In Darkness

    If they show me stone and I say stone they will say stone.

    If they show me wood and I say wood they will say wood.

    But if they show me blood and I say blood they will say paint.

    If they show me blood and I say blood they will say paint.

    Translated from the Hebrew by Leon Wieseltier

     

    We Need Robert Frost

    A boy is out doing a man’s work with a chainsaw, when his sister comes to call him in for supper. Suddenly, the chainsaw leaps and cuts deep into his hand. The boy looks at the bleeding gash and begs his sister, “Don’t let him cut my hand off— / The doctor when he comes.” But before long the boy’s pulse begins to drop: “Little, less,” soon “nothing.” And the boy is dead. There’s “no more to build on there,” so his family turns away: “And they, since they / Were not the one dead, turned to their affairs.” 

    That is the narrative that Robert Frost unfolds in “Out, Out —” and it is, I believe, emblematic of his understanding of life. Danger is everywhere; the darkness is always crowding in. You cannot rely on others to sustain you. They have their own lives to live, and they return to them readily, no matter what sorrows might befall you. You have only one pillar of sustenance in this world: yourself. Frost elaborates his view of the world with considerable art.

    In the long run, I think that Frost will prove to be our most consequential and most read twentieth-century poet. Though interest in poetry overall is dwindling and rather rapidly, Frost continues to draw readers and top-flight critics. Adam Plunkett’s recently published Love and Need: The Life of Robert Frost, for example, is a deeply thoughtful blending of reflections on Frost’s life and his work. It testifies eloquently to our culture’s need to continue reading and brooding on the poems of this profound and often misunderstood man. 

    Born one hundred and fifty years ago, Frost writes the poetry of the isolated and often threatened individual. He is our prophet of post-Emersonian self-reliance, our most inspired chronicler of its joys and of its costs. Whitman, the greatest of democratic poets, writes memorably about the joys of being in groups. He loves the collective, the mass, the everyday. Frost doubts all groups. In “Neither Out Far nor In Deep,” he describes people looking blankly out to sea: they cannot look out far or in deep, “But when was that ever a bar / To any watch they keep?” Most people and most crowds are numbly uncomprehending; they offer little or nothing to the individual. But the individual does have the power to go his own way and sculpt a life worth living outside the rule of the majority. In his best poetry, Frost shows how to live a self-reliant life far from the noise of the crowd. He also is committed to showing what self-reliance can cost. Nothing is got for nothing in Frost’s world, and though self-reliance has its joys, it also comes at a price.

    We know Frost as a New England poet and a poet of rural life, though he was born in San Francisco and lived for some time in the city of Lawrence, Massachusetts. Eventually he moved north to farm in New Hampshire and Vermont. Frost had a difficult time getting his early work published. When he was nearly forty he finally found an appreciative editor, and a group of literary allies (including the very unlikely Ezra Pound) in England. Frost returned to America in 1915 and thrived. He won the Pulitzer Prize four times, and was poet in residence at Amherst, Michigan, Harvard, and Dartmouth. He read — or tried to read: the glare of the bright winter sun defeated him — at John F. Kennedy’s inauguration. He went to Russia as a goodwill ambassador for the United States, and apparently charmed Nikita Khrushchev. Frost died in 1963 at the age of eighty-eight, having written well into his final years, and reigned consistently as the best loved poet in America. He could also be what Lionel Trilling, in a revisionist speech delivered in the presence of the poet, called a “terrifying poet.”

    Frost is a poet for all seasons, but he is especially apt now for those of us who are weary of the current forms of collective identity. We look around and see that the joy that Whitman found in groups is no longer readily had: groups now are acrimonious, conflict-ridden, nasty. The happiness that Whitman found in collective life is hard to locate, if you can find it at all. But we do have another path. Enough of the romance of community, which can curdle quickly: the freedom that democracy dispenses to the individual can also be vitalizing if we know how to use it. Whitman taught the way to general happiness: it is free, unguarded. Its emblem is the open road. Emerson, whom Frost greatly admired, launched the discourse of the free if beleaguered democratic individual. In essays and addresses such as “Self-Reliance” and “The American Scholar,” he wrote the prose of the independent man or woman, though he could not, despite his efforts, write the poetry. That had to await the next century. A hundred years and more after Emerson’s great period in the 1830s, Frost came along to do precisely that. Frost can teach us what it might feel like day to day, to follow one’s own path, go one’s own way. For those who do not care for the present-day pressure to join, profess, represent, and conform, Frost can be a resource and an inspiration.

    Frost’s world is constantly dangerous; rarely does anyone in it care about you and yours. “Out, Out — ” is an allusive title. It refers to Macbeth’s famous speech after his wife dies of guilt and grief:

    Out, out brief candle!

    Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player 

    That struts and frets his hour upon the stage

    And then is heard no more. It is a tale

    Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury

    Signifying nothing.

    Obvious allusion is not common in Frost, though his work is drenched in the English poetic tradition, as Plunkett demonstrates; and so an open allusion to Shakespeare, and to what may be his darkest speech, carries weight. For Frost this is what life is, or too often can be. And if this is the case, what is to be done? 

    In “Acquainted with the Night,” Frost finds himself walking disconsolately down city streets late:

    I have been one acquainted with the night.

    I have walked out in rain — and back in rain.

    I have outwalked the furthest city light.

    I have looked down the saddest city lane.

    I have passed by the watchman on his beat

    And dropped my eyes, unwilling to explain. 

    Then the walker hears a cry from far away. He pauses hopefully. But alas, the cry is not meant for him. It is not sounded to call him back or say goodbye. Whatever he has left broken behind him will stay broken. No one comes to save him from his sorrow. No one comes because no one ever comes. It is up to you to do what you can to help yourself.

    A life of solitude has its pleasure (we will get to those), but it also creates fear and longing. In “Desert Places,” Frost stares off into a “blank whiteness of benighted snow / With no expression, nothing to express.” His world has gone as inscrutably and frightfully white as Ahab’s whale. Salvation? Solution? There is none ready to hand. All Frost can say is that this is familiar territory: “I have it in me so much nearer home / To scare myself with my own desert places.” Frost’s comfort is that he possesses “a violence from within that protects us from a violence without,” to cite his rival Wallace Stevens. 

    The writer whom Frost most admired was almost certainly Emerson; but his chosen philosopher was Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer took his understanding of life from Buddhism: life is largely pain. And pain hurts far more than any pleasure pleases. “Pleasure is never as pleasant as we expect it to be,” Schopenhauer declared, “and pain is always more painful. If you do not believe it, compare the respective feelings of two animals, one of which is eating the other.” Frost would probably nod in assent. 

    Is there anything to be done to mitigate a life largely defined by pain? Whitman’s answer — merge ecstatically with the democratic mass — was never on the table for Frost. He knew himself to be different. He speaks of “the exception I like to think I am in everything,” and though he seems to be boasting, he is also aware of the vulnerability that the sentiment entails. He would surely have concurred with an observation that I heard Harold Bloom make frequently, “He who would be all in himself risks becoming nothing in himself.” Put off by the poisoned and futile group life of our day, in which people too often define themselves through hatred and opposition, any number of us will end up choosing the path that came naturally to Frost, the path of the individual who tries to live on and find meaning on his or her own.

    Religion cannot solve Frost’s problems for him. Though he respects Christianity — probably as Schopenhauer does, for its tragic view of life — he could never conform to an institutional or catechismic faith. He cordially disliked T. S. Eliot, who he thought relied too heavily on religious consolation in his poetry. “I play euchre,” Frost said. “He plays eucharist.”

    So what is there for the solitary individual unmoored from the traditional stays and props? To begin with, you can go off and make something. Frost called his poems momentary stays against confusion. He was speaking not on behalf of the reader but on behalf of the poet. You make something that is sturdy and well-crafted and resilient. You capture the play of human speech; you find just the right metaphor; you round the work off with a dose of wisdom, however ambiguous it may be. Frost particularly wished to be praised for his power to make metaphors: he wanted to be applauded for his capacity to be reminded of this by that, of that by this. The chainsaw story sends him to Shakespeare; climbing a tree delicately in “Birches” — “I’d like to go by climbing a birch tree, / And climb black branches up a snow-white trunk / Toward heaven, till the tree could bear no more . . .” — recalls what it is like to fill a glass to the top and then, ever so slightly, over the top. A white spider on a white flower takes him to Aquinas’ argument about how the perfect design of the world proves the existence of God. A bounteous woman reminds him of a graceful silken tent standing alone and poised in a field.

    To keep confusion at bay and the night from taking over, you make things, well-formed, useful things. Frost was not referring only to poems: he made that clear. He said that to make a horseshoe, with perfect symmetry, tough and durable, was a kind of making that could hold off confusion. Make things, make them right, and you put darkness at bay and maybe do a little good in the world.

    You should also hold onto what gives you sustenance. In “Two Tramps at Mud Time,” a pair of ragged men emerge from the woods while Frost is chopping wood. He reads their minds: they want to do his job for pay. But Frost will not hand over his axe. Thoreau observed that he hoed beans to get sustenance, but also to cultivate tropes for his writing. The farm and the chores that sustain it are practical necessities for Frost, but they also provide him with substance for his art. Frost writes about country life — farming and husbandry — because he feels deeply that rural life is where reality is most potently concentrated. “My object in living,” he proclaims near the close of “Two Tramps,” “is to unite / My avocation and my vocation / As my two eyes make one in sight.” My students are often disappointed when it becomes clear to them that Frost is not going to give up the axe or even hand a few charitable dollars to the men. But in Frost’s world you need to take care of yourself, for no one — at least no one creditable — is going to provide for you. It’s not that Frost does not feel the social sting of not handing off his axe. He does. It’s just that such a gesture makes no sense in his fragile but competent individualist world. 

    There is a recorded clip of Frost reading a hyperbolic poem about putting away resources for old age. The poem is called “Provide, Provide,” and it’s a fable about a one-time starlet, called Abishag, “the picture pride of Hollywood,” scrubbing stairs in old age to get by. Do not let it happen to you, Frost says. 

    No memory of having starred 

    Atones for later disregard

    Or keeps the end from being hard.

    Better to go down dignified

    With boughten friendship at your side

    Than none at all. Provide, provide!

    After he’s done “saying” the poem — Frost never recited his verse or read it aloud, he “said” it — he pushes his face toward the camera and remarks, with dark gusto, “Provide, provide — or someone else will provide for ya. How would you like that?” Someone else being your neighbor, the town, the government. 

    Frost takes another memorable swipe at groups and groupthink in “Departmental.” Ostensibly it is a poem about ants, and in particular the death of one ant, the noble forager Jerry McCormic. “The word goes forth in Formic / ‘Death’s come to Jerry McCormic.’” (Calling ant-talk Formic is a marvelous touch, no?) The disposal of Jerry’s body is cold and standardized:

    Will the special Janizary

    Whose office it is to bury

    The dead of the commissary.

    Go bring him to his people. 

    It is all routine, all unfeeling. Jerry is an anonymous creature, characterized only by his work, not mourned for when he passes but submitted to a scripted interment. How much is Jerry’s fate like that of the human factory worker, rendered faceless by the industrial machine? His funeral protocols “[C]ouldn’t be called ungentle / But how thoroughly departmental.” 

    The factory worker: in “A Lone Striker,” Frost tells the story of a man locked out of the factory gates when he is late for work. He doesn’t immediately reject the factory and its regimented (ant-like) life. But as he stands outside waiting, a fresh impulse takes him, and surprising both himself and the reader, he considers taking off for the woods:

    He knew a path that wanted walking;

    He knew a spring that wanted drinking; 

    A thought that wanted further thinking;

    A love that wanted re-renewing.

    Nor was this just a way of talking

    To save him the expense of doing.

    With him it boded action, deed.

    Note that the lone striker is not a member of a union, striking for better wages and conditions. He is striking for freedom and for no one other than himself. At the end of the poem, he seems on the verge of discovering it.

    The lone individual — the one who says no to the ant-life of groups — can find joy in beauty, though Frost’s idea of beauty is not entirely conventional. Schopenhauer believed that beauty saved you from inner turbulence by creating a contemplative calm. You could stand and stare at a landscape or a painting for hours and achieve some manner of ease. For Schopenhauer, life was walking a fiery path: beauty gave you a cool spot to rest, for as long as you could sustain your gaze. But Frost loves, and brilliantly evokes, transient beauty. Listen to him praising a hillside thaw:

    To think to know the country and not know

    The hillside on the day the sun lets go

    Ten million silver lizards out of snow!

    As often as I’ve seen it done before

    I can’t pretend to tell the ways it’s done.

    It looks as if some magic of the sun

    Lifted the rug that bred them on the floor

    And the light breaking on them made them run.

    The poet claims that it is the sun that makes the magic here, but it is the poet who knows to compare the shimmer on a snowy hillside with the glow of lizards running wild. 

    Beauty passes in Frost, and even at its most dramatic it submits to constraints. It’s as though Frost were somewhat suspicious of beauty and joy. The more transient the beauty, the more Frost loves it. Consider the short and quite wonderful poem “Blue Butterfly Day”:

    It is blue butterfly day here in spring,

    And with these sky-flakes down in flurry on flurry

    There is more unmixed color on the wing

    Than flowers will show for days unless they hurry.

    But these are flowers that fly and all but sing:

    And now from having ridden out desire

    They lie closed over in the wind and cling

    Where wheels have freshly sliced the April mire.

    The blue butterflies are magnificent, more vibrant even than the spring flowers will be. Yet their magnificence lasts only a short time — blue butterfly day. Soon they are folded over, clinging to the mud. The poignancy of this portrait of transience brings to mind the classical Chinese poets and their blossoms. 

    Beauty is splendid, but sustain contact with it too long and you will inevitably be left vulnerable. You become mesmerized and can be taken unawares. Life is dangerous, life is fraught, as the boy in “Out, Out — ” learns. Frost commends vigilance: there is too much out in the world that can ruin you if you are besotted by its wonders. In Studies in Classic American Literature, a book that has itself become something of a classic, D.H. Lawrence observes that “the essential American soul is hard, isolate, stoic and a killer.” Frost is no killer, and though he is often hard he has a capacity to open himself up, albeit cautiously, to beauty. But “isolate and stoic”: that is Frost to a T. 

    What about love? You might, if you are very fortunate, find one other person to share your solitude fruitfully. (Frost often thought that he had found such inner companionship in his formidable wife Elinor.) Frost wrote some wonderful love poems, the best of which manage to be both joyful and prudent. Prudence, of course, is not a common theme in the poetry of love. Perhaps the most touching of them is “Putting in the Seed,” a sonnet (Frost wrote many of those) that runs this way:

    You come to fetch me from my work tonight

    When supper’s on the table, and we’ll see

    If I can leave off burying the white

    Soft petals fallen from the apple tree

    (Soft petals, yes, but not so barren quite

    Mingled with these, smooth bean and wrinkled pea),

    And go along with you ere you lose the sight

    Of what you came for and become like me,

    Slave to a springtime passion for the earth.

    How Love burns through the Putting in the Seed

    On through the watching for that early birth

    When just as the soil tarnishes with weed,

    The sturdy seedling with arched body comes

    Shouldering its way and shedding the earth crumbs. 

    Anyone with an acquaintance with gardening will recognize the feelings that infuse the poem. In the springtime, people fall in love with planting, and with imagining the bounty to come. It is the time of hope for the gardener, before pests or bad weather interfere with the dream of plenty. Frost himself was a gardener and knew the passion for growing well.

    Yet the poem is about more than gardening. “Putting in the Seed” is also about the act of love, putting in the seed that leads to pregnancy and birth. But “Love burns through the Putting in the Seed”: life begins with sex, passion inspired by love. (Note the quasi-metaphysical capitalization of the central terms.) But love continues on past the moment of lovemaking, into the days of pregnancy, when husband and wife together wait for the birth. And then comes the seedling, the child, sturdy and strong, “shouldering” away the earth crumbs. The poem, then, is about fidelity. The husband is there for the act of love, yes; but he will remain there through the pregnancy and on to the birth. The transformation that his wife undergoes will not rattle or alienate him. Love will abide into the future. This is a marriage poem, about a love that goes beyond simple passion into regions of care, compassion, steadfastness, and respect. 

    But Frost was also the author of a stingingly bitter marriage poem, “Home Burial” A newly married couple’s child has died, and the death has put them horribly at odds. Amy, the wife, is mourning her child furiously, and she makes it clear that her grief will never stop. Her husband, unnamed in the poem, is a practical countryman, who cannot understand the depths of Amy’s grief. “What was it brought you up to think it the thing / To take your mother-loss of a first child / So inconsolably — in the face of love?” He thinks that his wife’s grief arises from conceit and over-refinement. Amy finds her husband crude, empty, hopeless. The poem is composed with grim conviction. For the strong individualist, like the husband in the poem, marriage can provide some succor, but it can also be a trap, a chainsaw waiting to jump.

    The poem that seems to me most completely to capture Frost’s view of life is called “The Most of It.” In its way it is an anti-marriage poem. It is an allusive poem, with a submerged mythical theme. A man finds himself alone in the world, not unlike Adam before Eve. He is lonely. He cries out in frustration and sorrow, but all he hears in response is an echo. He wants more. He cannot live with a mere reflection from the world. He wants what he calls “counter-love, original response.” He wants Eve, or someone like her, someone who will give him more than “copy speech,” and talk to him in an idiom of her own. But he never gets it. The kind of Romantic love that helps a poet like Shelley burn imaginatively through received feelings and thoughts, and discover, if only fleetingly, a paradise on the other side of them, is not available to our man.

    What he sees instead is a shape plunging into the waters on the opposite bank. It makes its way toward him, and emerges,

    Instead of proving human when it neared

    And someone else additional to him,

    As a great buck it powerfully appeared,

    Pushing the crumpled water up ahead,

    And landed pouring like a waterfall,

    And stumbled through the rock with horny tread,

    And forced the underbrush — and that was all. 

    Not a woman, not Eve, but a magnificent buck, that appears as though in a dream-vision and then is gone. Our Adamic individual is left alone.

    Yet he does receive something. Or as he puts it in another poem about the unlikelihood of fulfillment: “For once, then, something.” He receives the buck, who is potentially an image of majestic self-reliance. Adam can embrace that vision of himself or he can go on pining. To save himself, and affirm his solitary dignity, he is going to have to learn to read in the way that Frost commends. He is going to have to see a metaphor when it arises and understand how far he can ride it out. As Frost says in Education by Poetry, “Unless you have had your proper poetic education in the metaphor you are not safe anywhere. Because you are not at ease with figurative values: you don’t know the metaphor in its strength and its weakness. You don’t know how far you may expect to ride it and where it may break down with you.” Our protagonist will have to begin by seeing that nature has offered him a potentially illuminating image, if he is ready himself for such an illumination — if he can then understand what he can make of it. He will need to grasp and embrace his solitude, even if he wishes things were otherwise. 

    The poem’s title, “The Most of It,” can be puzzling. The most that we can even be given in the way of consolation — a warning of a limit? Or, as I would prefer to read its inexplicit meaning, Make the Most of It, in the old American phrase. Can our man do so? Can he read the metaphor that life has offered him? And then can he live it out, taking some joy in his solitude? Can he be satisfactorily alone in the world, savoring the beauty of nature and the dignified, difficult pleasures of work? Is his life a diminished thing for the lack of others? Not, I suspect, if he knows what his path is and how to follow it. 

    Frost steps into our militant age of groupthink and tribal rage and makes a path for the individual who does not care for any of it. Make sturdy useful things; contemplate beauty in nature, but not for too long; consider marriage, but acknowledge the dangers; learn to be at home in the metaphor, and when the image arises that embodies your fate do not be afraid to embrace it. Take the hits as they come, for they will come. Chart your own course, cut your own path, to the best of your abilities; and be prudent and wise. Learn to rely on yourself and do for yourself. Think twice before you surrender the axe.

    The Rise and Fall and Rise of American Publishing

    I knew the jig was up when one day, in the fall of 1995, my boss and publisher Peter Osnos asked me to lunch. I was then editorial director of Times Books, an imprint of Random House. Previously, I had been publisher of Hill & Wang, a nonfiction division of Farrar, Straus & Giroux. I’d had some success during my years there in the late 1980s, publishing Innumeracy by John Allen Paulos, Hill & Wang’s first bestseller since Elie Wiesel’s Night in 1960. Wiesel’s slim and scorching account of his torment at Auschwitz and Buchenwald had been rejected by more than fifteen American publishers before Arthur Wang took it on. It was not an immediate success despite glowing reviews. Over time, however, it would sell more than ten million copies and become a central text in the world’s moral education, such as it is. Paulos’ polemic pressing the case for mathematical literacy was unlikely to find similar favor, especially given the one-hand-clapping review buried in the middle of the New York Times Book Review. Yet to my surprise it vaulted to the upper echelons of bestseller lists all over the country, including the Times, largely, I came to believe, because of its brevity — it was more essay than full-length jeremiad — written with engaging wit, and so it didn’t feel like homework. It did a lot to help many people overcome their allergy to numbers.

    My phone was soon ringing with offers from other publishers, who perhaps felt I had some mojo, some secret sauce, that might help them out. They offered to double my salary and to give me the keys to their respective bank vaults so that I might dangle larger and more substantial advances to authors whose books might similarly sell well. Plus giving me a larger playing field to run around on, with all the presumed market clout that a larger, more corporate concern might provide. I took the bait. What could go wrong? 

    There I was, on the eve of publishing a revisionist history of the American Revolution by Theodore Draper, one of the most independent and formidable historians in the country, a public intellectual avant la lettre, a man I had long admired and whose defenestration of the Iran-Contra scandal I had published at Hill & Wang. His new book was the work of a lifetime of study, just over five hundred pages of brilliantly argued scholarship, an original account of the causes and nature of the revolutionary process that resulted in the final rupture with England and, as Draper put it, in a struggle for power, whatever its ideological conceits. I rounded up praise — read: blurbs — from a clutch of worthies, including R. R. Palmer, Esmond Wright, Edward Countryman, and even Gore Vidal, who had long ago anointed himself an expert on American history. He called it a book written “with an acuity and balance worthy of the late (and until now unequaled) Richard Hofstadter.” I arranged a paperback edition with the head of Vintage Books at Random House, to follow our hardcover. Our first printing was ten thousand. The pump was primed. I was excited.

    Osnos waited until dessert to deliver the bad news. He said that, going forward, we could no longer publish the Drapers of this world. First printings of ten thousand copies were killing us. It was our obligation to find books that could command first printings of forty, fifty, even sixty thousand copies. Only then could profits be had that were large enough to feed the behemoth — or more precisely, the more refined and compelling tastes — that modern mainstream publishing demanded.

    It was a dark moment, but still I was game, except for the sad fact that almost never had I — or Osnos — acquired books that warranted such large printings. To be sure, we had published books that had “done well,” going back to press, some in numbers that ultimately far exceeded sixty thousand copies sold. But, I pointed out, if such a principle were raised to the level of dogma, none of the several books that were then keeping Random House fiscally afloat — Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, John Berendt’s Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil (eventually spending a record two hundred and sixteen weeks on the bestseller list, and adapted into a film by Clint Eastwood), and Joe Klein’s Primary Colors (published anonymously and made into a movie by Mike Nichols in 1998) — would ever have been acquired. None had been expected to be a bestseller, and each had started out with a ten-thousand copy first printing.

    Osnos would soon decamp to start an independent press called PublicAffairs, and I accepted an offer in late 1996 to edit the Los Angeles Times Book Review, one of only three separate Sunday sections devoted to books left at the country’s major metropolitan dailies. Four years later, I organized and published a symposium on the state of American publishing. More than thirty distinguished editors (Robert Gottlieb, Robert Loomis, Jason Epstein, Robert Weil, Marian Wood), publishers (Alberto Vitale, André Schiffrin, Richard Seaver, Roger W. Straus Jr.), literary agents (David Black, Sandra Dijkstra, Morton L. Janklow, Gloria Loomis, Betsy Lerner), and booksellers (Andy Ross, Barbara Meade, Douglas Dutton) participated. They represented both mainstream trade publishers (Alfred A. Knopf, Random House, Simon & Schuster) and independent houses and university presses (W. W. Norton, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, Seven Stories, Harvard, Oxford, Walker & Co., The Overlook Press, Verso). Today a third of the respondents are no longer with us. The important, and stinging, question remains: Is their publishing world still with us? Or has the business — which, like all cultural enterprises, has effects beyond its own profits or losses — evolved beyond recognition, for better or for worse? 

    When, in that Pleistocene era, I invited a broad spectrum of industry veterans to share their individual and collective wisdom, the twenty-first century had just begun. It was plain that for some time several issues had been plaguing those of us fortunate to work as midwives to the birthing of books. None of us were naïve. We had always known that working at the intersection of art and commerce was inherently fraught. Publishing had always required an admixture of idealism and cynicism. Many were temperamentally Chicken Littles, fearing that however difficult the old ways of acquiring and editing and selling books were, the new ways were worse. The Golden Age, as usual, was in the past — a time synonymous with our youth — and of course we were convinced that it had been much better. (And there were, we soon discovered, some good reasons for thinking so.) The future was now fast upon us, and whatever else might be said about it, we knew one thing: it would not include us. 

    We had entered a new world of painful — even, for many, unimaginable — challenges. Among the more acutely distressing trends were the conglomeration of nearly everything, a sovereign obsession with the bottom-line and the pressure to reap short-term profits, and the near-universal enrollment in the junk cults of celebrity, sensationalism, and gossip, which made it harder for publishers to successfully maintain a commitment to literature and the public discourse — to be a serious publisher. Complicating the picture even more was the advent of electronic technologies that threatened to significantly transform old ways of both producing and distributing books. The swift rise of Amazon was a critical factor, transforming the landscape of bookselling, putting to the sword hundreds if not thousands of independent bookstores even as Jeff Bezos built with a single-minded determination both admirable and appalling a digital juggernaut that made it possible for millions to gain access at remarkably cheap prices to a more diverse array of books than ever before. Bezos got big fast and was soon able to dictate the terms of the entire trade. Publishers reeled. And so did the noble bookshop owners. By 2010, the number of bookstores in the country fell from a high of about four thousand in 1990 to fifteen hundred. (Thirteen years later, against all expectation, it had rebounded by about 1,000 bookstores.) 

    The rise of digital communication and book-buying caught Hollywood’s imagination and swiftly became the basis for a hit movie, Nora Ephron’s You’ve Got Mail, a glamorous tale of the unglamorous reality of the independent American bookstore. Worry deepened that these trends would alter even how people read. The growing proliferation of screens raised the specter that the habits of attention necessary to absorb extended narrative — the new term “long form” was itself an expression of the jitters — would fall victim to the seductions of a culture hostage to velocity and instant gratification. The patience necessary for the lasting pleasures of a more contemplative, slower approach to both knowledge and entertainment was at risk.

    Perhaps it was delusional on our part, but optimism dies last. We felt ourselves to be a species defined by our opposable thumbs and an inherent need to tell each other stories. For this was the principal way in which we extracted meaning in an otherwise inchoate world. Surely technology could not destroy or replace this essential human quality. We might debate the many ways the industry had resisted opening itself up to the stories of others and what should be done about it. We could argue about how a world of ostensible privilege and presumed entitlement had too often shaped who got to be the “gatekeepers” — another shibboleth of digital culture, though of course it applied most precisely to Bezos and Zuckerberg and the other tech mandarins — of our literary culture. We might decry the dismal fact that American publishers, with notable exceptions, had long been allergic to translating works from other languages. We might blame the manifold failure of our experiment in public education to advance literacy so that we now have an electorate in which fully half are unable to read at a level higher than fourth grade, thus enfeebling the very idea of an informed citizenry that is so essential for a healthy democracy. 

    Book people are nevertheless temperamentally given to a persistent idealism even while constantly complaining that everything is doomed. Almost uniformly they will insist that any glass filled halfway with water (or more likely, vodka) is half empty, but they will behave almost without exception as if it were half-full. They live to hear a new story by a new writer, or a fresh gloss on an old truth. The main worry, as the late Marian Wood, a veteran of many years in New York publishing, insisted to me in early 2001, wasn’t “the conglomerate or a celebrity-hungry culture or the technology, or the idiocies of the last thirty years. The biggest problem is keeping reading alive as a passion — and finding ways to reach those passionate readers with the news of a great new writer.” The renowned Robert Gottlieb, who died at the age of ninety-two in 2023, told me: “Every few years since I’ve been in publishing — that’s since 1955 — we’ve been told that it’s all over. There’s always a new reason: remember ‘The medium is the message’? Meanwhile books go rolling along. The very golden age that young and middle-aged people are looking back at so romantically was forcefully (and frequently) described to me by Alfred Knopf as ‘the age of the slobs’ — for him, everything after 1939 represented the death of publishing. I thought he was mistaken then, and I think today’s doom-criers are mistaken, too.”

    The venerable literary agent Georges Borchardt is still working at age ninety-seven. When I met with him not long ago in his Manhattan office, he saw no reason to revise his sober assessment rendered a quarter of a century earlier, reminding me that good and daring writers had almost always had a hard time getting published by big established houses, long before the mergers and the conglomerates came into being: “William Faulkner was turned down by the legendary Maxwell Perkins (Scribners); Elie Wiesel was turned down by the original Knopf (Mrs. K herself); Samuel Beckett was turned down by just about every publisher in New York. Both Wiesel and Beckett were then picked up by small publishers with little capital, but good instincts, Hill & Wang and Grove Press respectively.” (Borchardt represented both writers.) “So put me in the camp of the guardedly optimistic.” It was inspiring to have pessimism dispelled by someone who has seen so much. 

    Still, twenty-five years into the new century, something has changed; an ill wind is blowing through publishers’ suites. One wonders if those rosy sentiments are more a treasured conceit — editors and publishers have always mythologized themselves — than an unsentimental acknowledgment of a more disturbing reality. The big surprise is less the manifold ways in which Brobdingnagian publishing has come to dominate the ecosystem of publishing generally, but — this is the good news of our day — the consequent and unexpected resilience of an entire galaxy of small independent publishers. You would have thought that as big publishers battened on economies of scale, merging back-office bureaucracies, outsourcing entire departments of copyeditors, shedding aging (and expensive) staff, and kicking an entire generational cohort to the curb, the result would be leaner, more efficient, more profitable publishing machines ever more deft at discovering the quirky writers whose daring imaginations would be well served by publishers skilled in the alchemy of promotion and marketing. More: that as the big companies merge and consolidate the small fry would be snuffed out, deprived of oxygen, unable to compete. But you would be wrong. 

    With conglomeration came cowardice. Turns out, mass wasn’t synonymous with class. A culture of timidity soon set in among the corporate overseers, and invertebrate behavior quickly became a striking hallmark of the merger mania that characterized much of mainstream publishing dealmaking and practice. (Beyond the economic realm, one must not forget the shabby fear with which mainstream publishing greeted the fatwa against Salman Rushdie.) Most publishers began in the first half of the twentieth century as the black sheep of their rich families: Horace Liveright, Roger W. Straus, Jr., Barney Rosset, to name only a few. One example tells the larger story: Bennett Cerf and Donald Klopfer founded Random House in 1927 and bought Alfred A. Knopf in 1960 and Pantheon the following year. Four years later, in 1965, they sold it to RCA and then RCA, in turn, sold it in 1980 to Si Newhouse’s privately owned Advance Publications for between $65 million and $70 million in cash. Newhouse ruled the roost for eighteen years and then sold in 1998 to the private German multinational conglomerate Bertelsmann, which paid a reported $1 billion, making Bertelsmann a publishing Goliath. Fifteen years later, in 2013, Random House and the Penguin Group combined because of a deal between Bertelsmann and Pearson, the parent companies of their respective publishing houses, a response to the threat posed by Amazon. Other publishers followed suit, the French company Hachette buying Little, Brown, the German firm of Holtzbrinck absorbing Farrar, Straus & Giroux, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation swallowing HarperCollins, and the global private equity and investment firm of KKR gobbling up Simon & Schuster, leaving today just five corporate empires dominating the American publishing landscape. Corporate raiders made out like bandits; authors and editors not so much. 

    To be sure, opportunism and market agility are among the requirements of a successful business. But fear hollows out the good kind of opportunism, and mainstream publishers grew wary of alienating readers and found themselves cleaving to the familiar, the safe bet, the tried-and-true. A certain predictability set in; and, as ever, smaller publishers — independents who had almost no money — were less encumbered and therefore nimbler and more willing to take on risk. Kris Kristoferson was right: freedom’s just another word for nothing left to lose. Big publishing blew itself up, and much of its current predicament is the result of self-inflicted wounds, prompting the emergence of an arcadia of small publishing houses, many of which display all the qualities of imagination and taste and pluck which largely elude the established firms. 

    Today, thanks to a concerted campaign to discover and publish a wider array of voices, more representative of America’s changing racial and ethnic demography than had been permitted in the past by a publishing elite hostage to its own class and racial and ethnic origins, more writers from every corner of the country and the world, ostensibly reflecting a greater range of human experience, are being published than ever before. But this politically inspired expansion has also prompted a politically inspired contraction. The politicization of American publishing — from both the left and the right — has become more pronounced in recent years. All the self-congratulation and the virtue-signaling that often accompanies the appearance of this or that new novelist cannot disguise the fact that the stories that are told in many of these new books, especially those peddled by the mainstream houses, no matter the ethnic or racial origin of their respective authors, seem mainly to be chapters in a single tale of trauma, survival, and resilience, testimonies intended to keep open the wound of victimhood whose suppurating nature is seen as a sign of moral authenticity. 

    A new orthodoxy has arisen. As David Rieff points out in his incisive and important book Desire and Fate (recently published by a small courageous house in London called Eris and distributed by Columbia University Press), we live today in a therapeutic culture in which the idea of trauma has become central. Rieff worries that “we are entering a Woke version of the Victorian Age, or post-Hays Code Hollywood, in which censorship will be the norm, not the exception” and suspects “that the increasing consensus that a writer or an artist’s moral character, and political and increasingly racial and gender bona fides, should determine whether they are published or exhibited, celebrated or ignored, will grow stronger, not weaker in the decades to come.” Rieff denounces the “ecstatic philistinism of identity politics” and locates its origins in the “old axiom of small-town White Protestant America — ‘If you don’t have something nice to say, don’t say anything at all’ — a trope that has now been “redeployed in the service of supposed emancipation and reparation.” The use of “sensitivity readers” by publishers to assure them that nothing heretical or insensitive (heretics are always insensitive!) appears in their books, that characters and language that might offend are expunged from publication, is common, as is the proliferation of “trigger warnings.” There is, Rieff concludes, “a new kind of politicized moral prudery sailing under the flag of anti-racism and inclusivity (not to mention under medicalized fetishization of trauma) to impose the claim that only morally defensible art is acceptable art.”

    Rieff’s book is likely the most intellectually sophisticated and rigorous critique of “wokeness” that we will have, but by now the anxiety is hardly his alone. One hears it also in the book trade. “We all know the elephant in the room,” the literary agent Andy Ross and former owner of the great Cody’s Books in Berkeley told me. “It goes by the name of ‘cultural appropriation.’ It supposes that authentic fiction demands the writer can only write in the point of view of characters of the same sex, race, or ethnicity as the writer. It’s become a tyranny. It’s dangerous to speak out against it. When you do, you get accused of things like ‘literary colonialism’ or something like that. Everybody in publishing agrees, but nobody will do anything about it or even talk about it out loud. I’m glad I don’t represent Arthur Golden, a Jewish guy who wrote a wonderful novel in 1997, a bestseller, Memoirs of a Geisha. It would never be published today.” In our culture now, like seeks only like, and only like can speak with any authority about like. We know only what we ourselves are. We have permission to write only about ourselves and people like us. Fiction has been inundated with “auto-fiction.” Authenticity is the supreme literary value, when in fact it is not an aesthetic value at all. Can there be a prescription more discouraging to the imagination than this? 

    This is not an entirely unprecedented debate in American letters. It is useful to recall, for example, the controversy that erupted in 1983 over Famous All Over Town, a novel of Chicano life, by one Danny Santiago. Hailed by the New York Times as “a classic of the Chicano urban experience” and by the Dallas Times Herald as the work of an author with “a voice rich with barrio talk and a comic touch” and by the street-wise Richard Price as “utterly seductive. . . funky, cocky, innocent, cagey and at times screamingly funny,” the book’s author turned out not to be who he said he was. He was unmasked by John Gregory Dunne as his former landlord and friend Daniel James, not Chicano at all, a Yale graduate and past member of the American Communist Party and middling Hollywood screenwriter whose career had tanked and who had been so frightened by being blacklisted that he resorted to using a pseudonym to get over his writer’s block. “The idea of an Anglo presenting himself as a Chicano, I found troubling,” Dunne confessed. He felt that “this particular kind of literary deception could, if discovered . . . have unpleasant extraliterary ramifications.” James, however, insisted that as Danny Santiago he was “so much freer” to write and it was under that guise that he was able to publish the stories that would become his novel in Redbook and Playboy in 1971, including one called “The Somebody” that was chosen in Martha Foley’s annual collection, Best American Short Stories

    The identity police were aroused. Philip Hererra, the editor of Nuestro, a champion of Latino writers who had published one of Santiago’s stories, was outraged: “We were deceived. We were led to believe that Danny Santiago was a Mexican American. Clearly, he was not.” Alvin Poussaint, Harvard’s resident progressive psychiatrist, joined the chorus of denunciations, saying that “by implying it was written by a Mexican, it gave the book an authenticity it simply did not have.” Others rose to James’ defense, including many Latino writers. Thomas Sanchez, for one, author of both the bestselling Zoot-Suit Murders and the acclaimed Rabbit Boss, a novel that through an act of gifted literary ventriloquism gives voice to four generations of Washo Indians in the California Sierras, declared that “I don’t care who writes a book — a man, a woman, a cat or a dog. They say you shouldn’t judge a book by its cover. Well, you shouldn’t judge it by the author’s ethnic or cultural background.” 

    Dunne, Herrera, and the others got it backwards. Surely it is a tribute to the scope of a writer’s imagination if he can create a world not his own, if he can persuasively write not within difference but across difference. Madame Bovary, c’est moi, Flaubert thrillingly proclaimed, in defiance of the writer’s confinement to his inherited circumstances. There is an old and honorable literary tradition of writing in somebody else’s lane. Besides, are we not all traveling in humanity’s lane? 

    More recently, in 2020, the publishing world was roiled by the controversy over Jeanine Cummins’ novel American Dirt, a story about the calamity that befalls a Mexican mother and son who slip the noose of a drug cartel and seek refuge in the United States. Cummins, a white woman of Irish and Puerto Rican extraction, sold the book to Flatiron, a division of Macmillan, for a reported advance of seven figures, received early praise from Stephen King and John Grisham, and saw her book become an Oprah Book Club smash hit, selling more than four million copies in nearly forty languages. But Oprah, the supreme voice of conventionality, spoke too soon. To the author’s astonishment and the distress of her publisher, American Dirt was excoriated by more than one hundred and forty writers who signed an open letter calling the book “exploitative, oversimplified, and ill-informed, too often erring on the side of trauma fetishization.” These were not literary objections. Condemned for its alleged caricatures of Mexico, and despite Cummins’ wistful and not altogether savory admission that she wished that someone “slightly browner than me” had been the author, she was unable to avoid becoming, as she put it, an “example of the white supremacy problem in publishing, as a part Puerto Rican woman from a working-class background.” In reality, of course, it was she who had sought to tackle “the white supremacy” problem by writing a book that tried to transcend all such extra-literary considerations. 

    Among the commissars of publishing, Cummins took a beating. The battle over American Dirt was so bruising that she was unable to write for a year. (Her new novel, Speak to Me of Home, appeared last spring.) Ordinary readers didn’t care about the disputations; they bought the book by the millions. Yet her public shaming had a chilling effect on many agents and authors. A curtain of fear descended, and you could feel the dread especially in the corridors of corporate publishers who dared not admit what had become common knowledge: that they were operating according to certain ideological and sociological constraints. Despite their market clout, they worried about provoking the wrath of the Red Guards of Woke. For all the chest-thumping triumphalism of the new dispensation, ballyhooing the enfranchisement of voices previously excluded from mainstream publishing, what was striking was the unacknowledged conformism of the stories now being championed. 

    Less noticed was the long retreat among mainstream publishers, with, as ever, notable exceptions, from the highwater mark of an earlier period to publish works of serious history and daring, even offensive fiction. Following the Second World War and the subsequent expansion of American colleges and universities as the Baby Boom generation reflected the country’s growing middle class, publishers were quick to seize the opportunity to expand their publishing programs. The growing archipelago of institutions of higher education and public libraries helped underwrite this growth. In 1953, Jason Epstein founded Anchor quality paperbacks at Doubleday, while three years later Harper & Row started Harper Torchbooks, both imprints making classic works of history, literature, philosophy, and criticism popularly available to ordinary readers. Other publishers (Beacon, Meridian, Norton Library) followed. A taste for the serious was encouraged. In 1953, for example, Random House was happy to publish the recondite journals of the sixteenth-century Jesuit Matteo Ricci, one of the first Westerners to visit Japan. Today doing so would be considered commercial suicide and never mind the intellectual glory. Such a book would be consigned to the ghetto of the university presses, deemed (not altogether wrongly) to be of interest only to scholars and specialists. And so we must award plaudits to the university presses — many of them beleaguered by parent institutions that have increasingly lost faith in the intrinsic significance of core humanities curricula — who have taken up the slack of the trade houses’ reluctance and have been publishing many important works of history with all the editorial scrupulousness and marketing zeal that such books require. 

    History as a category has suffered especially, and those publishers still committed to bringing out serious works of history complain bitterly. A case in point is the Penguin Press’ recent publication of Ian Buruma’s fine book The Collaborators, a forensic exhumation of three morally complicated lives in imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and occupied Netherlands. The book was acclaimed in America’s few remaining review publications — but the book bombed, selling only slightly more than 1,000 hardcover copies. The number was so disappointingly small that the publisher decided against bringing the book out in paperback. And this is not an exceptional circumstance in today’s unforgiving market. A recent visit with a former longtime editor at Alfred A. Knopf with decades of experience editing many of the nation’s most distinguished historians confirms the disobliging sales reality: readers are neither reading nor buying history in the numbers needed to make such publishing profitable. Buruma, of course, is a well-known writer, and at least his book made it into hardcover. What about all the gifted but less celebrated historians whom the trade houses ignore and can no longer imagine publishing in hard cover or soft? (Rest in peace, Ashbel Green.) 

    Perhaps this was to be expected. Americans have long suffered from a collective historical amnesia. Our politics are hobbled by our refusal to understand the manifold ways in which history, as was once famously said, weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. Americans have long cleaved to the conceit that history, insofar as it was deemed important at all, was more hindrance than help in our presumed unstoppable march to the munificent future. Optimistic, pragmatic, impatient, inventive, generous (when they are not other things), Americans have refused to be held hostage to the past, or even to be interested in it, believing America to have burst its bounds. The cost of such myopia is large. It enfeebles understanding, promotes false and ugly nostrums of all kinds, and licenses the infantilization of public debate. But the interest in facts has always taken a backseat in our culture to the easier and more seductive approach whose pleasures have tended to arouse a lasting echo of enthusiasm among a broad public, an approach best articulated by the reporter Maxwell Scott in that great mythmaker John Ford’s film The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance: “When the legend becomes fact, print the legend.” It is one of the more sinister American slogans. 

    The death of publishing, like the death of the novel, is an evergreen prediction. But the obituary is always premature. Neither the specter of AI nor the widespread and growing illiteracy of an alarming chunk of the public, nor the cowardice of all too many mainstream publishers, is enough to dim the passions of the word-addicted and the book-besotted. The current proliferation of small and independent publishers (I work at one of them) is remarkable proof of a thriving commitment to the written word, the serious written word, and even to the tactile pleasures to be had from the book as object. Kate Gale, the founder and intrepid head of Red Hen Press in Pasadena observes that “books run on thin margins; it’s not the oil business. Yet writers like Percival Everett cup their hands over their keyboards to deliver stories and poems, and we who work in the independent press world, we press on. It was never about money, it was about story, the long game of reading a manuscript and saying as I did just yesterday this story about a creek and a girl has me. I am with this girl by the creek beaten down, getting back up again. As we do in this industry.” 

    The list of these blessed and stalwart publishers continues to lengthen. The roll call includes Grove Atlantic, New Directions, City Lights, Tilted Axis, Beacon, Europa, Other Press, Faber and Faber, O/R, Two Lines Press, Melville House, Akashic, Verso, Milkweed Editions, Graywolf, Transit Books, Archipelago, PM Press, Ren Hen Press, Taschen, Copper Canyon, Zone, and, not least, Wiley & Sons, family-owned since 1807, an unrivalled record of independence in the American publishing industry, and W. W. Norton, not exactly a small press but the country’s only employee-owned press. Many are regional in nature, devoted to this or that interest, to one literary, political, or cultural tendency or another. Some have owed their survival, in part, to the largess of federal institutions such as the National Endowment for the Arts, now under ruthless assault by the Trump administration; others, to private philanthropy. Many would find it hard to thrive without continued reliance on their nonprofit status. But these fragilities notwithstanding, they exist. There is a feistiness that refuses to fold. One is tempted to say that, despite all the challenges, we may be entering a renaissance of independent publishing, remarkably nimble and business savvy, intellectually curious and culturally indispensable; and the corporations be damned. This may well be enough to keep despair at bay. 

    Poems by Haris Vlavianos

    Niccolò Machiavelli
    (1469–1527) 

    To my son

    I still remember Hedley Bull

    his slow, regular footfall

    in front of the podium;

    the sudden way he would look up

    and turn his handsome head to us

    before asking in that droll Australian accent:

    “Gentlemen, it all hinges on the meaning of the word virtù

    Bacon, Hobbes, Adams, Strauss, Skinner —

    they each provide an interpretation.

    What’s yours?”
    I knew in a few months he would no longer be with us.

    (Riddled with bone cancer

    he continued teaching

    with the assistance of daily morphine injections.)

    I also knew 

    out of all the political philosophers we were studying
    that semester

    this one was my favorite.

    I raised my hand

    he gave me the floor:

    “Without virtù, even though a ruler may gain an empire 

    he will fail to attain gloria.

    If I had to choose between Scipio Africanus and Agathocles

    I’d opt for the first, no question.”

    Pleased, he smiled and continued: 

    “It’s all too easy to create utopian communities;

    it’s a lot more difficult

    to truly come to grips

    with harsh political realities.

    We have spent enough time on Plato and Augustine’s

    ‘What is as it ought to be.’

    Let’s turn to Thucydides 

    for he remains key.”

    Machiavelli survived that spring.

    Next semester, Adam Roberts 

    (hired in Bull’s place)

    was not as charitable to the Florentine.

    As he sets his sights on deconstructing 

    the “realist school” in lecture after lecture

    I kept thinking about one of our final sessions with Bull:

    “Could someone

    who wrote such poems and plays

    whose writing was so elegant

    whose thought, so sharp and lucid

    possessor of a sense of humor

    truly lack all morality and ethics?

    When we speak of him 

    why do we allow the scarecrow created by the Catholic Church

    to carry the day?”

     

    When he was very ill and homebound

    I had gone to visit him one night

    and he gave me a volume of 

    Machiavelli’s Letters

    which includes one addressed 

    to Francesco Vettori

    his “benefactor” (10 December 1513)

    written while he was living in exile

    at his country retreat outside the city

    (the Medicis had returned to Florence, you see).

    After describing his daily work on the farm

    he eagerly turns to the coming of evening

    and his study

    where he is writing  

    his “little work” On Principalities

    (later to become The Prince)

    at which point he observes: 

    “And because Dante 

    says it does not produce knowledge 

    when we hear but do not remember 

    I have tried to remember

    what a great man once said to me.” 

     

    Same here, caro Hedley.

    Sofonisba Anguissola
    (c. 1532–1625)

    To my daughter

     

    Because she was a woman 

    no one  

     — neither the Vatican nor the Medicis, the Sforzas

    and the respectable condottieri  — 

    commissioned of her 

    the religious or historical paintings

    that were the exclusive domain

    of the male artist. 

    Perforce she turned to portraiture.

     

    She, of course, exacted her vengeance

    for in one of her self-portraits

    the one housed today

    in Poland’s Łańcut Museum

    she paints herself 

    painting the Virgin embracing the holy infant.

    Despite her poise

    her somewhat irritated expression 

     — as if having burst uninvited into her studio

    we are interrupting her finishing touches —

    throws into relief

    the courage and determination

    even Vasari acknowledged.

     

    After an eventful life

    she settled in Palermo with husband number three

    painting portraits 

    for the next forty years.

    She was now so famous

    artists like Rubens and Van Dyck

    visited her

    to see “the brilliant woman”

    in the flesh.

     

    Van Dyck’s painting

    of the now elderly Sofonisba 

    (almost ninety-two at the time)

    still survives.

    She looks at the young painter

    much like Michelangelo

    must have once looked 

    upon her twenty-year-old self

    at their first meeting:

     

    “My dear Anthony

    we artists strive

    to immortalize 

    a few traces of life 

    before our unfurling shadows 

    veil it all in oblivion.

    I wonder in the future

    what will people think

    when they see my work?

    Perhaps that I was a woman

    who spent her life fleeing her prison cell

    and shaking off the dust

    stifling her soul.

    You, however, as a man

    what do you know of dust?”

    Desiderius Erasmus
    (1466?–1536)

    Theologians lost their night’s sleep 

    pondering portentous questions:

    Why had God chosen to incarnate Christ 

    as a man, not a woman

    or, for that matter, a donkey?

    But how was a donkey-Christ to preach the Jewish law?

    Or perform the miracle of Cana?

    Thoroughly amused by this scholastic nonsense

    Erasmus wrote In Praise of Folly

    during his second sojourn in England 

    to entertain his friend Thomas More.

    (Lacking the Dutchman’s humor

    the latter eventually lost his head

    whereas Henry VIII likely had more than his fair share

    for he was playing tennis

    when the executioner brought down the ax 

    on More’s “very short neck”).

     

    In one of Oxford’s second-hand bookstores

    (I must have spent over twenty hours a week on Turl Street)

    I found one of Erasmus’ travel letters

    (to my knowledge

    the only scholar with the audacity 

    to teach at both Oxford and Cambridge).

    I could not find a single fault with it:

     

    “English girls are divinely pretty and have a most admirable custom:

    When you go anywhere on a visit the girls kiss you. 

    They kiss you when you arrive. 

    They kiss you when you leave. 

    They kiss you when you return. 

    If you are lucky enough to get a taste of those soft and fragrant lips 

    you will long to spend your life in that blessed land.”

     

    While Erasmus was exchanging kisses with English girls

    the teenaged Luther was conscientiously studying

    The Summa Angelica by Angelo Carletti di Chivasso,  

    which twenty years later

    (along with the latest bull of Pope Leon X)

    he would toss into the fire

    in Wittenberg’s central square

    exclaiming as he did so:

    “the burning of sinful books

    is an age-old custom

    in Germany.”

     

    Undeniably true.

    Four centuries later

    this “age-old custom”

    still held strong.

    And books were not its only victims.

    Haris Vlavianos‘ forthcoming collection Renaissance will be published by World Poetry Press. These poems were translated by Patricia Barbeito.

    Secretaries of the Invisible 

    “I am no more than a secretary of the invisible thing.” Czesław Miłosz begins one of his poems with this evocative declaration of artistic vocation. In this spare statement, the poet abandons any pretense of authorship in the conventional sense and presents himself as a vessel, one who listens inwardly and transcribes what he cannot claim as his own. The image is metaphysical, drawn from a lineage of writers who serve something higher than craft or culture, something closer to sacred obligation. Among the few who recognized this rare calling and lived its demands with equal gravity was Thomas Merton, the monastic contemplative who saw writing as a form of listening and language as a possible bridge to the divine.

    In “Secretaries,” Miłosz evokes a quiet community scattered across the globe. These fellow scribes do not know one another, and perhaps never will.

    Secretaries, mutually unknown, we walk the earth

    Without much comprehension.

    There is a tender humility here. These mysterious and diligent figures are possessed by a duty to record what has no fixed origin. They receive fragments, phrases that begin in the middle or trail off into uncertainty. They are faithful to what comes, though they may never understand what it means. Their labor is characterized by humble devotion.

    This sense of transmission deepens in “Ars Poetica?” in which Miłosz wrestles more urgently with the demands of his calling:

    I have always aspired to a more spacious form

    that would be free from the claims of poetry or prose,

    and would let us understand each other without exposing

    the author or reader to sublime agonies.

    Here the poet yearns for a language that does not distort reality for the sake of literary fashion. He dreams of a form capacious enough to accommodate the full weight of experience without exaggeration or disguise. The “sublime agonies” he speaks of are the wounds that authentic encounter inflicts: the cost of genuine transparency between souls, the pain of being truly seen and of truly seeing. This is a longing for a deeper sincerity, a mode of expression that neither conceals nor flaunts, but clarifies without inflicting such wounds. What Miłosz calls “a more spacious form” finds its echo in Merton’s yearning for a contemplative language free from violence — both artists seek words that heal rather than wound, that open rather than close.

    In “Ars Poetica?” Miłosz elaborates further on the burden of the secretary’s task. 

    The purpose of poetry is to remind us   

    how difficult it is to remain just one person,  

    for our house is open, there are no keys in the doors,   

    and invisible guests come in and out at will. 

    What I’m saying here is not, I agree, poetry,  

    as poems should be written rarely and reluctantly,   

    under unbearable duress and only with the hope  

    that good spirits, not evil ones, choose us for their instrument.

    To write poetry, in Miłosz’s understanding, is a spiritual practice, a response to pressures that move beneath the surface of ordinary perception.

    Thomas Merton would have understood this calling and its attendant burdens instinctively. In his journals and letters, one discerns the same search for unguarded language, a mode of speech not marred by pretense. As a poet Merton wrote to reveal what could only be discovered in solitude. For him, words were vessels of reverence. He believed the truest writing arises from stillness and must preserve something of that stillness if it is to be believed. In No Man Is an Island, Merton describes the paradoxical power of creative work as transformative and self-effacing: “Art enables us to find ourselves and lose ourselves at the same time.”

    In their remarkable correspondence across continents — one writing from a monastic cell in Kentucky, the other from intellectual exile in California — Miłosz and Merton recognized in each other this same fidelity to the unseen. Merton found in Miłosz’s work the same refusal to domesticate mystery that characterized his own contemplative practice. Miłosz discovered in Merton’s letters a kindred spirit who understood writing as a form of prayer. The spiritual terrain they shared was unmistakably intimate, marked by the same willingness to serve as conduits rather than creators.

    When Miłosz writes in “Secretaries” “how it looks when completed / Is not up to us to inquire, we won’t read it anyway,” he articulates a rare trust in the work as something independent from the self. The poem, once written, belongs to a deeper order, one that resists the hunger for evaluation or finality. This surrender is faith by another name. It reflects a refusal to dominate what one has received, and a willingness to let it pass on into the world without being possessed or explained.

    Such submission characterized Merton’s spiritual life as well, who declared that “true contemplation is not a psychological trick but a theological grace. It can come to us only as a gift, and not as a result of our own clever techniques.” His best writing holds space for bearing witness to that which exceeds the intellect. In passages such as this one from his journal The Sign of Jonas — “There is in all visible things an invisible fecundity, a dimmed light, a hidden wholeness. In the visible world around us, there is a glory that is greater than anything else that can be seen, but this glory is not visible except by faith and by the interior light of wisdom” — we witness the secretary at work, transcribing what arrives from the margins of perception. The language is precise yet porous, faithful to an experience that cannot be fully captured yet must be attempted.

    Both men practiced an ethic of restraint that in our time appears quite radical. They did not chase acclaim, nor did they try to simplify their vision for popular understanding. Their fidelity was to the unseen, the unspeakable, the barely intuited. With his characteristic humility with regard to language and mystery, Merton put it this way in Thoughts on Solitude: “No writing on the solitary, meditative dimensions of life can say anything that has not already been said better by the wind in the pine trees.” In a culture that mistakes noise for substance and demands constant visibility, their example offers a different possibility, that of writing as resistance to the tyranny of the seen and the immediate, as a way of preserving space for what cannot be commodified or consumed. And “Secretaries” and “Ars Poetica?” invite us to think of poetry as a form of ethical transmission, where the goal is beyond self-expression, a spiritual self-emptying that is an offering. They speak for those who serve in obscurity, who give without expectation of recognition, who understand their task as larger than their own literary ambitions.

    Miłosz and Merton belong to a consecrated company. Through them, we are reminded that writing may still be a sacred act. When it is done without possession, without pride, without explanation, it becomes a form of listening. And in that act of listening, something of the invisible may enter the world. As Merton wrote, “The deepest level of communication is not communication, but communion. It is wordless. It is beyond words, and it is beyond speech, and it is beyond concept.” 

    The Psychoanalyst and The Poet 

    The following is, for the first time translated and brought to print, the written correspondence between Sigmund Freud and Rainer Maria Rilke. The record was only completed in late 2022, when the German Literature Archive (GLA) acquired Rilke’s entire literary estate from his descendants. Letters between the two went unnoticed by scholarship; the GLA itself didn’t seem aware at the time of acquisition that Freud was one of Rilke’s correspondents. Over a century after they were written, the German literary review Sinn und Form corrected that astonishing oversight, and through their publication granted us the two writers’ reflections on psychoanalysis and war.

    Freud and Rilke had a strong (albeit indirect) relationship through their close friendships with Lou-Andreas Salomé. Salomé was a pupil of Sigmund Freud (she is often labeled the first female psychoanalyst), and a sometime lover of Rilke. The epistolary exchanges between Rilke and Salomé lasted until his death, and formed the contact surface between him and psychoanalysis, a subject which terrified and allured him. Analysis and poetry brawl throughout their letters for mastery of the soul. Rilke likened it to an exorcism, a ritual that would drive out the demons underneath both his hypochondria and his sensitivity to nature. Salomé agreed, at last warning him: “Never let yourself be analyzed. Your creativity will die.”

    This context infuses the conversation between Freud and Rilke with a sinister air. Rilke is vulnerable, even frightened by an animal sense of who has the power. The poet wants to keep his distance from the analyst, due not to mundane social anxiety, but to his fear of what that meeting might bring. Freud meanwhile strolls casually through topics sensitive to Rilke: the assault on Duino, and his own verdicts on human nature. Near the end of his letter, Rilke resigns: “the choice to see it through alone prevailed, insofar as I still retain the dregs of my solitude.” By choosing loneliness over therapy, while revealing that loneliness is all that he has left, a paradox is simultaneously created and resolved. Declining company because you are alone is obviously a contradiction, but, by incarnating loneliness and joining himself to it, he collapses subject and object into one. Against the brutal invasions of his world by analysis and war, he replaces that world with solitude and rejects that which he could have lost. In doing so, Rilke places himself in an untamed expanse of will, at the origin of art, a poet to the bitter end.

    Freud to Rilke, February 11th 1916

    Prof. Dr. Freud

    Wien, IX. Berggasse 19.

    11.2.16

    My dearest and most esteemed doctor,

    It was somehow brought to my attention that you are back in Vienna, on military duties, and live at this mailing address. I had to suppress my urge to visit until you showed signs of life, that is, until I gathered that you had ordered your affairs. But my son Ernst (to whom you were kind enough to write, and even somewhat resembles you) is on leave from Isonzo for a few days. He had me ask when and where he could meet you. Naturally, I’d much rather have you at ours for a bite, but I don’t know if you’ll make it – Tuesday evening I’m holding a lecture somewhere, and either Thursday or Friday my wife travels to Hamburg with Ernst.

    That is to say, a prompt response would be most kind.

    Your most humble servant,

    Freud

    Rilke to Freud, February 17th 1916

    Hopfners Park-Hôtel

    Wien XIII. (Hietzing.)

    on Feb. 17, 1916

    My esteemed Professor Freud,

    Have I missed your son? It’s as I fear: your letter is dated the eleventh, but consider this — I first found it today, have been away on “business” since precisely the eleventh, and returned this morning. Could the timing be any worse? Or do you still have him in Vienna? In this case, can he come tomorrow evening at five–?, for I am too tired, too upset, too confused to come myself; indeed so oppressed by these incommensurable daily circumstances, I’m saddened to think that he’ll even see me like this. This strange world and its demands are so preposterous, that they petrify me deep within. First were some fourteen days of basic training. Then came my assignment to the War Archives, where I squander the hours in intellectual despair, just as I had in physical despair. But the greatest terror is the rubble burying my heart, deeper by the day, and often I’ve thought that a talk with you would save me from this burial. Alas, the choice to see it through alone prevailed, insofar as I still retain the dregs of my solitude. If I can gradually collect myself, then I’ll be sure to call on you and visit; I know this will be good. 

    In the meantime, convey my greetings to your ladies, and should your son Ernst already have departed, the most heartfelt regret at not having met. Should he still be in Vienna, I’d request a word by phone: but here [at home], for we may not receive calls in the Archive.

    Yours truly and sincerely devoted,

    R.M.Rilke

    Freud to Rilke, February 18th 1916

    Prof. Dr. Freud

    Wien, IX. Berggasse 19.

    18.2.16

    Most esteemed,

    The pattern has continued: on the very evening that your pneumatic letter arrived, my Ernst departed for Germany. But he returns in a week, and now knows where to find you.

    If you do feel the urge to unburden yourself with a chat, don’t hide yourself from us. I’ve struggled with this particular monstrosity for 1½ years. I armor my weak spots here and there, hoping to check it, so long as it leaves my four weakest alone – my three sons, and my son-in-law in the service. And even if you aren’t as vivid, composed, or polished as during your first visit, we’ll make it work.

    The war confused me, but only at first. I soon developed a pessimistic revulsion and ever since have had general license to cast authoritative judgements on human nature, as I’ve always secretly wanted to do. I can be pessimistic without bitterness. It’s most advisable.

    Perhaps you’ve gone too far in separating your inner and outer lives. Now the dam is full to bursting. Perhaps — but I won’t triumph presenting this image, I’d rather not compete against a poet. Yet, it’s rather easy for me to empathize with your fate. If I were to be sentenced to spend half the day under one roof with psychiatrists!

    Your beloved Duino is now under bombardment! Ernst tells me the enemy shoots wastefully, while we hold back.

    In conclusion, let’s rendezvous soon on a Monday, Friday, or Sunday! Tuesdays and Wednesdays are association days, Thursdays are game nights, and Saturdays are for lectures.

    With warm regards on behalf of yours truly,

    Freud

    Hidden in the Bourgeois

    The hero of The Magic Mountain — the perfectly ordinary, blond, blue-eyed Hans Castorp —  is the typological bourgeois male. I spent seven years writing a book about the novel of which he serves as protagonist and in that time I wondered often what possessed me to devote so much energy to him and to it. At a certain point, I rather tragically resigned myself to the obvious answer that I have a deplorably bourgeois soul.

    The Magic Mountain is one of the great novels about the bourgeois soul. It challenges Joseph Schumpeter’s idea that the bourgeois is a fundamentally unheroic narrative type. “The stock exchange is a poor substitute for the Holy Grail,” Schumpeter wrote. Yet, rather ironically, the poet Howard Nemerov interprets Hans Castorp’s quest for knowledge as precisely a quest for the Holy Grail. Thomas Mann would have approved of Nemerov’s interpretation. 

    Hans Castorp, significantly, is from Hamburg, the merchant city of the middle classes, a city whose center is dominated by that most bourgeois of German buildings, the Rathaus, or Townhall. As the novel opens, he is about to join the ship-building firm Tunder and Wilms, and seems to everyone around him “an honest, unadulterated product of the local soil, superbly at home in it.” And yet as we read on, we learn that the family doctor suspects Hans Castorp of being anemic and has prescribed him a daily glass of robust porter — intended to help build his blood, but which Hans Castorp enjoys for its soothing, dozing effects. We also learn that although he is a decent tennis-player and oarsman, Castorp prefers sitting on a terrace of the boathouse with a drink in hand, “listening to music and watching the boats as they drifted among the swans.” Hans Castorp is not especially interested in exerting effort, in working, that supreme of bourgeois activity. Effort strains his nerves and exhausts him. He prefers it when time passes “easily, unencumbered by the leaden weight of toil…” When he first meets the shrewd, intellectually active Ludovico Settembrini, Castorp declares: “I only really feel healthy when I am doing nothing at all.”

    Hans Castorp resists our understanding, he is difficult to know — perhaps because he is insubstantial. (Though maybe not! Hard to say.) When asked by the director of the Berghof why he chose to become an engineer, Castorp claims he did so purely by chance, and that he could just as well have become a doctor or a clergyman. Similarly, when local citizens of Hamburg wonder if Hans Castorp will ever seek a career in politics, given his good family name, they cannot decide if he would stand as a conservative, like his grandfather, or as a progressive, as he has entered the fields of commerce and technology. “That was quite possible – but so was the opposite.”

    The narrator hypothesizes that Hans Castorp may be suffering from the nihilistic condition of his age, from the hollow silence with which the universe around him responds to the question of meaning. It is above all this question that Hans Castorp is confronted with during his seven years at the Berghof, where his latent sympathy with death is awakened and aroused by Clavdia Chauchat, who teasingly calls him “my little bourgeois.”

    And indeed, what could be more bourgeois — as Thomas Mann understands the term — than Hans Castorp’s celebrated epiphany in the famous “Snow” subchapter, that “man is the master of contradictions.” The coexistence of apparent opposites is characteristic of the bourgeois. Werner Sombart, in his The Quintessence of Capitalism, makes the Faustian claim that “two souls dwell in the breast of every complete bourgeois: the soul of the adventurer and the soul of the respectable middle-class man.” A claim that sounds quite a bit like Thomas Mann’s Tonio Kröger, who, in the eponymous novella, cries out: “As an artist I’m already enough of an adventurer in my inner life. So far as outward appearances are concerned one should dress decently, damn it, and behave like a respectable citizen…”

    Thomas Mann offers the image of the writer as someone who keeps his office hours and dresses appropriately, whose writing is characterized not by the heat and flame of inspiration but by the cold comfort of thoroughness and industry. “There is much to be said for a wife and children,” Thomas Mann wrote in his diary in 1919, “but given my nature, the decisive consideration for me is that it allows me to hide in the bourgeois realm without actually becoming bourgeois.” As the French writer Bernard Groethuysen observed in 1927, “the bourgeois likes to keep his incognito.”

    It was Flaubert who originally formulated the contradictory character of the bourgeois when he observed, in a letter, that “one should live like a bourgeois and think like a demi-god.” But it was Thomas Mann in whom this dialectic, the yes and the no of bourgeois culture, found its most prophetic repository. “I have become what I am,” Thomas Buddenbrook, the good bourgeois, tells his brother, Christian, the failed artist, “because I did not want to become like you.” Many years after writing those words, Mann described his enemy Adolf Hitler as “a brother, a rather unpleasant and mortifying brother,” by which he meant that Hitler, like himself, was an artist, only he was an artist gone astray, a good-for-nothing who believed himself “reserved for something else — as yet quite indefinite, but something which, if it could be named, would be greeted with roars of laughter.” Significantly, Mann titled his essay “A Brother,” as though aware that he and Hitler represented two paths for Germany. I have become what I am, because I did not want to become like you. A few weeks after the war, Mann, ever the conscientious artist, confessed: “it is all within me, I have been through it all.”  

    “I Am Trying To Live A Life I Do Not Understand”

    Frequently, in conversation with others or in an incessant inner monologue, I try to imagine what a world after this, after this political crisis, after this historical paroxysm, will look like. I love two countries — America and Israel — which have, let us say, transformed themselves. I am rich in crises, overwhelmed by hopelessness and heartache the causes of which are so enormous I cannot fully fathom their implications for the world or for my conception of myself. My loyalties torment me. After October 7 a certain cohort that has since fragmented spoke wistfully of “the day after,” but even in those early weeks the phrase was an insult to human wisdom. The phrase itself has become a synecdoche in my mind for our outrageous lack of a proper understanding of what was occurring around us and what we have become.

    I am trying to imagine an Israel-and-Palestine and an America in which the word “peace” means something substantial, a world in which that word has not been thinned to a pixelated, politicized flourish. But neither of these places — neither of my homes — are sufficiently familiar to me anymore, and so I do not trust my own intuitions about what will happen and what is possible in either context. I want ruminations on these futures to be rooted in reality, to be based in deep understandings of the peoples at stake. But it never feels that way. When I listen to or participate in discussions about a future worth living for, they feel grotesquely ignorant or fanciful. I think I know why that is. No one alive today was raised to understand the versions of our countries that exist now. This is not only because we were living “in a bubble,” but also because genuine transformations have taken place. And we cannot responsibly possess what we do not know. It is difficult to conceive of ourselves as leaders (or even members) of the strange places we live in now, these mutations of the countries we used to think of as ours but which have become alien to us.

    In my mind these ruminations are associated with a particular image of nullity. I am a painter and so I am familiar with the dread of staring at a blank canvas — and that is the sensation that comes over me when conversation turns to “the day after” and related themes. I recently spent an afternoon in my studio face to face with an easel on which there rested an unblemished canvas. The trouble was I did not have something particular I wanted to paint, I just wanted to be painting. I wanted to feel the brush sliding pleasantly along the slick primed surface. I wanted to make something intelligent and even beautiful. But that abstract yearning could not bear fruit. Beauty — the kind I am occasionally capable of when properly prepared, and the kind I most admire — is the result of having intimately understood an entrancing subject (entrancing at least to me) and communicating that intimate understanding through a medium over which I have a measure of control. Yearning to create some unknown beautiful thing is exactly like yearning to be in love without loving someone. What intimacy? What understanding? (A relevant Jewish piece of wisdom: in an essay excoriating a literary critic, the great Yiddish writer I.L. Peretz scolded, “It is not enough to write in Yiddish. You have to have something to say.”) Usually the memory of actively engaging with my bouts of creative sterility is disturbing enough to keep me from entering the studio without proper preparation. 

    The urge to paint has to come from within. I need to be captivated by some subject and driven to communicate its seductions, to externalize in paint what has occurred inside me. I have to arrive at the easel possessed by this inspiration. The assignment of meaning to a subject comes from me: I am forced to action because of an inner necessity. I am not referring to “self-expression,” but rather to the effort to be loyal to my sense of an intuition or a perception. But in the realms of other loyalties, particularly collective and political allegiances, I act on values that I did not assign to myself but that were assigned to me. I used to move through the world armed with a profound sense of received meaning and conscious of the life choices that a serious life required of me. There was a time in my life when my sense of loyalty and honor was so concrete to me that I could rely on my inherited frameworks to give me both a worldview and a course of action. My life was plotted according to that heritage. This is no longer true. In so many essential ways the world I was born into does not any longer exist. The countries which I had been raised to love and serve have revealed characteristics so strange I cannot recognize them, so unattractive that I am no longer pulled toward them, though I still derive meaning from my loyalty to… them? To my idea of them? To a version of them for which I try to fight and in which I tell myself I still believe? If honor is a matter of loyalty, then honor will mean something new to me now. 

    The artist Chaim Soutine called the compulsion to paint something new “being hit by lightning” or “the lightning bolt.” If it did not come, he would not paint; and not painting was, for him, a form of not living. Soutine experienced two of the most devastating horrors in human history and throughout both of them his primary context, his significant world, remained the canvas. The first of these crucibles was the first war. He spent much of World War I in the south of France weak with hunger (he had made no name for himself and so had no money for food), subsisting on the goodwill of Amedeo Modigliani, his closest friend, and the kind-hearted members of Modi’s social circle. For everyone else the scarcity of resources was the stuff of war — for Soutine it was what kept him from his vocation.

    Soutine’s most famous period as a painter began just after the war was over, the same year that Modigliani died, in a small French village in the foothills of the Pyrenees miles from the Spanish border, called Céret. He was a long way away from his community, lonely, poor, and recently bereft of his closest friend (Modigliani was just thirty-five when he died), but he thought only of his work. This is not an exaggeration: his single-mindedness was fanatical. Each day was like his last: he painted with gusto for as long as he could sustain the energy. When his agent Léopold Zborowski made the long drive from Paris to Céret to visit him, he found Soutine holed up in a small, airless shack with all the windows sealed shut. Apparently he feared that his paintings — which were piled in a massive stack — would be damaged by the oxygen outdoors. The agent asked to see the completed works but Soutine refused. He said they were failures, unfit for view. Zborowski determined that he had better find his painter some food before continuing the argument, and when he came back he found that Soutine had set fire to the heap of canvases. It was with great difficulty and no small risk that Zborowski salvaged a number of them.

    The mania with which Soutine worked during the Céret period he never matched again. He spent the rest of his career waiting for the next thunderbolt to strike. He would on occasion try to put himself in the way of inspiration, to invite the bolt. His most trusted mechanism when in such straits was to go for a drive, to shift location, to shake up his context. Soutine was intensely affected by his surroundings, and when he felt stultified rather than excited by the quality of the sunlight or the vertiginousness of the landscape in which he found himself, he would peripatetically seek out someplace else. In the years after he achieved success Zborowski secured Soutine a chauffeur for precisely this purpose, and that man – his name was Daneyrole – recalled that there was a particular tree situated in Vence in the south of France to which Soutine would instruct Daneyrole to drive. The tree’s shape or placement, or the way the light hit it, could trigger a trance. The drive from Paris, where Soutine usually lived, and the tree to which he pilgrimaged took roughly ten hours. Such an intensity of commitment strikes ordinary people as excessive and bizarre, but the regular ten-hour slog was not the strangest or most unpleasant inconvenience Soutine endured in service to his passion.

    In the mid-1920s Soutine was overcome by the need to paint a painting inspired by Rembrandt’s Woman Bathing in a Stream. That canvas, which hangs in the National Gallery in London, depicts a woman hoisting a thin white dress to her knees while standing in what appears to be a lake licking the sides of a cave. Soutine had to paint from life — he could copy neither a painting nor a photograph nor could he paint from memory and imagination. If he wanted to paint a woman in a stream, he had to be standing in front of such a person. Soutine enlisted his patroness, a wealthy eccentric woman named Madeleine Castaing, and her husband in a mad search for an appropriate model. The group drove about the Castaing estate in Lèves until such a woman was identified, convinced to model, and dressed in appropriate garb. A lake was located. The woman was placed to Soutine’s satisfaction and then… a thunderstorm came over the pair. But Soutine would not hear of stopping — he had to paint a whole picture from start to finish while the paint was still wet — and so he painted through the gales as the woman shrieked for permission to leave and he shouted back instructions to stand still. 

    During his episodes of creative commotion Soutine was in thrall to a mandate that no one else could fathom. What seems inconceivable to the rest of us was obvious and necessary to him. He was obeying the dictates of a value-framework which assigned worth and honor known only to him. This was not the result of reflection; Soutine was not consciously deducing a system of appropriate painterly behavior. He was heeding an edict that came from the interior, that was a part of who he was. It was not inherited. It was not subject to any nature but his own; it would exist for as long as he did. He could not separate himself from this orientation, and it could not be altered by outside forces. They were insulated from history — so long as Soutine’s health, wealth, and safety permitted him to follow his own course.

    The love of Soutine’s life was a woman named Gerda Michaelis. She understood nothing of his painting and she was, for the entirety of their relationship, uninterested in discussing it with him. But she did grasp what it was to be borne forward by a force that compelled her to deep and irrational action. Her love for Soutine was like that. It was not as violent or idiosyncratic as his analogous aesthetic mania, but it was the effulgence of a similar maniacal configuration, and it did become the central force which conferred meaning on her life. Her obedience to her own romantic impulses was as much the result of her self-understanding as his obedience to his painterly dictates was evidence of a similarly visceral self-knowledge. Their loyalties, you might say, were entirely self-generated, which made them invulnerable to the world-transforming events which took place in the years in which they lived together. In fact, those events both occasioned their meeting and forced their separation.

    Michaelis was born in 1910 into a Jewish family in Magdeburg, a German city on the Elbe. The racial laws that the Nazis enforced after their rise to power in 1932 stripped Michaelis’ father of his livelihood and then the entire family was forcibly relocated from Magdeburg to Berlin — the Nazis had decided to address the housing crisis by seizing Jewish homes and collecting Jews in centralized locations. Gerda was not optimistic, stupid, or dedicated enough to the Volk to ignore the tidal pull towards what could only be a brutal end and so she decided to flee to France. Michaelis returned to Germany only once, in 1935, to see her family. Her mother, father, and two sisters were killed shortly afterwards.  

    She met Soutine on an autumn evening in 1937. She had stumbled into her usual café, Le Dome, at Vavin, the white-hot center of Montparnasse and the meeting spot for a community of German refugees and other émigré artists. Immediately upon entering she noticed a man whom she had never seen before. He was seated at a table near three of her friends. “Medium build, pale complexion, with deep black hair and dark brown eyes, he could have been about forty… Everything about his physicality pleased me.” On their first date he took her with him to a boxing match — one of his favorite pastimes — but he collapsed in the middle of it. In a prefiguration of the beneficent role that she was to play in his life, she took him home and nursed him the whole night through. When he awoke to find her preparing to leave for work, he told her not to go. He said that he would take care of her from then on, as she had taken care of him. Garde, he called her, for she was his guardian. 

    She moved in with him immediately, and she loved him forcefully and totally. They had three years together. Soutine’s health deteriorated and on the strength of a doctor’s advice he and Garde left Paris in the summer of 1939 for a visit in Civry-sur-Serein. While they were there, war with Germany broke out and Garde was suddenly a citizen of an enemy country. She could not leave the city freely, but Soutine’s poor health necessitated trips to specialists in the capital and so he would leave her alone for long stretches while she laid low awaiting his return. This tormented status quo held for eight months till the pair snuck back into Paris. A full third of their relationship was consumed by the fear and helplessness which stalks all people with precarious legal status during wartime. And Soutine was a Jew, as was Garde. She spent those months agonizing over what could have happened to him in her absence, and what might happen to her before he had a chance to return. She would subsist on the food and meager funds that he left behind and so she was always at risk of running out of basic necessities. When they could no longer submit to these conditions, the pair fled overnight. Clutching what they could fit in bags light enough to carry, they walked for miles in silence holding their breath until the city thinned out. They reached the train station at one o’clock. When the train pulled into the outskirts of Lyon, Soutine took Garde in his arms and whispered, “You are saved.” Two Jews fleeing into Paris in April 1940, laboring under the delusion that safety was a luxury that they still enjoyed. 

    Reality rapidly asserted itself.  The morning after their return all German women were commanded to report to the bicycle stadium known as the Vel d’Hiv, from where they would be transported to an internment camp in the Pyrenees. On their last night together they repeated promises to find one another as soon as they could, to write, to wait until the war was over before resuming life as before. The next day they took a taxi together across Paris. He kissed her goodbye and she disappeared behind a mass of uniformed bodies. They never saw each other again.

    The historical paroxysms which decimated her family, her home, and all the frameworks for happiness, success, and meaning that she had been bequeathed are hardly mentioned in the only remaining account of her life. Garde’s memoir is a slim volume of reflections on the fleeting years she and Soutine lived together, written decades after his death, as if her whole life up to and since the time they spent in the world they created together was the only stretch of years that she recognized as “my life.” The book begins “today, like yesterday, despite the time, his image is constantly present to me.” This, though his final years were spent in hiding with another woman, a woman he met just weeks after Garde was rounded up along with all German nationals in Paris while France was still at war with Germany.  Soutine remained for her a fixed ideal, a constant phantom companion. 

    Michaelis recounts her great love story in straightforward language, as if she wrote it to help her remember exactly what had happened. She does not recount an instant of hesitation. From the moment she saw him her fate was sealed. The only standard of existence for Gerda Michaelis was generated organically from her love and her dedication to Soutine. Her needs grew around his motion forward, much like his needs emerged from his ferocious commitment to painting. And both of these concerns, these ever-fixed marks, bore the two of them forward in a world in which the communities they both knew were decimated.

    Soutine and Michaelis were blessed. Their primary sources of meaning came from within themselves. They were not blind to the evils around them, but in some essential way they were living outside of those evils and so their souls could not be snuffed out by social and political events until death forced extinguishment. Their souls, as Leon Wieseltier once wrote, exceeded their circumstances. In ordinary times, Soutine’s and Michaelis’ oblivious behavior might have been called clueless or insane. In fact, during his life and since his death Soutine was and often is referred to as a madman, and this characterization is due largely to the public way he lived utterly beholden to a system of values and actions that made little sense to others and that was in violation of the ones which governed the commonplace life around him. Even his admirers cannot enter into his stirringly idiosyncratic psyche and understand it. The same is true about Michaelis — though her folie is more familiar to us. We have seen mad love and there is a literature about it. But still she led a rationally incomprehensible life. 

    Is such monomania admirable? Is it admirable to think only of art or only of a beloved while your family (and many other people) are being rounded up and slaughtered? Is such a myopia, such an exclusive commitment, an aesthetic strength or an ethical weakness? Admirable or not, that model of existence certainly provided Soutine and Garde with an answer to a question that many now have to grapple with: how can one live after one’s world has been mutilated or even obliterated?

    We have all been born into contexts that offered us blueprints for how to live our lives and standards for how to measure our success or failure. We hold ourselves in contempt or with pride depending on the degree to which we rise or fall against those expectations. But we have also all been born into communities that have already been outgrown and sloughed off. Soutine and Michaelis witnessed the engine of industrialized decimation which altered their worlds and ours. To this day our ur-example of mass destruction is the war that forced them apart. The Holocaust did not only destroy people, it also destroyed the conditions, the ethos, that made possible the worldviews that made life comprehensible and meaningful to the victims and the survivors.  But genocide is hardly necessary for such an obliteration. Technological development has whipped us all into ceaseless forward motion and we are helpless in its grip. Our constant velocity is violent even without the blood and the ash — though it does seem to catalyze much blood and ash. We are living in our own crucible of erasure and destruction. It too is wounding and pitiless.

    The late Jonathan Lear’s astonishing book Radical Hope valiantly treats a response to such an experience of obliteration. It is an interrogation of a philosophically perplexing pronouncement made by Plenty Coups, the last great chief of the Native American Crow Tribe. Just before his death, Plenty Coups told the first part of his life’s story to a white man who pressed him to continue it up to the present day. The last great chief refused, and he offered the following as explanation: “When the buffalo went away the hearts of my people fell to the ground and they could not lift them up again. After this nothing happened.” After this nothing happened. What could that possibly mean, Lear asks. And he proposes the possibility that after a certain way of life was destroyed it became impossible for “happenings” to continue in the sense that happenings had before the buffalo’s departure — in other words, Plenty Coups was speaking literally. “Happening” in the sense that the Crow could understand the word no longer occurred. The Crow “conception of what happiness is could no longer be lived. The characteristic activities that used to constitute the good life ceased to be intelligible acts.”

    We might suppose that Garde experienced a similar loss of meaning after Soutine’s death — after a secret emergency surgery in Paris — in 1943, and that subsequent “happenings” were not possible or not vital in the way that they had been while the two were together. Garde was the kind of person who was especially vulnerable to the loss of a beloved. There are people who can continue living after such a loss. Most people find their partners in a community and choose their partners with the intention of creating a certain kind of family which belongs within a certain kind of communal context. Such people are less vulnerable to complete desolation and inconsolable grief after a beloved’s death, though the prospect of the destruction of communal life would surely terrify them. Garde was not like this. She had no community, she had only him. Soutine perished, her heart fell to the ground, after this nothing happened.

    Lear suggests that courageous people are especially vulnerable to the destruction of their community. As he puts it, “the very traits of character that make for a courageous person would place such a person in an especially disadvantaged position to make a courageous transition out  of traditional forms of courage. The courageous Crow warrior willingly gave up his life… all his training and encouragement from early youth was directed toward producing such character.” But, as Lear explains, after the buffalo went away the very acts that had previously accrued honor were suddenly rendered ridiculous. Lear emphasizes courage because his chosen case study is the Crow Tribe and for them — as for all warrior communities — courage was the highest virtue. Every element of their way of life was defined in relation to battle, and honor itself was derived in relation to that occupation. When battle was no longer possible, their rituals, their vernacular, their very family structure, ceased to be comprehensible even to themselves. As one Crow elder woman repeats throughout the book, “I am trying to live a life I do not understand.” 

    This is why we are so starved for honorable models now. The frameworks that we have for conferring honor have themselves been degraded and disgraced. The leaders among us who pledged fealty to a country that has betrayed itself have themselves been delegitimated. Even if they are not guilty of ideological betrayal they are at least guilty of poor stewardship. Courage has absconded. What can we do when the world in which we derived honor by professing loyalty to our country changes so dramatically that the reasons for that profession no longer hold? What if the foundations of our patriotism, the premises about our country and its trajectory toward justice, have been ruptured, perhaps irreparably? What do we do when, say, a country that represented freedom, liberalism, equality, and generosity violently and democratically overturns those commitments? Who decides what America is? Who decides who Americans are? 

    The natural response to all of this horror, in the wake of the catastrophes that have destroyed our worlds, is to flip things, to invert the value systems that we inherited and to condemn the attributes and people and symbols we once admired with energy equal to the energy with which we once loved them. I am conscious of a powerful impulse to detest what I once loved. This detestation has the added benefit of allowing me to preserve the frameworks according to which I used to live, just in the negative. That way the energy I have exerted developing intimate knowledge of people and ideas can remain alive inside me — as it will anyway, since I am inseparable from it. The tactic of philosophical and emotional inversion allows me to take vengeance in my own heart and my own mind against the figures who made a fool of me by accepting my loyalty and my admiration and then traducing and abandoning the values that undergird them. A bloated self-hatred swollen to encompass my entire peoples, the peoples in whom I locate my essence, is a great temptation. Another sip of rage, please, another glass, the bottle, I can’t help myself. We are pitiable. 

    Jonathan Lear suggests that when Plenty Coups was still young he intuited great tragedy ahead for his people and he offered the Crow a method for living beyond the time of the buffalo. He did this through a prophetic dream and its interpretation, one of the holy rituals of the tribe and one which fused together the tribe’s spirit allies and its generations: it was customary for the young to have prophetic visitations in their dreams and then for the elders to interpret the dreams’ meanings for the community — a collaborative prophetic exercise. This way the authority of the prophecy was affirmed by the old, the young, and the gods. Plenty Coups’ dream was interpreted by the elders to mean that, though great tragedy and destruction would befall the Crow, there would be life for them on the other side of it if they did not resist the violence of the white man. This dream allowed Plenty Coups to invoke the authorities the Crow already revered in service to the transformation of Crow life. The integrity of the tribe was in that way intact. Meaning could survive. Faith in that possibility is what Lear called “radical hope.”

    I have no such hope. How could I? Plenty Coups saved the Crow from losing faith in their elders and in the spiritual authorities to which his community devoted itself. He provided them with a framework for preserving the structures that assigned honor, and updated them for an unrecognizable age. But the authorities I know how to trust, the ones who lead the countries and communities that I love, are now thoroughly debased. Even if I believed in prophecy I have no elders to interpret one, except those elders who are as alienated as I am. The only mentors left to me are the ones who share in my disgust. We are all equally lost. But disgust is not a policy. It is abundantly warranted, but we need something more to live: some force propelling us forward in service to an ideal. 

    When I come to the easel freighted with the image and the ambition of a painting, itching to begin the process of articulating through paint this vision which has taken possession of me, I do not pause for questions. I do not wonder if this is a worthy subject or if I am the proper person to paint it. The subject and I are one thing — it is an experience of absorption. I want to spend myself through painting, to exhaust myself the way Soutine used to do, to hold nothing back. I used to feel this way at the sight of my countries’ flags — I was not distinguishable from the objects of my loyalty and each had total claim on me. (I believe in multiple loyalties as long as they are genuine.) I long for that feeling, for the oceanic thrill of being bound up in a movement that I believe has a right to all my heart and mind. I would have given so much, perhaps even everything, for those flags and all that they represent. But what do they still represent? What is my life worth without that loyalty, without those loyalties, now?

     

    Temporalities

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Remembering Jonathan Lear

    A vision of the future must never be only about the future. Otherwise we will commit the terrible mistake known as futurism, which is nothing more than an attempt to make a virtue out of velocity.

    Whether in the form of impatience or dread, the future can deplete the life out of the present, and no less ravenously than the present can deplete the life out of the past.

    It makes no sense to believe in a mode of time. To believe in the future is to believe in a cipher, or to perpetuate the illusion that the future will be one thing, this and not that, when in truth it will be everything, as all life is everything. And to believe in the past is also to believe in everything, because everything may be found in the past. The past does not all go together and neither will the future. (This is abundantly demonstrated by the historical origins of every innovation, by every “unprecedented” breakthrough. Chemists may look with contempt upon alchemists, but the science of chemistry was born in the superstition of alchemy, and for a while they coexisted in an incongruous explosion of the desire to know.) Until we make decisions about what we wish to retain and to cultivate from the past, until we make selections from among the survivals, until we impose some italics on the welter, the past is only a pile of events — an annals and not a history. It is only rich clay. But on what grounds can we make such selections? Only on ahistorical grounds, I would say; on philosophical grounds. And what certifies these philosophical grounds as criteria for our commitments is not that we find them in the past. The fact that certain values once existed and once animated a society does not establish their legitimacy. Their pastness teaches nothing about their correctness. Evil communities also had elders. Venerability verifies nothing, though their possible irrelevance to truth is no excuse for the wanton destruction of inherited beliefs. And contemporaneity, too, verifies nothing.

    Conservatism — remember conservatism?— is no less selective about the past than progressivism, and no less committed to the future. The distinction between conservatism and progressivism lies in the philosophical criteria for choices among the many legacies. 

    We have no right to erase something old merely because it displeases us; the erasure of disagreeable survivals of the past — statues, etc. — will establish not justice, but only a chimera of innocence. The grand telos of all the history that came before us was not to affirm us. We are the past’s stewards, not its tyrants; its stewards and its interpreters. There is no point in fighting its facticity, its finality.  And what we gain from our stewardship of the remains of evil is knowledge, which is one of the conditions of responsibly established belief.

     

    Iconoclasm has a sterling reputation for its independence of mind, but it is also a variety of vandalism. Where were the independent of mind in the iconoclastic mobs? Consider, for example, the paintings of the sixteenth-century iconoclastic riots in the Low Countries, particularly in Antwerp. They give the lie to the categorical loftiness of iconoclasm. They depict only power and hatred.

    Spit, abhor, but don’t demolish. 

    A mile away, as I write this, the East Wing of the White House is being transformed into a heap of dust. Not a catastrophe by any means, and nothing like the rubble that one encounters in other locations in this roughed-up world. At least the local debris is not the work of war. But this demolition is certainly a perfect emblem of the Trump regime’s flippancy toward the past. Historical figures should be less casual about history, which normally should serve as a quarry for the inhibitions that are among their qualifications for office. An inhibition is often the expression of an appropriate reverence. An uninhibited man is an ahistorical man. There is something essentially disrespectful, essentially callous, about a rampaging backhoe, as there is about a rampaging president. 

    Our power over the past is so immense that often we prefer not to know that the responsibility for what endures is ours. Secular and religious doctrines of inevitability relieve us of the anxiety of stewardship, not least by providing us with alibis for obsolescence, as if certain things are simply doomed to disappear, destined by time or by science or by providence. But nothing is obsolete until we agree that it is obsolete. We make it so.  We let it go.

    The inheritance of the past and the reception of the past are two discrete moments. The former is passive, but the latter is, or must be, active. Without active reception, tradition expires. Culture advances when we revolt against the heir’s passivity, when we refuse to certify raw contingencies and we rise above our apathy about the flow of things. Allowing valuable pieces of the past to slip through your fingers is worse than melodramatically discarding them.  

    Natural oblivion, the passing of memory with the passing of the years, is a permanent feature of human experience, and it may also be a blessing by leaving room for those who come after us, who would otherwise face an extremely discouraging sense of their own redundancy,  the asphyxiating feeling that there is nothing left for them to say or to do. Yet there is also unnatural oblivion, which is what we wreak upon the past with our laziness and our indifference. Unnatural oblivion can also be the consequence of persecution and oppression. We not only neglect and forget our own patrimonies, other people sometimes attempt to erase them, to coerce oblivion, so that the development of certain cultures, particularly the cultures of oppressed peoples, must proceed not least by means of salvage. And we sometimes attempt to coerce oblivion on others. 

    Finding a responsible position among the generations is a matter of calibrating the feeling that we are not worthy of what we have been bequeathed with the feeling that what we have been bequeathed is not worthy of us. 

    Futurism is a fantasy of a new beginning, a new birth — but really there is only a single beginning and only a single birth. We can travel far from our origins, but we cannot abolish them. Yehuda Amichai wrote: “I search for new beginnings / and find only changes.” 

    It makes no sense to be born again. A transformation owes its resonance, its softly tragic consciousness of an earlier privation, to the lingering awareness of what preceded it. Otherwise a second birth is just an escape hatch, a “do-over” (what children want when they are too young to grasp the constraints of meaningful activity and seek to be held unaccountable for a mistake or a failure and want it not to “count”), like a third birth and a fourth birth. Moral and spiritual progress can be measured only against a continuous substrate.

    Marx’s famous pronouncement that “the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living” was a little cheap — another outlandish bid for newness. All the dead generations will never be overthrown, nor should they be. A war on origins is a waste of spirit, and misuses the energies that are required for constructing our own place in the epic chain, for creating the material with which to stimulate our descendants in their own nightmares of being trapped by the past, that is, by us.

    What we call the past is only the remainder of the past. However overwhelming the past may feel, the truth is that we inherit only relics. By the time the past reaches us, oblivion has already done its work; so much has been forgotten or destroyed. “The past” is what’s left. 

    There are always grounds, big ones and small ones, for the complaint about entrapment in the past. Until theories of necessity are cobbled together, the circumstances into which we have been tossed will seem capricious. Most people live their lives conquered by accident. The absence of restlessness, which can be mistaken for wisdom, can also denote a premature surrender to the given. But what home ever sufficed for a living soul? Restlessness is the attribute of a significant existence, or more accurately, of an existence laudably anxious about significance.  

    My tradition teaches me that inherited customs are sacred, but all the customs that I inherited were invented. (They are sacred but they are not divine.) The problem with our derivativeness and our belatedness is not that we were robbed of the opportunity for self-creation, which is the adolescent Nietzschean-Rortyan objection. The problem is that we may not know what to do with what came before us, how to interpret it and to adapt it, how to hear it and how to see it. 

    And what about the dead hand of the present that weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living? In the alienation sweepstakes, the past is a piker.

    One of the sins of the traditionalists is to regard restlessness as a sin.

    Whoever wishes to be born again really wishes to be blameless. And blamelessness is not in our cards.

    Ex nihilo: that train left the station on the day you were born. “Self-fashioning” as it is propounded by the professors — who have the sabbaticals required for it — is a haughty doctrine; Emersonian arrogance without Emersonian humility. Who really wants to come from nowhere? And who is so vain to believe that he can suffice with his own resources for his identity and his improvement? A wish for a different beginning may be an expression of early pain — a wish, say, for different parents; a common wish, I suppose, since human beings are more biologically equipped to have children than they are psychologically equipped to raise them. But a wish for no parents? Self-fashioning is self-orphaning, and with the passage of one’s years it becomes more and more clear that orphanhood is overrated as an experience of emancipation. Nor is racination the threat that certain freethinkers have said it is, in the way that language is not such a threat. Obstacles can sometimes be overcome. Our specificity certainly condemns us to limits, but it is not obvious that we can flourish without limits. Whether or not we stand on the shoulders of giants, we stand on shoulders. 

    In a tiny, low-ceilinged, plainly tiled room in a modest house in an obscure town in the countryside Spinoza conjured the entirety of the cosmos. On my first visit to Rijnsburg the disparity between the scale of his setting and the scale of his thinking made me spin. Limited or not?

    Nothing is true because it is old, and much that is old is false. The history of science, for instance, is a history of mistakes, which is why contemporary scientists need not consult their ancient and medieval precursors. Old physics does not belong in the science of physics but in the history of physics. That is not so with old philosophy. We still study Aristotle, because the obscurity in which many questions of human meaning are shrouded, and the slim likelihood of arriving at perfect certainty about them, transforms ancient opinions about them into contemporary opinions. When we reject an Aristotelian theory of justice or truth, it is not in the way that we reject the Ptolemaic cosmos or the theory of phlogiston. Rational argument is transhistorical, which in our historicist culture, drunk as it is on developmental analysis, is an exhilerating respite.

    The prestige of antiquity, of what came long ago, can be easily exaggerated, and culminate in a thoughtless piety — a counter-futurism, which longs for a cessation of movement, for stasis. For this reason, the querelle des anciens et des modernes of the seventeenth century seems beside the point. In its time, the exaltations of newness, the inebriating phenomenon called modernity, were becoming undeniable, provoking a panic about the tenacity of the past. The panic, and therefore quarrel, was unavoidable — but we have the privilege of considering it more calmly, because modernity, too, is now a piece of our past. Those modernes are our anciens! Time makes all precedence ironic. In that grand early modern disputation, both parties were right and both parties were wrong. 

    There is a similar tension in the Talmudic tradition. One Talmudic opinion declares that certified instruction, or binding independent rulings, the ancient authority known as hora’ah, ended in the sixth century, which implies that the earlier a rabbinical decision was made, the more confident we may be in its correctness. Priority takes priority. But another Talmudic opinion states that the law is to be determined according to the “later ones,” the most recent experts, because the later you live the more you know. (Would that this were always so!) Belatedness, in this view, is an advantage. 

    For the purpose of living meaningfully, one is always right on time. 

    The recognition of one’s genealogy, of one’s place in the parade, should be a source of humility. But here is Nietzsche, moving steadily from brilliance to madness, denouncing humility and confusing it with timidity, and demagogically recommending self-origination, and bequeathing his culture not only the most challenging questions that have so far been asked about it but also a crass assertion of ontological arrogance. He once wondered how God can exist if he is not God. Nietzsche liked to call himself a psychologist, and sometimes he makes philosophical expressions seem like clinical expressions.

    Heine once said of a French industrialist: “He is a self-made man, which relieves God of a terrible responsibility.” 

    We have it backwards. The ancients are not old. They are young, because they came first. That is why we find their limitations not exasperating but enchanting, as with infants, and also why we marvel at the depths of their understandings when they are deep. But we are old. The later you come in the history of a culture, the older you are. And we will be judged by how much we have to show for it. 

    The price we pay for our late appearance in history is that our avowals lack the patina of wisdom. This may not be altogether a bad thing, since the promotion of an idea into wisdom often insulates it from skepticism and removes it from the requirements of critical examination. Sanctification is an efficient way of ending a discussion. Whereas a laboring mind is too busy for wisdom. And wisdom is easily degraded: consider only the wisdom racket of our own era, in which there is a Stoic on every corner. Wisdom may be reduced to a style, to the style of wisdom. Maybe the difference between truth and wisdom is merely that wisdom is truth that has aged. Did the contemporaries of Anaximander and Empedocles regard their opinions as wisdom, or as physical and metaphysical propositions for their consideration? (I omit the adepts, which anybody can attract.) I do not recall that Descartes and Hume and Kant and Hegel were regarded as too immortal for their contemporaries to challenge. The thinkers of one’s own time must never be beatified as sages, since we are still in the midst of evaluating the merits of their ideas. Pedestals make people stupid. And wisdom, to count as wisdom, must manifest the additional quality of being true. 

    The problem for the wisdom-lovers among us is that all the wisdoms do not agree with each other, and sanctimony alone will not resolve the contradiction. 

    Conservatives often chastise us for having forgotten wisdom. If they mean that we are wasting ourselves with intellectual ephemera and simulacra, it is hard not to agree. But there is often a churchly sentimentality in their complaint. The important question is not, Do we have wisdom? The important question is, What do we believe, and why? 

    A wise man knows also the limits of wisdom. The worship of wisdom does not make one wise. 

    Unlike some wines and cheeses, truths do not get better with age. Unlike other wines and cheeses, truths do not get worse with age. 

    In his ravishing writing about his old manse — have any more beautiful pages ever been written by an American? — Hawthorne declares that we should be grateful for our ancestors and grateful for our distance from them. Of course there are cases when gratitude for our ancestors is impossible, because they were evil or otherwise wrong, but generally Hawthorne’s prescription gets it right. There need be no ingratitude, no treason, in our distance from our ancestors. Indeed, one of the reasons that we admire them is for the distance that they put between themselves and their own ancestors, so that they could become themselves, the figures whom we admire. The distance between fathers and sons, however agonistically it is established, is a necessary test of the sons’ capacity for freedom. 

    The perfect reproduction of oneself in one’s child is a narcissist’s fantasy.  All heirs are deviationists.

    The pathos of the traditionalists lies in their futile belief that the forward movement that has characterized their traditions on their long journey to the present, to the traditionalists themselves, should stop with them. Yet even within orthodoxies there was always movement. The forms that the traditionalists wish to freeze were themselves the products of churnings and revisions. Unlike tradition, traditionalism is often a formula for unhappiness. The unhappiness is often weaponized.

    In traditional Judaism, authors are known to posterity not by their own names but by the names of their important works. This pious habit can have a slightly comic effect. It would be like referring to Kant as The Critique and to Hegel as The Phenomenology. (As in: Did the Phenomenology ever meet the Critique? Or: I have a friend who studied with a direct descendant of the Critique.) This personification of books is an astonishingly effective device for making books live. The author’s name is scanted in favor of the author’s work. And this, ironically, makes you feel closer and more personal.

    The nostalgist is an editor, and with no pretense to impartiality: he omits the disagreeable parts of the past, the episodes that are unedifying or useless to his intellectual framework, which is why every nostalgic picture of the past is axiomatically incomplete. In this way nostalgia takes the critical edge off the encounter with the past: it softens the life lived in time and is a kind of early stage of self-forgiveness. It is a cure for vertigo and a cure for loneliness, if ghosts can do the trick. But nostalgia is not quite happy. It is laced with melancholy, because it is born in the sense of loss, of disorientation in one’s own surroundings. Sadness always runs through its delight. Yet what delight! Surely the present in its various degrees of oppressiveness owes us such a passing recompense, a spate of rest. We can be hard-boiled and up-to-the-minute later. We must never become the sum of our carapaces. When Adam was discovering the first sweat on his brow and Eve was enduring her first labor pains, who could begrudge them a recollection of Eden? 

    One afternoon, when my son was two years old, I asked him how his day was going, and he replied: “I don’t remember yet.” I have pondered that remark for decades. Too soon for a past! Experience without memory! I was jealous.

    The police captain: “Those were the good old days!” Nick Charles, serving drinks: “Don’t kid yourself. These are the good old days!” In 1934.

    Language confers upon us the illusion that the modes of time are distinct from one another, conceptually and even existentially separable phases, when in fact the past, the present, and the future are always spilling into each other like sauces on a plate. How porous can a border be and still be a border? Duration is, among other things, a condition of initial chaos. How we live, individually and collectively, depends on how we make order out of the ticking disorder. 

    A vision of the future cannot be inspired by the future, because the future is still a nullity and without substance. Of course we never experience it as such: since it arrives as early as tomorrow, it will look a lot like today. But not always; and there will come days in which the differences will exceed the similarities — days of genuine departure, of the emergence of something new out of the old. Where else could it emerge from? We tiresomely refer to these hours of mutability as “inflection points.” Kinetically we adore them. Only inflect! But they are certainly not as common as we think, as we hectically inflect the recently inflected on our way to the next inflection; and sometimes we are forced, for stability’s sake, to devise mental techniques to retard the rapids and mitigate the shock of  the discontinuity, to preserve connections across the crucibles, to incorporate the breakthroughs into prior schemes and systems even when they will not fit. (Many years ago I had a Syrian Marxist friend who used to amuse me when we argued, because every time I presented him with a logical contradiction or an empirical refutation of his views he would blithely respond: “Well, I just have to work that into the analysis.”) But there are moments when we must concede, or lament, or rejoice, that things really are no longer what they were. The people who make these announcements regularly are called visionaries. The problem is that the visionary mode — like the prophetic mode — is notoriously facile. In contemporary America, who is not a visionary? Here all it takes to qualify as a visionary is a t-shirt and the latest iteration of a jargon. (Unless you are a visionary, you won’t get the financing.) We are drowning in the clichés of our dime-a-dozen visionaries. An entire population suffers from vision migraines.

    Tocqueville’s most profound contribution to historical understanding may have been not his dazzling intuitions about America but his careful descriptions of how much of prerevolutionary France persisted into post-revolutionary France. In the age of revolution the incompleteness of revolution was a revolutionary idea. He wrote the greatest book ever written against the tabula rasa.

    Our fashion in visionaries accounts also for the inundation of our culture by science fiction, which is the literary form that futurism takes. From Jules Verne on, radical depictions of the future have occasionally inspired a more helpful and sophisticated grasp of what may be possible: innovation is always the product of an expanded imagination. The problem with these prophecies is that too often they loosen not only the imagination but also the mind. The imagination involved in those visions is chiefly technological: the master plot of science fiction is the behavior of familiar human beings in unfamiliar technological circumstances. It is only lately that the imbecilic geniuses of Silicon Valley have had the effrontery to also promote the technologization of the human being – that “post-humanity” has become an ideal. Replicants are too human for these futurists. (Phillip K. Dick, the most accomplished futurist imagination of our time, never surrendered his humaneness and what he liked to call “the authentic human being.”) The insolence of the Kurzweils and the Andreesens and the rest of the Prometheans with offshore accounts knows no bounds. Billions and billions in the cause of de-humanization! I have been reading the unintentionally risible theological speculations of Peter Thiel — on the legend of “a zombie Nero resurrected in a parody of Christ,” for example, and its source in the Book of Revelations: “Saint John identified 666 as the number of the beast, and Nero’s Hebrew name, Neron Kaisar, has a gematric value of 666.” And so on, in this pseudo-esoteric vein. Thiel’s deep original thinking is a parody of hermetic tripe, a witless exchange of engineering arcana for chiliastic arcana, according to which what most direly imperils us now is the Antichrist. In this way thinking outside the box culminates in the least original and most poisonius thinking of all. “One question ripe for literary treatment,” Thiel reflects, “is how the Antichrist will take over the world.” His literary standard is low, since he treats comic books as metaphysical sources. (In one of these scriptures Christlike Luffy defeats Kaidou and Big Mom. Praise the Lord!) It will come as no surprise that the quasi figura Antichristi of our day is for Thiel the critic of artificial intelligence – or more generally, “in the twenty-first century the Antichrist is a Luddite who wants to stop all science,” as if the technical (and economic) connivings of Thiel and Altman and the others are coterminous with science itself. (Needless to say, Carl Schmitt has a cameo.) We are paying heavily for one undergraduate’s infatuation with René Girard’s vaporizings about the redemptive power of violent unreason. 

    It is no wonder, amid this outburst of science fiction and its antihumanist sensibility, that another genre of film and fiction is also thriving. The genry of the moment is horror. In our culture now it is everywhere. It responds to one variety of antihumanism with another variety of antihumanism, the genre of horror is consecrated to giving the darkness the last word. It, too, is visionary, except that its vision of the future is of a time in which uncontrollable sadistic forces have not been eradicated because they are ineradicable. What did the Saw and Hostel and Chainsaw franchises advertise if not the eternal recurrence of human depravity? Which, as a fact of history, is of course indubitable. But there is no courage in horror, no fearless confrontation with what must be faced, no high-minded reckoning with the worst that we need to know about ourselves. It is merely a commercial formula that exploits the fragility of our dignity, and the emotional infirmity of those who find pleasure in fear. Horror is to Thanatos what porn is to Eros. There is nothing especially tough-minded about the presentation of torture as entertainment. It is only a program for learning not to feel. Everybody was so frantically searching for the feminist lessons in that repulsive Demi Moore movie about a woman’s viscera that they neglected to note its virulent hatred of the human, its nihilism disguised as a bracing interpretation of body dysmorphia. (5,500 gallons of phony blood!) And the Gothic blockbusters of the nineteenth century — which like Dracula will never die, but continue to seduce filmmakers who prefer the demagoguery of special effects, Guillermo del Toro most recently — these allegedly transgressive classics teach the perdurability of the past at its most despairing: that there is nothing anachronistic about all those medieval castles and capes because the descent into the irrational and the insane is a perennial norm. Neither reason nor religion will keep the demons down. Transylvania forever! Pessimism with popcorn. We are at the same time so advanced and so atavistic. I guess atavism is the flip side of advancement. Or is it the other way around? For every gleaming gadget, a lopped-off limb. For every app, a fang. 

    There was a time — all of human history until approximately now — when the existence of the future could be taken for granted, all the histrionics of apocalypse notwithstanding. But now we must pause over the houses slipping into the sea and the fires in the rain forests and the ice caps as they vanish to reflect that this platitude — this quotidian assurance about the lastingness of the world, upon which all human activity was premised  — may have been a momentous blunder. Futurity is no longer what it used to be. We must begin to picture what it will be like to live in the absence of any confidence about the year after this one and then the day after this one and then the moment after this one. What will it be like to carry on without the sense of an unbounded and unendangered future? Only the condemned have known that feeling. The sensation of ordinary mortality is certainly nothing like it. After all, the steadiness of the dying, or so I imagine, the equilibrium of the soul on the brink of the body’s extinction, is premised on the conviction that the world will not die with them. What will it be like to die without the certainty that the world will live on? What will it be like to be the last one to die? Bill Gates now declares that we need not worry about the end of the line “for the foreseeable future,” but what exactly is the foreseeable future? I am not yet prepared to exhale and open a bottle. Futurism (and its cult of the machine) may turn out to have been the indulgence of a shallow and greedy species that could not be bothered to look after the vast portion of nature that was not itself.

    “The end of the line”: I suppose that the phrase comes from the railroads. Anybody who has ever been to the end of a line, to the final buffer where the tracks ignominiously stop, will agree that it is a peculiarly melancholy place. Whereas the sight of tracks running into infinity is peculiarly heartening. 

    There is something funny about the fashion in infinity pools. Another game that the rich play with limits. 

    Why should boundlessness be heartening? Why should we aspire to what we cannot be? (Americans evade the difficulty of such questions by hiding behind “the aspirational.”) To want to be what one can never be is damaging and dangerous, to oneself and to others. Surely it is the work of a lifetime to become no more than what one can be. In that enterprise we are in no danger of early or easy success. If you think hard about infinity, you will recognize that it is terrifying — but perhaps not for its silence, as Pascal remarked. The silence may be the best part of it.

    The name that finite creatures have often given to what they are not is God. Some religious philosophers have been so militant about the conception of God as everything that we are not, as the strict and perfect antithesis of what we are, that they unwittingly lend support to the modern criticism that theology is no more than an exercise in human projection, except in the form of a negation. (This negation also explains how the idea of infinity can occur to a finite mind, which centuries ago was regarded as a miracle that proved the existence of the deity.) I do not see how a God worthy of the name, or the Name, can have anything in common with human attributes, or how infinity can also be finite, which is why the Christian idea of the Incarnation is philosophically offensive to me; but it is not hard to understand why finite creatures would need to find something of themselves in infinity – a link, a sign, a wink, a loophole — a back door to pagan satisfaction, the body of Christ. 

    Unless you already believe that Jesus was the Son of God, the effect of a beautiful representation of Christ — say, Zurbaran’s huge corpus floating in a field of the purest black, in Chicago — is to encourage not heavenly religion but earthly desire. Listen to Buxtehude’s lachrymose seven-cantata cycle, Membra Jesu Nostri patientis sanctissima, or The Most Holy Limbs of Our Suffering Jesus, each cantata a penitential celebration of a different part of his body, and you will hear the sound of monotheism gently vanishing.

    The most daunting challenge of all is to believe in a God who provides little or no satisfaction.

    In the very few instances in my life when I seemed to have been lifted to some sort of brush with infinity — by the third movement of Beethoven’s fifteenth string quartet, for example, the “Lydian” movement, on a rainy night in a small room in an old stone manor at Oxford, a rickety gramophone on the trunk next to my monk’s bed — it was a relief to come away from the uncanniness without an obligation of worship. It was real, but it was only an experience. Is there a less reliable authority for cosmic conclusions? Epiphany, delirium, ecstasy, apotheosis: I wish I were visited by more of these heightened moments, but not because they are intellectually trustworthy. There are many reasons to want to vibrate, but a climactic illumination, the vouchsafing of an irreversible clarity, is not one of them. I am, alas, spiritually overprotective, with a phobic attitude toward illusion, which can interfere with pleasures of the imagination, and with experiences of abandon, and this almost neurotic skepticism has condemned me to a relatively unadventurous mundanity; but still I would rather be starved than swindled. 

    A brush with the unlimited, maybe; but contact, never. Or not yet. No, never. 

    The doors of perception? Don’t let them hit you on your way out. 

    The plot thickens with the introduction of the infinitesimal — a thing not infinitely large but infinitely small. The origins of the concept are to be found in mathematics, where I am never to be found. My understanding is that it refers to a numerical value that is as close to zero as it can be without being zero. Or it could refer to a minute point somewhere far down an infinite line. Yet the dissociation of infinity from size permits a marvelous thought — that there is no end to littleness, or: the grandeur of humility. It is big to be small. (The self-abnegation of a point: an ethical allegory from poorly understood mathematics.) 

    “There will be no other end of the world, / There will be no other end of the world.” Czeslaw Miłosz wrote those lines in one of his scorching poems about the Warsaw Ghetto, which he composed from the other side of the ghetto walls. Just think: a second end of the world! It sounds unbearable. But really it may be the most comforting thought of all. To live after the end — which, unless the entire planet burns up, somebody always will — is to benevolently recontextualize the idea of an ending, to fight back successfully against the most frightening aspect of extinction, which is its finality. Panic owes its power to its literalness, but a with panic disarms that literalness. The future may be good or bad, but so far it has never not arrived.

    We go through our lives attempting to create permanent things — commitments and institutions — but the permanence to which we aspire for our creations is premised on the open-endedness of life, on the banality of time. What if time is no longer banal? My parents, and all the other survivors of the modern world’s protracted kingdoms of killing, lived for years without being able to rely on the open-endedness of life, while around them so much of the world stayed open-ended — which, for them, between 1939 and 1945, was one of its worst cruelties. 

    The end of the world is more coherent than the end of a people. It is at least a shared human fate.

    In 1948, a time when Jewish history was simultaneously flush with sorrow and joy in an impossible disequilibration of feeling, the Jewish thinker and scholar Simon Rawidowicz wrote a mordant and gentle essay called “Israel: The Ever-Dying People.” It was a critique of Jewish morbidity, in which he observed this about the chronic Jewish “fear of the end”: “A nation dying for thousands of years means a living nation. Our incessant dying means uninterrupted living, rising, standing up, beginning anew.” And also this great release from the prison of grief: “But if we are the last – let us be the last as our fathers and forefathers were the last, let us prepare the ground for the last Jews who will come after us, and for the last Jews who will rise after them.” That prayer belongs in the prayerbook. 

    But what about calamities that are in some way without precedent, and cannot be tucked into prior patterns, into a salving familiarity which can lessen the temptation to hopelessness? I am thinking of the political nausea that occurs with the first appearance of post-liberalism in liberal societies. It is the sickening moment that we are living presently. The Trump era in America and the Netanyahu era in Israel are groundbreaking calamities in the histories of these countries, first iterations of national nightmares, and while they do not come out of nowhere they are an incontrovertibly new chapter, and so the customary consolation of historical irony will avail us nothing. About these developments there is as yet no way to knowing or weary. The first time is a heartbreak all its community.

    Never, ever write the story of your own as a narrative of angels. Otherwise the discovery that you are not perfect strangers to evil will shipwreck you.

    Is every heartbreak like the first one? 

    We are mongrels of temporality: all the tenses exist in us at every moment, and our task is to attend to the proportions in the mix. Is the past colonizing the present? Is the future? Guard the frontiers! But we are never unmixed. 

    This is the case also about previous epochs. In his defense of “the painting of modern life,” and more generally of the legitimacy of modernity, Baudelaire wrote that “by ‘modernity’ I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent” — He was concerned that the speed of the new urban life, its pandemonium of people and incident, its noisy vulgarities, would disqualify it from the classical ambitions of art. And so he sagely pointed out that “every old master has had his own modernity,” because everybody has lived in their time, which was the latest time, and no time is incapable of transmutations into beauty. The poet – who was writing here as an art critic — was not privileging modernity; he was insisting that it be treated with the same philosophical and cultural privilege that other eras enjoyed — that the transience of a streetcar is no less real and interesting than the transience of a blossom, and no less inviting to art. Baudelaire’s whole sentence reads: “By ‘modernity’ I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable.” Never unmixed.

    So, the temporal and the eternal share in all things, or all things share in them – a partnership of opposites. But the alliance is not always legible. It is easier for me to find the eternal in Brueghel’s pictures of tiny people shitting on the ice than to find the temporal in Poussin’s ideality composed pastorals. (In his The Rape of the Sabines, a true masterpiece of pictorial design, the sub specie aeternitatis mood has, for me, always offended against the terror that is portrayed. What on earth is an orderly breakdown of order?)  

    And for those who do not believe in the eternal or the absolute? Even for them, reality is not just a landfill of data. As long as there is form, we are not forever shut up inside our empirical preoccupations and conditions. Form has the power to alter our experience of a thing, of any thing, and to broach a beyond. How distant a beyond? Not necessarily as far as the heavens: no metaphysics are necessary for a faith in form, though a measure of abstraction is. The godless are not excluded from this realm of numinousness. And form is utterly neutral, devoid of prejudices or prerequisites: it will put up with, or shape, or disfigure, or transfigure, any material.

    There is nothing more difficult than to live significantly in the present. Most people accomplish this by, well, cheating: they borrow from the past and from the future, from memory and from hope, until the present is overrun by the other modes and comes to consist chiefly in commemorations and in dreams, in hindsight and in anticipation. To be sure, the influences of the past and the future upon the present are impossible to annul; as I say, in the matter of temporality we are forever mixed. But can we control their intrusions? Can we calibrate our own temporality? This gave birth to the riveting notion of a pure present, an Eternal Present — to the view that the present is spiritually primary because it is the only mode of time in which we may experience the transcendence that we seek. In one sense, of course, this observation is trivial. When else is transcendence supposed to take place? In this sense, the ideal of living solely in the present, though it may be a fiction, is a magnificent attempt to protect transcendence from the relentless interferences of time — to insulate the soul’s shot at fulfillment from the distractions of memory and desire. One prooftext out of many: in the second part of Faust, Goethe has his hero declare that “the spirit looks neither ahead nor behind. Only the present is our happiness.”  

    Whether or not it is easy to seize the day, it is not easy to seize the instant. Modern philosophers — Husserl, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Bergson, Bachelard, and others — have gone to pains to isolate the instant from the flux and attempt a characterization of it. The project proved to be rather Sisyphean. In 1932, Bachelard, inspired by an amateur play by a university colleague who was a historian and a winemaker, suggested that, as opposed to Bergson’s search for time itself, “the only way we ourselves can feel time is by multiplying conscious instants.” An instant is “the compressed center around which we would posit an evanescent duration.” But is evanescent duration the answer or the question? Four years earlier Heidegger edited and published the lectures that his teacher Husserl delivered in the 1910s on “the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness.” This may be the most impossible book I have ever read. A sentence randomly chosen from the discussion of “longitudinal intentionality”: “If we now let the flux flow away, we then have the flux-continuum as running-off, which allows the continuity to be retentionally modified, and thereby every new continuity of phases momentarily existing all at once is retention with reference to the total continuity of what is all-at-once in the preceding phase.” I do not adduce such a passage to make fun of it. In his admirable search for a close account of the lived experience of the fleeting moment, the philosopher was heroically undeterred by the difficulty of trying to capture in language what probably cannot be captured in language, even in the compound-coinages of a style of philosophy unfazed by turgidity. Husserl was braver than Heraclitus, who believed that he could make do with the metaphor of the river. Yet the more one considers these attempts to clarify the smallest and most immediate units of lived time, the more plausibly one may conclude that a life lived completely in the present would be incoherent without the shadows and the foreshadows of the past and the future. The coherence of a temporal life may require a mess of temporal intrusions. What, after all, can we do with an instant? 

    There are perfunctory versions of the ideal of pure instantaneity. Animals live completely in the present. So do voluptuaries (Casanova’s memoirs are eight volumes of pure presents), and so do the beaded forever-young Baba Ram Dassians on the coasts and in the mountains. Yet they experience nothing like an eternal present: they live merely in a series, moment to moment, climax upon climax, high after high, sensation followed by sensation, over and over, robotically, by rote, in a frantic and unconnected collection of what Americans call “peak experiences.” But peaks are nothing without valleys. There are peak people and valley people. An existence of endless stimulation — the peak people — requires a deformation of time based on its complete atomization: be here now, and then now, and then now, and then now. Never mind that there may be more attractive than here. But the passage from here to there takes time — dumb extended duration of an unatomized and unmagical kind, provisional and continuous. Be there and then there and then there and then there, until the achievement of arrival will be yours. A series of theres is often deeper and more sustaining than a series of heres. The fantasy of a pure present expresses a kind of temporal provincialism; it is the connections between the instants out of which a life is made. (For the animals with whom I have gratefully lived, by contrast, I detected no distinction between ordinary experience and peak experience, except for sleep. Lucky pugs!) 

    Another name for a pure present: immanent exile. What else could follow it?

    Nothing valuable can be accomplished without repetition, but repetition deadens more than it quickens. The only solution I know for this problem is the musical form of theme and variations.
    The colonization of the present by the past — there is so much past! — is a more common phenomenon than its colonization by the future, but there is an increasingly troublesome instance of the latter: messianism, or more precisely, political messianism. No matter how traditional they seem, messianists are people who derive the meaning of their lives not from the past but from the future — or rather from a particular construction of the future in which it will reproduce a particular construction of the past. Restorations are conspiracies between the future and the past. In their own minds the restorationists are already living in the future because they have already been living in the past, usually an ancient past that ended badly, and this hallucination of time travel accounts for their obnoxious tone of spiritual superiority. (All redeemers are obnoxious. They come with love but without respect.) They have come from their future to drag the rest of us into it. They are high on historical rupture. They mourn destruction and are ready to destroy. Guns sometimes follow. 

    Another reason for preferring the present, a completely worldly reason, was given by Pierre Hadot. “Ordinarily our life is always incomplete, because we project all our hopes, all our aspirations, all our attention, into the future, telling ourselves that we will be happy when we have attained this or that goal. We are scared as long as the goal is not attained, but if we attain it, already it no longer interests us and we continue to run after something else. We do not live, we hope to live, we are waiting to live.” Hadot, as is well known, argued that the Stoics and the Epicureans had devised the solution to this conundrum: “to live not in the future but as though there were no future, as though we only had this day, only this moment, to live.” This is a little precious. We must add, compassionately, that hoping to live, and living in hope, is not the worst fate that can be imagined. Having lived but living no more, or having no grounds for hoping to live, is much worse. As for waiting, it is an art, a lost art; it is not a grudging way of meeting an inconvenient or frustrating delay, but a mature way of grappling with the stubbornness of time and the work requirements of truth and goodness and beauty.

    To recommend impatience is to play with fire.

    Hadot goes beyond his customary proselytization for Stoicism and its illusion of personal immunity. He suggests that an intensity of focus upon the present confers a different advantage. “To live in the present moment is to live as though one were seeing the world both for the last and for the first time. To work at seeing the world as though one were seeing it for the first time is to get rid of the conventional and routine vision we have of things, to discover a brute, naïve version of reality, to take note of the splendor of the world, which habitually escapes us.” How splendid this is. Since we are so accustomed to confusion in the present, it is encouraging to be reminded of its power to clarify. The purpose of Hadot’s putative ban on the past and the future is to prevent them from blurring a precise apprehension of what actually now exists. For lucidity’s sake they sometimes need to get out of the way. 

    To see clearly: a stupendously immodest goal. It is the secular mysticism, the sharpening of perception as a spiritual elevation, that one finds in many modern poets and painters — the thrilling notion that seeing clearly is not only a practical matter but also, when the focus rises above our everyday eyes, and we succeed in a degree of detachment from our commonplace cognitive practices, an attainment of transcendence, even if it remains terrestrial. Seeing clearly is a life’s work. I am reminded of the passage in Rilke’s Ninth Elegy when he suspends his swooning and wonders whether the most that we can do in the way of an accurate grasp of reality is to delineate it properly, to say “house, bridge, fountain, gate, jug, fruit tree, window” — “such saying as the things themselves never hoped so intensely to be.” Nouns and nothing more, but each of them with the force of a revelation. Behind this dream of comprehensive clarity, of complete optical definition, was the poet’s revelatory encounter with Cezanne’s apples, which, like Zurbaran’s lemons and Chardin’s cherries and Morandi’s bottles, challenge ordinary perception with their distinctness and their vividness and their concreteness — with their overwhelming but immanent presence. 

    Will someone who seeks a better view of heaven be satisfied with a better view of earth? Can apples do the work of angels?

    The plot thickens. A jug figures prominently — two jugs, actually — in another twentieth-century attempt to seize the instant. This one occurred not in philosophy but in psychology, and this endeavor arrived at the opposite conclusion: that clarity about an object is to be found not in the delineation of its boundaries but in the blurring of its boundaries. Marion Milner was a British psychoanalyst and a strangely riveting writer about lived experience, born in 1897, a colleague of D. W. Winnicott and a friend of Adrian Stokes, who in 1950 published an exciting book called On Not Being Able to Paint. The story begins, as it often does for the analytical Milner, with a subtle observation of a small incident:

    I woke one morning and saw two jugs on the table; without any mental struggle I saw the edges in relation to each other and how gaily they seemed almost to ripple now that they were freed from this grimly practical business of enclosing an object and keeping it in its place. This was surely what painters meant about the play of edges: certainly they did play, and I tried a five-minute sketch of the jugs.

    Her sketch is reproduced in her book: two jugs overlapping, two solid objects with open borders. This imprecision gladdened Milner, and provoked her to a war against outline, against “the need to make objects keep themselves to themselves within a rigid boundary,” against “the fear of losing all sense of separating boundaries.” Her actual experience of the jugs was tentative and unclear and transitory, very much akin to the “transitional objects” that Winnicott interposed between the “inner reality” and the “outer reality” that the baby and then the child had to negotiate. Milner, in the realm of the visual arts, argued what Winnicott did in the realm of child psychology: against hypostatization, against too much fixity. When Rilke said jug, in other words, he had it backwards. He was distorting the object by means of excessive definition. In his search for a lasting crystalline reality, he made the object overly distinct. In this way he sought to idealize it, to make poetry out of it, but by idealizing it, by seeking to complete what revealed itself best in its incompleteness, he withdrew it from the world of natural perception. There is no instant, no present, in which you see the jug, unless you have the stamina for mysticism. Winnicott wrote wisely about “the strain inherent in objective perception,” which is to say that objectivity involves both a gain and a loss, because it represents an elaborate treatment of perceptual experience; it may grant truth but not immediacy. It might even be a stranger to experience.

    I look again at Cezanne’s apples, first with Rilke’s eyes and then with Milner’s eyes. It’s a wash. Sometimes they have edges but not outlines, sometimes they have outlines in place of edges, and sometimes the shadows make the inquiry moot. How much of a shape must one see to know it? Not the entirety of it, to judge by the evidence of some of Cezanne’s incomplete still-lifes. Sometimes it is more powerful to suggest a shape than to document it. (One of the most precious aspects of Milner’s writing is her loss of interest in wholeness.)

    Freedom may lie in the difference between an edge and a border, though both can be emboldening.

    As they were together contemplating one of Cezanne’s depictions of Mont Sainte-Victoire, Rilke remarked to Count Harry Kessler: “Not since Moses has anyone seen a mountain so greatly.” Was he thinking of Sinai or Nebo? Not every peak is the same. 

    Presence occurs only in the present. This is not as pretentious as it sounds. A presence that has departed and a presence that has not arrived are poor nourishments, though we snack on them constantly.

    Why would mortal creatures expend themselves with a longing for the end? It will come, it will come.

    A short drive from Alamogordo, the cursed town in New Mexico where the first nuclear weapon was created, is one of the strangest and most spiritually addling places in the world. It is White Sands National Park, almost three hundred square miles of blindingly white gypsum sand. Truly one feels translated to another reality. With the rare exception of the skeleton of a dead tree — nothing can grow in that glistening ground — the white desert stretches featurelessly and without interruption in all directions as far as the eye can see. I never comprehended the obliterative power of white until I walked those dunes. The infinite was there, and so was the infinitesimal. I was surrounded by sublimity and I was lost.

    Lviv: A Canary’s Diary

    February 20, Sunday

    Yesterday, at home in Kyiv, we listened to Boris Johnson’s speech and immediately bought tickets to Lviv. My husband Roman suggested a week ago that S, our three-and-a-half-year-old daughter, and I stay with my parents in Lviv, but I refused, despite the American and British embassies having already relocated there (and my mother begging us to come). A few days ago, the older daughter of my husband, a first-year student, left to join her mother who lives abroad.

    Now it’s time for us.

    As I’m packing, S is running around, exclaiming “Let’s go to Lviv, to Lviv!” An unusual enthusiasm, which I wouldn’t notice if she didn’t also say: “I don’t want him to kill us all!” “Who?” I ask. “Who’s gonna kill us?” She doesn’t answer, just keeps selecting which things I should pack. I’m astonished: she couldn’t have heard anything like that from me or Roman, as we didn’t discuss the situation in such a dramatic manner. Her kindergarten, maybe? They were preparing children to go to a shelter, and she might have overheard the older kids. During the last month schools and kindergartens in Kyiv and Lviv (I’m not sure about the other cities) taught children what to do in case of an air raid. We were all urged to prepare survival bags, or, if literally translated from Ukrainian, “an anxious backpack.” There were dozens of how-to articles everywhere. Yet we didn’t pack ours until now.

    I keep telling myself that we will come back in a week, covered with shame. Another voice in my head tells me that we may never come back if the city is occupied or destroyed. We send a couple of boxes with clothes by post to pick up in Lviv later. We take all the documents, many toys, and almost all of S’s clothes with us. What I learn instantly is that you look differently at your belongings when your home may be destroyed or vandalized. I take my diary, which I gave up after I started to write a book last year. I take my daughter’s vyshyvanka (a Ukrainian folk embroidered shirt) for the same reason: I just hate to think anyone may touch it. I take three books: two old Polish books I recently purchased at the Internet flea market, and the first edition of Yuri Andrukhovych’s novel Perversion. Not only is it my favorite book, I bought it at a very special moment of my life in 1997, so I guess it’s my most precious possession, when it comes to material objects.

    One of my duties as a fellow at a Central European think tank — the fellowship is named for Marcin Krol, the Polish philosopher and democratic activist — has been to contribute to a weekly overview of security in the region. And so I’ve been explaining my anxiety by the fact that I have to read all the news. It’s hard to draw a line between my intuition and my information overload. I notice my relief as soon as our train reaches the Ternopil region, officially western Ukraine, the area that is not of Russian interest according to the published maps of future invasion.

    A canary in a coalmine:
    No, the Russian invasion was not a surprise.

    Ukrainians tend to say that we’ve been at this war for eight years, since 2014. That is true: even those not directly affected by the aggressions of the past eight years know someone who was. Almost every morning the war was mentioned in the news: someone was killed or wounded; even in the “quiet” period it was not really quiet. My husband later told me that his heart sank as he was closing our door, thinking of his friends who, in exactly the same way, closed the doors of their apartments in Donetsk eight years ago.

    At the same time I never felt so much at home in my country as after Maidan. The paradox is that while parts of the country — Crimea and areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions — were occupied by Russians in 2014, the rest of the country was, as I experienced it, de-occupied; emancipated. I started my own small business, a publishing house, in 2015, since finally I knew that I wouldn’t be persecuted by the tax administration, and that my business would not be raided, as happened before to many people I knew, especially when Kuchma and Yanukovych were our presidents. Of course, many others had businesses in the pre-Maidan years, but I was not as brave as them. In 2014 I applied to the State Security Service to use its archives because I realized that they are my public service now, no longer just the former KGB, politicized and filled with Russian agents.

    Then, in 2018, it changed for me, when my daughter was born. I became terrified by the images of all possible dangers and risks. I couldn’t see a movie or read a book (except for some non-fiction) if they included a situation with a child in danger. Even fairy tales horrified me: how can any sane person let a child go into the woods alone?

    Of course, I told myself, there were rational explanations for my outbreak of fear. First, the oxytocin storm, which is normal when you have a newborn on your hands. Second, all survival mechanisms are on. And finally, the family traumas in anamnesis: both of my maternal grandparents were orphans. My grandmother lost her mother when she was seven, growing up mostly with relatives who weren’t particularly kind to her. Her painful memories were among the first stories I heard. And so I felt like I was five again, brimming with the fear of becoming an orphan. My grandfather, too, grew up in an orphanage, after his parents were killed by the Bolsheviks as “class enemies.”

    It didn’t get better with time. I read so many books about the atrocities of the twentieth century. I wrote and edited articles about them, and here I was, helpless to say “no” to my daughter asking for a cookie because how can you not give food to a child? Five years earlier I put some effort into the Ukrainian edition of Bringing Up Bébé by Pamela Druckerman, an American journalist who moved to Paris and tried to raise her children in the French way, that is, giving them only healthy food and teaching them to eat gracefully. A big enthusiast of the book, I was sure that one day my own child would eat steamed broccoli, too. Now I realized that one needs to have had one’s grandmother live through World War Two in occupied Paris, not in occupied Kyiv as my grandma did (though she was a survivor of the famine in 1933), to have a gut tough enough to issue a firm “no” when a child asks for an unhealthy snack. Pamela Druckerman is Jewish, and so I speculate that this partly explains her struggle. Now, as I was preparing chicken meatballs for my not-that-French baby, I suddenly realized that I have myself become the proverbial Jewish mother from the jokes we used to tell. Except that they are not so funny anymore.

    I have been living with these fears for more than three years. During the last month before the invasion, I was totally freaked out for seemingly no reason. And so with the first bombings I felt a kind of relief, and I began to calm down. As in a horror movie, the part after the monster is visible is not as scary as the suspense at the beginning.

    Something like this had happened before. I knew that something was coming before the Maidan revolution. I wasn’t afraid, I just avoided making big plans. During the three months of Maidan I was extremely lucky: I didn’t suffer a bruise, though I was in the thick of things. Like a canary in a coalmine, I feel the danger before the explosion.

    February 22, Tuesday

    As expected, Putin signed the decrees of “independence” of the occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Shchastia (a town on our side of the frontline) was shelled. It has begun.

    February 23, Wednesday

    It seems that everyone I overhear while taking my walks with S comes from elsewhere. On a playground on the neighboring street, I met a woman from Vyshhorod, near Kyiv. She rents an apartment in a building of the same type as ours — they call it “Polish luxe,” meaning very nice and comfortable interwar Constructivist buildings, with thick walls, relatively wide stairs, sometimes marble panels in the hall, and solid, deep cellars. She asked me where the local bomb shelter is. I told her to use the basement, they are good for this purpose in our neighborhoods. And I realized that basements in these buildings are so well equipped as shelters because the people of that era expected a war. That never occurred to me when I was growing up here.

    Later I noticed a sign that said “Shelter” in our own hall.

    February 24, Thursday

    I wake up as my mom was talking on the phone with my in-laws. Kyiv and its surroundings were attacked from the air. The Russians invaded. Roman’s parents are coming to be with us. Or rather they are trying to come. All roads from Kyiv are jammed with cars, and the lines for fuel are huge.

    Later I go to a pharmacy and do some grocery shopping. There are no signs of panic on Lviv’s streets, except perhaps the long lines at the ATMs and at every pharmacy. It’s unusually quiet for this area: we live seven minutes from a big crossroads and a farmer’s market. I notice that there are fewer cars. Some shelves in the grocery store (bread, flour, sugar, and so on) are already empty. That’s understandable, I say to myself: we live in an old residential area, there are a lot of elderly people here, and they are not used to Internet shopping. And they remember the Soviet shortages of, well, everything.

    I also went downtown. Most of the shops are closed. That makes sense: who needs boutique clothes today? I noticed some people in military uniform with rifles.

    I spent most of the day writing emails and texting. Friends from all over are worried.

    A tale of two cities:

    I moved to Kyiv from Lviv in 2011. Before that I spent thirty-three years here. Most of my friends left Lviv earlier, some of them when I was still a student. They graduated hastily from university and moved on. I’m not sure how much I belong here. Still, all this time I’ve been registered in Lviv and my income taxes go to the Lviv city budget. I once had an apartment here (I sold it in 2019). My mother was born here.

    But my grandmother came from Kyiv in 1947, the period called “the second Soviets” (the first Soviet came in 1939, after Stalin and Hitler invaded Poland). She left starved and ruined Kyiv, where she didn’t have any means to live with her sister, who moved earlier. In other words, she came to save herself and her daughter (my aunt). The population of Lviv changed almost completely after World War II. Many Poles, who had been the majority, were killed or forcibly deported to Russian camps, and so were Ukrainians. Almost all the city’s Jews — they knew it as Lemberg — were killed by Nazis during the Holocaust. After Yalta, Lviv became a part of the Soviet Union, and few Poles stayed in the city. Russians, Ukrainians, and Jews came from the USSR. They somewhat derisively called those Ukrainians and Poles who had stayed “the locals.” Their children, and often their grandchildren, did the same. My grandmother used the word in that way. My mother pronounced it mostly with respect, as she considered “the locals” to be kinder than the people she knew at home; but pronounced in a different tone the word was a pejorative. “The locals” in turn called the newcomers “liberators” — vyzvolyteli in Ukrainian, or osvoboditeli in Russian (the latter was used to add a little acidity to the sardonic usage).

    Were we “liberators”? Technically, we were. We spoke Russian while my grandparents were alive. We lived as the majority of Soviet people did, an extended family in one apartment. Both my mother and I went to Russian schools. We lived in the city center, that is, the quarter of the city built before 1939. My grandfather was a captain in the Red Army and an invalid of the Great War who came to Lviv in 1947.

    And yet we were not like typical Russians, not at all. My grandmother never had a job in Lviv, and she lived completely immersed in the world of relatives and family, never embedded in any Soviet social structure. My grandfather once held some power in his hands: he distributed “liberated” apartments (empty after their owners were either killed, or deported, or left for Poland or the West, the luckiest ones). As he had never known anything but an orphanage, a military training, and the Red Army, my grandfather believed that a person may be happy with only a bed and a nightstand, and so he stayed in a shared apartment (kommunalka) and refused to get a four-bedroom place for himself. It was only when he married Grandma that she made him apply for a modest one-room apartment. Nor did he avail himself of any of the opportunities for corruption, except for a bottle of vodka as a present after the paperwork was done. Soon he ended up on the bottom of the Soviet bureaucracy’s food chain, and most of his life he worked at a factory. Moreover, he was not Russian but Chuvash, the Turkic ethnicity in the region of the Volga River. The most interesting thing about the Chuvash is that their language is the closest to the dead language of the Khazars, a Turkic people who are said to have adopted Judaism in the Middle Ages. Anyway, my grandfather struggled with Russian grammar until his death. My father, born near Lviv, grew up in the Dnipropetrovsk region, and came to Lviv as a student. So maybe we were not real “liberators,” but neither were we “locals.”

    The real “liberators” were mostly part of the machinery of repression in a rebellious region, where the underground Ukrainian resistance operated until the late 1950s. (Strangely, I never heard of the banderivtsi, the anti-Soviet partisans, before I went to school at the age of seven, which means that in our family they were not considered a menace.) Unlike in other Ukrainian cities, Russophones here were not Ukrainians who had to switch to Russian, but ethnic Russians, since they were regarded by the authorities as more reliable politically, and dominated the army and the KGB. Even the Russian language was different in Lviv: it was proper Russian, without a Ukrainian accent. And the KGB staff was as large in Lviv as it was in Kyiv, the capital of the Soviet republic, a city almost three times larger. The closeness of the Western border (the territory of the enemies — yes, socialist Poland too) explained the extensive presence of the military. Thus the lines between the castes were more visible in Lviv (as in the other cities occupied by Soviets after the war) than in the east.

    My grandmother missed Kyiv, but she never came back. My history with Kyiv had one more twist: my father started to work in Kyiv, and my mother joined him soon after I became a student. We started to live in two cities: me in Lviv with my grandparents, and my parents in Kyiv. Mom hated it, and that was understandable. It was not a hospitable place back then. They came back to Lviv in late 1998. That was their first experience of living apart from my grandparents, and they switched to Ukrainian there, a rather non-conformist move for Kyiv in those years. I meanwhile switched to Ukrainian in university, so it was all very natural when they were back.

    I decided to move after I realized that I was spending more and more time in Kyiv and enjoying it a lot, that I had exhausted Lviv, that most of my friends were in Kyiv. I wasn’t bitter. I left determined to be happy, and I was, just as I had once been in Lviv. My 33 became a new 19. I had a happy farewell to Lviv and a happy arrival in Kyiv. I found a place in an old building in Podil, the nicest neighborhood in the city, just a few blocks from the riverbank. My windows faced the emerald rococo dome of the Andriivska church (and a red flag directly in front of me, as I lived next door to a Communist party headquarters). The Maidan was a short walk away, which was a strategic advantage during the revolution. I spent the next eight years in that apartment. My future husband moved in, and later we bought a new place, also in Podil, after our child was born.

    While I lived in Kyiv I didn’t like to come back to Lviv. I did so, just a few times a year, mostly for an annual book fair (I worked in publishing), and sometimes for Christmas or Easter, certainly far less often that most of my friends did. At some point I realized that the obstacle was physical: I felt suffocated in Lviv, as if I had only one lung. The thought that I might one day have to return to Lviv (if I lost my job, say) was my nightmare. Yet something changed last year, in March 2021. I came for longer, more than a week, to work with the Cultural Strategy Institute, a think tank for which I serve on the supervisory board. Though the institute is a relatively new municipal body, for its institutional memory and its people it is a sort of sequel to the Dzyga Art Association, where I worked twenty years earlier, and which provided the best professional experience of my life. Dzyga organized festivals, rock concerts, and exhibitions, a sort of production cmpany with an asymmetrical focus on being good in art rather in business. It also opened clubs and cafes, and its venues were safe spaces for artists, journalists, academics, and students like us.

    This time I came to Lviv with my daughter, who brought long and slow walks to my life: you can’t walk fast with a two-year old. For the first time in years, I had occasion to meditate on the blurred surfaces of the old Habsburg-era buildings, on all the backyards, on the hypnotic topography of the city. Another novelty: I began to think obsessively about people who had lived there before World War II. Not that I wasn’t aware of them all those years. I just didn’t have much empathy for them. In Kyiv I once started to write a book of essays partly about that. I even entertained the possibility I might come back to Lviv someday. I didn’t tell anyone.

    February 25, Friday

    I woke up in the middle of the night because of a strange noise — the airplanes, I guess. The distant sound is familiar, and not: it was as if I had heard the planes before, but in a dream, not in reality. Though I understood the planes were most likely Ukranian. I think that the afterlife may sound like that.

    Then we heard the air raid sirens. I held the sleeping S tight.

    Roman’s parents are still on their way: they drove all day but could only make it to Ternopil, and they stayed there for a night. They arrive, finally, in the afternoon, exhausted.

    Roman is busy renting and arranging everything necessary in the apartment for the refugees. His friend gave him a substantial sum of money for that purpose on her way to Poland. She threw a pack of cash over the heads of the crowd at the railway station. He reported that the people at the station were weeping and gnashing their teeth.

    February 26, Saturday

    I texted Andriy, my daughter’s godfather, to check on him. (He stayed in Kyiv.) I found him on his way to his hometown for conscription: the military mobilization is not digitized. His home is high in the Carpathian Mountains.

    Andriy is an old friend and a kum. Kum is a family you choose yourself. The official title “godparents” means that they should provide spiritual guidance for a child of their friends. I recently realized that our bloodlands made the title special also for another reason: godparents have the responsibility to care for a child if the parents should die. That signifies an enormous degree of trust, and the ties are so important that they gave a name for the Ukrainian practice of nepotism — kumivstvo.

    Andriy is seven years younger than me. I got to know him when he was a student at Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, and I had just started to write articles in English. I wrote a piece about the heroes of the Orange Revolution, and he was one of them. In 2004, as an observer at the second round of the presidential election in some distant village in the Odessa region, he hid himself under the wheels of the truck when local authorities tried to steal the box with the votes. When he confronted the local authorities, they tried to ignore him; he figured that they wouldn’t dare drive over his body and kill him, and it worked. He came to Maidan directly from there and spent the entirety of the revolution in the square. Graduating with a masters in theology, he moved to Kyiv to work in an organization providing assistance for people with HIV. Sometimes I stayed at his place when I was in Kyiv. For years Andriy has been providing me with guidance in several areas, above all in music (he is also an extraordinary DJ) and spirituality. He has a special talent for explaining the Bible in the style of a stand-up comedian, using the vocabulary of a street pusher. He looks like another hedonistic Kyiv hipster, and few know that he is a devoted Christian, living what he preaches.

    Most universities in Ukraine have military classes for male (and sometimes female) students, so they can get a rank with graduation. Ukrainian Catholic University does not have any. Andriy is a private now. I saw him at Maidan and in many other situations, I know how selfless he is, so now I’m desperately worried about him. When I asked him to be my kum, I made him promise that one day it will be he who introduces my daughter to her first joint. He must keep that promise.

    February 27, Sunday

    In Hostomel, Russian bombings destroyed AN-225, the famous gigantic airplane known as “Mriya.” It wouldn’t matter so much if “Mriya” had not had its special moment last August, during the thirtieth anniversary of Ukrainian independence, when my daughter became fascinated by it as it flew over our home during the rehearsal for the parade and then over the parade itself. Since that day, she has called every airplane “Mriya.” Not long afterwards Roman took her to the Aviation Museum, and it looked like she found her new passion. We haven’t told her that it is gone, of course.

    “Mriya” means “dream” or “aspiration.”

    February 28, Monday

    It is snowing, and the trees in the huge backyard that we share with the nearby buildings are all white. You can barely make them out through the wet snowy lace. In the morning someone plays the Ukrainian anthem on a trumpet, we can’t see exactly where, maybe on his balcony. We open our balcony door and applaud him as he finishes, as do some other neighbors whom we do not see.

    Lida, my old friend and colleague at the Cultural Strategy Institute, called. We worked together at Dzyga: she was there from the beginning, in charge of finances, and I came later and did press and promotion. Her mother died shortly before the invasion. Contrary to Ukrainian tradition, she didn’t wait and instead let refugees live in her mother’s apartment immediately, and gave away most of her belongings to those who need them now.

    Lida is just back from the cemetery, visiting the grave on the ninth day after her mother’s death, in accordance with Ukrainian tradition. She couldn’t buy candles there, as is the custom; the gravediggers were busy preparing Molotov cocktails for territorial defense.

    March 1, Tuesday

    The Russians hit the TV tower in Kyiv. Five people were killed, and some were injured who were just passing by. The shells damaged the broadcasting facilities nearby and also the territory of Babyn Yar, which is right there. The tower stands.

    March 2, Wednesday

    It seems like everyone I know is volunteering. I joined Lida to help pack necessities for the territorial defense and the refugees; she had volunteered there the day before. It turns out that the hub is managed by the daughter of a well-known Lviv architect and political activist, one of the members of the Lviv Student Fraternity in the late 1980s. Lida was also a member. In those days the “brothers” organized anti-Soviet student strikes, including the major hunger strike in Kyiv in 1990 that led to the resignation of the prime minister in the still-Soviet republic. (It was the first Maidan.) The head of the fraternity, the late Marek Ivashchyshyn, shortly thereafter founded the Dzyga Art Association. Both Marek and most of the other “brothers” never stopped being politically active, no matter what they did professionally.

    I can’t help noticing that today I see the same people I knew from my work at Dzyga. The network becomes visible with every political crisis: when Georgy Gongadze was killed and the Russians used the political crisis to assert control over our president Kuchma, and when Marek and Yaroslav Rushchyshyn, another former student leader, founded an opposition newspaper and were persecuted by the brother of Victor Medvedchuk, Putin’s kum, during the Orange revolution, and then during the Maidan revolution. (Medvedchuk was the director head of Putin’s presidential office in the early 2000s and is now under arrest for state treason. His younger brother Serhiy was the head of tax administration in Lviv, an institution that was weaponized for political repression.)

    And now their teenage children are packing the medicines, the clothes, and the food for the war with the same enemy. Will it end with their generation?

    March 3, Thursday

    We saw our trumpeter: he went out and played the anthem between the two neighboring yards.

    I came back home in the evening to have an online PEN discussion with the historian Marci Shore, who knows so much about Ukraine. I was covering for the wonderful Ukrainian philosopher Volodymyr Yermolenko, who was evacuating his family from Brovary, a town near Kyiv.

    Today we mostly sorted out thermal underwear and packed it for the people in Kharkiv. It is much easier to do manual labor than intellectual work. That was the same problem during Maidan. Being a rational thinker, I tried to create added value amid the turbulence, to do what I do best. Anyway, I’m never sure I do the right thing.

    March 4, Friday

    I stay home today: S is very nervous when I’m away, despite the two sets of grandparents. There is a lot of drama when I get back. She sleeps badly.

    In the city center the sculptures in the UNESCO heritage area are wrapped in special protective materials. Some of them, such as a crucified Christ from the medieval Armenian church and a seated Christ from one of the domes, are hidden in shelters. The famous Renaissance market square and the nearby quarter have already survived several wars, as has the rest of the city. Even after World War II the damage was minor, nothing comparable to Kyiv or Warsaw. Over the last two decades the city fulfilled the dream that was in the air in the early 2000s, which I felt when I would cross the deserted square in the evening on my way home from the gallery. Lviv became the new Krakow, full of tourists (before Covid), with a bar in every hole in the wall.

    It is full of other kinds of newcomers now. It is easy to spot them: they are usually waiting for someone. Do they think I’m one of them when we look at each other nervously? I, too, also wear warm comfortable winter clothes when a simple coat would be more appropriate. I, too, keep looking around as if I had never before noticed the strange mascarons on a nineteenth-century facade. But I’m not like these new arrivals: I came in peace to the city I know.

    March 6, Sunday

    In her sleep my child says, “Home!”

    She is needy for my attention, demanding that I “read” a tourist guide of Stockholm that I brought from there in 2005. I promise her that we would go to Stockholm when she is a little older. She asks questions about every picture, and we make plans: we will see the Royal Palace, we will meet the Queen and the King, we will run in a park. Nothing is more important these days than spending time with her.

    I’ve been to Stockholm once, and I fell in love forever. Ever since that visit I used to say that I will go there to die. Today I received an invitation to spend some time in Gothenburg, a fine opportunity for Ukrainian editors in need. Well, I’m not in need, at least for now; I’m quite comfortable. I have no right to take a place that others may desperately be seeking. And I don’t want to go anywhere without Roman. Besides, the prospect of going to Sweden is not as attractive these days. If I really need to go there — if, say, Lviv is occupied — it is very possible that I will never come back. The idea of dying in Sweden is still attractive, but I would prefer to do it on my own terms.

    March 7, Monday

    I’ve written a short piece called “Postwar” for Krytyka, the journal I used to work at, about how the West has been mesmerized by toxic Russian narratives for decades, about how disgusting are the attempts to justify Russia’s “great culture,” as if that is the most important thing right now. At first I thought that my piece was too harsh. Then I read the statement of German PEN, which was concerned mostly with the fate of Russian writers and made an equivalence between “poorly equipped Russian soldiers” and Ukrainians under attack, since both were “Putin’s victims.” No, my piece wasn’t too harsh.

    The infotainment of our days: a woman at Darnytsia, an old working-class area in Kyiv, knocked off a Russian scouting drone with a jar of preserved tomatoes. She was out on her balcony for a smoke, and this was what she thought to do when she saw a drone and panicked. Some may say it’s an urban myth, but I can easily imagine such a woman: she might be one of the women I met many times in the printing shop at Darnytsia, where I discussed the paper and the bindings with them. They could easily do what the woman in Darnytsia did.

    I notice the announcements on every pharmacy door I pass: “No iodides available.” The Russians have occupied Chernobyl and are holding personnel as hostages; there was a fire at the captured nuclear plant in Energodar, the biggest in Europe. The possible consequences may be far worse than the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986. No wonder people bought out everything that might protect them. After Chernobyl they gave us kids antistruminum, small sweet pills of potassium iodide. Like almost everything in Soviet schools, it was obligatory: from time to time a school nurse would deliver it to the classroom at the beginning of a lesson.

    Recently I remembered that we moved into the apartment in which we now live three days before the Chernobyl catastrophe, on April 23, 1986. I was in the first grade, and I don’t remember exactly when we learned about the explosion. I’m sure that my parents understood how serious it was from some of the “hostile voices,” that is, from Radio Liberty, the BBC, or the Voice of America. My father brought a Geiger counter. It stood on a windowsill for some time, but soon my parents were so annoyed by its sound that they just put it away in the basement. Lviv was lucky again in 1986, not affected by radiation, but Kyiv was heavily affected. I don’t really remember people coming from Kyiv and Prypyat those days, though I knew they were trying to escape. Only later I learned how difficult it was to leave Kyiv. People fainted in lines to get a train westward. Exactly like now. I don’t remember anyone using the word “refugees” back then, but we were aware that many people from Prypyat found their new home in Lviv.

    I was eight, and my own fears were a consequence mainly of books and movies: as with many Soviet “technical intelligentsia” — people involved in what is called R&D in the West — my parents liked science fiction and I was caught up with their interests. In the Soviet Union science fiction was a loophole in Soviet censorship, but probably a slightly different pool of authors than people in the West read. Ray Bradbury, Herbert Wells, Arthur Clarke (until some point), and Clifford Simak had been translated and published in the Soviet Union, but I doubt that I know a single name of the writers whom Americans of my generation preferred. Stanisław Lem, who grew up in Lviv, and had to leave for Poland after the Soviet occupation, was hugely popular. As we didn’t have real news in 1986, but only indoctrination programs, my idea of the catastrophe that we faced was embroidered out of the plots of man-made apocalypse in science fiction. Yet the idea of a nuclear apocalypse had one more source in my case: oddly, I loved the Soviet “international news” TV program, which was in fact propaganda speeches about how mad Ronald Reagan was and how the USSR was striving for peace. I was the only one in the family who watched it, terrified that Reagan might start nuclear war at any moment (as they said he might). In school corridors I saw older kids running in gas masks. Happily I was spared that experience, thanks to Gorbachev.

    Chernobyl marked a huge shift in Soviet consciousness, as Soviet people realized that they themselves may cause nuclear catastrophe, not the capitalist demons overseas. Many years later I read that it was also the beginning of the end for the USSR: people learned that there are things more dangerous and powerful than the KGB. My interest in science fiction faded with glasnost and perestroika: it turned out that reality itself had almost infinite resources for miracles. Westerners often underestimate the isolation in which Soviet people lived. (The situation was very different in “socialist” Central Europe.) Back then no aliens and distant planets could compete with the newly opened Western world. In fact, we were the aliens.

    March 8, Tuesday

    I saw a person I’ve known for ages. Yurko is also my neighbor. He had a Kyiv period too, and now lives with his family and children at his old home, the grand neoclassical four-story apartment building that we see from our windows. The building is quite unusual for Lviv: its palatial design would fit Paris. When I was a child, everyone called it the “professors’ house.” Yurko’s father, who is now ninety-six years old, is a member of the Academy of Science, a distinguished achievement, and the honorary director of the Physico-Mechanical Institute, where my parents once worked and started dating. Yurko tells me that until recently his father went to work, having taken a break only due to Covid. Yurko himself walks with a cane: he badly injured his popliteal ligaments five months ago, and this keeps him in Lviv. As he spent two years in the military in the Donbass war, he is one of “the first-call reservists.” “They told me to come back when the knees are fine,” he says. In the 1990s Yurko was one of the first Internet-providers in Lviv and more broadly in Ukraine. His company made the first websites for almost everyone I knew. He was also the ultimate party guy, making cocktail shots of his own recipe and usually the last man standing.

    I received a long email from my editor at the European Review of Books, a new magazine for which I’ve been working on a review of a new book by Yaroslav Hrytsak, a historian and public intellectual whom I’ve known for years. (He lives in Lviv.) This task was a real joy from the start, but now it gets tricky: as I write about Ukrainian history, Ukrainian history starts to run amok. Now I discuss the ending of the review with my editor. The previous ending is outdated already. The article is supposed to appear in May. Our history will be different in May. But how different?

    March 9, Wednesday

    I texted with my kum. He finished his training and is “fully deployed.” I can’t ask where he is and he can’t say. I promised to keep a bottle of cognac for him. (I was referring to a Ukrainian brandy that we prefer. It’s imprecise to call it cognac, but we do.) We agreed to drink it on a bench at Podil as we did after Maidan.

    An acquaintance of mine, a Belarussian poet who moved to Ukraine many years ago, and his wife, a Ukrainian poet, wrote on Facebook that they are stuck in occupied Bucha. He quoted a Russian occupier who told a group of women and children: “Well, Ukrainian tribe, are you dying out? No one is gonna rescue you from here.” They didn’t let them leave.

    We celebrated the New Year together once, in 2012. It was my first New Year’s party in Kyiv. I was happy then, and even happier that night. We danced to a remix of a Soviet children’s song with a refrain that was changed to “Lu-ka-shen-ka!” I had many hopes for the upcoming year.

    Our host that night went to Donetsk in 2014 and was arrested as a “spy” by the separatists. He spent forty-eight days in the Donetsk concentration camp known as Izolyatsia, interrogated by the Russian FSB. (A book about Izolatsia by Stanislav Aseyev recently appeared in English.) I guess it was then that he (or his kidnappers) deleted the photos from that New Year’s party from his Google drive, the ones that he shared with us back then.

    March 10, Thursday

    I take S for a walk in the park near our home. There is also an amusement park there, obviously not functioning now. Many of the carousels are the same ones I used to ride decades ago. It is cold, even colder than it was in winter, and we are almost alone there. S likes the small stadium where I ice-skated with my mother when I was six. S keeps herself busy cleaning the seats with her mittens, when a David Lynch-ish thing happens: an elderly man who had been pacing along the stadium suddenly stops after having walked three hundred feet and starts to step backwards, slowly, almost like a moonwalk. He traces his entire way backwards and then hides in one of the stadium facilities.

    It is almost the city center here, but it is absolutely quiet. It could be any other cold spring day in a deserted park: no signs of war. Like a time capsule.

    March 12, Saturday

    The air raid sirens wake us up again very early this morning. We all have a special app for air raids on our smartphones now, and the sound is awful. S is afraid, and Roman makes up a story for her, about a small brave bear who travels to Baryshivka, a village near the summer house of his parents. Baryshivka was bombed yeaterday. Roman’s parents talk to the neighbor who looks after their cat, urging him to use their food storage in the house. Their village is cut off from food supplies for now. We all fall asleep soon, but S has a bad dream. I feel her shiver.

    March 15, Tuesday

    A sunny day. It smells of March, but not as it was last year. The fragrance is of the past, when I was a teenager. I believe this is because fewer people are using their cars now: the price of fuel has risen, business has slowed down, and the air has become again as it was when we were poor. The old city center is almost a cup, a lowland, partly open and partly encircled by hills. All its smells are more intense, as I learned after moving to windy Kyiv.

    People sit in cafes, but no one is relaxed. I took a photo of the wall of the yard we went to with S a year ago. The same playground, the same wall, a different March.

    March 17, Thursday

    I meet a friend of a friend for coffee: a lovely American-Israeli journalist. Almost everybody around us in the café speaks English. She asks me if she could hug me when I have to go, and we laugh about how quickly we have all forgotten about Covid.

    March 18, Friday 

    Russian missiles hit Lviv for the first time, the facilities near the airport. It’s a sunny and cold day.

    I think to myself that from now on I can never think of Lviv as my own special experience. Any Lviv story is now overshadowed by the thousands of stories of those who found shelter here.

    March 23, Wednesday

    We meet with Lida and Vlodko Kaufman and discuss our plans for a big exhibition of contemporary Ukrainian art to be shown in Lithuania, Poland, and maybe France and Austria — a retrospective of a kind, mixing old and new.

    Kaufman was one of the founders of Dzyga back in 1993. When I started to work there in 1998, I was overwhelmed by my proximity to a living legend, though as a journalist I had written about his work earlier. Already at that point he was celebrated by the writers I admired. Later I was deeply honored to write commentaries for his various projects. He would bring a pile of trash to the gallery and announce that it would become his new installation, or he would show some new paintings, or he would try to explain the idea of a performance. As I would produce a text about it, he would exclaim: “Oh, that’s what I mean!” A stranger overhearing us would have thought that we were mad. What Kaufman taught me in the process was priceless: he managed to explain the few seconds of ecstasy he lives through during a performance, the elusive magic that an artist may capture if he or she is very lucky. He prepared me to recognize and to welcome those moments of selflessness that nothing in the world may give us but art. I would never have written my first (and last) novel if not for him.

    And now we discuss how to present Ukrainian artists to the public in Europe, when that public is finally ready to look more closely at what was under its nose all this time. I must admit that in retrospect I’m a little bitter: even as I enjoyed my work in Dzyga, I was not able to grasp how valuable the art, the music, and the people were back then. But as the world became global for us too, and I’ve seen a bit here and there, I realize that what was happening in Ukrainian culture back then was unique. And almost no one mentioned it. Kaufman talks about how Malevich and Archipenko were appropriated by Russians, and about their roots in Ukrainian contexts, and about the many more artists still unknown to the world, a whole invisible universe that survived the oppressions and the occupations of the past. As he speaks I wonder whether I know how to tell the world a story about the magic that I remember myself.

    Roman’s parents left for Vinnytsia, their native city. No air raids today.

    March 24, Thursday

    We go to a playground with S, the one we used to go to last year. But it is full of people now, mostly newcomers it seems. On our way home S asks, “Where is my home?” She is tired, and probably is asking how long it would take to get home, but it sounded desperate.

    March 26, Saturday

    I was coming back from a coffee with Elliot, a journalist for Time, when the air raid siren went off. It feels different in the city center, where we hear the voice urging us to get to shelters. The wind rose, almost a storm. The touristy horse-and-carriage passed by in a hurry. It is a strange combination, an air raid siren and a cabbie in Habsburg-era costume, his carriage decorated with gilded patterns.

    I hear an explosion, then another, when I go up the street not far from home. The distant explosions catch me on the top of the hill, and I see the thick black smoke quickly covering half of the sky behind the familiar hill on the far side of town. I call Roman: he has taken our girl for a walk and the blast was even more distant on their side of the hill. On my way I meet Yurko coming back home with his kid, both totally cool.

    The rockets hit the oil depot on the other side of the city, less than a mile from my godmother. She said their windows were intact, but the fires were raging and the black smoke was everywhere.

    March 28, Monday

    Our trumpeter performs again in the backyard.

    We have a long walk with S to Stryiskyi park, a beautiful nineteenth-century park with dramatic ravines, a pond with swans, pseudo-Romantic ruins, springs, and a greenhouse. One of the few prewar Polish monuments that survived the war is here, a monument to Jan Kilinski, a hero of Kościuszko’s anti-Russian uprising. The whole park was named after Kilinski when it was established, but everyone called it “Stryiskyj” even before Soviets, and the old name prevailed. My mom used to take me there when I was S’s age. We lived close by then, and we live close by now, just on the other side of it. When I was little I didn’t know how unique our street was, with its upward spiral of remarkable early twentieth-century buildings. I also didn’t realize how unusual the street on our way to the park is, a dark ravine between two high slopes with the buildings over our heads.

    How does a landscape determine who we are? The back of our building faces the hill. Not only does it confer upon us the privilege of a huge green backyard with fruit trees, which were once my overgrown magical woods when I was little; these days it also provides us with a sense of safety. We never go to our basement shelter, the hill protects us, as if we can hide from the bombings in the folds of the landscape.

    You can’t explain Lviv until you explain the landscape. First, the river. The Poltva once gave life to the city, but it was buried beneath its streets in the nineteenth century. Now it is the municipal sewer system. The central prospect and Lviv Opera House stand on what was once the mainstream. Our building stands on the bank of what used to be one of the Poltva’s tributaries, now a busy and noisy street. The pedestrian and transport arteries of the city repeat the course of the underground river. We somehow feel the streams under our streets: even S spins in her sleep to adjust to the flow of the underground river.

    We connect the dots of the familiar locations when we see them from the top of the neighboring hill, especially now, when the trees are not green yet. In a few weeks, when the foliage is thick, we will use our inner Google maps. Mine is especially rich with pins these days. I can point to a building with a kitchen full of smoke and Taschen albums where I was happy in 1996, sitting with my new friends, both dead now. Or to a building where a boy lived with whom I was hopelessly in love in 1992, and the nearby yard where we used to try our first cigarettes with my friend, who left for New York. In my private chronology, different blocks are different worlds. But a single missile can wipe away all the nuances of these worlds, and turn the whole terrain, crowded with miniature scenes and characters as in an illuminated manuscript, into a mash of ruins.

    A landscape also means a lot for an army. If I’m not mistaken, it is one of the primary considerations of military thinking: “take the heights.” The landscape is what they see on their maps, but it is different from mine, which is dotted not with targets but with memories.

    S is busy with her ice cream when we run into Yaroslav Hrytsak, whose book I’m reviewing, taking a walk in the company of other people from Kyiv whom I know, including my colleague from the Soros Foundation. I am unexpectedly happy to see them all, and when they leave I realized why. These days our life in Lviv, filled with foreigners and high ranking guests, is dream-like, in that you meet people where they are not supposed to be. Only it’s war, not your brain, that oddly reshuffles them.

    March 29, Tuesday

    I woke last night terrified for no reason, and soon the air raid siren went off. S woke up too and she snuggled me.

    We had two more air raids today, one of them as soon as we went for a walk with S. On our way back I made up a story about monsters we must hide from. I don’t know how else to explain to my daughter why we must stay at home. I also realize how fortunate we are: we are not hiding in a shelter. I’m making a chocolate pie during an air raid, and recalling many texts that were written by frightened people like me: on the curbs of wars, on the safe side of catastrophes.

    April 1, Friday

    We went with Lida to Genyk Ravsky’s exhibition at the Dzyga Gallery, one of my favorite places in the world. We noted that it’s been a quarter of a century since its opening. Dzyga is a part of the former Dominican monastery. The narrow medieval street, called Virmenska for the Armenians who lived there for centuries, ends at the gallery’s doors, but the gallery hall is a prolongation of the street, just under the arch, which was painted black twenty-five years ago. The scene is usually full of people sitting in the gallery café.

    Genyk Ravsky is one of the first artists who was involved in Dzyga. I remember him from the old days in a leather jacket and long hair, looking like one of the rock musicians who loved his paintings (he played also, but I was too young to witness it). Genyk used to mix pop art with classical images, to put jeans on the characters of the Iliad. I guess it was a mark of those times and that milieu. Now he is in Territorial Defense. Lida would later send me a photo of him in the gallery when he managed a day off: in a military uniform, with unusually short hair.

    There are many photos along the stairs to the second floor, where our office once was. All the photos are black-and-white all are by Vilya, the eccentric photographer who died fourteen years ago, one of the regulars of the old Soviet underground scene — not glamorous at all, like his photographs. He was already quite old when our nightclub in the basement of the Lviv Puppet Theater had its heyday. He was so poor that sometimes he didn’t have film in his camera, though he pretended to take photos anyway. But his photos preserved the era for us. Here is Junko, the rock musician. He was roughly my age, now dead. Frankly, he always had a kind of a mark on him: both a mark of genius and of death. I remember he had a small volume of Rimbaud in his backpack when I first saw him, and he also looked like Rimbaud. I mentioned this in my novel. When I saw him for the last time, at Maidan on the day after the shootings in the government quarter, and learned that he escaped the massacre, I felt immense relief: if he survived that, he would live. He died soon after. Listening to the songs that his band played in the late 1990s, I marvel at how original and progressive they managed to be, a galaxy away from the mainstream music industry. If Junko and his band had lived in London or even in Bristol, they would have become global stars. I see also the ghosts of many other musicians, writers, and bohemian types, and of course of Marek himself, a father figure for them even if they didn’t know it. All of them are gone now. I reflect that Lida and I are among the few survivors, and it has nothing to do with the bombings. Some people die because their environment is too harsh and unresponsive, because they don’t feel that they are needed.

    Our club was in the basement, and this accurately reflected the status of Ukrainian culture at that time, even when the state was nominally “ours.” The people in the photos were mostly marginal for their own TV and media, even in Lviv. My perfectly Ukrainian first editor, a nice guy, approved my pieces about Dzyga and Ukrainian rock musicians without much enthusiasm, encouraging me instead to get interviews with the Russian actors who were regularly touring in Lviv.

    Now most Ukrainians spend time in basements of another kind — the opposite of the basements of my youth, the workshops of musicians and sculptors, cafes and clubs. Why do I feel that there is a connection?

    April 3, Sunday

    I noticed that Lviv used to annoy me when my mind was all about the future, but now I have surprisingly intense flashbacks, an urge to visit the sites of my student years. When planning, and thinking about the future, is not an option, the past dominates the mind. As one door shuts, another opens.

    April 5, Tuesday

    Olesya Ostrovska-Lyuta, the director of Art Arsenal, the huge national art center in Kyiv, wrote a Facebook post that perfectly captures what I feel these days. Olesya calls herself a bureaucrat, but in fact she is one of the most profound intellectuals I know. She is my age, also from Lviv, but she left early and graduated university in Kyiv. She wrote that after the first shock of the war her mind was crowded with reminiscences:

    These visions come one after another. I’m kind of wallowing in them, telling them to family and friends. I enjoy recalling small details, rolling a memory of an air temperature or light in my head.

    Maybe that’s exactly what happens to an old person, when she slowly departs from reality, immersing herself in her own vanished world instead. Maybe that’s how our mind reacts to a boundary experience, which in my case is the shocking reality of war and the risk of death, and in the case of old age is an approaching transition to nothingness. And so you feel as if you are swimming in a soft fog of your own stories, there is just you and the world that has passed by, and thus has lost its acuteness, has become amicable, like a grayish anesthetic substance. Maybe this is how we cope when approaching the frontier of the unknown.

    We stay late at a playground, it is dark when we leave. We leave almost simultaneously with another parent, who is obviously not from Lviv, and I wish him a good night. Again I feel like I’m cheating: because of my shabby winter clothes in April (a cold April, but still) they may think that I am one of them, that like them I return to a rented apartment with uncomfortably high ceilings, strange smells, and a chilling uncertainty. Whereas I’m coming back to the apartment I grew up in.

    April 14, Thursday

    I take S to a meeting with my colleagues in the Institute for Culture Strategy to discuss the exhibition we are planning. We put up a name already: “Ukraine. Unmuted.” S causes only minor damage at the office.

    Then we go to a playground at the top of the steep street on the hill of the Citadel. Just above us is one of the Citadel towers, now turned into a five-star hotel. Most of the people descending the metal stairs from the hotel and down the street speak English.

    An elderly man with a small, cute dog starts a conversation with a janitor. The two seem to know each other. The older guy speaks Russian, trying to switch to Ukrainian. He gives some intangible impression of wealth, as some people do: it was easier to spot in our part of the world when imported clothes were a sign of privilege, but I can detect it even now, when the same brands are worn everywhere. They discuss the area, and the man with the dog turns out to be immersed in his memories: he points to the fancy hotel and says, “That used to be a Torture Tower. When we were kids we found bones here all the time.”

    I know what he means. The Citadel was a concentration camp, Stalag 328, during World War II, mostly for prisoners of war. About 140,000 of them died there.

    Built in the 1850s as Austrian fortifications, the four towers and cantonments for the garrison were supposed to protect the city. The idea came after the Austrian army used the hills to batter the Polish uprising in Lviv in 1848. In Soviet times the territory of the Citadel was closed, but some of my classmates boasted that they had explored its bunkers. There were some military facilities there, and, they said, the KGB too. (The headquarters of the KGB was on the opposite side of the hill, on my street.) Since my school was just in front of another slope of the Citadel hill, I stared at the other death tower during my boring classes. Most of my classmates lived nearby: in Soviet times children attended the school nearest to where they lived. This was the Russian school, meaning that instruction was in the Russian language, quite natural for the city center. The elderly guy likely went there, too. It is possible that he brought his children there, and that I knew them.

    Our school was a sort of citadel as well. It used to be an unofficial obkom school, meaning that the children of the local Communist authorities went there. It was renowned for its math teachers, who were so good that their students could enter elite Moscow universities. (They didn’t help my math skills any.) We were isolated from the roiling political and cultural Ukrainian life just a few blocks from our building. I remember that the teachers were once concerned for our safety because a huge anti-Soviet rally was taking place in the city center.

    I don’t quite remember when the Citadel was opened to the public, certainly sometime in the late 1980s or early 1990s. For a while my dad had an office in the former Austrian cantonment. When I was fifteen, I went there with friends. Though it’s in the heart of the city, encircled by nineteenth-century streets from every side, it was a separate world, like a summer camp. The view from the ground of that death tower, then abandoned, was breathtaking.

    Today I watch a group of teenagers cross the playground, heading up to that place. The girls wear heavy makeup, exactly as I did when I was their age. I overhear them talking about the war. They will hide from it there, as we used to hide from the challenges our parents faced and the 10,000% inflation of 1993.

    We follow them. As we walk, I tell S that I spent a lot of time here when I was little. “Were you little, mommy?” she asks skeptically. “And I was once big,” she says firmly. “Will you be little, mommy?”

    “I will.” I’m proud of myself, the mother of a natural born Buddhist.

    April 25, Monday

    A heavy rain catches us on our way home. My daughter is happy, jumping into every puddle. The rain is brushing the blossoms off the trees when an air raid starts. And immediately the blinding sun shines. The air raid siren yowls. I look back and see a huge rainbow across the sky. In a universe such as this, no one should judge anybody for dancing at a funeral.

    May 1, Sunday

    I’m 44 today. Eleven years ago on this day I was buying the first bottle of brandy as early as 11 am. It was for a traditional morning rock concert in the inner yard of the city hall, organized by Dzyga. A long line early in the morning for a rock concert on the first Sunday of May: this was another mark of the city. It was also my farewell; I would leave for Kyiv soon afterward, and I mostly remember that May as endless walks and drinks with my friends. Today I use the opportunity to walk alone and take some of my old routes.

    Two days ago Kyiv was hit with missiles again, including a residential building not far from our home. It’s too early to go back.

    Every Monday morning I finalize the weekly overview of the news from Ukraine. I sort out the dispatches about attacks, about the killed, the tortured, and the raped, to include all that is important for the security of the Central European region. I do it cold-bloodedly. But I may burst into tears seeing sun streaks on a familiar roof, or young grass in an abandoned lot, or a splash of audacious green in a backyard behind the narrow front door.

    I think again about how a landscape shapes you: it’s easier to believe that the world is full of miracles when you know that a dirty, dark, and uninviting entrance may hide a magic garden behind it. A person accustomed to walking in a flat city gets a particular idea of time, her time is linear, as block after block is left behind, becoming the past. But keeping several hills in your sight simultaneously, several distant areas at once, makes it easier to connect different eras in one’s mind — to feel the past, which is never dead, and not even past.

    About thirty years ago, every day on my way to school and back, I passed by the Citadel, the KGB, and the notorious prison on Łącki, now the Museum-Memorial of Victims of the Occupation Regimes. At that time I did not know that during “the first Soviets” in 1939-1941 it was the NKVD prison where up to a thousand people were tortured and killed. Polish girl scouts were raped there in the way young girls, almost children, have now been raped in Bucha, Borodyanka, and Irpin. Unlike the Russian soldiers near Kyiv, the Soviets came back. Maybe some of those soldiers picked up their grandchildren at my school. Anyway, they owned the city because of what was done in 1939, and then in 1944, and then later. But the city in its turn owned their children and grandchildren, at least the many of them who became hippies and underground artists. The city owned those who came here during the urbanization of the 1960s: unlike most peasants who switched to Russian as they moved to a city, in Lviv they were sticking to Ukrainian, and eventually turned it into a stronghold of the Ukrainian movement.

    I need this city even after I die. I need it to lie on the abandoned concrete slabs, warmed by the sun, at Citadel hill, just as I did in 1993. I need it to hang out in the Jesuit gardens, the beloved park of little Stanislaw Lem, just as I did in 1995 with the grandchildren of those who pushed his family out of the city. I need it to listen to music and poetry under the walls of the Dominican monastery as the sun still shines, because it is June, the enchanted June of 1997. I wish I could somehow do that before I become little again.

    War and the Liberal Hegemony

    Why did the United States intervene in the Second World War? The question is rarely asked because the answers seem so obvious: Hitler, Pearl Harbor, and what more needs to be said? To most Americans, World War II was the quintessential “war of necessity.” As the late Charles Krauthammer once put it, “wars of choice,” among which he included Vietnam and the first Gulf War, are “fought for reasons of principle, ideology, geopolitics or sometimes pure humanitarianism,” whereas a “war of necessity” is a “life-or-death struggle in which the safety and security of the homeland are at stake.” If World War II is remembered as the “good war,” the idea that it was “necessary” is a big part of the reason why. The enemies were uniquely wicked and aggressive; Americans were attacked first; they had no choice but to fight.

    This perception of World War II has had a paradoxical effect on the broader American foreign policy debate. On the one hand, writers of an anti-interventionist bent rightly perceive that the war’s reputation as “necessary” and therefore “good” has encouraged Americans to believe that other wars can be “necessary” and therefore “good,” too. (Krauthammer believed the “war on terror” was also one of “necessity,” and Richard Haass put the Gulf War in the “necessary” category, and in 1965 even David Halberstam and The New York Times editorial page believed that American intervention in Vietnam was necessary.) On the other hand, anti-interventionists are not alone in believing that, even if World War II was necessary, the circumstances were unique and therefore irrelevant to subsequent foreign policy discussions. There will never be another Hitler, and the idea that a foreign great power (as opposed to a terrorist group) might launch a direct attack on the United States seems far-fetched even today. World War II thus stands apart, bracketed from further relevance, as perhaps the only widely agreed “necessary” foreign war and therefore the only “good” foreign war that the United States has ever fought.

    But what if even America’s intervention in World War II was not “necessary,” as most Americans would define the term? What if it, too, was a “choice” that Americans made, based on calculations not so different from those that produced the later wars of choice in Iraq, the Balkans, and Vietnam?

    Those many Americans who opposed American involvement in Europe and Asia in the late 1930s and early 1940s certainly did not believe the war was necessary. This was not because they were ignorant of the potential risks posed by Hitler and the Japanese Empire. The America First Committee, a group that combined corporate elites such as the chairman of Sears Roebuck with scions of the eastern establishment such as Joseph Kennedy and Chester Bowles, launched itself in September 1940, three months after the unexpected conquest of France by the German blitzkrieg. Its founders understood the implications of France’s defeat. They not only believed but predicted that Britain would be the next to fall, leaving the United States without a single meaningful ally in the European theater. (The bestselling author Anne Morrow Lindbergh wondered whether it was “courage” or “stupidity” that made the British fight on.)

    With Japan on the march on the Asian continent — Japanese forces, having conquered much of China, invaded Indochina three weeks after the Committee’s founding — Americans in the fall of 1940 faced the real possibility of a world in which Europe and East Asia, along with the Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Western Pacific, could soon be dominated by a trio of militaristic dictatorships (Mussolini’s Italy being the third.) This was the moment — arguably the nadir of the future Allies’ fortunes — when the America First movement took its stand against further American aid to the victims and prospective victims of Nazi and Japanese aggression. Just a few weeks earlier, after the British evacuation at Dunkirk, Winston Churchill gave his famous “we shall fight on the beaches” speech, with its concluding prayer, mingled with reproach, that, “in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might,” would come “to the rescue and the liberation of the old.” That was precisely what the American First movement aimed to prevent.

    The anti-interventionists’ main practical argument was that even in those direst of international circumstances, American security was not immediately or even prospectively threatened. By virtue of its wealth, its strength, and, above all, its geography, the United States was effectively invulnerable to foreign attack. Those who held this view were not benighted cranks, nor even the well-respected men and women who led the America Fist movement. It was conventional wisdom among the nation’s leading foreign policy and military experts in the late 1930s. Respected analysts such as George Fielding Eliot concluded, after “a detailed consideration of America’s strategic position and military requirements,” that American security was not in danger from any European power so long as it maintained an adequate navy. This was also the view of self-described “realists” of the day, a new breed of professional foreign policy and military experts who prided themselves on what Eliot called “realistic thinking,” the “banishment of altruism and sentiment” from their analysis, and “single-minded attention to the national interests.” Yale’s Nicholas Spykman, one of the founders of the school of “classical realism,” argued that with “the European neighbors of the United States … three thousand miles away” and the Atlantic Ocean still “reassuringly” in between, America’s “frontiers” were secure. So long as the United States maintained a strong navy capable of protecting its shores and so long as bombers’ cruising radius remained less than four thousand miles, the Atlantic and Pacific would remain “the chief elements in the defense of the United States.”

    Hanson Baldwin, the military editor of The New York Times, explained in detail what an attack on the United States would require.

    Under fire from bomb and gun, soldiers and heavy equipment would have to be transshipped to small boats from the transports anchored offshore. Then the small boats would have to make a landing through the surf. Once on the hostile beach, the enemy would have to struggle to get their tanks and field pieces off ramp-bowed landing boats onto the beach under shells and machine-gun fire, their only support, their carrier-based aviation, and the guns of their warships.

    This proved a prescient description of the D-Day landing in 1944, but at the time Baldwin meant to show how unlikely it was that a foreign power would or even could launch an invasion of the United States. In the same spirit Senator Robert A. Taft, no one’s idea of a yahoo, argued that no foreign power “would be stupid enough” to try to land “troops in the United States from across thousands of miles of ocean.” A Council on Foreign Relations study group in February 1940 concluded that “no one believes that an actual military threat to this country exists, even if Britain and France were to be conquered by Germany.” Although some, such as Spykman, began to change their minds after the fall of France, most did not. Herbert Hoover denied that American security depended on the outcome of the war in Europe. The victor, if it was Germany, was not going to turn around and “attack 130,000,000 people 3000 miles overseas, who have a capacity of 10,000,000 soldiers and 25,000 aircraft.”

    Not only was a foreign attack on the United States physically unlikely if not impossible, the anti-interventionists argued, but it was also avoidable if Americans simply attended to their own affairs and stayed out of the other great powers’ business. Neither Germany nor Japan had any reason to risk bringing the United States into the war. And the United States had no reason to stand in the way of nations seeking to expand their territory and spheres of influence. Most Americans agreed that the United States had no vital interests in Europe or Asia. At least that had been the dominant assumption of American policymakers throughout the 1920s and Franklin Roosevelt’s first term.

    After the Pearl Harbor attack and the subsequent declaration of war by Germany, many of the anti-interventionists did not change their views. War had come to the United States not because Tokyo and Berlin had sought it, but because Franklin Roosevelt, departing from the policies of his predecessor Herbert Hoover, had interjected the United States into distant quarrels. While the great majority of Americans regarded Pearl Harbor as a treacherous act of “infamy,” the anti-interventionists made themselves unpopular by insisting, in the words of Arthur Vandenberg, that the United States had “asked for it.” The Roosevelt administration’s “dogmatic diplomatic attitudes” had driven the Japanese “needlessly into hostilities.” After all, as Hoover put it, if the United States insisted on “putting pins in rattlesnakes,” it should expect to get bitten.

    The anti-interventionists’ arguments were not as weak as they are often portrayed. In retrospect it is clear that the Japanese would have preferred not to go to war with the United States, certainly not in 1941 but perhaps ever. Japanese military leaders did not even believe they could win a war with the United States absent divine intervention or a failure of American will. As the anti-interventionists pointed out, the Japanese would not have attacked Pearl Harbor had the Roosevelt administration not attempted to use its economic and diplomatic influence to try to block or slow Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland (and had Roosevelt not decided to place the U.S. Pacific Fleet there as a supposed deterrent).

    And if Japan had not attacked when it did, Hitler would not have declared war on the United States when he did. In 1941 Hitler was actually trying to avoid pulling the Americans fully into the Atlantic war, despite Roosevelt’s deliberately provocative and aggressive expansion of the U.S. Navy’s role. There is some evidence that Hitler may have intended to go to war with the United States eventually. In 1941, while preparing for the invasion of the Soviet Union in June, he had ordered plans for constructing a “big battleship navy,” likely for use against the United States. But such thoughts were shelved when the initial invasion of the Soviet Union bogged down and settled into a war of attrition.

    With the war a stalemate with Britain in the west and Russia in the east, any German assault on the United States was likely years off and left the United States plenty of time to watch and to prepare. Even staunch pro-interventionists such as Henry Luce acknowledged, as late as February 1941, that no one could “say honestly that as a pure matter of defense — defense of our homeland — it is necessary to get into or be in this war.” Even if “the entire world came under the organized domination of evil tyrants,” it was “quite possible” that the United States “could make itself such a tough nut to crack that not all the tyrants in the world would care to come against us.” If Americans did enter the war, Luce argued, as he hoped they would, it would not be because the war was “necessary” as a matter of “survival.”

    The anti-interventionists were also right to point out that American policy had turned against Germany and Japan well before the latter were in any position even to think about an attack on the United States. The critical event in that regard, the fall of France, did not occur until the summer of 1940. Prior to that, most observers regarded it as impossible that French forces, dug in behind their Maginot Line, could possibly be overrun by an as-yet largely untested German military. Yet Roosevelt began bringing American influence to bear against Germany as early as 1937, after Japan’s full-scale invasion of China but before Hitler had committed any act of aggression at all, when he labeled Germany, Italy, and Japan “bandit” nations that needed to be isolated and quarantined like a disease. Thereafter he worked to modify the neutrality legislation that had prevented him from helping Britain and others; he enacted an increasing array of economic sanctions against Japan; and he brought the U.S. Navy into the Battle of the Atlantic as a belligerent in all but name. Were these steps necessary to the defense of the American homeland? Certainly not in any immediate sense. If anything, as the anti-interventionists argued, they brought the threat of war closer, a possibility of which Roosevelt was aware and which gave him no pause.

    Why, then, did Americans start sticking pins in rattlesnakes in the late 1930s, increasing the risk of war, before any direct threat to American security had materialized? The answer had more to do with belief and ideology than with raw assessments of German and Japanese military capabilities. Roosevelt and many other Americans concluded that the Nazi regime was dangerous well before it had committed any act of external aggression. As Hugh Wilson, the one-time American ambassador to Berlin, observed, fears about Germany’s course began immediately after Hitler’s ascension to the chancellorship in 1933. That year brought early signs of the coming persecution of Jews as well as celebrations of book-burning in the squares of German cities and towns, which people in the West found disturbing.

    But it was the infamous “night of the long knives” in 1934 that shocked the liberal world. As Ambassador Wilson noted, the Nazi’s murderous purge “profoundly” affected the “attitude toward Germany of every man of politics in Europe and of most of them in our own country. The temper of Europe toward Germany changed from indignation and exasperation to fear and horror.” The fears grew as the Nazis consolidated control and began the systematic persecution of Jews and other minorities. For many American observers, the turning point came in the fall of 1938 after the mass persecution and killing of Jews in what became known as Kristallnacht. Even more than the Munich settlement six weeks earlier, which Roosevelt privately condemned but publicly praised, Kristallnacht convinced Roosevelt and others that, as the historian John A. Thompson has put it, the Nazi regime could never be “incorporated into a stable, norm-governed European order.” That perception shaped American policies going forward as Hitler rearmed and began working more aggressively to overturn the Versailles settlement, but its origins preceded those efforts.

    Not only could such a regime never become part of a stable liberal peace, but in the eyes of many Americans, especially liberals, the very nature of the regime guaranteed conflict. Most liberals believed that because Germany and Japan were “totalitarian” states, they would never cease their struggle against democracy and liberalism at home and abroad. As the critic Lewis Mumford put it, the fascists could not co-exist with “the ever-rising, ever-recurrent forces of civilization.” Their “propulsive system of beliefs” would drive them onward until the world was “made over in the fascist image.” In 1937 the American diplomat George Messersmith insisted that what was occurring was a “basic clash of ideologies” and that the dictators were embarked on “a long road” that must end in an attack on the United States. Roosevelt spoke for many when he divided the world neatly along ideological lines, insisting that unlike nations “devoted to the democratic ideal …autocracy in world affairs endangers peace.”

    These theories echoed Americans’ ideological preferences going back to the founding era, but they were, nevertheless, only theories. As a practical matter, Germany and Japan might not ever find the circumstances propitious for launching an attack on a United States that was, indeed, substantially invulnerable. In his State of the Union address in January 1939 — months before Germany’s invasion of Poland — Roosevelt barely talked about national security per se. He talked about belief and principle. “There comes a time in the affairs of men,” he told Americans, “when they must prepare to defend, not their homes alone, but the tenets of faith and humanity on which their churches, their governments and their very civilization are founded. The defense of religion, of democracy and of good faith among nations is all the same fight. To save one we must now make up our minds to save all.” Roosevelt’s most arresting image was not of a German invasion or massive bombing raid, but of a democratic America isolated in a world of dictatorships. In a speech at the University of Virginia following the fall of France, he warned Americans that they were at risk of becoming a “lone island” in a world dominated by the “philosophy of force,” “a people lodged in prison, handcuffed, hungry, and fed through the bars from day to day by the contemptuous, unpitying masters of other continents.” Among other concerns, Roosevelt and others worried that the United States could not long survive as an open, free-market, democratic society in such a world, that confronting the dictatorships over the long term would require a controlled economy and limits on individual freedoms.  This was also just a theory — did free market capitalism and individual liberties die during the long Cold War? — but it reflected a timeless American anxiety.  It was just another way that American. policy was shaped more by matters of belief and ideology than by tangible measures of threat.  Roosevelt and other Americans believed that preserving American democracy — the ultimate American “interest” — required a global balance of power that favored liberalism.

     

    The nascent school of foreign policy realism was appalled at the “giddy” moralism and emotionalism that, in Charles A. Beard’s words, prevented Americans from dealing “with the world as it is.” Hugh Wilson, a senior member of the “realist” camp at the State Department in the 1930s, observed of Americans in general that “our most certain reaction to the stimulus of a piece of news from a foreign land is to judge it ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ ‘righteous’ or ‘unjust’… we instantly assess it by a moral evaluation based on our own standards.” This moralistic approach had “poison[ed] our relations with Japan,” and with the Nazis as well. The historian and critic C. Hartley Grattan complained that such “powerful currents of emotion and opinion” had led Americans to “throw cold reason out of the window.”

    For the realists and other anti-interventionists, accepting the world “as it is” meant accommodating historical shifts in the global balance of power, not fighting them. In one of the seminal works of realist thought, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, published in 1939, the British diplomat and intellectual E. H. Carr defended Neville Chamberlain’s concessions to Hitler at Munich on the grounds that the “change in the European equilibrium of forces,” that is, the growth of German power, made it “inevitable that Czechoslovakia should lose part of its territory and eventually her independence.” The American diplomat George F. Kennan, then serving in Prague, agreed that Czechoslovakia was “after all, a central European state,” and its “fortunes must in the long run lie with — and not against — the dominant forces in this area.” Carr argued that if dissatisfied “have-not” powers such as Germany were bent on changing the existing system, “the responsibility for seeing that these changes take place … in an orderly way” rested as much on the defenders of the existing order as on its challengers. Americans, of all people, should respect “the right of an able and virile nation to expand,” Charles Lindbergh argued. As for Japan, the journalist Herbert Bayard Swope, winner of the first Pulitzer Prize, maintained that “sixty-three million people living on rocky islands” had “the right to exist,” and if their existence required expansion, “then why forbid Japanese expansion to follow natural lines?”

    To do so was more than a mistake, the anti-interventionists believed. It was immoral and contrary to American traditions and principles. Americans’ refusal to accept the world “as it is” amounted to a form of imperialism. Even if the United States managed to defeat Hitler “after many years” of brutal war, Taft warned, it would just be the start of an open-ended American commitment to European peace and security. American forces “would have to police Europe or maintain the balance of power there by force of arms.” If Roosevelt’s commitment to the Atlantic Charter was to be taken seriously, the historian Howard K. Beale ominously observed, then the “victorious Anglo-Americans” were not just going to have to “maintain democracy by armed force on the Continent of Europe and then ‘police’ that Continent.” They were also going to have to establish and defend the “four freedoms all over the world.” This would require “an Anglo-American navy large enough to establish ‘freedom of the seas’… on all the oceans of the world.” For Beale and other anti-interventionists, this was a prescription for “unadulterated imperialism.” The famous Christian pacifist A. J. Muste worried that “we shall be the next nation to seek world-domination — in other words, to do what we condemn Hitler for trying to do.” The Germans, Beale argued, would probably regard “Anglo-American ‘policing’” much as Germany’s victims in Europe now regarded German occupation: they might even call it “slavery.” Beale did not want to see “a German imperialism” replaced by an “Anglo-American world imperialism.” He did not want the United States to “dominate the world.”

    The vast majority of Americans, of course, would have denied any such intention. They saw their actions in purely defensive terms. They preferred to believe they were responding to an unprovoked attack from Japan and an equally unprovoked declaration of war by Germany. Once these were dealt with, once the aggressors had been defeated, most Americans likely assumed their nation would return to something like normalcy again. Indeed, in what would become a central paradox in American foreign policy going forward, most Americans probably thought that they were fighting a war precisely so that they might return to the relative passivity of the interwar years or the decades before World War I. A few internationalists talked about shouldering global “responsibilities,” and that may have sounded like a good thing to some, but few Americans believed they were engaging in a massive reshaping of the world, exerting hegemony, imposing a liberal order, or even establishing the United States at the center of world affairs.

     

    But whether they understood it that way or not, the United States was imposing its preferences on a resistant world. Americans were engaged in hegemonic behavior, perhaps not on behalf of themselves, but on behalf of liberalism, which to their opponents amounted to the same thing. Whatever else Germany and Japan were doing, and however unpleasant their methods, they were attempting to break free of the restraints of an Anglo-American world order they had no part in establishing, which did not serve their interests as they perceived them but, on the contrary, was created specifically to constrain them. The Versailles settlement, which the United States had played a central role in shaping, had made Germany a “have-not” power, and the Washington Naval treaty, with its Nine-Power agreement on East Asia, had attempted to clamp a lid on Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland. The Germans and Japanese were thereby denied an empire and the regional sphere of interest that the other great powers enjoyed. And now, as Germany and Japan attempted to break out of the cage of these postwar peace agreements and resist the liberal hegemony, the United States once again roused itself to slam the cage door shut.

    It was not unreasonable to ask what gave Americans the right to decide that it was unacceptable for Germany and Japan to enjoy the same kind of regional dominance that the United States enjoyed, or to acquire the kinds of empires that Britain and France had acquired over the previous three centuries. The Japanese made this argument repeatedly, claiming to seek only their own version of the Monroe Doctrine. Many Germans, too, and not just Hitler, believed that Germany required the kind of room to grow — the “living space” — that the United States enjoyed in abundance, thanks to its own past aggressions on the vast North American continent. Roosevelt could not even claim, as Wilson had in the lead-up to the First World War, that he was defending American neutral rights, since Hitler had been careful to avoid attacks on American shipping. So whether they had right on their side or not, Americans simply insisted, by dint of their power, that the liberal hegemony be preserved and strengthened and the international balance of power remain favorable to the liberal powers.

    That, in the end, was what American intervention in World War II was about, and it was also what World War I had been about. If either war could be regarded as “necessary,” it was not to defend the United States against an immediate threat, but to restore the kind of liberal order in which Americans preferred to live and which seemed to provide the greatest degree of protection against possible future threats.

    Americans roused themselves to defend the liberal hegemony not because they were eager to make a “bid for world supremacy” or because they feared being supplanted as the world’s “Number One power,” as the historian Stephen Wertheim now argues, echoing the charges of the America First Committee and other anti-interventionists at the time. Americans had for most of the twentieth century consistently and deliberately avoided taking on such a role. They had not been jealous of British and French world leadership prior to World War One, and they would have preferred to see that leadership resumed after the war rather than take on the responsibilities of global “leadership” themselves. When they emerged as the world’s dominant power after World War I, they did not seek to exploit it but pulled back from exercising it.

    American diplomacy in the 1920s had aimed at establishing a framework for international peace that would require little if anything of the United States: the Washington Treaties governing naval arms levels and outlining the terms of an Asian peace; the Dawes Plan which aimed at bringing economic stability to Europe; the Kellogg-Briand Pact which aimed to codify international strictures against aggression. In the late 1930s it was not with eagerness but with resignation that so many Americans who had once abjured any significant international role decided that, with the evident failure of these efforts, there was no choice but to place the United States at the center of world affairs. Suddenly, there was much talk of America’s “world responsibilities,” a concept most Americans had rejected throughout the two decades after Versailles.

    Americans had simply changed their minds, both about the nature of the threats out there and about America’s role in addressing them. Just a few years earlier, intellectuals such as Walter Lippmann and Reinhold Niebuhr had abandoned their World War I idealism and interventionism for a postwar cynicism, or “realism,” or, in Niebuhr’s case, Marxism. Lippmann by the end of the 1920s had begun arguing that the United States “should withdraw from all commitments.” Now, he and the others reversed course again. Like Senator Harry Truman, who had discarded his own anti-interventionist views after Munich and Kristallnacht, they believed Americans’ failure to accept “our responsibility as a world power” had led to the catastrophic breakdown of the postwar world.

    But the line between assuming “world responsibility” and exerting hegemony was a thin one. As Roosevelt put it, “destiny” had made Americans heirs of European civilization, and “fate” now compelled the United States “to assume the task of helping to maintain in the Western world a citadel wherein that civilization may be kept alive.” Niebuhr wrote of “the obligations which we owe to the community of nations … as inheritor and custodian of the standards of justice of western civilization.” It was America’s fate, Lippmann argued, to give to “the world of the future that order under law which Rome gave to the ancient world and Britain to the world that is now passing away — that order under law in which alone can freedom prevail.”

    Vandenberg once warned that when it came to intervention in world affairs beyond America’s shores, there could be “no middle ground.” It was “either all the way in or all the way out.” There was much truth in this. It was one thing when American foreign policy was limited to defense of the Western hemisphere, which by itself was an assertion of regional hegemony. But once the United States took on the goal of defeating the autocracies and re-establishing the ascendancy of the liberal world order, it was reasonable to ask where American commitments and obligations stopped. In 1943 Roosevelt set as America’s goal “to organize relations among nations” so that the “forces of barbarism can never again break loose.” This was not the United States as offshore balancer of last resort. It was the United States as proactive defender of an international liberal order. As Roosevelt saw it, the events of the interwar years had proved that “if we do not pull the fangs of the predatory animals of this world, they will multiply and grow in strength — and they will be at our throats again once more in a short generation.” Such a view of the world and America’s responsibility seemed likely to involve the United States in not a few foreign conflicts — none of which were likely to be “wars of necessity” in the sense that American security was directly threatened.

    American realism itself underwent a critical transformation as a result of World War II. Prior to the fall of France, self-described realists of the day had not believed American security would be threatened even after a German victory on the continent, and many realists continued to believe this right up until the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was only after the fall of France that some realists began to suggest that the United States had a vital interest in preventing the emergence of a hegemon in Eurasia. (Realists later promulgated the myth that the founders shared this view, but they too were guided primarily by belief and ideology: in the early 1790s, Hamilton feared Revolutionary France and favored an outright British victory, whereas Jefferson feared victory by the British monarchy and favored Revolutionary France.) Although rarely commented on, this was an extraordinary redefinition of American vital interests. To insist that no power should gain hegemonic control in Europe or Asia was tantamount to insisting on American global hegemony, since the essential prerequisite to American international primacy was precisely the absence of such a “peer competitor.”

    Nor should it be surprising that an American policy aimed at preventing the rise of a plausible challenger to the liberal order might lead to conflicts only tangentially related to that goal — such as preventing a communist takeover of southeast Asia or a hostile takeover of Middle Eastern oil fields. The degree to which American hegemony became baked into the common understanding of America’s “interests” was most notable in Richard Haass’ argument that the first Persian Gulf War was a “war of necessity.” The notion that the United States had a vital interest in the sovereign independence of Kuwait, a one-time Iraqi province, would have struck pre-World War II anti-interventionists as beyond absurd. Only an America that regarded its role as the defender and promoter of a liberal world order could possibly regard the liberation of Kuwait as a matter of “necessity.”

    All of which should raise questions about how useful the distinction between “wars of necessity” and “wars of choice” really is, especially for a nation that enjoys the degree of invulnerability that the United States has. It could be argued that no war is ever actually necessary, not even wars of self-defense. Realists such as George Kennan and Neville Chamberlain believed Czechoslovakia was better off not resisting German conquest, after all. The Japanese entertained hopes that the United States might not fight after Pearl Harbor, that the enormity of the task would be too daunting for a flaccid, selfish, unheroic people like the Americans. Given that the United States was not even threatened militarily when it began to take sides against Germany and Japan in the late 1930s, World War II could only be considered a “war of necessity” because the United States chose to take upon itself the defense of a liberal world order.

    It is not unusual for people to claim to be acting out of necessity.  For one thing, it relieves the otherwise unavoidable moral burden of wielding power.  One is forgiven much when one has no choice. Americans prefer to regard themselves as simply reacting to the provocations of others, even when they are at least equal participants in the confrontation. They have been taught that to try to shape the world to make it more accommodating to their physical and ideological needs is “imperialism.” Yet that is what all great powers do when they can, and the United States, perhaps alone among the great powers of history, has done it with the voluntary collaboration of many other nations and peoples. Instead of insisting they had no choice, Americans, with all their flaws, can be relatively proud of the choices they have made.

    The World as a Game

    What is a game? Ludwig Wittgenstein famously chose this nebulous concept to illustrate what he meant by “family resemblance,” where the individual members of a class can be determined to fulfill no necessary and sufficient conditions for admission, and instead only share some traits with some others in the class, others with others. Yet we can at least identify two types of game, which seem not just distinct from one another but very nearly opposite. One class of games, which includes peek-a-boo, charades, and musical improvisation as representative instances, is characterized by free expressivity. It is the manifestation of what Friedrich Schiller called the Spieltrieb, the “play-drive,” which is innate in all human beings insofar as they are free. The other class includes chess, fencing, and wargames as its representative instances. If there is still some dose of freedom operating in this sort of game, it is freedom under severe constraints. The purpose here is to win, and one does so by means of strategy aforethought. In such games, serendipity and spontaneity are disadvantages. While some such games may, like Schillerian free play, be “fun” (especially when you win and the other guy loses), at their outer edge they shade over into a domain of human endeavor that has little to do with leisure at all. At their most serious they can determine the fate of the world.

    It is this latter sort of game alone that machines are capable of “understanding.” Strategy games, in other words, are essentially algorithmic. A good portion of the history of computing has been dedicated in fact to training machines up algorithmically in such narrow domains as chess, then Go, and more recently a full array of natural-language processing tasks. This training has facilitated the gradual progress of the machines from domain-specific “weak artificial intelligence” — the ability to master all the possible moves within a given narrow field — to something at least approaching “general AI” — the ability to competently execute the whole range of tasks that we associate with human intelligence.

    Yet curiously, as the machines draw closer to this peculiar ideal of humanness, the society they have been brought in to structure has grown correspondingly more inhuman. As the scope of algorithm-based applications in social reality has expanded over the past decades, we have by the same measure been conditioned to approach ever more fields of human life as if they were strategy games. The technology was honed in such narrow domains as chess and video poker. By the 2010s it had come to shape public debate as well, in the transfer of the greater part of our deliberative efforts to social-media platforms that are, in effect, nothing more than debate-themed video games, where one racks up points in the form of likes and followers by “gaming the algos,” just as one racks up points in Super Mario Bros. by smashing turtles. Soon enough algorithms bled out from behind the screen too, and began to transform the three-dimensional world of labor, first in “disruptive” app-based companies such as Uber, where gamified structures determine each “move” a driver makes, and then in domains such as warehouse work, where the laborer might never have used an app before signing up, and might not have understood the revolutionary significance of the top-down imposition of gamified structures for the measurement of his work productivity.

    Finally, the development of social-credit systems for the algorithmic measurement of the civic standing of individuals living under authoritarian regimes extends the gamification process to the entirety of social reality. Life becomes, quite literally, a game, but emphatically not the kind of game that is expressive of our irreducible freedom. On the contrary, the spread of gamified structures to the entirety of life has brought about the near-total eclipse of the one sort of game by the other, the near-total loss of a distinctly human life of Schillerian free play, and the sharp ascendancy of a machine-centered conception of play: play as strategy, as constraint; the extremity of play where it shades over into never-ending high-stakes work and struggle.

    It is against this background that we must understand the recent popularity in some circles of the “simulation argument,” according to which all of reality is, or is likely to be, an algorithmically structured virtual system of essentially the same sort we know from our encounter with video games such as Pac-Man or Minecraft. This is by now an argument with a bit of history behind it. The philosopher Nick Bostrom has been promoting it for a few decades, and by means of it has gained the attention of such tech mandarins as Bill Gates and Elon Musk, who unsurprisingly are attracted to the idea that the world itself resembles the very products that they are in the business of selling.

    The “simulation argument” has more recently been taken up by the philosopher David J. Chalmers in his book, Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy. It is worthwhile to consider this work in some detail, because it is a rich document of our gamified world. The “technophilosophy” that it expounds is perhaps the clearest expression yet of a new sort of hybridism between industry and the academy, in which it is decidedly the first member of this unnatural pair that forms the head of the resulting beast. Philosophy, while in its most enduring expressions always stands apart from the era in which it emerges, also has a long history of subordinating itself to whatever appears in its day as the biggest game going, as the most dazzling center of concentrated power and influence. Once it was theology, then it was science, now it is Big Tech, whose ascendancy required the prior work of the scientists even as it now operates independently of any faithfulness to truth-seeking and has nothing other than capital accumulation as its logic and life-breath.

    Before turning to Chalmers’ central claims and arguments, some interesting characteristics of our moment are revealed in his style and method. It is instructive indeed to see what gets through the filter of the big trade publishers these days. One striking feature of the prose in this particular work is that even though the book includes a special online supplement that presumably may be opened in a browser window right next to a search engine such as Google, it presupposes no shared background knowledge whatsoever between author and reader, nor any ability or motivation on the part of the reader to undertake a quick search that would supplement any informational gaps. Thus Plato is “the ancient Greek philosopher Plato,” and Queen is “the British rock group Queen,” headed up by “lead singer Freddie Mercury” (identified a few lines later as “Mercury”). The opening of Chapter One seeks to draw the reader in by making the most profound questions of philosophy appear close to home, by reference to what must be for the author a treasured lyric from Queen’s hit “Bohemian Rhapsody”: “Is this the real life? / Is this just fantasy?” Now that the tone has been set, the philosopher seeks, as best he can, to flesh out the backstory. “These questions have a history,” he writes. “Three of the great ancient traditions of philosophy —those of China, Greece, and India — all ask versions of Mercury’s questions.”

     

    Such a framing is significant beyond what it reveals about one man’s musical taste. Rather than understanding pop-cultural artifacts such as “Bohemian Rhapsody” as lying at the end of a tradition of romance ballads, faintly echoing that tradition’s themes in words whose large and original meanings have been mostly forgotten, we are instead invited to see pop culture, or at least the pop culture of Chalmers’ childhood, as the pinnacle of tradition, as bringing to its fullest expression what could only be more crudely attempted in centuries past. Here it is the past that asked “Mercury’s questions,” rather than “Mercury” channeling that past with only dim knowledge that this is what he is doing. And this order of things, which characterizes Chalmers’ approach to philosophy in general, largely obviates any need for him to dwell on what I, for my part, take to be the total debt that our present conceptual possibilities owe to the historical legacies that shaped them.

    In the book Chalmers dispenses with style and metaphor in order to speak in plain language, indeed in the simplest sentences possible. But this is not a clarification, it is a conceit which does not really free him, in the way he might hope, from the perceived pitfalls of a more stylish language. For in truth his whole project rides on unacknowledged metaphor: a captivating image of reality taken for an account of reality. The simplicity of his style confers upon Chalmers’ argument an unearned air of realism, and emboldens him to push for conclusions unmoored from the evidence of history and anthropology as if they were plain common sense. This is how the analytic tradition in modern philosophy has long operated: through the abjuration of “erudition” in favor of “straight talk,” the rejection of the properly humanistic disciplines, embedded in centuries-old traditions, in favor of pandering and “relatable” pop-culture references from Star Trek, Black Mirror, and Queen.

    Thus do analytic philosophers deliver their truths in the mode of naïveté, though they are not of course the first philosophers to do this. Descartes (“the French philosopher René Descartes”) worked his way into this mode too, if only as an exercise of so-called “radical doubt” in the first of his Meditations, pretending that he never learned any truths from any book or authority, even though what follows in the next five Meditations is rich with the learning that he could only have received under the tutelage of the Jesuits, with whom he studied, among many other guiding lights, Saint Augustine (“the North African saint Augustine”). As far as I can tell, Chalmers, by contrast with Descartes, is a true naïf, “just some guy,” as Keanu Reeves’ Neo memorably describes himself in The Matrix — one of Chalmers’ touchstones, naturally.

    We get an intimate sense of the scope of this philosopher’s inner life on nearly every page. Here he is, for example, describing himself at leisure: “During the pandemic, I’ve… met up once a week with a merry band of fellow philosophers in VR. We’ve tried many different platforms and activities — flying with angel wings in Altspace, slicing cubes to a rhythm in Beat Saber, talking philosophy on the balcony in Bigscreen, playing paintball in Rec Room,” and so on. There is a well established pattern in analytic philosophy, to which Chalmers has conformed in his career with something almost approaching grace, by which the refusal to put away childish things helps to establish the aura of a certain kind of philosophical brilliance. I have been told by someone who once shared a vacation home with the renowned analytic metaphysician David Lewis that the reading material he brought along for the summer consisted entirely in a giant stack of magazines for model-train hobbyists. When asked by my informant why these toys interested him, Lewis glared back as if the answer were self-explanatory.

    The pop-culture encyclopedia on which so much recent analytic philosophy has drawn yields flat-footed examples at best, and at worst it betrays a cavalier indifference to the depth of the subjects it grazes. It is, in a word, slumming. Now I am generally the last person to condemn “appropriation.” Who could possibly make sense of the unpredictable and scattershot and often demagogic way in which calls are made for switching out terms of art deemed to be “problematic,” or to have been originally deployed in another cultural sphere from which it is allegedly not ours to borrow? A perfectly anodyne-seeming term can be targeted for elimination — recently I observed a philosopher catching heat from another philosopher for hosting a podcast called “Unmute,” which was seen as an ableist belittling of the hearing-impaired — while another term that appears, at least to me, far more open to criticism just keeps going, year after year, in innocent ignorance of its huge semantic charge. Consider, for example, the use in analytic philosophy of the figure of the “zombie.” This is a use that precedes Chalmers, but that he did more than any other to make familiar in his book, The Conscious Mind, and that he continues to deploy in Reality+. Of course I see no particular problem with the figure of the zombie in American mass entertainment since the mid-twentieth century. I recognize that George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead belongs at least to some sort of canon, and I have myself enjoyed Jim Jarmusch’s recent spoof of the zombie genre, The Dead Don’t Die. But the genre in question is what is sometimes called “exploitation,” and it seems to me that if philosophy should not distance itself from this genre altogether, it should at least be cautious about deriving its thought-experiments from it.

    What is the zombie genre exploiting, exactly? For one thing, it exploits its audience, enticing the viewer into a few hours of thoughtless titillation that could also have been spent in edifying contemplation; for another, it exploits a complex system of folk-beliefs and practices, in this case one that developed over the centuries among the African diaspora of Haiti, and does so without acknowledging any of the depths of experience or the internal cultural logic from which these beliefs and practices emerged. For Chalmers, a zombie is simply “a complete physical duplicate of a conscious human being [or animal], with the same brain structures but no subjective experience.” He acknowledges that this is essentially the same thing as what Descartes called an “automaton” (“Descartes thought that dogs were mere automata, or zombies”), but he cannot resist the lure of the new, or the temptation to break with history.

    Some contemporary philosophers attempt to make this figure of thought more precise by calling it a “philosophical zombie,” but what this misses is that the character from Haitian folk-belief is already itself philosophical: it is a representation by which a group of people make sense of and navigate the world. The folk-belief in zombies is not only, and not principally, concerned with the bodily zombie of interest to analytic philosophers. Their zombie is only half of the story; there is also the corresponding soul zombie, which an evil priest keeps in a bottle throughout the duration of a corpse’s interment, and then deftly opens up under the corpse’s nose in order to bring it halfway back to life — quickened enough to do the priest’s will, and most importantly to work the fields in some living person’s stead, but not enough to remember who it was before or to contemplate its unhappy plight. Belief in zombies is thus heavily dualistic. It is not that there remains for the zombie no locus of subjective identity, only that this stays under the priest’s control while the body, also under his control, is elsewhere. The theory seems to have emerged, as it is not hard to imagine, in the encounter of Roman Catholicism, ancestral African beliefs about body and soul, and the grueling inhumanity of slave labor.

    The idea of the separability of body and soul in fact has a long and complex history in both European and African folk-belief, and race is thematized with surprising frequency at many of this history’s key moments. In 1690, for example, the French Jesuit Gabriel Daniel published a satire of Cartesian dualism under the title Voyage du Monde de Descartes, which tells the story of an African servant in Europe who falls asleep while sitting in a field under a tree. A white maiden has been dishonored nearby, and a lynch-mob sets out to find the culprit. Little do they know when they find the servant that he is also an adept of the secret art of the Cartesian sect, by which an initiate can go out as his body sleeps for a little ambulatio animae, traveling around the earth and even into outer space as a disembodied soul. The mob kills what it takes to be the boy but is in fact only a “zombie.” When the soul attempts to return, it finds it has no corporeal home to return to, and so it floats around as a specter, and ultimately befriends the disembodied soul of the long-deceased Descartes. It is at least possible that Daniel is drawing on some knowledge of the proximity of Cartesian dualism to what by the end of the seventeenth century may have appeared as a distinctly racialized cluster of folk-beliefs, of the sort that would later be associated with the figure of the zombie.

     

    None of this is to say that there is anything misguided about the particular thought-experiment analytic philosophy enjoys contemplating, but only that the choice of the zombie as this experiment’s vehicle reminds us of the limitations intrinsic to a philosophical tradition that considers, say, the oeuvre of George Romero part of its general culture, its universe of references and illustrations, but not, say, ethnographic reports from rural Haiti, or indeed the profoundly learned anthropology of the Jesuit intellectual tradition.

    While it is simply naïve to start a reflection on zombies as if they were invented from scratch in twentieth-century American popular culture, it is positively self-defeating to start a reflection on the prospect that reality is itself virtual as if the very notion had to await our current VR technologies in order to be entertained. Perhaps under pressure from editors to give hasty shout-outs to non-Western ideas — the sort of shout-outs that are now de rigueur in Anglophone philosophy, which congratulates itself for being “inclusive” and then goes right back to doing what it would have been doing anyway — Chalmers duly catalogs in his book not only Nāgārjuna’s Buddhist anti-realism about the external world, but also the famous dream of Zhuangzi (in which the Chinese philosopher believes himself to be a butterfly), as well as the even more famous account of dreaming provided by Descartes. In this mechanical nod to the history of philosophy (in the book’s acknowledgments he provides a long list of the historians of philosophy who helped him to execute the nod) he seems close to recognizing that our brains themselves, for about eight hours a day, furnish us sufficient material for philosophical reflection in the remaining sixteen on the possibility that reality is in some way virtual. Chalmers even acknowledges early on that “[a] dream world is a sort of virtual world without a computer.” But soon enough this concession to the timelessness of the problem in question gives way to a bold claim of the problem’s novelty: “any virtual world,” we are now told, “involves a computer simulation.”

    The possibility that we come pre-stocked with the sort of experiences generally thought to be novelties of the era of VR goggles looms as a threat to the entire project of what Chalmers calls “technophilosophy.” He writes that “we haven’t developed dream technology as thoroughly as we’ve developed VR technology, so Descartes’ dream argument is less affected by technological change than his illusion argument. (The latter argument concluded that Descartes’ own mind is in fact awake, but is being systematically deceived about the existence of an external world by an “evil genius.”) But it is not at all self-evident what ought to count as “dream technology,” and an older and more capacious approach to the philosophy of technology, as distinct from Chalmers’ technophilosophy, never lost sight of the fact that tekhnê, in its original sense, included not only gadgets and other objects of human invention, but also, crucially, practices. And in this sense it is important to note that “dream technology” has in fact been well developed in certain places and times: practices for the collective interpretation, social processing, and pragmatic management in waking life of dream experience.

    In cultures where such dream technology is developed, it is typical to find very different philosophical commitments concerning the objects and beings encountered in dreams, and concerning the relation of these objects and beings to those encountered in waking life. The most common view of what dreams are, if we consider them from a cross-cultural and trans-historical perspective, is that they are either as real or more real than waking life. Significantly, the urgency of proving that this is not the case takes hold as a central task of modern philosophy, as in the work of Descartes, at precisely the moment when European missionaries, some of whom are in Descartes’ own epistolary network, are encountering groups of people, in the Americas for example, whose practical rationality is largely governed by experiences had in sleep. Descartes is anxious to contain these experiences, to keep them cordoned off from the waking life whose basic constituents — the self, God, the external world — are alone worthy candidates for his project of epistemological foundationalism. This is indeed one way of going about things, but it is not the default way of humanity.

    Repeatedly, in fact, what Chalmers takes to be the default way of humanity turns out to be only a local road taken by modern philosophy in the centuries since the scientific revolution, often in an effort to remain faithful to the apparent implications of key scientific discoveries. But this faithfulness has frequently gone far beyond what is actually implied by science itself, and has forced modern philosophy into accepting as the default account of reality commitments that fall apart under scrutiny. Chalmers arrives on the scene at the moment when this falling apart is becoming impossible not to notice, and interprets it as evidence for philosophy’s linear progress, rather than philosophy’s return to other widely available and well-tested alternatives. This is particularly clear in his evocation of the current moment’s “fall from Eden.” Thus he reflects that “rocks in Eden were Solid, full of matter all the way through without any empty space. They had an absolute Weight, which did not vary from place to place.” But now, subatomic physics has forced us to throw out this model. “People in Eden had Free Will,” similarly. “They could act with complete autonomy and their actions were not predetermined.” But now, physics and neuroscience together have significantly challenged this belief.

    What is missing here is any acknowledgment that this Eden was never long-lived and never universal. The belief in irreducible external matter and the belief in free will come with distinct local histories, emerging originally as answers to specific contextual problems (as, in the case of free will, accounting for the causes of sin). And so when Chalmers suggests that a further instance of the fall is currently transpiring, from an idea of reality as inherently physical to one that acknowledges the virtual as well, one cannot help but wish for further genealogy and elucidation of the supposedly Edenic stage of the representation of reality which is supposedly now coming to a close.

    And now to the heart of the matter. What is the nature of the increasingly widespread contention that reality may be “virtual”? A great deal in our culture and our society hangs on the answer to this question. In Chalmers’ book, the argument sets out from the observation that we, today, have become adept at running simulations of many things, from possible chess moves to possible pathways and chronologies of early human migration from Asia to the Americas. We simulate paleoclimates and the possible pathways of future climate change. We simulate hydrodynamic flow and the risks of nuclear escalation. We also simulate regions of the world, from, say, a digital model of Paris in 1789 to the Amazon rainforest. In time, it is reasonable to anticipate that we will have a fully immersive model of the entirety of the observable universe. In scientific research, in defense initiatives, and in leisurely gaming, we as a species have begun digitally to reproduce the world into which we have been cast, and even to generate new possible worlds that have the power to reveal to us the general form of the future.

    Now, you might anticipate that as world-simulations become increasingly fine-grained, they will begin to include not just individual human beings but also the smallest details in the constitution of these human beings, notably the number and the arrangement of their individual neurons. But if these are simulated faithfully and exhaustively, supporters of the simulation argument contend, then they are likely to come to have the same conscious experiences as would be had by the neurons of a physical brain. Given our own tendency to run huge numbers of simulations for anything in the physical world that is of interest to us, it is reasonable, the argument in turn holds, to suppose that any beings in “base reality” (that is, the physical reality in which simulations are generated) that develop the ability to run fine-grained simulations of human brains will bring into being vastly more simulated human beings than human beings who ever existed in base reality. That means, we are told, that if you find yourself thinking, and experiencing your life as a human being, and you acknowledge the possibility that our descendants may develop the ability to run exhaustively detailed simulations of their ancestors, it is highly probable that your own thinking is the thinking of a simulated human being and not of a human being in base reality.

    This conclusion rests on a few fairly substantial presuppositions. One of them is what Bostrom, in an influential article in 2003 entitled “Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?,” calls “substrate-independence.” This is the view, widely but not universally shared among philosophers of mind, that the organic substrate in which human consciousness is realized is a contingent and not a necessary condition of this consciousness, which could just as well be realized in a silicon substrate, or in a substrate of toilet-paper rolls and string, or in anything, really, that faithfully reproduces the organization of the neurons in the brain. One implication of substrate-independence is that it would be in principle possible for each of us to “upload” our consciousness into a computer and thereby to achieve immortality.

    If substrate-independence is not true, then the simulation argument is a non-starter. This is indeed a big if, and you might think that anyone who offers a version of the simulation argument would also feel compelled to make a convincing case for the truth of the claim on which it depends. But Bostrom simply presupposes it, a move that might be excused in an article in the name of succinctness. Chalmers, for his part, dilates in his tome on every question of interest to him, often repeating the same basic claims several times — and yet the argument that he offers for the substrate-independence thesis is hasty and unconvincing, and sometimes seems to be one he would rather not have to make at all.

    Early in the book the technophilosopher states the case for the consciousness of simulated beings (or “sims”) hypothetically: “At least if we assume that a simulated brain would have the same conscious experience as the brain it’s simulating…”; “Under reasonable assumptions, … sims will have conscious experiences that are the same as those of the nonsims they simulate.” His fifteenth chapter, called “Can there be consciousness in a digital world?,” seeks finally to justify these “reasonable assumptions” — but it consists in a short introductory section telling of an episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation in which the philosophical problem of the android Data’s contested consciousness is explored, which is followed by a section entitled “The problem of consciousness,” in which Chalmers summarizes the philosophical contributions of his previous book on the philosophy of consciousness, in which he argued that “no explanation of consciousness in purely physical terms is possible.” Chalmers does not reject this view in Reality+, though it does seem to be in some tension with the simulation argument: if base-reality consciousness is not to be explained by existing fundamental properties of the physical world, then it is not clear, at least to me, how we can be confident that a computer-based model of the structures we find in the physical brain will be conscious. If we don’t know what the relationship between the physical brain and consciousness is, we would seem to be on even weaker ground in attempting to account for the relationship between a simulated brain and consciousness.

    But Chalmers quickly sets the “hard problem” aside and moves on to another section, called “The problem of other minds,” in which he runs through the familiar problem of skepticism about the consciousness of other biological beings such as humans and non-human animals. When it comes right down to it, for all we know it is not just machines that lack qualia — inner subjective states, something it is “like” to be them — but other humans and animals may lack them as well. We have no access to the inner experience of other beings, and so in a strict sense other naturally generated minds leave us with the same problems as artificially constructed “minds.” But this problem is not directly relevant to solving the more narrow question of the possible consciousness of AI systems, and in this section again the philosopher of virtuality postpones the promised answer to the question that serves as this chapter’s title. We finally get to the heart of the matter in the penultimate section, “Can machines be conscious?,” and in a short coda entitled “Consequences.” The stakes are high: without substrate-independence, you will remember, the entire simulation argument fails to get off the ground.

    So, then, can machines be conscious? Chalmers focuses on one type of machine: “a perfect simulation of a brain, such as my own,” that is, a brain simulation that is “a digital simulation running on a computer.” The initial attempt to characterize such a simulation has a troubling air of circularity to it: “How would simulating a brain work?” Chalmers asks. And he answers: “We can suppose that every neuron is simulated perfectly.” Alright, one wants to say, but how does it work? Chalmers acknowledges that it might not work: some believe, after all, that consciousness is not an algorithmic process at all. But even this obstacle, he supposes elsewhere in the book, might be got around eventually by simulating it, whatever it is, on an analog quantum computer, when, and if, such a technology becomes available. But how again, now, using known technologies, would a simulated brain work? In what appears to me a startling bit of legerdemain, Chalmers moves from an apparently sincere concern to answer this question to what I take to be a reiteration of the presumption that a simulated brain would work (that is, would be conscious), and then proceeds to tell us what “one big advantage” of such a simulated brain would be (that “it raises the possibility that we might become the machine”), and, next, to tell us his preferred strategy for going about such a simulation (“the safest way to become a simulated brain is to become one in stages”). But this strategy for “gradual uploading” is not an argument for the view that uploading is possible. It is a proposal for how to go about testing, someday, whether it is possible or not. And this is all we get in the way of an answer to the question: “Can there be consciousness in a digital world?”

    Beyond the simple non-delivery of the promised answer, there is a troubling conflation of two different kinds of models of the brain. Chalmers begins the penultimate section of Chapter 15 proposing to discuss a particular kind of machine, namely, again, “a digital simulation [of a brain] running on a computer.” But then he goes on, with the example of gradual uploading, to describe something that looks a lot more like the successive removal of cells from the actual brain and their successive replacement by implants that “interact, via receptors and effectors, with neighboring biological cells.” Now, it might well be possible to preserve the full functionality of a biological brain when it is partially, or even perhaps entirely, replaced by physical implants that do the same job as brain cells or neurons. But this does not seem to me to answer the question whether a separate computer simulation of a brain — separate in the same way that a computer model of, say, the hydrodynamics of a river is separate from the river — could become conscious. In the case of brain implants, there is a clear respect in which the artificial implants are “like” the cells they replace, and in which both the artificial and the natural entities share in the same approximate nature, notwithstanding their distinct causal histories. In the case of the computer simulation, it is not at all clear to me that the simulated brain cell, even if it is a limit-case atom-for-atom simulation, shares the relevant properties with the biological brain cell, such that we may be able to anticipate that it is capable of facilitating consciousness — no more in fact than we might anticipate that a computer-based hydrodynamic model of a river, if it were to reach a sufficiently fine-grained degree of accuracy, would become wet.

    That is just not something we can expect to happen inside a computer, no matter how much the computer is able to reveal to us about wetness, and I have seen no real argument that consciousness is relevantly different from wetness in this regard. Until I see such an argument, I must withhold a commitment to substrate-independence, and this means that I am also going to decline to take the simulation argument seriously, since it depends entirely on substrate-independence in order to work. Or at least, as with creation science and other similar deviations, I am going to take it seriously as a social phenomenon, and try to understand its causes, while refusing to take it seriously on the terms it would like to be taken.

    Though we are both philosophers, Chalmers and I belong to different discursive communities, and most of my criticisms here (though not the criticism of his discussion of consciousness), I recognize, may be considered as “external” to his project as he conceives it. Ordinarily I believe projects should be criticized on their merits, according to the aims and the scope that those who undertake them have chosen. But in this case I am motivated by a concern about what gets to count as philosophy, and why. Although I am a philosopher, my preoccupation with such things as the ethnography of folk-beliefs about revenants has led to a general perception among my peers that I have strayed from the discipline, that I have let too much of the actual world seep into my thinking, that I have wandered off into mere “erudition,” a term that is always used by analytic philosophers as a back-handed compliment to signal that the erudit in question is cultivating a lesser skill, one that compensates for the lack of any natural aptitude in what really counts: the art of rational argumentation and distinction-making. And so the result is that what gets to count as philosophy is often generated in a vacuum, ignorant of its sources, of the contingency and localism of what it takes to be its self-evident starting-points, and destined to be as ephemeral as the pop-culture that nearly exhausts its universe of references.

    Chalmers may well be living in a simulation, but not the one that he imagines. He is simulating for himself a world that is not inhabited by scholars and critics adept at exposing the ideological forces that shape a given historical era’s conception of reality; a world not inhabited by anthropologists and the people who inform them of models of the world inspired by objects of particular cultural value just as the video game inspires Chalmer’s model; a world in which there are no other ways of representing reality than those of a highly specialized caste in the learned institutions of Europe, India, and China, the latter two admitted as full members of the philosophical community only recently and begrudgingly, and at the expense of other traditions that could now more confidently be cordoned off as “non-philosophical.” Ideology yields simulations too, and the highest goal of the philosopher, now as ever, ought to be a search for “signs” that might lead us out of this simulation. These signs will not be “glitchy” cats that walk by, revealing their virtual nature as a result of some defect in the program, but rather doubts that might arise, for example while reading a pro-VR book such as Reality+. A philosopher who has no interest in even acknowledging the way in which ideological structures shape our worldviews has no business presenting himself as an authority on the question whether the world is a simulation or not.

    Somewhat surprisingly, Chalmers favorably invokes Jean Baudrillard’s well-known postmodernist explorations in Simulacra and Simulations, which appeared in 1981. It is likely that this work entered Chalmers’ universe of references primarily because it was, famously, featured as an Easter egg in an early scene of The Matrix. Lily Wachowski, one of the pair of the original movie’s creators, claimed in 2020 that the film was born of “rage at capitalism,” while the critic Andrea Long Chu would a year later make the case that the film is an allegory of transgender identity (an identity both Wachowski siblings would claim some years after the film appeared). But plainly these are high-theory retrofittings upon what was in its original form mostly a piece of standard-fare science-fiction fun, in which the Baudrillardian flourish adds or explains next to nothing. And in any case the extent of Chalmers’ use of the French theorist involves little more than a technical distinction that Baudrillard makes between simulation and representation.

    It is ironic that Baudrillard should find his way at all into a book arguing that physical reality itself may be a simulation, since Baudrillard’s concern was with the way in which our picture of social reality is shaped and mediated in large part through media technologies. His famous (or notorious) declaration that “the Gulf War did not take place” was not, by his own lights, a denial that anyone actually died in Iraq or Kuwait in the early 1990s, but only that the idea that a typical American, and perhaps a typical European, formed in association with the phrase “the Gulf War” was excessively shaped by media forces, particularly the new uninterrupted onslaught of images on cable news networks such as CNN. And when you understand a war to be something that happens on your screen rather than in the world, this significantly constrains your capacity to arrive at a mature and sober analysis of war’s moral and human costs. Baudrillard’s analysis of simulation drew him toward the conclusion that our attachment to digitally mediated images of reality, an attachment that is pushed on us by the profit-seeking interests of the media companies, fundamentally weakens our ability to engage critically with reality itself. He was an enemy of simulation. He would have considered the “simulation hypothesis” — that what we think of as reality is in fact a virtual world of the sort with which we are most familiar from our screen- or goggle-mediated games — to have been a resounding victory for the forces of which his work is meant to be a condemnation. It is hard to think of any idea that would more gravely damage our sense of reality than the idea that it is virtual or simulated.

    The gamification of social reality is a political matter, and not, in the first instance, a metaphysical one. To conceptualize reality as a whole on the model of the algorithmic gaming technologies that have so enraptured us in our own age is to contribute to the validation of a particular form of social reality: namely, the model of reality in which gamified structures have jumped across the screen, from Pac-Man or Twitter or whatever it is you were playing, and now shape everything we do, from dating to car-sharing to working in an Amazon warehouse. The “simulation argument” is nothing but an apology for algorithmic capitalism.

    The spirit of this new economic and political order has extended from Chalmers’ philosophical writing into other para-academic projects, most notably the social-media network PhilPeople.org, which he co-directs with David Bourget, and which largely duplicates the structures of Facebook or LinkedIn for a global network of professional philosophers. As if to demonstrate the great distance that AI has yet to traverse before it achieves anything that might be called “intelligence” in a non-equivocal sense, I have more than once had to write to PhilPeople to request that false information in AI-generated stub profiles of me be taken down. Still today, there is a stub that appears to indicate that I am an “undergraduate” at Eastern University. There is no accounting for this, nor evidently, given that it is still there, any human being willing to be held accountable.

    Such a landscape of artificial stupidity, in which there is a glut of undifferentiated information and misinformation issuing forth from machines that could not care less about the distinction between the two, is, much more than the possible dawning of machine consciousness, which is the real story of our most recent technological revolution. That we human beings are compelled to submit to the terms and the constraints laid out by thoughtless machines — for example that we are expected to groom and update AI-generated stub profiles of ourselves that we never asked for in the first place, lest misinformation about us spread and we “lose points” in the great game of our professional standing — is, quite obviously, an encroachment on our freedom, and therefore, again, an encroachment on the one sort of play by the other. Play is now left to the very youngest of us: those too young to understand what screens are, too young to discern the world that lies behind and beyond them. Adolescence begins, perhaps, when we learn to channel our innate playfulness into competition. The comprehensive gamification of adulthood, in this light, has the condition of permanent adolescence as its corollary.

    PhilPeople is in the end a boutique affair, greatly overshadowed by such large-scale projects as ResearchGate, Google Scholar, or Academia.edu, which aggressively metricize scholarly output, and effectively transform the assessment of a scholar’s work, even of a philosopher’s work, into formulae so crude that even a machine, even a dull vice-dean with a background in business administration, can understand them. Universities now regularly take such metrics as the number of downloads an open-access article has received to be decisive for promotion and tenure, and there is no reason not to expect, in such a gamified landscape, that soon enough professors up for advancement will respond to this absurd predicament by paying an off-shore click-farm for bulk downloads of published work. In time we might expect to outsource the work of both scholarship and scholarship-evaluation to the machines, which would really just be the perfection of a system already emerging, in which the only real job left is the work of managing our online profiles, while the machines do everything else.

    If you wish to set yourself up in this world as a poet, your plight is substantially the same as that of a scholar: you create an account on Submittable, “the social impact platform,” and you manage it. You also have to write some poems at some point, of course, but what can poetry hope to be in the age of “streamlined social-impact initiatives so you can reach your goals faster,” as Submittable describes itself? In nearly every domain of public life in which I have any investment at all, I also have an online portal to it, and automated messages telling me that I need to update the information in my portal. In most of these domains, the activity in these portals is being tracked, and is taken as an ersatz measure of my commitment to the domains themselves. My experience is limited, admittedly, but I have trouble believing they are not representative of our contemporary situation, and that if I were a truck driver, or a restaurateur, or a cosmetician, I would be doing much the same thing as I am in my actual life: updating my passwords, checking my stats, pumping my metrics — feeding the machines.

    That these are the real challenges of our current technological conjuncture, rather than, say, the search for glitchy cats that might show us the way out of the Matrix, is a sober fact that at least some professional philosophers are prepared to acknowledge. Daniel Dennett, great influence and inspiration for Chalmers, has been increasingly outspoken in the view that we should not be wasting time speculating about the dawn of conscious machines when this time would be much better spent coming up with practical policy measures to ensure that machines be prevented from encroaching into distinctly and irreducibly human spheres of existence. Other philosophers are interested in the serious dangers of algorithmic bias, where machines that lack consciousness nonetheless discriminate against groups of people, with no awareness that this is what they are doing, and no accountability for doing so; and the even more serious dangers of algorithmic defense systems, where machines that lack consciousness are imbued with the gravest responsibility of all, one that they could fail as a result of a simple technical malfunction, and once again with no real accountability. Sober philosophy, in sum, recognizes our human responsibility as the makers and stewards of the machines, rather than imagining that our entire reality is a virtual simulation produced by a machine.

    At least some readers might expect a book co-written by Henry Kissinger and former Google CEO Eric Schmidt (along with Daniel Huttenlocher) to be more susceptible to ideological infection than a book about technology written by an academic philosopher. But these are strange times, and I must grudgingly report that in their recent work The Age of AI and Our Human Future these authors are surprisingly lucid about the actual challenges that we face at present. This lucidity extends both to practical risks and to philosophical questions about the nature of the new systems that create these risks. For them, AI’s ability to process information about aspects of the environment that remain undetected by human beings fundamentally transforms the nature of several domains, notably warfare, as it adds a tremendous element of incalculability. But this information-processing capability is in the end only a further development of the same sort of computation that machines have been doing for many decades now, since they first began to be trained up on the rules of checkers and chess. No matter how far and wide their training extends, the ability of machines to process a wide range of moves more quickly and exhaustively than a human being ever could is by no means an indication that they are moving towards any sort of intelligence, let alone consciousness, of the sort that human beings experience. Indeed the fact that they are so much better at processing certain bodies of information should itself be taken as an indication that they are not at all doing something comparable to what we are doing in our imperfect, limited way. Information-processing, no matter how vast, is not the same activity as judgement.

    It is the presumption that human beings are, in their nature, algorithmic “problem-solvers,” as Karl Popper was already saying in the 1950s, that leads to such poorly thought-out efforts at the integration of machines into human society as we are seeing in the present day. Already in the early 1960s, Norbert Wiener discerned the most serious challenges of the digital revolution, where simply training machines to execute evidently minor tasks already awakens threats that can be foreseen in their concrete form, and forestalled in good time, only with great difficulty. “To turn a machine off effectively,” Wiener warned, “we must be in possession of information as to whether the danger point has come. The mere fact that we have made the machine does not guarantee that we shall have the proper information to do this. This is already implicit in… the checker-playing machine [that] can defeat the man who has programmed it.” Our greatest challenge today is not that machines may gain consciousness, and still less that we are ourselves conscious machines, but that the machines may defeat us, and do not require consciousness in order to do so.

    The real prospect of our total defeat arose in the middle of the twentieth century at the same moment that we began to take strategy games, even such trivial pastimes as checkers, to be paradigmatic models of the core endeavors of human life. The intellectual historians of the last century regard “game theory” as one of its great achievements, but it is past time that we regard it critically and recognize the poverty of its understanding of human motivation and human action. We have conferred too much prestige upon games, just as we have mistaken algorithms for play. We should be highly wary today of anyone who continues to take games, even such trivial and seemingly harmless pastimes as the VR-mediated fun of Rec Room, as any sort of key for grasping the human difference and its place in our fragile and frightening world.