Farewell to Greatness

    A few years before his death, Zbigniew Herbert, the prominent Polish poet, published a slim volume of nineteen poems titled Elegy for the Departure. Many of the poems had a clearly valedictory theme. The title poem, “Elegy for the Departure of Pen Ink and Lamp,” is particularly significant: it seems to announce the end of Herbert’s lifelong project as a poet. The poet bids farewell to three companions of his childhood that might have set him on his literary path: the pen, the “outlet of the critical mind, messenger of soothing knowledge;” the ink of “wise depths” smelling of “a gentle volcano / the call of the abyss;” and the oil lamp, “a bright allegory / a spirit stubbornly battling / the demons of gnosis,” yet also familiar with ”the surf of passions” and able to call up “landscapes of a savage city repeated in water.” 

    Elegy for the Departure was not Herbert’s last book. The poet had still eight more years of life and three more poetic volumes ahead of him, but he was already very ill, tired, and aware that his best days were behind him. What he was bidding farewell — apologetically, as if the departure was his fault — in these three objects was both his turbulent life and his poetry based on the struggle of reason and light against the “demons of gnosis” and the “gentle volcano” of existential mystery. It was not a gentle farewell. The last line sounds like a door slammed shut in anger: “and / it will be / dark.”

    Reading this poem again thirty years later, I cannot resist the feeling it is also a farewell to a whole poetic epoch, or to a certain type of poetry that had prevailed in Eastern Central Europe in the postwar decades, especially after the relative relaxation of the political and aesthetic strictures of Communism around 1956. It was as if the poet felt that after his departure, and the departure of several members of his generation, no one is going to write like them. He expected a literary extinction.

    This is exactly what happened. The young Polish poets of the 1990s, those born in or around the 1960s, loudly foreswore the legacy of the giants of the previous generations. And a similar revolution was taking place in practically all the countries of the now post-Communist region. This was not surprising, considering the immensity of social and cultural change that occurred with the end of the Communist regime. But what was the era that had so spectacularly ended with the victory of the dreams of all the postwar generations? Did it have to end? And was it replaced with anything that promises equally lasting value?

    The first of these questions may be the most important and also the most difficult to answer. In the postwar decades the poetic scene was dominated by a handful of great names scattered throughout the region subjugated by the Soviet Union after the Second World War: Czesław Miłosz, Zbigniew Herbert, Tadeusz Różewicz, Wisława Szymborska, and Adam Zagajewski in Poland; Vladimír Holan and Miroslav Holub in Czechoslovakia; János Pilinszky in Hungary; Vasko Popa and Ivan Lalić in Yugoslavia. The list may be longer, but it is certainly not shorter.

    What, if anything, links all those poets? For a start, they shared a tragic time and tragic circumstances. Most of them were born in the 1920s. They were teenagers when the war broke out and young adults when it ended. There were the older ones, like Miłosz or Holan, who started writing and even gained prominence before the war, and younger ones, born after the war, such as Adam Zagajewski. But most of them grew up during the Nazi atrocities, sometimes as members of the resistance and sometimes as helpless witnesses. After the war, they faced the momentous political disruption in the form of the Soviet Communist takeover. Some of them, such as Herbert, met it with inner resistance, some with hope, or resignation, or even, like Szymborska, with enthusiasm.

    In every case, however, the political and social transformation must have been a moral and psychological jolt. Those who were favorably disposed towards the new order were usually quickly disappointed, leading some of them to open opposition, but more often to poetic resistance against the ideological and aesthetic vulgarity that surrounded them. During the years of the strict and forcefully imposed doctrine of socialist realism, they were often reprimanded and sometimes silenced by the monitors of official culture for their pessimism or alleged obscurity. With very few exceptions they staunchly refused to write “for the masses” in the prescribed propagandistic mode. In many cases, their true poetic debuts took place in or around 1956.

    Many of these poets knew and respected each other, met or corresponded, formed friendships or practical alliances, and generally felt a bond of fraternity, a certain “genetic attraction” to each other. They constituted what is called a “biographical” literary generation linked by a set of historical facts and private experiences that defined their lives. It would be hard, however, to call them a literary school, or group, or movement. In the strictly literary sense, there are few similarities and much diversity among their particular poetic idioms. At first glance, what can link Miłosz’s elegantly versed declarations, meditations, and “treatises” on poetry, philosophy, and theology with Popa’s rich, oneiric, near-surreal imagery, or with Różewicz’s stripped-down, unfigurative, deliberately un-poetic style, or Herbert’s ironic anecdotes, and perfectly balanced “classical” lines with the texture of ancient marble, or with Holub’s tongue-in-cheek philosophizing and free use of scientific language, or with Pilinszky’s prison-camp tableaus, where realistic description flows into a set of metonymies so accurate that one can easily take them for plain speech? (Upturned faces of hungry prisoners pulling a heavy cart seem “strained for a scent / of the far-off celestial trough.”) Is it possible to talk about all those very different poets as a common literary phenomenon?

    When, in the 1960s, the works of these poets were discovered in the West, mainly in the English-speaking world, among others by Ted Hughes and the poet and translator Daniel Weissbort, the editors of Modern Poetry in Translation, or by the British critic Al Alvarez, the editor of Penguin’s Modern European Poetry series, and a bit later by Seamus Heaney and the Irish poets from the North, it was soon noted that the voices from East Central Europe were similar in that they were quite different from what was happening at that time in the English language. “This poetry is more universal than ours,” declared Hughes in a letter to Weissbort. It was more “insistent,” and could “stimulate poetry-making in this country.” In his introduction to a selection of Pilinszky’s poems, Hughes mentions the Hungarian’s “simple, unambiguous, direct” language, but also notes something reaching beyond poetic style. “Critical judgment cannot rest in the aesthetic excellence of his work: it inevitably ends up arguing the ethical-religious position of Pilinszky himself.” Speaking about Holub, the poet Andrew Motion observed that poets from the East managed to express in language “the great humanitarian breakdown, including the breakdown of language, that occurred in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century.” The Northern Irish poet Tom Paulin saw in Holub’s poetry “the art of a prison-camp society, of a closed world where poetry is written without hope but with an obstinate integrity that negates as it creates.” Donald Davie, the indefatigable campaigner for “purity of diction” in English verse, observed that the experience of living under oppressive regimes confirmed those poets “in their values, in the value of the poetic act, in the act of the imagination.” In the United States this poetry was greeted especially by poets like Anthony Hecht, W.S. Merwin, Philip Levine, Robert Hass, Edward Hirsch, and Charles Simic, who positioned themselves outside the then dominant “schools” of American verse: the confessionalism of Berryman and Lowell, the programmatic mundanity of the New York School, and the loud strident protest of the Beats. 

    It was evident that the voices from East Central Europe possessed a form of grandeur and dignity that seemed to have been banished from postwar English language poetry. They could combine dispassion with urgency and pathos, irony with seriousness and conviction. They showed that modern poetry was still able to talk about great subjects without sounding quaint and pretentious, and could engage critically with reality in a calm, deliberate, and rigorous way.

    Perhaps the most complete analysis of what separated Eastern Central European poets from their English-language colleagues can be found in Seamus Heaney’s book of essays The Government of the Tongue, in which he pays tribute to Miłosz, Herbert, and Holub. He noted that this poetry ran contrary to many “orthodox assumptions” of the poetic practice of the time. It eschewed “inwardness,” and “cadences that drink at the spot of time.” It was full of “aerated adjectives” and great abstract words. Through its “laconic accuracies” this verse laid bare “the shape of relationships, politics, history; the rhythms of affection and disaffection; the ebb and flow of faith, hope, violence, art.” It was analytic rather than sympathetic. It “aspired to deliver what we had once long ago been assured it was not any poem’s business to deliver: a message.” Most of all it reminded the Irish poet that all the “things forbidden within an old dispensation” pointed towards the very origins, the mystical source of poetic expression. Can it be, wrote Heaney, that “the shortest way to Whitby, the monastery where Caedmon sang the first Anglo-Saxon verses, is via Warsaw or Prague?”

    The Eastern European, or, more specifically, the Central European “wave,” did leave some rather direct traces in the English language poetry of the time. Critics noted Pilinszky’s and Holub’s influence on Hughes’ “Crow” cycle. According to Paulin, he and other Northern Irish poets discovered in their Eastern colleagues a shared “invisible reference” to “the idea of being dominated by a foreign power.” The chilling sequence “Legion” by the English “minimalist” David Harsent, a disturbing account of an anonymous, seemingly endless war, sounds sometimes like Pilinszky’s realism and sometimes like Herbert’s mythical allegory. Sometimes the influence took the form of direct borrowings or paraphrases: Ken Smith’s “Cogito at the British Museum” not only borrows Zbigniew Herbert’s poetic persona (“Mr. Cogito”) but also the Polish poet’s unique ironic-reflective style. The English-language poet perhaps the closest to the mood of Eastern Central European poetry was Geoffrey Hill, the author of “Ovid in the Third Reich” and “Two Formal Elegies for the Jews of Europe,” who acknowledged the influence in his “Triumph of Love” sequence. It can be seen also in English-language poetic works that addressed the Holocaust and Nazi atrocities, such as Anthony Hecht’s dispassionate yet horrifying poem “More Light! More Light!” (It contrasts favorably with Hughes’ similar attempt in “Lines about Elias,” where music played by prisoners before they are marched to gas chambers rather absurdly transports and unites the inmates and their guards, making them “Innocent all equally / Innocent equally and defenseless.”)

    Those various homages hardly arrange themselves in a coherent definition of Eastern Central European poetry and its uniqueness in the eyes of Western poets and critics, but they touch upon some important characteristics responsible for its appeal in their own countries and abroad. What strikes the reader first is a similar approach to language, which is often an indicator of a larger poetic philosophy. This approach can be defined as restorative and protective rather than innovative and disruptive. It is visible in the predominantly straightforward, clear, and direct diction — neither lofty nor pedestrian, free of grammatical disjunctions, phraseological idiosyncrasies, and semantic games. It was what Eliot called “The common word exact without vulgarity, / The formal word precise but not pedantic.” The choice of this idiom was as much ethical as aesthetic. In his “Dedication,” addressed to those who did not survive, Miłosz pledges to use “simple speech as I would be ashamed of another.” “I speak to you with silence like a cloud or a tree,” he continued.

    It was during the war that poetry of the region started to turn away from its dominant French — that is, symbolist and surrealist — influences and towards a more reflective Anglo-Saxon brand of modernism. “The symbolists discovered the idea of a poem as an autonomous, self-sufficient unit, no longer describing the world but existing instead of the world,” wrote Miłosz, the translator of Eliot’s “The Waste Land.” According to Miłosz, poetry’s raison d’etre rests “somewhere outside poetry itself — in the spiritual and interhuman domain.” Not everybody would go as far as Miłosz, who linked the symbolists’ linguistic license to the “sack of cities,” and found a connection between “theories of literature as écriture and the growth of the totalitarian state.” But many would agree with Miłosz that such poetries were “not prepared to cope with those catastrophes.” Even those who were ardent symbolists in the interwar period, such as the Czech poet Miroslav Holan, felt the inadequacy. “How to live? How to be simple and literal?” he asked in a poem titled “How?” After what happened, could reality be disregarded as an obstacle to a free play of individual imagination? (There were such attempts in the post-war poetry of the region, and they were treated as politically innocuous, and with a good measure of forbearance by cultural bureaucrats, but the great poets of the time would have nothing to do with them.)

    Language had fallen victim to power as much as people and cities. It was now to abandon its flights of fancy and come down to earth. It could no longer pretend to be a separate, self-sufficient universe parallel to and competing with reality. It suffered immensely at the hands of ideologues and propagandists and should be healed rather than experimented upon. It was also faced with the challenge of expressing the inexpressibility of violence, and in order to be even marginally suitable for this task it should undergo, to use Paul Celan’s words, the purification of “terrible silence.” This was one of this poetry’s main goals.

    Another often noted characteristic, obviously linked to the directness of language, was its preoccupation with the objective, the demonstrable, the empirical. It can be argued that all poetry is the expression of the subjective, of the poet’s self. Where else can a true poem germinate, unless it is a stylistic exercise or a work on assignment? But in this poetry we see a constant effort to objectify the subjective, to give it an impersonal character, to turn it (in Herbert’s words) “into a person or a thing,” something located safely outside the self, with clearly delimited borders, that can be regarded from a distance and analyzed with a degree of cool detachment. Hence the frequent fascination with, even envy of, inanimate objects, perfect essences, never alive and therefore immortal, with no business whatsoever with the vagaries of human existence. The motif of a conversation with a stone can be found in Herbert, Popa, and Szymborska. Herbert’s pebble appears as “a perfect creature / equal to itself / mindful of its limits / filled exactly / with a pebbly meaning.” Popa’s stone-hero of the cycle “The Quartz Pebble” “listens to itself / Among the worlds a world.” Szymborska’s arrogant stone refuses to open his door: “You may get to know me but you’ll never know me through. / My whole surface is turned toward you, / all my insides turned away.”

    Objects often rebuke people but their presence, their inviolable sameness, is also a source of reassurance, a strategy of perseverance. For Herbert, objectivization of our volatile, paradoxical existence into “a person or a thing,” locking it in a sculpture, a piece of architecture, or a myth is the very essence of culture, a source of aesthetic delight but also a strategy of survival. And in his introduction to Vasko Popa’s collection Homage to the Lame Wolf, the American poet (and Popa’s translator) Charles Simic writes: “One might be reading Euclid on the triangle here. He is so deadpan. The usual drama of the self is completely absent. The archetypal forms that emerge are employed for cognitive ends. Popa meditates on myth. He talks to it, and it talks back.” It is probably owing to this “deadpan” objectivity among the greats of Eastern Central Europe that whenever the poetic “I” appears we are often forced to ask who it is, who is actually speaking. The tone makes us suspect a persona, whether or not openly introduced, like Herbert’s Mr. Cogito, which puts a distance (but what distance?) between itself and the poet’s voice. What is more, persona, even in the singular, often sounds like a voice of a collectivity: a chorus, a generation, a nation, or maybe, as in Herbert’s “Envoy of Mr. Cogito,” the whole civilization. Quite definitely not Herbert’s “small broken soul with a great self-pity.”

    And there is still another seminal paradox. Having assumed the immense burden of speaking in the name of many, this poetry is constantly skeptical about its expressive powers. It dwells in the shadow of Adorno’s famous warning that writing poetry after Auschwitz would be “barbaric.” It answers that after Auschwitz it would be barbaric not to write poetry, but it must be a very different poetry, stripped of all “poetic” trappings, it would have to be poor poetry, an anti-poetry using non-poetic tools and sources: hard, unsentimental, clear-sighted, and relentless, responding to existential rather than esthetic needs. “You are asked again and again why you write poems. To find out why you are alive — that is why you write poems,” declared Popa. 

    The poet who went furthest in this direction was Tadeusz Różewicz. It is said that he read his poems in a monotonous, almost apathetic tone, as if reading from a newspaper. “I regard my own poems with acute mistrust,” he said in an interview. “I fashion them from the great rubbish dump, the great cemetery.” Michael Hamburger observed that Różewicz and other poets of his generation “have made themselves at home in the silence.” “Should someone ask, what, after all, is my poetic language,” said Pilinszky, “in truth I should have to answer: it is some sort of lack of language, a sort of linguistic poverty. . . . I would like to write as if I had remained silent.” Silence is a frequent trope in Holub’s poetry, as in the poem “The Lesson” where it is “cutting like a knife” through the drone of voices from the loudspeakers.

    Silence and understatement come to the rescue of constantly threatened language. Was it a political stratagem, a way to avoid censorship and let the readers fill in the gaps? Perhaps, but such evasions were not to the detriment of the poetry itself. Also, although born out of a certain political situation, it was not, by and large, political poetry, although it was often presented as such. When read today, even poets who were publicly engaged as citizens, such as Herbert and Holan and Holub, seem to be preoccupied with ethical and metaphysical problems rather than pointless squabbles with the regime.

    It is true that almost all of them, from time to time, were tempted to write something that sounded like political satire or an Aesopian comment on current events. Herbert, with his mythical allusions, comes to mind, as does Zagajewski in the early stage of his career when he was a member (with Stanisław Barańczak, Julian Kornhauser, and Ryszard Krynicki) of the poetic group called the New Wave, advocating for a more direct involvement of poetry with the social and political “here and now.” These were usually not their best productions, although they were adored by their readers and passed around like Masonic handshakes. In my youth it was habitual to look for contemporary political innuendos almost everywhere. Al Alvarez called it the favorite Polish game of “Find-the-Allusion.” (The proclivity was unfortunately shared also by censors, who often suppressed quite innocent poems in case they were “wrongly” understood.) For the most part, however, poetry aimed much higher than just sticking it to the regime, and Zagajawski openly repudiated those efforts in his extraordinary essay “Solidarity and Solitude.”

    Yet the shadow of history, both the memory of the war and the reality of Communist strictures, was always reflected in their writing. They were poets of ruins, of a disintegrated and debased world, of broken human relations, philosophical confusions, and moral uncertainties. In that, they resembled the moderns of the Eliot generation, except that they were moderns whose anxieties and dark premonitions had been most cruelly actualized. Their wastelands and their hollow men were not metaphors. They were part of the physical reality that surrounded them. Where the great moderns of the past suffered from ennui, alienation, and the indefiniteness of their lives, the postwar moderns from the East saw terror, dehumanization, moral collapse, and ever-present threat. Eliot’s protagonists dwelled in Limbo, “without infamy or praise.” His East-Central followers saw man descend into the lower rings of Hell. Their world ended both in a bang and a whimper.

    The older moderns believed that they had reached an end, but the question of what comes next, though disturbing, could still be thrilling. It posed an intriguing aesthetic challenge, the task of inventing new styles and literary forms to express it all. The East Central Europeans knew that what comes next may be annihilation. For them, searching for the right word was a moral rather than an aesthetic task, the expression of their need to find a path among Różewicz’s “great rubbish dump, the great cemetery.” This is, perhaps, how we should understand Popa’s dictum about writing in order to know why one still lives.

    Yet the great poets never succumbed to total despair, or its smirking nihilistic twin called “postmodern irony.” Even the writing of Tadeusz Różewicz, who in his early poetry seems to abandon all hope, is an unending quest to prove himself wrong. Herbert, by contrast, temperamentally an enemy of pessimism, stubbornly invoked “the old incantations of humanity,” which do not promise victory but at least keep the human person from dissolution. Miłosz finds nourishment and hope in his repeated returns to his “native realm” in pre-modern Lithuania and tries to restore the human universe that had been destroyed, in his view, by the “scientific outlook,” while Holub’s sharp scientific eye takes apart facts and events and then puts them back together to prove that objective truths can be extracted from the sea of doubt and confusion. And Popa peruses cryptic Balkan yarns and fables in an effort to find the source of what he calls “word-keys” that give the human soul a fighting chance “when the very existence of this tiny, fertile star — whose shine should be mankind itself — is in question.”

    This poetry was never far from the last things, even when it spoke from agnostic or atheistic positions, never far from the human drama even when speaking about stones, wooden cubes, onions, or, like Holub, about “ugly, grunting creatures” of the microbial world. And even at the most apolitical, it was never far from history, because, as my poet-friend Michael March helpfully suggests, it often originated as “civilized resistance to circumstances.” It spoke with urgency, as if what it had to say was of real and general importance. It was concerned with ideas, sometimes expressed directly but more often through a particular blend of thought and feeling, not unlike in Eliot’s definition of the metaphysical poets of sixteenth-century England. It was poetry of unmistakable grandeur and power, though often wry and self-ironic. 

    Is it possible to sum it up in a neat phrase that would gather it all? Was it a poetry of “ardor,” to borrow Zagajewski’s term from one of his essays, or a “wisdom project,” from Susan Sontag’s essay on Zagajewski? Or, to use the German theologian Paul Tillich’s term, was it a “concern about being?” (For Tillich, those who deemed being — their own, everybody else’s, and Being in general — as worthy of concern were already on the side of faith, even if they defined themselves as atheists.) Or was it — in the awkward, unscholarly term — a poetry of greatness? Greatness is something quite different from “excellence,” which is akin to what Eliot called “word mastery,” a virtuosity that in his view can push out everything else, especially insight into the human soul. (He used Dryden and Milton as cautionary examples, although Milton at least got Satan’s soul right.) An excellent poet can excel in anything he or she endeavors — grand or trivial, true or conceited, wise or silly — and leave us in awe of his or her craft. Poetic greatness, on the other hand, is entirely a matter of soul.

    Excellence can be described and analyzed with the ever-expanding toolbox of supposedly precise academic terms and definitions to show how a poem “works.” It can be evaluated according to various, often conflicting, critical approaches. Greatness is much more mysterious, elusive, difficult to grasp; but given the right sensitivity, it is usually unmistakable even to the uninitiated. It is about a largeness of vision that includes and unifies all strata of human experience — from the empirical to the intellectual, from the individual to the collective, from the historical to the ethical and the metaphysical. Greatness properly understood is not, as Hughes rightly observed about Pilinszky, an exclusively aesthetic phenomenon. A great poem is more than a verbal construct of considerable beauty and complexity. It stands with one foot outside its own text. It requires the encounter of a poet and a reader who are both interested in more than poetry.

    The three long decades between 1956 and the late 1980s were definitely the era of poetic greatness in East Central Europe. Then, abruptly, a reaction came. The young poets, born in the 1960s, proclaimed that they were sick and tired of this sort of greatness. They wanted a clear break from it, and from their venerated elders. A Polish poet of this generation, Andrzej Sosnowski, born in 1959, declared in his programmatic poem “What is poetry?”:

    Certainly not a strategy of survival,
    or a way of life. Your insistence is droll
    when you invoke mystic lakes,
    rustling forests or abysmal caves where voice
    can echo forever. The caves
    of Sybil?

    He might have been addressing Miłosz (“What is poetry which does not save / Nations or people . . .”) or Herbert, or maybe one of their younger followers, such as Zagajewski. For Sosnowski, such salvific ambitions are “droll.” What really matters, he continued, were little stones you can play ducks and drakes with. A tiny room in a tenement house can be more interesting than a magical cave. This is what our world is made of — small everyday facts, common objects waiting until the draft of poetry picks them up and scatters them “like confetti.”

    It was a rather elegant sendoff, and one that ended on a consolatory note. The young poet asks his exalted colleague not to leave in offense, to stick around and listen, because the new poetry of leaves and stones may also carry a grain of knowledge, may “suddenly say / about peoples and wars, struggles and sea voyages / about how things are and how the business goes.” There were, however, much more violent attacks. A Polish critic found it necessary to declare the formation of the League to Defend Polish Poetry from Herbert. “The poetry of slaves feeds on ideas, / Ideas are watery substitutes of blood,” inveighed Maciej Świetlicki, one of the young poets, mocking poetry where “even trees have crosses / — inside under their bark — made of barbed wire. . . .” Even older poets who chose, or were chosen, to be the mentors of the young rebels, added their quotient of invectives. “Words huge like beans and as hard to swallow,” said one of them in a poem. This poetry was “not beautiful, but suddenly all reach for their hands / And clap, so it must be right.” (Piotr Sommer, “Liberation in language.”) And another one (Bohdan Zadura), known for subtle lyricism and formal refinement, fulminated in a prose diatribe (possibly ironic, but I cannot be sure) about “toothless gums of empty rhetoric,” and the “vanity and shittyness” of “the old and infirm, and only youth is allowed to be vain.”

    Hardly anybody tried to be fair, thoughtful, or to use the standard language of literary criticism. It was mortal combat and the point was to hit, and hit hard, no matter where. Most of the assaults were based on crass misreadings or directed against straw men with little resemblance to the alleged targets. The attacked poets hardly used “words large like beans,” or pretentious symbols like “crosses made of barbed wire.” But the characteristics that so enraged the poetic newcomers were the perceived loftiness, abstraction, intellectualism, didacticism, and ethical rigor (Herbert’s “yes, yes, no, no”). They were calling into question the very aspiration to poetic greatness.

    The clash was most raucous in Poland, but similar battles were taking place throughout the region. What was supposed to replace the poetry of great subjects and high concerns? Everything that was its direct opposition. The new poetic idiom had to be down to earth, open to chaos, to the contingency and the banality of daily existence. It should be personal, even autobiographical, focused on details and eschewing abstractions and grand ideas. Its language should step down to the level of street talk, common speech as practiced by the young generation, including vulgarities and slang. It should constantly remind the reader of its awkwardness as a tool of serious communication. The poet should address the reader as an equal, that is, as someone equally confused, bored, or annoyed by “all that.” High cultural references — those eternal myths and timeless masterpieces — should be replaced by mass culture tropes. Poetry should accept its inevitably marginal status, something to be enjoyed in a close circle of friends rather than on a national stage. In sum, it was a general lowering of poetic register and narrowing of the range of interest to things observed “outside the window.”

    The change began a few years before the miraculous year 1989, in the gloomy and uncertain time, anxious and lethargic, when it was obvious that Communism was finished but it was by no means clear what was going to replace it. When the breakthrough finally came, the intoxication with new freedom quickly gave way to disappointment. The post-communist countries did not turn overnight into mature and stable liberal democracies. Where the older generation saw a lot of unfinished work, the young ones noticed vulgarity, emptiness, primitive consumerism, economic uncertainty, frenetic money chasing, and rapid commercialization of culture. That was their world. The older poets kept writing, but it seemed that they completely overlooked these realities and talked above the heads of the crowds that not long ago listened to them in rapture.

    One of the reasons for the pique of the younger generation might have also been the extremely elevated, almost prophetic status that the great few enjoyed in the post-war decades. Especially, but not exclusively, in Poland, great poets were treated, often against their will, as moral arbiters, spiritual guides, guardians of their nation’s soul. They were asked to read in churches and at secret gatherings where the public eagerly “reached for their hands” to attest that this poetry was not only beautiful but also “right.” What passed for literary criticism of their work often amounted to blatant hagiography, while rare attempts at respectful critique were suspected of a nefarious political agenda. In other words, they were forced into the old Romantic role of “unacknowledged legislators of the world.” Inevitably, this kind of reception simplified and diminished their poetic message. During these mystery rites the devotees heard what they wanted to hear. The powerful echo drowned the original tune. Such spectacles could provoke jeers from the more skeptical in the audience. Was it time to blaspheme against the gods, to be naughty, and finally to break some things?

    Interestingly, the new generation of poets from Eastern Central Europe sought inspiration primarily among English-language poets — not among their contemporaries but those one or two generations older: the New York School, especially Frank O’Hara (in Poland, “Oharism” became a handy critical term); English “minimalists” (Tony Morrison, David Harsent) with their attentive, unadorned descriptions of everyday life; the “Liverpool poets” (Brian Patten), with their penchant for pop, humor, and performance; the British “New Fantasts” or “Martians” (Craig Raine) searching for strange and “denaturalizing” perspectives on familiar objects and situations; and also poets from Northern Ireland (Seamus Heaney, Paul Muldoon, Andrew Motion, Derek Mahon) cultivating, at least at that time, their provincialism and treating the political drama in their own realm with a tad of detachment. Some of those “influences” were merely imitations and unwilling parodies. In some cases, however, the young apprentices managed to turn them into a fresh, personal idiom. One of the Polish “Oharists,” Marcin Sendecki, can draw in few quick lines a brilliant image with a small intriguing point:

    Shadows glow from billboards. After
    Crossing the tracks the boy stops
    To rush the dog. Do not expect
    A miracle from a factual photo. This
    Is a chair. This is a table.

    Or,

    The dust seems lighter, the leaves
    Breathe: slowly, carefully.
    We made love and now we talk
    To each other. Bronze drops swell and
    Fade with every flap of the lids.

    Andrzej Sosnowski evolved into probably the most hermetic poet in his generation, fond of intertextual games and sudden surrealist riffs, as in this impression of a watch left on a beach:

    And moisture will be able to dream about a museum
    Wandering among springs and stones
    And steaming under a golden watchcase
    Till the end of the sea and time.

    The young rebels of the 1990s are now in their sixties. It is they who are now the leading generation in their countries. They gather awards named after their once-rejected elders. There are already younger ones, who try to add something new — references to the digital world, social media, cyber- and hyper-textual experiments — although they usually stay within the same zone of the quotidian, the domestic, the private, and within the same colloquial registers. Their gift of observation can be impressive. I have recently read — with pleasure — a poem by the Polish poet Sara Akram about a young “girl in golden sequins” vomiting and undressing in a metro station, while her amused companions take pictures and post them online. As Eliot said, “the possible interests of a poet are unlimited.”

    The question I hear sometimes, “So what is happening now in Central European poetry?” is simple to answer, but the answer is usually unsatisfactory. There is absolutely everything there: conceptual poetry, intertextual poetry, language poetry, surrealist poetry, lyrical poetry, confessional poetry, poetry about death (a lot of it), poetry of social criticism (mostly anti-consumerist), feminist poetry, queer poetry, and environmental poetry. But greatness, at least as I have tried to define it here, is nowhere to be found. The question that often follows, impatiently, “So who, in your view, are the three best poets writing today?” is not only impossible to answer, but somehow beyond the point. Critics have frequently noted that in the new poetic environment hierarchies got flattened. It is as if reaching too high, trying to be too different, was somehow undemocratic, or impolite towards one’s fellow poets. The field is full, even crowded, but at the same time it looks empty. Within their particular niches, poets sound strikingly similar to each other and similar to their contemporaries in other countries. It would be hard to distinguish a poem written today in Poland or the Czech Republic from one written in the United States, or Great Britain, or Germany. The poets of the region have finally joined the world and “softly and suddenly” vanished in it.

    An era has ended. All eras have to end. Perhaps this is exactly as it should be. After all, as Auden declared, “poetry makes nothing happen.” But few care to read on in Auden’s poem: poetry “survives, / A way of happening, a mouth.” Poetry does not change the world (for that we need real muscles and good politics), but it is a part of what happens, a way of seeing the world and articulating it. So we must ask ourselves some more questions. Have we really put all the “great narratives” of humanity behind us? Is it not obvious that, for all the astonishing transformations of our time, the world has not completely changed? Are we not living again in times when (to stay with Auden’s “In Memory of W. B. Yeats”) “intellectual disgrace / Stares from every human face?”

    History teaches us that poetry does not remain for long satisfied with marginality and dispersion. Is it not the pursuit of greatness that kept this strange, some say unnatural, art alive as “a part of what happens” for millennia? True, much of its intensity comes from the intensity of its times, from the often terrifying historical drama within which it is composed, and no one should wish for more historical tragedy, for another bout of madness, to “hurt us into poetry.” But tragedies are never too far away. In fact they are happening right now, in Europe and elsewhere. It is possible that the stimulation that Hughes saw in Eastern Central European poets will come from parts even farther east. There is something happening in contemporary Ukrainian poetry, suddenly confronted with existential questions — individual and collective — that not too long ago seemed like the songs of the past. A Belarusian prose writer and poet, Alhierd Bacharevič, called his recent novel The Dogs of Europe. Yes, the same dogs that bark in Auden’s poem. We already hear them, too, but they sound louder in the darker peripheries. Their poetry, too, may prove “more universal than ours.”

    Thinking Thoughtlessly

    In The Gulag Archipelago, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn described the moment he realized that he did not really believe what he had always professed. It happened during a conversation with another zek, or prisoner, named Boris Gammerov, a “yellowish youth, with a Jewish tenderness of face.” After exchanging biographies they passed to politics. Gammerov “began to question me” in a peculiarly intense way new to Solzhenitsyn, who had always lived in a world where educated people agreed on fundamental issues. Recalling “one of the prayers of the late President Roosevelt,” he “expressed what seemed to me a self-evident evaluation of it: ‘Well, that’s hypocrisy, of course.’ ” To Solzhenitsyn’s surprise, Gammerov furiously countered: “Why do you not admit the possibility that a political leader might sincerely believe in God?”

    Solzhenitsyn could hardly believe that someone born and educated under Soviet rule could utter such words. He suddenly became aware that he was less than certain about what he had said — and about the system of thought that his remark presumed.

    I could have replied to him very firmly, but prison had already undermined my certainty, and the principal thing was that some kind of clear, pure feeling does live within us . . . and right then it dawned on me that I had not spoken out of conviction but because the idea had been implanted within me from the outside. And because of this I was unable to reply to him, and I merely asked him: “Do you believe in God?

    “Of course,” he answered tranquilly.

    “Implanted in me from the outside”: evidently there is more than one way to have convictions. They can be accepted and professed, quite sincerely, only because one has never doubted them. They can seem like an intrinsic part of oneself, even when they are not. They can be nothing more than the impact of an external influence, a contagion, a surrender to conformity. But authentic convictions, by contrast, derive from lived experience. One must have seriously examined, tested, and revised them, and be prepared to do so again.

    Beliefs “implanted from outside” are accepted passively, while authentic ones demand effort. If ideas are simply learned, the way one memorizes the kings of England, they remain inert. Their truth seems beyond question only because one has not questioned it. Authentic beliefs exhibit what Mikhail Bakhtin called “ones-ownness”; they are “inwardly persuasive” because we have worked on them. Having gone through a complex process of examination and assimilation, they have acquired our own unique tonalities, which are themselves always changing in response to outer and inner experience. “One’s own word,” Bakhtin observed, remains “unfinalized.” “Its creativity and productiveness,” he writes, “consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions.”

    Inwardly persuasive words often conflict with other inwardly persuasive words. They enter into dialogue with each other, they “struggle” and undergo change. Out of these inner dialogues we construct a self. Our point of view on the world develops “in just such an intense struggle within us . . . among various verbal and ideological points of view, approaches, directions, and values.” So long as one lives, these dialogues continue. Inwardly persuasive discourse is therefore “not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever new ways to mean.” Yet sometimes inwardly persuasive discourse begins to lose its persuasiveness. It begins to feel more than half “someone else’s,” or, in Solzhenitsyn’s words, “implanted from the outside.” Once one becomes conscious of a belief as “implanted,” one acquires a kind of double vision. With effort, one can still see the world in the old way, but can never wholly banish the way one really sees it.

    Communism posed questions about belief especially starkly, but the most profound Soviet thinkers consciously developed insights from Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and other great pre-revolutionary Russian writers. One could almost say that the central question of Russian literature for the past two centuries has been: what does it mean to believe something? That question leads to several others. How can it be that one believes what one does not really believe? What process leads us to accept inauthentic beliefs?

    In his autobiography Child of the Revolution, Wolfgang Leonhard — with whom I studied Soviet history as an undergraduate at Yale — described how, as a young German refugee growing up in the USSR, he was delighted to be admitted to the Komsomol even though his mother, friends, and teachers had not long before been arrested. “Somehow I dissociated these things, and even my personal impressions and experiences, from my fundamental political conviction. It was almost as if there were two separate levels — one of everyday experiences, which I found myself criticizing; the other of the great Party line, which at this time, despite my hesitations, I still regarded as correct, from the standpoint of general principle.” What exactly does Leonhard mean by “dissociating” these two realities? When (or if) one at last “associates” them again, what happens to one’s consciousness, to one’s self?

    Does contemporary America raise similar questions? One can hardly live in a university environment — or in some other professions, such as journalism — without being aware that one cannot say all one thinks, that students express political opinions that they know their teachers, neighbors, and parents expect, and that self-censorship is routine — not only of ideas but also of words, idioms, even grammatical forms that are hard to avoid without constant vigilance. I often wonder whether my colleagues really believe what they profess. If so, are their views accepted because they were “implanted from outside”?

    Writing about the nature of dialogue in the 1930s, Bakhtin clearly had in mind the emphatically non-dialogic Soviet view of beliefs. For the Soviets, the right answers to all important questions were known. Everything else was simply wrong. Any attempt at individuality, any departure from the “ready-made truth” accepted by the properly informed collective, amounted to a dangerous error.

    Socrates, Bakhtin stressed, proceeded from the opposite assumption — that the more certain we are about something, the less likely we are to have examined it closely. Theaetetus expresses delight at the unanswered questions that Socrates poses: “It is extraordinary how they set me wondering whatever they can mean. Sometimes I get quite dizzy with thinking of them.” Socrates replies: “The sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. Philosophy, indeed, has no other origin.” And wonder expresses itself in open-ended dialogue — for Bakhtin, that is why Plato chose the form — whereas certainty is expressed “monologically,” as categorical and indubitable propositions. The plot of Soviet socialist realist novels often centers on a well-intentioned young man who learns that not he, but the Party, possesses the truth, and so he must act not on his own initiative but at the Party’s direction. In Soviet terms, he must recognize that “consciousness” (that is, Party doctrine) is superior to “spontaneity.”

    Like Socrates, Konstantin Levin, the autobiographical protagonist of Anna Karenina, relentlessly pursues the truth, even when it indicates that he has behaved wrongly. We see him stop in mid-sentence to ask himself how he can profess some high-minded doctrine when he has behaved quite differently. Levin has trained himself to look for counter-evidence. Honesty, Tolstoy suggests, entails a lot more than not telling a conscious lie. It demands that one actively determine whether what one thinks or says is actually true.

    The last thing Levin would do is thoughtlessly adopt a “ready-made truth.” His friend Stiva, by contrast, favors fashionable beliefs no less than good taste in wine, cuisine, and conversation. Keeping up with the latest opinions, knowing what has just become passé and what has replaced it, becomes not only a mark of sophistication but also a delightful game that Stiva plays adroitly and with ease. The right opinions must seem to have come effortlessly — and, in Stiva’s case, they really do: Stiva “had not chosen his political opinions or his views; these political opinions and views had come to him of themselves, just as he did not choose the shapes of his hat and coat, but simply took those that were in style. And for him, living in a certain social environment, where a desire for some sort of mental activity was part of maturity, to hold views was just as indispensable as to have a hat.” Stiva, of course, reads

    a liberal paper, not an extreme one, but one advocating the views held by the majority [of his circle]. And in spite of the fact that science, art, and politics had no special interest for him, he firmly held those views on all these subjects which were held by the majority and by his paper, and changed them only when the majority changed them — or, more strictly speaking, they seemed to change of themselves within him.

    What does it mean to hold “firmly” beliefs one has not really considered? Clearly, it does not mean that those beliefs reflect one’s unique experience or train of thought. The “firmness” of Stiva’s opinions derives not from any serious attempt to examine the grounds for them, but from his life among a certain social class. So far as evidence is concerned, these opinions might just as well have been quite different. And they do, in fact, become different over time, not because Stiva has changed them — no agency is involved — but because they “change of themselves within him.” In sum, Stiva thinks thoughtlessly.

    If one chooses beliefs for their truthfulness, which one takes pains to verify, then one is bound to amend them as the evidence warrants. They will not always coincide with those of the “majority.” That is what Levin does, as we see the moment he begins to converse with Stiva. “Aha! You are in a new phase, I see — a conservative,” Stiva remarks with his “scarcely perceptible smile.” As the novel progresses, we see Levin change his mind about several questions, especially the one that most concerns him: how can one make Russian agriculture more productive and so improve the wretched life of the peasants? Levin has tried the method favored by up-to-date thinkers: copy what the English do. Since well-educated liberals routinely — almost instinctively — treated imitating the West as the answer to every problem, their recommendations for agricultural productivity required no special knowledge of how farming actually works. But painful experience, and an empirical frame of mind, has taught Levin that copying Western methods never improves and sometimes actually harms productivity. Import an expensive English threshing machine and somehow it always breaks. Levin’s English seed oats have unfortunately been, in his bailiff’s understated phrase, “a little scorched.” For reasons no one can specify, the peasants seem unable to follow new practices.

    These problems are foremost on Levin’s mind when he visits his friend Sviazhsky. Tolstoy focuses primarily not on what but on how Sviazhsky believes. Levin is puzzled that Sviazhsky can sincerely profess liberal principles contradicted by his own conservative way of living. “Sviazhsky was one of those people, always a source of wonder to Levin, whose convictions, very logical though never original, go one way by themselves, while their life, exceedingly definite and firm in its direction, goes its way quite apart and always in direct contradiction to their convictions.” Although Sviazhsky “despised the nobility and regarded the government of Russia as so bad that he never permitted himself to criticize its doings seriously . . . he was a functionary of that government and a model marshal of the nobility, and when he drove about he always wore the cockade of office.” Like a good Westernizer, Sviazhsky “considered the Russian peasant as occupying a stage of development intermediate between ape and man,” yet no one was readier to shake hands with peasants “and listen to their opinions.” Believing “in neither God nor the devil,” Sviazhsky nevertheless “took special trouble to keep up the church in his village.” An extreme feminist advocating women’s right to labor, “he arranged his wife’s life so that she did nothing and could do nothing but share her husband’s efforts to make her time pass as happily and agreeably as possible.”

    Some might have dismissed Sviazhsky as a fool or a scoundrel, Tolstoy observes, but Levin knew that his friend was admirably intelligent and thoroughly decent. Regarding Sviazhsky as a “living enigma,” Levin wanted to “get at the foundation of his life,” but whenever he “tried to penetrate beyond the outer chambers of Sviazhsky’s mind . . . he noticed that Sviazhsky was slightly disconcerted; faint signs of alarm were visible in his eyes . . . and he would give him a kindly, good-humored rebuff.” What’s more, Sviazhsky takes an interest in matters of no relevance to his life or to his other intellectual concerns. Why does he care so much about new discoveries about the eighteenth-century partition of Poland, Levin wonders — but when he asks “‘Well, what then?,’ there was nothing to follow. It was simply interesting that it had been proved to be so and so. But Sviazhsky did not explain, and saw no need to explain why it was interesting to him.”

    Tolstoy suggests an explanation for some of these enigmas. What matters most to Sviazhsky is being a good host, welcoming and entertaining. His finely expressed liberal views, along with his interest in questions about which no one could feel strongly, make the time his guests spend with him admirably pleasant. His concern for peasants, noblemen, and clergy reflect his kind-heartedness. In a sense, Sviazhsky’s life and views do cohere, not because they are consistent with each other but because they all foster convivial entertainment. Though inauthentic, they make sense in the economy of Sviazhsky’s personality.

    To make his point unmistakably clear, Tolstoy portrays another of Sviazhsky’s guests, described simply as “a reactionary landowner” with whom Levin disagrees. Again, Tolstoy wants us to focus on how the landowner has arrived at his views:

    The landowner unmistakably spoke his own individual thought — a thing that rarely happens — and a thought to which he had been brought not by a desire of finding some exercise for an idle brain, but a thought which had grown up out of the conditions of his life, which he had brooded over in the solitude of his village, and had considered in every aspect.

    In his later works, Tolstoy portrays inauthentic thinkers much more harshly. Those whose beliefs and behaviors unthinkingly conform to ready-made norms — who aspire to be perfectly comme il faut — have surrendered their souls. They live “unconsciously.” “And if the whole complex lives of many people go on unconsciously,” Tolstoy recorded in his diary, “then such lives are as if they had never been.”

    That is the horrible discovery made by the eponymous hero of “The Death of Ivan Ilych” as he is dying. A “virtuoso” of conformity, Ivan Ilych has made his self coincide more and more completely with his social roles, in both his profession and private life. In law school, he was “already what he remained for the rest of his life: a capable, cheerful, good-natured, and sociable man, though strict in the fulfillment of what he considered to be his duty; and he considered his duty to be what was so considered by those in authority.” You could not call him a toady, Tolstoy acidly observes, because he cultivated people of authority without hypocrisy or premeditation, but “as a fly is drawn to the light, assimilating their view of life” completely. Like them, “he succumbed to sensuality . . . and latterly among the highest classes to liberalism.” When Ivan Ilych is promoted, he easily finds a new house that perfectly suits himself and his wife. “It might have been specially built for them.” Ivan Ilych chooses the wallpaper, furniture, and knickknacks according to his own taste, but because his taste conforms exactly to the prescribed pattern, the result “was just what is usually seen in the houses of people of moderate means who wish to appear rich, and therefore succeed only in resembling others like themselves.”

    When Ivan Ilych falls ill, however, he begins to discover his unique self. After all, his roles will continue when he is gone. They are immortal, but he will die. And that is especially dreadful because he has not really been alive. The sicker he gets, the more he suffers an unspeakable terror of death. “‘Maybe I did not live as I ought to have done,’ it suddenly occurred to him. ‘But how could that be, when I did everything properly?’ he replied and immediately dismissed from his mind this, the sole solution of all the riddles of life and death, as something quite impossible.”

    At last Ivan Ilych realizes that he lived not just “improperly,” but exactly contrary to the way he should have lived. What he deemed good was bad, and vice versa. In childhood, before he had lost his self to conformity, there was still real life. He recalls particularities: the smell of a striped leather ball and “the raw shriveled French plums of his childhood, their peculiar flavor, and the flow of saliva when he sucked their stones; and along with the memory of that taste came a whole series of memories of those days.” In short, “the further back he looked the more life there had been,” but the closer he came to the present real life disappeared ever more rapidly, “in inverse ratio to the square of the distance from death.” At last Ivan Ilych realizes that “my whole life has been wrong.” Everything now confirmed the “huge deception which had hidden both life and death.”

    If conformity is death, then a single genuine action is life. No one recognizes the authentic feeling with which Ivan Ilych forgives his wife and blesses his son, but in doing so he transforms his dying. “To him all this happened in a single instant, and the meaning of that instant did not change” in the two hours he had left. At last he hears someone say “it is finished,” but he is content to die having regained life. “‘Death is finished,’ he said to himself. ‘It is no more.’” The story of Ivan Ilych was to haunt Western existentialists and, still more sharply, Soviet Russians who strove to conform to official norms.

    Unlike Tolstoy, Dostoevsky focused on the political dangers of adopting ready-made beliefs or, in his words, wearing “a uniform.” In his great novels we encounter enthusiastic copy-cat radicals who believe just what they should. He describes Lebeziatnikov, a minor character in Crime and Punishment, as “one of the numerous and varied legion of dullards, of half-animate abortions, conceited, half-educated coxcombs, who attach themselves to the idea most in fashion only to . . . caricature every cause they serve, however sincerely.” Lebeziatnikov trips over himself voicing all the approved nihilist doctrines: the denial of free will (“it all depends on the [social] environment”), the condemnation of charity (which distracts from attacking root causes), the uselessness of art, and the duty of husbands to applaud the infidelity of their wives.

    In The Possessed, a novel about the Russian terrorist movement, Dostoevsky illustrates how such buffoons can be dangerous. As Lenin was to show, a few thoughtful revolutionaries can seize power if others follow whoever is considered most radical. As the conspirator Pyotr Stepanovich explains, we can get such people to do anything if we only tell them they are not progressive enough. Those who do not actually commit violent acts will excuse, justify, or even applaud them, as the Russian liberal party, the Kadets, actually did, only to be the first people Lenin liquidated.

    “Do you know how many we will catch by little ready-made ideas?” Pyotr Stepanovich asks. Those eager to accept prevailing beliefs will spread them and shame each other into obedience. “Ha, ha, Listen,” Pyotr Stepanovich explains,

    I’ve reckoned them all up. . . . the lawyer who defends an educated murderer because he is more cultured than his victims and could not help murdering them . . . is one of us. . . . The juries who acquit every criminal are ours. The prosecutor who trembles at a trial for fear he should not seem advanced enough is ours, ours. Among officials and literary men we have lots, lots, lots, and they don’t know it themselves.

    “When the radicals hold a meeting,” Dostoevsky writes, “they compete to voice the most up-to-date ideas and decide that the revolution will entail ‘a hundred million heads.’” The most frightening moment in The Possessed occurs when a major, who has stumbled into the meeting accidentally, accepts this bloody theory. “I confess I am rather in favor of a more humane policy,” he asserts, “but as all are on the other side, I go along with the rest.” Once people are eager “to go along with the rest,” they can be brought to agree to anything.

    As they did: the famous Black Book of Communism, which appeared in 1997, calculated that the various countries under Communist rule murdered at least a hundred million people. Many have wondered at Dostoevsky’s astonishing accuracy in this and other predictions about what radicals in power would do, but the reason for his prescience is not far to seek: as a former member of a revolutionary group, he understood the psychology that could have led him to commit foul deeds deemed humane.

    Dostoevsky understood that many people become conformists not only from fear, but also to free themselves of the burden of individuality. In The Brothers Karamazov, the Grand Inquisitor maintains that although people praise freedom, almost all want to surrender it. Free choice entails guilt and regret. Since we can never be certain of what is truly moral or even of our own motives, there is no escape from conscience. Craving certainty, people eagerly worship authorities claiming infallibility. “I tell Thee that man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find someone quickly to whom he can hand over that gift of freedom with which the ill-fated creature is born,” the Inquisitor explains. “But only one who can appease their conscience can take over their freedom.” To do so, authorities appeal to the desire to surrender individuality. Worship is not sufficient if one worships alone: people “are concerned not only to find what one or the other can worship, but to find something that all would believe in and worship; what is essential is that they all may be together in it,” since where people differ, doubt is always possible. Left unsatisfied, “this craving for community of worship is the chief misery of every person individually and of all humanity from the beginning of time.”

    “From the beginning of time”: Dostoevsky’s point is that humanity always faces a fundamental choice between freedom, individual conscience, and doubt on the one hand, and authority, conformity, and absolute certainty on the other. In various periods, each alternative affirms different theories. For Dostoevsky, the Inquisitor’s view of life takes the form of socialism, which promises to unite mankind “in one harmonious ant-heap.”

    The Soviet Union was, in this sense, entirely “inquisitorial.” Its fundamental tenet, as Lenin insisted, is that there is no such thing as “extra-class morality.” Whatever serves the interests of the proletariat (that is, the Party) is good, whatever aids the bourgeoisie is bad. It follows that the Party cannot be wrong because its actions are right by definition. To imagine that there are standards by which the Party might be judged is to adopt a counter-revolutionary bourgeois philosophy. As Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon correctly illustrates, one reason that Party leaders purged by Stalin confessed to imaginary crimes is that they believed in the Party’s infallibility. Had not they themselves justified executing other leaders on these very grounds?

    Nadezhda Mandelstam explained that the word “conscience” almost entirely disappeared from Soviet discourse, which replaced it with “consciousness” (as in “class consciousness”). So long as people followed Party commands, they could not be behaving immorally. In 1976, in his memoir To Be Preserved Forever, Lev Kopelev described what it felt like when he enthusiastically agreed that to achieve Communism “everything was permissible — to lie, to steal, to destroy hundreds of thousands and even millions of people.” And so Kopelev helped to enforce the terror famine, in which millions of peasants were deliberately starved to death. “I took part in this myself, scouring the countryside, searching for hidden grain . . . stopping my ears to the children’s crying and the women’s wails. . . . I saw women and children with distended bellies, turning blue, still breathing but with vacant, lifeless eyes.” Not cruelty but devotion to the Party motivated Kopelev’s actions. “To hesitate or doubt . . . was to give way to ‘intellectual squeamishness’ and ‘stupid liberalism.’”

    In Solzhenitsyn’s novel In The First Circle, Klara expresses dismay at the countless deaths entailed by collectivization and purges. Her friend Gorbunov replies “gently but firmly”: “Who is doing these things? Who is it who wants to do them? It is history. History does what it wants. You and I sometimes find it horrible, Klara, but . . . what matters most is the conviction that the process itself is necessary and inevitable.” Not individuals but “history” — understood not as the totality of past events but as an impersonal agency in its own right — does what it cannot help doing. No one is responsible. Bakhtin referred to this idea as “living representatively,” that is, imagining that one can avoid all personal responsibility by acting as the agent of government or some other collective. Such “representation” seems to provide an “alibi,” but the fundamental fact of ethical human life, Bakhtin insisted, is that “there is no alibi.”

    Soviet education instructed people to overcome their conscience, their “squeamishness,” and their “liberalism.” They were instructed to aspire to the loss of their individuality and become perfectly functioning cogs in the machine. (Stalin famously offered a toast to “the cogs.”) Ideally, they might achieve the highest Bolshevik virtue, partiinost, or Party-mindedness. As Getmanov, a devoted Communist in Vasily Grossman’s Life and Fate, reflects, “the attitude of a Party leader to any matter, to any film, to any book, had to be infused with the spirit of the Party; however difficult it might be, he had to immediately renounce a favorite book or a customary way of behavior if the interests of the Party should conflict with personal sympathies.” 

    Complete Party-mindedness demands still more: “a true Party leader simply didn’t have personal likings or inclinations. He loved something only because, and only insofar as, it expressed the spirit of the Party. . . . true Party spirit showed itself when a sacrifice was not even necessary, when no personal feeling could survive even for a moment if it happened to clash with the spirit of the Party.” In sum: what Ivan Ilych came to reject — the absolute loss of individual selfhood — is precisely what constituted the Bolshevik ideal.

    And how does one learn to overcome individuality? In 1953, in The Captive Mind, written when most Polish intellectuals (and many other Western intellectuals) still regarded Communist rule as progressive, Czeslaw Milosz identified “the intellectual’s feeling of belonging” as the key motive for conformity. As they concluded that their work could be significant only if they renounced outmoded ways of thinking, so American humanists I have known assiduously practiced the new paradigm and expository style. As Milosz explains, life becomes “acting, with the exception that one does not perform on the theatre stage” but everywhere. “Such acting is a highly developed craft that places a premium on mental alertness. Before it leaves the lips, every word must be evaluated as to its consequences.” Eventually a person “grows into it [his role] so closely that he no longer differentiates his true self from the self he simulates, so that the most intimate of individuals speak to each other in Party slogans.”

    To be sure, Milosz continues, full identification with official thinking rarely happens. “A large residue of unassimilated matter remains” and people preserve a consciousness of having two selves. Since even ardent intellectuals cannot entirely rid themselves of their former personalities, they become “schizophrenics.” And occasionally the private self reasserts itself. When doubt assails Krymov, another devoted Communist in Life and Fate, he questions whether he really believes what he has always thought he believed. He wonders: “Why have I never found the strength to say, ‘I really don’t believe that Bukharin was a saboteur, provocateur, and assassin?’” If, as he tells himself, he always believed what he professed, why had he sometimes felt that his words “went against his deepest feelings”? “What is it I’m trying to say?,” he at last asks himself. “That I am a man with two consciences? Or that I am two men, each with his own conscience? But then that’s how it’s always been — for all kinds of people, not just me.”

    In their fight for human rights, Russian and East European dissidents above all valued personal integrity and an undivided conscience. They wanted to break through the theatricality — the lies — of Soviet life, which is why they hit on the strategy of citing the Soviet constitution and insisting that it be observed in fact. When arrested and tried, they would demand that the authorities observe the code of criminal procedures. Make words mean what they say!

    Westerners often wondered about the point of a public demonstration of protest that would end instantly with arrest. For the dissidents, however, such cost-benefit reasoning was a fundamental mistake: it fostered subservience and pretense. The point was to act honorably regardless of the cost. As the contemporary philosopher Vladimir Zelinsky has explained, human dignity — the “fundamental concern” of the movement — demanded “inner freedom.” Dissidents sought “self-liberation from conditional, almost inborn ideological reflexes.” They therefore struggled against “the degenerate, reflexive herd mentality that inevitably arises when people are bred . . . in ‘incubators of opinion.’”

    Is it any wonder that dissidents often cited Hans Christian Anderson’s “The Emperor’s New Clothes”? Andrei Amalrik compared himself to the child who says the emperor is naked. Even if others remain prudently silent, it is vital for some honest people to say what they see. “Behind any public protest,” Zelinsky explained, “is an individual’s attempt to break through his own social adaptation, through his own double think, and find himself. When young people enter into hopeless political conspiracies for which they are subsequently sentenced to ten or fifteen years, they do this because they want to possess their own identities among the surrounding masks.” They wanted to make the public self coincide with the private self.

    In his autobiography Never Alone, Natan Sharansky described growing up in a world in which “life was a perpetual loyalty test.” To escape that life and the Soviet Union’s ever-present anti-Semitism, Sharansky, like so many Jewish boys, escaped first into the chess world and then into science. Admitted to the prestigious Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, “I had reached the double thinker’s summit, as far as I could go as a Jew.” Professors advised that “with our smarts and our work habits, we could live a full intellectual life . . . All we had to do was stay focused on our orderly inner world of scientific theories and mathematical theorems [and] ignore the ever-changing pseudo-truths of politics.”

    Was all the theatricality worth it? Already a doubter, Sharansky was struck by the dissidents’ bravery. He was especially impressed with Andrei Sakharov’s sacrifice of his position as the leading Soviet scientist to demand intellectual freedom. It was as if Sakharov’s words were meant for him personally: “You want to run away from your life of doublethink and fear by making a scientific career, but that’s impossible. There’s no scientific breakthrough you can make that will free you, as long as you’re enslaved to this immoral doublethink. . . . Either you overcome your fear and stand for truth, or you remain a slave to fear, no matter how fancy your titles, no matter how big your dacha.”

    Sharansky realized the falsity of the view that so many Americans today take for granted, that life is about individual happiness. So long as one thinks that way, one will never make sacrifices for anything higher. “When getting ahead professionally is the most important thing in life,” Sharansky explained, “you become too willing to go along with everything. Why take risks? . . . To become free, to transcend doublethink, you must first overcome the fear that is always with you. There must be something more important than your career.” Earlier this year, a reporter asked Sharansky why Andrei Navalny returned to Russia: did he not know he would be arrested and probably killed? For Sharansky, this question betrayed the Western assumption that the point of life is individual well-being. He described his retort as “pretty rude”: “You’re the one who does not understand something. If you think the goal is survival — then you are right. But his true concern is the fate of his people — and he is telling them: ‘I am not afraid, and you should not be either.’ ”

    Gradually, the young Sharansky learned inner freedom. “My doubts were growing, but I wasn’t yet ready to abandon my — and my parents’ — dream of finding refuge in science. The longer I stayed paralyzed, the more self-respect I lost.” When he finally took the irrevocable step of applying to emigrate to Israel, “my life as a loyal Soviet citizen ended.” Sharansky’s scientific career was over, and his life as a refusenik and human rights activist had begun. He served thirteen years in prison and a labor camp, but he was spiritually free. “Now I could say what I thought, do what I said, and say what I did. Finally, thirteen years before my release from prison and my move to a free, democratic Israel — I was liberated.”

    Until his “liberation,” Sharansky had lived in two worlds, but many Soviet citizens, devoted whole-heartedly to the reigning ideology, had not even progressed to double-thinking. The main character of In The First Circle, Innokenty Volodin, gradually evolves from a sincere believer in Communism to a political prisoner rejecting it. First, he recognizes that in his job as a diplomat, “you need a double wall in your chest. Two thicknesses of skull and two separate memories.” When he discovers his mother’s pre-revolutionary diaries and favorite books, he comes into contact with a wholly different way of experiencing the world.

    “Goodness shows itself first in pity” and compassion, she wrote, but he had been taught to reject such outmoded and “shameful” feelings. When Volodin reads her admonition to “respect other people’s opinions even when they are inimical to yours,” he thinks: “That was pretty old-fashioned, too. If I have a correct worldview, can I really respect those who disagree with me?” Even the words his mother and her friends used were “outdated. In all seriousness, they began certain words with capital letters — Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Good and Evil, the Ethical Imperative.” Volodin was accustomed to words easier to understand, such as “progressiveness.”

    Vigorous cultural debates characterized Volodin’s mother’s pre-revolutionary world, whereas he routinely attends some “pompous assembly where everybody would unreservedly agree with everybody else.” Hers was a life of open-ended dialogue, where you actually had to consider counter-evidence and contrary opinions. Volodin at last realizes that “he was a savage” who does not know what real reading is. Having read only those books “that were warranted sound . . . he had got into the habit of believing every word, of submitting without question to the author’s will.” In his mother’s library he encounters books that contradict each other. “What he found most difficult of all was to lay down his book and think for himself.” As Volodin views his life through his mother’s eyes, he realizes that he has conducted it on a false principle. “The great truth for Innokenty used to be that we are given only one life” and therefore, since nothinghigher exists, we should get as much pleasure out of it as possible. “Now, with the new feeling that had ripened in him he became aware of another law: that we are given only one conscience, too.”

    What does it mean to rediscover conscience? For Vaclav Havel, it meant refusing to affirm what one knows to be untrue. Yes, the system pressures people to lie, Havel wrote, but the pressure only works because people are all too willing to live that way, a willingness marking their “own failure as individuals.” In each person, Havel continued, lives a longing “for moral integrity . . . and a sense of transcendence. But there is also in everyone . . . some willingness to merge with the anonymous crowd and to flow comfortably with it down the river of pseudo-life.” Havel argued that conditions in Eastern Europe were in fact an extreme version “of modern life in general.” The temptation to conform and to avoid risking the pleasures of consumer society does not require Communist rule. Havel therefore asked whether East Europeans “do not in fact stand . . . as a kind of warning to the West.” Solzhenitsyn was sure that they did.

    What do these principles of modern dissent have to do with us? Alas, a great deal. For many Americans, it seems as if we are living in an age of prescribed and proscribed beliefs. American students, for example: on March 10, 2022 The New York Times reported on a survey “of over 37,000 students at 159 colleges [showing that] 80 percent of students self-censor at least some of the time. Forty-eight percent of undergraduate students described themselves as ‘somewhat uncomfortable’ or ‘very uncomfortable’ with expressing their views on a controversial topic in the classroom.” Faculty are similarly reticent. Like Havel’s fellow citizens, they almost always tolerate this state of affairs. Why?

    On July 4, 2020, a letter signed by hundreds of Princeton University faculty demanded not only requirements for “anti-racist education” and credit for “anti-racist” activism, but also a faculty committee to “oversee the investigation and discipline of racist behavior, incidents, research and publication on the part of faculty. Guidelines on what counts as racist behavior, incidents, research and publication will be authored by a faculty committee for incorporation into the set of rules and procedures.” Did the faculty who signed this letter really want other faculty deciding on what they were allowed to research and publish? Twelve days later, an article by the Princeton professor of classics Joshua Katz identified four reasons that so many faculty signed. A few of them, he conceded, believe every word. Others told him that they signed the letter without reading it. Still more “felt peer pressure to sign.” The most numerous group signed because “they agree with some of the demands and felt it was good to act as ‘allies’ and bring up the numbers even though they do not assent to everything themselves.” Endorsing — whether automatically, under peer pressure, or to ally oneself with the right people — what one does not believe, including something as unprecedented as disciplining faculty for their research: how different is that from Eastern Europe?

    To explain such behavior, wherever it occurs, Havel cited the example of the Czech greengrocer who placed in his window a “Workers of the World, Unite!” sign, not because he believed it or had even considered whether he believed it, but to convey “a subliminal but very definite message [that] ‘I, the greengrocer XY, behave in the manner expected of me. I can be depended upon and am beyond reproach.’” How many people whose email signature contains an “indigenous land acknowledgment” or preferred pronouns resemble that greengrocer? Most likely, the overwhelming majority of professors do not favor censorship, cancel culture, or policing of views and language. But they let those who do speak in their name and so remain, like that greengrocer, “beyond reproach.”

    Beyond the campus, the crisis of authentic thinking is no less grave. Supinely accepted conspiracy theories abound. Regardless of where one is on the political spectrum, if one makes sure to hear only voices that exclude contrary evidence and does not allow for the possibility that decent people may disagree, then one is choosing to think inauthentically. By ruling out the possibility that one’s allies may be mistaken, one demonstrates a quasi-Soviet disregard for truth. “Let us at least refuse to say what we do not think!,” urged Solzhenitsyn in his famous article “Live Not by Lies!” Let us, indeed. People do not do so, they refuse this refusal, partly because they cannot imagine placing themselves outside the right group and partly because they do not wish to take any risks. Cowardice comports nicely with thoughtless thinking. “There is no loophole for anyone who seeks to be honest,” Solzhenitsyn insisted. “And as for him who lacks the courage even to defend his own soul: Let him not brag of his progressive views . . . Let him say to himself plainly: I am cattle, I am a coward, I seek only warmth and to eat my fill.”

    If we Americans would stop finding reasons to believe what we are supposed to believe and begin developing the courage to resist conforming to our group’s preferred views, we might avoid a terrible future. If one confines oneself to information from a single point of view, then one values something other than the truth. Real thinking takes work, and when everything confirms what one wants to believe, one can be sure that one’s thought is counterfeit. So let us practice open-ended dialogue, learn to consider opposing beliefs seriously, and to affirm only what we have genuinely considered. We may thereby regain the power to think not thoughtlessly but thoughtfully.

    The Use and Abuse of Magical Thinking

    Recent reports in The New York Times and the Guardian have noted that at least one-quarter of Gen-Zers believe in the idea that you can attract the things you want — luck, money, love, anything you want — by repeating certain mantras. The practice is called “manifesting.” Most of these believers are devoted adepts of Rhonda Byrne’s self-help mega-seller The Secret, which appeared in 2006 and has been translated into fifty languages. Byrne urges them to understand the “hidden untapped powers” within, and pledges that these latent powers will help them to “eradicate disease, acquire massive wealth, overcome obstacles, and achieve what many would regard as impossible.” Ask, Believe, Receive — so goes the mantra. Answers are available within you; you need only will them into existence. My Gen-Z daughter, a thoroughgoing skeptic, tells me that I should check out something called witchtok (a subdivision of TikTok), where people of her generation “do witchcraft” to prevent bad things from happening to them. The keyword has over six million posts and over fifty-five billion views — many of which were apparently made during the Covid-19 lockdown when this kind of magical thinking flourished. Occult practices, it seems, are not primitive or medieval, but a large part of modern society everywhere: Ask, Believe, Receive.

    On almost every telephone or electricity pole in Nairobi or Mombasa, on almost every bare scrap of wall, hang slapdash advertisements promoting the services of a mganga. The crude ads, usually printed on cheap office paper and pasted to any bare surface, confidently offer sources of help for any ailment, physical or otherwise — they promise cures for the sick, business boosts, love potions, help in resolving land issues or recovering stolen items, even remedies for erectile dysfunction. If you’re suffering from bad luck, an antidote is available. 

    Waganga (plural) is the umbrella Swahili word for diviners, spiritual healers, traditional herbalists, or night runners. If, for instance, you think you have been bewitched, the mganga you would most likely consult is a diviner (pejoratively referred to as a “witch doctor” in the lingua franca), someone who could — ideally — mobilize supernatural powers to undo whatever malevolence might trouble you. If, more prosaically, you simply feel sick or depressed, you would seek out a mganga who practiced spiritual healing or traditional herbalism, someone whose remedies rely less on the occult. For the most part, though, the kind of waganga who peddle the services advertised on the roadside posters claim to be diviners, and their remedies rely on the cryptic and the uncanny.

    The ads that the waganga have plastered everywhere have succeeded in making the citizens’ pathologies public. In fact, they have become primary documents of urban culture and have drawn the attention of serious Kenyan artists. For example, Onyis Martin, in his series of paintings on Kenyan urban life, “Talking Walls, 2021,” incorporates the boastful promises of the waganga onto the surfaces of his paintings. Worn away, covered with graffiti or other makeshift notices, the remnants of the ads still surface in his paintings to remind us of the waganga’s guarantee that they can heal our modern problems. The textures of Onyis Martin’s paintings are gritty, thick with roughly applied impasto that reflects the cluttered walls of the urban landscape. The colors tend to be muted greys, tans, and browns, and the canvases are strewn with fragments of printed text, spray-painted numbers, slogans, and torn portraits. Occasionally a child’s eyes stare out from a tattered ad, beseeching us from the scraps of text. Overall, the canvases present us with a palimpsest that records the indecipherable chaos of the streets; each is an archeological site of sorts, an archive, and the more we try to piece together the fragments of the worn waganga fliers, the more we can see the changing nature of Kenyan politics, economy, and culture over the last three decades.


    Onyis Martin was born in Kisumu and raised in Nairobi, and for some time now has been collecting waganga posters for his art. “I remove a whole bunch every day, but there are lots of fresh ones the next day. So, someone must be responding to the message in them,” he told me last year. “People are desperate. The government doesn’t provide basic needs, so people go to a mganga for help.” But the mganga is rarely the first resort, according to Martin. “People in distress start off by going to church, thinking that God will solve their problems. They pay the God-damned preacher who claims to be connecting them with God. When God doesn’t respond favorably, they turn to the mganga who promises to link them with magical powers.” He continued, shaking his head, “But, unlike God, this mganga is a real person, so if you are desperate, you end up paying him, hoping that he will solve your problems. But as soon as he takes your money, he disappears. It’s about hope and desperation.” 

    It is hard not to share Onyis Martin’s cynicism. I, too, wonder why these ads have become more and more visible over the last few decades. Kenya is not the only place where the waganga business is booming. I have seen similar ads in almost every African country that I have visited — Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Cameroon, South Africa, and Senegal — so enough people must be responding to justify the ads’ continued presence. Waganga seem to be drumming up enough business to cover the continent with their posters. Surely, all these waganga can’t simply be conmen, and it is tempting to scoff along with Onyis Martin. But it is still the case that a quarter of Kenyans, both Christians and Muslims, “believe in the protective power of charms or amulets, and that they consulted waganga on a regular basis” — at least according to a Pew report published in a local daily newspaper in Kenya in 2014.

    The phenomenon has not gone unnoticed by academics — according to scholars such as Adam Ashforth, James Howard Smith, Kate Luongo, Peter Geschiere, and Jean and John Comaroff, the number of people who take part in occult practices has increased throughout much of Africa over the last three decades. Generally, they have attributed this increase to neoliberal economies that have, in the name of free markets, torn apart communities and eroded many traditional relationships, and made material life more precarious for most people. As Adam Ashforth tells us, witchcraft has become “one of many complex ways in which Africans are creating modern societies as well as understanding modern changes in their socio-worlds and how the changes are connected to the rest of the world.”

    I don’t disagree with such assessment, but there are other causes, too. If the recent appeal of witchcraft in Kenya can be traced to the contradictions of the modern world, and if we are probably right to blame neoliberalism for producing lives that are increasingly circumscribed and frustrated, there is also the mismanagement of the economy by elites and politicians, and the increase in population, and the corresponding rise in rural-urban migration — all these factors have rendered everything up for grabs. It is reasonable to argue, then, that the demands of the isolated self have become paramount, and life has become more and more about survival of the fittest — and as always, the rich are getting richer and the poor poorer. And many of those who do not succeed in the new economy attribute their failure to occult factors.

    You can read James H. Smith’s book from 2008, Bewitching Development: Witchcraft and the Reinvention of Development in Neoliberal Kenya, to learn how this works. If, for example, your neighbor’s business is thriving and yours is not, surely your neighbor’s evil eye must be causing your bad luck, and a diviner may just be the person you want to consult for a remedy. If a powerful politician is trying to steal your property, a diviner’s spell might thwart the crook. If you cannot find a job, or someone steals your wallet in a matatu, a diviner’s magic will surely help you locate them. So call Prof. Okafo or Dr. Swahib or Dr. Gombe for a ready solution — call someone with power to provide you with an intimate space and an interim answer that will help you heal. Call someone who will give you the sense that you are being taken care of, someone who will provide a place where you can suspend your disbelief and find whatever relief you are looking for. Call the good doctor and find a place that champions magical thinking. Ask, Believe, Receive.

    When I was in Kenya last year, I photographed a few of the advertisements out of curiosity. It was my intention to call one of the advertised phone numbers and find out how the relationship between the waganga and their clients work; I wanted to understand for myself how exactly this place of magical thinking is created and performed. I braced myself with a cup of tea, stiffened my backbone, and began to make the call — but it immediately occurred to me that I had not invented a problem for the mganga to help me solve. It couldn’t be anything too maudlin or melodramatic — I wasn’t confident enough in my ability to maintain the fiction. I settled on “property rights,” since it seemed the least personal kind of problem, and also the most intractable. l would invent a problem about land ownership.

    It might seem a relatively straightforward topic, but it was a loaded issue. Fraudulent land appropriation and the illegitimate use of eminent domain have become endemic in Kenya in the last few decades, especially in the cities. One reason is that the Kenyan government has taken advantage of loans from China and used the money to build new roads and airports in Nairobi, Kisumu, Mombasa, and Eldoret. All these improvements require land which gives the government the opportunity to claim the right of eminent domain, take over the land, and offer paltry compensation. The perils of land ownership are further complicated by the fact that all the improvements in infrastructure have led to drastic increases in rural-to-urban migration, and a corresponding rise in the value of urban real estate. In 2020, for example, real estate contributed 17.8% to the country’s GDP compared to a mere 2.5% in 1994. It is no surprise that, as real estate speculation has rapidly increased, so too has land-grabbing by private developers and dishonest politicians. Though private property rights and zoning codes governing urban housing do exist, their enforcement has been sporadic and ineffective. Government officials have failed, for example, to keep up with the issuing of title deeds, owing to the high number of real estate transactions. Regrettably, these delays have made it possible for powerful individuals to grab the untitled land of ordinary citizens. As a result, every vacant lot in Nairobi bears a sign proclaiming that the LAND IS NOT FOR SALE, usually accompanied with a threat of prosecution. It is unclear whether or not the signs have any effect, other than preventing people from squatting on the land and claiming it as theirs.

    All told, the troubles regarding land were tangible and familiar — the perfect topic with which to confront a mganga. Again, I stopped dialing. This time I hesitated over doubts about whether or not it was ethical for an academic to obtain data like this, by stealth. What value would any of the information have if I had lied to obtain it? But curiosity quickly vanquished any scruples. In any case, the waganga had shamelessly declared themselves doctors or professors of unspecified disciplines. Mine was a lesser offense.

    It turned out that reaching a mganga was not quite as simple as I had hoped it would be — I had to dial at least five different numbers before a call was answered.

    “Hello, hello. Is this Dr. Sangoma?” (Sangoma happens to be a term for “diviner” in South Africa.)

    We started talking in Swahili.

    “Yes,” replied a husky voice like that of an old man just woken from a nap. 

    I told him that I was calling for help with a dispute over a piece of land I had bought for a prospective house.

    He asked me where the land was.

    “Near Thika Road,” I lied. 

    He asked me where I was calling from.

    “From Umoja,” I lied some more.

    When he inquired as to whether my dispute was with the government or an individual, I assured him it was with an individual and that I planned to take the case to court but was worried about the probable aggravation and delay. Without hesitation, Dr. Sangoma instructed me to go to the land, gather some soil, and wrap it in a white cloth and take it to his office in Kajiado, just outside of Nairobi. There he would prepare some medicine to mix into the soil, which I would return to the land and sprinkle it around. The medicated soil would solve my land dispute. “Itakuwa vizuri kabisa,” he reassured me — everything is going to be fine.

    The fee for the magic powder would be ten thousand shillings (equivalent to a hundred American dollars — about a monthly salary for most Kenyans).

    I said I would find the money and call him back.

    “Please call me any time if you have any questions.”

    I thanked him and hung up. Dr. Sangoma had played his part convincingly, much to his credit. He sounded like a kindly old man, someone who could be trusted — he was neither pushy or ingratiating, and his voice carried conviction. He had even revealed his location. Perhaps if I had an actual problem Dr. Sangoma’s prescription for medicated soil might have had some appeal. Who’s to say? Perhaps an attentive listener with a reassuring plan is all that is required by someone frustrated by the loss of land, and fed up with the time and money wasted in the land office at the behest of some crooked bureaucrat. Perhaps it would be twice as bad to be twice swindled, but I could begin to see how the receptive calm and confidence of a mganga might invite one to suspend their disbelief long enough at least to entertain the idea of a supernatural remedy. When everything else fails, the preternatural might prevail. It could at least for a while permit one to enter a different kind of space, a space where one could unapologetically chase away their vexations and indulge in magical thinking. This, I imagine, is a space where one goes when one has been made thoroughly desperate.

    It is likely that the approximately twenty-five percent of Kenyans who consult the waganga do so out of similar desperation. Consider a matatu driver by the name of Patrick, who sought the advice of a mganga to help “tame” his stubbornly wayward wife. “I decided to protect my wife from mafisi [hyenas],” he told a reporter for the Standard newspaper, “by visiting a mganga in Lang’ata who applied some stuff on my SIM card for a fee and told me no one will ever touch my wife.” Convinced of the efficacy of the cure, he boasted to the reporter that “it’s been nine months now, and I am sure no one is eyeing her.” I admired Patrick’s faith, though I hoped he had a nearby piece of wood to knock on (a figure of speech that awkwardly exposes my own occult thinking).

    And yet, however much I might suspect the surety found in the SIM card, it is at least plausible that Patrick might believe that magical power could be found in a cell phone. These devices, that seemingly came out of nowhere, now connect Kenyans everywhere, invisibly and inexplicably. Millions of Kenyans had never made a phone call, and now, suddenly, it was possible to contact anyone, to send pictures, and to transfer money with a glowing palm-sized gadget. Kenya was the first country in the world where phone banking and money transfers were used widely, through the magical MPESA app, so if you had a phone you could miraculously receive and send money to people in the remotest parts of the country. It’s not much of a leap, then, to believe that doctoring a SIM card could work magic. And so Patrick believed: the doctoring “locked” his wife from predatory hyenas. That, at least, is his reality. Perhaps we should be happy for him. Many of us pay far more for our peace of mind.

    This kind of conjuring was no less real for Jane, who also visited a mganga to prevent her spouse from cheating on her. Jane’s story, as told by a friend of hers to the Standard, was, shall we say, a bit more scandalous: “I almost fainted when Jane . . . confessed that she had sex with the mganga so that the ‘medicine’ would make it impossible for her husband to sustain an erection with another woman.” The idea that Jane’s infidelity — with a mganga — would disable her husband’s sexual aptitude left her friend bewildered, especially since they were both “devoted members of a popular church along Mombasa Road.” Jane’s cuckoldry was not a casual affair, to say the least. She was so desperate to bring her husband back, and so convinced of the mganga’s competence, that she allowed herself to be persuaded that sex with the good doctor might unlock some kind of deep magic. That Jane’s wrong would make right her husband’s wrong was an instance of wishful thinking that could only be possible in her state of mind. To go along with the witch doctor’s connivance, she had to be so fearful and vulnerable as to believe that her own infidelity could be homeopathic. We don’t know whether or not it worked. But who can say that they have never acted out of fear or vulnerability? It is not just Africans such as Patrick and Jane who believe that thought alone can influence the objective circumstances of one’s life. This kind of thinking appears to be universal — we have our crystals and our witchtok, our internet health cures, our billions of Rhonda Byrne devotees, and certainly our conspiracy theorists. They all nod at the occult.

    Predictably, the “manifesting” mantra doesn’t always work for everyone. Consider Natalie, who consulted a mganga because she suspected that her husband was having an affair with another woman. “He [the mganga] asked for [my husband’s] boxers, took them, smelt them, then put them in a bowl and poured a brown liquid,” said Natalie in an interview with the Star, another popular Kenyan newspaper. “He started chanting and after a minute, he told me to drink the liquid. At first, I told him I couldn’t, but he said if I wanted to have my husband back, I had to take it.” Natalie finally gave in and drank the vile liquid, after which the mganga chanted a little bit more, applied oil on her hands, and finally blew some chalk dust towards her face. As Natalie left, he gave her a small bottle containing more of the foul liquid and told her to add two drops to her husband’s drink. She followed the instructions, but to no effect. She tried calling the mganga to complain, but he had disconnected his phone.

    What went wrong for Natalie? Perhaps she had failed to manifest sufficiently what she had asked for; perhaps she had not believed enough. Perhaps the mganga had not invested enough emotional energy into her client to get her to “believe” — recall the masterful rhetorical skills of Jane’s mganga, who talked her into sleeping with him in order to block her husband’s infidelity. In any case, she received little more than embarrassment and disgust. Her mganga was, like most, a charlatan. A fly-by-night mganga; the kind of mganga that Onyis Martin describes, the kind that takes your money and runs. Having received their money, and fearing retaliation, they quickly disconnect their phones and disappear, until they can buy another burner phone and circulate a new number and a new name on posters pasted over the old ones.

    What distinguishes these charlatans from the waganga who might be considered “legitimate” is that they do not make an effort to create a space of healing. They don’t tell you where they live, as Dr. Sangoma did when I talked with him: “call me any time,” he said to me (though whether or not I would get an answer is unknown). In other words, they don’t hold up their end of the bargain by facilitating, for however short a time, the belief that a solution is forthcoming. They offer neither sincerity nor solace; they are just out to make a quick buck. Still, there are worse things than getting duped by a fly-by-night mganga. You could encounter an abusive one. Ciku, a cybercafe attendant, experienced a far more disagreeable encounter. Six years into her marriage she had not yet conceived a child. “I was desperate,” she told the Standard, “I could have done anything.” She consulted a mganga, was asked to visit his office, and when she arrived was immediately asked to strip off her clothes: “Then the witchdoctor tried to undress me, I slapped him and ran out of his ‘den’.” Surely, it is not possible that Ciku’s mganga assumed she wanted to be impregnated right then and there. Surely, she was not proposing to “manifest” quite so unexpectedly or so literally. One may consult a mganga, and even believe in him, but it is important to be wary of what one receives.

    I decided to make more calls. Since my pleasant experience with Dr. Sangoma differed so much from those I was reading about, I wanted to find out if there were anything but charlatans to be found. I was getting bolder. I planned to tell the mganga that my husband had run away with another woman. It seemed one of the more common problems.

    I started dialing. Once again, I dialed about seven different numbers before the phone was picked up. A man with a gentle low voice said, “Hello”

    “Hello,” I responded, and we began to chat in Kiswahili.

    “How are you?” 

    “I am okay. Are you the mganga?”

    “Yes, I am Dr. Gombe.”

    “I have a problem. I want you to help me.”

    “What problem do you have?”

    “My husband has run away with another woman. And he has refused to return home. And he does not even support me or our children.”

    “How many years have you been married?”

    “Seven,” I replied.

    “How many children do you have?”

    “Two children.”

    “When did he run away?”

    “Two months ago.”

    “Is it the first time he has run away?”

    “Yes.”

    “Have you consulted another mganga about this problem or am I the first one?”

    “No. You are the first one.”

    “Do you want me to return him back home today or tomorrow?”

    “Today.”

    “He will return,” he said confidently. “But this is what I want you to do. Get a square piece of white cloth. Write your husband’s name on each corner of the cloth. And then write your name in the middle. Then place an egg on your husband’s name and another one in the middle of the cloth where your name appears. Then randomly spit on the piece of cloth six times. You will invoke a curse, saying the following words: ‘I am cursing you, my husband. Not because of bad intentions but because I love you. I want you to return home.’”

    I listened carefully, and then asked him how much he charges.

    “On your part,” he began, “you will have to send me your names plus seven thousand six hundred shillings [seventy dollars]. The money will assist me to get what is required to do my work, which is two chickens and incense. You will pay me five thousand shillings [forty dollars] upon his return.”

    “Okay,” I said.

    “Are you ready, so that I can embark on my work?”

    “Yes, I am ready,” I said politely, using the appropriate Kenyan colloquialism, as though I am receiving a blessing from God.

    “Are you ready so that I can assemble my mganga paraphernalia? If so, send me your name and your husband’s, plus seven thousand six hundred shillings, by phone. Then just give me thirty minutes. After I do my work, your husband is going to call you. He is going to apologize to you. He will start supporting you and your children financially.” He was insistent: “He is going to call you today right away, and will be back home to you by seven o’clock. Are you ready for him to return home?”

    “Yes, I am ready.”

    I told him that I was going to look for an MPESA agent and then send him the money. I hung up. The whole conversation took about three minutes. I had enough; I never called back. But I was not off the hook. Dr. Gombe called me a few minutes after our conversation, and he kept calling. Unlike Dr. Sangoma, he was aggressive, even bullying. Eventually I blocked his phone. But even that was not enough — he contacted me one last time using another phone number to send me an abusive text: “You prostitute stop blocking my number.”

    I couldn’t help but smile. I suspected Dr. Gombe would never become a successful mganga, though his aggression might have been a reaction to a perceived lack of conviction on my part. Perhaps I had not granted him the authority that he felt he deserved; perhaps he might have been less abusive had I called him back as promised, and sent the money. Perhaps it was my fault.

    Conmen or not, it is important to note that diviners, or witch doctors, are in fact illegal in Kenya. There is a history behind this. When the British colonized Kenya in the late nineteenth century they dismissed witchcraft stories as mere superstition, because many of the accusations were the consequence of personal grudges. Many alleged witch doctors died as a result of local rancor and resentment. And worse, as far as the colonizers were concerned, it challenged the state’s monopoly on legally authorized violence. In the same way, the colonizers tried to suppress tabibu wa dawa za kiasili, traditional herbalists — the local men and women understood to have a special knowledge of healing plants. In fact, colonial officials did not make a distinction between the two groups; they were both simply referred to, derogatorily, as witch doctors (granted that there were some people, as is still the case now, who claimed to do both). Yet the official efforts to stamp out waganga did not succeed. People continued to give credence to witchcraft narratives, and they continued to visit diviners and traditional herbalists during periods of crisis — prolonged drought that led to crop failure, for instance, or after the death of livestock. Or when a friend or relative was seriously ill or died suddenly.

    In the early 1980s, however, traditional herbalists in Kenya started pushing the government to legalize their trade, as had been done in other African countries, most notably in Ghana and Nigeria, but also in places such as China, Vietnam, and Korea. Their efforts have been largely successful. By 2011, Kenya had about forty thousand registered traditional practitioners, including herbalists, birth attendants, bone setters, and faith healers. In response to the decriminalization of traditional herbalists, the diviners came forward and demanded that their businesses also be legalized. To no avail. The officials of the post-colonial government, like their predecessors, feared their authority would be undermined and that accusations of witchcraft would result in retributive murders.

    Although outlawed, diviners continue to do their business, and allegations of witchcraft rarely end up having any repercussions, despite the fact that accusations of witchcraft have increased (particularly in the rural areas) along with retributive murder of supposed witches. Older widows are the usual victims of the murders since they present especially inviting targets — as has almost always been the case. Unattached, without a role in the villages, they are easily scapegoated; inexplicable misfortunes are easily attributed to their supposed “evil eye” and they are less able to retaliate with violence. This kind of targeting is hardly unique to Kenya. But the large increases in population have put a lot of pressure on the need for land and people want some kind of pretext to legitimize their claims. It is not uncommon, for instance, to see the relatives of widows’ deceased husbands accuse their widows of witchcraft so that they will be kicked off their land. People who suffer from dementia, Alzheimer’s, or Parkinson’s often meet the same fate. Their diseases are often misunderstood (partly due to the fact that people are living longer and subject to diseases previously unknown in the villages). Since most rural people do not recognize the physical and mental changes caused by these diseases, the afflicted are considered strange and abnormal. “She acts like a witch,” a thirteen-year-old boy from my village once told me, referring to a neighbor with Parkinson’s disease whose spasms brought to mind the supposed behavior of witches. Once stigmatized and declared a witch, the sick widow is forcibly removed from her land and the accusers claim it. It is not unheard of for widows or the sick to be murdered.

    It is important to know that diviners in the rural areas do not advertise with posters the way the diviners in the urban areas do. Like the local herbalists, diviners are usually people known in their communities as having an exceptional knowledge of plants or supernatural powers. Such people often belong to certain clans and their healing (or harming) powers have been in their families for generations. People in their communities know who they are and when to consult them. In the early 1980s, I remember vividly, my sister Linet contracted Hepatitis A from drinking contaminated water at her boarding school. Though my mother took Linet to several nearby hospitals and clinics in western Kenya, they were unable to diagnose her symptoms — fever, malaise, loss of appetite, diarrhea, nausea, abdominal discomfort, dark-colored urine, and jaundiced eyes and skin. She missed school for almost a year. Villagers who saw her eyes and her skin told my mother that Linet had been bewitched. As an ardent Quaker, my mother had never been to a witch doctor, but as Linet developed a blood clot in one of her legs due to a prolonged infection, my mother became desperate and gave in. She contacted a well-known diviner in a nearby village. Accompanied by my aunt Leya, a well-regarded traditional herbalist in our village, she selected two chickens and filled a basket with maize to take as payment. My sister, now able to look back with a triumphant chuckle, dramatized the story for me recently by mimicking the solemn witch doctor slaughtering one of the chickens and making her stand in the pooled blood as he chanted in an unknown language. 

    Sadly, it did not work. Even the herbs he gave her had no effect. Perhaps my mother, the staunch Quaker, had not “manifested” enough magical thinking to cure my sister. Even though she was desperate, she may have been too pragmatic and too practical in temperament to allow the diviner to “unlock” her mind long enough for her to believe that his magic could heal Linet. Ask, Believe, Receive. For her it was difficult, and probably impossible, to believe. She received nothing until a well-known medical doctor from my village helped her get a referral for my sister to Kenyatta Hospital in Nairobi. There the correct diagnosis was made; my sister was treated and she recovered.

    It is undeniable that the diviner whom my mother consulted was recognized in our community, and even though his prescriptions failed to heal my sister, my mother never felt that he was a charlatan. He continued to be considered a legitimate diviner who had successfully treated many people. Sometimes mistakes are made, something unforeseen occurs in the treatment process, much like an error might occur in a Western-style operating room. We don’t doubt the efficacy of the operation itself. Once in a while an unsuccessful outcome is inevitable, a consequence of human error, or fate.

    For better or worse, consulting a diviner in our household was always the last resort. When we got sick, when we contracted the flu or malaria or had skin rashes, my mother would ask aunt Leya to treat us first. Leya would go into the woods, gather herbs (peppermint, sage, eucalyptus, African wormwood), add them to boiling water, and then ask us to cover ourselves with a blanket and breathe in the steam. Rashes were treated with concoctions made from aloe, periwinkle, and climbing oleander. She would combine the herbs by chewing them and then smearing the mixture on the afflicted areas. Within a few days we were cured. If the rash or flu persisted, our mother would take us to the local dispensary to be examined by a Western-trained doctor. Only when we were defeated and vulnerable would we consult a diviner. Only when we had given ourselves over to fate and stepped into the realm of magical thinking.

    In the urban areas, by contrast, there are few community-sanctioned witch doctors. As the urban communities are often in flux, it is not easy to establish with certainty who operates in good faith, who at the very least offers a story or a spell that can, for a while, contain a possibility — a possibility that makes up for the gaps and the inconsistencies in the social systems or provides some ephemeral hope for the ill. It is exactly this ambiguity that encourages the hustlers and con artists whose ads adorn the walls and fences and telephone poles in the cities. They claim to have the powers of a diviner, but they do not have the trust of the community. When people in desperate situations in the urban areas don’t know whom to turn to, they call the numbers on the posters and fail to get help. Without the good faith of the community to sanction the diviners who advertise in posters or to punish them, they can simply disappear when they are unsuccessful, and all they need to do to get back into business is buy a new phone, adopt a new name, and glue up new ads over their old ones.

    The charlatans are a real problem for the traditional healers and herbalists. As Lydia Matoke, the president of the Herbalists Society of Kenya, has noted, the people who advertise on those posters “lack medical ethics and damage the reputations of genuine traditional healers.” Matoke wants the government to step in and arrest the charlatans. “People in my community know who I am,” she said. “My family, since my great-grandmother, has been using herbs to treat diseases for many years. The medicine is in the family and people in our communities know who we are, so we don’t need to advertise on posters.”

    Yet the advertisers remain vigilant and inventive. They craftily deploy the stereotypes of diviners in Kenya by posing as someone from the Kenyan coast. (Traditional lore in Kenya has it that coastal people have powerful medicines due to their associations with djinns, and so the quacks will adopt Giriama or Swahili/Muslim names to lure their clients.) Often they use coastal Kiswahili while speaking to their clients — when I called Dr. Gombe, for example, he kept saying naam, or “yes” in Arabic and coastal Swahili, instead of ndio, for “yes” in Nairobi Swahili. Many of them also claim to have been trained in Tanzania, since Kenyans believe that Tanzanians have particularly strong traditional medicines. The Kamba are also known for having strong waganga (as noted by the historian Kate Luongo, who has spent years studying witchcraft in Kenya), so some charlatans will claim to hail from Kitui, a town in Kamba known for exceptional waganga. In an interview conducted by one of Kenya’s daily newspapers, one mganga who called himself Doctor/Professor Bwayo, explained that “I use the title Doctor because Kenyans easily connect to holders of big names.” The title “doctor,” he noted, was adopted because his services are meant “to offer a remedy, just like our brothers in conventional medicine do.” When asked what makes him think that he is a professor, he asked, incredulously, “what other prefix should I use before my name?” He declined to disclose his level of education, but argued instead, “masomo haisaidii, ni talanta kama hii niliyorithi kwa babu” — “education is nothing compared to talent like the one that I inherited from my grandfather.” 

    The irony seems to escape them. They want to be seen by the “modern” world as legitimate, so they appropriate its titles in their advertisements. To have any chance at success, they need to appear as accredited as the Western-educated professionals practicing in their vocations. But what they claim to offer is something altogether different. The doctors and the professors who advertise on the streets hope to capitalize on a different mode of knowing: the powers of the occult. But they do so by invoking a professional context whose practices would undermine their claims to that power.

    Yet the irony isn’t lost on everyone. Some towns have carried out campaigns to remove posters. In February 2021, the mayor of Nyeri, a town north of Nairobi, asked that the posters be removed and burned. According to the Star, the mayor said that “Nyeri people are God-fearing and will not entertain witchcraft.” The people who advertise on posters, he went on to say, “are not diviners but con artists who are after fleecing residents.” The real diviners had to be protected from the fake. Similarly, in August 2014, James Marwa, the leader of a county on the Kenyan coast, asked his workers to remove all the posters advertising waganga, saying that the advertisers were “thugs masquerading as diviners.” He told the Star that he had “received several complaints of residents who are furious with the mushrooming of the posters and signboards in the town . . . that the posters had created a feeling of superstition in the area . . . and were an eyesore and not good for tourism as well as for children.” Interestingly, when Marwa tried to arrest two of the waganga, some of the residents were not happy and claimed that the witch doctors were very helpful and that the posters should not be removed. According to one resident, “traditional herbalists had solutions to quite a number of problems and ailments that cannot be treated in hospitals.”

    Some people are cynical about the status of the charlatans. They think that the con-artists should be left alone to do their thing. Tom Kamau, a street vender, says that he knows that “some witch doctors are conmen, but they should go on with their trade, just like pastors do.” To Kamau, “witchdoctors are just like pastors and priests, they reinforce superstition and fear,” he said in an interview with the Standard in 2020. And perhaps he is right. It is sometimes possible to see that witch doctors and pastors in Kenya are offering similar services: magical intervention in order to bring luck, to make other people do things you want them to do, to resolve problems, and so on. All it takes is a certain degree of objectivity to recognize that prayer is often used as a way of asking God to bend the laws of nature to solve your personal needs. “Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen” (Hebrews 11:1–6). It would be cruel to deny suffering people the relief that they can obtain from psychological placebos; illusions sometimes have positive consequences, just as the truth can be crushing.

    Anyway, the world is full of religious charlatans who profit from people’s desperation just as readily, and with similar promises of rescue and salvation, as quack diviners. It is hard not to argue that the purveyors of the “prosperity gospel” in America work in precisely this way: they ask for your money, command that you believe, and promise that you will receive a tenfold reward from God. Perhaps in Kenya, and in other African countries, there is a kind of three-way cross-fertilization between Western medicine and the Gospel and the indigenous systems of healing provided by traditional herbalists and diviners.

    Yet the popular media in Kenya still abounds with skeptics. On radio talk shows the guests regularly mock the diviners. “Who can treat the lack of a girlfriend?” asks a guest on one of the radio shows. “How is that even a condition? Who can treat kukosa kazi (unemployment), kukosa mke (lacking a wife) to kukumbana na nuksi (dealing with general bad luck)? They are treating the untreatable.” And, of course, there are contemporary Kenyan artists such as Onyis Martin who strongly feel that those who advertise in posters are fakers. In several of his paintings he portrays the faces of children who appear as if they are emerging out of, or being erased from, the layered remnants of the waganga posters. The eyes of the children are innocent and hopeful and seem to plead for help, or at least recognition. The haunted faces look lost and vulnerable. They seem to be pleading for rescue, but are at the same time buried by the forces that pretend to offer them relief.

    When I walk through the streets of Nairobi and see the waganga posters everywhere, I cringe. But when I return home and turn on my computer and google witchtok and scroll through over six million videos of Gen-Zers playfully “practicing witchcraft,” I cringe even harder. Occult thinking is inescapable; it seems to be a symptom of modern urban life, stemming in part from its omnipresent “market rationalities” and its anxieties. Maybe fantasy and superstition are the only alternatives to the callous regimentations of economic rationality. Occultism is not — as is often presumed — a holdover from some archaic or primitive backwater. The primitive does not always represent some obscure atavism: here it is, everywhere among us, the West included. What is occultism if not the attribution of efficacy to forces that one cannot understand? Occult economies are at the heart of modern capitalism today — so mysterious to some that they turn to diviners to ease its ravages. Maybe the wizards of Silicon Valley, the priesthood of digital engineers, are the most powerful occultists who ever lived, even if the long-term effects of their miracle are beginning to seem less than magical. 

    Victimhood, Pain, and Virtue

    On December 8, 2015, French President François Hollande announced plans to posthumously award the Legion of Honour to the one hundred and thirty victims of the terrorist attacks of November 13 at the Bataclan concert hall and the surrounding area. The institution’s Grand Chancellor disagreed. Since its creation on May 19, 1802, by Napoléon Bonaparte, the Légion d’honneur has rewarded service members and civilians for distinguished service to France. The innocent people barbarically slain in the name of jihadism deserved France’s respects, but in a thousand other ways than by awarding them a medal reserved for acts of heroism. In the end, Hollande backed down and, on July 1, 2016, created the National Medal of Recognition for Victims of Terrorism, the fifth highest decoration in protocol order of precedence.

    The news of this award was received coolly by some of the public and within the armed forces. It meant that those hurt or killed by fanatics were afforded higher honors than those bestowed on people who fought to defend France. Here were more symptoms of a very contemporary confusion that already sparked debate in the immediate post-war period between members of the Resistance and those sent to the camps: Is suffering torture more worthy than performing feats of valor? Are the unfortunate more heroic than the brave? In another example of this conflation, the municipal government of Paris wanted to honor Arnaud Beltrame, the police officer who offered himself — and ultimately his life — in exchange for a hostage in the southern French town of Trèbes on March 24, 2018. The plaque read “For Arnaud Beltrame, victim of his heroism.” His family protested and the wording was changed.

    Persecution is among those “Christian virtues that have gone mad,” to quote Chesterton. That the son of God came to Earth as a crucified slave to save humanity and elevate the poor and dispossessed was outrageous to men of antiquity, and also to Nietzsche, who was a big fan of strength and aristocracy. Jesus preached not for the rich and the mighty but for the meek and the fallen. With his characteristic blend of gentleness and aggression, he set in motion the ideal of rebellion against the powerful that would shape the entire Western world, including the great secular doctrines of modernity. What is Marx’s working class if not the body of Christ formed into a revolutionary bloc to upend history and create the perfect society? What are minorities in “wokeism,” if not so many Christ-like effigies for us to stop and revere? Their misfortune legitimizes them, especially when that misfortune is pluralized through “intersectionality,” Kimberlé Crenshaw’s concept of a crossroads where several forms of oppression meet. (The more, the better, for this mentality.) Hierarchies must be inverted and the vanquished elevated above the brutes. Where the victor says, “might makes right,” conversely, the victim says, “my weakness is my weapon and my right.”

    This quasi-sacredness of the vulnerable is one of the great prerogatives of civilization. We are the beneficiaries of this revolution, for better and for worse. It is this revolution that, over the past two millennia, has promoted compassion and sympathy and solidarity into high ethical ideals, and made possible women’s rights, children’s rights, the rights of exploited and enslaved and oppressed and colonized people, and their emergence into the public arena a reality. But a perverse strategy has grafted itself onto this undisputed leap forward, with both countries and individuals enthusiastically identifying as victims. This trend seems more entrenched in rich countries, whose citizenry is devoted to material pleasures and structurally dissatisfied with its lot. On both sides of the Atlantic, our current pantheons are comprised only of the oppressed and the crushed. They alone are eligible for our sympathy, and new victims — and categories of victimhood — are identified each day. It has become our great democratic passion — even the privileged want to play the maligned. Freedom, the ability that each of us possesses to lead our lives as we see fit, has above all become the right to indulge in self-pity.

    The word “victim” is polysemic. To be robbed or to be hurt in an accident is not the same thing as to be raped or to be tortured. But within the cult of victimhood there is no gray — only black and white. Everyone, especially since World War II, has aligned their own condition with that of the most afflicted. Traditionally, victim status has been accorded by historians or the courts: the former described the reality of a massacre, the latter confirmed that reality and drew conclusions from it. The road to recognition was long and often paved by countries or governments. But today, in a time of impatience distended by social media, people hurry the process along by crowning themselves martyrs. The French Revolution’s lists of grievances set the precedent. But consider the phenomenon of what might be called grievance studies, these recriminatory departments in American universities that break down into a myriad of social groups who dub themselves martyrs from the outset. Armenians, Jews, enslaved people, colonized people, Harkis (the Algerian soldiers who enlisted in the French army during the Algerian War), and gays had to wait around impatiently for a long time before being recognized. We no longer have the courage to wait; we want to identify as pariahs now. What does it mean to be a victim? Is it a narrative identity we adopt and expect others to confirm? Is it a pathology of recognition, the desire to be identified without having to introduce oneself?

    The intense hero-idealism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been replaced by the intense victim-idealization of the twenty-first, at the risk of mass-producing false martyrs who crowd out the real ones. It has become the alibi of killers, such as Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Hamas, who rely on some ancient wrong to drape themselves in the mantle of martyrdom as they commit their crimes. After 1945 and the Holocaust, the Jewish people were put atop a pedestal, and then toppled off it when they became Israelis, accused of every evil: colonialism, racism, imperialism. From blessed to cursed: from their model station the Jewish people have become the rival to eliminate if one is to take their place. We most clearly understand the entire Middle East conflict when we see it as a global fight to win the title of humanity’s wicked stepchild. On a planetary scale, a competition is playing out for who can scream their distress the loudest. The brotherhood of the fallen is met by a cacophony of injured voices who hold the whipping boy in their highest esteem and feed the two great passions of revenge and resentment. White or black supremacists, radical Islamists, bitter male supremacists, wrathful neo-feminists, angry environmentalists, revanchist Slavophiles, vindictive neo-Ottomans — each claims a stolen glory or past disaster it can accuse its enemies of perpetrating. How many defeated empires, Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, don the raiment of the damned so they can indulge in the unbridled hubris of avenging ancient wrongs? How many independent countries point the finger at their former colonial powers only to continue to exploit their own peoples?

    Once in power, the natural trajectory of any persecuted person is to become the persecutor. Painting oneself the victim is, in truth, a form of warmongering: the more you feel sorry for yourself, the more entitled you feel to punish those you call enemies, your tears fat with rage and animosity. Dispossessed status enables one to potentially enjoy every right, especially the right to accuse others in the name of one’s trauma, even if the accusation is tantamount to a conviction with no other form of process or trial.

    The final stage in victim identity formation is the crowding out of actual victims in favor of opportunist pariahs whose only distinction is having the networks and the reputation that enable them to stake their claims. In a dark comedy, the fortunate and the powerful also want to belong to the aristocracy of the margins and form new disadvantaged castes, brandishing their reduced fortunes like a weapon. How did the messages of the Enlightenment and of the French Revolution, messages of a better world rid of fatalism and zealotry, lead to a society of sniveling and fragility? But while victim status has become all the rage, what is really astounding is that suffering has become the new sacred. Formerly the fate endured by all of humanity, suffering is now a trophy one proudly displays to impress one’s contemporaries. It provides you with a borrowed identity, transforms you into someone exceptional who can peacock in public on the cheap. Even Donald Trump has compared himself to Alexei Navalny. Trump’s supporters have likened him to Jesus himself and elevated him, after his brushes with assassination, to secular sainthood — complete with stigmata! Silvio Berlusconi used to say that he was the Italian Jesus, prepared to endure any torment to save his people. (In fact he lived one of the least tormented lives on the planet.) The ultimate dream would be to achieve martyrdom without having to suffer anything worse than the misfortune of being born.

    There are several explanations for this. Democracy’s default setting is dissatisfaction; it perpetuates a thirst that it cannot slake and escalates rivalries. Its inputs are indignation, rebellion, and envy. It makes each of us citizens more worried about the things we don’t have than about the things we do. The prosperity enjoyed by some fuels a permanent state of jealousy based on ceaseless social comparison, and the privileged are not spared. Collectively, as Odo Marquart has observed, we are struck with the syndrome of the Princess and the Pea, Hans Christian Andersen’s heroine who tosses and turns all night because of a tiny pea stuck under her mattress. As modern medicine eases our living conditions, so does our sensitivity increase. Broadly speaking, the mythology of victimhood has been explained by the discrepancy between what the modern world promised and modern reality itself. But what if the opposite were true? If the unquestionable successes of science and industry instead have provoked our impatience? So many ills have been overcome, so many injustices righted, that we are astonished that they cannot all be resolved within the hour. The advanced state of our civilization creates, despite itself, as much suffering as it eases. By setting up well-being and health as a minimum standard, the lack thereof becomes all the more intolerable.

    Today’s prevailing hedonism accentuates what it would rather downplay: the omnipresent terror of pain, both physical and psychological. A society in which happiness is mandatory is also one that incessantly speaks the language of distress. In a warped shift of meaning, it calls anything that frustrates its ambition a “hardship.” The Greco-Romans sought to limit suffering by applying logic to its causes; Christianity exalted suffering to redeem humankind; we, meanwhile, deny suffering’s very existence in the crazy hope that it will disappear if we deprive it of any public expression, with the result that new categories of victims crop up every day and public or private grumbling has never been so common. Young people in rich Western countries have been called the “snowflake generation” as an expression of their extreme fragility. Hordes of “vulnerable groups” line up to share their despairs and fears.

    When we compare previous centuries to our own, what has changed is not the number of scourges humanity is burdened with but the way we think about them. Europe’s classical era could be pessimistic, merely confirming the dogma of original sin: crimes and atrocities ensued as proof of our wickedness, which will be redeemed by God. The tragedy starts in the Renaissance, with the hope for a better world, provided only that man account for his failures. This promise to build a reasonable Eden with the tools of the welfare state, education, and law remains, by definition, unfinished, and therefore perennially disappointing. Whatever we do to help ourselves, it is never enough. The more we try to make our lives easy, the more any residual difficulties seem to us insurmountable obstacles. 

    In France especially, where the welfare state is in equal measure bloated and ineffective, we live in a cycle of raised and dashed expectations. The government looks after us, takes its citizens under its wing and assures them their country will not forget them. In a society of thoughtful consideration, we are overprotected from cradle to grave, taken by the hand and set on the right track. Everyone’s exposure to adversity must be lessened to the fullest possible extent. But as our protection is ever more provided for, so too do our fears loom larger. We are never sufficiently fulfilled, loved, or rewarded, and our structural disappointment grows.

    Just one century ago, in a French secular republic emerging from a dehumanizing Great War, effort and endurance were the norm, the minimum discipline to which people had to submit in order to succeed. Now our comparatively enviable living conditions make us less tolerant of hardships. File “effort,” “tenacity” and even “setback” under “unpopular.” What is new is the indeterminacy of suffering and non-suffering. Every day new harms emerge to which we prove less than resilient. The difference is perceptible between generations, with older people better tolerating expectations deemed shocking by younger people. Every twenty years or so, our sensitivities recalibrate and what earlier generations deemed pain or pleasure is recategorized.

    Consider our vision of work, particularly since the pandemic. For some, work is a “right-wing” value; for others, work has, since the Enlightenment, contributed to liberating the individual, raising people up from ignorance. To work is to transform oneself while transforming the world. People turn down traditional employment, such as physical labor, unless it is as play, in the form of sports or fitness. Jobs in building and road construction, the food-service and hospitality industries, but also nannies, security guards, delivery people, and house cleaners — these we leave to immigrants, in both France and the United States. Who are immigrants? Those who carry out the menial work we no longer willingly accept. When young generations in France and elsewhere say they want a job that has meaning, they forget, in their noble request, to consider caring and maintenance positions, the humble tasks that ensure that our streets are clean, our restaurants open, and our children supervised.

    Citizens of modern democracies are both spoiled children raised rather permissively and exacting customers who are always right. My parents expected to have to wait, to delay gratification. Since 1968, we have only known multiple and instantaneous satisfactions, accelerated by developments in digital technologies. The individual in a democratic society no longer tolerates frustration and waiting, which is likened to an affront, almost an oppression. He remains until adulthood “His Majesty the baby,” to borrow Freud’s expression. Veruca Salt wants a Golden Goose now. The right to have rights has mutated into the right to have every right, with rights being confused with “whatever makes me happy.” Any limitation or refusal makes me a victim and legitimizes my fury. Any duties, already reduced to a bare minimum, are experienced as new abuses. Whatever our age, we act like adolescent slackers irritated by the slightest restriction who confuse being subject to any confines with being clapped in irons. Hence, today’s employees’ preference for a maximum reduction of the workweek, if possible for the same salary. Hence, the reflexive aversion to any restrictive policy seeking, for example, to reduce the speed limit or establish low-emissions zones in cities, the latter being disadvantageous to owners of older cars. The memory of the Gilets Jaunes insurrection in 2019 is still too recent to regulate a means of transportation that remains essential for the majority. Prohibiting anything in a democracy without first embarking on a lengthy awareness-building campaign is still seen as political suicide.

    Even higher education gets likened to serfdom. In seeking to spare our kids any vexation, after the 1970s, schools have often given up on educating. Grades became tantamount to violence and were swiftly replaced with letter grades that were then considered no less detrimental. We must help pupils blossom, not stuff their heads with useless knowledge! And when they are taught the classics, we must spare them any linguistic challenges, unacceptable anachronisms, and pompous wording, not to mention any negative representations of women or minorities, so as not to offend their fragile souls. As a result, standards fall and functional illiteracy rises. Those private schools that still care about excellence and competition are thriving. Meanwhile, the new Internet professions (blogger, YouTuber, or Instagrammer) require no other skills than an appealing look, a glib speaking style, and an eye for novelty, while trivializing difficult work and underpaid advanced research. Discomfort has always been a code, across various societies, but one that has continuously changed over time. We no longer see misfortune in sharp focus, if indeed we ever did. The boundary between what is normal and what is pathological is in constant flux, at the risk of our losing all sense of proportion and mistaking temporary setbacks for unsurpassable disasters.

    Instead of challenging each other to excel, people in the West too often race each other for a seat on the struggle bus and make it a point of honor to share how terribly they’re doing. A good ego is now a suffering ego, never a conquering one. Hence, suffering now sells more than sex. Take, for example, the raft of crybaby “autofictions” vying each year to tug the hardest at readers’ heartstrings with their tearful confessions. Authors both male and female describe the physical violence, sexual abuse, poverty, and nasty alcoholic parents at the root of their trauma. This genre is far from new, first appearing in Europe in the eighteenth century with British and French sentimental literature that the Marquis de Sade laughed at in his day. Child-abuse novels get vast print runs and influence court cases. In these highly coded works, you have to drip-feed the reader your pain, not tip from pity into grotesquerie. (Or, as the Guardian critic and journalist John Crace put it, “the art is to portray yourself as a victim while selling yourself as a survivor.”) A terminal cancer diagnosis will have no chance of moving people unless you actually die, but then you won’t be around to enjoy all your success. This trend salts the earth that literature grows in, reducing it from an imaginative creation to a mere laundry list of despondent moods. From their comfy beds, everyone breaks into their little formulaic laments. If all you had to do to have talent was suffer, people would know!

    Misfortune is no longer obscene but takes up the whole stage, and as soon as it appears it silences doubters and demands respect. The rules of ordinary ethics no longer apply to those with a claim to victimhood, aglow with every virtue, part of the Holy Family of the outcast. This is why the market value of the dispossessed fluctuates over time. Landing the title of “victim” — and, above all, keeping it — is a tall order. Whatever one does, it will always be to the detriment of other oppressed people who are not in the public spotlight. Tell me who your preferred victim is and I will tell you who you are: for the Vatican, migrants; for environmentalists, the planet. For others, the victim animals, Claude Lévi-Strauss’s “Other-of all the Others,” hunted down with dogs, tortured in slaughterhouses, dealt the death blow in the corrida. For still others, it is the Ukrainians on the receiving end of Russian imperialism, the Uyghurs, the Yazidis, the Kurds. On the left now Palestinians are especially in favor since war broke out in Gaza in 2023. Through contagion by, proximity to, or solidarity with the one-hundred-percent-certified oppressed, you too can glom onto the great clan of the stigmatized. Generally speaking, intersectionnalité oblige. If both true and false martyrs abound, it is because of the vast crowd of candidates in the running.

    To be acknowledged as a victim is to have every right, no strings attached. In France, where violence is a thousand-year-old tradition, riots still have a positive connotation in memory of the French Revolution, the July Revolution of 1830, the Revolution of 1848, and the Paris Commune of 1870. Global warming, the crises of rural and blue-collar communities, and the challenges faced by truckers, livestock farmers, and “excluded” housing projects, apparently warrant the damage caused by rebellious violence without anyone incurring the slightest punishment. Freud’s idea of the crowd, that “collective soul independent of the individuals comprising it,” is always innocent, the raging masses are an indomitable deity, and woe is he who would dare call them to account, especially in a court of law. These insurgent groups are not subject to basic law: drug dealers, armed robbers, even terrorists are exempt on the ground that they belong to the “racialized.” Everywhere “excuse culture” is flourishing. In 2018 we watched the Gilets Jaunes destroy monuments, vandalize the Arc de Triomphe, threaten the French president’s life, and brutally beat the security services (who also injured a number of Gilets Jaunes) without overmuch concern or having to pay for the damage caused, all in the name of “the People’s” holy wrath. The right to demonstrate and express one’s righteous fury is sacred, especially when the nobility of the cause (be it our burning planet or its downtrodden people) justifies the savagery of the means.

    If we invert the opening line of Anna Karenina, we might say that the maligned are all alike, only happy people are happy in their own way. When it comes to miserabilism, extremists at either end of the political spectrum act identically, both in Europe and the United States. All adopt the defensive speech of the slave fighting for his survival: for example, the French racist journalist and politician Éric Zemmour’s concept of “Francocide” in reference to the ghastly murder of a twelve-year-old girl by an Algerian woman. Why this need to transform an appalling news item into an instance of civilizational war? The trend is always to carry one’s line of argument to the extreme, so as to move readers to anger or pity. Back in 1993, while an actual war of ethnic cleansing was underway in Bosnia, Jean-Marie Le Pen said the French were suffering from ethnic cleansing. Two years earlier he used the phrase “cultural genocide” (in reference to contemporary art) at a time when the left was in power, because the left “insisted upon compliant socialist art, worthy of Goebbels.” You have to hold the voters’ attention, and the more willing you are to exaggerate, the more persuasive you become. Now, as then, Nazi name-calling abounds, the vocabulary of the Second World War recycled ad nauseam and applied to every subject.

    An identity built on victimhood is the democratic version of privilege. Like the aristocratic “de” of a noble surname, it is a distinction handed down from father to son, mother to daughter, the new blue blood that establishes you in one of the only two nobilities democracies recognize: merit and trauma. According to the French university professor Johann Michel, for example, one can “become a descendant of a slave” — his book is actually called Becoming a Descendant of a Slave — the way one becomes a woman according to Simone de Beauvoir, with a reconstructed ancestry, in this case focusing on the fight of the “Maroons,” the formerly enslaved who rose up against their masters. Victimhood entrepreneurs begin as memory entrepreneurs, who revive painful chapters from history in order to claim them and unite. Theirs is a doleful aristocracy outlining a reverse caste system in which having suffered harm supersedes the advantages of high birth.

    Our culture, as Robert Hughes presciently observed in 1993 in a book of the same name, is a “culture of complaint,” of whiners upset by everything, even their successes. Affirmative action policies “send us the message that there is more power in our past suffering than our present achievements” as the African-American essayist Shelby Steele put it. Any attempt to flourish today would therefore be pointless; the traumas of the slave trade and segregation surely weigh too heavily to be overcome. Being the Wretched of the Earth is becoming a profession with hereditary transmission of victim and perpetrator status. Dynasties of despoiled people endure through the ages, armed with their prerogatives. At the risk of being labelled pretentious, or indeed a sham, as they take their places among the outraged, the cleverest have become masters in the dark art of trading on their underdog condition.

    But any official victim will first encounter an enemy, not in the person of his torturer but in that of other sufferers, the sheer number of which repels him. This is why the Holocaust has become a symbolic treasure chest that must not be left to Jews alone. No, they must make way for all victims of torture, Native Americans, enslaved people, Africans, Palestinians from Gaza, the LGBTQ community, and so on. We are not trivializing genocide — on the contrary, we remain fascinated by this ultimate evil that should benefit other, more deserving, groups! In this respect, the Holocaust denialism of Robert Faurisson in France or of the Iranian or Turkish governments is a symbolic swap: some people deny that the gas chambers or the Armenian Genocide ever happened in order to better oppress those who claim to have been their victims. The Jews hide their crimes in the Middle East behind the screen of the Holocaust, the Armenians hide their complicity with Turkey’s enemies in 1915. The stakes are high. The great advantage that bad fortune has over good fortune is that it procures you a destiny. Only misfortune counts as admission to this new aristocracy. But there’s never much room on this mental pedestal, is there? It is an elite club and rough types, copycats, and pale imitations don’t get past the velvet rope. The victim identity is a pitiless Darwinian one, which explains the sharp rise in antisemitism since October 7, 2023. The Holocaust is ours, not yours!

    Oppressed peoples or groups have only one right, but it is sacred: the right to no longer be oppressed. And we owe them only one duty, that of coming to their aid if they are threatened with annihilation. But having been subjugated or discriminated against confers no metaphysical superiority on any category of human beings over others. The idea that such a category of people is always right, even when they resort to violence, is untenable. No minority gets a free pass for barbarity, nor does it enjoy some metaphysical grace that would exempt it from accountability in consideration for the suffering it has endured. So enough with these holier-than-thou groups, especially in the Global South, who brook no criticism and figure that they are forever owed whatever they want to make up for crimes perpetrated against them centuries ago.

    Victims are our ambassadors in a land of darkness that they have surveyed with a courage that commands our admiration. As scars fade over time, so, too, can disaster be turned to our advantage. We are not merely the products of our history and backgrounds. We have this leeway called freedom and it enables us to escape determinism. We can switch tracks like a train, though it may require a long struggle, and see our afflictions end, with the old lines of hatred and anger falling into disuse, grown over with tall weeds. We are descendants but even more we are forebears, cutting the ribbon on an unwritten future. The miracle of childhood starts the human adventure all over again from a new starting point, and it need not perpetuate its elders’ wrath. All we can wish for younger generations is that they cast off our old grudges.

    To resist victimhood’s self-righteous pull, you must step outside yourself, not surround yourself with self-proclaimed martyrs, so drunk on their own condition as to approach hypnosis. Building misfortune up into a sacred space makes any escape from one’s wretched situation impossible. It is possible to recover from serious injury or disease or from a horrible experience and still continue to love, to hope, and to work. The greatness of a life well lived resides wholly in our recovery from disappointments and humiliations, our abandoning them to the black hole of the past to better step into a future full of unknown wonder. Cradled and coddled in the prosperous second half of the twentieth century, are we capable of facing the challenges of climate disruption, the return of war, and terrorist inhumanity? Who will instill the courage in future generations not only to face but also to overcome adversity with their heads held high, without faltering, without moaning, without failing? That is reality, and it alone will tear us from the narcissism of victim culture. We must learn to resist the seductive allure of panic, of admiring misery. We must learn to suffice with the heroism of being human.

     

    Translated by Jennifer Gore

    After Six Hundred Years, the City of Lausanne Appoints Its First Female Night Watch

    for Cassandre Berdoz

    Cassandra does not sing the fall of Troy,
    where Little Ajax raped her in the sanctuary.
    She does not sing her slaughter by Clytemnestra
            while Agamemnon beat his fists on the ground.

    From the tower of the Cathedral called Notre Dame,
    what Cassandra sings is the passage of time.
    She sings the hour, east toward Jerusalem,
            then south across the lake to Évian,

    through the cardinal points, following on
    the great bell that is called Mary Magdalen,
    that shakes you with the aftermath of its hum-tone.
            And there is another bell than this hourly bell,

    smaller, a bell called Clemency, whose do
    sounds a warning to announce and follow
    calamity, carved with a bas relief to show
            a gowned woman kneeling on a scaffold,

    and an angel stays the sword of the executioner.
    But I swear to you by each cobble and rafter,
    Cassandra, I swear by the narrow red door
            you opened for me in a wall of stone

    melting like a sugar cube in the rain,
    I tell you, long ago I knew someone
    who heard the hours pass, felt the commotion,
            but could not rise to flee from where she lay,

    in your city of staircases and Burgundian Gothic.
            Cassandra, sing to the plume of crematory smoke
    that drifted southwest out over the lake,
            sing to the killing hearth, Cover your fire!

    Sing to the night that marriage is unmerciful.
    With every breath, sing that there is no angel.
    Cup your hands, when the growling bronze is still,
            and sing that the executioner’s arm works in different ways.

    Operation Pacific (1951)

    It was just a B-grade submarine movie (or maybe all sub
           movies are B-grade), a vehicle for John Wayne,
                   whose drawling virility I always resent,
           while Patricia Neal plays his ex-wife, though off-screen
                   her lover Gary Cooper visited the set
                           to try to persuade her to abort their fetus.
                           And after all the khaki, depth charges and dud torpedoes,
    while they’re sitting together in a Honolulu nightclub,

    at the very moment when her dazed come-hither look
           was on my last nerve, somehow the writer-director
                  throws himself a life-ring, on this property
           where the hero keeps returning like a commuter,
                  and borrows a few lines from the The Odyssey,
                         so Neal as Lieutenant (j.g.) Mary Stuart
                         reaches way back and, not missing a beat
    while talking about a young pilot, says to Duke,

    He wants to go someplace where they never heard of the Navy.
           His idea is to fly back to Wichita, Kansas
                  and start walking inland carrying a pair of oars
           and stop when he gets to a place where someone says,
                  “What is that anyway you’ve got on your shoulders?”
                         a place where they never season the food with salt,
                         and then he’ll know that his wandering’s done, that’s it.
    He’ll die in his own bed surrounded by family.

    And although the reference goes right over Duke’s head,
           it did feel somehow as if a black hull had surfaced nearby,
                  its teak decks sieving the creamy runnels of salt,
           to watch a broken-backed freighter in its death agony:
                  and you could have knocked me flat for just a moment,
                         that prophecy of peace after so much war
                         definitely the last thing I would have looked for
    amid all the routine lies of postwar Cold War Hollywood.

    Anzeindaz

    For years I lived on the mountain,
    but I never drank from the high stream
    where it flashes over gray scree

    on its way down to the valley
    after percolating through the glacier
    that holds grains of carbon and pollen,

    maize and grasses, smoke, plague and famine,
    spores of fungus on the manure of cattle,
    a thousand years legible in its core.

    I wanted my words to be like that,
    but I was too careful in my body.
    Then one day I found I was dragging

    a sled twice my weight through a plush tunnel
    studded with fool’s gold and inhabited
    by pale eyeless creatures and mouths.

    In one of a hundred gleaming caves,
    I stopped to consider a hunger
    that sickens before it is sated.

    I found I starved down nicely.
    I slept in a fetal curl and earned
    some weeks of my own foul making.

    When I woke, it was with the taste
    of bitter coins in my mouth,
    and the stream was nowhere in sight.

    I was ready to drink anything I could read through.

    The Woodcock

    It was almost vulgar the way that it was just
    so pronounced, how innocent they were.
    —photojournalist Lynsey Addario, 3.15.22

    On the front page of the newspaper this morning,
    there was a photograph of a mother and her children
    killed by a Russian mortar round

    as they tried to flee across a ruined bridge.
    They lay as if a strong wind had blown them down,
    and I thought: They look like dead birds.

    Later, on the ramp behind my office,
    I found a dead woodcock, also known as
    a timberdoodle, bogsucker, night partridge,

    brush snipe, hokumpoke, or becasse,
    and once thought to winter on the moon.
    I studied its cryptic plumage,

    the richest thing I had ever seen,
    an earthworks, a stone tracery, a selvage,
    with tuftings of the softest gray down,

    like dawn coming up on the world
    or the filling torn from an anorak,
    and a row of dark eyes that did not blink,

    rimmed with salt when some infinitely mild
    touch lingered along its side
    before leaving it to the viaticum

    of its wounds and their copious blood
    — since the woodcock is hunted as game,
    “best cooked pink, and just a little bloody.”

    America Giveth

    The abstract principle that human beings are born with dignity is too difficult for a person to formulate on her own. It had to be formulated by many minds in concert over generations and then enshrined in philosophical texts which shape worldviews and governments. Though the idea of human dignity is at least as old as the Bible, it was not set down in a political philosophy until millennia later. Liberalism is the word we use to refer to the systems of belief and the politics which are buttressed by this principle. It instructs that human dignity endures even when it is abused. And as a political philosophy, liberalism constrains the power of government in service to this inalienable human dignity. Liberalism hectors, and long may it do so, that might does not make right. Might can ignore the truth, but it cannot annul it. In a liberal country — and America is the only country founded explicitly on that philosophy — our leaders serve at our behest. Power does not confer dignity: humanity does. We are blessed to be born late, after this tradition had been developed, and after the government formed upon it has grown fat and sophisticated.

    Fat and sophisticated, but alas not always wise. In our country every four years the electorate grants power to a single executive, on the condition that that power be checked and bent to the citizens’ will and rights and good. But it is possible for a liberal system to democratically grant power to an illiberal leader, a leader who has contempt for individual rights and who does not have faith in the liberal system. Insofar as they are only a poll, elections are value-neutral and can reward illiberal leaders and parties without being undemocratic. Such a leader, once elected, can corrupt the power of the presidency by governing as if power itself is constrained by nothing but other power, and that rights are a myth which the citizenry cannot insist upon. Such a leader, like a medieval king, mistakes rights for privileges, which he believes are his to give and his to take away.

    There have been power-hungry American presidents before, but the power that they were hungry for derived from the mechanisms laid down in the Constitution. American identity has been perverted, misinterpreted, swollen, shrunk, and turned in on itself — but before Trump the many varieties of abuse dealt to the country by its elected leaders were all products of a particular president’s perverted interpretation of what America was supposed to mean. Trump is different. For Trump, American power is in service to nothing but the personal interests of the man at its helm. Even more than he detests those who “poison the blood of our country,” as he once put it, he adores himself. He is a misogynist but misogyny is not his worldview, and a racist but racism is not his worldview. Self -preservation and self-aggrandizement are his operating principles. Power for power’s sake — fascism, in a word. Trump’s prejudices are all handmaidens of his avarice.

    Donald Trump’s stranglehold on our power is premised on wringing out the liberalism which is the lifeblood of this country. He is a bloodhound, and he follows the scent of his own interests with a sub-intellectual zeal. The liberal system was designed to constrain precisely his variety of brute greed, and so he is hellbent on destroying the liberal system — our system, the system of government upon which American identity depends. The system that has made this country the most powerful source and defense of freedom in human history, and the philosophy which informs that system, is the price of his perpetual ascent.

    On January 6, 2021, our current president goaded thousands of violent supporters to attack the U.S. Capitol because, he insisted, the election held that year had been stolen from him. He instructed the mobs to fetch for him what was rightfully his. This was a lie which he told in order to protect himself. That day was traumatic for the country because on it a former president sowed distrust in the democratic process throughout the population of a great democracy. But for Trump something else happened that day: for the first time, and irrevocably, he associated his interests with the obliteration of our democracy. When he returned to power — through the very system he now permanently associates with his own defenestration — he returned to destroy it.

    It is often pointed out that, while Trump allies himself with various far-right groups (the Christian right, for example) he is not strictly speaking an adherent of any far-right ideology — of any belief system at all. This line of argument is sometimes trotted out to make the point that Trump is not as bad as the company he keeps. This is true: he is worse. His many allies have various discrete concerns, various uses for Trumpian contempt for the liberal system, but Trump’s concern, his aggressive obsession, is with the system itself. And so every beneficiary of American liberalism — and American beneficiaries in particular — is duty-bound to consider Trump and his allies the gravest threat to our wellbeing and our future.

    Powerful leaders of one minority group in particular, the American Jewish community, are already shirking that duty. I write as a member of that group, in the first-person plural, because I believe we have a duty to denounce the cowardice committed in our name.

    On January 20, 2025 — the first day of Donald Trump’s second and final term as president of the United States, the president issued about one thousand five hundred pardons and commuted the sentences of fourteen of the supporters of his who had, at his instruction, mounted that violent insurrection against the Capitol four years prior. Among those pardoned were members of the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers, two violent white-supremacist groups. On that same day Rabbi Ari Berman, the current president of Yeshiva University, gave the benediction at Trump’s inauguration.

    Berman is not the only Jewish leader — in both America and Israel — to be displayed by this administration as proof that there are Jews, even important Jews, who give Trump their blessings, despite his flirtation with white supremacy and even Nazism. But it was a poetically significant moment — the Jew blessing the king on the same day that the king had pardoned and defended a man in a Camp Auschwitz sweatshirt. Berman’s treachery is representative of a strategy that deserves analysis and condemnation. Black, Latino, and women leaders have also been called upon to sell their blessings in service to our Bigot-in-Chief, but this dishonor has peculiar relevance for the Jew.

    Berman’s pandering is a betrayal of his people because it gives support to the undermining of the liberal system by which Jews — for the first time in our history, including before both exiles and after the advent of the Jewish state — were acknowledged to have rights that are axiomatic, not an expression of a monarch’s whim or economic need. Those rights, and the full citizenship that followed on them, were based on nothing other than our humanity. America was the first political power to insist that Jews have dignity because all human beings do. George Washington himself said as much in his sterling letter, written in 1790, to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island:

    The citizens of the United States of America have a right to applaud themselves for having given to mankind examples of an enlarged and liberal policy — a policy worthy of imitation. All possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship.

    It is now no more that toleration is spoken of as if it were the indulgence of one class of people that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights, for, happily, the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens in giving it on all occasions their effectual support.

    For once, the Jews’ sameness brings them security and even secures the legitimacy of their own institutions of power. America is special because, finally, Jews are not, because Jews here do not have to be. Separateness, cohesion, defenses against assimilation — all of these are choices Jews can decide to make or not. But America owes us the same rights as our fellow citizens, and for the same reason.

    The Jewish American is a type of significance to both traditions. No minority which benefits from the largesse of American liberalism has spent more time than the Jew languishing in illiberal alien states. None has exerted more effort in developing mechanisms for securing privileges in societies which grant minorities no rights, of growing dependent on those privileges before, as inevitably happens, they are taken away and the process of dependence and gratitude and nervousness had to begin again somewhere else.

    In the millennia that Jews have spent in the Diaspora, no country other than America has based its own right to exist on its duty to honor its citizens by making itself blind to those citizens’ personal identities and group memberships. American liberalism was not an act of charity but of self-preservation. It is the only prudent way to guarantee social peace in a heterogeneous society. Equality is not a favor our elected leader does for us — it is his obligation, and the obstruction of our equality is a betrayal of the office with which he has been entrusted. Liberalism was the philosophical mechanism which granted America authority to separate from Great Britain and govern itself. No country is more indebted to and dependent on the liberal system — and more allergic to monarchy, or any kind of absolute and unquestioned authority, which was what liberalism sought to dissolve — than ours. And so Jewish success in America is a testament to the success of the American project, as is true of all minority groups. Insofar as the Jews are distinct from other vulnerable Americans, we are distinct because we have more empirical evidence, more lived experience, that no other system is as reliable and as ethical as the liberal system is. The alleviation of our vulnerability is proof of America’s promise. America absorbed us — however incompletely, but then America does not demand complete absorption — and we are both, America and its Jewish inhabitants, stronger for it.

    The Trumpian flirtation with monarchism titillates his followers. It winks at a bloody dispensation in which monarchs enjoyed absolute power — executive orders galore. Memory is strong, long, and alive in our bones: people respond automatically to Trump’s invocation of monarchism by reverting to pre-modern genuflections. The tech bros trooping in and out of Mar-A-Lago, and then in and out of the White House, to kiss the ring distinguish themselves in this regard, but they are not alone in their atavistic behavior. Jews have also had to appease all-powerful leaders who had no respect for their rights or wellbeing. By the time liberal society had been invented, Jews had spent many centuries developing tools for securing protections. Trumpian illiberalism seems to have awakened in much of the American Jewish population a slumbering but deeply held faith, a kind of buried collective memory, that in an illiberal system a different relationship to power must hold. And so American Jewish leaders such as Rabbi Ari Berman of Yeshiva University morphed like clockwork into their medieval ancestors.

    It is enlightening to situate Jewish hospitality to Trump in the political history of the Jews in the exile. Throughout the exile Jews used to develop formal alliances — and, where possible, informal relations — with the ruler of the country. These alliances with the supreme central power were preferred to the other option for establishing a measure of security for themselves — an alliance with the population among which they lived, or with local secular and ecclesiastical authorities whose antipathy to and fear of Jews was reliably more powerful than whatever benefit Jews could offer them. The sovereign, by contrast, could be tempted into a mutually beneficial relationship in which privileges — as opposed to “rights” — were granted in exchange for certain goods. The Jewish historian Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi called this strategy — by which Jews circumvented local communities and leaders and went straight to the highest authority in the land — “vertical alliances,” and the rejected option of dependence on their neighbors “horizontal alliances.”

    Beginning with the Babylonian exile following the destruction of the first temple in 586 BCE, the Jews in exile replicated the governing structure held when they had sovereignty in the Holy Land. It was a sophisticated society. Jews were among the first nations in history to hold common property (the land of Israel belonged to the people, not to the king of Israel — a startling fact), to provide social safety nets, and to criminalize exacting interest from fellow Jews. This meticulously structured and tightly run society ensured that Jews were mutually dependent — that they could find political and economic security by depending on each other. The Jewish community in exile functioned, if not exactly like a state within a state, which became one of the classical canards of modern European anti-Semitism, then certainly as a corporate entity, with a greater degree of organizational independence and self-government than would ever be permitted in a modern European nation-state.

    Under Persian, Macedonian, Ptolemaic, and Seleucid rulers, Jews were granted a great deal of autonomy by gentile leaders. The basic structure of the internal Jewish community, and its relationship to its rulers, was essentially fixed from the start of exile through the time of the French Revolution and the advent of the modern era. And throughout that time this independence was secured, often, by paying for it. Jews paid special taxes in exchange for the freedom to govern themselves, and this also spared the monarch responsibility for coercing compliance with the legal and the tax system. This system held the longest, and was the most comprehensive and mutually beneficial, in the exile in Spain. Even after Ferdinand and Isabella forced the Jews into exile in 1492, the Spanish Jewish exile Solomon ibn Verga wrote with pride and nostalgia about the halcyon days of his destroyed community, and of the vertical alliance system throughout Spain and France: “in general, the kings of Spain and France, the nobles, the men of knowledge, and all the distinguished men of the land used to love the Jews, and hatred obtained only among the masses who were jealous of the Jews.”

    During the Middle Ages, the relationships between Jewish communities and their political leaders were formalized in charters negotiated by prominent Jews on behalf of their communities and made directly with the highest authority in the land. The earliest extant examples of the medieval charters are Carolingian, issued by Louis the Pious (778–840 CE), and likely modeled on similar charters issued by Charlemagne himself. All of these charters share the same structure and differ only slightly in details and application (from individuals to communities and ultimately, in the thirteenth century, to the Jews of an entire country — Emperor Frederick II issued a charter for all German Jews in 1236). All have in common the basic commitment to protect the Jewish communities and to honor their right to practice their law, in exchange for a direct feudal relationship sworn on the part of the Jewish representative to the King. Jews were called Juifs du Roi, the king’s Jews, or servus regie camerie, serfs of the royal chamber. Frederick Barbarossa wrote that the Jews “belong to our treasury,” and the Jews appreciated this. It was the highest form of protection.

    Similar dealings were conducted with the Papal authority, whose contempt for Jewish apostasy was tempered by Christianity’s canonical dependence on the Jewish tradition. Popes could be by turns vicious and solicitous about their Jews. Thus Pope Innocent III — who presided over the Fourth Lateran Council, which in 1215 was the first to compel Jews (and Muslims) to wear badges — also issued the Edict in Favor of the Jews, which begins, “Although the Jewish perfidy is in every way worthy of condemnation, nevertheless, because through them the truth of our faith is proved, they are not to be severely oppressed by the faithful” and warns Christians to refrain from, among other indignities, desecrating Jewish cemeteries; killing, robbing, or wounding Jews; forcing Jews to convert; and disrupting Jewish holidays. At the same time the Crusades were viciously violating these papal prohibitions. Similarly, Gregory IX, the first Pope to order that the Talmud be burned, a cultural disaster that occurred in Paris in 1242, also urged Louis IX of France to stop the crusaders and their mobs from massacring Jewish communities. Jews learned to forge alliances with actors whom they knew harbored ill-will against them. They had no choice. Their neighbors and local leaders reviled them, too. Jews preferred an imperfectly reliable but powerful ally bound by utility to perfectly unreliable and weak allies sour with jealousy and fear (though there were quiet times and places in medieval Europe in which Jews and Christians lived in coexistence with each other).

    Until the modern period, Jewish separateness was necessary for securing safety. Separateness — contained autonomy — is what the charters protected. Assimilation was both impossible and undesirable. Cohesion and insulation were protective mechanisms. Mixing with gentiles and weakening the bonds that delineated the Jews from gentiles would have confused the ruler from whom security had been so carefully extracted. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Jewish bankers and businessmen who handled the finances of and lent money to the nobility, and who represented the Jewish communities in their dealings with the monarchy, became known as “Court Jews.” These Jews enjoyed privileges withheld not only from their Jewish coreligionists, but often also from the gentiles. This political arrangement, the system of the Court Jews, was also premised on traditional Jewish separateness. The promise of equality, remember, was never on the horizon.

    Until the eighteenth century. The French Revolution brusquely thrust France into the modern period, and the French Jews were the first to be fed the strange fruit of emancipation. Liberalism not only guaranteed rights to everyone, it also made demands of everyone. The possibility of full citizenship came at the cost of an unmixed loyalty to France and a significant degree of self-erasure. Insofar as the organized Jewish community was a quasi-political structure, it had to be dissolved, along with the special access enjoyed by the unelected wealthy Jewish leadership. As Mirabeau, one of the leaders of the revolution, put it, “son pays deviendra sa patrie” — his country must become his homeland. No dualities were allowed.

    The old protectionist system of Jewish security vanished with the monarchy. Suddenly the French Jewish community was called to trust a new system which seemed discomfitingly dependent on the goodwill of their political and social leaders as well as the enlightenment of their neighbors — something Jews, like all minorities of liberal countries, recognized was too often honored in the breach. (Yerushalmi described “the royal alliance” as a “myth.”) And so Jews for the first time had to ask ourselves the same question vulnerable minorities of liberal countries have been asking ever since: how big is the breach? How far from the ideal of itself was the reality of the liberal state?

    In France, granting rights to Jewish citizens certainly marked something of a departure from the nativist identity of the state. But anti-Semitism burbled in the cauldron of French prejudice as a reminder that liberalism exists always in tension with the uglier impulses of every population which aspires towards it. The burble boiled over first with the Dreyfus Affair at the end of the nineteenth century, and then with the establishment of the Vichy government in the middle of the twentieth.

    America was always different. For the American Jew, the distance between liberal promise and liberal fulfillment has always been smaller than anywhere else. Even before total enfranchisement, Jewish Americans recognized that when we were deprived of our rights we were deprived of something that belonged to us, something that the country owed us. We could fight the abuse of our rights with the country’s own principles.

    Isaac Leeser was a Prussian Jew who joined his uncle in Richmond, Virginia, in 1824 at the age of seventeen, and became one of the most important leaders of early American Jewry. He published the first English language translation of the Jewish Bible in America (the twenty-two books arranged according to Jewish custom, as opposed to the thirty-nine books which make up the Christian Old Testament), and he was the founder and publisher of the Occident, the first general Jewish newspaper in the United States. In the pages of that paper Leeser published, in 1845, an article about the Maryland Bill, known as the “Jew Bill,” which had been passed in the Maryland legislature nineteen years earlier, and which gave the Jews of that state the right to hold public office. Leeser pointed out that

    the few highly respectable Israelites who then lived in Maryland took a noble stand in defense of the good cause; they made no concession; they did not explain away the features of their faith, which might appear harsh and unpalatable to the Christians; but asked for their rights, and obtained them, as becomes freemen, unconditionally and without any trammels whatever. And at the present day, the Jews in Maryland are free, like all the other citizens. At the time when this act of justice was awarded, there was not even a Synagogue in all the state; hence it must be considered as the abstract triumph of liberality over bigotry and prejudice; and we therefore rejoiced the more at the passage of the bill in question, since it proved that Americans will be just whenever they are properly enlightened . . .

    Leeser was contrasting the Jewish American strength with the self-conscious weakness of British Jewry’s contemporary Reform movement, which, Leeser insisted, was a systematic attempt to alter Jewish practice in order to make the religion more palatable to British gentiles.

    As Leeser makes plain, American citizenship granted the Jews something they had never had before and could never have anywhere else: a rights-based relationship that was not a deviation from the essential character of the country in which they lived, but was a full expression of the state’s promise. In America, the possibility of Jewish success was and is proof of the health of American identity, because it is proof that a weak minority can prosper if treated as full and equal members of a pluralistic democratic society. There was anti-Semitism in America, of course, but it lacked political legitimacy: it was a contradiction of the country’s founding values. In this way, America offered an epochal deviation, as a matter of principle and practice, from what Salo Wittmayer Baron famously called the “lachrymose pattern of Jewish history.” And it accomplishes this in a way that not even the Jewish state does.

    The Jewish state was founded as a democracy, but its democratic character has always been in tension with its Jewishness. This tension was inevitable, but the task of moderating between these two elements is a balancing act made nearly impossible by various elements. First, Israel has no constitution and no Bill of Rights — powerful tools with which Americans are immeasurably helped in safeguarding our democratic character. Israel does have a Declaration of Independence but, unlike America, Israel, which is similarly a multiethnic society, did not derive its right to exist from the equality of all its citizens, even though it guaranteed all its citizens the same rights. America grants Jews rights on the basis of equality. In practice, in 2025, Israel grants Jews rights on the basis of an increasingly popular theory of Jewish supremacy, which flies in the face of its Declaration of Independence. It did not have to be this way, but this is the way it is.

    There are tragic reasons for this undemocratic devolution. Unlike America, Israel is straddled and partially populated by sworn enemies who have no state, no sovereignty, and no means of either distinguishing their own authority from Israel in a manner that Israel considers legitimate or assimilating as full members into the Jewish state. The Jewishness of Israel’s majority is a bludgeon against the Palestinian members of Israeli society. In Israel, Jewish citizens enjoy full rights and Palestinian citizens do not. The Palestinian citizens of Israel account for twenty-one percent of the Israeli population, and they should enjoy the full rights which citizens of a democracy are owed; and this is true also, and more desperately, of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza, where the Israeli police, military, and other Israeli officials openly consider Palestinians their enemies.

    Israel, under Netanyahu’s leadership, makes the grotesque case on the global stage that non-Jews are not equal to Jews, and that Jews are entitled to rights in Israel because Israel is a Jewish State. This means by implication that in every other state — including America — Jews are not entitled to full rights. Israeli illiberalism undermines American Jewish equality, and it undermines the liberal project in general. This is more the case today than it ever has been since Israel’s establishment.

    Israel’s example, Israel’s brutality, compliments Donald Trump’s, which is why Netanyahu settles so naturally into Trump’s menagerie. No Jew, in America or anywhere else, has dishonored his Jewishness by using it as a fig leaf for fascist and even neo-Nazi sympathies as visibly as Benjamin Netanyahu. Something unprecedented in Jewish history has happened: A Jewish state has determined that it is in its own interests to benefit from and accelerate the erosion of American democracy, thereby jeopardizing America’s Jewish citizens in the name of its own tribal interests. Netanyahu’s illiberalism, Netanyahu’s nativism, gives Jews like Ari Berman and Stephen Miller a calling card for membership in Trump’s thuggish troop.

    It seems likely that the anti-Semitism that this administration tolerates and inflames will not be directly caused by the government, but the government will encourage, downplay, and forgive it. The bizarre prominence of Elon Musk and his raised right arm is evidence enough. Black, Latino, Native, and trans people were the first to bear the brunt of Trump’s earliest executive orders, which were only the beginning. But Jews will pay a price for Trump’s fascism, too.

    And even if we don’t, the policies Trump is already enforcing should be interpreted as a direct attack on the legitimacy of our membership in this country, since not too long ago it was our ancestors who were clambering at the gates to be let in. It was our grandparents — rather than Mexican or Arab migrants — who were slandered as burdens, job-stealers, spies, and thieves. Between 1820 and 1880, the American Jewish population ballooned from three thousand to three hundred thousand. In the half-century that followed, more than two and a half million Jews joined the slim community already here. This increase was despite the passage of the Johnson–Reed Act in 1924, which was intended to “protect” the country’s “racial stock” by staunching the immigration of “undesirable” immigrants — Jews among them. The United States had no immigration policy, and the quotas set on Jews by the Johnson–Reed Act were not adjusted at all, between 1933 and 1941.

    But perhaps more disturbing even than the quota system is the fact that immigration officials perceived that they would be rewarded for letting fewer people in and so they routinely failed to fill the quotas. The Johnson–Reed Act had capped the number of Germans permitted to enter the United States at 25,957, but in 1933 the State Department issued only 1,241 visas to German citizens, while 82,787 German citizens languished on the waiting list for visas that they could not afford. Through 1943, “Hebrew” was a racial category in American immigration law. Between 1939 and 1940, over half of all immigrants to America identified themselves as Jewish, and that number is likely incorrect, since many of the people fleeing the Nazis did not consider themselves Jewish even if the Nuremberg Laws did.

    Two weeks after Kristallnacht, on November 24–25, 1938, a Gallup poll asked American citizens, “Should we allow a large number of Jewish exiles from Germany to come to the United States to live?” Seventy-two percent of the respondents said no. The following January, while Congress was considering the passage of the Wagner–Rogers Bill, which would allow special entry for twenty thousand refugee children, Gallup sent out another poll. This time the question read: “It has been proposed that the government permit ten thousand refugee children be brought into this country and taken into American homes. Do you approve of this plan?” And sixty-seven percent said no. Over the next few years, as war spread across Europe, Americans began to suspect that Germany and the Soviet Union were secreting spies into America in the hordes of Jewish immigrants. Perhaps they thought the children were spies, too. This heartlessness was a failure of the American people to live up to the American promise. A hundred years ago, it was our ancestors who suffered for the American inability to rise to its own ideals.

    One Jew’s contribution to the Trump administration represents a betrayal of American Jewish history more than any other. Consider the case of Stephen Miller, the man responsible for shaping Trump’s draconian immigration policies. Miller’s radicalism began when he was in high school, a century after his mother’s family arrived in America. Wolf Lieb Glosser and his wife Bessie were the first of Miller’s ancestors to arrive in this country. The couple had fled vicious pogroms in Antopol, Belarus, and set sail on the German ship S.S. Motke, which docked in New York on January 7, 1903, twenty-one years before the Johnson-Reed Act instituted its quotas. Glosser spoke Yiddish, Russian, and Polish but not a word of English. As Miller’s uncle, David Glosser, wrote in Politico in 2018,

    I have watched with dismay and increasing horror as my nephew, an educated man who is well aware of his heritage, has become the architect of immigration policies that repudiate the very foundations of our family’s life in this country. I shudder at the thought of what would have become of the Glossers had the same policies Stephen so coolly espouses — the travel ban, the radical decreases in refugees, the separation of children from their parents, and even talk of limiting citizenships for legal immigrants — had been in effect when Wolf Liev made his desperate bid for freedom. The Glossers came to the U.S. just a few years before the fear and prejudice of the “America First” nativists of the day closed U.S. borders to Jewish refugees. Had Wolf Lieb waited, his family likely would have been murdered by the Nazis along with all but seven of the 2,000 Jews who remained in Antopol. I would encourage Stephen to ask himself if the chanting, torch-bearing Nazis of Charlottesville, whose support his boss seems to court so cavalierly, do not envision a similar fate for him.

    American Jews should take it personally when our president describes immigrants as criminals and poisons. It should scare and enrage us that the first bill which Trump signed into law in his second term was the Laken Riley Act, which will result in the deportation of migrants who are merely accused of a crime, and that at the ceremony for that occasion Trump remarked that “today’s signing is bringing us one step closer to eradicating the scourge of migrant crime in our communities once and for all.” Make no mistake, he was raising the specter of our grandparents, no matter the color of the people who will be turned away from our borders this time.

    The ancestors of ours who made it here were not merely lucky. Luck was part of it but not all of it: America granted us what is by right our due as human beings. And as American citizens we have a right and a duty to insist upon that same dispensation for us and for others, which is why American Jews have also contributed significantly to the establishment of institutions in this country which work within the law to protect the vulnerable. It is true, we Jews have a tradition which teaches us to pacify brutes like Trump and to create and fetishize thugs like Netanyahu, but we have other traditions, too. Like every great nation we contain contradictions. We are not fated to emulate our ugliest examples. In Exodus, God told us, “You shall not wrong or oppress a stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” It is not moral and it is not wise to align ourselves with the merciless bigots who drew the blood that stains our history.

    The first chapter of the Book of Job ends: “And Job said ‘Naked did I leave the belly of my mother, and naked shall I return there, God gives and God takes away, may the name of God be blessed.” Job’s faith is freighted with lyrical resignation. He makes no demands. God’s power is a force which acts over and through him. We have no right to repeat his concessions, not here, not in our country. America is ruled by no God and Donald Trump is no one’s Lord, despite all his invocations of Jesus. America is an artifact, man-made, a product of human will and wisdom. It is not for us to bow and accept the caprice of its leaders. They work for us. America giveth because we designed her to give. When its goods are revoked out of turn it is because we have been poor stewards of our own inheritance. We must fight — not least in the name of our ancestors, the huddled masses yearning for the breath of freedom which is the only air that our spoiled lungs exchange — we must fight for what belongs to us.

    Impotent Musings

    For Mario Vargas Llosa, a prince of our liberalism.

    With one foot on the platform

    and the other foot on the train

    For many decades I have participated like a good soldier in the war of ideas, by which I mean the application of philosophical notions to public affairs for the purpose of persuading readers for or against certain political and cultural outcomes. It is a private-public activity: you cannot be a “public intellectual” unless you are also a private intellectual. Otherwise you are merely a polysyllabic sloganeer waiting for CNN to call, a college education looking for a buyer. Without philosophy, politics is just a contest for power, and without politics, philosophy is just a pastime for professors. Who in their right mind would abandon power to interests devoid of ideas? The search for justice inexorably leads back to concepts. Don’t be cruel! But why should I not be cruel? Because it is wrong! But why is it wrong? Because it hurts people! But do you really believe in a hurtless world? Well, how would you like it if they hurt you? And just like that we are in the severe and magical kingdom of philosophy, because we are, even those of us who will not be reminded by that last question of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, even the most obtuse among us, self-interpreting beings. Sooner or later everybody wants reasons.

    One evening a group of Syrian friends, some of them refugees, all of them activists, asked if I could meet them for a conversation in the lobby of a local hotel. It was the Obama years, and we all despised him for his sanctimonious refusal to lift a finger against the savagery in Syria, but my friends did not want to discuss foreign policy. They wanted to talk about God — or more precisely, God and the chemical attack in Ghouta. A young man spoke first: “I was in Ghouta and I held dead babies and I resolved that I could never believe in Allah again.” Then a young woman in a lavender hijab remarked: “I was also in Ghouta and I also held dead babies and I never needed Allah more.” They asked me if I could help them make sense of the contradiction. The gravity of the request was not lost on me. I felt honored but mainly I felt humbled, since nothing like Ghouta had ever happened to me, though something was done to my mother in Nazi-occupied Poland that may have qualified me slightly to assist them in confronting their perplexity. (I did not mention it.) For almost three hours I discoursed on the multiplicity of God-concepts and the variety of theories of historical causality and the diversity of spiritual temperaments, and they responded with probing questions and more recollections of the horrors. The hotel might have exploded from the intensity. At one o’clock in the morning we embraced and said goodnight. They expressed their gratitude, but the gratitude was mine. I was drenched in sweat — the sweat of a non-recreational and non-journalistic exploration of ultimate meanings. As I walked out into the deserted street I was surprised by the wonderful thought that the entirety of my education, every single Penguin paperback I had ever read, was all for this night, so that I might be in some way helpful to these people, and leave them with some improvement in their understanding of the philosophical torment to which their brutal experience had sentenced them. The utility of the humanities!

    The intellectual agitations that I made in all those decades, and those that I assisted, sufficed for a defensible, even a justified life, as a thinking individual and a dissatisfied citizen. I am one of the lucky ones who has had not a career but a calling. “A life of significant contention,” as Diana Trilling famously described it. The significance to which she was referring was owed to the confidence that the disputations were not trivial, that the stakes for society were considerable. No doubt this led to a certain exaggeration of their — our — own importance (which for a while developed a small sub-genre of its own, the memoir of a visit to the White House); but the vanity is a small price to pay for the possibility that we really are clarifying our society and our culture to themselves. I recall many moments at my various desks when striking the keys felt like a form of national service. An open society seemed designed for precisely what I was doing, for how I was enthusiastically earning my living. It began to seem plausible that I might leave behind what a friend of mine called a scar on the map.

    It was in my time of service, which is not yet over, that the war of ideas spread from the “little magazines” and the medium-sized ones to the editorial pages of newspapers, when Aristotle and Mill were suddenly staining your fingers with fresh ink. One momentous morning William Safire decided that a column of seven hundred words should be named “Essay.” George Will helped to inaugurate what became a culture-wide addiction to quotation — a vernacular version of the old institution of prooftexts and the reverence for authorities that in the religious traditions frequently substitute for reflection. Now the editorial pages are replete with little middlebrow citation-ridden sermons on exceedingly profound themes: who knew that the form of the op-ed piece is adequate for the adjudication of the question of the existence of God, or the definition of a good life? Or that a column should be a regular report on the columnist’s ostentatiously serious reading? (As I write, David French has discovered Carl Schmitt.) The shallowness is deep. The war of ideas has become the board-game of ideas, which has achieved its apotheosis in the festival of ideas, in which analysis and erudition are reduced to entertainment for the affluent and training for their dinner parties. Intellectual life should not be this affable.

    And then, of course, the internet blew it all up. I speak not as a disgruntled gatekeeper, though I believe fervently in gatekeeping as an indispensable cultural position for which one must be qualified by more than merely landing the job. One should hardly be churlish about the digital democratization of intellectual activity: isn’t this the dream of an open society? And so the tumbrils are filling with elites. (Never mind that there never before existed gatekeepers with the power of Zuckerberg and Bezos and Brin and Musk and Altman.) Unfortunately, the more intellectual activity has increased in volume, the more it has decreased in intellectuality. If only the speed and the scale had left the discourse alone! Instead the new bottles molested the old wine. On the internet Nietzsche and Moldbug are equals. Together they float in a contextless entropy as they compete for the attention of untold numbers of passive and gullible consumers who are eager to feel transgressive and to take them at their word. One of the strangest characteristics of mental life on the internet is that as it becomes more hysterical it feels less urgent. (I know, I know: there are praiseworthy islands of serious thought online, but I insist that they are noteworthy precisely for being the sites least affected by their marvelous medium.)

    This has created the vexing problem of how to achieve intellectual impact on the internet. How fleeting can something be and still create something lasting? How evanescent and still leave a mark? Naturally the preferred measurement of influence became quantitative, because the technology generates nothing so abundantly as data, which is to say, numbers, and because this is how businesspeople think. Influence has been re-interpreted as virality. (In the old days we used to inflate our influence to deceive advertisers by including in our circulation reports the large quantities of issues that we would dump at airport terminals and the like.) I will tell a story. One day at my old magazine I ran into its owner — a young man pathetically ill-equipped for the stewardship of the great American institution with which his money had allowed him to play — in the corridors of our office, and he seemed glum. He said that he was actually on his way to see me because he wondered if we had made a terrible mistake. The mistake was that I had devoted too many of my pages — my colleagues had also devoted the cover of the issue — to a lengthy (and, in the view of its editor, unimpeachable) critique of Obama’s foreign policy by Robert Kagan. “The numbers aren’t great,” lamented the boss, another metrics lad. His timing was impeccable: I told him that I had just gotten off the phone with Kagan, who had called to tell me that Obama had just invited him to lunch to discuss the essay. “Does the president of the United States count as one click?” I asked. He disliked the question. Quants do not know what to do with qualts. All I wanted him to understand is that influence — which is, after all, the objective of serious journals of thought — works in many and diffuse ways, even when there are iPhones in our pockets. If we had disturbed the Oval Office, surely it was worth every penny. (Kagan’s analysis has been dismally vindicated in the intervening years.)

    I imagined us in the late eighteenth century having just published “Common Sense” as a special issue of the magazine, and the billionaire in stockings and sticker shock mumbling, “You know, the Paine piece isn’t doing well.” Never mind that it was doing good. Like almost all the owners of “legacy” publications, he had mistaken a sterling act of citizenship and patronage for an investment. (It came as no surprise when he destroyed the institution almost completely.) “This is not a charity!” another of the owners of the magazine, who has in recent years established himself as one of America’s most renowned bullies, once barked at me. I barked back at his disrespect, and at his odd assumption that the writers and the editors were somehow responsible for what he and the business staff failed to achieve. But frankly I can think of many worse charities. Making one’s society less stupid is a noble cause. If I had the money, I would pay for it.

    But who do we toil for now? We must have intellectuals, I mean genuine ones, learned ones, honest ones, inconvenient ones, because we are a polity that was founded on ideas, and because the search for human purposes is not an elite pursuit, and because we are too deeply wounded to carry on thoughtlessly. The work of intellectuals, however underappreciated (and underpaid) by society, can have a strong cumulative effect, which is why I construe it as an enterprise in climate change, the sedulous creation of a better moral and cultural weather, without inflection points or tipping points, without media sensations, just the diligent and careful refinement and promulgation of what one believes is right and true, as clearly and as persistently as one can do it, in the hope, and even the expectation, that it will eventually enlighten an individual and a society. Whatever the intrinsic satisfactions of argument, it is essentially extrinsic. Contrary to the pervasive sentimentality, ideas are not at all the antithesis of power. Without power no idea can be tested, no idea can succeed or fail. When it fails, the blame, and in some instances the shame, will properly be laid at its author’s doorstep. If what matters to you most is that your hands always be clean, you should write poems.

    But who do we write for now? If, as the economists teach, value is to be found in scarcity, then our work has never been more valuable; and yet I am uneasy. My unease about the condition of intellectual life, and about its prospects, is of a piece with what I feel every day about everything public: a sickening powerlessness. Every morning I wake up nauseous and brace myself for the nausea that the afternoon will bring. My deepest convictions about the sanctity of struggle, about the unsinkable force of hope, about the incontrovertible reality of truth, about the resilience of the human heart (and of the miracle that Madison wrought) — all this now sounds too often like happy talk, like Jon Meacham–style uplift. The transports of eloquence are not cutting it. Forgive me, but we are rotting. Solidarity has collapsed and I do not see how we will get it back. The ignorant and the malevolent are winning, here and abroad, and all I can do about it is vote and watch and grieve. I am not the sort who attacks the Capitol.

    What I am experiencing, in this regular sensation of impotence, is not the melancholy of the loser. Sometimes you lose. I like losers; they know more. And there is dignity in losing if you are prepared to continue the fight. A political defeat is not an intellectual defeat, not at all. I will tell another story. In 2017, not long after Trump began his first term, I attended one of those ludicrous high-level international conferences that bring out the Robespierre even in me. (Even at this stratospheric event there were VIP tables! The thirst for hierarchy is never quenched. I was reminded of what an Indian friend once told me about his country’s greatest contribution to the vocabulary of status anxiety: the concept of the VVIP.) Trump had just retaliated militarily against Bashar al-Assad’s chemical attack on the village of Khan Sheikhoun: it was, therefore, for me at least, an exhilarating evening, but at dinner I angered H. R. McMaster, the National Security Advisor, by asking whether this was the blessed beginning of a new policy or a tweet in fifty-four cruise missiles. I had been invited to the gathering to present my thoughts on populism, a subject that was much in demand after Trump’s victory but hilariously ironic in that setting. Tell us, Mr. Wieseltier, who are all those real people whom we hear about? After I finished my talk, in which I discussed the populist myth of the people and the populist myth of the leader, an elegant French woman, a renowned international civil servant, raised her hand with a question. “Now that Trump has won,” she asked, “how should we revise our views?” I was a bit shocked by the question and its unembarrassed expedience about beliefs. I explained to her that a defeat at the polls did not require any revision of what we believe, which in this case was trans-Atlantic liberalism, though it certainly demands a withering look at our empirical assessment of the electorate. Trump’s victory did not prove that our views are wrong. It proved that our views are unpopular. The popularity of a view has no bearing upon its truth. And, intellectually speaking, success proves nothing. Who would want to win as what they are not?

    Who would want to win as what they are not? Quite a few people, apparently. Authoritarian governments would be nothing without accommodationists. The toadies are the grease.

    I am a man rich in loyalties. I love two countries. I love them for the good that they have done and for the values that they have proclaimed. I have known all my life that they are far from perfect, and that they have committed crimes and abuses, but a state that has not committed crimes and abuses has never existed, and the political systems that my countries established for themselves made them corrigible. I have also known that, official declarations and founding documents notwithstanding, no society is morally and philosophically uniform, so that both my countries have always been characterized by bitter debates about their first principles — debates that were possible because of the freedom of speech to which they were committed, and often took the form of political parties and movements. Yet one must love not blindly, but with eyes wide open, so that one is not afraid of the full truth about the object of one’s love and can therefore participate in ameliorations and reforms. I have always admired dissent, not because one must always “speak truth to power” — sometimes power has a point — or because it requires valor — in my two countries it usually requires no valor at all — but because it is evidence of the rarest human attribute in the world, independence of mind. Neither of my countries tremble at the prospect of exigent citizens, even if the success of such citizens in holding their country to a high standard has often been thwarted by the baser regions of its society and its culture.

    Even where courage is not necessary, cowardice flourishes.

    Is it treasonous to love a country conditionally? We know from personal life that it is possible to love a flawed or culpable person. (What other kind of person is there?) Unconditional love, which is the signature of parental love, has been broadened to encompass many bonds in which we would like to avoid the discomfort of judgement. But judgement is one of the obligations of membership and citizenship, so the question of the limits of love in the event of evil recurs. What would my country have to do to forfeit my love? There is honor in not rushing to the exits, in staying to fight; and there is little substance to a love that is renounced at the first sign of disappointment and even disgrace. Such a devotion was never reliable in the first place. But neither is absolute love, because it will go along with anything, which is not how one properly serves a country or a friend.

    I will do everything I can to never take back my love. Such a pledge is an obligation of my Americanism and my Zionism. It is also selfish; a life without these memberships and their treasures would be desolate. And so, I am embarrassed to admit, I have sometimes averted my gaze and looked away. There is nothing shameful about the impulse to defend what one loves, but there are times, such as now, when we should emphatically prefer the full unedifying truth.

    Lincoln held that even the perpetration of human bondage, even the mass genocidal murders that attended it over the centuries, did not justify the destruction of his country. The proposition that slavery did not make the country worthless is morally jarring. But he adamantly did not support the erasure of his own country, even though he was a Biblical man who studied the ancient accounts of national destruction as a divine punishment for sin. This saving complexity of purpose was his retort to John Brown, the absolutist and the terrorist. (And our contemporary.) I do not recall that in the post-Auschwitz period anybody called for the erasure of Germany. Decent societies are not built by absolutists. And indecent societies always contain decent people.

    But now my loyalties have been distressed and darkened. Both my countries, the United States and Israel, have chosen to confront the crises that beset them by means of cruelty. They are pursuing solutions to their problems that inflict misery on the already miserable, that proudly elevate heartlessness into state policy, that make a despicable farce of the humanist values about which their leaders used to boast. They despise the weak and they scorn the unfamiliar. These countries should have been havens from the poisons of ethnonationalism, which anyway flies in the face of their multiethnic realities. They should have pointed away from the retrograde direction of the world. Instead they have joined the malevolent herd in the post-liberal stampede. They are complicit in the creation of the lowest and most debased era in a hundred years.

    The second Trump administration could not be more candid about its appetite for destruction, and about its indifference to the human costs of its policies. Its controlling values are retribution and profit. Consider a few examples. While there are precincts of American life in which DEI has become a protection racket and an exercise in thought-policing, it is impossible to avoid the impression that the government’s frenzied campaign against it is animated mainly by racism. They are against DEI because they are against diversity, equity, and inclusion — the values themselves, regardless of the manner of their implementation. And while there is no doubt that the American immigration system is a shambles with bipartisan origins, and that the deportation of criminals who are in the country illegally is not an abuse of power but a valid exercise in law-enforcement, the virulence with which the government speaks about all immigrants leaves no doubt that what really lies behind its panic about the border is a rank nativism and a fear of the ethnically mottled society that we are. We have for too long flattered ourselves with the legend about our hospitality to immigrants — that uplift again; the truth is that we have struggled against our own callousness toward the refugee and the stranger since our origins. Immigration should be legal, of course, and a country should control its own borders, but if the government really intends to fulfill the spirit and the substance of its immigration program, we are about to witness a nightmare of federally authorized brutality. The bastards are even talking about reviving family separation.

    And while it is undeniable that the size of the federal government is unimaginably large, the administration’s approach in its own bizarre experiment in “downsizing government” seems to relish the human damage, at home and abroad, that its bureaucratic “reform” can accomplish. Yet the MAGA mandarins despise government at their peril. The despised technocrats serve society. One of the reasons that the American government is so huge is that American life is so complex: specialized and arcane knowledge is a condition of effective and humane government in an era when fiscal policy and health care policy and climate policy and regulatory policy and military policy are byzantine in their details. And anti-elitism does not qualify as the knowledge of anything. Quite the opposite. It is usually a prejudice against knowledge. (One of the worst episodes in the history of American nativism was called Know-Nothingism.) The age of Trump will be known for the sudden respectability of the animus against higher education, as if a democracy can function without a knowledgeable citizenry, as if it is an insult against populism and “the people” to want them to study the world and strain their minds. (Among the most comic figures of our unfunny time is the Ivy League–educated skeptic about higher education. It’s Yale or nothing, I guess.)

    The Trump administration will immiserate the people who elected him and bow and scrape before the people who paid for his election. The main product of this government purportedly consecrated to American security will be the relentless expansion of American insecurity. It will preside over a new age of social Darwinism and uncontrolled oligarchy. The most obscene sight in America now is the smile on Elon Musk’s face. In sum, we are entering a new age of American pain.

    Israel, too, has become renowned for its pitilessness. This is Benjamin Netanyahu’s contribution to Israel’s reputation, and to the education of young Jews everywhere. I understand that it has its strategic uses (“the restoration of deterrence,” though never for long). But the scale of what was done to Gaza cannot be explained or scanted in strategic terms, as the acceptable price of a national security policy. There are many ways of establishing national security, of diminishing — because eliminating it by military means is simply impossible — the danger in which Israelis live. But first a few heresies must be defended. The Hamas attack of October 7 was one of the worst atrocities of our time. It was motivated by a bloodthirsty anti-Semitic hatred and by a fanatical interpretation of the Islamic faith. Israel, which will one day wrestle with the astonishing failures of its political and military establishments on that hideous day, was perfectly justified in retaliating, and ferociously, to the slaughter. No self-respecting state would have done otherwise.

    Moreover, the moral and strategic outcome of the Hezbollah-Israeli war in the north have been decidedly positive. Innocent civilians were killed, but why are Israel’s wars the only wars that are measured against the fantastical standard of no non-combatant deaths? The destruction of Hezbollah’s leadership and of most of Hezbollah’s arsenal was an incontrovertible victory over an evil enemy, and also a historic opportunity for Lebanon to regain its sovereignty. It represented also a dramatic weakening of Iran, the mastermind and the operational enabler of all this jihadi violence, which had been already humbled by the haplessness of its missile attacks against the Zionist Satan; and this in turn resulted in the spectacular overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, the highly accomplished butcher of his own people who somehow failed to provoke the ire of Hamasniks and progressives and undergraduates in the West. (These same justice warriors are not to be found on streets or in encampments to protest the murder of a hundred and fifty thousand Sudanese civilians and the use of chemical weapons against them.)

    Yet forty-seven thousand Palestinians were killed in Gaza. Forty-seven thousand! Even if a third of them were Hamas soldiers, that amounts to a wanton slaughter of innocents on a scale that must torment every Jewish conscience. I should immediately note, since the contrary notion is being bruited about, that this requisite outrage has nothing to do with Judaism. Israel is still a secular state and the bombings of Gaza were not carried out by the Netanyahu regime for religious purposes. (The same cannot be said of the anti-Palestinian violence perpetrated in the West Bank by the settlers and Itamar Ben-Gvir’s malicious vigilantes, in which almost a thousand Palestinians — not Hamas, not Islamic Jihad, just men and women and children living on their land — have so far perished. During this period twenty-five Israeli residents of the West Bank were killed by Palestinians.) There are many sources in the Jewish tradition that warn against bigotry and cruelty, but there are many more that endorse bigotry and cruelty, as is the case with every religion that has ever tasted power or embraced exclusiveness, especially in its beginnings. Classical Judaism contains no concept of equality, and along with its Scriptural insistence upon human dignity it is riddled with contempt for the other, as the religious Israeli right will be happy to show you. My advice to Jewish progressives is not to play the prooftexts game, because it is not a game that they will win. And how is their appeal to midrashim any different from Smotrich’s and Ben-Gvir’s appeal to midrashim? I advise them also to search their hearts to verify that the politics that they claim to draw from their religion is not really the religion that they draw from their politics. Whether or not Israel is guilty of war crimes, and I think it is, the Torah is the Torah.

    The attacks of October 7 traumatized every Israeli. Anybody who does not recognize this psychological convulsion holds an imprecise and indecent analysis of what subsequently happened. This collective trauma had, to put it mildly, a basis in reality. It is a commonplace in the literature on trauma that it is experienced as a sudden descent into helplessness and vulnerability — in Freud’s words, as “a breach in an otherwise efficacious barrier.” In the anguished weeks after the attacks, I became possessed by the question of whether post-traumatic rationality is possible. No giant leap of empathy was required for me to grasp the temptation of revenge, but I feared the consequences of a military campaign undertaken in a spirit of angry abandon. It would result in a war fought with moral sloppiness. (Aren’t all wars fought with moral sloppiness?) October 7 inaugurated the most perilous period for Israel in fifty years, and I worried that the catastrophe that had made it essential for Israelis to keep a level head was the same catastrophe that would make a level head impossible.

    To this worry I added my concern, now decades old, about the suppression of the Palestinian question in Israeli life — the cowardly refusal of liberal politicians, most recently Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid, to discuss the matter, so that the subject has become a centrist taboo. (It is not a taboo on the right!) At one of the anti-government demonstrations on behalf of the hostages, a representative of the families’ lobby remarked that it “appealed to Israelis’ hearts instead of their reason, which would dictate that we should occupy Gaza and expel its residents.” Perhaps that is post-traumatic rationality. It is certainly consistent with the growing respectability in Netanyahu’s Israel of the foul dream of population transfer. Will the expelled now expel? Such an eventuality is almost too odious to imagine — but it may take the intervention of the Sunni states, who are on the brink of a grand bargain that will bring the Arab-Israeli conflict to an end, to save Israel from its most inglorious impulses. Not long after October 7, I visited the Israeli ambassador, an acquaintance from shul, and after we discussed various strategic and diplomatic matters I asked him about the Palestinians, and he responded with a dismissive wave of the hand, as if to say that they are not worth talking about. That was all. This dogmatic silence about the Palestinians, which the Palestinians have certainly done their share to inflame, is a prudential blunder and an ethical delinquency.

    For all the differences between the demons of contemporary America and the demons of contemporary Israel, there is another failing that they share: the absence of a vital opposition. A democracy cannot work without the resistances of an opposition. The system is designed for regular challenges of principle and policy, and in the absence of such friction it can degenerate into a kind of de facto one-party state. The point is not that the opposition has to win, though political power is finally the only effective way to reverse a deplorable course; the point is that the opposition must meaningfully exist. The collapse of the Democratic Party in the United States, its damaged sense of reality, its inarticulable identity, its self-immolation in sectarian commotions — all this had the grotesque effect of making Trump increasingly attractive. Kamala Harris’ giddiness now looks vaguely psychotic. Unless there is an about-face in the midterm elections, the unbound authoritarian will proceed unchecked with his chaotic cruelty. Never in our history did a man so deserving of impediments face so few.

    In America, however, the wreckage of the Democratic Party is at least clear about its adversarial stance, even if it cannot settle on a shared sense of its grounds and its methods. There is a healthy disgust at what is happening. And there are sound statistical refutations of despair: in a country of 334.9 million people, 156,202,318 people voted in the last election, in which Trump won 77,284,118 votes, or 49.8 percent, and Harris won 74,999,166 votes, or 48.3 percent. Those are not apocalyptic numbers. Indeed, of all the crises that may afflict a democracy, we may be experiencing the most intractable one of all: a more or less evenly divided society. The same state of affairs is also hobbling my other country. The most recent election in Israel was, in the popular vote, a tie: the Netanyahu bloc received 2,361,739 votes, or 49.57 percent, and the Gantz–Lapid bloc received 2,331,788 votes, or 48.94 percent. It was only his enormous and unscrupulous skill at forming coalitions that returned Netanyahu to power. Israeli society is bitterly divided against itself. It turns out that a house divided can stand, at least long enough to do lasting harm.

    In the beginning of Netanyahu’s new term, it became apparent that he is no longer a traditional conservative who believes in law and equality and the hallowed institutions of democratic governance — a political worldview that he imbibed not only from Israeli conservatism and the example of Menachem Begin, but also from his many years in the United States. But Netanyahu is not, alas, the reincarnation of Begin, who, when he recognized the costs and the deceptions of his war in Lebanon, had the decency to have a nervous breakdown. No, Netanyahu is a repulsive innovation in Israeli politics. After hanging out with Trump and Putin and Modi and Bolsonaro and Orban, he decided that their way — the populist trickery, the, um, unitary executive, the politics of contempt, the cult of the personality — was the better way. He set out, immediately and brazenly, to destroy the Supreme Court, which was the most formidable obstacle to the expansion of his power and the implementation of his policies, especially his Palestinian policies. The months and months of mass demonstrations against his “judicial reform” saw the finest hours of Israeli democracy — the streets were a heaven of peaceful political participation, and the lawyerly coup was defeated. (Still, the anti-Netanyahu protests also illustrated the limitations of Israeli liberal discourse: I noticed at the demonstrations in Jerusalem that placards with the word “Palestinian” displayed on them were shunted to the side.)

    The problem with Russian ethnonationalism and Hungarian ethnonationalism and Indian ethnonationalism is not that it is Russian or Hungarian or Indian, but that it is ethnonationalism. An ethnonationalism is not virtuous because it is ours.

    Then came the disaster of October 7, over which Netanyahu, the self-styled invincible shield of the Jewish people, presided, and then came the war, and suddenly the streets were silent. There were understandable reasons for the disappearance of dissent: the country was collectively plunged into mourning, and everybody’s sons and daughters were in uniform in Gaza. As it became clear — this was another of the many shocks that he has administered to his society — that Netanyahu felt no urgency about the Israeli hostages in Gaza, even if the ransoming of captives had always been the most immediate priority for Jewish communities throughout Jewish history — when this became clear, the families of the prisoners lost their wartime inhibition about criticizing the government and the streets began to fill again. But the hostages were the only socially permissible subject for protest. Which is to say, there was no significant Israeli opposition to the conduct of the war, not even when its drastic nature became plentifully clear. The solidarity, again, was natural, but even when the numbers of the Palestinian dead in Gaza attained terrifying proportions, and the IDF’s tactics obviously made massacres inevitable, all the targeting technologies and ethics manuals notwithstanding, the leaders of the opposition had nothing to say. I do not know of a single political speech that would have outraged the consensus, even if it would have secured a place in the moral history of the Jewish state. (There were a few military resignations, but they had to do with the professional failures of October 7.)

    Is the Israeli public in agreement and at peace about the human costs of the Gaza war? Is it generally believed in Israel that the lives of Palestinians and the rights of Palestinians are worthless? (The other day I came across this in a Talmudic passage: “What do you think, that your blood is redder than his? Maybe his blood is redder.” But never mind the Talmud!) Does the scruple about means and ends vanish when it is we — I am not an Israeli but I am a Jew — who are threatened? All those decades of indifference and apathy and complacence and illusion about the seven million people with whom the Israelis live have done their work. Yet even Israelis who cling to their own callousness about the Palestinians and are weary of the moralism of the left (if they can find the left) must eventually acknowledge that reconciliation with the Palestinians, some kind of political and diplomatic settlement, is a condition of Israeli security. The Zionist idea was that the Jews be not only free but also safe.

    And the American Jews: how long will we applaud our brothers and sisters in their short-sightedness? I would have thought that the telling of truth, however unpleasant, is also an expression of solidarity. Surely the American Jewish community can rouse itself from its all-too-comfortable posture of endless mourning to attend to the actual needs of Israeli security, which include more than the very latest iteration of AI. Kaddish is not a strategy. But the American Jewish community prefers commemoration to candor. Does the magnitude of the destruction in Gaza really not trouble the sleep of the majority of American Jews? I think I know the answer. And so I wish to reassure my brethren that humaneness is not a surrender to Hamas. After all the fortifying sermons about the justness of Israel’s cause, a rattling sermon about moral culpability in a just cause would seem incumbent upon an ethically wakeful community. Disturb only a single Shabbat, but disturb it. We need to know more than our own righteousness. We have many obligations to the Jewish state, and one of them is to keep our consciences intact.

    It is one of the characteristics of an atrocious time that Yeats’ poem about the best and the worst is ubiquitous, but in this instance we really are slouching toward Bethlehem.

    After the depredations of Trump and the depredations of Netanyahu, I live with the bitter feeling that as an American and as a Jew I will never be young again. (At my age, it is probably just as well.)

    A few weeks ago a dear friend, an Iranian dissident, a happy warrior, sent me a wish: “May we always smile in the pursuit of justice!” This put me in mind of a conversation long ago with a brilliant friend who had just written a devastating essay about Judith Butler (God’s work!) for my pages. She concluded her long and meticulous analysis with a remark about “the joy of justice.” I called her to say that the phrase seemed not quite right to me. The achievement of justice, I suggested, cannot be attended only by joy, because justice is always preceded by injustice, it never comes first and it always comes too late. The joy of justice is a fantasy of light without shadow. I have never seen such an unalloyed sight. A just outcome deserves to be celebrated, but when you dance with justice you dance with ghosts. I do not mean to recommend morbidity, which is sorrow as kitsch, sorrow become mechanical, sorrow performed for others. But I recall that conversation now because of the almost stupefying sobriety into which these harsh days have cast me.

    In Nicholas Jenkyns’ magnificent study of Auden in the 1920s and 1930s, I learned that decades later the poet wrote: “Ah! Those twenties before I was twenty / When the news never gave one the glooms.” Now the news gives nothing else. Impotently one lives in the glooms.

    Sorrow does not cease when suffering ceases: what it knows can never be unlearned. 

    The problem is that a grieving spirit is not a fighting spirit. The line between wise acceptance and unwise resignation is difficult to draw. The exhaustion of the opposition in both my countries frightens me, because it suggests a wide diminution of liberal energy. How can the heirs of Milton and Jefferson and Mendelssohn and Mill and Constant and Lincoln and Douglass and Mazzini and Herzen and Weber and Roosevelt and Brandeis and Niebuhr and Camus and Popper and King and Berlin and Havel and Sakharov be so wan, so lifeless, so unexcited by their own patrimony? The path out of our predicament must include a vigorous refreshment of liberalism. What was once the most encouraging transformation in the history of political belief, the one with the likeliest chance of advancing justice, has become a cliché, a banality, without sufficient strength to respond effectively to the slanders against it upon which a new order is being built. For too long liberals have received trouble without making trouble. The old pieties are true, but they need to be made strong, and lustrous, and perhaps less pious.

    Consider the question of patience in politics. Patience is often lauded as the quintessential liberal virtue, which has effectively protected liberals from the ruinous fictions of revolution for centuries. We have been taught to restrain ourselves and to contain ourselves, with the aim of preventing rash mistakes and hasty excesses, so that respect may be established in political society and deliberation may become a meaningful political activity. But sometimes patience has the lamentable effect of turning a player into an umpire, and umpires have no sides. It is easy to confuse the patient man with the man who has risen above the fray. (This was the case with Obama, except when he was running. Then the arc of history had to bend fast.) Sometimes patience signifies that your threshold for political and philosophical pain is too high.

    Don’t just defend the rights of others. Use your own.

    Impatience may be dangerous, but human suffering must not be regarded under the aspect of eternity, at least if one is to view it as a problem in need of a solution — that is, politically. Nothing could be more anti-political than the cosmic view of human suffering, which is a justification for quietism.

    John Lewis, then twenty-three years old, was chosen to be one of the speakers at the March on Washington in the summer of 1963. When he completed a draft of his speech, he showed it to Bayard Rustin, a man who was uncannily able to combine the most uncompromising idealism with the most uncompromising practicality. After Rustin read Lewis’s text, he phoned his hotel room. “We have a problem,” he told the young activist. What follows is taken from David Greenberg’s superb biography of Lewis.

    “A problem? What problem?” Lewis asked.

    “It’s your speech. Some people are very concerned about some of the things you’re going to say in your speech. You need to get down here. We need to talk.”

    Lewis went to Rustin’s room. Several others were there. They explained to Lewis that an associate of Archbishop Patrick O’Boyle, who was to deliver the invocation the next day, had shown the clergyman the speech. O’Boyle was refusing to participate if Lewis delivered the speech as written.

    As Rustin and Lewis spoke, Rustin said he thought O’Boyle might be appeased with one fix. A line in Lewis’ speech spurned counsels of “patience,” calling it “a dirty and nasty word.”

    “This is offensive to the Catholic Church,” Rustin said.

    “Why?” Lewis asked.

    “Payyy . . . tience.” Rustin dramatically articulated the word. “Catholics believe in the word ‘patience’.” It was a theological tenet, cited throughout the Bible and by thinkers like St. Augustine.

    Lewis relented.

    But not completely. In his address from the Lincoln Memorial, Lewis declared, to enormous applause: “To those who have said, ‘Be patient and wait, we have long said that we cannot be patient. We do not want our freedom gradually, we want it now.” And he concluded: “For we cannot stop, and we will not and cannot be patient.”

    I wonder if the archbishop recognized that before a quarter of a million people Lewis had repudiated a quietist conception of time in favor of an activist conception of time. The impatience of the liberal! This conception was in keeping with Dr. King’s thinking. A year later he published Why We Can’t Wait, the most complete statement of his philosophy of political action. He began the book by explaining the historical origin of the alleged long-sufferingness of American blacks. The civil rights revolution, he wrote, “is not indicative of a sudden loss of patience within the Negro. The Negro had never really been patient in the pure sense of the word. The posture of silent waiting was forced upon him psychologically because he was shackled physically.” Later, in the “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” which was included in the volume, King declared that “for years now I have heard the word ‘Wait!’ It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This ‘Wait” has almost always meant ‘Never.’ We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that ‘justice too long delayed is justice denied’.” (It was actually William Gladstone who coined the adage, but it now belongs to King.) This was followed by one of the most eloquent pages that King ever wrote, a rending inventory of concrete acts of oppression perpetrated against individual blacks, with its grim peroration: “There comes a time when the cup of endurance runs over.”

    Liberal cups sometimes fill too slowly. All the sage lessons about moderation notwithstanding, dare one suggest that this is a time when liberals should grow a little impatient with patience?

    Patience should not make us fools, or pawns. The enemies of liberalism have been spoiled by our high-minded forbearance, by the liberalism of old men. And the illiberals, the party of Trump and the party of Netanyahu, have also made good use of patience. (The repeal of Roe v. Wade was a triumph of conservative patience.) “How poor are they that have not patience? What wound did ever heal but by degrees?” Those fine meliorist words were spoken by . . . Iago! He was praising the utility of “dilatory time” for plots and conspiracies.

    A suspicion of impatience can disguise an allergy to alacrity. What are Netanyahu’s adversaries waiting for? Or can the snail’s pace of political outrage be explained by the deeply demoralizing fact that 72 percent of Israelis immediately supported the American plan to expel two million Palestinians from Gaza?

    Alienation can drive one toward the fight or away from the fight. It is not only an emotion, it is also a decision.

    Patience is a friend of impotence.

    And yet there is one thing for which, alas, we must always be patient. It is courage.

    The Job Poet and the Order of Things

    The writer responsible for Job is the greatest of all biblical poets and one of the most remarkable poets who flourished in any language in the ancient Mediterranean world. He is a technical virtuoso, deftly marshaling sound and rhythm for expressive effects, at times deploying brilliant word-play — as when he writes, “My days are swifter than a weaver’s shuttle, / they snap off without any hope,” the word for “hope,” tiqwah, punning on a homonym that means “thread” — utilizing a vocabulary that is the most extensive of any biblical poet, with borrowings from Aramaic, an enlisting of rare words, and even introducing words that seem to be his own invention. His range of metaphors is inventive and often dazzling, drawing on cheese-making, weaving, horticulture, and much more. Had there been bicycles in ancient Israel, I suspect we would find a bicycle simile somewhere in his poem. He exhibits an interest in nature quite untypical of biblical poets. And no other poet of his time and place possessed his ability to link together different passages with recurrent terms and images, even over long stretches of text.

    We know nothing about this anonymous heterodox genius except that he probably lived in the fifth century B.C.E., and even that has been disputed. In the fluidity of forms that characterized the Late Biblical Period, it would certainly have been possible for him to frame his argument as prose, but poetry was an inevitable choice for him. The power of poetic expression gave him the means to articulate the full measure of Job’s anguish and of his outrage at having been severely mistreated by God, as well as conveying the dizzying span of God’s vision of the created world in the Voice from the Whirlwind at the end. And one should also say that he surely knew he had a mastery of the poetic medium and relished its deployment in the great work he produced.

    The outlook of the Job poet is a radical dissent from the mainstream biblical consensus, and in this regard, too, poetry was a powerful vehicle for him to express his dissent. In what follows here, I will be examining two rather long passages, the first a complete poem, in order to show how the resources of poetry enabled him to say what he wanted to say.

    The Job poet strategically frames his poetic argument by beginning with a harrowing death-wish poem that communicates 
Job’s acute sense that his existence has become so unbearable — all his children dead, his property in flocks destroyed, 
his body afflicted with an excruciating burning rash — that he wishes he never would have been born. Here is the poem that takes up all of chapter three. (This and all the excerpts that follow are my translation.)

    Annul the day that I was born
    And the night that said, “A man is conceived.”
    That day, let it be darkness.
    Let God above not seek it out,
    nor brightness shine upon it.
    Let a cloud-mass rest upon it,
    Let day-gloom dismay it.
    That night, let murk overtake it.
    Let it not join in the days of the year,
    let it not enter the number of months.
    Oh, let that night be barren,
    let it have no song of joy.
    Let the day-cursers hex it,
    those ready to rouse Leviathan.
    Let its twilight stars go dark.
    Let it hope for day in vain,
    and let it not see the eyelids of dawn.
    For it did not shut the belly’s doors
    to hide wretchedness from my eyes.
    Why did I not die from the womb,
    from the belly come out, breathe my last?
    Why did knees welcome me,
    and why breasts, that I should suck?
    For now I would lie and be still,
    and would sleep and know repose
    with kings and the councilors of earth,
    who build ruins for themselves,
    or with princes, possessors of gold,
    who fill their houses with silver.
    Or like a buried stillborn I’d be,
    like babes who never saw light.
    There the wicked cease their troubling,
    and there the weary repose.
    All together the prisoners are tranquil,
    they hear not the taskmaster’s voice.
    The small and the great are there,
    and the slave is free of his master.
    Why give light to the wretched
    and life to the deeply embittered,
    who wait for death in vain,
    dig for it more than treasure.
    who rejoice at the tomb,
    are glad when they find the grave?
    To a man whose way is hidden,
    and God has hedged him about.
    For before my bread my moaning comes,
    and my roar pours out like water.
    For I feared a thing — it befell me,
    what I dreaded came upon me.
    I was not quiet, I was not still,
    I had no repose, and trouble came.

    The first word of the poem, yo’vad, literally means “perish,” but unfortunately “perish the day” is no longer a viable English equivalent because the locution in our era has slid into prissiness (“perish the thought”). The effort of a couple of modern translators to give the expression punch in English (“damn the day”) inserts an inappropriate tone or implication because there is nothing about damning, in either the invective or theological sense, in the Hebrew. The transitive verb “annul” has the justification that the poem is all about expunging the day from the calendar. The two versets of this line exhibit an altogether original use of the dynamic of intensification from the first verset to the second. Job wishes not merely never to have been born but, moving back nine months, never to have been conceived. Thus the conventional poetic word-pair, “day” and then “night,” is given a startling new force.

    The poet then picks up “night” from the second half of this line and launches on a rich orchestration of synonyms for darkness. After the primary term “darkness,” he enlists “cloud-mass,” “day-gloom,” “murk.” (“Day-gloom,” kimrirei yom, seems to be his coinage, probably derived from an Aramaic root that indicates darkness, with the expression here possibly referring to a solar eclipse.) The poet’s tapping of the Hebrew lexicon for synonyms is evident throughout the book. (There are five different terms for “lion” in biblical Hebrew, and at one point he uses all five in two consecutive lines.) With elegant appropriateness, Job in this poem wants the night of his conception to have been “barren,” of course the opposite of conception. 

    In the process of intensification as the poem continues, he then moves up to a mythological register: “Let the day-cursers hex it, / those ready to rouse Leviathan.” A minor emendation to the Masoretic text yields “Yamm,” the primordial sea-god who is also Leviathan, instead of yom, “day.” (At this point, the King James Version commits one of its most lamentable errors, rendering the Hebrew for Leviathan, lewayatan, as “their mourning,” which is both grammatically wrong and imagines that the noun is lewayah, a term for “funeral” in rabbinic Hebrew that is not biblical.) The second line in this verse makes the wish for darkness cosmic, still another aspect of intensification — no stars, a night without dawn, without morning stars. The concluding metaphor of this line demonstrates how utterly original the Job poet is in his deployment of figurative language: “let it not see the eyelids of dawn.” 

    This is a daring, and beautiful, metaphor: the first crack of light on the eastern horizon is likened to the opening eyelids of the sleeper looking out to the east. Modern translators, deluded in thinking that readers can no longer understand metaphors, substitute for the metaphor what may be its referent, as in the Jewish Publication Society’s “the glimmerings of the dawn.” The Job poet knew that this was a remarkable metaphor, for he did not hesitate to use it again. This occurs much later, in a radically different context, in representing the fierce appearance of the daunting Leviathan, thus locating beauty at the heart of terror: “His sneezes shoot out light, / and his eyes are like the eyelids of the dawn” (41:10).

    The initial movement of the death-wish poem heads toward a conclusion by Job’s saying of the day he was born that it “did not shut the belly’s doors / to hide wretchedness from my eyes.” The prominent noun in the last phrase is a strong instance of poetic efficiency. We might expect here “life” or “the light,” but for this sufferer life itself has become nothing but wretchedness. In the next few lines, following the characteristic movement of biblical poetry from the general to the specific or concrete, we get an evocation of the physicality of birth: womb, belly, knees (presumably parted in birthing), and breasts giving suck.

    Job’s wish never to have been born joins with a panorama of human life, and it is a bleak panorama. Kings “build ruins for themselves,” imposing structures that inevitably crumble to dust (one thinks of Shelley’s “Ozymandias”) and princes store up gold and silver, futilely, for they will part from it in death. Verse 18 shows the poet’s firm sense of integrated structure, of which we will see a more spectacular instance in the Voice from the Whirlwind, for “babes who never saw light” takes us back to the early lines expressing the wish to be a stillborn and blot out the light. Everyone, in this despairing vision, finds repose only in death, the great equalizer. And what has life been for humankind? The wicked have troubled others, all are weary, there are prisoners and slaves and taskmasters. Existence is so universally miserable that everyone longs for death. In this way, Job invites us to see his wretchedness not as a special case but merely as a particular instance of the fate of misery shared by all. The large resonance of Job’s inveighing against God as he proceeds in his poetic argument derives from his seeing unwarranted suffering not as his alone but as the common plight of humankind.

    A single word toward the end of this poem exemplifies how this writer creates connective links in the overall structure of his work. In the frame-story, the Adversary says to God, “Have you not hedged him about and his household and all that he has all around?” (1:10). The verb here obviously has the sense of “protected.” But the same word in Job’s mouth here, “and God has hedged him about” means the opposite: Job is complaining that God has blocked him on all sides and left him no way out of his terrible plight. This sharp play on two opposed meanings of the same word might suggest that the Job poet did not transcribe verbatim the old folktale that had come down to him, probably orally, but felt free at least at one point and perhaps others to modify a wording. Alternatively, the folktale may have included “hedge,” which the poet then played against. That same verb will occur twice more in the Voice from the Whirlwind, with still a third meaning, but I will postpone commenting on its use there until we have a long look at the God speech that concludes the poetic body of the book. 

    The final lines of the death-wish poem aptly round off its argument. The third line before the end exhibits the expected biblical intensification from verset to verset: “For before my bread my moaning comes, / and my roar pours out like water,” from moaning to roaring. Job goes on to assert that he had lived in a state of anxiety, perhaps intimated in his offering sacrifices for his children because he was afraid that they had committed some offense. Finally, having longed for the quiet of the grave, he admits the realization of those fears. The last word of the Hebrew text is rogez, etymologically a state of disturbance or unrest, as this same verbal stem is used elsewhere to describe the shaking of earthquakes.

    The devastating extremity of Job’s wish for non-being raises a general issue. It serves the obvious purpose of introducing all that he will say by making clear how utterly unbearable his suffering is. He does not yet indict God, though that will follow, for he never ceases to believe in an all-powerful God, which means that God must be responsible for the chain of disasters inflicted upon him. But what good can poetry do in the face of intolerable and unwarranted suffering? The Job poet is clearly not alone in confronting this dilemma. In English literature, perhaps the most memorable instance is Lear driven out on the moor in the fierce storm, blinded, stripped of his possessions, cruelly rejected by two of his three daughters: “For I am bound upon a wheel of fire, / that mine own tears do scald like molten lead.” The Job poet would have appreciated this figurative 
language, especially the way the wheel of fire is extended in the simile of the scalding tears like molten lead.

    In our own time, the signal instance of poetry conveying unbearable suffering may well be Paul Celan’s celebrated Todesfuge, or “Deathfugue.” It is a formally deft and beautifully crafted poem, but it embodies “a terrible beauty,” in Yeats’ phrase. The first two words, repeated as a kind of refrain, are a shock: “black milk.” The violent transformation of the nurturing substance of life into blackness will then work in tandem with another refrain-phrase, “Death is a master from Deutschland.” Celan exploits the resources of poetry to express the unspeakable outrage of six million of his people murdered in the industrial death-machine of Deutschland, the cherished homeland figured in the poem by the fair Margarete. What, in confronting such appalling realities, can poetry possibly do? The reflexive response to outrage against our moral instincts is, I suppose, a scream. Poetry of this order of greatness, from Job to Celan, transforms the scream into articulated, eloquent expression. I do not believe that it is really cathartic, but it communicates a feeling that suffering has been endowed with a sharp focus in language, the primary human medium — that outrage has been given a voice, a voice that gets across the full awfulness of what has occurred and therefore is, strangely, at once horrifying and satisfying. We somehow cling to our humanity in the face of horror.

    As the great poem of Job unfolds, it emerges that the work incorporates three different orders of poetry. Most prominent, until a new poetic voice appears at the end, is Job’s poetry. The poetry of the three comforters in the debate is by and large inferior to his. It is inferior because they are working with the complacent clichés of traditional wisdom, and so the poetry that they speak in their argument invokes many shopworn formulas. From time to time, to be sure, there are brief passages of strong poetry, because this writer was such a fine poet that he could scarcely refrain from intermittently giving the comforters a few good lines. Finally, when we come to the conclusion of the poetic body of the work, the poet takes a certain risk, at which he succeeds splendidly. 

    God is now, at last, speaking, and because He is God, He must be given poetry that transcends the stunning poetry of anguish spoken by Job. It is a challenge that the Job poet undertakes because he must have been confident in his own mastery. If I may propose a seemingly irreverent analogy, let me cite Molly Bloom’s soliloquy that is the concluding episode of James Joyce’s Ulysses. She has been a looming presence in the novel, especially in her husband’s thoughts, as we are taken through a rich variety of remarkable prose-poetry, some of it stream of consciousness and some of it in other forms. Then, at the end, we enter the living current of her unspoken words as she lies in bed, mulling over the day, her husband, her loves, her life, and this soliloquy proves to be prose-poetry arguably even greater than all that has come before. Like the Voice from the Whirlwind, it is poetic language that embodies a grand epiphany, the resonant affirmation that the work as a whole is meant to pronounce.

    God’s poem begins with a challenge to Job: “Who is this who darkens counsel / in words without knowledge?” 
The initial phrase demonstrates how aptly this poet chooses his words. “Darken counsel” is not an idiom that appears elsewhere in the Bible, and so it evidently has been coined 
for the present purpose. Job’s first poem, as we saw, begins with a whole sequence of images that express a longing to blot out the light — daylight, the rising sun, the stars, all things to be engulfed by darkness. In response, God signals in the very phrasing that this is profoundly misguided. After a line in which He tells Job to gird his loins like a man, 
God continues:

    Where were you when I founded earth?
    Tell, if you know understanding.
    In what were its sockets sunk,
    or who laid its cornerstone,
    when the morning stars sang together,
    and all the sons of God shouted for joy?
    Who hedged the sea with double doors,
    when it gushed forth from the womb,
    when I made clouds its clothing,
    and thick mists its swaddling bands?
    I made breakers upon it My limit,
    and set a bolt with double doors.
    And I said, “Thus far come, no farther,
    here halt the surge of your waves.”
    Have you ever commanded the morning,
    appointed dawn to its place,
    to seize the earth’s corners,
    that the wicked be shaken from it?
    It turns like sealing clay,
    takes color like a garment,
    and their light is withdrawn from the wicked,
    and the upraised arm is broken.
    Have you ever come into the springs of the sea,
    in the bottommost deep walked about?
    Have the gates of death been laid bare to you,
    and the gates of death’s shadow have you seen?
    Did you take in the breadth of the earth?
    Tell, if you know it all.
    Where is the way that light dwells,
    and darkness, where is its place,
    that you might take it to its home
    and understand the paths to its house?
    Have you come into the storehouse of snow,
    the storehouse of hail have you seen,
    which I keep for a time of strife,
    for a day of battle and war?
    By what way does the west wind fan out,
    the east wind whip over the earth?
    Who split a channel for the torrent,
    and a way for the thunderstorm,
    to rain on a land without man,
    wilderness bare of humankind,
    to sate the desolate dunes,
    and make the grass sprout there?
    Does the rain have a father.
    or who begot the drops of dew?
    From whose belly did the ice come forth,
    to the frost of the heavens who gave birth?
    Water congeals like stone,
    and the face of the deep locks hard.

    The arresting image of the morning stars singing together in joy singles out these points of light in the night sky, heralding a dawn that Job had wished never would have come, and there are more references to light further on. This is an imagining of creation not hinted at in Genesis, though we do not know whether it is the poet’s original invention or reflects a tradition about creation that did not make it into the text of Genesis on which he drew. In the next line, we get the sea “hedged” with double doors. That verb, we recall, occurred in two different senses in the frame story and in the death-wish poem. Now, the idea that it conveys in this moment of cosmogony is a blocking of the surging waters of the sea from flooding the land. That notion is inherited from Canaanite poetry, where it is accompanied by the mythological motif of the conquest and imprisonment of a monstrous sea-god, variously called Yamm, Leviathan, Rahab, Tanin (the last also refers to lesser sea-beasts), affected by the land-god (or weather-god) Baal. This old story was so familiar in the culture that Job could invoke it without explanation to signify God’s holding him captive under relentless surveillance: “Am I Yamm, or the Sea-Beast [tanin], / that You should put a watch upon me?” (7:12). 

    The explicitly mythological figure is excluded from the representation here. Instead, we witness the waters gushing forth from the “womb” of the primordial sea, an image for it invented by the Job poet. This strategically chosen metaphor thus represents creation as birth, the very thing Job wanted to cancel in his death-wish. Birth is confirmed in the following line: “when I made cloud its clothing, / and thick mist its swaddling bands.” This is a metaphorical coinage of the same level of originality as Shakespeare’s scalding tears of molten lead. In the ancient world, infants were wrapped snugly in swaddling bands, strips of white linen. These are like what one might see looking out to the west at bands of mist over the water. The strikingly visual image is completely unusual while it continues the figuration of creation as birth.

    Verses 17–20 further develop the rejoinder to Job’s initial bleak poem: “Have the gates of death been laid before you, / and the gates of death’s shadow have you seen?” Job had fervently wished for death but knew nothing of its looming reality. God alone is the master of death, His all-seeing eyes taking in the full measure of its dark realm. The next two verses underscore the antithesis to chapter three: “Where is the way that light dwells, / and darkness where is its place / that you might take it to its home / and understand the paths to its house?” Light appears here in poetic parallelism with darkness, as it does elsewhere in the Bible, but that appearance is diametrically opposed to Job’s desire for light to be swallowed up by darkness. Instead, there is a diurnal rhythm of alternation between light and darkness — and just possibly, by implication, between hope and despair. Light and darkness are part of the harmonious ongoing process of the created world, something the devastated Job has chosen to turn away from.

    What follows in the poem is a manifestation of the powerful, at times even violent, energy that pulses through creation, a theme that will continue through this poem all the way down to Behemoth and Leviathan at the end. This might be the relevance at this point in the mythological reference to God’s setting aside the harsh elements as weapons “for a time of strife, for a day of battle and war.” The face of nature itself is limned with violent action — “who split apart the channel for the torrent, / and a way for the thunderstorm.”

    At this junction, the poet introduces a crucial, and radical, idea: God brings “rain on a land without man, / wilderness bare of humankind, // to sate the desolate dunes / and make the grass sprout there.” The version of cosmogony in Genesis is emphatically anthropocentric. Man is the culmination of creation, enjoined to rule over all things, everything set out for his benefit. Here, by contrast, God causes the rain to fall “on a land without man,” a rainfall that will “sate the desolate dunes.” (The poet’s mastery of sound as well as metaphor is evident in these words: “desolate dunes” represents the Hebrew sho’ah umesho’ah, that alliteration merely approximated in my English phrase.) This dissenting notion that the natural world extends far beyond man and is perhaps indifferent to him surely resonated with Melville in Moby-Dick, perhaps as much as Job’s Leviathan, which the novelist chose to construe as a great whale. 

    Finally, in the next lines, the poem returns to the birth imagery prominent at the beginning:

    Does the rain have a father,
    or who begot the drops of dew?
    From whose belly did the ice come forth,
    to the frost of the heavens who gave birth?

    The second line here demonstrates both the originality and the boldness of this poet in his handling of metaphor. Having chosen to figure the origins of ice and dew as a birth, he represents that birth in a way that is almost shocking when he invites us to contemplate chunks of ice emerging from the womb. Poetry can be a means of reorienting or radically shifting perception, especially in conjoining through figurative language totally disparate and surprising ideas or realms. This is clearly what God wants to do with Job — to shake him up, to compel him to see the world in ways that would never have occurred to him.

    After leading Job’s vision to the sky in the next few lines, the Voice from the Whirlwind moves on at the end of the chapter to the animal kingdom, with particular attention to beasts of prey — the lion and the raven. (One should remember that chapter divisions in the Bible were a medieval editorial intervention, and the lines to which I am referring were meant to initiate the tour of zoology that will continue to the end of the poem.) This zoological section, running to the end of chapter 39, then picking up after a few lines of address by God to Job with the climactic Behemoth and Leviathan in chapters 
40 and 41, is too long for a reading here, but we can look at two passages. The first is in 39:1–12:

    Do you know the mountain goats’ birth time,
    do you mark the calving of the gazelles?
    Do you number the months till they come to term
    and know their birthing time?
    They crouch, burst forth with their babes,
    their young they push out to the world.
    Their offspring batten, grow big in the wild,
    they go out and do not return.
    Who set the wild ass free,
    and the onager’s reins who loosed,
    whose home I made in the steppes,
    his dwelling-place flats of salt?
    He scoffs at the bustling city,
    the driver’s shouts he does not hear.
    He roams mountains for his forage,
    and every green thing he seeks.
    Will the wild ox want to serve you,
    pass the night at your feeding trough?
    Bind the wild ox with cord for the furrow,
    will he harrow the valleys behind you?
    Can you rely on him with his great power
    and leave your labor to him?
    Can you trust him to bring back seed,
    gather grain on your threshing floor?

    We are now returned to the theme of birth announced in the figurative language at the beginning of the poem. Birth is universal among animate creatures, and it goes on, far from human observation or human ken, in the mountains and the forests, beyond the grasp of the man who wished for his own birth never to have occurred. The animals of the wild “burst forth” with their little ones. Birth, too, is imagined as a violent process. This is a unique application of this verb to birthing — the general meaning of the verbal stem is “to split apart” — an indication that the poet is imagining procreation in a different way. The lines that follow take up a theme that will become more salient in the representation of Behemoth and Leviathan. The wild ass and the onager, out on the salt-flats and the steppes, live remote from any human control, scoffing at the crowded habitations of men and women, free from the whips and the commands of the driver. 

    As one sees elsewhere in biblical poetry, intensification within the single line is projected forward through a sequence of lines. In the four lines devoted to the wild ox, the poem’s audience is challenged with the question of whether they can ever domesticate the wild ass and subject him to servitude, hitch him to the plow, train him (fantastically) to bring back seed or gather grain from the threshing floor. This theme of the resistance of the beast to human mastery will be elevated to a new level of intensity in Behemoth and Leviathan. All this is a strong expression of the rejection of anthropocentrism: contrary to the assurances of Genesis 1, humankind will never be able to rule over the animal kingdom; there are forms of life simply too powerful for man.

    A few lines down, the poem goes on:

    Do you give might to the horse,
    do you clothe his neck with a mane?
    Do you make him roar like locusts —
    his splendid snort is terror.
    He churns up the valley exulting,
    In power goes out to the clash of arms.
    He scoffs at fear and is undaunted,
    turns not back before the sword.
    Over him rattles the quiver,
    the blade, the javelin, and the spear.
    With clamor and clatter he swallows the ground,
    and ignores the trumpet’s sound.
    At the trumpet he says, “Aha,”
    and from afar he scents the fray,
    the thunder of captains, the shouts.
    Did the hawk soar by your wisdom,
    spread his wings to fly away south?
    By your word does the eagle mount,
    and set his nest on high?
    On the crag he dwells and beds down,
    on the crest of the crag his stronghold.
    From there he seeks out food,
    from afar his eyes look down.
    His chicks lap up blood,
    where the slain are, there he is.

    At this moment in the poem, before the eagle and before Behemoth and Leviathan, the poet introduces his famous description of the war horse (39:19–25). Here are some vivid lines from the beginning of this section:

    Do you give might to the horse,
    do you clothe his neck with a mane?
    Do you make his roar like locusts —
    his splendid snort is terror.
    He churns up the valley exulting,
    in power goes out to the clash of arms.
    He scoffs at fear and is undaunted,
    turns not back before the sword.

    Some readers may wonder what it is doing here. There is one plausible explanation that does not immediately justify its inclusion in the Voice from the Whirlwind. It is that the poet put it here as a demonstration of literary skill: he was drawn to do it and knew that he could evoke this bellicose equine presence with remarkable vividness. He gets the sound of weaponry around the horse just right, enriching the depiction with an expressive alliteration — “clamor and clatter” in my version emulates the Hebrew ra‘ash werogez, with the accent on the first syllable of each alliterated noun. Sound plays an energizing role in the effect of the passage — the rattle of the quiver and the weapons, the clamor of the pounding hoofbeats, the blast of the martial trumpet. With all this, the fierce battle charger prepares the way for the two daunting beasts yet to come, Behemoth and Leviathan. Like them, he is at once glorious and frightening: “his splendid snort is terror.” Also like them, he embodies power and fearsome beauty that are beyond humanity, that do not relate to humankind: “Do you give might to the horse, / do you clothe his neck with a mane?” The war horse, in contrast to the wild ass and the onager, is surely saddled with a rider holding reins, at the command of the mounted warrior. The main point is that this fearless creature galloping into the midst of battle is imagined — in this one respect, unrealistically — as though he were virtually autonomous, charging into the fray out of the sheer love of armed combat. 

    The poet needs this divergence from verisimilitude in order to set the stage for those two creatures, Behemoth and Leviathan, who are impermeable to any human action and resistance. They will make their climactic appearance, beginning in verse 15 of the next chapter, after an intervention addressed by God to Job (40:1–14). In brief words God challenges Job to answer all that He has said, to which Job responds with a profession of his own worthlessness. God then resumes His speech, beginning as before with “Gird up your loins as a man.” But before that, in the last six verses of chapter 39, we move from the battlefield to the sky in the depiction of the hawk and the eagle. It is an appropriate place for the naturalistic phase of the zoological parade to end because it is a realm no human being can ever reach. Even the nests of these creatures of the sky are unreachable, placed in the crags of high mountains.

    But what is it that the poet focuses on in the life-cycle of the eagle? That the eagle nurtures his young, an instinct that impels all creatures. The nurturing of the fledglings, however, necessitates killing: “His chicks lap up blood, / where the slain are, there he is.” I have been contending that this writer, virtually unique in biblical poetry, is a poet keenly interested in nature, but that interest is resolutely unsentimental. There is no anthropomorphizing in his vision of the natural world, no pathetic fallacy, no gentle rhapsodizing over the beauties of creation. He understands that nature is red of tooth and claw — the eagle’s chicks “lap up blood.” That is the harsh order of things. He lucidly sees that violence, even lethal violence, is an intrinsic element of the life-cycle in the animal kingdom. This does not really answer Job’s complaint about unjust suffering, but it does suggest that the world around us does not conform to our comforting assumptions about good and evil and that we have to live with a reality that resists our conventional moral calculus.

    I will not consider Behemoth and Leviathan directly, because our scrutiny of the fierce creatures from the lion to the war horse to the eagle has anticipated much of what needs to be said about them. The difference between these two and the preceding creatures in the catalog of animals is that they straddle the border between zoology and mythology, thus culminating the poetic process of intensification. Presumably, they are based, respectively, on the hippopotamus and the crocodile, creatures of the Nile conveniently removed from the direct observation of the poet and his audience, mainly reported to them through travelers’ yarns. There are realistic touches in the depiction of both: Behemoth in the shallows of the river shaded by lotus, and willow, “hedged” — again that strategic verb — by the lotus, and Leviathan with his crocodile’s plate of armor, “His back is rows of shields, / locked close with the tightest shield,” and his fearsome teeth, “All around his teeth is terror.” But such naturalistic depiction seamlessly slips into the supernatural. “Could one take him with one’s eyes,” it is said of Behemoth, “with barbs pierce his nose?” (In fact the Egyptians did hunt hippopotami.) And before long, the naturalistic crocodile morphs into a dragon, his mouth shooting firebrands, his nostrils emitting smoke. He is impregnable to all man’s weapons (a note Melville would pick up in associating Leviathan with the Great White Whale): “When he rears up, the gods are frightened, / when he crashes down they cringe.” At this point, Leviathan has merged with the ferocious Canaanite sea-god from whom he takes his name. 

    In the logic of the poem, the poet needs these mythologized beasts for his conclusion because they crown his argument that there are things in nature beyond human ken and absolutely beyond any hope of human domination. The Psalmist, in a splendid celebration of man’s supreme place in a cosmic hierarchy, wrote: “You make him rule over the work of Your hands. / All things You set under his feet.” (Psalm 8:7) Tellingly, Job the sufferer quotes another line from this same psalm — “What is man that You should note him?” — but bitterly reverses its meaning to say, what is miserable man that You constantly scrutinize him to persecute him? Here, in the climax of God’s speech to Job, the idea that man exerts dominion over all things is powerfully opposed.

    The writer responsible for this extraordinary book was not only a very bold poet, among other things coining imagery, as we have seen, that would not have occurred to any other poet in ancient Israel, but also a very bold thinker, not hesitating to challenge some of the essential ideas long cherished in the Hebrew tradition. The boldness of the poetry is a necessary vehicle for the boldness of the thought. Poetry of the first order of originality is a way of enabling us to see the world with fresh eyes. It is worth going back to a notion promulgated by the Russian Formalists a century ago, that what literature in general does is to shake us out of what had become complacent, unseeing perception through what they called “defamiliarization,” thereby bringing us back to the realities we had ceased to experience, making us feel anew the stoniness of the stone. 

    The poetry of the Voice from the Whirlwind does this on a philosophical level, serving, I would say, as the Bible’s ultimate defamiliarizer. As countless readers have complained, it does not really provide an answer for the dilemma of unwarranted suffering under a supposedly just God. But that dilemma has no real answer. There is no way of explaining why an innocent child should die of cancer or a benevolent woman perish in a fire with all her family. What the poetry does manage to do is carry us away in its sweep, in the brilliance of its riveting and sometimes startling imagery, occasion us to see the world freshly, prod us to let go of our habitual notions of man as the master of nature and the measure of all things, and realize that contradiction and anomaly and even violence are at the heart of reality — in sum, to accept the limitations of human imagination. We need to take in the power of the poetry in order to have a full sense of the originality of the thought.

    The Wages of Cultural Secularization

    I take my title from the critic and literary scholar Simon During, who coined the phrase “cultural secularization” as a way of understanding the sharp decline in prestige — since the beginning of the twenty-first century and especially in the last decade — of the “high humanities.” The concept will strike many as evasively abstract, and certainly it is as open to skepticism and revision as its predecessor and model, the social-scientific and philosophical account of religious secularization that extends from Nietzsche to Weber to Charles Taylor. But the core of the religious secularization narrative rests on a basically unimpeachable empirical claim — that we have “moved from a condition in 1500 in which it was hard not to believe in God” to a modernity in which unbelief “has become quite easy for many,” as Taylor puts it. During’s parallel claim — “Faith has been lost across two different zones: first, religion; then, high culture . . . The humanities have become merely a (rather eccentric) option for a small fraction of the population” — cannot yet command the same ready assent. But in our universities, where tenure tracks in the humanities are swiftly disappearing, where majors and enrollments in fields such as English and art history are plummeting, some such notion as “cultural secularization” seems necessary — even, once you get past a first recoil at its conceptual hubris, obvious.

    Cultural secularization, During writes, is a “second secularization,” meaning both that it came about after religious secularization and that, to a degree, it is a variant of it. That is because the ascent of the high humanities was understood, and to an extent engineered, by thinkers for whom, as During writes, “culture was consecrated in religion’s place.” The most important expression of this compensatory substitution in the nineteenth century is by Matthew Arnold, for whom “poetry” might preserve what is true in religion from the depredations of scientific positivism: “Our religion has materialized itself in the fact, in the supposed fact; it has attached its emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it.” But “poetry attaches its emotion to the idea; the idea is the fact. The strongest part of our religion today is unconscious poetry.” By the 1930s, I. A. Richards could insist that “the fact” was failing or had failed much more than just religion. As he writes in Science and Poetry, “Countless pseudo-statements — about God, about the universe, about human nature, about the soul, its rank and destiny — pseudo-statements which are pivotal points in the organization of the mind, vital to its well-being, have suddenly become, for sincere, honest, and informed minds, impossible to believe as for centuries they have been believed.” Yet there is a “remedy,” Richards declared: “to cut our pseudo-statements free from that kind of belief which is appropriate to verified statements,” from any dependence on facts. “This is not a desperate remedy,” he insisted, “for as poetry conclusively shows, even the most important among our attitudes can be aroused and maintained without any believing of a factual or verifiable order entering in at all.” Not just religious emotions, but also the whole complex of scientifically invalid but existentially inescapable intimations of significance, are what poetry, or more broadly the sublimated religion of the high humanities, might save. 

    This sublimation was institutionalized in the twentieth-
century university’s commitment to the study of art and 
literature, where the humanities secured a repository of post-Christian meaning precisely for the educated classes that had fallen furthest away from faith. As During observes, an important distinction between cultural secularization and religious secularization is that “unlike religion, the humanities have always been classed. In their formalized modes especially, they have belonged mainly to a fraction of the elite.” That historical reality has led, too hastily, to a prevailing diagnosis of the crisis of the humanities as essentially one of status-signaling. One commonly hears humanities professors lament, in a sociological vein, that classes in literature or art history are under-enrolled now because knowledge about those topics no longer confers “cultural capital” — no longer impresses, or even interests, one’s bourgeois dinner party guests. This is true, but question-begging. The loss of cultural prestige follows upon a more primary loss of felt significance. 

    Artistic modernism bears a special relationship to this history, because its emergence coincides with, is indeed an effect of, the decisive acceleration of secularization between the mid-nineteenth and the early-twentieth centuries. W. B. Yeats’ “The Second Coming” might stand as an emblem of what Helen Vendler called, in these pages, this “single historical fact: the exhaustion of Christian cultural authority after its ‘twenty centuries’ of rule.” As the scholar of modernism Matthew Mutter, from whom I borrowed the conjunction of Arnold and Richards, puts it, modernism “is the first sustained moment in the long secularization of Western intellectual culture where writers begin to imagine a comprehensively post-Christian future, and where secularism becomes, out of necessity, an object of reflection.” This does not mean that there were no religious or spiritualist modernists, or that modernists were the first to imagine a religion of art as a compensation for religion as such. They inherited that substitution from the Romantics, but with a difference: they have “become critically aware,” Mutter writes, of earlier “methods of naturalizing and adapting religious concepts,” and with this awareness came critical scrutiny. When 
T. E. Hulme accused Romanticism of being “spilt religion,” he meant to suggest that it didn’t quite know what it 
was doing. The art of his own time, he implied, ought to be more self-transparent about its operations. Modernism lives by a spirit of critical demystification supposedly more reflexive, more thoroughgoing, than its predecessors. This is what Mutter calls “modernist secularism” or, alternatively, “restless secularism.” 

    The result is that secularism itself, and especially its compensations, became an object of acute critical concern. Romanticism came to look too tethered to the religious models it was, only half-wittingly, adapting; that kind of self-delusion would no longer do. The technophilic futurism of F. T. Marinetti and company was one response, the machine being the appropriate god for a secular age. T. S. Eliot’s neo-orthodoxy offered another solution, D. H. Lawrence’s erotic neo-paganism yet another. What all of these strategies have in common is a distressed sense of the vulnerability of the model of culture as sublimated religion — perhaps an adequate compromise when things weren’t quite so far gone but hopelessly naïve after the aeroplane, Freud, and the Great War. 

    Modernism was therefore constituted by its impassioned attempts at resolving contradictions that remain with us. For a while, and with the collaboration of a system of higher education that promoted the study of interpreted aesthetic traditions perceived to climax in modernism, its particular modes of high seriousness held the field. (In some cultural arenas, they still do: the tendency of the Nobel Prize in literature, for instance, has up to the present been to reward writers recognizably working in the wake of a modernism become traditional, an acknowledged source of the major aesthetic possibilities.) But in others — American publishing by and large, as well as in American university curricula — modernism’s rigors have passed into a kind of obsolescence. Its demands made sense only so long as art was felt to matter in something like the same way religion once had. With the faltering of that faith, the study of modernism first, and then of the “high humanities” in general, is contracting almost out of existence. 

    Ivy Compton-Burnett was born in England in 1884. Her first mature novel (she had disowned an earlier work of juvenilia), Pastors and Masters, was published in 1925; her second, 
Brothers and Sisters, in 1929. By that time, as Compton-
Burnett’s biographer Hilary Spurling puts it, there was “no doubt that she represented the last word in modernity.” In what did that modernity consist — and what has happened to it? Today, her nineteen novels are almost entirely out of print (although New York Review Classics offers handsome paperback editions of two of them, A House and its Head and Master and Maidservant, originally published as Bullivant 
and the Lambs). One would be hard-pressed to discover an undergraduate or even a graduate seminar in which her works are taught. 

    After a series of losses in her early years, Compton-Burnett led an almost eventless life, save for the event of writing and publishing. Her adolescence and young adulthood are a record of family deaths, one sibling after another — some to the routine devastations of a pre-antibiotic age (a beloved brother died of pneumonia), others to psychopathological tangles specific to her rather odd family (two sisters died by poison, 
in a suicide pact). Another brother, Noel, died in the Great War, after which his widow tried to kill herself. Ivy nursed her to health. 

    Noel, with whom Ivy was close, went to King’s College, London. Her biographer tells us that Ivy absorbed through him “not only the general skepticism prevalent at King’s but even the mannerisms of Cambridge conversation.” Compton-
Burnett evolved a stylish atheism ballasted by knowledge of the tragic waste of the war. Here is some representative dialogue from Pastors and Masters

    “I think I have found myself at last,” said Herrick. “I think that, God willing, I shall have done my little bit for my generation, done what every man ought to do before he dies.” . . .

    “Assuming God, you wouldn’t do much if he wasn’t willing,” said Masson. 

    The influence of Cambridge was decisive; the most distinctive feature of all of Compton-Burnett’s novels is that her characters talk to one another about their melodramatic problems (involving wills, inheritances, bigamy, false parentage — things like that) with a high degree of linguistic self-consciousness (“Words pass from mouth to mouth. It is the only way you can become conversant with things,” as one character says, describing the circulation of a rumor.) Told largely in dialogue, the novels read as if Samuel Beckett were writing Freudian soap operas parodying the way Henry James’ people talk. Oedipal rage is routine in Compton-Burnett’s books — she rings grim changes on all the ways that children can hate their parents and that parents can destroy their children. Incest is a motif. Murder and theft are not unheard of. These sordid plots play out in dialogue that is arch, hyper-formalized, elliptical, and extremely precise. Unlike the Oscar Wilde comedies to which they are clearly affiliated, there is something cold and forbidding, something deliberately, nastily airless about Compton-Burnett’s novels, even when they are quite funny, as they often are. They are “glacially witty,” in the apt phrase a reviewer applied to them in The Atlantic in 1951. The subjection of extreme emotional intensities, drawn from highly melodramatic plots, to disciplined grids of language and syntax is one face of Compton-Burnett’s modernity 

    In the milieux of decaying gentry that Compton-
Burnett depicted in novel after novel, men of the cloth are not unknown, but religion as such is almost never Compton-
Burnett’s real topic. Religiosity, rather, is a signal of a personal deficit. As Spurling observes, “an active faith is generally a sign of mental or moral obtuseness.” Compton-Burnett’s vicars “are usually odious, fools and toadies or worse.” This cool contempt for religion and the religious, so different from the painfully achieved unbelief of her parents’ generation — “Ivy and her brothers seem to have reached their position of humorous incredulity easily and early . . . apparently without any of the torments suffered by an older generation of conscientious Victorians,” as Spurling puts it — is another face of Compton-Burnett’s modernity.

    But it is not, for the most part, thematized or presented as an artistic problem. Compton-Burnett’s unanguished atheism may be modern, but it is rarely modernist, in the sense that it does not submit the secularization process that it reflects to self-conscious scrutiny. Secularism is its condition but not its theme. “Religion, or the lack of it,” as Spurling says, “plays no great part” in Compton-Burnett’s books, “except as a convenient indication of social and intellectual standing.”

    That is almost true. There is one major exception: Elders and Betters, from 1944, perhaps the greatest of Compton-
Burnett’s mid-career novels, the plot of which can be summarized in a few sentences. The Donnes — the widower Benjamin and his children, Anna, Bernard, Esmond, and Reuben — have recently moved into the neighborhood of Benjamin’s sister, Jessica Calderon, her husband Thomas, and their children Terence, Tullia, Theodora, and Julius. Also living with the Calderons is Benjamin and Jessica’s invalid sister Sukey, possessor of a failing heart and a large fortune. Sukey soon dies and Anna, thirty and therefore approaching old maidhood, contrives by deception to inherit Sukey’s fortune. Jessica, aghast not so much at her failure to inherit as at the discovery, so she thinks, that her sister did not love her, commits suicide. Anna uses her fortune to marry Terence, love of whom seems to have been her motive. 

    This is the only novel in Compton-Burnett’s oeuvre in which a central family, the Donnes, is described in ethno-
religious terms: “The family had a faintly Jewish look, and biblical names had a way of recurring amongst them, but they neither claimed nor admitted any strain of Jewish blood. The truth was that there had been none in the last generations, and that they had no earlier record of their history.” In Compton-Burnett’s world, this is an unprecedented, and unrepeated, instance of genealogical specificity. And both family names, the Donnes and the Calderons, carry associations with Catholicism (John Donne was born to a recusant family; Pedro Calderón, the great seventeenth-century Spanish dramatist, became a Catholic priest). Calderon, moreover, is a not uncommon name among Jews of Iberian origin. It might be true that Jessica “held the accepted faith” — English Anglicanism — “and lived according to it,” but through their Jewish looks and their Catholic names, the Donnes and Calderons might be open to other admixtures.

    That possibility is realized in the private religion of the youngest characters in the book, Julius and Theodora (“Gift of God”), who worship in secret an Asiatic deity called Chung, whom they address in the cadences of the King James Old Testament: “‘O great and good and powerful god Chung,’ said Theodora Calderon, on her knees before a rock in the garden, ‘protect us, we beseech thee, in the new life that is upon us. For strangers threaten our peace, and the hordes of the alien draw nigh. Keep us in thy sight, and save us from the dangers that beset our path. For Sung Li’s sake, amen.’” 

    Theodora and Julius’ charming syncretic faith represents the only sustained treatment of religion in all of Compton-
Burnett’s novels — almost the only treatment at all. Touchingly precocious, the two children work through the vast problems of post-Christian belief as they offer a sort of anthropological commentary on their own invention. “‘Sung Li is a good name,’ said Julius, as they rose from their knees. ‘Enough like Son and yet not too much like it. It would not do to have them the same.’” His sister responds: “‘Blasphemy is no help in establishing a deity,’ in a tone of supporting him.” They go on to speculate about whether the power of Chung will persist into adulthood, or whether he is merely a children’s god. And they stumble upon hard questions about their own moral character: 

    “After the age of fourteen his influence fades,” said Julius, in a tone of suggestion.
    “Then people have to turn to the accepted faith. Their time of choice is past. But the power of the young gods is real for those who are innocent. That would be the test.”
    “But we are not innocent,” said Julius.
    “Yes, I think we are. Children’s sins are light in the eyes of the gods.”
    “We steal things that are not ours, Dora.”
    “Yes, but not jewels or money or anything recognised as theft.”
    “A sixpence would be thought to be money.”
    “But it is not gold or notes or anything that counts 
to a god.”
    But the steps of the pair faltered, and they turned with one accord back to the rock.
    “O great and good and powerful god, Chung,” said Dora, as they fell on their knees, “forgive us any sins that go beyond the weakness of youth. Pardon any faults that are grievous in thy sight, for temptations lie in wait. For Sung Li’s sake, amen.”
    “Temptation does beset us,” said Julius, gaining his feet.
    “It is a pity that so much of the pleasure of life depends on sin,” said his sister. “We could not be expected to live quite without joy. No god of childhood would wish it.”

    Later they wonder whether the exotic names that they have given Chung and Sung Li, “purloined from a book,” are “fitting,” and decide that they are. Dora points out that “a name with a Chinese sound is more reverent than an English one. “We could not call a god John or Thomas,” Julius says. “Or Judas,” says Theodora. 

    For Julius and Theodora, religion might be a fiction, but the sin it polices is a fact. They share this conviction with other exemplary moderns, such as Hulme, who writes of the “sane classical dogma of original sin,” and, most exemplarily, the anthropological Freud of Totem and Taboo, for whom the primordial Oedipal murder is original sin’s original scene. It is their recognition that they are not immune to — that indeed they are already corrupted by — the same cruelty and aggression that infect their elders and “betters” that makes the children in Elders and Betters so poignant and interesting. 
“‘O powerful god, Chung,’ said Julius, in a rapid gabble, turning and inclining his knee, ‘be merciful to any weakness that approaches real transgression.’” Julius and Theodora 
have no illusions about the innocence of childhood, their 
own included. 

    Compton-Burnett is nowhere more modernist than in suffering a lively sense of the reality of sin, a sense which should be incompatible with her atheism. This tension, or contradiction, was typical. It was partially for what he took to be their implausibly anodyne vision of human benevolence that Hulme railed against the Romantics; and in this he was sometimes joined by Yeats, for whom, as he put it in one of his autobiographies, Romantics such as Emerson and Whitman “have begun to seem superficial because they lack the Vision of Evil.” Elsewhere, Yeats averred that “the strength and weight of Shakespeare, of Villon, of Dante, even of Cervantes, come from their preoccupation with evil,” whereas in “Shelley, in Ruskin, in Wordsworth . . . there is a constant resolution to dwell upon good only.” What Mutter calls Yeats’ “sense of recalcitrant evil” compelled Yeats to embrace what he himself called “original sin,” a concept that he thought was compatible with heathenism and paganism. That was one solution to 
the problem. 

    T. S. Eliot’s conversion to Anglicanism, in which his reluctance to dispense with the idea of original sin figured prominently, offered another solution, albeit an incomprehensible one to more resolutely secular modernists such as Ezra Pound and Virginia Woolf. “I have had a most shameful and distressing interview with poor dear Tom Eliot,” Woolf wrote to her sister, Vanessa Bell, in 1928, “who may be called dead to us all from this day forward. He has become an Anglo-Catholic, believes in God and immortality, and goes to church. I was really shocked.” Nine years earlier Pound had been similarly struck by Eliot’s assertion, during a trip to the south of France, that he thought he might believe in life after death. In language he could not have known mirrored Woolf’s to Bell, Pound in Canto XXIX, published in 1930, had Eliot express a certain satisfaction at Pound’s surprise: “‘I am afraid of the life after death.’ / and after a pause: / ’Now, at last, I have shocked him.’” Writing in his own voice, Pound was capable of moralizing anti-religiosity: “All religions are evil.” 

    Pound’s own solution to the felt thinness of secularity, at least before he was seduced into grandiose fascistic politico-
economic visions, was the old nineteenth-century one, the effete “religion of culture” that Matthew Arnold’s critics accused him of desiring. (“It is said to be a religion proposing parmaceti, or some scented salve or other, as a cure for human miseries,” as Arnold paraphrased the charge.) Eliot felt its attractions, too, but decided, in what seemed like deliberate perversity to many of his peers, that the answer was instead to merge an avant-garde poetics with a resuscitated religious orthodoxy, even as Pound was merging an avant-garde poetics with a pseudo-scientific theory of political economy. For Eliot, the critic Matthew Hollis writes, “the weakness of the condition of literature was an effect of the weakness in the condition of religion.” 

    For four months in 1934, Pound and Eliot argued about these issues in the pages of the New English Weekly. Their dispute began with Pound’s aggressively negative review of Eliot’s After Strange Gods, the text of a lecture given at the University of Virginia arguing, among other things, for the importance of “orthodox” religion to culture in general and literary culture specifically. Pound took a programmatic secular line: “‘Religion’ [has] long since resigned,” he wrote. In the old days, “religion was real,” but today, for most people, it is “either a left-over or an irrelevance.” (In later decades Eliot himself suppressed the text of this lecture, which had become notorious for its anti-Semitism — “reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable.” It is one of the more tangled ironies of the history of modernism that Pound, who would become a systematic anti-Semite and a traitorous fascist during the Second World War, should have objected to After Strange Gods, not indeed out of any love for the Jews but out of distaste for the Christian parochialism of Eliot’s anti-Semitism.) 

    Like Woolf, Pound finds Eliot’s profession of faith essentially incomprehensible — so much so that he claims not even to know what Eliot means by “religion” in the first place. This, despite the fact that there is nothing really obscure in what Eliot intended. As the literary critic Christina C. Stough summarizes the Pound–Eliot controversy, religion for Eliot comprised “a full sense of Heaven and Hell — a religion of sacraments, rituals, orthodoxy, and above all, an acceptance of original sin.” For Woolf, the notion that Eliot could believe in all this was absurd: “A corpse would seem to me more believable than he is. I mean, there’s something obscene in a living person sitting by the fire and believing in God.” For Pound, such belief was perhaps even pathological; he refers, in a letter of 1936, to “Eliot’s crazed and pseudo-religious brain.” 

    Compton-Burnett’s personal convictions on the matter were surely closer to Woolf’s and Pound’s than to Eliot’s. Yet she shared with Eliot, as with Yeats and Hulme, a vivid sense of human sinfulness, and so she was compelled, in Elders and Betters, to take religion seriously, as a poetic system with moral effects. Or at least half-seriously: religion in this novel is after all a children’s game. But is it merely that? 

    Throughout Elders and Betters, the adults use a secularized and ironized religious language to refer to their own actions and emotions. When Anna, whose secret bullying dishonesty triggered Jessica’s suicide, tells her father that Jessica “raised the devil within me,” she is speaking accurately, although dissembling in context. When, later, Anna rebukes her cousin Terence for what she suggests is his hyperbolically gloomy portrayal of human nature — “Oh, we are not such sinks of iniquity. We are most of us well-intentioned, everyday sort of creatures” — her irony of course conceals the truth about herself. Closer to Compton-Burnett’s own vision is Terence’s rejoinder: “The part of us” — where “us” means not just the Calderons and the Donnes but all people — “that we have in common would shock anyone.” Terence’s cousin Bernard deflates Terence’s pessimistic articulation of something like original sin by reducing it to mere shallow moralizing: “You sound as if you would make a resolution on New Year’s Day.” 

    But for Dora and Julius, the problem of “the part of us that we have in common” cannot be so easily contained or dismissed. Small lies trouble them, like their having told their governess that their mother had given them a holiday from instruction. “‘O great and good and powerful god, Chung,’ prayed Dora, ‘forgive us, we beseech thee, the lie that has passed our lips. For we have uttered to thy handmaid, our governess, the thing that is false, yea and even to our mother. And this we did to gain respite from our daily task.’” Their sensitivity even leads them to a sort of scrupulosity, a constant condition of moral auditing; they are always able to discover further subtleties to a misdeed. For instance, after the above prayer for forgiveness:

    “I should think it is especially wicked to take advantage of [Mother’s] being absent-minded, when it is a sort of illness,” said Dora.
    The pair met each other’s eyes and in a moment were back at the rock.
    “O great god, Chung, pardon any wickedness we showed in putting our mother’s weakness to our wrongful purposes. For Sung Li’s sake, amen.”

    The heightened language of Julius and Theodora’s worship, laced with the rhythms of the King James Bible and the secondhand exoticism of Orientalist adventure books, is one of the funniest and most touching inventions in all of Compton-Burnett’s work — touching because, for the children themselves, its magic is absolutely real. The deployment of ritual language really can render atonement for the “wrongful purposes” one is always discovering within oneself. This despite the fact that they know perfectly well that their sacred idiom is merely their own invention, that it lacks any priestly or scriptural warrant. In their games with Chung, Dora and Julius are very serious ironists. Irony is one way of handling the problem of sin in a secular age. 

    Serious irony is modernism’s master mode. It is a way of approaching not just the sacred in a secular age but also the authority of the past in a technological age. One of its basic forms is the quotational — the deployment of a rhetorically self-conscious language larded with quotations or near-quotations or shadowed by the penumbra of quotation. This is what Louis Menand, writing of T. S. Eliot’s verse, calls “the literary quotation marks of imitation and allusion.” (Most infamously, there is Walter Benjamin’s fantasy of producing a book that consists of nothing but quotations.) Eliot’s facility with a kind of virtuosic imitation became clear in his second book of poems, Ara Vos Prec, modeled stylistically and metrically on the French symbolists. That book was a disappointment to many reviewers, who sensed in Eliot’s ironic recourse to an earlier generation of ironists the last redoubt of a minor satirist. But in “The Waste Land,” Eliot performed a kind of alchemy on an allusive poetic idiom that had otherwise come to seem insincere. Eliot understood that what Menand calls “the aura of insincerity” associated with literary quotation was in fact where its modernizing potential most clearly lay. Irony wedded to a sufficiently capacious grasp of tradition could save one from insincerity by estranging the source material — thereby smuggling intensities of emotion through the cracks between the juxtaposed inheritances, the shored fragments, of the poetic past. Irony and collage enable an extreme and sincere intensity. That was “The Waste Land”’s achievement, its instruction to the culture. 

    In their own way, Dora and Julius are similarly masters of a sincerity that issues, paradoxically, magically, from cobbled-together pieces of past language, a King James cadence made newly powerful in the mouths of these precocious, self-aware, vulnerable children. Where Eliot wrung a renewed sense of sacred meaning, however fractured and tenuous, from sources drawn from anthropological texts such as The Golden Bough, so Dora and Julius are attracted to pagan rites of sacrifice (just flowers, no animals) and even to witchcraft. (The two children, atoning for a scuffle over a wishbone, drop some of Dora’s hair into the fireplace. Dora: “Say an incantation over the witch’s cauldron.” Julius: “We ought to have the finger of a dead child, not the hair of a live one.”) Where Eliot’s interest in non-Western religion, in particular the Vedas, supplied a much-needed mystical charge to his exhausted Unitarianism (and supplied some of “The Waste Land”’s most famous and estranging lines, “Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata. / Shantih shantih shantih”), so the fictional Asiatic divinities “Chung” and “Sung Li” caress the children’s Biblical idiom with an exotic wind from the East, amplifying its authority by suggesting that its truths are transcultural and transhistorical, with rhymes across time and place in the great book of comparative religion. And where Eliot’s own conviction, confessed to Pound before “The Waste Land” was even begun, that he believed — needed to believe — in life after death must have been, in 1919 at least, a component of a generalized mysticism rather than an item of orthodoxy in an Anglican creed he had yet to embrace, so Dora and Julius’ own anxious envisioning of an afterlife flows less from Anglican doctrine than from the multifarious speculations of their uncannily sophisticated childish imaginations. “‘Of course Mother can look down [from Heaven] and see,’ said Dora. ‘It almost seems a pity that people can do that. It might prevent them from having perfect bliss.’” 

    When Julius and Dora get going, their rituals take on a life of their own — they become possessed, transported by their own serious game. Here, in one of the novel’s most striking scenes, Julius encourages Dora, who is reluctant at first, into anathematizing their father, Thomas, for what they rightly perceive as his condescending failure to grasp the emotional complexity of their attitude toward their mother’s death. After scolding them for fighting, Thomas encourages them to mourn in what strikes Julius as a false and sentimental fashion. “If people can’t talk about their dead in a natural way,” Julius says, “they had better be silent.” 

    “Of course we did fight,” said Dora.
    “Well, and why not?” said her brother, with increasing violence. “Are we children or are we not? Are we likely to have the ways of a man and woman, or are we not? Had we been through an impossible day through no fault of our own, or had we not? Is it our fault that Mother is dead? I should like to hear Father answer those questions.”
    “You did not ask them.” said Dora.
    “The time was not ripe. The moment is not yet. But I hold them in store. And then let Father rue the day.”
    “I don’t suppose you would dare to ask them. And it wouldn’t be any good to make him hate you.”
    “There is such a thing as wholesome respect,” said Julius.
    “We are in his power,” said Dora. “I suppose he could starve us if he liked.”
    “Whatever base and dastardly thing he contemplates,” said Julius, striking an attitude, and losing sight as readily as his sister of Thomas’s having no inhuman tendencies, “whatever dark meditations have a place in his heart, there is no easy way for him towards them; there is no royal road. So let him keep the truth in his heart and ponder it.”
    “He gives us food and clothes and has us taught,” said Dora, in a dubious tone, uncertain if mere fulfillment of duty should operate in her father’s favour.
    “The minimum that a man could do,” said Julius. “The least amount of expense and thought, that would save him from the contempt of all mankind. Would you have him cast us forth, as if no tie bound us?”
    “As if we were not his kith and kin,” said Dora, falling into her brother’s tone. “As if we were penniless orphans, driven to seek a moment’s shelter within his doors. As if no sacred tie of blood bound us, hand and heart to heart.”
    “Let him take thought for the dark retribution that is gathering,” said Julius, with a deep frown. “Let him take counsel with himself. That is all I have to say.”
    “The bread he has cast upon the waters, will return after many days,” said Dora.
    “Then he will repent the grudging spirit that stayed his hand.” 

    Unlike all the other scenes of Dora and Julius’ ritual language use, this one does not take place at the temple of Chung, and it is not addressed to that deity. Instead, as Julius seeks to vent his anger at his father and to encourage Dora to join him in that feeling, his speech becomes stained by the ritual idiom — at first, it seems, almost involuntarily, and then with mounting deliberateness. Dora, hesitant at first (“He gives us food and has us taught”), is at length compelled by the rhythm and the sacred diction of Julius’ lines to join him: “‘As if we were not his kith and kin,’ said Dora, falling into her brother’s tone.” The prosody of the sacred here offers the children a sort of therapeutic pressure valve for their pent-up feelings — and affords them one of religion’s less savory uses, the cursing of an enemy. 

    The scene ends with our learning that the children’s older brother, Terence, has been listening in on their strange conversation. “Terence rose and left the room, disturbed by the activities of his brother and sister, whom he believed to be acting some kind of play, a view in which he was right.” “Some kind of play” — rooted in an ever-expanding aura of allusion and quotation, in a pseudo-Biblical speech that riffs but does not mock — is how, for Julius and Dora, the highest devotions are enacted, and the sternest moral judgments passed. Julius and Dora’s private ritual language enacts modernism’s serious irony, in a childish key. 

    The ritual, even magical force of language was a prominent aspect of the modernists’ interest in religion. If modernist literature is the literature of the first historical period in which secularity itself was an object of reflection, its difficult style was the new language in which that reflection could unfold. But its newness — in Joyce, in Pound, in Eliot, in Yeats, in Stevens, and indeed in Compton-Burnett — is compounded of older strains, including, saliently, of idioms drawn from the religious traditions felt to have been superseded. In other words, the “restlessness” of what Mutter calls “secular modernism” inheres in its uneasy — alternatively skeptical and re-enchanted — repurposing of ritual language. Nor is this restricted to the Anglophone world. As Pericles Lewis observes, both Kafka and Proust became the transnational influences they did in part because, “fascinated by the limits of secularization,” each relied on “the frequent use of religious language.” Their very modernity is a consequence of their post-religious navigation of the magical formulas of religion. 

    Matthew Arnold wrote in 1880 that “most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry.” If that was true in 1880, it was even truer in 1909, in 1922, in 1944. It doesn’t seem to be true anymore. One way of understanding cultural secularization, then, is as the process whereby the ritual emanations of literary language no longer arouse a response among a large enough body of readers to sustain literary culture as a satisfying substitution for religious feeling. Or, more accurately, to sustain it at the scale at which it had become entrenched over the course of the twentieth century. Literary culture persists, of course, but interest in any literature not of the immediate present is increasingly the mark of the antiquarian. 

    The analogy between religious secularization and cultural secularization should not be pressed too far. The most important difference is that the formal humanities have always been the province of the elite. But religious secularization, too, was an elite, rather than a popular, phenomenon in the period encompassing Arnold, Eliot, and Compton-Burnett. (In fact, Arnold’s era saw fairly high rates of church attendance, and although attendance declined at the end of the nineteenth century, it was fairly stable in the first several decades of the twentieth century.) The shock that Woolf and Pound felt at Eliot’s conversion was a distinctly rarified response. The average Englishman would have seen nothing surprising. 

    In the West, irreligion as measured by church attendance as well as by reported self-identification is much more widespread today than it has ever been — even in the United States, long thought to be an outlier in this regard. If “cultural secularization” is a useful concept (as obviously I think it is), its relationship to the uneven distribution and recent acceleration of religious secularization will need to be worked out. It seems fair to suspect that the weakening claims of religion, the increasing unfamiliarity of its ways of thinking and seeing — of its poiesis — have also vitiated the study of literature specifically and the humanities in general. Will a completely secular society create and preserve and transmit high literature? Must supporters of the humanities hope for an incomplete secularization? In the absence of religious forms, how will we honor and express religious feelings? Are the humanities, at least in many of their forms, at bottom the study of the same eternal themes that preoccupied religion — the same questions with different answers? 

    When, in a conversation with her father, Dora lets some of her heightened ritual idiom slip into her speech, she is rebuked. “Suppose we stop quoting other people, and say the things that come into our own little head,” he says. Then, “there was a silence, while Julius and Dora exchanged a glance, and with it a resolution to submit to fate.” That fate increasingly appears to be one of an obsolescent tradition. But the contours of cultural obsolescence were first fully comprehended 
by the modernists themselves. In the coming years, the most vital cultural institutions, whether in the academy or outside of it, will need to reckon with the terrible responsibility of preserving kinds of value and forms of meaning to which the wider culture is inhospitable.