pensions in order to take the fear of catastrophic illness and poverty in old age out of people’s lives. Liberalism’s victories in the 1950s and 1960s laid the foundations of a welfare state not just in Canada, but also in Europe and America. Lyndon Johnson’s administration secured Medicare for elderly Americans and Head Start for poor children. 

    We liberals of the 1960s thought we had laid the granite of basic security under everyone’s feet. Sixty years later, the granite is cracking, the liberal state is frayed, contested, underfunded, straining at the seams, and we are defending our achievement, and none too successfully, against populists and authoritarians who want to take it apart. They have mobilized resentment at the price of social solidarity, but they offer no solutions, or solutions so drastic, such as the forcible deportation of millions of migrants, that they would tear society to pieces. A politics that stokes anger without proposing solutions is not a politics. It is only manipulation, and we like to think that we are in the solution business. 

    We are right about that, but we keep on defending achievements of long ago instead of raising our sights and finding a way to fund and reinvent social solidarity for the twenty-first century. For my heyday — 1945 to 1975, what the French call les trente glorieuses, the glorious thirty years of robust growth and relative equality — has gone forever. Beginning with the oil crisis of the 1970s, an abyss slowly opened up between a credentialed elite and an uncredentialed working class whose steady union jobs were stripped out and shipped overseas. Those of us who got the credentials to enter the professional classes did well, but plenty of our fellow citizens fell behind. We didn’t notice this in time, and our failure opened up a chasm between who we were, what we believed, and the people we represented. We kept offering “equality of opportunity,” a chance for the credentialed few to enter the professional elite, without tackling capitalism’s remorseless distribution of economic disadvantage itself. 

    By the late 1990s, the conservatives began to gain power by playing to the resentments of the ignored. The authoritarian right, especially, understood that they could build an entire politics on mocking the blindness of the liberal elite. They didn’t need solutions; stoking the rage was enough. We are now the embattled object of that rage. What will it take to earn the trust of those whose discontent we ignored? Liberalism in the next generation will need to save social solidarity from the “creative destruction” of the market, by rebuilding the fiscal capacity of the liberal state and investing in the public goods that underpin a common life for all. Saying this, at a high level of generality, is easy enough: the tougher part will be finding the language and the cunning to convert a radical liberalism into a politics that wins elections and a governing strategy that pushes change through 
the veto-rich thicket of interests waiting to derail our best laid plans.

    In the meantime we lament the “identity politics” of our populist and authoritarian competitors, when it would be more honest to admit that identity is where all political belief actually comes from, including our own. My identity — charter member of the white professional classes of Canada — defined my liberalism. What the liberal critique of identity politics does get right, though, we owe to our much-maligned individualism. Identity is not destiny. Every formative confrontation with reality presents each of us with political choices. We can either make up our own minds or borrow someone else’s beliefs. The convictions that stick are the ones that we decide for ourselves. The beliefs that we hold onto are the ones that first required a primal Yea or Nay to the allegiances we started life with. In the 1960s, I could have rebelled against my parents’ liberalism. Many of my generation 
did. Instead I said yes to the world I was born into and to the parents I was lucky enough to have. 

    Black friends of my generation also said yes to their parent’s allegiances, and they remain committed to deliver the still withheld promise of American equality. But this liberal inflection isn’t a racial obligatory. The black entertainment superstars of succeeding generations, with their bling and their Bentleys and their “attitude,” appear to have emancipated themselves from the entirety of their civil rights inheritance and its liberal conscience. So no, identity does not give us our politics. I was born a liberal, but I stayed one for life because I chose the liberal tribe as my own.

    How tribes shape you depends on the times that shape the tribe. My liberalism’s primal beginning was World War II. My parents were in their twenties when the war picked them up by the scruff of their necks and changed them forever. They found each other in London in the midst of the Blitz and the V-2s. They came to maturity during the most dramatic expansion of state power in history. In the space of five short years, Canada, like the United States, became an arsenal of democracy and fielded an army that landed in Normandy and liberated Europe. Their generation discovered the power of government, and the idea that government could be the problem and not the solution was inconceivable to them. There seemed to be nothing that a democratic government under arms couldn’t do, even defeat absolute evil. 

    Because they had watched their world burn down, theirs was a liberalism with internationalism at its heart. Human rights, the United Nations Charter, and the spider’s web now known as the “rules-based international order” were not the vapid bromides that they have become, but my father’s life-calling. He was part of an international generation of public servants who believed that the United Nations system, with its rules and its treaties, would tie down the predators in the international system and keep the small fry safe. 

    Their generation also knew what it was to hunker down in a bomb shelter with strangers, trying to keep the talk in the darkness light while the ground shook. They had lived the cross-class solidarity of those wartime shelters, and they came home from the war believing that liberal government could bind the classes together in peacetime. My left-leaning generation was just as sentimental about working people, except that we didn’t know any actual workers. As a student journalist in the 1960s, I once spent a morning on a picket line with printing workers who had been locked out of the plant that printed our university paper. It was a cold autumn morning, and we walked up and down, in front of the plant, carrying picket signs and what I remember best was not the warm glow of solidarity, but a red-faced feeling that I had nothing but good intentions to share with the big men who knew in their bones that they were marching not to victory but to the unemployment line. 

    Looking back now, liberals of my generation didn’t realize that the welfare state we grew up in did not unite classes. It interposed a state bureaucracy between classes, and its programs divided those who earn salaries from those who claim benefits. The rising costs of social solidarity divided citizens into warring camps. Exiting from liberal arrogance means finding a way back to a liberal politics of cross-class solidarity. 

    Exiting from arrogance also means, even if this sounds contradictory, recovering what that inheritance actually believed, before liberalism slipped into the suave managerial discourse it became in the Clinton and Blair years. For my parent’s wartime generation, it was a fighting creed. They knew that they were fighting against: fascism’s cult of death, its loathing of Jews, its national and racial hatred, its lust for conquest and domination. Against these forces of darkness, there was no place for compromise, moderation, splitting the difference, all the liberal virtues. This was a fight to the death that had to be won. 

    We can still learn from this intransigence. The Nazi marches in East Germany, the re-packaged Vichyite racism in the National Rally of Marine Le Pen, and the jeering anti-Semitism in Charlottesville, Virginia, show us that malignity never rests. Liberalism today would do well to be less self-deceiving about its opponents. I used to believe that liberalism only faces adversaries who could be allies tomorrow. I have had to learn there are some enemies in the house, dangerous to democracy, fatal to every liberal achievement, who simply have to be defeated, over and over again. 

    With the onset of the Cold War, my parents’ generation’s anti-fascism turned into anti-communism. By lining up against the Soviet threat, recent revisionists have argued, their generation abandoned their progressive New Deal beliefs and became apologists for American hegemony. According to Samuel Moyn, liberal thinkers such as Isaiah Berlin and Judith Shklar — who happened to have been my teachers — let their anti-communism blind them to the ugly violence of America in its imperial heyday. This progressive critique is meant to chide contemporary liberalism into learning from its mistakes, but it has the opposite effect. It severs the liberalism of today from potential sources of renewal. For if there is anything that Cold War liberalism can teach the next generation, it would be its unflinching opposition to authoritarian tyrannies and a determination to contain and deter their expansionist march. 

    Canadians, like Mexicans, do not need progressive Americans to tell them that America is an imperial power with blunt unilateralist instincts when it comes to defending vital interests. But we never forgot that America had fought fascism, stationed troops and weapons in Europe to deter the Soviets, and ensured that Western Europe stayed free, and we didn’t care overmuch that their motives, like any great power’s, were bound to be mixed. We also did not forget how long it took for America to enter World War II or to let in the refugees — too long, on both counts. So yes, the liberalism that became mine at adulthood was human rights universalist, militantly anti-communist, strongly internationalist, and pro-American at its core. 

    Besides, America also shared with the rest of the world an exuberant popular culture created by artists of genius. My parents’ heroes were Louis Armstrong, Fats Waller, and Ella Fitzgerald. Mine were Buddy Holly, Bob Dylan, Marvin Gaye, Sam Cooke, Wilson Pickett, and the Four Tops, names which still conjure up, across sixty years, what it felt like to be sixteen. It would be comical to call this music liberal, but it was certainly liberating, and it was profoundly American. This was a music of freedom and soulfulness, and tenderness too, and the fusion of black and white music promised something at once exciting, terrifying, and new: a truly inter-racial society. A young white teenager such as myself didn’t know a single black person well, but in our high school dances we danced to black music. We went to basement clubs and listened to grizzled old bluesmen, up from the deep South, and we knew by heart all the haunting and apocalyptic lyrics of Robert Johnson. This was still an innocent time when whites and blacks could learn what they wanted from each other’s culture, before the ban on “cultural appropriation” forced us all back into the false authenticity of our exclusive tribes. 

    We embraced black music, but we had no real idea about what was at stake in the struggles to the south of us. In the summer of 1963, President Kennedy gave his first television address on racial justice. I was sixteen, at my aunt’s house, having dinner with her sister’s husband, Clark Foreman, a New York lawyer, who did pro bono work for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. I proclaimed how impressed I had been by Kennedy’s speech. Foreman lowered his bifocals, stared me down across the table, and shook his head. I insisted Kennedy was going as fast as he could. Fast enough? Bull Connor’s dogs were tearing the clothes off black demonstrators in Birmingham parks; Governor Wallace was standing at the door of his state university, barring entry to a qualified black man who wanted to study. Black churches were being dynamited, and young children were dying. 

    My inter-racial enthusiasms were too cautious by half, but the civil rights struggle gripped me. It offered a vision of inter-racial harmony as well as a politics of how to get there: through non-violent civil disobedience, mass rallies, legal challenges in the courts. In the space of a decade, black men and women perfected the whole repertoire of liberal politics for my generation, from the sit-ins and freedom marches in the American south to Rustin’s organizational effort that produced the March on Washington. It was a transformative experience to see that liberalism could be a fighting creed again, as it had been in my parent’s time — to see a young man named John Lewis, no older than I was, daring to cross Selma Bridge and being beaten bloody by the troopers, an image so resonant in memory that when, sixty years later, on Capitol Hill, I was introduced to Lewis, all I could do was clasp his hands and thank him, inarticulately, for the lesson in courage that he had taught us all. It was impossible for someone of my generation to hate an America that produced such a man. 

    When we entered college, we marched against the war in Vietnam, and borrowed the entire repertoire of black civil disobedience, not to denounce America, as our leftist friends wanted us to do, but to redeem it. Looking back now, I see that it was precisely then that a pro-American liberal like me made the emotional commitment that decades later led to a mistake that haunts me to this day: support for the war in Iraq. We had opposed the war in Vietnam to call America back to its better angels, and fifty years later the same instinctive belief in America, despite Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and all the avatars of doom I might have noticed, led me to support an operation that has become synonymous with imperial folly. 

    When I entered graduate school in history at Harvard in 1969, I continued marching against the Vietnam war, often with people far to the left of me, but my chief political commitment of the time was prison visiting at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Norfolk. My doctoral thesis was on the punitive side of Enlightenment liberalism, how intellectuals and philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham, Benjamin Rush, and others sought to replace the arbitrary violence of ancien regime punishment with the new carceral technology of the penitentiary. By day, I read historical documents in Langdell Law Library, while by night I sat in a poorly lit room, sixty miles south of Boston, behind bars with a dozen young black men doing time for murder, rape, and a host of other crimes.

    For four years, I came out every Tuesday night and sat across the table listening to them arguing, joking, and just being themselves with profane exuberance, often at my expense since I was the only white man in the room. As I got to know some of them, I helped them to get parole, or to get jobs, only to see them skip town or skip parole as soon as they tasted freedom. Some of what I learned was shocking, such as discovering that the handsome and articulate young man across the table was doing life for having thrown a skillet of boiling fat all over 
his girlfriend, blinding and scarring her forever. I had no conception of where such life-devastating rage could come from, or how a man could ever repent or repair such lethal harm. My years at Norfolk were the first moment in my life when I could see, plain as day, that a liberal upbringing was insufficient for me to understand the world I had entered.

    In 1973, in the wake of the Attica prison riots in upstate New York that claimed forty-three lives, a similar riot devastated Walpole, the medium security prison next to Norfolk, and I volunteered to go in and mediate the stand-off between police and inmates that followed the uprising. When I did get inside and toured the cell blocks, the anger that had consumed the place seemed elemental in its force. In the weeks that followed, I played out a classic liberal role — mediating between the prisoners barricaded inside the ruined prison and the state police, waiting outside, tear gas and truncheons and shotguns at the ready, to retake the institution. I did a night shift on the segregation ward, reserved for prisoners too dangerous to be in general circulation, and I remember sitting on a chair in near darkness at one end of the cell block while black men on lockdown poked mirrors out between the bars of their cell doors to keep me under observation. I was twenty-five years old. 

    As a young graduate student in the dark and turbulent 1970s, the education that changed me most was not at Harvard but at Norfolk. It led me out of innocence. Here was rage beyond understanding, directed obliquely at me because of my race. I had never experienced the impersonality of racial hatred, its fixation on your skin, its indifference to who you actually are. After the prison riot of 1973, I retreated back to academic work and wrote my dissertation on the origins of the penitentiary in more privileged precincts, in the stacks and cushioned reading rooms of the Harvard library system. 

    I earned my living teaching the first generation of young students to benefit from Harvard’s venture into affirmative action. Now, fifty years later, affirmative action and race-based admissions have been outlawed by the Supreme Court, to loud expressions of liberal despair, and so it is worth recalling that the first students to benefit from affirmative action were often miserable. I remember a young female student from South Carolina, the first in her family to attend college, saying between choked-back tears that liberal good intentions had gifted her a place in an elite institution, but not the belief that she had a right to be there. 

    Without realizing it, my generation of young white liberals was witnessing the problematic unfolding of a multi-dimensional and all-encompassing revolution. Affirmative action for black students was followed by the feminist upsurge. In the space of a generation, women went from being a minority in university classrooms to the majority. The girls we had dated in high school, with their gardenia corsages and “good girl” proprieties now became the young women discovering their sexuality and challenging our own. Outside the university, in the wider society, a little-noticed change in immigration law opened the door to Asian, Caribbean, and African immigrants who had been barred since the 1920s. In the same period, liberal democracies began decriminalizing homosexuality. As Pierre Trudeau said in 1967, “the state has no place in the bedrooms of the nation.”

    The Canada I grew up in had been white and aggressively heterosexual. By 1980, I was living in a multiracial and sexually pluralistic society, teaming with new citizens from every corner of the globe. The contrast is captured in a comparison of my University of Toronto graduation class photo of 1969 — mostly male, at least professedly straight, all white — and the graduation photo of the same age group, at the same college, in 2024 — majority female and every color of the rainbow, turbans, hijabs, and skullcaps all expressive of a new diversity which we liberals quickly turned into a religion of its own. 

    This still-unfolding multi-dimensional revolution turned out to be the cardinal liberal achievement of my era, but it enormously complicated the liberal task of finding the middle way between the Scylla and Charybdis of extremisms. We were naïve about the nature of this problem, preferring to believe that all reasonable human beings would embrace a revolution of inclusion, when the reality was that our generation had upended the entire social order, and even our own place in it. Diversity — of gender, sexual orientation, race, religion, and class — was a virtue in comparison to the dire cantonment of peoples in silos of exclusion, but liberals turned diversity into an ideology. Once an ideology, it quickly became a coercive program of invigilation of speech and behavior in the name of dignity and respect. 

    Credentialed whites of my generation welcomed the revolution because we could invite new recruits of color into our ranks without ever feeling that our own elite status was being challenged. We didn’t seem to notice that non-elite whites were threatened, even betrayed, by the new multiracial order. Faced with what we thought was white racism and sexism, when it was mostly fear, we began promulgating codes of speech and conduct to impose diversity as a new cultural norm. New bureaucracies in universities, corporate headquarters, 
and government offices enforced diversity at the price of freedom, the freedom to defend unpopular loyalties, to freely dislike others, to be funny at other people’s expense, to be critical of the pieties of others but especially our own. A liberalism whose defining value should have been liberty invented a diversity and inclusion industry, whose guiding principle may have been justice, but whose means of enforcement included coercion, public disgrace, and exclusion. 

    Worst of all, we censored ourselves, willingly turning off our bullshit detectors, and stilling the inner doubts that might have made us confront our mistakes. We abandoned the truism that arguments are true or false, irrespective of the race or the origins of the person who makes them. We began promoting arguments as true based on the gender, race, class, origins, or backstory (oppression, discrimination, history of family violence) of the person uttering them. The value that we placed on diversity and inclusion led us by stages to jettison a care for truth itself. We ended up compromising the very epistemological privilege that had provided us with such unending self-satisfaction. 

    In failing to pay heed to the fears of displacement that the liberal revolution created, we ended up creating a vital political opening for every strand of extreme opinion queuing up to speak on behalf of everyone whom liberals had stopped listening to. By the 2020s most liberals were walking back, at first nervously, and then with increasing speed, from our own self-righteous politics of virtue. First we made everyone else sick of our virtue-signaling and then we became sick of 
it ourselves.

    The irony was that the liberal revolution destabilized liberals as much as it upset those who were resisting it outright. For it was the liberal revolution of inclusion that fragmented the centrist consensus that had made the liberal revolution possible in the first place. Once each group — black, female, gay, and trans — achieved emancipation, many of them began to identify with their own group to the exclusion of wider civic-sized political aggregations of interest. The old political parties — Liberal in Canada, Democrat in the United States, social democratic in Europe — that had presided over the liberal revolution now saw their white working-class base heading for the exits, and their multicultural support splintering into autonomous groups each beginning to make a strange new epistemological claim: you can only understand me if you are like me. Only black people can understand the black experience of racism and police violence. Only women can understand the tyranny of patriarchy and the fear of male sexual violence. Only gays can understand what same sex love truly means. 

    The old liberal epistemology at least rested on egalitarian and universal premises. We believed that everyone was capable of entering to some degree into the mental worlds and lived experiences of others, because all of us, regardless of race, creed, ethnicity, or sexual orientation, were rational human creatures. This rationalist universalism disintegrated in the 1980s and 1990s, attacked by a new generation of “progressive” scholars as masculinist, colonialist, racist, and fundamentally condescending. This assault was supposed to awaken us to “intersectionality” — the interaction of disadvantages — but instead of drawing hurt constituencies together it fragmented them into highly sectarian and identity-based political groupings that foreclosed on alliances, shared understandings, and common political projects across race, class, and gender. So now liberals denounce the prison house of identity politics, without realizing the degree to which this new self-defeating politics is a consequence of the very revolution that we helped to foment. 

    Needless to say, at the time I understood little or nothing of this, but these were some of the factors — the complacent politics of virtue, the blindness to the new inequality, the conceit that ours was the only rational politics — that began to erode the electoral base that had sustained the center ground of Western liberal politics. The convictions of my youth had survived intact from 1968, sheltering me from any mind-changing encounter with the world that had metamorphosed around me after the end of the Cold War. When, in 2005, I left behind a professorship at Harvard and took the plunge into Liberal party politics in Canada, it didn’t feel like a crazy departure from security, tenure, and privilege, 
but instead as if my feet had been traveling homeward bound all along. 

    I had no idea of what I was letting myself in for. I had no understanding of my own inexperience, and no grasp of how weakened and debilitated the liberalism of my party had become. We were a party that kept winning elections and governing the country, but with a vote-share slowly declining in the small towns and rural districts and piling up in the downtown urban centers where the professional and commercial elites liked to live. When I led the party into an election in 2011, truth be told, the liberal platform had not much to offer a people still shocked by the financial crash three years earlier. Our message, though we never said so directly was “trust us, we are the adults in the room.” We even called ourselves “the natural party of government.” On election night in 2011, our party suffered the worst defeat in our history, and I lost my seat in parliament — a verdict that all these years later reads to me like a judgment on me, but also on a liberalism that had allowed itself to be captured by its own self-regard.

    Defeat is a great teacher. It taught me that liberalism endures because it is a way of being and a set of values that tell us who we should try to be. This is what gives liberalism its hidden resilience, its capacity to rebuild after political reversals. If we want to rebuild, we will need to recover what the word used to mean. It once was a synonym for generosity. In the old days, a liberal gentleman was a generous man. We will want to discard these male, elitist associations by marrying generosity to the egalitarian individualism at the core of the liberal creed. The creed tells us that we are no better than anybody else but also no worse. What liberals value should be within everyone’s reach. A liberal person wants to be generous, open, alive to new possibilities, willing to learn from anyone. We want to share whatever wealth and fortune we have, to welcome strangers to our table, to stand up for people when they are in trouble. We know we have to change our minds when someone’s idea is better than ours. We have faith that history rewards those willing to fight for what they believe. Now, none of us is ever as generous as we would like to be and no liberal has a monopoly on generosity, but the largeness of spirit it calls us to does define our horizon of hope. 

    Such values are embattled today, and they need defending because our societies so desperately need largeness of spirit, together with a revived liberal ideal of solidarity. We need to be filling out this vision and bringing our citizens to believe in it. Defeat has taught me that we cannot afford to jettison our values when the tides of politics turn against us. Liberalism’s incorrigible vitality comes from the fact that it tells us who we most deeply want to be, provided that we are willing to fight for it and never surrender to the passing fashions of despair.

    Egalitarian Idealists and Authoritarian Zealots: A Cautionary Memoir

    In 1952, a year after I was born and a decade and a half before I became an active participant on the American left, Daniel Bell published a book called Marxian Socialism in America, the first serious scholarly examination of the subject. He considered, among other questions, why the traditional Marxist parties in the United States had by then descended into abject political isolation. The Socialist Party of America (SP), which four decades earlier had enrolled over a hundred thousand members and attracted nearly a million voters in the presidential election of 1912, was reduced to less than a thousand aging stalwarts by 1952; its youth affiliate, the Young People’s Socialist League (YPSL), had fewer than a hundred. Further to the left (or to the east, given its affinity for the Soviet Union), the Communist Party, USA (CP) still counted roughly twenty thousand members, but many of its leaders were imprisoned or about to be imprisoned for violation of the Smith Act, a federal law making it a crime to conspire to teach or advocate the desirability of overthrowing the government. According to public opinion polls in the early 1950s, a clear majority of Americans believed that the Party should be outlawed entirely. 

    Bell, who had joined YPSL at the age of thirteen in the early 1930s, and who in the first election in which he was eligible to do so voted for Socialist Party presidential candidate Norman Thomas, now concluded that the American Marxists of all persuasions had been destined for failure from the beginning, their fate “rooted in [an] inability to resolve a basic dilemma of ethics and politics”:

    The socialist movement . . . in its rejection of the capitalist order as a whole, could not relate itself to the specific problems of social action in the here-and-now, give-and-take political world. It was trapped by the unhappy problem of living “in but not of the world,” so it could only act, and then inadequately, as the moral, but not political man in immoral society. . . . A religious movement can split its allegiances and live in but not of the world . . . ; a political movement can not.

    Bell continued in later years to describe himself as a socialist in economics if not in political allegiances, and his verdict was delivered in a regretful tone, at least in regard to the Socialist Party’s fate. In any case, from the perspective of the early 1950s, it would have been hard to disagree with his judgment that the Marxist left’s moment as a meaningful player in American political life had come and gone. 

    Fast forward a dozen years to 1964, when I turned thirteen, the age that Daniel Bell was when he joined the socialist movement more than three decades earlier. This was also a coming-of-age moment for me, as I first began paying attention to what was happening in the broader world outside of family, neighborhood, and school. In that year’s presidential election, I was a fierce (if still eight-years-under-the-voting-age) partisan of the candidacy of the Democratic incumbent Lyndon Baines Johnson, and took great satisfaction in his trouncing of his arch-conservative rival Barry Goldwater in November. But something else caught my attention in 1964 that was destined to have a lasting impact on my political trajectory: a sub-drama within the Democratic camp playing out in Mississippi. There, from June through August, about a thousand young civil rights volunteers from around the country were taking part in the Freedom Summer Project directed by a remarkable twenty-nine-year-old activist named Bob Moses, a leader of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). At the risk of their own lives (three would be kidnapped and murdered by the Klan at the very start of the project), the volunteers conducted a voter registration drive among the disenfranchised black population, and helped organize a new political formation called the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) as an alternative to the regular and staunchly white-supremacist Democratic Party in the state. 

    At summer’s end, the MFDP sent an integrated delegation of Mississippi residents to the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City to challenge the seating of the all-white regular delegates. Although President Johnson had overseen passage of the Civil Rights Act earlier in the year, fearful of losing the state and perhaps the entire south to Goldwater he dispatched a crew of established liberal and civil rights leaders to persuade the insurgent Mississippians to give up their challenge. In exchange, they were promised that the MFDP would be awarded two at-large delegates to the convention, along with the assurance that by 1968 all Democratic state delegations would then and thereafter be required to be open to black as well as white delegates. From the perspective of realpolitik, or what Bell would describe as the necessity of acting as “political man in an immoral society,” it was not an unreasonable offer. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was among those initially urging the MFDP delegates to accept it. Yet the MFDP delegates refused to do so. As Bob Moses declared, after King had spoken in favor of compromise, “This reasoning you’ve been giving us here is inaccurate. We’re not here to bring politics into our morality, but to bring morality into our politics.” 

    To bring morality into our politics: this was something new in mid-twentieth-century American major party politics, where compromise and consensus, defined as accepting the recognition that you were not going to get everything you initially asked for, were considered the fundamental rules of the game. Some things, the MFDP delegates decided, were not up for compromise, such as their claim to full and equal rights as citizens in the United States. Theirs was an example of the “in but not of the world” stance that, just a dozen years earlier, Bell had described as leading to inevitable political irrelevance. And yet, in this instance, it worked. Less than a year later, building on the uncompromising groundwork laid by Freedom Summer, the MFDP credentials challenge at Atlantic City, and the Selma voting rights campaign of the following spring, Congress enacted a Voting Rights Act signed into law by President Johnson that would transform southern politics. And in 1968 some MFDP alumni would be seated at that year’s Chicago Democratic convention as members of the official Mississippi state delegation.

    Of course, unlike the radicals Bell was analyzing back in 1952, Bob Moses was not a Marxist. Nor, apart from some Red Diaper babies (that is, children of Communists), were most of the Freedom Summer volunteers in 1964. Their political outlook, including their insistence on a morally driven politics that refused to compromise basic principles, came out of a different and older tradition in American radicalism. It stretched back to Anne Hutchinson in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the seventeenth century insisting on her right to question the authority of the colony’s Puritan ministers based on what she described as direct revelations from God. (For this she was branded an “antinomian” by both the political and religious establishments.) 

    A similar commitment to what in the nineteenth century was called obedience to a “Higher Law” was central to what was seen at the time as the wildly irresponsible demand for the “immediate” end of slavery by the abolitionist movement, as it was shaped by leaders such as William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick Douglass. Later still in the nineteenth- and early-twentieth centuries this same uncompromising morality-infused radicalism could be found in the women’s suffrage movement, represented by such figures as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Alice Paul. This American radical tradition also had some influence within the Marxist left, most notably on Eugene Debs, who read his Marx and Engels and believed in class struggle and international working-class solidarity, but whose aspirations for the American cooperative commonwealth were based on the moral principles about democratic citizenship and individual conscience that he had imbibed as a young man growing up in Terre Haute. “Despite his Socialism,” Debs’ biographer Nick Salvatore argued, “a fierce individualism fueled his core vision,” evident in his most famous speech. In 1918, upon being convicted in federal court of speaking out against American entry into the First World War, he declared: 

    Your Honor, years ago I recognized my kinship with all living beings, and I made up my mind that I was not one bit better than the meanest on earth . . . While there is a lower class, I am in it, and while there is a criminal element I am of it, and while there is a soul in prison, I am not free.

    Time and again in the history of the United States, outsiders to the political mainstream, raising what were regarded as unreasonable demands and speaking in a moral vernacular that owed much to that antinomian strain of American Protestantism, brought to the fore issues such as slavery, women’s rights, and opposition to war that found few if any supporters in more conventional political circles. The role of this left-wing prophetic minority, which Daniel Bell did not sufficiently appreciate, is part of a vital political tradition that has over the centuries enhanced the freedoms and opportunities of millions of Americans. It is a tradition that I consider worth honoring and emulating — so long as one recognizes that it has also led on occasion to unforeseen and less inspiring outcomes.

    17-year-old Bonnie Raitt, and beside her the then 16-year-old author, American Friends Service Committee project volunteers, Indianapolis, July 1967.

    When I turned sixteen in the spring of 1967, I was a high school junior living in a small town in rural Connecticut, desperately anticipating graduation the following year, and with it the opportunity to move away to a big city to attend college. With a Quaker mother and a Jewish father, coming of age in a community where what passed for ethnic diversity ran the gamut from Yankee Protestant to Irish Catholic, my early desire to fit in with my neighbors and classmates gave way sometime post-puberty to an even stronger desire to escape the whole lot of them, and in doing so lay claim to a new sense of independence. Identifying entirely with the heroic selflessness of students taking part in the Freedom Summer project (some of whom also went on in the fall of 1964 to play leading roles in the Berkeley Free Speech Movement), my otherwise conventional adolescent rebellion took on an increasingly political edge. Of course, those history-making freedom struggles were happening so far away from my tedious isolation in Coventry, Connecticut that they may as well have been set on Middle Earth (it was about this time I also was immersing myself in the paperback edition of Lord of the Rings).

    But in 1967, with the advent of anti-Vietnam war protests in cities relatively nearby, my life changed in ways that felt most welcome, adventurous, and authentic. In mid-April I took the train to New York City to join in the “Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam,” a demonstration called by a recently assembled coalition of radical, pacifist, and student groups, which proved to be the most massive anti-war gathering to that point in American history. Back home, nobody in my high school or community seemed to be against the bloody and unjust and unwinnable war in Vietnam but me. (My parents had their doubts, but prudently kept them to themselves.) But when I reached Sheep Meadow in Central Park on the morning of April 15, I no longer felt quite so lonely. With a quarter of a million other protesters, I marched downtown to a rally at the United Nations building. There, surrounded by my newfound fellowship (no elves, dwarves, or hobbits involved, but lots of students and hippies, as well as veterans, trade unionists, and other grown-ups), I listened intently to speeches by Dr. Benjamin Spock, Stokely Carmichael, and, most memorably, the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. He was not calling for compromise this time. “Let no one claim there is a consensus for this war,” he said as he began his remarks. “No flag-waving, no smug satisfaction with territorial conquest, no denunciation of the enemy can obscure the truth that many millions of Americans repudiate this war and refuse to take moral responsibility for it.” Maybe not King’s greatest speech and certainly not his best-remembered one, but it spoke to me then and continues to do so today, as part of the great American radical tradition that we now call “speaking truth to power,” as exemplified 
by Garrison, Douglass, Stanton, Paul, Debs, Moses, and 
King himself.

    I spent the summer that followed in a down-at-the-heels neighborhood in Indianapolis, Indiana, one of a group of teenage volunteers enrolled in an American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) project. An aspiring seventeen-year-old folksinger named Bonnie Raitt, bound for Radcliffe, and then for greater things, was among our number. Working with a local settlement house, we did various good works in the community, while learning about poverty, race, and the Quaker vision of conscience-driven social change. (Our texts ranged from Michael Harrington’s The Other America to Malcolm X’s Autobiography to Richard Gregg’s The Power of Non-Violence.) Bonnie and I and our compatriots organized a silent vigil in downtown Indianapolis on Hiroshima Day to protest the war, to the discomfort of the adult project leaders who were worried about hostile local reaction. (If they had preferred we stayed home that day, they should not have assigned us Gregg’s book.) By summer’s end, under the influence of Dr. King and the Quakers, I considered myself a committed pacifist, and what’s more — with the success of our little vigil — an organizer.

    That fall, a senior in high school, still short of my seventeenth birthday, I traveled from New York City with my Uncle Abe and Aunt Joan to Washington, D.C., to take part in the March on the Pentagon on October 21, organized by the same coalition of anti-war groups that had staged the Spring Mobilization. Although not a “Red Diaper Baby,” I did grow up knowing that people to whom I was related and respected had indeed been members of the Communist Party back in the years of the Great Depression — and some, like my father’s brother Abe, remained so. In fact, he had been one of the lawyers for the eleven Communist leaders convicted in 1949 for violating the Smith Act, and like the defendants he also went to jail, in his case for contempt of court. Despite his continuing allegiance to the Communist cause, he scrupulously refrained from trying to recruit me to his own corner of the organized Left (which, in any case, seemed to me too old and stodgy for serious consideration), but was happy to encourage my growing radical inclinations, wherever they led me.

    I had never been to Washington before, but sightseeing was not on our agenda — it would be years before I had the occasion to travel to the nation’s capital without attending a protest of some kind or another. We stayed in a downtown hotel, and on the morning of the march we joined the mass and legal part of the day’s protest, with about a hundred thousand people attending the rally at the Lincoln Memorial. Afterwards we marched across the Memorial Bridge to the Pentagon, where Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (who by then had his own private doubts about the war he was so instrumental in launching and escalating) was nervously looking out the window of his upper-story office at the gathering crowd. When we got there, I impulsively decided to part company with my uncle and aunt and ran with a group of other young participants past surprised lines of military police to the very steps of the building. Totally unplanned, this was my first venture into militant but non-violent civil disobedience, which I imagine was the case for most of the rest of the few thousand protesters who now found themselves hemmed in by soldiers and federal marshals. There, at the steps of the Pentagon, we listened to impassioned speeches against the war, chanted anti-war slogans — and did not, contrary to subsequent accusations, spit on anybody. Mostly, astonished at our proximity to the planning center and symbol of an evil and unjust war, we wondered what would happen next. In my case, the answer came shortly before dusk, when a burly federal marshal pulled my feet out from under me and dragged me roughly down the adjacent embankment before depositing me on the pavement of the Pentagon’s north parking lot. I picked myself up and limped back across the bridge connecting Arlington to Washington. All in all, I thought it had been the best day of my life. 

    Among the speakers I remember listening to that afternoon at the Pentagon was a young Swarthmore College graduate named Cathy Wilkerson, then working as a regional organizer for Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in Washington, D.C. Many years later I read Flying Close to the Sun, her memoir of the years she spent as a radical activist in the New Left. She began the decade of the 1960s as a Quaker and an admirer of Gandhi, and she ended it as a fugitive in the Weather Underground. When I encountered her in 1967, she was half-way through that unfortunate transition, but some part of the earlier Quaker influences apparently lingered. She urged us that afternoon not to take unnecessary risks. “While I had been excited by Debray and Fanon,” she recalled, “here in the heat of confrontation it was the model of the non-violent confrontations of the civil rights movement that seemed most powerful. To the extent we had any power at the Pentagon, which didn’t feel like much, it was the power of a moral witness.” 

    Wilkerson’s life story is, among other things, a cautionary case study of how even the best instincts can sometimes lead to terrible outcomes. The emphasis in the early civil rights movement of “putting your body on the line,” as in the lunch counter sit-ins of 1960 and the Freedom Rides on 1961, took on a darker meaning for some activists by the late 1960s and early 1970s. In Wilkerson’s case, it led to the “townhouse explosion” of 1970, which left three of her bomb-building comrades dead in the rubble of her father’s expensive Greek Revival home in Greenwich Village, while she stumbled out of the wreckage and took flight into the underground. 

    Wilkerson’s memoir provides an illuminating glimpse into the fatal trajectory of the largest radical student movement in American history. I find her particularly astute in describing the internal dynamics of SDS in 1968–1969, the year I joined as a freshman at Reed College in Portland, Oregon (having finally realized my ambition of escaping small town life). I was part of a flood of new recruits to SDS, pushing its numbers that academic year to the vicinity of a hundred thousand strong. “This infusion of young people,” Wilkerson wrote in her memoir, “drawn in more by culture than politics, was becoming the norm” in SDS: “They weren’t looking for a complicated discussion about how to bring about change, but for validation, for community, and for a way to express their anger about the war.”

    That seems exactly right in my memory of the moment: validation, community, anger, all understandable reasons for joining a radical movement. Embracing left-wing causes, historically, has not been restricted to “a complicated discussion” about either abstract ideals or political strategy. It also often includes, especially for young people who provide the majority of converts to such causes, the forging of a new personal identity, as Wilkerson — and my own example — suggest. What matters is how motivation and spirit that goes into shaping that self-redefinition is then channeled.

    A similar insight from an earlier generation comes from another memoir, Starting Out in the Thirties by Alfred Kazin, which I read while writing a senior thesis at Reed on the history of Communist-organized literary groups in the Depression decade. “History was going our way,” Kazin wrote of his own youthful attraction to the radical Left (and briefly Communism) in those years:

    Everything in the outside world seemed to be moving towards some final decision, for by now the Spanish Civil War had begun, and every day felt choked with struggle. It was as if the planet had locked in combat . . . There seemed to be no division between my effort at personal liberation, and the apparent effort of humanity to deliver itself. Reading Silone and Malraux, discovering the Beethoven string quartets and having love affairs were part of the great pattern in Spain, in the Valley of the Ebro, in the Salinas Valley in California . . . Wherever I went now I felt the moral contagion of a single idea.

    Substitute Vietnam for Spain, and, perhaps, the White Album for the Beethoven string quartets (we weren’t quite as attuned to high culture as Kazin’s generation of young Jewish intellectuals thirty years earlier), and that pretty much sums up my own sense of historical destiny in my year in SDS. I don’t know if “contagion” is quite the right word, but even though I and most of the Reed SDS chapter avoided the temptation to follow Cathy Wilkerson into the violent and radical Weather underground, student revolutionary politics in 1968–1969 did, at times, have a feverish quality. 

    Thinking back on those years, the problem was not so much that I had a “single idea” governing my political choices (and certainly not “Communism” as it would have been recognized by a veteran of the 1930s); rather, I had too many contradictory and muddled ideas, which in my youth and inexperience I found impossible to sort out. Like Wilkerson that day at the Pentagon a year earlier, I was still partially under the sway of the Quaker ideal of “moral witness” as espoused in Gregg’s The Power of Non-Violence. But I was also attracted to the in-your-face confrontational politics being pushed in New Left Notes, SDS’s weekly newsletter. The ideal of non-violent “moral witness” was giving way to the vague but not necessarily non-violent ideal of “resistance.” I remember sometime that fall reading The Port Huron Statement, the founding manifesto of SDS, written (largely) by Tom Hayden in 1962, calling for the creation of a left with genuine intellectual skills, and being entirely persuaded. But also, that same fall in 1968, I read his essay in the radical monthly magazine Ramparts called “Two, Three, Many Columbias,” celebrating the strike at Columbia University the previous April, and essentially dismissing higher education in the United States as a wholly owned subsidiary of the war machine, which, he implied, did not deserve to survive. I found that equally persuasive. In sum, I was confused, an intellectual mess. I found wisdom in the works of Lenin and in the works of Lennon (and McCartney, Harrison, and Starr). I somehow believed in all these things simultaneously, and that they all went nicely together. I failed, or refused, to notice any contradictions.

    The author, age 20, at an anti-war protest in Portland, Oregon, 1971 (photo by Michael Kazin).

    As Wilkerson noted, my cohort of young radicals had few fixed political ideas beyond opposing the Vietnam War. And that sentiment, completely justifiable in itself, could lead in any number of directions, some entirely sensible and decent, including marches and vigils, draft resistance and other forms of peaceful civil disobedience — or, in Wilkerson’s case, to her embrace of lethal terrorism. “People make their own history,” as Marx famously observed, “but not under conditions of their own choosing.” I hardly mean to excuse poor choices made by Wilkerson, or myself, or others at the time — but it does suggest why so many individual actors tended to make worse choices at the end of the 1960s than, at an equivalent age, they might have made eight or nine years earlier. 

    SDS’s evolution in the course of the 1960s resembled a streetcar that, depending on the year you climbed aboard, carried you where it would with no fixed route. Had I been old enough to climb aboard in SDS’s early days, from 1962 to 1965, our destination, at least in the short run, would have been what the Port Huron Statement had described as a “participatory democracy,” our chief activity supporting the southern civil rights movement. Climbing aboard in 1968, however, in the midst of an ever-escalating and ever more destructive war in Vietnam, plus domestic warfare in the streets of Newark, Detroit, and Washington, D.C., SDS’s destination was transformed into the revolutionary transformation of, well, everything — the details a little vague, to be achieved through means that were not clear, but in my imagination bore some resemblance to Paris, May ’68, if only American streets were lined with cobblestones. I could have gone either way, and looking back I much prefer the former to the latter destination. But instead, I climbed aboard the streetcar in what proved SDS’s final calamitous year.

    I did learn some valuable lessons in the late 1960s and early 1970s that, when the dust had settled, informed my subsequent career as a historian exploring the fate of twentieth-century American radicalism. Between 1982 and 2000 I published four books on the history of the American left, and then a fifth, Reds: The Tragedy of American Communism, this past year. If I were to summarize the thesis of that latest effort, it boils down to a single sentence in the book’s preface, arguing that the Communist movement “attracted egalitarian idealists, and bred authoritarian zealots.” Although I was never a Communist as such — I was too much immersed in the counterculture of the era to go that route — I have to confess there is at least a little submerged autobiography informing that thesis.

    The lessons I learned in the late 1960s also informed my own subsequent political choices. In 1982, the year my first book came out, I was a founding member of a new left-wing group, Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). DSA’s most influential figure was Michael Harrington, who I had first encountered as an authority on poverty back in that formative summer of 1967. DSA, in Harrington’s vision, would strive to be “the left wing of the possible.” By that he meant that it should devote itself to building the broadest possible coalition of progressive groups within and alongside the Democratic Party, including the labor, feminist, environmental, and civil rights movements. Along with its socialist aspirations, DSA was thus firmly committed to “relate itself to the specific problems of social action in the here-and-now, give-and-take political world,” to borrow Bell’s formula (although Bell, by then describing his own politics as neo-conservative, had no interest in Harrington’s project). DSAers also laid equal stress on both words in the organization’s name, combining an absolute commitment to democracy as well as socialism, in the United States and internationally. Given my experience with the crack-up of the New Left a decade earlier, which led to SDS’s splintering in 1969 into a host of competing would-be revolutionary vanguards, I found DSA’s pragmatism and its democratic principles reassuring. No more charging down blind adventurous alleys for me, literally or figuratively, thank you very much.

    The author, age 31 in 1982, the year he joined Democratic Socialists of America, (Photo by David Weintraub.)

    Over the next three decades, DSA’s membership hovered between five and ten thousand, making it the largest socialist group on the American left, but one that was unable to attract sizeable numbers of new (and younger) recruits in the years between the Reagan and the George W. Bush administrations, and so played at best a minor role in the nation’s politics. Harrington died in 1989 of cancer at the age of sixty-one, and no one of comparable public stature (and intellectual skill) replaced him as a widely recognized symbol of what it meant to be a democratic socialist.

    And then, unexpectedly as these things tend to happen, new opportunities arose. In 2016, Senator Bernie Sanders, a self-described democratic socialist (although not a DSA member), ran a spirited campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, and attracted many younger voters to his cause. That was followed two years later by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s election to Congress — a young woman of color with extraordinary political skills, who proudly proclaimed her own DSA affiliation. People, especially young people, began to Google this unfamiliar term, “democratic socialism,” and up popped the DSA website. By the early 2020s, forty-four percent of Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine reported positive views of socialism, according to polling by the Pew Research Center. (Unfortunately Pew failed to ask what they mean by socialism. Probably not Soviet-era Communism.) As a result, and in some ways comparable to the boost that SDS experienced in the mid-1960s driven by the escalation of the war in Vietnam, DSA underwent an enormous expansion in membership, peaking at over ninety thousand by 2020. 

    Most of those new members were in their twenties, with a lot of enthusiasm, energy, and raw political talent, organizing chapters in cities and states across the country that had not seen an active socialist presence since the Debsian era. Soon scores of DSA members, running as Democrats, had won election to state legislatures, city councils, and other offices. By January 2021 there were four DSA members sitting in Congress, more socialists than had ever served in that body at the same time. Harrington’s “left-wing of the possible” was really happening, at long last. Or so it seemed. 

    But in keeping with the history of the modern American left, DSA’s future trajectory and prospects would prove neither uncomplicated nor untroubled. Two factors began to tug the organization in a very different direction politically from its earlier identity. The first was that, like those of us who came of age in the 1960s, the younger radicals now pouring into the organization, who soon vastly outnumbered DSA veterans, were impatient with their elders. In the early 1960s Michael Harrington had served for a few years as a mentor and role model to Tom Hayden and other SDSers, but by the latter part of the decade was either regarded as a sell-out by my generation of SDSers or forgotten entirely. “Perhaps it is inevitable,” he observed ruefully in 1967, “that young people come to the radical movement with the fervor of catechumens,” that is, converts to the Faith preparing for confirmation in the early Church, “and always believe that the veterans of past struggles are tired and going soft.” So it proved in DSA. By 2019 or so, “Harringtonite” was becoming a term of abuse within the organization (although no one I knew in DSA ever labeled themselves as such — cults of personality were never a particular feature of democratic socialism). 

    DSA’s years of maximum growth were also, significantly, years of despair rather than hope on the left, coinciding with Donald Trump’s election in 2016 and the subsequent four years of his dystopian presidency. Those four years climaxed with the killing of George Floyd in 2020. To many of the young people joining the Black Lives Matter demonstrations that ensued, their nation seemed stained with the sin of absolute and irredeemable racism, not unlike the way it seemed to abolitionists in the 1850s and New Leftists in the later 1960s. 

    It might be useful here to think back on the events that took place in Atlantic City in August 1964, when the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party rejected the compromise offered them by prominent liberals, and chose instead to be ruled entirely by their principles. They were right to do so. But that moment had other, more protracted, and unintended consequences, especially for young radicals, as Bob Moses’ biographer Eric Burner argued in his perceptive account, And Gently He Shall Lead Them: Robert Parris Moses and Civil Rights in Mississippi: “In giving compromise a bad name the maneuvering of the liberals at Atlantic City . . . contributed to a mentality, increasingly aggressive in the years that followed, that purity is to be measured by how many people the pure refuse to cooperate with . . . It was purity of a sort that has since come to define the later sixties, at once fortifying and destructive.” 

    At once fortifying and destructive. What is fortifying for the already persuaded does not necessarily build bridges to those who still need persuading — quite the opposite. That tendency for “purity . . . to be measured by how many people the pure refuse to cooperate with” can be considered historically the Achilles’ heel of the antinomian tradition of American radicalism. All too often in recent decades, those on the American Left — and this is especially true on campuses, among faculty as well as students — seem to be engaged in a competition among themselves to demonstrate that they have individually arrived at a state of political grace, as measured by the ability to deploy ever more esoteric language and the embrace of ever more marginal niche issues. Failure to attract supporters outside the core group of believers can then be attributed to backsliding within the congregation, a morally satisfying but politically self-defeating habit. And seen in this light, Bell’s point about the political problems of “living in but not of the world” is not without insight. What worked in Atlantic City in 1964 decidedly did not work in the streets of Chicago in 1968, or in the Weather Underground in the years that followed. Or in too many left-wing circles today.

    The other factor complicating DSA’s future was that not all of the organization’s recruits were twenty-somethings new to the organized left. Starting in 2016, hundreds of veterans of left-wing groups that had nothing in common with democratic socialism joined DSA, with the intention of turning this now sizeable but somewhat inchoate group into something very much at odds with its founding vision. These included Trotskyists, Maoists, and others who traced their political inspiration and organizational lineage to the Leninist vision of (and here forgive the parade of venerable and stale clichés) creating a “party of a new type” of “professional revolutionaries” who would devote “the whole of their lives” to the cause. This is a vision of revolutionary change whose highest virtues are discipline and hierarchy, neither of which were much in evidence or much valued in DSA before this. 

    This reverence for authority and structure, for all its ideological variations, at its core differs very little from the model promoted by Joseph Stalin in an ideological primer that he composed in 1924 entitled The Foundations of Leninism, in which he asserted that “the working class without a revolutionary party is an army without a General Staff.” An essentially militarist mentality unites Trotskyist, Maoist, and other Leninist cults operating in the United States, which can be seen in their fondness for terms like “cadre” to describe their hard-core supporters. Accordingly, post-2016, various would-be General Staffs set to work to recruit that wave of younger members pouring into DSA, and in doing so convert the organization into the vanguard party of the American proletariat that they had never succeeded in creating when they were operating under their own banners of deepest red. DSA’s dwindling core of aging veterans who adhered to the traditional left-wing of the possible vision, and who did not think of or conduct themselves as a “cadre,” were not up for the ensuing challenge for control. Once again, as in so many factional wars on the left in the past, power became the real prize. In August 2023, at the organization’s bi-annual national convention, a coalition of self-described communist factions effectively gained control of DSA’s ruling sixteen-member National Political Committee (NPC).

    Here I will allow the new leaders of DSA’s NPC to introduce themselves. One of the dominant factions, the Red Star Caucus (with three members elected to the NPC, including one who was appointed co-chair of the national DSA), ran an article in its August 2024 on-line newsletter entitled “Communists Belong in DSA,” announcing that as “a Marxist-Leninist DSA caucus” it was calling “on all communists in the United States to join us” in the struggle to capture DSA and “move toward a revolutionary horizon.” Allied (as well as competing) with the Red Star Caucus is the Marxist Unity Group (MUG), which describes itself as “particularly inspired . . . by those that kept [the movement’s] revolutionary spirit alive in the face of political capitulation: Lenin and the Bolsheviks.” MUG’s vision of the transition to socialism in America is one in which “our class” (that is the working class, in whose name it presumes to speak — another trope of radical history) will take advantage of a future crisis of capitalism

    to topple the old order and convene a revolutionary Popular Assembly . . . Under the democratic leadership of a victorious socialist party [led by the Marxist Unity Group or its political heirs], the Popular Assembly will proceed to construct the socialist order. It will dismantle the slaveholder constitution and write the founding documents of the new republic. . . .  All parties that accept the laws of the new revolutionary order will be free to operate. 

    Tough luck for those Americans who will not be not on board with discarding the old (and certainly flawed!) U.S. Constitution for that imposed by “the new revolutionary order.” Embracing this vision of an extra-constitutional and almost certainly violent road to power at home, the communist majority on the NPC scrupulously avoids any criticism of anti-democratic actors abroad, at least those that are anti-American. As the Red Star caucus explained in its “points of unity”: “We see no benefit in levying public criticism of states or movements that are opposed to US empire, as such critique in effect serves no purpose except to create consent for empire.”

    Thus no criticism can be heard in DSA’s ruling circle of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, Xi Jinping’s China, Kim Jong Un’s North Korea, Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela — or Hamas. (It was DSA’s response to Hamas’ October 7, 2023 pogrom in Israel, uncritically celebrating it as an act of legitimate “resistance” to Zionist “settler colonialism,” that led to my own resignation from DSA two days later; I believe in Israel’s right to exist and defend itself, but condemn the humanitarian catastrophe that Israel’s subsequent military response has unleashed on Gaza). 

    Daniel Bell had experienced the likes of the Marxist Unity Group and the Red Star Caucus many decades before these latecomers to the perennial authoritarian strain of ultra-leftism came into existence. In Marxian Socialism in America, he described the equivalent kindergarten Leninist fantasies entertained by left-sectarian groups of his own era as consisting of “the illusions of settling the fate of history, the mimetic combat on the plains of destiny, and the vicarious sense of power in demolishing [other left-wing] opponents.” Since Bell’s day, however, the advent of social media has fostered and simplified the process through which the sectarian left can with a few keystrokes go about settling the fate of history on the plains of destiny. Consider the explanation for Kamala Harris’ decision to choose Tim Walz rather than Josh Shapiro as the vice-presidential candidate offered by DSA’s NPC in a statement posted to X on August 6, 2024:

    Harris choosing Walz as a running mate has shown the world that DSA and our allies on the left are a force that cannot be ignored. Through collective action, DSA and the US left more broadly have made it clear that change is needed. The Uncommitted movement, in which DSA members played crucial roles nationally and in multiple states, pressured the Democratic establishment into choosing a new candidate and backing down from a potential VP [Shapiro] with direct ties to the IDF and who would have ferociously supported the ongoing genocide in Palestine. 

    Most political activists engaged in real-world Democratic Party politics would find the claim that DSA somehow determined Harris’ choice of running mate an absurd example of childish boasting. Fox News, however, which has different priorities, really liked that tweet, amplifying DSA’s claims to exercising such powerful influence over Democratic campaign strategy on “Fox and Friends,” with a chyron on the screen reading “Tim Walz: A Radical, Far Left Ideologue,” and adding on its website, “Walz is not a member of the DSA, but has made favorable comments regarding socialism.” 

    As for the left sectarians’ vicarious sense of power in demolishing opponents within their own camp, consider how the Marxist Unity Group, in a posting to “X” on July 21, 2024, described the two individuals who more than anyone else were responsible for DSA’s growth between 2016 and 2020:

    AOC and Bernie Sanders have abandoned the working class to exploitation and the Palestinian people to genocide. Rather than lead the working class in the battle for democracy, they tried to tail Biden to win bandages for a disintegrating capitalism.

    Once again, in the time-honored radical tradition, the sectarian impulse is to eat their own. 

    While the Republic may well be facing its moment of maximum danger since the election of 1860 and its aftermath (see the events of January 6, 2021 and November 5, 2024), the danger does not come from this quarter. DSA’s new amateurish proprietors have already managed to reduce the organization’s membership from its peak of ninety thousand to seventy thousand. Or perhaps lower: it has been some time since they have offered any authoritative figures.

    That is the bad news, I mean for them. The good news, such as it is, is that the views of the NPC sectarian majority likely do not represent that of the actual majority of rank-and- file DSAers. Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, safe to say, are not seen as traitors to the cause by most democratic socialists. The communist caucuses that gained control of the NPC probably count no more than a few thousand members, if that, between them. Most of the remaining dues-paying DSAers are not active participants in any of the rival caucuses or in their local chapters.

    There still remain sane caucuses in DSA who plan on challenging the control of the ultras at the national convention 
in 2025, and I wish them well, but without much expectation that they will succeed. One thing left sectarians are good at is stacking meetings and manipulating votes. And even if the silent majority of DSAers, let’s call them the “democratic socialist caucus,” do regain power, the damage has been done. Thanks to the Red Star Caucus, and others who have succumbed to the Leninist temptation, DSA has become toxic in the eyes of many on the democratic left, for its juvenile ideological posturing and for lending ammunition to the Murdoch media empire. That legacy of would-be Bolsheviks romping across plains of destiny will prove hard to erase.

    David A. Bell, a historian at Princeton University and a contributor to these pages, and the son of Daniel Bell, penned a fine article for Dissent magazine a few years ago marking the centennial of his father’s birth. He noted that, despite his own repeated urgings, he could never persuade his father, who certainly did not suffer writer’s block, to write his memoirs. And he ends with a telling anecdote about his father’s relationship with my generation of young radicals in the late 1960s. His father, he tells us, “worried about the student movement, feared its wildness, looked askance at the hedonism associated with it, but still could not help sympathizing with its political radicalism.” The senior Bell was then teaching at Columbia University and was one of a number of faculty who tried to negotiate an agreement between the students occupying buildings during the Columbia strike of April 1968 and the administration. “But on the night of April 29,” the junior Bell recalled:

    negotiations broke down, and the police moved in with nightsticks and tear gas. Many of the students were badly beaten, and hundreds were arrested. I remember waking up early on the morning of the 30th — I was six years old at the time — and finding my father, fully dressed, on the couch. He had been up all night and he was weeping uncontrollably.

    For whom did Bell weep during that long and long-ago night? The students, beaten and arrested? Possibly. Columbia’s damaged reputation and future as a learning community? Also possible. His son suggests an additional possibility — that he wept out of frustration and confusion about how to understand the terrible and stark choices that he, his colleagues, and his students were forced to confront in the tragic spring of 1968: “He could never quite reconcile the Jewish conservative and the Yiddish radical within him — never quite decide from what perspective to judge and interpret the times he had lived through.” The tension between the two perspectives, one formed in his youth, the other in adulthood, had a positive side, the son wrote, for it kept the father politically “sensitive to the dangers of extremism, but also to the dangers of injustice.” 

    I did not know Daniel Bell personally, and I cannot say whether that is the case or not. But if it were true, it would make me think back on him with considerable sympathy. Remaining alert both to “the dangers of extremism,” and to “the dangers of injustice” is a tough balance to maintain. After a lifetime of engagement, sometimes hopeful, sometimes despairing, with the American left I can but aspire, imperfectly, to achieve the same. Can a disabused idealist still be an idealist? How zealously should one oppose zealotry? From one old radical to another, rest in peace, Daniel Bell.

    The Master of Attention

    It would be silly to call William Wyler underrated — he was one of the most acclaimed and commercially successful movie directors in American history. A staple in every American film canon, he was my favorite director long before I knew his name. Growing up I watched Dodsworth, The Little Foxes, The Heiress, and Jezebel dozens of times without noticing that four of my favorite movies were directed by the same person. His legacy is really remarkable: the same person who directed these close and complex dramas, and who was Lilian Helman’s favorite collaborator, also made movies such as Funny Girl, Ben Hur, and Roman Holiday. The man whom we have to thank for the stardoms of Audrey Hepburn and Barbra Streisand also taught Bette Davis how to act and Laurence Olivier how not to overact. And yet he does not inspire the kind of cultish attachment that other directors do. Perhaps that is because his style is almost imperceptibly subtle. It is not clear whether there is such a thing as a “Wyler touch.” We love Wyler movies, but we don’t love Wyler.

    Wyler famously quipped that although he was not an auteur, he was one of the only American directors who could pronounce the word correctly. Critics said that Wyler had an “invisible style.” Andre Bazin, in Cahiers du Cinema, called him the “Jansenist of mise-en-scène,” meaning that Wyler was controlled and even self-denying in his visual style, in contrast to the personal and easily identifiable signatures of John Ford, Fritz Lang, and Alfred Hitchcock. Yet there is nothing austere about Wyler. He was no shrinking violet as a director, sacrificing his own artistic individuality for the good of the picture. No, the Wylerian style is not a particular visual brand. It is a special kind of attention. As he himself explained, “I have never been as interested in the externals of presenting a scene as I have been in the inner workings of the people the scene is about.”

    Wyler films are not iconic. They do not dazzle us with specular images that stand on their own, that can be borrowed and parodied. Greta Gerwig’s Barbie can “quote” Kubrick, aping the imagery from 2001: A Space Odyssey and Dr. Strangelove for a gag — images so powerful that they transcend tone, context, and even the stupidity of a movie like Barbie. Wyler, by contrast, cannot be quoted. His genius is quiet, specific, unspectacular, and intimate. If Kubrick’s movies are operatic, Wyler’s are novelistic. Films like Kubrick’s are spectacles suspended in time. The composer of an opera manipulates the audience by controlling the music. Viewers are transported into the pace and mood dictated by the composer; they are held steady, made to wait, and then finally allowed the relief of climax: the aria. Just as an aria can be excerpted from an opera and still retain its power, the images from a Kubrick movie can be stolen, mimicked, and interpreted while still recalling the original. Not so Wyler’s. 

    Wyler’s films have the bounded and internally elaborated intimacy of a novel. Characters are shaped supremely in relation to one another. Wyler’s delicate details — slight movements of flesh, diffusions of light, fluid camera motions — reveal the inner worlds of each character. His greatest stylistic flourishes work on the viewer almost imperceptibly. They are meant to be discovered. Picking one up feels like eyeing a stranger on the street — say, watching as they grapple with some inconvenience. You recognize a slight shadow of annoyance cross their face, and for an instant you feel that you know exactly what they are thinking. The ephemeral intuition of other minds is so powerful precisely because it is so gentle and because it reveals our collective interest and investment in each other. Wyler is always counting on our capacity for close attention.

    Put simply, the “Wyler touch” is a prodigious gift for people, for understanding and conveying on film the truthful appearance of inner experience. He makes real the distances between people, the way they bounce off each other and retreat into themselves, the way they work at themselves and forge each other. In this regard he is one of cinema’s supreme humanists.

    Wyler does not fit into any of the familiar categories of American filmmakers, or rather he seemed to have a foot in all of them. He was a European Jew who came to America as a young man, like Ernst Lubitsch, Billy Wilder, and Michael Curtiz. Unlike them, he never worked in European film or theater; he got his start in Hollywood. He was the son of middle-class Jews, born and raised in Alsace-Loraine, speaking both German and French (but not Yiddish). As a child during World War I, he remembered his family spending nights in the cellar — huddled with their Protestant and Catholic neighbors — waiting for the battle outside to end so they could find out whether the town was French or German that day. When he came to America, he did not come fleeing war or antisemitism. He sailed first-class in 1920, with his violin and his skis. His uncle Carl Laemmle had come over in steerage in 1884 and gone on to found 
Universal Pictures. Laemmle offered the eighteen-year-old Wyler a job in the mailroom in New York. 

    Wyler’s start in Hollywood looked more like John Ford’s than his German Jewish contemporaries. Both he and Ford started out making two-reel quickie Westerns for Laemmle, churning out simple stories starring any guy who could ride a horse, making as many films as possible, and hoping to slip in something creative somewhere to get noticed. Directors were paid less than cameramen, but they were free to change the scripts and try new techniques without asking permission. Like Ford, Wyler’s quickies received positive attention, and he was promoted to making full-length features in 1926, mostly more Westerns. His first talkie was the first all-sound outdoor film Universal made, a Western called Hell’s Heroes, shot on location in the Mojave Desert and Death Valley. Wyler insisted on the location for its flat landscape and cloudless sky. The film was Wyler’s first major success, and it was lauded, at home and in Europe, for its bleak realism and for the innovative directorial choices Wyler made. 

    In 1933, Wyler got the opportunity to direct a prestige picture, an adaptation of an important and successful play written by Elmer Rice, who also wrote the screenplay for the film. The protagonist of Counsellor at Law was a well-respected lawyer named George Simon, a Jew from the Lower East Side who first crossed the Atlantic in steerage and then made himself a prominent member of New York society. Naturally, none of the Jewish actors whom Laemmle and Wyler wanted for the film would agree to play it, for fear of being ethnically typecast, so, less naturally, in an early example of non-traditional casting, the Jewish immigrant was played by, of all people, John Barrymore. Barrymore was glad to have Wyler as a director: “Because you’re Jewish,” he told him, “you’ll be able to help me a great deal with the character.” Barrymore was determined to incorporate “Jewish gestures” into his performance, to the point that Wyler had to assure him that there is no Jewish way to pick up the phone.

    However crude Barrymore’s understanding of his character was, Wyler knew how to build George Simon with his camera, using the interplay of fluid, constant motion with sudden, suffocating zooms to lay bare the paradoxes in the man’s life. As Simon hums along, Wyler’s camera sweeps around his office, following his characters as they rush through a dizzying labyrinth of side rooms and halls, waiting rooms and libraries. Clients and colleagues step in and out of Simon’s office, and as his attention settles on each, Wyler’s camera slowly rests on them, before Simon’s mind hurries along and they are sent bustling out into the hall. As long as Simon can keep moving, as long as his energy fills the succession of rooms that make up his world, he is content. 

    This office, and the lateral motion of the camera as it roves its corridors, embodies life as Simon has constructed it for himself. But these jumbled forms distract from the agonizing contradiction which he endeavors to ignore. His life is divided against itself: he is a man of principles but he is striving to hit it rich; he adores his wife and his mother, but his wife is too snobbish to make civil conversation with his mother; he wants to help the kids from his old neighborhood, but this work jeopardizes his career, and they are not always grateful enough to make it worth it; he is surrounded by people who are fanatically loyal to him, but he is also out on a limb all on his own, risen above his station. 

    As the fates close in, Simon’s world becomes suddenly airless, and collapses in on itself. The camera stops roving and instead it rushes at Simon from below, isolating him in the frame. The claustrophobia of these shots forces us inside Simon, deprived of all the trappings of the bustling life that ordinarily keep him safe. Through movement, Wyler creates an effect reminiscent of the moment in Anna Karenina when Anna’s husband realizes that his wife may be in love with another man: “Now he experienced a feeling akin to that of a man who, while calmly crossing a precipice by a bridge, should suddenly discover that the bridge is broken, and that there is a chasm below. That chasm was life itself, the bridge that artificial life in which Alexey Alexandrovitch had lived.”

    As this torment becomes intolerable for Simon, we start to notice that there is one feature of the world that relieves him of isolation. The camera zooms in on the back of his head as he sits framed in a window, looking out at the city. We have heard, a few times, that his plucky receptionist is feeling unwell because she saw a man jump from a building this morning. It slowly occurs to us that a dark impulse has drawn Simon to the open glass. At the climax of the film, Simon looks out the window, and for the first time in the film the camera leaves the office and we look in at Simon from the outside. We hear the sounds of the city, watching the man inside sit alone in the dark. Slowly he starts to move toward us, toward the window, and in turn the camera accelerates toward him from below, exaggerating grotesque shadows in his face. In one swift motion he opens the window and starts to climb out.

    Though Counsellor at Law is based on Elmer Rice’s play, it does not feel like a filmed stage play, even if that shot into the window is the only time we leave the office. Wyler refuses to open it up, taking the audience inside Simon’s world by trapping us in the office, heightening the mania and the claustrophobia. The film is a masterclass in thoughtful adaptation, a Wyler specialty. Authors and playwrights knew they could trust him with their work. Lillian Hellman, his lifelong friend and collaborator, remarked that “it was Wyler who taught me about movies.” Their first collaboration was his adaptation of her play The Children’s Hour in 1936. This was a play that should have been unadaptable, because censorship under the Hayes Code made it impossible to discuss, allude to, or otherwise hint at its subject: lesbianism. But Wyler understood that the core of the story was the horror of being at the mercy of a careless lie that hits dangerously close to an unspeakable truth. 

    Wyler’s straight interpretation of the story, These Three, was his first of seven collaborations with the great cinematographer Gregg Toland. In 1936, Toland had not yet perfected the deep focus technique for which he would become famous, but he and Wyler used blocking, the arrangement of actors in the frame, to allow the viewer to watch the unfolding drama of people watching each other. In the heterosexual version of the story, we watch a lifelong friendship fall apart when one woman is falsely accused of having an affair with the other’s fiancé. As much as the three victims of the lie declare that they are determined to stand together, Wyler’s blocking shows us how isolated Martha — the alleged guilty party — truly is, by how she stands and moves, how she peers at her friends and how the world glares at her. When the three confront Mrs. Tilford, the woman who has spread the rumor of Martha’s affair, Martha is positioned in the center and alone, pacing and turning in between two poles: Mrs. Tilford in the foreground at the far-left side of the frame and Joe and Karen, the engaged couple, together on the far-right. At times Martha stands in the background, wobbling slightly, at times she lurches forward as if about to faint. The physical separation between Martha and the others is so stark that when Mrs. Tilford addresses the two women separately, we know who she is speaking to in the close-up shots of her face because we can follow her eyes. She is firm, looking directly ahead when she speaks to Karen and saving contemptuous sidelong glances for Martha. 

    Martha herself cannot look at her friends straight on. Wyler trains his camera on her as she searches silently, furtively, for signs of a coming betrayal. Before they leave Mrs. Tilford’s house, Joe makes one final appeal. He stands positioned in the foreground with Mrs. Tilford, while Karen and Martha stand in the background, out of focus but clearly visible standing by the door. Karen turns her whole body to watch directly, proud and fortified by Joe’s loyalty. Martha, however, turns her head slowly, with a hint of shame, her body still angled toward the door as she watches. We know the lie has a kernel of truth: she is in love with Joe, and so his heroism is bittersweet, corrupted by her guilty desire. Even in the blurry background, it is painful to watch her twist and turn out on her own, believing herself undeserving of loyalty.

    Each of Wyler’s adaptations has this inventive quality, giving life to the essence of the story through the creation of a cinematic language. In The Little Foxes, Wyler translates the world of Hellman’s celebrated stage play into a series of intricately sculpted compositions. In one scene, a father and son test the depths of each other’s depravity, facing away from each other but watching each other carefully, each in their own shaving mirror. To allow the audience to clearly see both men’s faces through this maze of mirrors,was a technical achievement that drew bewildered admiration from no less an artist than Sergei Eisenstein. In The Letter, a genuinely extraordinary film from 1940, Wyler builds the strictly segregated but intimately intertwined worlds of British Malaya entirely out of light and shadow. The cutting, brilliant moon burns through the blinds of the carefully arranged, electrically lit colonial society, calling Bette Davis into its penetrating, almost transfiguring light. Dodsworth, in 1936, is a delicately observed portrait of an American marriage on the rocks, a study of the transformation of a middle-aged man (Walter Huston) in thoughtful pursuit of his own happiness, which deserves the compliment that Virginia Woolf’ paid to Middlemarch: It is one of the few movies about marriage for grown-ups.

    But perhaps Wyler’s most stylistically daring adaption is his Wuthering Heights, in 1939, which focuses more on the characters’ emotional states than the actual plot of the story. He almost entirely ignores the wild natural setting of the moors in which Emily Bronte’s story is set, and places most of the action indoors. But despite this choice — the screenplay was by Ben Hecht and Charles MacArthur — he uncannily recreates the dense and savage feeling of the novel, the gothic idealization of the dark and romantic and the contempt for the false brightness of ordinary life. 

    The camera drifts carefully through the interiors in which Cathy and Heathcliff spend their days: the bright, opulent halls of the society world of the Grange and the chiaroscuro gloom of Wuthering Heights. But it is not that the Grange is light and Wuthering Heights is dark. Things are not so simple. There is light in Wuthering Heights — light that obscures, that blinds. This is not the illuminating light of the sun, nor the soft light of lamplight, but the flashing, obliterating light of lightning. There, fire makes the darkness blacker. 

    Cathy says, “Whatever our souls are made of, his and mine are the same.” The strange material is lit with an obfuscating light. Wyler allows us to discover this secret vibrancy as the camera presses into Cathy’s and Heathcliff’s faces, or it glints and pools on their lips, their eyes, their teeth. Both Cathy and Heathcliff are often lit from behind, their profile framed, their features concealed. When Cathy declares, “I am Heathcliff,” lightning strikes behind her, engulfing her, so that for an instant she can barely be seen.

    Carefully and dramatically stylized as Wyler’s Wuthering Heights is, what it delivers is not the director’s artistic signature but his subject. Wyler crafts a visual vocabulary for the world-annihilating passion between two people. When Cathy and Heathcliff think of each other, their faces don’t glow, they shine, as if feverish. Both can move through the ordinary world and appear normal, even beautiful, but in this strange other light they are transformed. When Cathy, played by Merle Oberon, is in the world of the Grange, playing the society lady, her lashes cast soft shadows over dark, intelligent eyes. When Heathcliff calls her out of this comfort, her eyes widen and flash with an unearthly glow. The effect is maniacal. The light is so intense that her eyeballs strike the viewer as horrifically wet and round in their sockets. As Cathy and Heathcliff embrace on her deathbed, one of Cathy’s teeth catches this otherworldly light, and throughout the scene the tooth shines grotesquely in its winking glare. We get to see the animal that Heathcliff loves, sickening and dying inside her expensive cage.

    Laurence Olivier, brought off the stage where he felt he belonged to play Wyler’s Heathcliff, found the director sneering and sarcastic. Wyler, for his part, felt that Olivier was overacting, and after days of frustration brought the issue to a head in front of the whole crew. “Tell me Larry,” he barked, “what dimension do you reckon you got to now?” Olivier shot back, “I suppose this anemic little medium can’t take great acting.” Everyone on set burst out laughing, Wyler especially. Olivier was mortified. Wyler later took Olivier aside to talk earnestly about the potential for great film acting. Later in life Olivier would say, “If any film actor is having trouble with his career, can’t master the medium, and, anyway, wonders whether it is worth it, let him pray to meet a man like Wyler.” 

    Wyler believed that working with actors was one of the most essential jobs of the director, and he could be gentle and encouraging with his actors when he thought it would get results. Audrey Hepburn was a newcomer to acting when she was cast as the lead in Roman Holiday in 1953, and although possessed of a certain kind of natural charisma, she was shy and unsure about how to behave on camera. She was initially terrified of making mistakes, and Wyler set out to calm and secure her with a steady drip of praise. But he had a reputation for harsher treatment. In Jezebel, in 1938, the other — the better — Gone with the Wind, Wyler’s heroine is a vivacious and impudent southern belle named Julie played by a young (that is, exceedingly vivacious and impudent) Bette Davis. Viewers meet Julie arriving late to her own engagement party still dressed in her riding clothes. In her first few seconds on screen, Wyler wanted Julie to hike up the train of her dress with her riding crop and hook it over her shoulder. Easier said than done: it is a nifty bit of choreography and it needed to have the ease and feel of a gesture that she had performed hundreds of times. So, Wyler instructed Davis to repeat the scene over and over again. When an exasperated Davis demanded to know what she was doing wrong, Wyler merely told her, “I’ll know it when I see it.” Years later Davis herself admitted that Wyler’s perfectionism paid off. The gesture is powerfully sexy, tinctured with a masculine vigor and informality and yet elegant and indisputably feminine. In a film that forces viewers to wrestle with this woman on the way to accepting her, this single motion shows us at the start exactly who she is and leaves us as much enthralled to her as every character she bewitches. Julie hooks us with the crop, too.

    There were instances when Wyler used cruder methods to get what he wanted out of an actor. The Heiress was Wyler’s adaptation in 1948 of a play based on Henry James’ novel Washington Square. It stars Olivia de Havilland as Catherine Sloper, the plain single daughter of a wealthy family. Catherine is seduced and then jilted by a handsome but mercenary suitor (a young Montgomery Clift) who had promised to elope with her when he thought her money would be coming with them. He had not been prepared for her to renounce her fortune when her father, one of the cruelest characters in the history of film and played with blood-chilling elegance by Ralph Richardson, threatened to cut her out of his will. She waits by the door for the fiancé who had promised he would come. Hours crawl by. 

    The playwrights, Ruth and Augustus Goetz, who had adapted the James novella for the stage, had written a speech for the moment when Catherine realizes in agony that her suitor is not coming. They considered the speech essential to their interpretation of James’ story, which focuses on the tragedy of Catherine being so cruelly treated — by her father, her aunt, and her unscrupulous suitor — as unlovable. (Cruelty is the tale’s true subject.) The play called for her to say: “I used to think my misfortune was that Mother died. But I don’t think that anymore . . . If she had lived, she too could not have loved me.” The speech remained in Wyler’s script, but on the set he decided to cut it out. Instead he instructed De Havilland to silently, laboriously drag up the staircase the suitcase she had packed for her elopement. He made De Havilland repeat the scene again and again, waiting in vain for her frail form to communicate the desperate heartbreak which must have tormented the character. Finally he filled the suitcase with heavy books, such that De Haviland could barely lift it. With unfeigned exhaustion, she lugs the laden suitcase up the stairs, and we realize she is bereft of any hope of comfort or strength or love, that she must carry on living alone in a world that will only ever treat her unkindly. She didn’t need to tell us; she shows us. We are expected to see it because we are expected to look carefully.

    Wyler’s novelistic films allow us into the internal world of the individual through these delicate moments of discovery. It takes a special talent for collaboration, for other people, to construct a story out of the flesh and movement of others. This was Wyler’s special gift: recognizing, respecting, and at times manipulating the gifts of others. He was very demanding, but his style of work was designed to allow for as much cooperation as possible. The day before shooting he would schedule a day of rehearsals, which would begin with the cast gathering together to read and discuss the scene they would film the subsequent morning. Then he would stage the scene, allowing the actors to play it the way that was most comfortable for them. This also gave the cinematographer an opportunity to observe the staging and think through the photography. Then, before shooting, Wyler would have the cast rehearse the scene again, this time giving the actors suggestions on their performances. Shooting would not begin until every person involved had the opportunity to come to their own understanding of how it should work. Film is always a collaborative art, of course, but Wyler’s craft of collaboration was at another level altogether.

    The most important collaboration of Wyler’s career was his partnership with Gregg Toland. They worked together on seven films, including These Three, Wuthering Heights, and The Little Foxes. Toland, who may be the most famous American cinematographer of all time (particularly for his work with Orson Welles on Citizen Kane), worked with Wyler more than any other director. Some critics have declared that all there is to the “Wyler touch” is the Toland touch. In 1955, in an issue of Cahiers du Cinéma devoted to “The Situation of American Cinema” (dedicated to Orson Welles, “without whom the new American cinema would not be what it is”), the French critics offered a simple explanation for what they saw as Wyler’s artistic decline after 1948: “Gregg Toland était mort.” Short, ruthless, and to the point: no Toland, no worthwhile Wyler. The American critic Andrew Sarris, who lived under the spell of the French critics, wrote: “Subtract Gregg Toland from Welles and you still have a mountain; subtract Toland from Wyler and you have a molehill.” 

    But comparing Citizen Kane with The Best Years of Our Lives, the apotheosis of the partnership between Wyler and Toland, it is clear that Wyler has a different use for Toland’s powers than Welles did. Both films make extensive use of the deep focus shot, Toland’s signature achievement — and a real challenge considering the limitations of contemporary cameras. This technique allows the background and the foreground of a scene to be clear and uniformly visible simultaneously. In Citizen Kane, Welles uses deep focus shots for dramatic irony, the action in the background giving poignant context to the events in the foreground. The shots are highly stylized, giving voice to the director’s God-like view of the characters. The image is an icon of the story. 

    For Wyler, by contrast, deep focus photography had a more practical, and more poignant, purpose. Having more than one area of focus allowed Wyler, as he wrote in 1947, to have “action and reaction in the same shot, without having to cut back and forth from individual cuts of the characters.” Even before Toland was technically able to render both action and reaction in focus, he and Wyler worked together to achieve this effect, particularly in These Three and The Little Foxes. The viewer feels that we are taking in a scene the way that we take in life, shifting our attention from one person to another. There is no irony, there is no dramatic distancing, no iconography in these shots. Wyler was not creating myths, he was seeking the textures of human feeling. He composed the actors in the frame to encourage the viewer to watch the characters react to each other. A man in the background is placing a difficult phone call. A man in the foreground is watching as a friend plays piano, but he keeps glancing back at the man in the background. We know that our man in the foreground is troubled; he cares for the man in the phone booth, and he worries about him, but he feels that the phone call must be made nonetheless. We stumble into this private moment of internal conflict and watch with him as the man hangs up the phone and leaves. 

    The Best Years of Our Lives is Wyler’s masterpiece. In 1946, filmmakers around the world sought to understand what the recent war had made of their societies. What was left after the wreckage? How could they distinguish between what was essentially Italian, Japanese, German, and therefore unchanged, and what had been transformed forever? The Best Years of Our Lives is the American contribution to this exercise in global introspection. Through the stories of three men returning from war to the families they left behind, Wyler reveals a society weighed down with a new awareness of the horror of the world. His characters struggle with disability, posttraumatic stress disorder, reemerging antisemitism, surging reactionary anticommunism, and pervasive fears of nuclear annihilation, as they try to discover who they — and we — are going to be now that we are on the other side of an apocalypse. And he does it by allowing the audience to watch the characters watch each other. The three men keep looking behind the eyes of the people around them for signs that they are not welcome, that they cannot be understood. As we catch characters regard each other, or pointedly avoid each other’s gaze, we feel that we are discovering for ourselves something that is happening inside them, the surging and subsiding feelings they have about each other.

    One of the most moving scenes in The Best Years of Our Lives comes when Al, the bank vice president turned infantryman turned bank vice president again, is invited to give a speech at a banquet, and he is so miserable about his job denying small loans to veterans like himself that he gets outrageously drunk. Wyler shoots his speech in a deep focus down the head table. As Al staggers through his speech at the center of the table, we see audience members listening with anger and astonishment in front of us, and his wife Milly (Myrna Loy, exquisite as usual), almost at the end of the table, sitting in pained anxiety, occasionally exchanging nervous looks with Al’s boss. But as Al continues, he becomes more eloquent: 

    I wanna tell you that the reason for my success as a sergeant is due primarily to my previous training in the Corn Belt Loan and Trust Company. The knowledge I acquired in the good old bank I applied to my problems in the infantry. For instance, in Okinawa, a major comes to me . . . he says, “Stephenson, you see that hill?” “Yes, sir. I see it.” “All right,” he said. “You and your platoon will attack said hill and take it.”

    So I said to the major, “But, uh, that operation involves considerable risk. We haven’t sufficient collateral.” “I’m aware of that,” said the major, “but the fact remains, that there is the hill and you are the guys who are going to take it.” So I said to him, “I’m sorry, major. No collateral, no hill.” So we didn’t take the hill, and we lost the war. Uh, I think that, uh, little story has considerable significance. But I’ve, uh, forgotten what it is.

    He finishes his speech by professing his belief that the bank will end up granting so many small loans to returning servicemen “that people will think we’re gambling with the depositors’ money.” He concludes: “And we will be. We’ll be gambling on the future of this country.”

    As Al speaks, we watch his boss look up sharply and furrow his brow, and the audience look on in confusion. Milly, however, is transformed, now staring at Al proudly and lovingly. We watch her realize that, unhappy and drunk as he is at this moment, Al is becoming a better man than he was before the war. He had been a selfish man and had not understood sacrifice or fellowship. He had no sense of civic responsibility and he, like his bosses at the bank, was happy to disguise his greed, to himself and the world, by recourse to economic principles and their alleged moral neutrality. Now, through all his pain and confusion, he is profoundly idealistic that Americans do share a collective destiny, and a collective commitment to the betterment of the world. All this Milly understands, as we can see in her eyes, because she is not so unchanged as she appears, and because she loves him. 

    Mrs. Miniver was released in 1942, but Wyler directed it before the United States entered the war. Even Wyler would — and did — acknowledge that the film was propaganda, intended to stir American sympathy for the British under Nazi attack by showing life on the home front as the war becomes increasingly desperate. The film ends with a speech given by the local priest after the town — the fictional village of Belham, near London — has been disfigured by Nazi bombs, when the community comes together to mourn. Wyler himself worked on the speech, which was later translated into French, German, and Italian to be broadcast throughout Europe on the Voice of America, and airdropped in millions of leaflets into German-occupied territories. This time Wyler did want an iconic moment, poignant but clear, to send the audience a forceful message. And that is what he achieved. As characters take a break from burying townspeople whom the audience, over the course of the film, has been taught to love, we are told: “They will inspire us with an unbreakable determination to free ourselves and those who come after us from the tyranny and terror that threaten to strike us down.” When the priest declares that “this is the people’s war, and the people must fight it,” audiences watching today are no less stirred than the many who watched the film when it came out. 

    That tone was profoundly unlike the tone of The Best Years of Our Lives, the keynote of which was not righteousness but goodness. Goodness is not iconic. Goodness cannot be broadcast over radio waves to move men to war. Goodness is even banal. The last scene of Wyler’s great film is a small wedding, in which all these people who were mauled or magnified by history are gathered. Homer, the football star who lost his hands in the Navy — played, unforgettably, not by a professional actor but by a war veteran with prosthetic arms and hands — has finally stopped shutting himself away in shame from the people who love him, and allowed his high school sweetheart Wilma to show him that she is as devoted to him as ever. Fred — a moving and only intermittently tough Dana Andrews — is a heroic fighter pilot who came home to find himself trapped in a bad marriage and a humiliating job, and by the end of the film he is still adrift. The wedding is the first time he has seen Peggy, the girl he really loves, and who truly loves and understands him, since he broke things off with her and was subsequently dumped by his frivolous wife. She is played by Teresa Wright, as uncannily subtle here as she is everywhere. Fred and Peggy stand separated — him closest to the camera in the foreground and her in the background in brilliant white — locked in their own internal struggles on the left side of the frame.

    We, with the rest of the wedding guests, are on edge as the ceremony unfolds, afraid that Homer will not be dexterous enough with his hooks to place the ring on his bride’s finger. The crowd watches as Homer promises to be with Wilma for richer or for poorer, but we start to notice a private moment unfolding. Fred turns slowly to look back at Peggy. Their eyes meet, but they grimly look away. As Wilma returns Homer’s promise, Fred looks back again and we realize Peggy is staring at him with tears in her eyes. Their gaze holds, and we can see clearly in Peggy’s eyes that it is full and confident, echoing the loving look that Wilma is giving Homer on the right side of the frame. As the ceremony ends, and the rest of the wedding party swells to the right to hug Homer and Wilma, Fred and Peggy stand still, in their own world. Fred crosses the room back to Peggy, slowly and deliberately, and they kiss in the background. Even as we share in the relief and joy of the rest of the wedding party, we alone catch Fred and Peggy’s private moment of loving understanding.

    We are utterly in thrall to the powerful emotions of the characters, but we barely notice the technique that is making it possible for us to feel that we have stumbled upon the intimate pains and joys of an entire generation. There is nothing brash and operatic about the blocking; almost nothing is said. The pinnacle of Wyler’s and Toland’s collaboration, the apotheosis of their powers, is this quietly climactic moment, when we can at last watch two good people meet each other’s eyes and see each other.

    Is it ironic or perfectly correct that the great American postwar epic is a simple story, an intimate encounter with ourselves as we find each other — unsure, foolish, hurt — and good? Without affectation or swagger, Wyler builds a new country stumbling into a new world, fat and safe, apparently untouched by man’s greatest atrocities, and yet firm under the weight of a grandiose but clear-eyed sense of responsibility. This delicate idealism would be strangled by spectacular iconography; the brand of the artist would crush it. Here is the gentle profundity of Wyler’s humanist generosity. He gives us to each other to discover, teaching viewers nothing less than how to recognize the human, how to live in community with one another, how to watch, to listen, to pay attention. There is no shorthand for the quality of Wyler’s attention, which is, ultimately, the Wyler Touch. Attention, after all, is not only the condition of cinematic experience, but also the beginning of all our moral and emotional duties.

    Blood Stains

    Horror — like beauty, passion, and all states in extremis — confounds the habits which regulate the human mind. Before articulation — which is to say, before the experience or the witness of horror is transformed from something beyond our ken into a verbal artifact manufactured by reason or insight or prejudice or all of these things — we are alone with something unlike the materials we are able to know. When we are in shock we remain fixed before the horror without the means to investigate it, such that the time that a human mind is forced to spend with inhuman action is discomfitingly distended. A terrible alchemy preserves the horror which yields a pure, uncomplicated, and correct pain — the pain of considering horror squarely, without evasion or escape. Some acts should not be metabolized and smoothly fitted into ordinary life. But the human mind resists shock; shock must be melted like ice in the sun. What do we do with what we have witnessed? How do we alter it so that it fits inside the boxes which order our imaginations?

    Whoever manages articulation first secures a strange power. The race out of horror into language is a power race. First-speakers have the job of first and forever transforming what could not be absorbed. That lucky winner, whose haste is more often a symptom of unintelligent compulsion than it is of reason and wisdom, sets the conditions for everybody else’s confrontation with the horror. At least, everybody unlucky enough to have to think about the horror at all. Thanks to these “first responders,” whatever the intellectual quality of their response, the rest of us are granted the gift of mediation. And if we later attempt to unknit the mediation and gain a more immediate relation to the horror, we will find it is no simple emancipation. 

    But not all horror is seen, and some horrors are seen more than others, and of those some remain alive in public consciousness for longer stretches. The ones that remain alive the longest are corrupted beyond recognition, corrupted the most. They feel nothing like the precipitating horror which catalyzed the fascination. They have been interpreted and put to use. Once horror is described it becomes what we call it, and slips further and further away from what it is.

    On October 7, 2023, the entire world was enlisted into a new era of discourse about horror, in which atrocities of this order were perpetrated in the Middle East, recorded on cameras, and shared around the globe along with “analysis” that hardly rose above a snarl, every day for over a year. For over a year an enormous subsection of the human population has participated in or at least witnessed and been degraded by this poisoned discourse. After the sun set on the evening of October 7, the locus of the horror migrated westward. Now the images of mutilated bodies depict Palestinians instead of Israelis. And the discourse remains every bit as degrading. 

    Over the past year many Palestinians and Israelis have howled that their people are brutalized and the world is silent. It is a profoundly human cry no less stirring for being patently untrue. Is there any other sliver of land in the world about which the global population is less capable of silence? And while we type and glance and glance away, we gauze the horror in verbal and visual buffering. Thus, for example, when an American reads the phrase “the rapes perpetrated by Hamas on October 7,” she does not mentally resuscitate the horror. Instead, dependably, her mind moves to the arena of political discourse in which horrors of this kind are debased by conversion into talking points and dogmas and slogans. She does not smell smoke and blood or shiver at the recollection of a woman’s splayed naked body and a face burned so badly she can hardly make out its features. Too many headlines, talk shows, late night hosts, speeches, op-ed pieces, podcasts, tweets, and heated or fortifying conversations come between her and the thing itself. She is protected by language and time. Words do the work of balm even when we would prefer that they did not. She can hardly see the scar, and anyway it was always someone else’s.

    But words do not have to serve as a tool for diminished understanding. As certain writers and poets have shown, language is not helpless before its own numbing power: it can preserve the shock. Language — more even than images — can 
find ways to maintain the aura of awe and fear and disgust which is proper, which is moral. There is a tradition into which the ghastly accounts can be placed which inflicts no disrespect. Human beings have had abundant opportunity to grapple seriously with the ugliest expressions of human brutality. There are examples of how to respond to horror while preserving the dignities that have been debased.

    Every single instance of brutality perpetrated over the last year on that strip of land between river and sea — the strip of land which Jews and Palestinians share — demands attention, analysis, compassion, and respect. The photos of mutilated Palestinians bodies flood our feeds every day as they have for over a year, like the dying leaves which litter the streets in the autumn. Each should be raised and cleansed, the faces should be remembered and the life stories and the names. The violence responsible for their debasement should be studied. We know how to do this. We have done it before.

    But there is so much wreckage, and too little is known about each instance. How can the personal hell of two million Gazans be paid proper respect?

    The rapes perpetrated by Hamas on October 7 are anomalous among the brutalities committed since the start of this bloody nightmare because they have been studied — there has been no silence. There has been erasure, denial, and extenuation, and there has been documentation and the repeated proliferation of evidence. All this went on for months. While other atrocities came and went, the rapes of October 7 retained global attention. 
And so, in the grisly competition between horrific crimes, these, the rapes, were distinct. This is true despite the facts that they were not the only instances of rape committed in the region over the past year. Reports of Israeli guards raping the Palestinian detainees at the Sde Teiman detention center, for example, rattled Israelis and others last summer. The Intercept, one of the publications at the forefront of the smear campaign against the rape victims of October 7, published extensive evidence documenting the rapes that were committed 
in Sde Teiman. But after a short while the next horrific crime shifted global attention. 

    Nor were the rapes of October 7 the only examples of crimes which people afterwards insisted did not take place. When footage from Gaza of a young boy being burned alive from fires ignited by Israeli strikes spread across social media in October, Israeli propagandists immediately insisted that the videos were fake. Commentators then denounced the deniers, but after just a few days even the image of the teenage boy’s body burning had joined the millions of others we have time to pick up and put down but by which we refuse to be appropriately shocked.

    When so much horror is force-fed to so many people over so short a period of time, all of us ingesting the obscene deluge engage in coldblooded triage. This is not conscious. We hardly know why some horrors haunt and others fade from memory.

    “Men rape in war” is a truism, and the fact that it is a truism is its own trauma, which schools women in their subhuman status. Wartime rape is barbaric, but women have been conditioned to believe that rape in war is no more or less barbaric than all the other horrible things that happen during armed conflict. War is barbaric. Of course men should not rape, but is that injunction anymore essential than those against a host of other war crimes, to say nothing of the acts committed during war that are not violations of the laws of war? Is wartime rape worse than an entire family being killed in a rocket attack as happened in Gaza just a few hours before this writing, or worse than the displacement of three million people as has happened in Sudan since 2023, or the slaughter of nearly half a million Syrians? When attempting to explain exactly why rape in war is a phenomenon worthy of special consideration, one is forced to situate the act of rape in the context of numerous other bloodcurdling horrors. And so if society does not affirm that wartime rape is not just an act like any other awful one, that it is cursed with a peculiar repugnance, it might seem natural that it would not be considered especially grave.

    But “not especially grave” is rarely the designation. Wartime rape is either ignored all together, or treated as profoundly horrific. It is a peculiar category of crime: for most of human history it was dismissed as merely a woman’s issue. Thus, in 1996, when a briefer was presenting a report to the Austrian government which emphasized that widespread rape was occurring at that time in Kosovo, she was told by a senior official in an Austrian humanitarian agency that “it is not a story” because “men are being killed.” Twenty years later, we live in a bizarre era in which the crime is both too horrific to believe and unworthy of serious consideration. 

    In April 2022, American readers read and forgot that twenty-four Ukrainian women in Bucha were “systematically raped” by Russian soldiers. The veracity of this account did not become a lightning rod for international debate. Americans believed it. They just didn’t care that much. Ukrainian women were spared the debasement of having reports of their rapes analyzed to pieces and questioned endlessly, but they were dealt another indignity: the world simply moved on. And some of the Americans who insisted that the rapes on October 7 did not happen and that the rapes in Sde Teiman did also casually wondered why Ukrainians really do require more aid than America has already doled out to them, as if the possibility of Russian victory is an eventuality at which leftists in the strongest democracy in the world can merely shrug their shoulders. As a friend of mine recently put it, it’s not only that there are good victims and bad victims — there are also good aggressors and bad ones. Sometimes rape is unconscionable and sometimes it is literally forgettable.

    2023, I mean before October 7, was a record year for violence against Israeli women. Twenty-three women were murdered in Israel that year, a slight increase from 2022. Of the women murdered, nineteen of them knew their murderer. Ninety-two percent of rape investigations in the country are closed without charges. Seventy-five percent of those charged with sexual crimes are released before the end of their sentence. But rape happens in ordinary life even more than rape happens in war, and that sort are the rapes we learn to live with. The genocidal rape and genocidal murders that were committed on October 7 are different in kind and not just in degree than the rapes committed by Israelis against Israelis. The men and women who were savaged by Hamas terrorists on that day were slaughtered and brutalized because of their ethnicity. Rape was used as a tool for crushing Israeli identity.

    As I say and as we know, rape happens in war. It always has. Ancient Greeks considered women the property of their husband or their father, and in war the pillaging of enemy property was reason enough to go to war. Rape was considered a property crime, one that war rendered permissible because the loser loses ownership claims. (Marriage rape, still legal in certain states in this country and regularly practiced in all of them, was an oxymoron.) The ancient Romans, who in this macabre category distinguished themselves, considered rape not only a weapon of war but an expression of victory. 

    Humanity did not attempt much progress on this issue in the intervening millennia. In the Second World War rape was used as a weapon by the German army in every country it violated. German soldiers tortured, raped, and forcibly sterilized women in torture-brothels and in concentration camps. The rapes committed by Japanese soldiers in Nanking are infamous, but less well known is the macabre history of the “comfort women.” Between 1932 and 1945, Japan kidnapped thousands of “comfort women,” many of whom were children, from China, Korea, and other occupied countries and sold them into sexual slavery. A survivor recalled that “it was no place for humans . . . there was no rest. They had sex with me every minute.” She was regularly beaten by her captors. American soldiers frequented the brothels where these women were imprisoned. When Russia invaded Germany in 1944, Russian soldiers punished German women with a frenzy of systematic rape which crescendoed when they invaded Berlin in 1945 and raped an estimated two million women.

    The Allies established trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo to prosecute and punish those responsible for perpetrating war crimes, but neither one of these tribunals designated rape as a war crime in their charters. No victims of rape were called to testify before either tribunal. At Nuremberg evidence of rape was submitted but not prosecuted, whereas in Tokyo evidence of the Rape of Nanking was given and the defendants were convicted but no mention was made of the comfort women. Perhaps this had something to do with the fact that American authorities allowed the brothels to continue functioning even after the war was over; American soldiers could continue raping the comfort women until General MacArthur ordered the system to be shut down in 1946.

    The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established in 1998, defined genocidal rape as a form of genocide. Judge Navanethem Pillay, who later became UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said in a statement after the verdict: “From time immemorial, rape has been regarded as spoils of war. Now it will be considered a war crime. We want to send out a strong message that rape is no longer a trophy of war.” And yet. Even at the time she made her statement, rape was considered a war crime if and when it was genocidal. The qualification belies her assurances.

    Nowhere in the world do women securely enjoy the status — socially or legally — of full human beings, and so rape during war (like all other kinds of rape) has not been treated as a distinct crime for most of the period during which human beings have been committing it and bearing it. Concerning the rapes that were perpetrated on October 7, a variety of specific questions have been asked and answered and asked again and answered again, and analogous volleys have been performed before about other analogously horrific crimes, and all of them have been met with the same ritual questions. These are some of the questions.

    How do we really know rape was committed? 

    This is a question that victims of rape are always asked, regardless of whether the rape took place during war. And in war, as in life, people respond to allegations of rape as if the crime is so horrific it can hardly be believed. Thus, in the progressive outlets which set out to discredit the claims of the rape of Israeli women by Palestinian men on October 7, sentences such as these appear:

    The cornerstone of that report is Gal and Nagi Abdush, a couple killed on Oct. 7. The Times says Israeli police believe Gal Abdush was raped. But the only evidence given is a “grainy video” of Gal’s burned corpse, “lying on her back, dress torn, legs spread, vagina exposed.” Gal became known as “the woman in the black dress.” . . . 

    PHRI references the video of Gal Abdush as evidence of possible “sexual abuse.” 

    The Times mentioned messages that Gal and Nagi, parents of two children, sent to their family during the attack. After Gal was killed, Nagi sent “a final audio message” to his brother Nissim Abdush at 7:44 a.m., “Take care of the kids. I love you,” right before he was killed. 

    But the Times fails to mention other text and phone messages that make it almost impossible Gal was raped. She messaged at 6:51 a.m. about intense explosions on the border, based on an Instagram comment by Miral Altar, Gal’s sister. 

    Nine minutes later, at 7:00 a.m., Nagi Abdush called his brother Nissim to say Gal was shot and dying. . . . 

    The Times never explains how Gal could be captured, raped, fatally shot, and burned to death in nine minutes while Nagi messaged his family and never mentioned any physical contact with Hamas forces.

    How long, reader, would you guess it takes to shoot and burn a person? How long, for that matter, would it take to rape in war? Surely longer than nine minutes?

    Human beings are not supposed to have to know the answers to these questions. This “investigation,” published in Yes! Magazine, evinces a strange reverence for the status of rape. That is because there is no just reason to rape. This tendentious author can argue that Hamas “freedom fighters” had a right to fatally shoot a young woman, but rape? In war, “freedom fighters” are supposed to explode and maim and kill other human beings, but what sound reason could there be for sexual exploitation? 

    When criminals in international criminal courts are tried for war crimes, the prosecutor is tasked with proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime in question was committed. Reasonable doubt. Thus in February 2001, when the Trial Chamber at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia sentenced Dragan Kunarc to twenty-eight years imprisonment, it was because the chamber had been persuaded beyond reasonable doubt that he had, in July 1992, taken two girls to a house in which several soldiers awaited them. He personally raped one of the girls and aided and abetted in the gang rape of the other. In August of the following year he repeated the practice, this time with four girls, one of whom he raped himself. On at least two other occasions he took another girl to an apartment for the same purposes. 

    Can you imagine how Yes! Magazine would have analyzed such information? Would it have asked how, for example, almost ten years later, such facts could have been persuasively established? Would they have demanded to know how long the girls were imprisoned in the room so they could be satisfied that gang rape had truly taken place? Or would casting doubt of that sort on crimes of this kind seem to them unreasonable?

    Why are they doing it? 

    For those willing to accept that the rapes of October 7 had in fact been committed, another of the sickening questions raised about these particular rapes was whether or not rape was committed enough times for it to be called systematic. The Israeli government did immediately call it that, invoking a term which is an important part of the young international legal tradition on this subject, developed after the Rwandan genocide and the Bosnian wars, to try and force humanity to confront war rape as a distinct crime. In the war between Bosnia and Kosovo, rape was used by both Serbs and Croats, though Croats to a lesser degree, as instruments of war. Serbian soldiers committed mass rapes in Bosnian refugee camps, as those who managed to escape reported. The Bosnian foreign minister called them “rape camps.” Impregnated victims were forced to bear their enemies’ babies and were often ostracized by their own families afterwards, as often happens in such terrible cases. 

    In the Bosnian genocide in 1992, more than two hundred thousand women were raped in the war. The rapes served different functions. Some were especially sadistic and were perpetrated as acts of terror and humiliation; some were perpetrated with the aim of forcing pregnancy; some were forms of sexual slavery. In the Rwandan genocide in 1994, roughly a quarter of a million women were raped, after which they were often sexually mutilated, thrown into sex slavery, and forced to birth resultant children. In response to both of these genocides, international tribunals, the Yugoslav Tribunal (ICTY) and the Rwandan Tribunal (ICTR), were established and tasked with determining how to punish war crimes. ICTY convicted twenty-three men of rape and/or sexual violence, many of whom were convicted in the Foca case which was the first international case, to exclusively prosecute sexual violence. When the Israeli government said that rape was systematic on October 7, they were invoking the tradition of both of these tribunals and others like them, and one of their intentions was to communicate that Hamas had genocidal intent, even if they lacked genocidal capacity.

    But what does it mean to say that rape was committed with genocidal intent? According to international law, it means that the rape was committed on a large scale, systematically, by a belligerent force, with the intention of decimating the enemy culture in this way. This framing considers the crime as a crime against a people and not a crime against a woman — but of course it is both these things. It is both a crime against a woman and a crime against a people — and the fact that rape in war is overwhelmingly a crime against a woman is the primary reason that, for so long, it was regarded as an insignificant act, unworthy of special attention. “Just a woman’s issue.” Today the opposite is true: the crime is considered primarily a crime against Israelis, which is why leftists who ordinarily abhor the sort of barbaric interrogation of rape-victims which they model so enthusiastically in this instance felt entitled to overlook the fact that these Israelis happened to be female victims of male ferocity.

    Who were they harming and what was the nature of the harm?

    If rape is a war crime because it is genocidal, then the crime considers the harm done to the nation, not the harm done to a human being. When the Israeli government immediately insisted that the rapes were systematically committed, it was invoking the vernacular employed to prosecute genocidal rape, which is of course what the rapes had been. They were first and foremost an attempt to crush Israeli identity. And when progressives consider whether or not Israeli women could have been raped by Palestinians, their neat syllogism, which dictates that Israelis are oppressors and Palestinians are victims who either resist or submit, dictates that a victim could not have committed an act of violence that could harm a human being. They insist that all violence on the part of Palestinians against Israelis is justified because it is an act against the state. In Israel there is mandatory conscription. Progressives who insist that the rapes were fabricated often point out the connections that all those making allegations have to the Israeli army, as if connection to the IDF necessarily disqualifies the testimony. So in a country in which military service is legally mandated, who can be believed? All doubt, or a lot of doubt, is reasonable. And at the same time all acts of violence against Israeli citizens are acts of violence against the state. There are no innocent civilians. There are 
only colonizers. 

    The progressive left believes that Hamas is a resistance movement and that October 7 was a victory for resisters 
opposing Israeli oppression and colonization. The young 
Palestinian writer Ihab Hassan disagrees. In “Hamas Has Led Us To Slaughter,” an essay published on the website of this journal in October, he writes:

    On October seventh of last year, Hamas perpetrated horrific crimes: crimes against Israeli civilians the likes of which a healthy mind can hardly bear to imagine. In response, Israel has unleashed its own horrific retaliation on Gazan civilians, inflicting horrors that the same healthy mind cannot even begin to imagine. And the horrors multiply by the day and these bloody days have stained an entire calendar year and more. But Israelis were not the only victims of Hamas cruelty that day. Hamas also betrayed their own people. Gazans have been punished for Hamas’ crimes. Hamas knew that this is what would happen but did it anyway and they would do it again, just as Israel would repeat every crime it has committed against Palestinians if given the opportunity.

    In reply to the tweet in which Hassan shared this essay an especially sick individual wrote: “This is like condemning those that led the Warsaw uprising.” A respondent said: “The Warsaw uprising didn’t involve the people from the ghettos committing rape and child murder. You have a warped view of reality.” To which someone new chimed in: “Never happened.”

    This awful thread captures all the relevant reflexes and regurgitations: for those who esteem Hamas terrorists as freedom fighters, Hamas could not have raped because raping women cannot possibly help overthrow an occupation, just like slaughtering children cannot possibly quash a terrorist organization. Defenders of Israel cite the rapes in the same spirit as the defenders of Gaza cite the number of women and children killed in Gaza, both equally and tacitly affirming that the others who are killed could reasonably be considered dangerous and so worthy of death or violation. 

    The exchange on Hassan’s tweet occurred over a year after Israel first began to bomb Gaza. At least forty-two thousand people had been killed already. At the time of the exchange there were already no functional hospitals in Gaza, and nowhere in the entire strip where the two million people trapped inside could expect to secure safety, food, and water. No matter how horrific the crimes which catalyzed this onslaught, nothing justifies the magnitude of the carnage wrought on the people of Gaza since October 2023. So why insist that the rapes did not occur, as if their occurrence would justify everything else? Both things are true: Hamas terrorists are barbaric and motivated in their crimes by a repugnant ethnic hatred far dearer to them than their own people’s safety and freedom and what Israel has done and is doing and intends to do to the people of Gaza is unconscionable. 

    Hassan concluded his essay with this chilling paragraph:

    There are still outsiders who dare to characterize Hamas’ attack last year as an act of resistance. As a Palestinian, I hold you in contempt. I condemn your narcissistic usurpation of my people’s pain for your own shallow and cruel political posturing. What you call an act of resistance will be remembered forever by the Palestinian people as the day the gates of hell opened on the people of Gaza. Those gates still have not closed.

    For Hassan, who grew up in the West Bank and who has watched the lives of his friends from Gaza sink into utter immiseration, the hell which scorches the entire strip is not abstract. When he thinks about Gaza he can hear the screams. Images of Gaza represent a specific place and the bodies in the images are mere references to the actually existing human beings of whom the photograph was taken. 

    But for Americans like the ones in Hassan’s X thread, the images are an end in themselves. They refer to nothing outside of the digital universe. The photographs of dead children which they see on their social media timelines do not rattle them out of their screens. These bodies are made of pixels, they bleed pixelated blood. There is no original, no flesh, bones, earth, or concrete. It is not a category mistake to treat these bodies as something other than human, to treat them as a factor in a complicated political algorithm. That is literally what they are. (Musk makes sure of that.)

    We learned in primary school that Vietnam catalyzed mass protest in the United States because of the photographs which forced Americans to reckon with the vicious bloodshed. Today photography reproduces images of the destruction at such a high rate that the bloodbath hardly registers. This is not genocide, it is content. The image is the image alone. Rationalizing mass carnage cognitively, owing to distance and habit and speed, is now the human default, and there is no technology which mitigates our automated rationalization which does not also, and more powerfully, accelerate it.

    This is a disgraceful way to live. What can we do? How do we cleanse ourselves of these toxins leaching from every one of our public squares? Our days are laced with a repugnant, militant contempt for other people’s humanity. The flip side of this is the omnipresent and poisonous certainty that the people we love and care for are in a category apart from all other human creatures. This conviction stains us. The blood, the pixelated blood, stains us. Anyone numb to the sanctity of human life is incapable of treating the horrors of war with the requisite shock. And those are the people quickest to speak.

    By what right do we pick up and put down the facts of other peoples’ terrors and humiliations? What narcotic convinced so much of the human population that they have license to speak with certainty about the dismemberments of other peoples’ bodies, states, and souls? Where is our shame? Where is our shock? Shame and shock are not possible in a culture in which the only tools we have for communicating information about horrors committed around the world are tools which necessarily blind us to their horror. 

    Walter Benjamin famously observed that when a work of art is reproduced the quality of the original is always depreciated, and that 

    This holds not only for art work but also, for instance, for a landscape which passes in review before the spectator in a movie. . . . And what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is the authority of the object.

    One might subsume the eliminated element in the term “aura” and go on to say: that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art. This is a symptomatic process whose significance points beyond the realm of art. One might generalize by saying: the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence.

    Isn’t this true also of people? Do human beings not have auras? Think of the millions of copies of photographs of dead bodies — dead bodies pulled from rubble, dead bodies hustled onto stretchers, dead bodies lowered from the remains of a bombed out building. What is real? The photographs or the bodies? They are not the same thing. Ceci n’est pas un cadavre. 

    And Benjamin points out that, in the age of mechanical 
reproduction, art that can be reproduced is made to be reproduced — “the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility.” And if the “art” in question is the artifacts we make of war as the war is happening? We have done, we are doing every day, every moment that we contribute to or accept the discourse, a terrible thing. We are converting other people’s destruction into content. These are not human beings, they are retweetable, command-C-command-V-able vehicles for likes and replies and reposts. Engagement! 

    Benjamin, later in the same text:

    During long periods of history, the mode of human sense perception changes with humanity’s entire mode of existence. The manner in which human sense perception 
is organized, the medium in which it is accomplished, 
is determined not only by nature but by historical 
circumstances as well.

    And we have done this. We have altered our own minds, stunted them, hardened our hearts, changed their very function. How can a citizen of this digitized century resuscitate a faith in human worth?

    We have to preserve our horror, and not only our horror at the brutalities of war. Like Ihab Hassan, we must scorn all the journalists and reporters and politicians and diplomats and dinner guests and strangers in line at the grocery who, in their callous conversation, evince abject disregard for the human reality of all this content. That callousness spreads and the stain defies all manner of bleach. Beneath or beyond or outside of the rehearsed lines and prepared speeches, we have to cultivate and safeguard a human pulse, a redemptive repulsion. The horrors must provoke horror. Our horror is an antidote. It will not save us from evil — there is no sure escape from it, it is everywhere — but it will keep us from becoming evil ourselves.

    Sylvia Plath Turned 89 Today

    Sunrise lines a cloud: flamingo silk
    in an old fur coat.
    Seagulls catch the wind like scraps of paper. 

    She’s been up for hours, wrapped in her old plaid bathrobe.
    Migraine. Lightning
    flashes behind her eyelids.
    She drinks her coffee and writes: the tattered world

    Later there will be champagne and candlelight
    Phone calls from overseas.
    She’ll watch the full moon rise over the blue deeps
    and write a dreaming Fury.

    Who said to kill yourself for a man
    Is a waste of a good suicide?
    She hasn’t thought of Ted in years.

    Reading Marcus Aurelius in September

    Ripe olives drop from the tree, grapes glow
    green in the sun, bursting, already
    smelling a little of decay.
    A thousand miles away, the emperor slogs
    through mud with his grumbling soldiers.
    His son is worthless, possibly insane.
    At night in his tent he writes
    of odd accidental pleasures:
    bread splitting its crust in the oven —
    why do we love it?
    and urges himself to embrace his fate,
    like a rock in the ocean, waves boiling.
    Nature, he writes, holds us like a breath
    but also: a philosopher died eaten by worms.
    Seen rightly nothing is evil. Or lasts.
    His son watches, pretending to be asleep
    already seeing himself in the arena, slaughtering
    that strange and innocent creature, a giraffe.

    Going Gray

    My witchy hair
    so furious and alive
    stands up and crackles
    like a scratched 78
    Galli-Curci singing from the moon
    Sempre libera!
    It’s an owl’s nest
    twigs and feathers and bones and rain
    a straw broom
    forgotten in a corner
    but still capable
    of spontaneous combustion
    so watch out.

    There’s joy in taking your final shape
    if it’s what you’re meant to be.
    Who needs color anyway
    when the ocean in winter is so voracious
    and so beautiful?

    Ancestors

    Behind us, centuries of child brides
    split open in childbirth
    peasants fleeing bent under sacks of grain
    small boys who hid in the outhouse
    when the soldiers came for the family.

    Every one of us
    a survivor of survivors.
    Ishmael waves
    as he floats by on a coffin.

    Even the one-eyed cat
    slinking off round the corner
    had to have come
    from a lucky line of cats.

    My dear, my dear
    how is it we are here
    drinking green wine
    at the café in the square
    under the autumn leaves?

    The Woke Couch

    We refused most emphatically to turn a patient who puts himself into our hands in search of help into our private property, to decide his fate for him, to force our own ideals upon him, and with the pride of a Creator to form him in our own image and see that it is good.

    Sigmund Freud

    On April 6, 2021, Dr. Aruna Khilanani, a psychoanalyst, addressed a group of mental health experts at the Yale School of Medicine’s Child Study Center. The invited speaker titled her talk “The Psychopathic Problem of the White Mind” and delivered her remarks from New York City via Zoom. As she settled into her presentation, Khilanani told an audience of psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers about her murderous impulses. “I had fantasies of unloading a revolver into the head of any white person that got in my way, burying their body and wiping my bloody hands as I walked away relatively guiltless with a bounce in my step, like I did the world a fucking favor.” Talking with white people, she said, was a “waste of our breath. We are asking a demented, violent predator who thinks that they are a saint or a superhero to accept responsibility.”

    When the Child Study Center invited Khilanani, they knew what they were getting — and many in the audience welcomed it. One black woman thanked Khilanani for giving “voice to us as people of color and what we go through all the time;” a psychologist deemed the talk “absolutely brilliant;” and one man in the Zoom audience said he felt “very shook in a good way.” These details were gleaned from a leaked audio recording of the talk made public by The Free Press two months later. Days later, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and NBC News reported on Khilanani’s talk, citing as well the statement issued by Yale School of Medicine, calling the “tone and content” of the presentation “antithetical to the values of the school.” Having myself been a resident and then a faculty member in the Department of Psychiatry at the Yale School of Medicine, I knew that Khilanani’s lecture, its crass unprofessionalism aside, flouted the very purpose of Grand Rounds, which is to impart scholarship, clinical wisdom, and original analysis. 

    Around the same time, another New York City psychoanalyst, Donald Moss, came to attention for his article, “On Having Whiteness,” published in the Journal of the American Psycho-
analytic Association. Moss, who is white, wrote that whiteness is “a malignant, parasitic-like condition [that] renders its hosts’ appetites voracious, insatiable, and perverse.” These appetites, once established, “are nearly impossible to eliminate . . . there is not yet a permanent cure.” As one disenchanted reader of the paper remarked, “it is unfortunate that psychoanalysts like Donald Moss, who express their views in a more temperate fashion [than Khilanani], still espouse a kind of racial essentialism to explain extremely complex social realities.” 

    In the years since Khilanani and Moss held forth, more and more practitioners of psychotherapy — psychoanalysts, psychologists, social workers, and counselors — have become vocal about approaching their work as a primarily political, rather than clinical, undertaking. Indeed, according to the Holmes Commission on Racial Equality in the American Psychoanalytic Association, in 2023, both Khilanani and Moss might well be regarded as role models for their boundary-pushing. “To live up to its fuller potential, psychoanalysis must imaginatively, thoughtfully, and self-reflectively move beyond the boundaries set by racism and white supremacy,” said the Commission. (The Holmes report has been criticized for its myriad methodological errors.)

    Social justice and “decolonizing” psychology are the twin missions of the American Psychological Association, the APA. The association has vowed to “work [to] dismantle racism in important systems and sectors of society.” A 2021 APA report on racism within its own ranks confirmed its commitment to “a critical examination of how the discipline structures opportunity in ways that uphold White supremacy.” Cited in the report was the association’s Chief Science Officer, who stated that “until we can embark on scientific practices that are not dominated by White supremacy, we’re only going to be getting part of the truth.” In a piece last year called “Psychologists Must Embrace Decolonial Psychology,” Thema S. Bryant, president of the Association, explained that “decolonial psychology asks us to consider not just the life history of the individual we are working with but also the history of the various collective groups they are a part of, whether that is their nationality, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, religion or disability.” 

    The code of ethics of the National Association for Social Work requires all members “to practice through an anti-racist and anti-oppressive lens.” The Association now stipulates that “antiracism and other facets of diversity, equity and inclusion must be a focal point for everyone within social work,” and has expressed its commitment to “confronting and working to change policies, practices, and procedures that create inequities amongst racial groups, understanding these systems of oppression are based in and uphold white supremacy.” In 2015, the American Counseling Association (ACA), representing over sixty thousand professional counselors, published a document called Multicultural and Social Justice Counseling Competencies, which divided counselors and clients into “privileged” and “marginalized” groups and encouraged them to “possess an understanding of their social identities, social group statuses, power, privilege, oppression, strengths, limitations, assumptions, attitudes, values, beliefs, and biases.” It identified “social justice” as “one of the core professional values of the counseling profession.” My own professional organization, the American Psychiatric Association, issued a report in 2021 that called for a four-year curriculum to teach trainees “skills [to] address racism in the clinical setting and in-patient care.” 

    Whether the social justice imperative will eventually dominate psychotherapy remains to be seen, but clearly it is already tainting the practice. These national organizations mandate the standards for training program accreditation, and the programs, in turn, dictate required curriculum for their students. Accordingly, faculty in psychology, social work, and counseling programs are populating their curricula and workshops with the popular rhetoric of progressive movements. 

    At the same time, trends in program composition are setting the stage. In psychoanalytic training, for example, fewer psychiatrists are entering as increasing numbers of applicants from the humanities and other professions are arriving with certain progressive proclivities. And with many new and radicalized graduates joining the professions at the same time that seasoned and senior clinicians, the sole bulwark against eroding professional and clinical standards, are silencing themselves or choosing to retire early, I foresee a troubled future for the talking therapies.

    When I was a resident in psychiatry, learning to become a skilled therapist was an all-consuming ambition. Take it from me, the process is harder than it looks. My colleagues and I met weekly with experienced faculty to discuss our cases. We learned to keep our private passions, neuroses, and blind spots from distorting the work. We were in therapy ourselves to better understand those enthusiasms, flaws, and biases. We were vigilant about countertransference, Freud’s term for psychiatrists’ own emotional reaction to a patient, which could cloud our clinical judgment; and even our professors, we were relieved to learn, hired trust supervisors to help them manage their own countertransference. 

    Essential to our work with patients was the development and maintenance of the “therapeutic alliance,” a core bond of trust nurtured through a non-judgmental, empathic approach, mindful about not imposing our own values on the patient. We were taught, as well, to reach an agreement at the outset of therapy, about treatment goals and concordance about the way therapy is supposed to work. Freud called it the “analytic pact.” Volumes of data confirm that the rapport between patient and therapist is a reliably strong predictor of positive results.

    Enter Critical Social Justice–driven therapy (which I will call CSJT). The British therapist Val Thomas first used this term to indicate “a practice that views people not as individual actors but rather as representatives of particular groups which are nested within systems of power and trains therapist-activists to diagnose patients through a collective lens.” Though many years in the making, Thomas says, it seemed to blindside conventional practitioners when it emerged as a finished strategy. “Therapy would no longer be focused on helping individuals;” she writes. “Instead, it would be reframed as a political practice, a means of dismantling systems of power believed to be oppressive.” 

    The education of Leslie Elliott shows how CSJT is taught to fledgling counselors. In the winter of 2019, Elliott enrolled as a graduate student in the Mental Health Counseling program at Antioch University. At first, she found it to be a stimulating master’s program — informative and clinically relevant — until she took a required course in multicultural counseling. “We were taught that race should be the dominant lens through which clients were to be understood and therapy conducted,” recalled Elliott, a mother of four who had majored in psychology. Race was to be broached early in therapy, regardless of clients’ stated goals and needs. The point, Elliott explained, was to increase the degree of importance that clients place upon race. 

    Thus, if a client were white, the counselor’s job was to help them see how they unwittingly perpetuate white supremacy. “We were encouraged to regard white clients as reservoirs of racism and oppression,” Elliott told me. If the client were black, Elliott was instructed to ask how it felt to sit with her, a white counselor. If the client felt at ease, “my job was to make him more aware of how being black compounded, or perhaps caused, his problems, regardless of what brought him to therapy.” White women, one professor informed a class, were “basic bitches,” “Beckys,” and “nothing special.”

    Elliott was also struck by the degree to which her program inculcated “selective empathy” in the students. A faculty adviser told Elliott in an unapologetic manner that the program was producing counselors who were not going to be able to work with Trump supporters. (If Trump supporters are so deranged, as a cynical colleague of mine pointed out, don’t they need more mental health care than others?) After the death of George Floyd, Antioch’s three-year program intensified its focus on race and oppression, making clear that counselors were to be foot soldiers in the culture wars. “Incredible as it sounds,” said Elliott, “we were encouraged to see ourselves as activists and remake ourselves as social change agents.”

    How could a therapeutic alliance ever blossom when patients are labeled oppressors by their therapists? They will feel alienated, or at least deeply confused, about the function of therapy. How can therapists ever maintain what the psychologist Carl Rogers called “unconditional positive regard” for afflicted patients who happen to be white, male, religious, gun-owning Trump-voters, whom many young therapists unabashedly say they are averse to treating? (As a cultural matter, it is unlikely that such individuals are stampeding to treatment anyway — but, in fairness, they sometimes do seek therapy, and they should not be ideologically disqualified from it.) In this way, CSJT is the glaring antithesis, the mirror image, of legitimate psychotherapy.

    Where traditional therapy regards each client as a unique individual and working in collaboration, CSJT reduces 
the patient to avatars of gender, race, or ethnicity. Where responsible therapy helps patients cultivate an aptitude for self-observation and introspection, encouraging them to experiment with new attitudes, perspectives, and actions, CSJT foments grievance and feeble victimhood. Where traditional therapy helps clear a path to autonomy, social justice therapy convinces patients that they have little choice or agency. As for exploring the serious consequences of a patient’s poor choices — a waste of time, after all, as the patient is a little but a passive vessel roiled and manipulated by malign external forces.

    The violations of sound practice are self-evident. Under no circumstances should a therapist derive personal or professional gratification from imposing her own worldview on a vulnerable patient and directing them to assume an activist role. Nor should she determine the agenda of the therapy, compel the patient to focus on their ethnic or gender identity, or disclose her own ideological affiliations. I am reminded of Donald Winnicott’s warning to psychotherapists — which sounds almost quaint these days — to avoid becoming enchanted with imposing their interpretations on the patient. He argued that a major part of the analyst’s role is to immerse oneself in the patient’s own particular subjectivity and not be too quick to offer our own views.

    How is it possible that therapists increasingly believe that they are political activists rather than healers? Val Thomas suggests that the answer lies mainly in the deployment of sophisticated rhetorical strategies. Critical Social Justice Therapy, she says, “does not advertise itself as a new modality; if it did then it would be subject to the usual testing of new therapeutic approaches. Instead, activist clinical theorists positioned it as the natural evolution of the field.” This clever move, she continues, puts anyone who criticizes CSJT or asks for evidence of its therapeutic value, at risk of shunning, derision as a bigoted reactionary, or reputational damage that could lead to a loss of employment. “Without public debate and critique, therapy could then be subverted and harnessed to a political agenda, as happened in other domains such as education, the label on the therapy tin is retained but the contents are being radically changed,” Thomas explained. As if contemporary psychotherapy is nothing more than a contest between discourses upon which nothing empirical or evidentiary can intrude.

    Let me pause here to set out the somewhat confusing professional typologies at play here. The word “therapist” is generic. Anyone who talks to patients or clients with a view toward providing psychological aid is a therapist. The term “psychotherapy” may sound more specific — but, in practice it, too, is loosely applied. I tend to think of psychotherapists as individuals with formal degrees and professional licenses, but again, no hard rules prevail. Analysts, by contrast, can come from a variety of educational backgrounds, but generally must attend a lengthy program of formal psychoanalytic training at a recognized institute. Until 1992, several years after the American Psychoanalytic Association settled a lawsuit charging the association of violating antitrust law, only medical doctors could train and practice as analysts. As for counselors and social workers, they usually have a master’s degree. Their patients tend to be looking for a therapist who is very engaged and offers emotional support, practical advice, and shores up their coping skills. Sophisticated counselors will also pay attention to the patients’ self-sabotaging routines and self-defeating patterns in relating to others. And lastly, I use “client” and “patient” interchangeably, although, more formally, counselors and some psychologists help “clients,” while psychiatrists treat “patients” and analysts treat “analysands.”

    Established therapeutic approaches fall within three basic schools: psychodynamic therapy (which is aimed at helping patients understand how their past experiences and unconscious processes influence their present behavior and relationships); cognitive-behavioral (treatments that seek to change maladaptive behaviors and dysfunctional beliefs through learning); and humanistic-existential (unstructured exploration of issues such as life, meaning, freedom). By locating a person’s difficulties within the self, these methodologies focus on helping the patient to achieve insight, agency, and accountability. The ultimate purpose is emancipation from constricting beliefs and behaviors.

    Critical social justice therapy, by comparison, identifies external forces as the most determinative or even sole cause of the patient’s problem. Its origins can be traced to two conceptual root systems. The more visible of the two was the postmodern project that flooded academia with the idea that a person’s identity is a near-exclusive product of cultural conditions and social dominance. Little surprise that such a philosophy seeped into psychoanalytic training — a study as likely to be facilitated these days by humanities professors as by psychiatrists — and into university-based graduate programs in clinical psychology. 

    The other root system is a practice called multi-
cultural counseling, which is taught in psychology, social work, counselor training. The first textbook on the subject, Counseling the Culturally Different, was published in 1981, and was grounded in the idea that conducting therapy with minority populations required a distinct set of competencies. By 1992, the ethics code of the APA held that a psychologist 
could be sanctioned if he or she is not behaving in a manner that could be considered “culturally sensitive.” The APA’s “Guidelines on Multicultural Education, Training, Research and Organizational Change for Psychologists,” from 2002, set a perfectly sensible standard for culturally sensitive practice, stating that “psychologists are urged to gain a better understanding and appreciation of the worldview and perspectives of those racially and ethnically different from themselves.”

    Indeed, there are broad variations in culture, such as individualist versus collectivist values, and variations in levels of acculturation within immigrant groups, as well as variations in family-of-origin differences. Some ethnic and racial groups are more likely to report emotional distress in the form of bodily sensations; sometimes culturally specific metaphors allow therapists to make a point more clearly. Such cultural adaptations have been incorporated with success into well-tested cognitive behavioral therapy strategies. A “culturally competent” practitioner is, in reality, little more than an otherwise competent therapist who has made necessary and thoughtful accommodations to patients with different traditions of disclosure, habit, and help-seeking.

    Less recognized as potential key aspects of identity are sociopolitical values. “This element may form the core of a client’s personality and identity,” I am told by the psychologist Richard E. Redding of Chapman University, one of the first scholars to research political values in psychotherapy. “Because mental health professionals overwhelmingly tilt to the left politically, they should be cognizant of the fact that their politically conservative, libertarian, and centrist clients will not share many of their values.” Redding refers here to the moral intuitions driving attitudes about issues such as abortion, affirmative action, welfare policy, crime-control, immigration, or gender politics. “Clinicians must be sensitive to the impact this may have on the therapeutic alliance and the ways in which this influences their diagnostic and therapeutic choices,” he cautions.

    Attention to myriad aspects of the patient, from ethnicity to sociopolitical values, is part of the routine methodology of conventional treatment. The relative weight, or insignificance, of various dimensions of the patient will announce itself in the course of treatment, a collaborative enterprise informed by liberal values of patient choice, autonomy, and truth-seeking. By stark contrast, CSJT represents an authoritarian regime. Not only is the patient compelled to conform to the unyielding social vision of the therapist, CSJT feeds off the misbegotten notion, as my colleague, the psychoanalyst Ira Moses, puts it, “that innate attributes are the core driver of one’s experience of himself and his world.”

    Moses warns, too, about the outsize emphasis placed on the idea of patient–therapist racial/cultural matching, an arrangement presumed by champions of CSJT to facilitate therapy. “No doubt the patient might feel more comfortable starting with a clinician of similar race or culture, but therapists should realize how they place themselves in an untenable position if they believe that they have a special understanding or a unique empathy with patients who share these external similarities.” It is a fallacy, he notes, that our identities give us wisdom, “Therapists who share a similar background or identity as their patient, he argues, should be cautious about over-identifying or assuming they have an increased likelihood of understanding the patient.” Moses calls this a “symbiotic fantasy,” of understanding each other without communicating. A related paradox of CSJT is captured by the psychologist Craig L. Frisby. “It doesn’t acknowledge universals, because groups are supposedly too distinct from one another,” he says, “and it doesn’t acknowledge individuals’ uniqueness, because only group affiliation matters.”

    To see what CSJT looks like in the real world of the clinic, imagine a depressed white man in his twenties talking to his therapist, a psychologist, about career woes. He has just been turned down for a coveted research fellowship and speculates that he lost out because of affirmative action. The hunch so unnerves the therapist, who is non-white, that he looks for guidance from colleagues during a weekly staff meeting where difficult cases are shared. In the Brooklyn clinic at which this scenario played out in real life, a colleague of mine, another psychologist, was at those meetings. “The group discussed the patient’s comment about affirmative action and the consensus was strong,” recalled my colleague. “They strongly advised the therapist who consulted them to tell the patient that if he didn’t overcome his biases, he would be transferred elsewhere.” The rationale? The group argued that it would be unfair for a clinician of color to be asked to treat a “racist” patient, my colleague explained.

    Andrew Hartz, a psychologist in New York City, recently published an account of his experience in City Journal:

    A few years ago, I provided therapy for a young heterosexual white man . . . he told me that he had experienced pervasive racially charged bullying at both his elementary school and his high school. . . . Much of it was explicitly racial, including comments like “white faggot” and “white bitch.” . . . He said that he had held back from telling me about it in part because he worried that I would frame him as privileged or “just 
not get it” — reactions he had experienced in the past from his friends.

    The patient had grown so used to keeping this experience buried that he became numb to it. “[I]n some ways more upset at the current cultural attitudes about race than about the bullying he had endured [and] the inability of the culture to express concern for white people who were attacked.” As therapy went on, Hartz writes, the patient became “more relaxed, more reflective, more open, authentic, and assertive.”

    Consider, also, the case of Paul O. Having read of my interest in the issue of politicized psychotherapy, the fifty-three-year-old-year-old from Sturbridge, Massachusetts emailed me to share his experience. Several years ago he suffered a pulmonary embolism and spent a week in Mass General in Boston. Paul’s health deteriorated and had to quit his job. “My physician recommended that I speak with a counselor due to the dramatic changes I was going through. After a few visits with the psychologist, he got to know me and he had the nerve to ask me how I could possibly take public funding since I was a conservative and Republican (I’m actually an independent here in Massachusetts) I was shocked by his lack of empathy. Needless to say, I never went back to him or any other counselor.”

    Some are alienated before ever setting foot in the therapist’s office. I learned about a politically conservative patient who saw a Black Lives Matter poster on the wall of a psychologist’s office and simply turned on his heel and walked away. In another, a young Christian woman was alienated by the they/them pronouns that her assigned therapist used on her website and stationery. Strictly speaking, of course, the poster and the pronouns say nothing about a therapist’s capacity for empathy for patients who might not share their politics. But in the face of such thoughtlessness, a patient could be forgiven for suspecting this would be the case. Even more repellent, I would surmise, is hearing your therapist refer to women as “AFAB people with vulvas” — assigned female at birth — as one of Elliott’s professors told her class to do. 

    In other instances, patients are rejected out of hand by the people assigned to treat them. I spoke to a newly minted psychologist who works in a Veterans Affairs medical center in Florida. His peers, he told me, are not interested in treating combat veterans; “they’d rather deal with ‘racial trauma’ and ‘LQBT issues.’” I have heard of psychiatric residents refusing to treat patients whose politics they dislike, patients who, in the throes of psychosis uttered a racial slur, and veterans who are too white, straight, and out of touch with the advanced opinions of the day.

    The magnitude of the betrayal inflicted by this new species of therapist cannot be overstated. Imagine yourself arriving at the clinic for your first visit. You are demoralized, in distress, perhaps in crisis. You are summoning the nerve to share with a stranger your most intimate, mortifying, and traumatic experiences. And instead of encountering a wise and empathically attuned presence, you are met with a therapist who seems to think that progressives are the only ones who need psychological safety and understanding. A therapist who forgot that she exists to heal pain, not to propagate doctrine.

    The mental health professions today are home to therapists who are overwhelmingly female, liberal, and politically aware. As self-declared enemies of privilege, they are primed to imbibe the social justice narrative and accept it as the proper objective of therapy. They reflexively impose the narrative on individuals who seek their help and react harshly to those who resist their efforts. The talking professions, I’m afraid, seem to be attracting as trainees people least suited to the job — and making that job inhospitable to would-be therapists who do not wish to be part of a highly politicized profession, one where therapy becomes politics by other means.

    The pipeline to the professions is skewed from the outset. A Yale psychologist colleague told me that he was “struck” by the number of applicants to his program “who were unabashed activists with their minds made up about best practices in psychology.” One of them declared that she had already staked out black feminist theory as her template for practicing therapy. “If what I saw is at all representative of incoming graduate classes, the future of psychology doesn’t look good,” my colleague said. Signing diversity statements and pledges are now part of the application process at many training programs. But perhaps the most potent deterrent is the exposure of poor training and psychological abuse in some programs.

    Which brings us back to Leslie Elliott. To warn would-be graduate students as well potential clients, she sought to expose what she calls “the ideological capture” of the counseling profession. She began to create YouTube videos and to post Substack commentary in the fall of 2022. She also recounted how the dean of Antioch’s counseling graduate program reacted to these online postings and to her refusal to sign a “civility pledge.” Not only did he urge students and faculty not to watch her videos, he also asked that they reach out to an ad hoc “crisis team” to help them handle their reactions to the “hate speech” — his term — that Elliott, by now labeled a “transphobe” and a “white supremacist,” had disseminated. She decided to leave the program, and has hired a lawyer so that she can complete her master’s degree without signing the pledge should she choose to return. Leslie is now working as a wellness coach in Seattle and continues as an active YouTube presence, spreading the word, in a preternaturally calm and measured style, about the corruption of the counseling profession

    Thousands of miles away in Knoxville, Suzannah Alexander enrolled in the University of Tennessee’s Clinical Mental Health Counseling Master’s Program in the summer of 2022. For six months, she endured colleagues and professors implying that she should be ashamed because she was white. “Professors taught us,” Alexander relayed, “that if you’re white, you are privileged and you need to ‘do the work,’ but at first it was never clear exactly what the work was or how we were supposed to do it.” Later, it did become clear: doing the work, Suzannah said, “really meant assuming that black or brown clients had more difficult lives due to their skin color, and it must be awful for them to have to be therapy with a white counselor.” What’s more, she explained, “we learned that it was not okay to ask a marginalized person, meaning someone whose skin was tan to black, not hetero, or disabled, about their experience. Why? Because that put an additional burden on them while they are already working hard to tolerate your whiteness.” The idea of treating individuals without delving into their unique experience makes a mockery of treatment, unless of course the therapist is more concerned about where the patient is located within the hierarchy of privilege relative to the clinician’s position in it.

    In one of Suzannah’s classes, a professor asked who they thought their most difficult client would be. “To a person, the class said a bigoted white man was their nightmare client,” she told me. In class she had mentioned that the Buddhist practice of reducing focus on one’s self could make it easier to act on one’s values — a tenet that Suzannah saw as consistent with the goals of secular psychotherapy. After all, suspension of obsessive self-regard is an element in cognitive behavioral therapies, she pointed out, further arguing that it could help therapists foster compassion for even the most challenging client. The professor disagreed.

    After several months in the program, her professors told Alexander that her thinking was, as she puts it, “too concrete.” They also objected to her allusions to Buddhism, calling it “bad thought” and resented her refusal to concede that she should be ashamed for being white. “I knew this was abusive,” she later wrote is a wrenching account. “I was determined not to quit until I absolutely had to. But I was discouraged.” Eventually Alexander’s adviser told her that she would not be able to take practicum (hands-on clinical experience), an activity without which she could not graduate and obtain a counseling license. Alexander left the program and is now seeking legal redress for her wasted tuition. “I doubt I’ll ever be a counselor now. I’m not even sure I still want that. More’s the pity, so many have told me I would have been great at it, and I do feel for the many men who find suicide to be their only outlet.” 

    In 2020, Lauren Holt enrolled in a mental health counseling program at a Jesuit university in New Orleans where “social justice indoctrination consumed a great deal of the training.” Many of her teachers were chronically unprepared, presented course material that was superficial, failed to grade assignments in a timely fashion, and ignored student emails — derelictions of duty that other students experienced as well. In response to complaints, the program held a mediation session between staff and students. Grievances were aired, though no faculty were in attendance to hear them or to respond to them — apparently, faculty members were to be briefed later on the complaints. Subsequent mediation sessions would be held, but only students who were marginalized (minorities, or gender non-conforming, or disabled) were allowed to participate. Lauren asked: “What about those of us who are not in “marginalized groups?” Do our concerns no longer matter? I find that difficult to swallow.” All hell broke loose. “Within minutes, I received a mountain of emails from other students calling me a bigot, a racist, a white bitch, all sorts of heinous things,” Lauren wrote in an article describing her ordeal. Eventually, she was told by a lower level administrator that the department head had decided she could not return for her second year unless she fulfilled the hours of therapy he requested she attend to manage her, as he put it, “incompetency” as a counselor and her “inability to listen to people.” The head also expected her to sign documentation stating she was, at that juncture, unfit to be a counselor. Lauren was not allowed to state her case or to defend herself. 

    Unwilling to be bullied by him, she filed a grievance. Though her complaint was successful and she was technically permitted to resume her coursework, faculty members were icy to her and her new advisor ignored her emails, and so she left school. Now she lives in Asheville, North Carolina, where she runs her own accounting business and teaches English to immigrants. As for the students who called her racist, she says, “they have presumably completed the program and are now collecting their hours towards licensure.” Lauren is seeing a therapist. It took her over two years after leaving the program, she said, “to feel comfortable seeking help from a mental health professional after my experience in counseling school.”

    By no means are all training programs so ideological, but the experiences of Leslie Elliott, Suzannah Alexander, and Lauren Holt are not rare outliers. In the years since Val Thomas, the British therapist, launched Critical Therapy Antidote in 2020, an online community for practitioners and clients dedicated to “protecting the integrity of talking therapies,” she has posted dozens of articles written by trainees who resorted to self-censorship (and near-nervous breakdowns) upon finding themselves the targets of indoctrination by professors, intimidation by faculty, mobbing by fellow students, and retaliation by their schools despite Orwellian reassurances that their programs were “safe spaces.” They include also many testimonies on professors scrimping on the basic facts and models of human psychology in favor of teaching dumbed-down mental health propaganda. 

    Many graduates of these debauched programs will go on to occupy slots at public mental health clinics, university mental health clinics, schools, and other institutions. Surely some of them will be well-prepared — not every single school is infested, and even marginal programs still have a remnant of qualified professors — but too many American therapists will base their work with patients on a distorted idea of their roles.

    The practices of CSJT roundly violate the code of ethics adopted by the American Counseling Association in 2014, which states that “counselors are aware of — and avoid imposing — their own values, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors.” Counselors are obliged to respect the diversity of clients, trainees, and research participants — and more, “to seek training in areas in which they are at risk of imposing their values onto clients, especially when the counselor’s values are inconsistent with the client’s goals or are discriminatory in nature.” The American Psychological Association also has a solid code of conduct that counsels psychologists to be “aware of and respect cultural, individual, and role differences, including those based on age, gender, gender identity, race, ethnicity, culture, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, language, and socioeconomic status.” And yet, the major governing entities in the field have turned a blind eye to blatant ethical breaches, because — this conclusion is impossible to avoid — what they believe in most of all is the primacy of the political. 

    What to do? One strategy is to warn prospective students while shaming poorly performing programs. A cohort of dissatisfied (former) trainees and a handful of disillusioned counseling professors are doing this on social media and online postings. Another option includes robust referral networking for people searching “non-woke” therapists, as the requests for therapists are generally phrased. The website of “Conservative Professionals” provides names of conservative therapists because, as it says, “half of Americans have Conservative values, yet the majority of professionals in various occupations are guided by a Liberal mindset. (Unfortunately, this “matching” service reinforces the notion that only like can counsel like, an ironic and unattractive complication of the effort to make the couch a safe space for conservatives, too.) Another new site is called ethicaltherapy.org, established this year by a former professor of counseling at the University of Vermont to “help new and existing psychotherapy patients find psychotherapists who endeavor to leave ideology out of therapy.”

    Parallel institutions can play a role. In 2021, a professor of clinical mental health counseling at Florida Atlantic University and former president of the American Counseling Association launched the International Association of Psychology and Counseling. Its mission is to “promote critical thinking over indoctrination” and help the mental health field to return to “its roots of liberal education” and to “professionalism where advocacy should be the domain of individual conscience, not one’s professional identity.” Andrew Hartz, mentioned earlier, seeks to restore trust in the professions by launching the Open Therapy Institute in 2023 to “foster open inquiry in mental health care and support those underserved in the face of politicization of the field.” The institute will offer professional development for therapists and promises to provide therapy from professionals who “strive to be open, curious, and empathic,” he told me.

    Administrative and legal avenues also exist. A group of already certified counselors could appeal to the state legislatures or licensing boards to tighten accreditation standards or introduce an alternative accrediting body. Wronged or dissident trainees could undertake legal action of some sort, either individually or as a class action with others in the same program or across programs. It is hardly an exaggeration to allege that some training programs are perpetrating educational fraud or malpractice.

    Transforming therapy into a vehicle for political change fails on yet another count: there is no evidence for the effectiveness of an approach that conceives of patients’ problems as a function of oppression. By contrast, a robust research literature exists on the generally positive to very positive impact of behavioral and psychodynamic interventions. There is substantial literature purporting to show that dynamic psychotherapy is as effective as or more effective than cognitive-behavioral therapies, and also a very strong body of research suggesting that all therapies are effective and at about the same level. Certainly private insurers and Congress should be alerted to the fact that they are paying for a lot of therapy that is unproven and, worse, potentially harmful. 

    If I have not said much about organized psychiatry in the context of CSJT, it is because psychiatry is, foremost, a medical specialty. Psychiatrists do offer psychotherapy, but it is not the defining activity of the field. Consequently, traditional approaches remain largely intact. And yet in 2021, the American Psychiatric Association issued an apology to black Americans, announcing that the association “is beginning the process of making amends for both the direct and indirect acts of racism in psychiatry.” Three years later, it remains unclear what amends were made and whether anyone was helped. I have a better proposal. The field should compensate for historical offenses — and make no mistake, transgressions, including overtly racist ones, were indeed committed in the past — by educating the therapy-seeking public about what they deserve: practitioners who are free of ideological agendas; who see themselves as healers, not activists; who extol the primacy of the individual; and who inspire their patients to participate in their own flourishing.

    With Shestov in Ukraine

    Dawn in Podil. The Jewish quarter of Kyiv from times past. March 21, 2024, sunrise and missiles over the Dnipro river — although it was impossible to see the sunrise from inside the bomb shelter.

    In a frame on my desk there is a scrap of paper that Václav Havel once left behind on a stage in Bratislava. Pravda a láska, he wrote. Truth and love, with some florid lines doodled around the letters. It was November 2009, the twentieth anniversary of the Velvet Revolution, and the Central European Forum had organized a series of conversations at the Hviezdoslav Theatre in the Slovak capital. Havel likely said nothing new that day: he had long insisted that truth and love would prevail over lies and hatred. And there are moments when they have and moments when they do. Evil regimes are sometimes vanquished. In November 1989, on Wenceslas Square in Prague, crowds jingled their keys and called out “For whom the bell tolls!”

    The bell was tolling then for the communist regime. Borders were unsealed, censorship was lifted, files were opened. What had been kept in darkness was released into light. I was enchanted by this unclosing, by all the literary references, and by the dissidents once gathered around the extraordinary Czech philosopher Jan Patočka, who spoke of responsibility, conscience, and truth. Above all I was fascinated by the idea that truth was something whose ontological reality was as indubitable as the keys chiming in a chorus to a line by John Donne. In searching for where this truth that could be lived in came from, I began to read backwards, following the references: Havel to Patočka to Martin Heidegger to Edmund Husserl, the founder of a philosophical tradition called phenomenology. In communist Eastern Europe, dissidents had drawn upon this tradition in confronting Marxism-Hegelianism and its “iron laws of History.” In the decades following Stalin’s death, phenomenology, and still more so the Heideggerean existentialism that grew from it, became an antidote to the “Hegelian bite.”

    Patočka had been Husserl’s last great student. The Polish philosopher Krzysztof Michalski had in turn been Patočka’s. And Krzysztof read Husserl with me. I would not have stood a chance without him. I had anticipated that it would be Heidegger who would be impenetrable, but in fact it was Husserl where I encountered a wall. His writing was so much drier and more technical. Obsessed with the Cartesian “clarity and distinctiveness,” Husserl was unable, it seemed to me, to write a clear sentence. I struggled to bond with him. What was he like as a person? I asked Krzysztof. “He was not like you,” Krzysztof told me. “He had no emotional life.” Krzysztof insisted that Husserl lived purely for philosophy. Perhaps this is why, while the philosophical literature on the founder of phenomenology is very dense, the biographical literature is very thin. 

    And this is what led me to the philosopher Lev Shestov. There is a single piece of great writing about Husserl, and it is a text in Russian by Lev Shestov — his most impassioned critic and his most earnest admirer, and at the end of his life one of his closest friends. Against Husserl’s profound commitment to reason, Shestov insisted on the limits of reason and the impossibility of epistemological certainty, on the need to search for truth not in light but in darkness. I came to Shestov through Husserl — which is to say, neither through Ukraine, nor through Russia, both subjects of my work, but rather, if this can be reduced to national categories at all, through Czech-via-German philosophy. I came to him in an oblique way, reading him as an interpreter of an elusive thinker whose ideas, seemingly impassable, were nonetheless foundational to a philosophy of responsibility that feels ever needed.

    Verehrter Freund und Antipode!” Husserl addressed Shestov affectionately, and with a sense of humor otherwise rare in his writing. Who was this “esteemed friend and antipode”? He was born in 1866 in tsarist Kyiv to a Jewish family with a dominating father, and given the name Yehuda Leib Shvartsman. Was Shestov a Russian Jew or a Ukrainian Jew? Today the question suddenly matters. “Ukrainian Jew” feels like a neologism, a self-conscious identity that made its grand entrance during the Revolution of Dignity on the Maidan in 2013–2014. And right now, in the midst of this gruesome war, as Russians slaughter Ukrainians for no reason at all in a nihilist frenzy and Kyiv feels to me like the capital of the free world, I want Shestov to belong to Ukraine. And yet the embrace of anachronism feels disingenuous; it involves the projection of categories into the past that were not those of the time. Nor was Shestov a Soviet Jew: he was formed by the tsarist empire, he studied in Kyiv, Moscow, and Berlin; later he lived in Coppet, Geneva, and Paris. He was neither a monarchist nor a Bolshevik, neither a Russian nationalist nor a Jewish nationalist. He was a cosmopolitan who rebelled against his observant Jewish father, who adopted a Russian pseudonym as a young writer, yet who never in any way disavowed his origins.

    Shestov spoke French and German and read Nietzsche as intensely as he read Dostoevsky. Self-reflective in an ironic sort of way, he was fond of the Russian saying that what is healthy for Germans is fatal for Russians. Once, late in their lives, when the two philosophical antipodes were together, Shestov played with that expression. “What is healthy for a Jew is fatal for a German,” he said to Husserl. And Husserl had not understood what Jews had to do with their conversation: Husserl had converted to Protestantism as a young man. In his mind, he was not a Jew but a German. And Shestov, for Husserl, was not a Jew, but a Russian. After all, Shestov neither kept kosher nor attended synagogue. But Shestov did not accept this interpretation. For him, once a Jew, always a Jew.

    In February 2024, nearly a century after that exchange between Shestov and Husserl took place and two years into the largest ground war in Europe since World War II, I was invited to speak at the Kyiv School of Economics together with the Ukrainian philosopher Volodymyr Yermolenko.

    “What should the topic be?” Volodymyr asked me.

    “I want to talk about Shestov.”

    “He’s too Russian,” Volodymyr said.

    I disagreed, although I did not protest. I understood — as much as an outsider could understand — the desire, even the need, at this moment, as the Russian army buried Ukrainian children under rubble, to introduce an absolute distinction between what was Ukrainian and what was Russian, a hard boundary to parallel an ontological distinction between good and evil. So Volodymyr and I chose a broader topic, inclusive of Shestov as well as other thinkers, inspired by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers’ concept of the Grenzsituation, a “limit situation,” when we are shaken from the everyday and pushed to the very boundaries of human existence.

    In Kyiv, when our discussion began — among Volodymyr, his brilliant literary-scholar wife Tetyana Ogarkova, and myself — I realized that I had misunderstood what Volodymyr meant by “too Russian.” He had meant this neither politically nor ethnically nor even linguistically. By “too Russian” he had meant belonging to an anti-Cartesian Russian irrationalist tradition, at a moment when what was needed was the level-headed grounding of French rationalism. After all, had not this Russian irrationalism brought about absolutions for madness?

    The classic encapsulation of Russian anti-rationalism was articulated by the nineteenth-century Russian poet Fyodor Ivanovich Tyutchev, in a stanza translated by the contemporary Tyutchev scholar John Dewey:

    Who would grasp Russia with the mind?


    For her no yardstick was created:
Her soul is of a special kind,


    By faith alone appreciated.

    Dewey’s version is a rather lyrical one. A literal version of Tyutchev’s most famous lines would be: “Russia cannot be understood with the mind./ In Russia it is possible only to believe.” Volodymyr Rafeyenko, the Ukrainian novelist from Donetsk, in the eastern mining region of the Donbas, once said to me that the poem “became the universal formulation of Russian self-consciousness. Russians believe that they cannot and should not be judged according to laws and standards common to all people. And in this sense everything is permitted.”

    A younger Ukrainian writer also from the Donbas, Stanislav Aseyev, studied philosophy in Donetsk. When he arrived at university, his professor told the students, “The art of thinking, this is what we intend to teach you. And on each occasion when you ask yourselves: ‘What do I need this for?’, remember that philosophy is everything, and all the rest is compromise.” Soon the teenaged Stanislav encountered the dominating question of modern philosophy: In the absence of a deity to guarantee the correspondence between perception and being, how do we know that the world really exists, and is not just a projection of our consciousness? How can we ever step outside of our own minds to ascertain the mind-independent reality of things? Kant’s compromise assured us that while the world was real, we had no direct access to things-in-themselves. Kantian idealism came to Stanislav as an apocalyptic revelation: “The table, walls, flowers, vase, even I myself — all of it is merely an image of my consciousness.”

    What about everyone else? What about all those people? After all, most of them have no idea about this! They go about calmly riding in trams, paying for tickets, shopping for food, buying dinner — and they don’t even suspect 
that all of this is merely a grandiose set of sensations, not extending so much as a millimeter beyond the boundaries of their own minds!

    In 2017 Aseyev, then twenty-seven years old, was taken captive by Russian-sponsored separatists; he was held for nine-hundred-and-sixty-two days, most of them in the dungeons of Izolatsiia, the most infamous Russian prison camp in occupied Ukraine. During this time he was continually 
tied to a table with duct tape where he was subjected to torture by electric shock. In an essay that he wrote there, published in his memoir The Torture Camp on Paradise Street, he rebelled against epistemological optimism: “No science in all its history can point to such a profound failure as the one that eventually caught up with philosophy: two and a half millennia of Western thought still hasn’t resolved any of the problems philosophy set out to address.” 

    In December 2019, Stanislav was released in a prisoner exchange. In 2023, he volunteered to serve in the Ukrainian army and went to the front lines. I sometimes texted him there about Shestov — their sensibilities struck me as very similar. Stanislav answered one of my messages by referring to one of Solzhenitsyn’s protagonists, an engineer in the gulag, who said to a Chekist: “You’re only powerful insofar as a man has something to be taken from him. And when everything has been taken from him, you no longer have power over him, he is once again free.”

    “In Russia,” Stanislav told me, “they’ve made this maxim into a national treasure: the people have nothing, and in that they see their strength and their ‘distinctiveness’ vis-à-vis the West.” He sent me this comment about “the ontology of Russia” as he was firing rounds from a machine gun in a trench.

    I was in Poland on June 24, 2024 when he sent that message over Signal at 1:05 pm Central Europe Time. Thirty-five minutes later his next message came in: “They’ve just surrounded us.

    Was — is — Shestov too Russian?

    Shestov positioned himself most famously against Husserl, who was not a French philosopher yet did belong to the rationalist tradition. Husserl very self-consciously saw himself as continuing the Cartesian project of achieving knowledge that was certain. He was determined, as Descartes had been, to reach “clarity and distinctness.” This phrase — “Klarheit und Deutlichkeit” — Husserl repeated time and time again. If Descartes, Kant, and others had failed before him — Husserl believed — this meant that what was needed was a deepening of reason, not a turning away from it. 

    The irresistible juxtaposition here is with Freud, who shared with Husserl an uncannily similar biography: both were assimilated Habsburg Jews from Moravia born in the 1850s; both came to Vienna and studied with the philosopher of psychology Franz Brentano. They were two of the greatest rebels against the materialist and objectivist inclinations that dominated nineteenth-century European thought. And they both conjured up world-reconstituting philosophies of radical subjectivity, centered on the “I.” Yet these philosophies were in other ways antithetical: one, Husserl’s, grasped the most essential subjectivity as radical transparency, the other, Freud’s, as radical concealment.

    Shestov shared with Freud a love of Shakespeare. In December 1896, the then-thirty-year-old Shestov wrote from Berlin to his friend Varvara Malafeeva Malakhievaia-Mirovich in Kyiv telling her that she need not be so insecure about her knowledge of Kant, because she would find something much more essential in the English playwright. “All of knowledge, all of literature is in Shakespeare,” Shestov told her, “all of life is in him.” At the time Shestov was in the midst of an intense reading of Nietzsche — the thinker who, Freud believed, “had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who ever lived or was likely to live.” Shestov’s sister Fania Lovtskaia was a Freudian, who became a prominent psychoanalyst working in Palestine, then Israel, and later Switzerland. To her it was obvious that her older brother’s preoccupation with Nietzsche was a symptom of self-absorption. Her brother wrote only of neurotics, she pointed out to a friend — Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard. It was all masked self-analysis. 

    On the stage with Tetyana and Volodymyr in Kyiv, I defended Shestov against the disapproval that his sister had expressed a century earlier. I am writing a book about phenomenology, and among the multiple generations of characters in this book that begins with Husserl and eventually reaches Havel, Shestov is the most generous, the most menschlich. I read his correspondences with Husserl, with Varvara Malafeeva, with Martin Buber, and with fellow Kyivan philosopher Gustav Shpet. His letters were always modest and warm, always worried about his friends, always appreciative of other thinkers for pushing his own ideas forward. He was, of all of them, the most acutely sensitive to the feelings of others. 

    When Fania Lovtskaia spoke of her brother’s self-absorption to their aunt, her aunt’s analysis of the problem was Lev’s rejection of Kant. For Fania Lovtskaia, this was absurd: “If a person exhibits boundless narcissism and self-absorption and at the same time is extremely insecure and feels surrounded by enemies, then no Kant is going to help.” 

    A non-trivial question remains: Was Shestov’s rejection of Kantian reason an exaltation of irrationalism in Tyutchev’s archetypally Russian spirit? Or was it rather epistemological 
modesty, of a kind very different from Kant’s? “In our own minds and in our own experience we can decidedly find nothing that would give us a basis to limit in at least some way proizvol in nature,” wrote Shestov in 1905 in The Apotheosis of Groundlessness, using a Russian word for arbitrariness tinged with tyranny, willfulness, caprice.

    If reality were other than it is now, it would seem no less natural to us. In other words: it may be that in human judgments about phenomena there are elements both necessary and accidental, yet notwithstanding all efforts, 
we have thus far not found and evidently never will find 
a way to separate one from the other. Moreover, we do 
not know which of these are more essential and more important. Hence the conclusion: philosophy should abandon attempts to discover veritates æternæ. Its task is to teach man to live in uncertainty — man who above all else fears uncertainty and hides from it behind various dogmas.

    Shestov’s opposition was between certainty and uncertainty, between rules that constrain and contingency that is capricious. (The Apotheosis of Groundlessness was translated in 1920 into English as All Things Are Possible, with a preface by D. H. Lawrence.) But that Shestov believed that all things were possible did not mean that he believed all things 
were permitted. 

    After February 24, 2022, when Russia carried out a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and he and his wife came under Russian occupation, Volodymyr Rafeyenko decided that he would never write in Russian again. For a writer, giving up a native language is like cutting off an arm. And he was not the only one to engage in such self-amputation. Others among the best Russophone Ukrainian writers — including Stanislav Aseyev — have given up Russian in favor of Ukrainian as well. It is a linguistic amputation implicitly in solidarity with the bodily amputations to which so many Ukrainians have been subjected.

    Haunting this conversation from beyond the grave, or from the depths of the Seine where he drowned himself in 1970, is Paul Celan, whose native Czernowitz is today the Ukrainian city of Chernivtsi. It is impossible not to think about Celan, and to try to understand anew the devastating intimacy of Muttersprache/Mördersprache. What does it mean to write poetry in the language of one’s mother’s murderer? Can the language ever transcend atrocity? Can it ever be purified, conceived anew? Celan was among Shestov’s readers, although I don’t know what language Celan read him in — Russian? German? French? Like Shestov, Celan knew all of these languages.

    In a speech in 1960 known as “The Meridian,” which he delivered upon his acceptance of the Buchner Prize, Celan turned to Shestov in speaking of darkness. The address became one of the most famous statements about the nature of poetry in its time. “Ladies and gentlemen, it is common today to reproach poetry for its ‘obscurity’” he said.

    At this point permit me to quote somewhat abruptly — but hasn’t something opened up here, suddenly? — permit me to quote a line by Pascal, a line that I read some time ago in Lev Shestov: “Ne nous reprochez pas le manque de clarté puisque nous en faison profession!

    Do not reproach us for a lack of clarity, since we make a profession out of it! Pascal’s sentiment very much reflected Shestov’s sensibility. It was antithetical to that of Husserl, who once wrote in his diary that he could not bear to live without certainty. For Husserl, truth was bound up with Klarheit and Sicherheit, clarity and certainty. It was emphatically not so for Shestov, for whom truth, clarity, and certainty in no way formed a seamless whole.

    Some half a century before Celan’s speech, Shestov grew fascinated by Husserl’s determination to reach Sicherheit. When, in 1912, Shestov’s younger friend Gustav Shpet headed to Göttingen to study with Husserl, Shestov was delighted for him. At the time Shestov was living in Switzerland with his wife, the physician Anna Eleazarovna Berezovskaia, and their two adolescent daughters, Tatiana and Nataliia, whose existence he had long kept a secret from his parents, believing his father would never accept a gentile daughter-in-law. He was very eager to hear Shpet’s impressions. What did Husserl think, Shestov asked Shpet in July 1914, about the anxieties expressed by Dostoevsky? Many people understood Shestov’s philosophy as skepticism and pessimism — Shpet told his new wife, Nataliia Guchkova, in a letter — “and meanwhile I don’t know anyone who is searching harder for, or is more desirous of finding, truth than he.” 

    In August 1914, the Europe that Husserl, Shestov, and Shpet had known met its end. Shestov returned to Kyiv, then in September went on to Moscow, where his wife and daughters met him and where they joined Shpet and Nataliia Guchkova, who was expecting a child. Sergei Listopadov, Shestov’s twenty-two-year-old son born out of wedlock, was already serving in the tsarist army. Early that autumn Sergei was wounded in battle, and Shestov traveled to Kyiv to see him. Shestov wanted his son to take more time to recover from his concussions, but Sergei soon headed back to the front. The following summer weeks went by with no news, and Shestov feared that his son had been taken prisoner. Sergei’s last letter had been ominous: the fighting was fierce; his commanding officer had been wounded; he was now the only officer in his company. Shestov wrote to his sister Fania and her husband Hermann Lowitzky in Switzerland: Sergei, he told them, had their address; if he contacted them, would they send a telegram to Moscow? It would be enough to send just one word saying they had heard from him, and perhaps a second word that — if — he was okay . . .

    Then Sergei reappeared, and finally took his leave from the front during the winter of 1916–1917 in Moscow, where Shestov and Shpet gathered for long evenings of discussions with their friends. Shestov loved these debates; the more dogmatic his opponent, the more kindly Shestov related to him, taking his time to respond. Varvara Malafeeva believed Shestov was finally almost happy, surrounded by friends and conversations. Sergei had not grown up with his father, but now Shestov brought Sergei into his family, and introduced him to his younger half-sisters. Shestov would include him in the gatherings, and from time to time — a friend noticed — would look adoringly at his son. 

    In Moscow Shestov lost even his indirect personal connection to the founder of phenomenology. Political conditions made any correspondence between Shpet and Husserl impossible: they belonged to empires at war with each other. Yet Shestov continued to be absorbed by Husserl from afar. Husserl’s phenomenological method, meant to achieve “pure seeing,” relied upon a concept that Husserl called Evidenz. Literally “evidence,” Evidenz for Husserl indicated the quality of “adequate self-givenness,” a clear mental seeing of something that did in fact exist as what it was seen to be. It was the means by which Husserl was pursuing a horizon of absolute truth, which — it struck Shestov — had been for mankind since time immemorial what the Promised Land was for the Jews. “Husserl desires no compromises,” Shestov wrote in wartime Moscow, “it is either all or nothing. Either Evidenz is the final destination towards which the human spirit strives as it seeks truth, and this Evidenz is reachable by human means, or a kingdom of chaos and madness is to reign on earth.” Shestov praised Husserl’s awareness of 
the question’s gravity. It was “time at last,” he agreed, “to lay all the cards on the table and to raise questions as radically as Husserl did.” 

    But the Promised Land that Husserl saw on the horizon seemed to Shestov a mirage. Its existence depended upon the “autocracy of reason,” from which history had necessarily to be excluded. For Husserl, historicism was skepticism. Truth needed to be absolute, valid always and everywhere; what was true had to be true an sich, in itself, not historically contingent. Shestov translated Husserl’s Evidenz into ochevidnost’, a Russian word meaning literally “visible-to-the-eye-ness.” It was a translation much better than the original: this word, absent in German, was precisely what Husserl had wanted to say. Yet were there not moments, Shestov asked, when “visible-to-the-eye-ness” reached the limit of its possibilities? Reason could only extend so far; and Shestov suspected that truth was something that lay beyond the limits of reason.

    Husserl, Shestov believed, did not confront the space beyond these limits; he remained in the middle zones of life, which reason could reach, and falsely extrapolated that this reachability applied to the border zones as well. But such was not the case. 

    We must have the courage to tell ourselves firmly: the middle zones of human and universal life resemble neither the equator nor the poles. Rationalism’s ever-repeating error is its certainty of the limitless power of reason. Reason has done so much, therefore reason can do everything. But “much” does not mean “everything;” “much” is separated from “everything” toto coelo; “much” and “everything” are absolutely incommensurate. They belong to two distinct, irreducible categories.

    In October 2023, Stanislav Aseyev, serving in the army, described the contrast between the middle zones and the poles, realms between which there was contiguity without commensurability. “A tram noisily racing down the tracks carrying a dozen people on their morning errands,” he wrote,

    while, at the same time, someone’s head is being pressed between a wall and a hammer. What were we doing when this was happening? Maybe buying groceries, putting eggs and ketchup into our carts, right at the time that, in a stretch of forest in the Donbas, a Ukrainian soldier’s head was being sawed off alive, the video “leaked” to Telegram along with the screams.

    Shestov titled his polemic with Husserl “Memento Mori.” He published it in Russian in 1917, a decade before Heidegger wrote Being and Time, and before its central concept of Sein-zum-Tode — “Being-toward-Death” — became a prevailing philosophical motif. Many other things happened that year. Shestov was in Moscow during the February Revolution; the following month he traveled to Kyiv. “Maybe, God willing,” he wrote from Kyiv to his mother, “Russia will be more sensible than other countries and will transition to a new system without too many convulsions.”

    News came of Shestov’s son’s death at the front; and it seemed to Varvara Malafeeva that after this Shestov never looked happy again. In April 1917 Lenin arrived in Petrograd, where he “found power lying in the streets and picked it up.” It was becoming harder and harder to live in Moscow. In February 1918 the Red Army took Kyiv. The following month the Germans drove the Bolsheviks from Shestov’s native city; in April they installed Pavlo Skoropads’kyi as hetman of a Ukrainian state under German control. In July 1918 Shestov and his family left Moscow for Kyiv, where they were taken in by his sister and her husband, the Balakhovskii family, who lived near St. Andrew’s Church. The house was not far from the bank of the Dnipro River; from the window there was a wonderful view. When the Balakhovskii family fled 
to Paris, other friends and refugees moved into the house 
with the Shestovs, including Varvara Malafeeva. Shestov’s 
older daughter Tatiana began attending university; she was drawn to Plato.

    In November 1918 the Hetmanate fell, and the Germans set about abandoning the city. This is the story that Mikhail Bulgakov tells in The White Guard, an epic novel published in 1925 that is set in Kyiv during a single day in December 1918. In Ukraine today Bulgakov is an object of resentment — a contributor to an imperialist Russian literature playing itself out in dungeons in Bucha, Kherson, and Donetsk, on the tortured bodies of Ukrainians such as Stanislav Aseyev. The judgment is not without justification. And yet we do not read literature because it is innocent. In history there can be no canceling: history is not just the history of people who were nice. Husserl’s phenomenological method involved Einklammern, putting all that was empirical and questions about its consciousness-independent existence “in brackets,” and thus setting those questions aside. In history, however, there can be no “bracketing,” no presupposing that a writer’s life can be set aside as a “genealogical fallacy” insignificant with respect to the work itself. 

    In any case, Bulgakov’s The White Guard stays in my mind for entirely other reasons — it is a novel illuminating how temporality itself becomes distended at the poles. Vasilia, the building manager who plays a cameo role, says, “When I think about all these things that have been happening, I can’t help coming to the conclusion that our lives are extremely insecure.” This understatement is very much in Shestov’s spirit. In Bulgakov’s novel, the insecurity is saturating not only because of the physical violence, but also because of the existential violence: temporality is revealed as being woundingly inconstant. It slows almost to a pause and accelerates as if beyond the laws of physics. Time is ripped apart at moments of extremity. In that single day in Kyiv the world changes as radically as if decades had passed. 

    The Ukrainian government extricated Stanislav Aseyev from captivity in a prisoner exchange in 2019, but for many months afterward he continued to feel afraid. It was not the torture chambers that he feared. In his mind he would return to the morning he was taken captive — he had taken a bath, put on cologne, listened to music, eaten farmer’s cheese with sour cream and raisins for breakfast — “a perfectly ordinary morning in May.” Revisiting that morning, he could find “no signs of impending doom.” But he was about to experience the inconstancy of time: only an hour passed between the farmer’s cheese and the iron bars. “It was the absurdity that terrified me,” he wrote, “the not knowing, the absence of any meaning that could even approach accounting for that abyss as narrow as an hour. From the white bathtub with hot water to the cold bars and faded walls, only an hour passed.”

    In December 1918, the forces of the Ukrainian nationalist leader Symon Petliura took Kyiv and established a Ukrainian People’s Republic. The republic was brief. In February 1919 the Red Army returned. The Bolsheviks considered Shestov a revolutionary philosopher and treated him well, hopeful that the revolutionary philosopher would devote his powers to the revolution. Shestov was allowed to teach at the university; he gave a lecture course on Greek philosophy, and another on fundamental philosophical problems from Plato to Descartes. Shestov understood, though, that his situation was precarious, and he chose indirect routes through the city, twisting through side streets.

    On June 14, 1919, Shestov wrote to his mother: “With us here all is blagopoluhno.” I pause on that sentence: blagopoluhno is difficult to translate. Its etymology suggests the state of having received a blessing and conveys a sense of good, safe, prosperous, trouble-free. What could blagopoluhno have meant then? Was there such a thing as good, safe, prosperous, and trouble-free in that time and that place? Perhaps it meant only that Shestov’s family had been thus far spared physical brutality. The following month Shestov wrote to Shpet in Moscow more darkly: “By now everyone, or most people, have physically and morally surrendered.”

    As August ended and September began, the anti-Bolshevik White Army took Kyiv. By mid-September the shops in Kyiv were empty. Shestov’s family had very little to eat. Tatiana and Nataliia worked for peasants, who paid them in food. There was money, but money no longer had any value. The city was full of blood. And there were pogroms. Unlike their father, Shestov’s daughters did not look obviously Jewish; they dressed like Russian girls. They were at a small dacha on the outskirts of Kyiv one day when a Cossack appeared, searching for Jews. Tatiana went out onto the porch. “Do you have any yids here?” the Cossack asked her politely. No, Tatiana replied, they did not. “I asked,” he told her, “because we’ve been ordered to slaughter all the Jews.” He was only explaining, almost apologetically. Then he bowed to her, tapped his horse with the whip, and rode away.

    Soon afterwards, in autumn 1919, Shestov and his family left Kyiv, heading east as a means of making their way west. Varvara Malafeeva and a few of her companions were on the same train; it was extremely cold. When the train stopped at different stations, she heard calls of “Thrash the Jews! Save Russia!” Then the train stopped in Kharkiv; it would not go on. Shestov and his family decided to shelter there; Varvara and one of her traveling companions would wait at the station for the next train and continue eastwards. Terror overwhelmed her the moment when she realized that Shestov was saying goodbye. Theirs was an old and close friendship; she could not believe he would leave her. She went on to Moscow, Shestov and his family to Crimea. It took the family three weeks to reach Yalta, a brutal journey overland in frozen freight cars to Rostov, and by sea from Rostov to Yalta. In Yalta, on November 15, 
Shestov wrote in his diary: “It’s impossible to conjecture anything, to anticipate anything. And everything seems so absurd, so senseless.”

    The family traveled from Yalta to Sevastopol, then from Sevastopol to Constantinople by French steamer, then from Constantinople to Genoa by American boat. From there they went on to Paris, and afterwards to Geneva. Everywhere Shestov went in Europe, everyone he met wanted to know the same thing: what was really happening in Russia? He spent the last months of that winter of 1919–1920 in Switzerland trying to explain what he found unexplainable. “Poor Russia is rotting and decomposing. All that is best is sinking to the bottom,” he wrote in a text dated March 5, 1920.

    No one understood. How could anyone understand? What was happening — as he described it — was worse than a war: people were annihilating their own homeland, not even understanding themselves what they were doing. Some thought that they were carrying out a great deed: the salvation of humanity. Some were not thinking at all: they were simply adapting to the moment in which they found themselves. “What will happen tomorrow is all the same to them, they don’t believe in tomorrow, just like they don’t remember what happened yesterday,” Shestov wrote. 

    Russians had never liked the word “citizen,” he explained. They preferred to think of themselves as objects rather than subjects. The Bolsheviks talked about freedom, but only until power was in their own hands — then they declared freedom to be a bourgeois prejudice. They believed that they knew better than the people what the people needed, and that the less they asked them what they wanted, the happier the people would be. But this was not the Bolsheviks’ only betrayal. In fact the Bolsheviks were neither good materialists nor good Hegelians; they were idealists who believed neither in knowledge or reason, but rather in “brute physical force.” They were ideologues — as paradoxical as it sounded, Shestov noted — of violence as such. “In Russia,” he wrote, “the ruling circles have always idealized precisely physical force.”

    Even now, a century later, that moment when the First World War bled into the Bolshevik Revolution, which bled into one constellation after another of civil war, is a difficult moment for historians to assimilate. Violence saturated everything and everyone. The state — whatever it might be at any given moment — no longer had any monopoly on the use of force. There was no more than a hair’s breadth between totalitarianism and anarchy. “In the atmosphere of mutual brutality and civil war, the last sparks of faith in the possibility of realizing even if only a spectral truth on earth were extinguished,” Shestov wrote.

    How could anyone grasp what was happening?

    A century later, Stanislav Aseyev wrote about his native Donbas in the revolutionary year of 2013–2014. There was a revolution in the capital, but where Stanislav lived most people reacted with fatigue and indifference — and pride in their cult of labor. These were people — he described his own world — who, coming out of the mines at the end of the workday covered in dirt, were consoled only by a shot of vodka, people long deprived of a future and habituated to humiliating conditions. These were people like his mother, who accepted her alcoholic husband’s abuse with an infinite capacity for self-sacrifice, and who did not know what to do with her freedom on the rare occasions when she had a holiday from work.

     

    Now, ten years into the war that began in the Donbas, and more than two years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, I find myself reading Shestov’s essay again and again. This decade of savage violence in Ukraine that began in 2014 evokes that decade of savagery exactly a hundred years earlier. And Shestov is suggesting connections that feel excruciatingly to the point today: the relationship between the absence of individual responsibility and the absence of truth; the indifference towards time as a symptom of the abdication of a freedom never possessed in the first place; and above all, perhaps, the connection between an absence of subjectivity and a belief in violence as such. Violence as habitus. The cities were dying, the villages were dying — from hunger, cold and carnage. Shestov, who had insisted in “Memento Mori” that reason could not reach beyond certain borders, understood that those borders had now been crossed, and that what was happening in his homeland was now beyond reason’s reach. 

    And what of the truth to be found beyond the limits of reason? Shestov turned to Dostoevsky, positioning 
him explicitly against Kant and implicitly against Husserl, philosophers who had longed for the timeless, the eternal, and the non-contingent. “In other words,” he observed in 1921, “knowledge becomes knowledge only insofar as we discover in a fact a ‘pure’ principle, that invisible-to-the-eye ‘always,’ that omnipotent phantom who fell heir to the power and rights of the gods and demons driven from the world.” For Shestov, however, as for Dostoevsky, this pure “always” was equivalent to tyranny. This was what the Grand Inquisitor had understood: that people feared freedom, that they longed for infallible authority before which all could bow down. Dostoevsky rebelled against this authority held in common. His act of resistance was to deny the law, the general principle that always held, in order to comprehend singular truth. For truth was above laws; these laws were to truth what shackles and prisons were for Dostoevsky.

    Dostoevsky revolted against the universal, that which was obtained for everyone, in favor of the individual. All notions of “common sense” implied the general. “Rational man” — in Russian zdravomysliashchii chelovek, “a person thinking in a healthy way” — was “‘Man’ in general.” This “everyone-ness” — what Dostoevsky named vsemstvo — was Dostoevsky’s great enemy. Philosophy had always felt obliged to justify itself before vsemstvo, before what Kant called “consciousness in general;” it craved immutable grounding and solid foundations. Philosophers, Shestov maintained, “feared freedom, caprice, that is, everything in life that was unusual, speculative, indeterminate, naturally not suspecting that precisely what was unusual, speculative, indeterminate, requiring neither guarantees nor defense, was its single and true object of study.” 

    In 1928, over a decade after the original publication of “Memento Mori,” Shestov and Husserl met in person for the first time. They argued for a long while about Allgemeingültigkeit, the principle of universality — and they bonded immediately, coming into the kind of friendship rarely begun so late in life. When that autumn Shestov wrote to Husserl with the news that he was traveling to Freiburg to present a lecture on Tolstoy, Husserl was extremely happy. He and his wife Malvine immediately invited Shestov to come for dinner. “I am extraordinarily looking forward to welcoming you soon in Freiburg,” Husserl wrote to him. The founder of phenomenology came to Shestov’s lecture on Tolstoy. At Husserl’s home in Freiburg the two philosophers paced and spoke all night and into the next day. “They’re like two lovers,” Malvine said, “inseparable.”

    It was on that visit to the Husserls’ home that Shestov met Heidegger. Shestov had already read Being and Time, which was published a year earlier. There followed a long philosophical discussion. To Shestov it seemed that Heidegger was not an easy person to get to know. After Heidegger had gone, Husserl urged Shestov to read Kierkegaard, explaining that underneath Heidegger’s work was the nineteenth-
century Danish philosopher.

    And so, as Stalinist terror overtook the place that had been his home, Shestov studied the work of the Christian existentialist from Copenhagen. Shestov had read Dostoevsky as an antidote to Kant; Kierkegaard had read the Book of Job as an antidote to Hegel. For Hegel, the problem that dialectics had to resolve was that of connecting the singular and the universal. Ethical life, what Hegel called Sittlichkeit, was for Hegel the universal, which for Shestov was connected to a necessity that could only be oppressive. Job, by contrast, carried out what Kierkegaard described otherwise as a “suspension of the ethical.” When God, provoked by Satan, tested Job’s loyalty by subjecting him to one source of anguish after another, Job withdrew from the general. During his excruciating suffering, Job’s three friends sat by his side and insisted that men and gods alike must accept their fate. But at a certain moment Job refused: no force was strong enough to make him accept the rightness of this fate. Why did the ethical demand the acceptance of necessity? The Book of Job lay bare this question. There it was God who appeared as proizvol — as arbitrary and capricious. Men longed for the general, the principle, the law, the guarantee, but God was pure proizvol, outside of any regularities and any guarantees.

    For Kierkegaard — Shestov understood as he read — Job’s greatness came not when he accepted that “the Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away,” but when he despaired that “his grief is heavier than the sands of the sea.” “The greatness of Job” — Shestov quotes Kierkegaard — “is that his suffering can neither be allayed nor suppressed by lies and empty promises.” In his own words Shestov explained that “Job restores to the weeping and cursing, ‘lugere et detestari,’ rejected by speculative philosophy their primordial right: the right to come forward as judges when inquiries are begun into the whereabouts of truth and falsehood.” 

    Like Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard asserted the individual against the universal. Against Hegel’s defense of the “slaughter-bench” of History, Kierkegaard insisted that the singular and the general could not be dialectically synthesized. Each singularity, each individual suffering, had to be taken on and as its own. “To leave Hegel for Job!” Shestov wrote.

    If Hegel could have admitted even momentarily that such a thing is possible; that the truth is not in him, but in the ignorant Job; that the method of inquiry into the truth lies not in a search for “the self-movement of the concept” (discovered by Hegel) but in wails of despair which from his point of view are wild and meaningless, then he would have had to confess that his whole life’s work and he himself amounted to nothing.

    Kierkegaard’s question, as Shestov extracted it, was this: “On whose side is the truth; on the side of ‘everybody’ and ‘everybody’s cowardice,’ or on the side of those who have dared to look madness and death in the eye?”

    “The problem,” Stanislav Aseyev wrote in the months after being released from Izolatsiia prison, “isn’t that humans live in a world of absurdity and pain; the problem is that we try to convince ourselves otherwise.” 

    Husserl died in April 1938, a year before his eightieth birthday. Shestov, who had written the most fervent criticism of Husserl’s philosophy, now wrote the most affecting eulogy. “How was it that a man whose whole life had been a celebration of reason should have led me to Kierkegaard’s hymn to the absurd?” he asked. And yet, Shestov continued, there was “a profound inner kinship between Husserl’s teaching on the one hand, and that of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard on the other. In absolutizing truth, Husserl was forced to relativize being, or more accurately human life.” Shestov understood that Husserl’s life was its own Kierkegaardian either/or: “He put to us the choice with unprecedented power: either we are all insane or ‘Socrates was poisoned’ is an eternal truth, equally binding upon all conscious beings.” 

    For Shestov, the absolute reign of reason was cruelty. He would follow Kierkegaard, who sought truth not in reason but in the absurd, who understood that philosophy began precisely where the possibilities of reason and “visible-to-the-eye-ness” had been exhausted. Now in this long text written for Husserl in memoriam, Shestov turned to Shakespeare, and spoke to his friend directly:

    I had to revolt against self-evident truth. You were profoundly right when you said that the time was out of joint. Every attempt to examine the least fissure in the foundation of human knowledge throws time out of joint. But must knowledge be preserved at whatever cost? Must 
the time be put back in joint? Or rather, should we not give 
it a further push — and shatter it to bits? 

    This beautiful eulogy was Shestov’s last piece of writing. He died on November 20, 1938, having lived to see the Anschluss and the Munich Conference — and that was, perhaps, enough. Late that September, Neville Chamberlain had returned from Munich to London and told the British, “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.” 

    Stanislav Aseyev completed his autobiographical novel in August 2014, asking in the final chapter for his readers’ indulgence as he “groped for the bottom,” writing these lines under the fire of artillery guns as Russian-sponsored separatists attempted to overthrow the Ukrainian state. By then it felt like a self-evident truth that the Russian-instigated war in the Donbas would be that fateful “quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.”

    When, in March 1939, the Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš faced Nazi Germany’s full-scale invasion of his country, he decided on exile; his country did not fight. When, in February 2022, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky faced Putinist Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he decided to stay in Kyiv. Ukrainians decided to fight. Ukraine, as Volodymyr Yermolenko described his country that spring, was “a Hamletian Europe that takes the question ‘to be or not to be’ literally.”

    In September 2022 a visitor had a question for Zelensky at a meeting in Kyiv. How — he asked the man presiding over a country under bombardment — had he known how to grasp a situation for which no one could have been prepared? “It’s all in Shakespeare,” Zelensky answered.

    This was what Shestov had believed as well. His first book was devoted to the English playwright. “For whole years,” Shestov wrote of Shakespeare, “the ghost of the accidental nature of human existence haunted him, and for whole years the great poet fearlessly gazed into the horrors of life and gradually clarified for himself their sense and their meaning.” Returning to Kyiv from western Europe in 1898, the year of that book’s publication, Shestov chose to stay at the home of one of his sisters. She lived on Bibikovskii bul’var 62, an address I passed while driving with Volodymyr Yermolenko to the Kyiv School of Economics this past March.

    Twenty minutes or so later Volodymyr and Tetyana and I took the stage to talk about Grenzsituationen, the “limit situations” that wrench us from the everyday. The room was full despite — or because of — the exhaustion of living by the rhythm of air raid alarms. I spoke of being drawn to Kyiv not only by attachment to my friends who were living this war, but also because this boundary situation felt like a privileged site of epistemological access, the poles that Shestov had described, where groundlessness overtook us and philosophical questions revealed themselves with uncanny acuity. “Men respond only faintly to the horrors that take place around them,” Shestov had written in 1905, “except at moments, when the savage, crying incongruity and ghastliness of our condition suddenly reveals itself vividly before our eyes, and we are forced to know what we are. Then the ground slides away from under our feet.” Tetyana pointed out that at this moment of Grenzsituationen, the border — the edge —became the center.

    Shestov knew that this border-zone was the center, the standpoint from which we had to look for truth. He certainly was empathetic to those, like Husserl, who looked elsewhere. He understood that philosophy, with its search for a priori intuition, had originated in the fear of nothingness, that this search for groundedness in knowledge was a search for truths “uncreated, dependent upon no one, general and necessary truths, which we imagine will protect us from the accidentalness of caprice, which saturates existence.” It was understandable that we longed for this. But Shestov knew that in life there is no protection, and no consolation. “Aristotle could speak of the greatness and beauty of the tragic: he saw it on the stage,” Shestov wrote in Athens and Jerusalem, his last book. “But for the man who has lived tragedy in his own soul these terms have no meaning. Tragedy is the absence of any way out. There is nothing beautiful in this, nothing great; it is only ugliness and misery.”

    Shestov completed Athens and Jerusalem in 1937, during the Great Terror. That year his friend Gustav Shpet was sentenced to death under Article 58 for anti-Soviet activity; he was executed in Siberia. Before his execution, Shpet managed to complete his Russian translation of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.

    For Hegel, the ethical demanded the sacrifice of the individual to the whole. This was Dostoevsky’s provocation against the German dialectician: if all the world’s happiness could be assured by the torture to death of “just one tiny creature,” Ivan Karamazov asked his Christian brother Alyosha, “would you agree to be the architect on such conditions?” “No,” Alyosha conceded, “I would not agree.” Like Ivan Karamazov, Job refused to accept a transcendent justification for suffering. Shestov’s insistence on the value of the singular, in solidarity with Job, was not only an epistemological position, but also a moral one.

    In my years of reading Shestov — above all as Husserl’s interlocutor and a character in a Central European story about a search for epistemological certainty and absolute truth — I had not fully absorbed what he meant by the irreducibility of the singular. Now this gruesome war that both is and is not my own has made me understand. Shestov, I now know, is the thinker we need to grasp what the Ukrainian filmmaker Mstyslav Chernov showed us in 20 Days in Mariupol, a documentary shot in February and March 2022 during the Russian siege of the Ukrainian port city. The camera turned on the mother wailing nakedly to the doctors who could not save her wounded baby; the father discovering that his teenaged son, who had just been playing soccer outside, was now a dead body; the little boy screaming for his mother who would never come back. “Who will return our children to us?” a young woman cried. “Who?” It was the most raw despair I have ever seen on film. It was caught in real time, prior to any reflection, despair unclothed in its unbearable primordiality.

    There are moments of suffering so absolute that they cannot in any way be compared, cannot be “overcome” and “reconciled” in Hegel’s terms. The anguish of each parent who sees their child torn apart by an explosion is absolutely, irreducibly singular. The forty-eight-year-old Yaroslav Bazylevych, cut and bleeding, watched his wife and their three daughters pulled — dead — out of the rubble of their apartment building in Lviv, exploded by a Russian missile. There can be no mediation in this kind of suffering. Shestov’s philosophy began with a respect for that irreducibility, which cannot be sublated into a higher logic. “Gazing at Shestov’s face, as it emerges from his books,” the Russian thinker Viktor Erofeev wrote in 1975, “you see that his face is distorted by a terrible spasm, born of the feeling of the tragic nature of individual human existence, given over to the proizvol of chance and death. This proizvol Shestov set against his own counter-proizvol.”

    What was Shestov’s “counter-proizvol,” his resistance against cosmic caprice and cruelty? It revealed itself, perhaps, as a negative: that anything was possible did not mean that anything was permitted. To accept that God was proizvol was not to take God’s side against the suffering Job, or to justify Job’s suffering in the name of a higher rationality. Shestov’s rejection of reason — be it Kantian or Hegelian or Husserlian — was not irrationalism in the nihilist sense. Shestov’s empathy for Job was an affirmation of truth disclosed at the darkest moments. It was an affirmation of life, and of love.

    When years ago I began reading Shestov, I never could have imagined the bomb shelter in Podil and how close to Shestov I would come to feel there. On that morning of March 21, 2024, sometime after six, when the sun had already risen, a chorus not of jangling keys but of air raid apps on smartphones announced that the immediate threat had passed. The missile attack was over. I climbed the stairs from the bomb shelter into the hotel. A few hours later, the Ukrainian Jewish book editor Leonid Finberg met me there and drove me to the building where Shestov had lived with his parents a century and a half ago. It was not more than a half mile away. Today it is a grandiose three-story residence, not far from the Dnipro River, painted a pale blue-green. A dozen stacks of sandbags — as if intended to provide grounding at a time of groundlessness — stood in front of the building. And I wondered how — and whether — they protected anyone or anything.

    That morning the Kremlin had launched thirty-one cruise and ballistic missiles at Kyiv. Ukrainian air defenses had intercepted all thirty-one. They have become extremely skillful. But they were nearly out of ammunition. Many months had gone by without American aid. Meanwhile Stanislav Aseyev was writing — and posting cat photos — from the front line in the east. He is a cat-whisperer; the abandoned cats that he adopted kept him company in the trenches. One day he added a message: if more ammunition did not arrive quickly, it would soon be up to the Russians whether or not the cats got fed. 

    “I’m counting on those cats to look out for you,” I wrote to him. I added that the cats in his photos looked much calmer and braver than I would be in their place. “But they know nothing about Shestov,” he replied.

    Christmas on Red Hill, or The Birth of Misotheism

    Shortly after the publication of Look Homeward, Angel, Thomas Wolfe traveled to York Springs, a village in Pennsylvania, 
to visit with his deceased father’s kin. W. O. Gant, the father of the novel’s protagonist, was modeled by Wolfe on his own father, William Oliver Wolfe. In a letter to his mother in North Carolina, Wolfe recounted his look homeward to the litter of hinterland villages and hamlets where his father had farmed. The pastoral prettiness of the region stirred him to extoll the “great fields and mighty stone barns, the richest, fattest farming county you ever looked at.” A second letter, composed in New York City, mused on the character of the English, Scot-Irish, and Germans pioneers who had debarked in Philadelphia in the eighteenth century and hacked their way through the forests. “As I walk through the crowded and noisy streets of this immense city, and look at the dark swarthy faces of Jews, Italians, Greeks,” Wolfe wrote, “I realize more keenly than ever that I come from the old Americans — the people who settled the country, who fought in its wars, who pushed westward.”

    No writer has repeated Thomas Wolfe’s lyrical infatuation with Adams County, the place that bore and bred me. After I left this borderland along the Mason–Dixon Line for Cambridge, Massachusetts, which might as well be a different country, I searched the national culture for traces of the filtered deposits of the ruddy farmers and rural bourgeoisie who raised me. Of my old Americans, however, contemporary letters evokes only dark political innuendos, such as when Charles Lindbergh circumnavigates the region’s lush valleys and corrugated ridges, surveying his blood-and-soil partisans, in Philip Roth’s The Plot Against America. But when I separate the years since I left, turning them over one by one, I inhabit the psychic interior of Adams County’s commoners, a guarded, undemonstrative people who go to work, try to honor the Commandments, and return home to their families. In the theater of modern volatilities, the desiccated faith of such mainline Protestants has been shunted off stage, as though nothing poetic or vital ever happens behind the veil. 

    The story that is about to unfold is a metaphysical high drama. The central event, told to me in the flat intonations of a country teacher’s voice, imbued my spiritual inheritance not long after my father cracked up and left our family, having been “Magnificently unprepared / For the long littleness of life.” Revisiting the story of Christmas on Red Hill, I find myself a stranger roaming in a landscape I know intimately, as though seeing the event that shaped me through a picture window whose frame I cannot breach. 

    Belinda always began her story with a memory of the black-haired sophomore who crowded into a seat beside hers in college. When the class ended, her eye followed him as he stood and strode toward the door. He looked even taller than her. A shade darker, he wore heavy eyebrows that made him look older than twenty.

    On their first date, Carmen Monterossi said he grew up in Sharpsburg, an hour’s drive south from campus, outside Pittsburgh. Belinda said she grew up in Hanover, four hours southeast across the Alleghenies. His father, like hers, made a living in the construction trades. Carmen’s welded on Pittsburgh’s bridges.

    Belinda and Carmen held hands at the parties thrown by her sorority and his fraternity. They played tennis on campus and swam in Lake Arthur, and they studied cheek by jowl toward their shared ambition for a career in special education. Classes at Slippery Rock let out for the summer. One weekend, she took a plane to Pittsburgh to see him. She laughed when a giddy teenage girl stole in close and pinched Carmen’s buttocks on a downtown street, squealing as she crept away that she just touched the Steelers’ famous running back. In his beard, Carmen did look like a dead-ringer for Franco Harris. She herself had large hands and feet, long thin legs, a plain, narrow face, and a body built like a licorice stick. She had been a cheerleader in high school, hanging out with the jocks. 

    She cried hard when she broke up with him. In high school, she had read a sentimental fiction about star-crossed lovers just like them. After saying goodnight to her mother and father in Hanover, she thumbed the novel by a small light behind the closed door of her bedroom. In the mornings, she hid the novel under her bed, lest her parents discover her curiosity about forbidden men. When she first arrived at Slippery Rock and measured the footloose spirit of rebellion seizing some of the students, however, she realized that her secret cigarette habit would mark the limits of her disobedience. She was no dreamer.

    Her mother was a Zartman, her father a Stonesifer. The Zartman and Stonesifer lines went far back in Hanover’s German Lutheran community. Buck and Sis, as everyone called her parents, belonged to St. Paul’s. They baptized and raised her and her younger sister in the church. Buck had been an altar boy. Carmen, however, had graduated from North Catholic High School in Pittsburgh. His father and mother were Italian immigrants and Roman Catholics. She thought of his parents as transplants from the old world.

    Carmen, at length, persuaded her to consider a way out of their predicament. He wagered the knowledge they might gain together from a night class on mixed marriages. No, she felt after the final session, she could not bring herself to convert. The sacrament of confession positively offended her. But she did summon the terms of a compromise. She could agree to raise any children with Carmen in the Catholic Church. As soon as she heard herself make the pledge, a vision of the future crystallized in her imagination. Yes, she would marry Carmen after they graduated from Slippery Rock. She would teach special education for three years. After she completed her master’s degree, she would give birth to two children, and then she would resume her teaching career. That was her plan.

    On August 21, 1971, she married her college sweetheart at St. Paul’s in Hanover. The wedding was traditional, the altar set with white mums, daisies, gladiolus, and palms, Belinda bedecked in a full-length gown of embroidered silk organza styled with an empire waistline, a softly gathered skirt, and billowing sleeves. Her sister, Sue Ann, served as her maid of honor. Belinda’s sorority sisters and Carmen’s fraternity brothers filled out the party. Reverend Don Stonesifer, her fire-and-brimstone uncle, came up to Hanover from his horse ranch in Virginia to officiate. A priest assisted. Carmen’s parents insisted.

    Belinda and Carmen soon found teaching jobs and bought a townhouse in Carlisle, a short half-hour north of Hanover. They immersed themselves in St. Patrick’s Catholic Church. He coached the parish football team and won election to the presidency of the athletic association. She joined the Junior Civic Club. But Slippery Rock had not fully prepared them for the politics of special education. Carlisle’s superintendent segregated her students. She had to rig up a classroom in the windowless, pie-shaped cement basement of the Lutheran church. She gravitated to the kids with learning disabilities, fascinated as she was by dyslexia. Privately, she concluded, she did not have enough patience to contend with the more severely afflicted. 

    Those students, the ones with emotional disturbances, Carmen sought out. His superintendent admired the gentle manner he displayed with the angry children of the world, so surprising for such a big man. Well liked and widely respected, he won promotion to a role in the school district’s administration. Sometimes, when defendants in the juvenile court claimed a disability to mitigate their offenses, he testified as an expert witness for the state. “I think they ought to quit giving these kids so many chances,” he said to the Carlisle Sentinel. “Leniency is not doing justice to kids or society.” 

    On issues of public morality Carmen and Belinda concurred. They blamed the hippies and the kooks for unraveling America’s fabric. In Hanover and Sharpsburg, the Stonesifers’ and Monterossis’ alike nodded toward their respective television screens when President Nixon came on and appealed to “the great silent majority” against the antiwar protestors.

    Belinda’s plan unfolded like a private charm. One month after she ceased taking her birth-control pill, she became pregnant. Two months after she completed her master’s degree, she gave birth to Jason. A second child, Nicholas, arrived on her calendar three years later. Jason and Nicholas bore Carmen’s dark brown eyes and her blond bangs. A priest at St. Patrick’s performed the baptisms. 

    On the rare occasions when Carmen and Belinda argued, their bickering revolved around her bird-like panics of possessiveness. She continually found reasons to keep her loyal discharge of daughterly duties conspicuous to Buck and Sis. She felt intensely jealous of Sue Ann, who also married a special education teacher in Carlisle. Two Saturdays every month, Belinda left Carmen in the townhouse and stayed overnight at her childhood home in Hanover with Jason and Nicholas. On those evenings, Buck and Sis minded the boys while she played bridge with her high-school girlfriends. The next morning, the Stonesifers’ attended Sunday worship at St. Paul’s and lunched at The Greenskeeper, a clubhouse restaurant run by her Aunt Linda and Uncle Larry. 

    The spirit of compromise that had made the marriage possible in the first place held for eight years. Every other Thanksgiving and every other Christmas, Belinda and Carmen and Jason and Nicholas packed into their Ford LTD sedan and motored across the Alleghenies to Sharpsburg, where they attended holiday Mass with the Monterossi family. Jason remembered without fail which elevator button would lift them to the dinosaur exhibition at the Carnegie Museum of Natural History. Nicholas adored the animals in the Pittsburgh zoo.

    In 1979, when the action of this story begins, Belinda forced a change. That Thanksgiving she insisted on spending with her clan in Hanover. Her Aunt Beverly in California promised to make a rare visit. Carmen’s father, wounded by the betrayal, stopped talking to his son. She thought her father-in-law was an Italian hothead with a short-man’s complex.

    On the twenty-third of that December, Belinda awoke at daybreak, donned her apron, and planted her feet in the kitchen. She cooked her homemade applesauce, her jellies, and her chicken corn soup. She baked a fresh loaf of bread, and when she finished her traditional contributions to the Stonesifers’ Christmas repast, she placed the fixings in three baskets each ringed with fresh apples. Two baskets she designated for her grandmothers. The third she put aside for her Aunt Ruth. Satisfied with her labors, she decided on the spur of the moment to deliver the provisions to her mother’s refrigerator in Hanover that very afternoon.

    “Can’t we just stay home and take this stuff with us on Christmas Day?” Carmen grumbled. He was not his cheerful self. She pursed her lips. “No, I’ve got to get all these gifts to Hanover today. I need to take all this stuff down, so it’s not so crazy packing and all that on Christmas morning.” The day after Christmas, she reminded him, they would drive to Sharpsburg. “It’ll be too much. We’ve got to pack our suitcases on top of everything else.”

    “But I hate that road,” Carmen remonstrated. “Let’s just stay home and relax.” The road to Hanover, a two-lane turnpike, crossed a belt of the orchard land below South Mountain, which broke into innumerable spurs and foothills. The sloping land pushed cold air down into valleys, protecting sensitive fruit trees from frost bite. The orchards yielded some of the most succulent cherries, peaches, and apples in America. 

    The harvest season had ended in October. Carmen, at the wheel, probably would not butt up against one of the cannery trucks that relied on the turnpike to convey crated fruit south past Hanover to the harbor in Baltimore. Even so, he could expect to trail one of the sixteen-wheelers carrying new cars to the dealership in Hanover, or one of the cement trucks that spewed rocks from its cylinder on the way from the quarry. A tractor would emerge from an unmarked access road and eke along interminably. The narrow contours had not changed since Belinda’s forebears had laid a wagon trail in 1736. How many rabbits, skunk, deer, and possum had met a violent demise on that road? During the growing season the warm scent of mellowing apples perfumed the drive through the orchards. Today the rancid smell of rotting animal flesh was sure to aggravate the queasy feeling induced by crossing twenty miles of hills like a slow-motion roller coaster. They would have to swallow the rising bile of carsickness.

    Belinda would not countenance Carmen’s objections. She would shuttle the boys to Hanover herself. After eight years of marriage, Carmen grokked the determination in her tone. “You’re not going to give me any peace until we take all this stuff, are you?,” he sighed. He buckled Jason and Nicholas into the Chevette, a subcompact they had just purchased. The best- selling car in America, manufactured in response to the energy crisis, the Chevette would zip to Hanover more easily than the lumbering Ford sedan in the garage. The warm air, moist from an overnight rain, prompted Carmen to remark that that day felt like an Indian Summer. 

    Sis and Buck received them warmly on McKinley Avenue. The family was at the very core and ripeness of its life together, the voluptuous energy of its conventions focused on the ritual feast of turkey and country ham to come. The festive patter of Belinda’s grandmothers seasoned the occasion with a snug sense of sufficiency. Her haven remained intact, her parents’ marital idyll steady against the torrent of divorces elsewhere in the country. Sis and Buck had graduated from Eichelberger High School. After the war, they had purchased a tract of open acreage in the tony Clearview section of Hanover, directly across from a Lutheran parsonage. The two-story house they built expressed a vernacular rhetoric of gentility, boasting a carport, flagstone steps, dormer windows, and immaculately groomed gardens, shrubs, and lawns. Buck designed and laid every inch of the structure himself, hauling the bricks from Alwine’s, the oldest manufacturer in America.

    Sis furnished the domestic interior with varnished walnut tables and chairs. In the formal dining room, a Swiss clock presided over a hutch that held porcelain crockery and assorted candies and nuts. A parlor opened into a patioed backyard under a canopy of maples and elms. The plummy tone of order and satisfaction, a matured décor of religion and taste, forged the family’s claim to belong to the better sorts of people in town. The neighbors were doctors and pharmacists, accountants and bank managers. 

    That afternoon, Belinda and Sis took Jason and Nicholas for a meal with Aunt Linda and Uncle Larry at The Greenskeeper. The boys rolled down their windows and piped Jingle Bells at the top of their voices. After lunch, they soaked up the dazzling sight of the Christmas tree. Carmen stayed behind with Buck and watched television in the living room. When the boys burst through the door and presented their grandfather with stain-glass ornaments, he pretended to believe their own tiny fingers had crafted them. 

    As twilight descended, Jason started in on his brother, poking and prodding. He had reached that age. “No TV tonight!” Belinda scolded him. Carmen scooped up Nicholas and cradled him in the crooks of his lean, hairy arms. In the carport, Sis leaned through the window and dropped a couple of bags of Christmas cookies on the boys’ laps, steadying their trembling chins and wiping away their frowns. A few minutes after seven o’clock, Carmen switched on the headlamps, turned left onto McKinley Avenue, and wheeled back toward the turnpike.

    As the town petered out, the landmarks notching their northward progress home loomed across the map of Belinda’s childhood memory. The quarry passed on the left. She anticipated how, after the Chevette’s engine labored over the fifth hill and reached a mile-long flatland, a corridor fringed by pine trees and tangled underbrush would darken the road. Off to the right appeared The Tropical Treat, the drive-in restaurant where she spooned down banana splits after drive-in movies with her girlfriends. Cornfields now stretched out on both sides of the road. The corners of her eyes reflected red and green colors flickering like fireflies inside the farmhouses. 

    Up ahead was Red Hill, the steepest on the road. Carmen prepared to round the blind spot at the crest when a yellow blaze of sodium light flashed into Belinda’s eyes. She raised her right arm above her forehead and swiveled her head toward Carmen. His face was illuminated in a bizarre clarity. She thought an airplane must be landing on top of their car. 

    She woke up on a gurney in the emergency ward at Hanover Hospital. She recognized Koby Klunk, a friend from high school, as the nurse standing over her. She had been in a car accident, Koby informed her. She had a broken forearm and some cracked ribs. The doctor, concerned about blood pooling around her heart, had ordered an ambulance to transport her to York Hospital, the nearest larger facility, in case she needed surgery. 

    Belinda caught sight of Sis exchanging inaudible words with a man who looked to be a Pennsylvania State Trooper. She lifted her uninjured arm and motioned her mother over. Carmen, Jason, and Nicholas would need to stay overnight in Hanover until her release. Her thoughts abruptly shifted when she observed her mother shrieking and pounding her fists against the trooper’s barrel chest. Sis, hysterical, came beside the gurney and looked down at her daughter.

    “Mom, are they not okay?”

    “No, he’s dead.”

    “Are the boys okay?”

    “No, they’re all gone.” 

    She turned to Koby and denied permission to transport her to York Hospital. Saying so, she relapsed into unconsciousness for the next day and a half.

    Until this moment, a particular sense of time had held her and molded her. She had grown up in the mores of the old Protestants. Methodical and industrious, her people had taught her how to save time, to organize time, to forestall the element of chance by the habit of preparation. Her habits stemmed from a tempo of life essentially unchanged since the brickwork farmhouses and churches were wrought out of the abundant clay deposits in the soil. Great revolutions in agriculture, industry, and science had accelerated the pace of change in the big cities. Even the modern theological conflicts that divided Lutheran synods, however, had passed lightly over congregations that clung to a past older than the country itself. No spiritual awakenings had swept through these parts. No hurricanes, earthquakes, or tornados had bewildered existence. Time moved in cycles, its rhythms marked by the four seasons and the liturgical calendar as surely as day followed night.

    At the limits of her imagination of novelty and contingency, Belinda had been able to picture Jason or Nicholas afflicted by some awful disease. One evening earlier in December, she had caught a television show that chronicled a girl’s suffering from leukemia and her mother’s struggle to save her. Belinda, distraught, had rushed up the stairs in tears and rustled Jason and Nicholas awake to hug them. If that manner of calamity had befallen them, she would have sought spiritual direction from Reinhold Niebuhr’s Serenity Prayer: “God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the difference.” But what transpired on Red Hill had not announced itself with a future expiration date. The collision had come on like the Apocalypse.

    Ted Kotula, the Pennsylvania State Trooper in the hospital that evening, had just left a scene that resembled an execution. Under the revolving lights of ambulances, trucks, and cruisers, the firemen and paramedics saw a Mercury sedan on its roof. Two men, pinioned inside, writhed and moaned in Spanish. The driver of the sedan was dead beneath a guardrail. Half his face was torn away. 

    The Chevette sat higher on the gradient. The roof had been sheared off, giving a clear view of an unconscious Belinda in the passenger’s seat. Her right ear was nearly split in half. Her right leg bore a gash where the door of the glove compartment speared her. Blood seeped around shards of glass that lodged in her face and arms. Beside her, Carmen’s body reposed in the driver’s seat. The firemen shined their flashlights deeper into the Chevette. The entire back seat was missing, having popped off the chassis.

    One of the firemen vomited on the macadam where he found Carmen’s head. Others dropped to their knees upon discovering Jason and Nicholas’ entrails and limbs. The father of the fire chief fell over with a heart attack. An ambulance took him away to the coronary care unit. A driver crawling through the traffic bottleneck craned her neck toward the carnage, fumbled the wheel in distress, and struck another fireman, sending him to the hospital in yet another ambulance. The atmosphere felt permeated by a sulfurous mist.

    None of the three men in the Mercury carried a driver’s license, automobile insurance, or immigration papers. Trooper Katula telephoned Pappy Bross, the owner of a large turkey farm in East Berlin and one of only two businesses in the vicinity known to employ foreigners. Bross arrived at the morgue to look at the driver. An old family friend of the Stonesifer’s, he breathed a sigh of relief when he disclaimed knowledge of the man. Trooper Katula summoned Pastor Hector Ramos from the Assembly of Pentecostal Church of Jesus. One of the surviving passengers, detained in the emergency room with a broken jaw, spoke no English. Ramos often fielded such emergency calls from the state police. Every year, several thousand Mexicans migrated northward to South Mountain’s fruit belt to work in the orchards. The phenomenon had begun during Belinda’s younger years, when teenagers began reallocating their leisure time from the family orchard to high school sports. Agricultural corporations stepped in and consolidated the land, constructing canneries where cider houses, elevated water tanks, and spray sheds had dotted the land for a century.

    Pastor Ramos sang and prayed with the migrants at their camps and conducted Catholic services for them at his church. He admired their work ethic. When they finished their labors, however, they had little to do with their time. Segregated from the white community, they passed their leisure in drink. They often began drinking on Saturday mornings and then continued through Sunday evenings. 

    The injured man gave Ramos his name: Domingo Azuel-Najero. He was twenty-three. Ramos’ heart sank when he heard Azuel-Najero break into a giggle. He was still drunk. Azuel-Najero asked about his friend at the wheel. “You tell him his friend is dead,” Katula snapped, “and by the way, you tell him the woman he hears screaming is the only survivor from the other car.” 

    Azuel-Najero stopped laughing. He said nothing more, refusing to disclose how the men knew one another. Most of the migrant workers left at the end of the harvest season in October. The three men might have been working on a skeleton crew. If so, they might have picked the very apples that Belinda ringed around her Christmas baskets.

    Belinda opened her eyes in the stillness of Christmas morning. The clock on the wall read three o’clock. She tapped the cast on her arm. Realizing she was alone in York Hospital, her memories began to coagulate: who she was, where she was, what her mother had said. A chill crept over her, and then the abscess burst. She heard herself howling. A nurse appeared and took her trembling hand. 

    “Shall I phone for a minister to come?”

    “Yes, please hurry.”

    The moment the door closed, a warm light poured into the room and chased away the shadows bunching in the corners. God’s caress evened her breathing. Her heart ceased hammering. The minister arrived an hour later. She was calm, savoring the stillness. He was unshaven, exhausted. She thought he looked disheveled. 

    At midday, a man’s silhouette drew into focus through her fogginess. Tall and square-jawed, his fists were buried in his pockets. “It’s time to go home,” Buck said in his soft-spoken manner. A high wind blew scuds of rain against the car and steamed the windows on the drive to McKinley Avenue. Buck fixed his gaze on the road ahead. She heard a husky whisper slip past his clenched jaw. He would shoot the two surviving Mexicans.

    That evening, as Christmas Day drew to a mournful close, her thoughts drifted to the time at Slippery Rock when Carmen had broken up with her. He had caught her smoking. Now, as she maneuvered her battered body down into a wing chair in her mother’s living room, she ended her nine-year remission and lit a cigarette. 

    “I can’t live without them,” she declared to her mother. As she said so, a floor lamp beside her chair went dark. Her mother, rising, checked the bulb and rattled the stem. Ten minutes later, when Belinda regained confidence and said, “I can make it,” the lamp flickered on. 

    “What is wrong with that lamp?”

    “Nothing is wrong with the lamp,” her mother insisted. 

    Six more times that evening, the lamp switched on and off by itself in concert with her will to live and her wish to die.

    Mr. Kenworthy, the funeral director, visited the next day to take her instructions. She had not planned a funeral before. She asked for Carmen’s cornu. She had given the necklace to him for his birthday to replace his crucifix. “It’s an Italian talisman, a good luck charm. It looks like a horn.” Mr. Kenworthy lowered his eyes and said nothing.

    Three days later, St. Patrick’s conducted a Mass of Christian Burial in Carlisle. She stepped haltingly through the front doors wearing her arm cast, a neck brace, and two black eyes. The moment her eye alighted on the three white caskets, she fainted. 

    After the funeral, Sis escorted her to the townhouse to pack some belongings. If she stayed in this place, the shadow of memory would suffocate her. She did not recognize her feelings as grief. To grieve would be to accept what was contrary to history and biology. Closeness to children constituted her character and occupation. She observed herself opening the door to the toolshed and reaching for an ax. On the drive to McKinley Avenue, her mother reported that she had climbed the stairs to Nicholas’ room and swung the ax against his crib until it lay in matchstick pieces.

    Every night that first week, Buck eased her into her childhood bed as she negotiated the pain in her ribs. She entered sleep pining for a way back to her husband and children. Her nights, clammy and dreamless, denied her access. During the short winter days, Sis and Buck, Sue Ann, Uncle Larry and Aunt Linda, and her grandmothers took turns sitting with her, patting her hand, listening to her reveries of mothering. “Such an easy child Nicholas was, a young two, still a babe,” she simpered. “Jason! Why did I have to scold him?” Carmen was a good man, her best friend. They had a honeymoon in Colonial Williamsburg and enjoyed five years together before the children came. She talked like this incessantly, compulsively. She talked to rub over the pain. She talked to fill the time. She feared that if she stopped talking, she might forget them.

    The fire chief rang the doorbell. He brought findings from Trooper Kotula’s investigation. Three young Mexican men had spent the afternoon guzzling liquor inside My Ladies, a roadside bar on the edge of New Oxford, two miles north of Red Hill. A witness had spotted them stumbling in the parking lot. They had climbed into the Mercury sedan and headed south toward Hanover. The driver had crossed the centerline going ninety miles per hour, more than twice the speed limit. Trooper Kotula surmised that he had passed out at the wheel with his foot on the accelerator.

    The extraordinary speed had lifted the car airborne over the crest of Red Hill. The sodium light she had perceived in the moment before losing consciousness shone from the Mercury’s headlamps on its downward plunge into their windshield. Hitting head-on at a forty-five degree angle, the two-ton Mercury flipped tail over head and ripped the Chevette apart. The sedan proceeded to skid on its roof two hundred and ten feet down the hill. The weight, angle, and velocity generated a force of impact that could not have dealt Carmen, Jason, and Nicholas any pain. 

    That Friday, Belinda stepped gingerly into the office of the Carlisle Sentinel with photographs of Carmen, Jason, and Nicholas smiling beatifically. “This didn’t have to happen,” the reporter warned revelers in a front-page story on New Year’s Eve. Half the number of all Americans who had died in Vietnam perished every year in drunk driving crashes. The roadway pandemic was the nation’s leading cause of death in people under thirty-four. On the roads running around Hanover alone forty-three people had died this year in such crashes, another record toll.

    Public health advocates urged a prevention model, blaming the alcohol industry. The previous year, the Pennsylvania State Supreme Court had rescinded the Blue Laws at the behest of business interests. The Blue Laws had banned the sale of liquor on the Sabbath since William Penn’s Quakers had put the prohibition in place in 1682. An alternative model, espoused by conservatives, called for longer jail sentences to deter and punish individual offenders. Belinda sided with the law-and-order conservatives. She herself drank regularly, copiously.

    That same Friday, Pastor Hector Ramos conducted the funeral of Armando Merino, the twenty-three-year-old drunk driver. Just one person, a white woman, attended. She did not introduce herself. Addressing the funeral director, she asked him to open the casket. When he resisted, she insisted. Peering in, she gasped, turned on her heels, and walked out.

    January brought Belinda’s thirtieth birthday. She longed to grasp a cause beyond the mechanics of the collision. The enormity overbore the word accident. A mishap implied an unforeseen contingency, inimical to her ingrained habits of thought and feeling. If the Blue Laws had been in place, no bar would have served the men that Sunday. Then again, Carmen had implored her to stay home. And she had elected to take the Chevette, the lightest car in America, rather than their gas-guzzling sedan. The dark-brown Ford they left in the garage, equal in size and weight to the Mercury, had four doors and a hardtop roof.

    Stop it, Sis interceded: “We don’t do guilt. That will get you nowhere.” Her mother had been warning against guilt since she was a young girl. Guilt was a stupid emotion, a handmaiden of Catholic melodrama.

    Reverend Glenn Ludwig visited from St. Paul’s. Belinda knew him from the services she attended twice a month on the mornings following her Saturday evening card club. Reverend Ludwig had honored Sis’ call to assist with the funeral Mass at St. Patrick’s in Carlisle. Now he unbuttoned his coat and jacket and sat on the edge of the sofa. He asked Belinda and Sid to dab their eyes. They bowed their heads in prayer.

    If God gave sight to the blind and commanded the lame to walk, Belinda said sharply, then why had God taken her family away from her? “God did not make this happen,” Reverend Ludwig maintained. “It was an accident, a purely physical event. Two pieces of matter were at the same place at the same time, and they couldn’t be.” A look of umbrage passed between her and her mother. They were not fooled by the reverend’s attempt to provide God with an alibi. If the collision was indeed an accident, then why had God failed to intervene and prevent it? And why had God humiliated her, forcing her to live?

    Nobody could explain to her why the Mercury destroyed every part of the Chevette except the one pocket of space where the firemen had discovered her with her seat belt still fastened. What were the odds? A thousand to one? A million? When she had quizzed the fire chief, he threw up his hands and declaimed what Reverend Ludwig declined to affirm: “It was a miracle.” 

    An awkward silence fell between them. She glared at the reverend, unappeased, until the storm inside her broke. She spat on the carpet. “That is what you could do with your God,” she cursed.

    Sis invoked the spiritual counsel of a fellow parishioner at St. Paul’s, a woman with bespoke gifts not possessed by the likes of Reverend Ludwig. Hanover’s churches and business clubs frequently opened their anterooms and auditoriums to visiting 
astrologers and clairvoyants. Downtown, inside lavender-
scented warrens honeycombing cindered alleyways, freelance mediums propitiated crystal balls, Ouija boards, and Tarot cards. 

    At the séance, the medium wrinkled her nose, shuddered her shoulders, and tossed her head from side to side until she finally made contact with Carmen, Jason, and Nicholas. None of Belinda’s decisions could have changed the outcome, the medium opened her quivering eyes and avowed. If Belinda had elected to stay home in their Carlisle townhouse that day, the gas furnace would have exploded.

    The medium elaborated the spiritual writ behind her reading during a visit to McKinley Avenue. Belinda learned that God encoded every baptized soul with the precise date of its body’s death. When the body reached the end of its earthly tether, a new body reincarnated its soul. 

    The word omen crossed her mind. Two days before the catastrophe, she remembered, she had taken Jason on an errand to the butcher. She had intended to cook and freeze meatballs in advance of the New Year’s Eve party that she planned to throw at the townhouse. 

    “Mommy,” Jason had said when she stopped at a red light, “I’m going to smoke when I grow up.”

    “You shouldn’t, smoking hurts your health, and it can make you die.”

    “Well, I am going to die.”

    “Yes, dear, we are all going to die one day.”

    “No, you don’t understand. God knows that I’m going to die, and he could keep me from dying.”

    Buck had some misgivings about the medium’s epiphanies, astonished by her claim that he had been Sis’ son in their former lives. Like Carmen, Buck had a doppelganger. He looked like Charlton Heston. (At the mall once, he posed for a photograph as if he were the actor in the flesh.) Still, the construction sites he superintended kept his feet planted firmly in the material world. Three years on the front lines in France, Belgium, and Germany ducking into foxholes, dodging the Luftwaffe’s bombs and bullets, also instilled in him a sense of death’s caprice. What he had done to survive had not escaped the vault of his private memory. Nobody talked about the violence of war.

    Buck turned to his brother Don, the Lutheran pastor who had solemnized the marriage of Carmen and Belinda. Don had served as an army chaplain in the war. The Nazis had taken him prisoner in the Battle of the Bulge. Don objected to the medium’s claims: Predestination was a heresy against free will. He challenged his brother: “Why not walk in front of a moving bus then?”

    “Dad,” Belinda countered, “the thing is, you can walk in front of that bus if you want to tempt destiny, but if it’s 
not your time to die, then that bus will hit you, and then you’ll live the rest of your life as a cripple because you’re not meant to die yet.”

    Her Catholic friends were bogged down in grief, still clinging to conventions honoring those who perish before their time. The eleventh of February would have marked Jason’s fifth birthday. On that day, the public library in Carlisle received honorary donations of books. The JCPenney department store sponsored a ten-thousand-meter footrace to benefit a memorial fund. “Many of the children really don’t understand what’s happened to Jason,” the director of the YMCA’s Tiny Tot program sighed to the newspaper. 

    In March, Belinda squirmed in a front pew at a special Mass in St. Bonaventure’s Catholic Church, the Monterrosi family parish in Sharpsburg. After the Mass in Carlisle, Carmen’s father had asked to view the Chevette. Uncle Larry had escorted him to the lot in Hanover. Peering inside the crumpled vehicle and noting the absence of blood, he stood back and shook his head. How could Belinda have survived this? Carmen must have swerved at the last moment to save her life. Now she listened to the priest in Sharpsburg repeat the lie and pronounce Carmen a martyr.

    God had sacrificed Carmen for our sins, the priest intoned, just as God had sacrificed his only son. She boiled at the lugubrious incantations. She was further inflamed when she learned that Carmen’s father had been buttonholing neighbors with word of his tragedy. He had not picked up the phone to reconcile with his son after the Thanksgiving betrayal. She regarded her father-in-law’s Passion Play as contemptible. 

    A practical question, even more delicate, remained between them. Would she please exhume the bodies, so that the Monterossis’ could rebury them in the Catholic cemetery in Sharpsburg? She refused. Obsessing over the bodies was pointless, immaterial.

    Their deaths were predestined. Their deaths were also illusory, the dismembered bodies of Carmen, Jason, and Nicholas insubstantial vessels for souls bound to shine again in the faces of new people. No miracle had spared her life. Her expiration date had not arrived. That was all. She had not fulfilled her purpose. God signaled as much to her on Christmas morning in her room at York Hospital, and then again that evening through the floor lamp at home. The medium feathered the metaphysical hole the Mexicans had torn in the Lutheran theodicy. The esoteric character of the claims befit the perverse extremity of the disaster. 

    The plan she had envisioned upon falling in love with Carmen at Slippery Rock College had come true. She had married him, taught special education for three years, earned her master’s degree, birthed two children, and returned to work. Yet God’s plan was always going to truncate hers two days before Christmas in the year nineteen seventy-nine. There was no need for her to blaspheme God or to repent her sin of hubris. The restoration of her trust in time on the astral continuum scabbed the wound. Her heart fundamentally unchanged, she cocked her ear for the quaking of her lost souls as they migrated to new bodies. To exit the liminal space she occupied, she simply needed a new plan.

    The story of Christmas on Red Hill streaked across the region’s newspapers and television stations for a few days. It marked the kind of senseless tragedy that elicited tears from Oprah Winfrey, the emotional young anchor at Baltimore’s WJZ-TV. The event cast a pall over whispered conversations at Adams County’s bridge clubs and church socials, hair salons and Sunday brunches, bringing the nightmare of the 1970s to a grim apotheosis. Throughout the decade of decline, amid the slaughter on the county’s roadways, hundreds of its young sons had trickled home from fighting in Vietnam, many of them privately shattered. The paramedics and firemen on Red Hill that evening counted among the veterans. 

    So did my father, a former U.S. Marine who witnessed and inflicted unspeakable carnage. In August 1971, the same month that Belinda and Carmen got married at St. Paul’s, my father returned from his trip halfway around the world a basket of nerves. His war demons chased him out of our family. He read about her disaster over the breakfast table in his childhood home in New Oxford, where my grandfather and grandmother tried without much success to rehabilitate his moral collapse.

    The story of Christmas on Red Hill brushed past my own life on the first Friday. I stood beside my mother inside our empty brick home in New Oxford looking through our double-paned front windows toward the street. A long car with a purple flag rolled toward the cemetery next door. “There goes the man who killed Belinda’s family,” my mother mused. They went to high school together.

    Belinda’s new plan entered my life seven months later. On the morning of July 19, 1980, I buttoned into a light blue tuxedo. Deposited at The Greenskeeper, the restaurant run by Uncle Larry and Aunt Linda, I shook hands with Buck and Sis, Sue Ann and Uncle Don. Reverend Glenn Ludwig greeted thirty-five guests on the lawn. He said the benediction, led the Lord’s Prayer, and pronounced my father and Belinda man and wife. I was nine. 

    Carmen’s mother and father had begged her to wait. But Belinda accepted his proposal less than three months after bumping into him, a protective cast still wrapped around her right forearm. She sold her townhouse in Carlisle and cut ties with her friends. In Abbottstown, a few miles from Hanover, she and my father built a new house atop a hill overlooking eleven acres. Reachable by gravel road, the isolated farmstead echoed with the sounds of barking dogs, tractor wheels crunching and grinding, deer hunters firing their rifles, and, overhead, an occasional medevac helicopter whisking a car crash victim to York Hospital.

    That first autumn, they planted seven hundred white pines along the meadow. The interior of their Yankee Barn-style house she festooned with images of child angels embroidered on pillows and cushions. One entire wall in the living room she plastered with photographs of Jason and Nicholas. At Christmas, she brought out her German smokers and placed them on the mantle, next to Santa Claus and his retinue of elves and fairies.

    The prestige of marriage restored her. The mood of the country brightened, inspired by a first lady who appealed to astrology and a president who signed the nation’s first drunk-driving legislation. “It’s morning again in America,” President Reagan intoned. Belinda gave birth to Adam eleven months after the wedding. A second son, Sheanon, arrived on her calendar eighteen months later. Adam and Sheanon bore my father’s eyes and my stepmother’s blond bangs. Visitors remarked on their uncanny resemblances to the children portrayed in the photographs. Adam and Jason and Sheanon and Nicholas even shared respective personality traits. In my half-brothers, Belinda saw the gleaming reincarnations of her deceased children.

    She soon stopped taking the long route between Abbottstown and Hanover. She went right over Red Hill. She returned to work in a special education classroom in New Oxford. She never visited the three graves in Carlisle. Instead, she participated in prayer chains and stoked the glow of her celestial faith. “I can’t tell you how many times in school,” she often remarked, “that I said to my aide at the end of the day, ‘I’ve got to check the calendar, it’s got to be a full moon.’ Because when full moons hit, it’s just pandemonium. The jails and hospitals fill up too.” She continued to consult mediums, now backed by my father’s sympathetic credulity. On the third anniversary of the collision, he opened his eyes and claimed to see an apparition of a little girl staring at him from their bedroom closet. He said she wore a white dressing gown. A medium in Hanover told Belinda the girl had been her daughter in a former life. “She’s right there with you now,” the medium exclaimed.

    Every twenty-third of December, Buck descended into the basement on McKinley Avenue and flipped through a file of newspaper clippings stored beneath his work bench. Sis venerated divine emanations. On vacation at the Jersey shore, she used to get up early with Jason and stroll along the surf. The summer before the collision, Jason had waded with delight toward a school of starfish he spied in the low tide. The summer after, a starfish washed up at Sis’ feet. She pinched it out of the silt and took it home.

    The sixth anniversary of the collision vindicated Belinda’s metaphysical conviction. She drove Adam home from his nursery school. “Mommy,” he blurted out from the back seat, “do you remember that time Jesus picked me up and put me in your arms?” A surge of exultation passed through her. She had repossessed the souls of Jason and Nicholas.

    The child in me esteemed Belinda’s healthy-minded resilience. I admired how she resisted the flattened identity of the trauma plot. After moving to the city and finding a second home in the language of modernity, however, I bucked the sentimental view of time and circumstance prevailing on my native ground. William James, the philosopher of the “multiverse,” would have recognized the old Americans of Adams County as believers in “the block universe.” In this psychic constitution, James wrote, “the frame of things is an absolute unit,” the horizon of novel possibility terminally recessive. After my fall into modernity’s self-consciousness, I realized that the block universe had enlisted me as an extra in a spiritual drama whose prewritten script floated above history’s nest of thorns, a netherworld in which “all time is simultaneously present,” as James wrote. 

    To my father, Belinda’s tragedy must have felt more authentic than his own. To me, the magic circle they improvised came to seem like a mutual confidence trick, a bathetic move from the sublime to the fantastic that divorced time from history and bore no more reality than the masquerade of men who converge in nearby Gettysburg every July to reenact battle scenes of mass death. “It is what it is,” my father often avowed, burying the elements of volition and chance in quicksand triggered by my questions. Death arrived, he said, “when your number comes up.” About the deaths of children in Vietnam, the precipitating cause of his crackup, he never opined. Yet the shame that he tried to sublimate in Belinda’s story erupted in beastly rages. A sentence in W.G. Sebald’s The Natural History of Destruction articulated a fragile suspicion that I eventually embraced as my own. “I had grown up,” Sebald wrote, “with the feeling that something was being kept from me: at home, at school, and by the German writers whose books I read hoping to glean information about the monstrous events in the background of my own life.”

    Thirty-five years after Christmas on Red Hill, after my father’s “number came up,” I drove to the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Gettysburg to reintroduce myself to Reverend Glenn Ludwig. A boyhood spell of brooding over souls and demons had broken during an adolescence spent crossing and recrossing my restless legs in the pews. The clangor of church bells now fallen silent, my rabbit’s foot discarded, my fear of ghosts banished, I was left to reckon with the poetic fictions that opened up the abyss in my life. I saw a father and stepmother who swaddled the past in blindfolds and hallucinated the forwarding hand of spirits. Maybe a conversation with Reverend Ludwig could jog loose some piece of the origin story I sought.

    The aftermath of the collision came back to him vividly. At the Mass in Carlisle, he said, he had nearly lost his composure while standing over the two tiny white caskets on their trestles. He recalled several visits to McKinley Avenue. I asked if he had not fretted then over the medium who operated out of the anteroom of St. Paul’s. According to Deuteronomy 18: 10–11, “There shall not be found among you anyone who practices divination, a soothsayer, or an augur, or a sorcerer, or a charmer or a medium, or a wizard or a necromancer.” Satan could have been impersonating Carmen, Jason, and Nicholas during the séance. Reincarnation, I further observed, contradicted the church’s core doctrine of resurrection. 

    Reverend Ludwig was nonplussed. Reincarnation could stand as a parallel belief, he averred, a consolation that did not preclude resurrection so long as one did not push the theology too far. As he knew, the German Lutherans inhabiting Adams County did not care to be pushed. He had walked with Belinda through her valley of dry bones. He had assured her that Carmen, Jason, and Nicholas went to heaven. He had not risked tut-tutting over canonical doctrine. In a crisis, the congregants of St. Paul’s called on him for the purpose of saying as little as necessary. A verbose intercession over theological scruples would offend their stoicism, embarrass their rural modesty.

    We discussed the spiritual bricolage in Grimms’ Fairy Tales, the timeless tales that my grandmother read to me at bedtime. They illustrated how salvation by faith, requiring no miracle of grace, invited Lutherans to turn to paganism for aesthetic solutions to existential anguish. The German tradesmen, artisans, and yeoman farmers who had settled the area carried pagan mysticism out of the Black Forest and into the Pennsylvania wilderness. “The Juniper Tree,” one of the fairy tales set down by the brothers Grimm, even told the grisly tale of a decapitated young boy’s metamorphosis to a reincarnated soul. 

    I asked Reverend Ludwig about the premarital counseling that he conducted for Belinda and my father. Had he asked my father about his spiritual hangover from Vietnam? No, the reverend answered, he knew better than to broach the topic. His own father had left his faith at the Battle of Tarawa, one of the most horrific of World War II, and had returned home cold and distant. He never spoke about the war and scorned his son’s entry into the ministry.

    As I departed, Reverend Ludwig mentioned a piece of news that gave me pause. The campus where we sat, the oldest Lutheran seminary in America, was scheduled to close permanently. I wondered to myself whether the church’s doctrinal reticence had not been a mistake. As Marylanders poured northward to escape their state’s income tax, Lutherans now counted half as many worshippers as Catholics in twice their number of congregations.

    A final facet of December 23, 1979, nagged at me. All these years, the voices on the other side of Red Hill had remained mute. Belinda had often recounted the collision. The three strangers in the Mercury, however, she had let go, never inquiring about their identities or circumstances. Their foreignness had added social disgrace to her injuries. A respectable white Christian family snuffed out by three Mexicans was mortifying. She repeated just one symbolic detail. The men, she said erroneously, had ridden in a Cadillac.

    My investigation suggested that Armando Merino, the agent of the atrocity, had left little trace in the vicinity. The Hanover police had once picked him up for disorderly conduct. A marriage certificate dated three months before the collision was signed by a justice of the peace. Merino’s father, according to the certificate, worked as a foreman in Guanajuato, Mexico, his own birthplace. The white woman who had appeared at his funeral must have been his betrothed, a local woman named Mary Ann Danner. Her mother was born in Germany. Mother and daughter worked side by side in a sewing factory in Hanover. Mary Ann’s cursive filled every part of the marriage application. Merino signed his name in block lettering. 

    I stopped by Feiser Funeral Home with my information and learned the name of the minister who had conducted Merino’s service. I took the turnpike into the apple orchards and turned onto a side road toward the Assembly of Pentecostal Church of Jesus. Pastor Hector Ramos said he often retold the story of the collision in his sermons. To this day, Ramos swore, he had never confronted an event so harrowing. He implored the migrants in his ministry to believe that Hispanics could become bank managers, lawyers, and doctors. “But when you hit the bottle, that changes everything,” he grimaced. “The bottle distorts all kinds of stuff. They just can’t get away from it.” Ramos himself, born in Puerto Rico, had nearly died from years of wanton consumption of beer, whisky, and vodka. When he met his wife, she introduced him to Jesus Christ. He converted from his Catholicism to her Pentecostalism and drank never more.

    I asked Pastor Ramos if he entertained beliefs in predestination or reincarnation. He smiled and clapped together a palmful of air. “The reasoning is beyond us,” he said. “Trust God. God is sovereign. He has the right to do as he pleases with us. There’s a lot of whys, but it’s all in God’s hands. Our minds, our doings, are usually based on something else. God doesn’t have love. He is love. So, we just have to trust. Trust God. He knows best.” But the deaths of children prompted the most dangerous theological problems. When I pressed him, he did not turn ruminative, like Reverend Ludwig. He turned rock-ribbed and invoked the Book of Job. 

    I thanked Pastor Ramos and drove to the cemetery in New Oxford, pausing before my old brick house to remember the moment I had stood inside with my mother, looked out the window, and stared at the hearse conveying “the man who killed Belinda’s family” to his final destination.

    I found headstones marking the graves of my father, grandfather, and grandmother above the banks of Conewago Creek. My search did not turn up Armando Merino’s plot. I knocked on the caretaker’s door. The temporary marker, he reported, was mowed over many years ago. Before me, nobody had asked about the spot. He directed me to a section where the bodies of such persons reposed in eternal anonymity. 

    I walked over and stood for awhile, gazing down at the grass. “Every moment is a window on all time,” Thomas Wolfe wrote in Look Homeward, Angel, channeling the sovereign spirit of Adams County. Yet Armando Merino never went home again, and my efforts to see past the palimpsest of memory were blocked by smudges and silences, the picture window between heaven and earth fated to remain opaque. Despite myself, I glanced skyward and wondered who possessed the man’s soul now.