The Missing Delight

    Delight is an orphan. Many other moods and emotions have had champions in literature and philosophy, patrons invested in their cultural standing. Melancholy can claim The Anatomy of Melancholy, Robert Burton’s strange masterpiece from 1621. It generated a fashion for melancholy that has not entirely faded, which the Romantics powerfully refreshed, lionizing melancholy for its immediate purchase on beauty. Baudelaire liked to remark that sadness is an essential element of beauty. In Kind of Blue and Sketches of Spain and other albums, Miles Davis projected modern melancholy onto a liquid music that proves Baudelaire’s point. Joy is, in this respect, like melancholy: it has great advocates in art and perhaps the greatest musical advocate of all in Beethoven, who composed the “Ode to Joy” — via Schiller’s poem, which Beethoven embedded in his ninth symphony — regal and radiant. Despair and anguish have secure homes in the arts and in letters. They haunt the literature of loss, the literature of mortality, the literature of romance, the literature of regret, the literature of war. Happiness? It is enshrined in the Declaration of Independence as an inalienable right, or at least the pursuit of it is. Stendhal believed the exact opposite of Baudelaire — that happiness is what beauty promises. And happiness can be formidable in absentia. It, too, cuts a culturally imposing figure.

    Horror is widely esteemed. What else could answer the human talent for cruelty? Horror intertwines with history — with Josephus chronicling the Romans’ destruction of Jerusalem or Thucydides relating his stories of plague and brutality or Gibbon summing up history itself as a record of the “crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind.” In the twentieth century, the Holocaust and other shatteringly large mass murders have deepened history’s association with atrocity and crime, leaving its shadow on the face of literature. The literature of witness has many twentieth-century tributaries. It is paradigmatically modern, an entire genre governed by horror. Or horror can flourish outside the historical realm, in the psyche. It can be the ahistorical preoccupation of Edgar Allen Poe, Flannery O’Connor, Edvard Munch, Val Lewton, and Alfred Hitchcock. No video streaming service would be complete without an expanding collection of horror movies. Hollywood discovered a long time ago that even horror can give pleasure.

             The more irate moods balance political with cultural stature. Raging against the dying of the light can resemble rage at the world’s injustices — the purity of political anger and the indignation that bends toward revolution. Karl Marx did not just study global commerce and speculate about alternative forms of political economy; a virtuoso of invective, he grounded his prophetic visions in fury. The dominant political mode in the United States at the moment is either anger or disgust, a point of convergence for the wrathful Right and the wrathful Left. Disgust is a mark of engagement and sensibility. Not to be disgusted is to be oblivious or simply to be stupid. For decades, disgust has colored contemporary art, which often confronts us with the extent of our rapacity, with the depth of our prejudice, and with our underlying commitment to the production not of value or of dignity but of garbage, of the waste we so callously leave behind. Disgust is definitely in vogue.

    But delight is not in vogue. It almost never is. It is, as I say, an intellectual orphan. More fickle than happiness and almost physiological, a reflex as much as an emotion, delight evades easy definition. It is intensely subjective, more so perhaps than sadness or anger. It is lighter, and with fewer evident implications, and even more impermanent, than pleasure. Delight cannot be summoned. It comes when it comes and goes when it goes — usually quickly. It awaits occasions, and in their absence it cannot be spontaneously generated. Often delight owes something to surprise. Yet delight is not a less meaningful state of mind, a less fundamental human mode, than sadness or anger, rage or disgust, joy or melancholy. But where are its advocates? Its placelessness puts it in a precarious cultural position. It runs the risk of being overlooked and, by getting overlooked, of being dismissed or forgotten as trivial. It runs the risk of neglect at precisely the moment when delight might be most culturally beneficial, which is to say the moment we are living in right now. Slaves of anxiety and fear, surrounded by unimpeachable reasons for pessimism, we are still in need of it. 

    I would like to say a few words in defense of delight.

    Delight is a Latinate word. The “de” is an intensifier placed against lactare, to lure or to entice. Old French modified delactare into delitier, meaning to please or to charm, and around the year 1200 Middle English winnowed delit from delitier, keeping its meaning. In the sixteenth century, delit acquired an “h” and with this addition its modern form, which by an accident of English spelling harbors a word that does not really belong to it — light. A room is lit, a lamp can be lighted, and a person can be delighted. Words properly related to delight are: delicious, delicate, lace, elicit, and dilettante. (A dilettante, unlike an expert, is someone who is often delighted.) The root of delight in lactare reinforces one of delight’s important aspects. It is an active emotion, kinetic in a way that anger and sadness are not. Compared to delight, anger and sadness can seem static.

    The 1913 edition of Webster’s Dictionary provides three definitions of delight, wavering between sense and intellect. First, it is “a high degree of gratification of mind; a high-wrought state of pleasurable feeling; lively pleasure; extreme satisfaction; joy.” “Gratification of mind” is itself an interesting variation on “extreme satisfaction.” “Lively pleasures” emphasize delight as a word of motion, more active than passive. Somewhat circular is Webster’s second definition: “that which gives great pleasure or delight.” And third, lest “gratification of mind” grant too much to mind and to highly wrought inner states, there is delight as “licentious pleasure; lust.” Without explanation, Webster’s parenthetically puts the name “Chaucer” next to this third definition. The Canterbury Tales could reasonably be called a compendium of delights. Chaucer merged verse, humor, and bawdiness in his characters (male and female), cheerfully acknowledging the pleasure they take in sex. Chaucerian writing captures a distinctive version of delight.

    Left out from the definitions in Webster’s are delight’s religious and spiritual overtones. Perhaps they are subsumed within the “gratification of mind.” Consider the thirty-seventh Psalm in the King James translation. Iterations of delight appear in it three times. The Psalm begins by eschewing antagonism. Its first line is an injunction: “fret not thyself because of evildoers, neither be thou envious of the workers of iniquity.” Antagonism is a distraction from God and from godliness. Trust, rather, in the Lord, the Psalm contends, and “delight thyself also in the LORD; and he shall give thee the desires of thine heart.” “Delight thyself in” might be a synonym here for worship, but more precisely it is an antonym to the Psalm’s opening word, an antonym to “fret.” To fret is to inhibit delight. To fret because of evildoers or to envy the workers of iniquity is to focus one’s mind on the evildoers and the iniquity, a technique for losing sight of God. Delight — by contrast — is the path to receiving one’s heart’s desires through God. It is the gate, the path, and the goal. This Psalm is a document not of a tormented religious sensibility, which is amply represented in all the religions, but of a joyous one. 

    The thirty-seventh Psalm guarantees the transience of wickedness. It promises the eventual demise of evildoers, after which “the meek shall inherit the earth; and shall delight themselves in the abundance of peace.” Together, righteousness and delight in the Lord are preludes to some period of God-given recompense, to a time when the meek can delight themselves in abundant peace. Both means and end, delight constitutes a virtuous circle in this Psalm. Its third and final mention of delight synthesizes the word’s first two appearances: “the steps of the good man are ordered by the LORD; and he delighteth in his way.” Abraham is ordered to sacrifice his son Isaac; Jacob must wrestle with an angel to become Israel; Job, a good man, is subjected to fantastic suffering. Such are the imponderables of God’s will and of faith in God. The thirty-seventh Psalm illuminates a separate pathway, of God ordering the steps of the good man and of the good man delighting in his way. Is delight the proof of his goodness? Is it the cause of his goodness? Is delight cause and proof simultaneously?

    A more secular sensibility would link delight not to God or to goodness but to art and aesthetic experience. Delight is thinner than tragedy’s catharsis, the constructive churn of emotion that arises from the spectacle of disaster. Nor is delight at all related to the awe that one feels in response to the sublime, a category of art or nature that has long fascinated philosophers. The sublime is a vertiginous awakening of the senses to the magnitude of things, one part wonder and one part horror. The sublime shades into terribilita, the trait claimed by Renaissance painters such as Michelangelo. Grandeur and seriousness are the markers of an artist aspiring to terribilita. To achieve their desired effect they must produce an art that is large-scale and riven with tension, with light and dark, good and evil, piety and sin.

    Delight is smaller and there is nothing cataclysmic about it. It is, in fact, anti-cataclysmic. It is a respite from intensity. Art in search of delight, art open to delight, tends toward moderation. It runs the risk of sweetness and harmony. Dangers abound for any art oriented toward delight. Aiming to please, to allure and to entice, it might please too much, starting in the gratification of the senses and ending in banality — the beautifully arranged image of a beautiful person in beautiful clothes contemplating a beautiful tree. Any excess will make a delightful work of art cloying. Another trap in which such easily grasped art might get caught is kitsch, and commodification. Once upon a time the Impressionists were shocking, with their revolutionary fidelity to sense impressions and their exhilarating liberties with color, but their paintings have since ended up on shower curtains and coffee mugs and picture puzzles. Delight sells, not least because it seems to demand no effort, merely a momentary capture of attention. The will to delight is a mainstay in the aesthetics of advertising.

    Delight’s natural affinity may be less with “high art,” which by definition makes demands on the viewer, than with interior and industrial design. Delight is not just the currency of advertisers and not just the advertisement. It is the iPhone itself, which gives great pleasure or delight. Delight can be an appreciation of craftsmanship. It is the effect of examining a well-made watch — the fineness of the pieces, the interlocking parts, the exquisite smallness of everything. Or delight is there to be absorbed from distinctive furniture, the Eames chair that hits every mark of style, the color of the wood, the excellence of the fabric, and the austere geometry of the chair itself. Delight in this regard cannot escape certain class connotations. It intersects with luxury, with the licentiousness of objects. Prized objects can give delight, reflecting the money and the taste that made them possible. Delight walks arm in arm with connoisseurship, with the educated ability to recognize things, preferably rare and expensive things, that rise to the level of delight.

    Two other domains of human experience, food and sex, do a lot to make delight their own. Food’s claim is self-evident — the unity of smell, taste, and sight heightened and then relished by appetite. The variety of a great meal, the conviviality: the hunger to be delighted by food is instinctual, something with which we are born. Even poor people can partake of it. The social character of eating has often been praised as an enhancement of delight: when Hume sought release from philosophical perplexity, his first instinct was to dine with friends. Similarly, erotica does not have much purpose beyond delight, giving fresh meaning to “a high degree of gratification of the mind.” Pornographic erotica often traffics in violence and exploitation, feeding into a high degree of rapacity of the mind, selling this rapacity to the highest bidder. It is often revolting. In milder erotica, however the mind similarly gratifies itself through fantasy, through idealizations or through idealized degradations, depending on tastes and preferences. As with food, the enjoyment of erotica is instinctive, crossing many cultures and many epochs. In ancient Pompeii, people had erotica painted into their houses without embarrassment. They displayed it with pride, as yet another way — in addition to images of field and flower — of ennobling a home with the delights of domesticity. In these examples, delight approximates the lively pleasures that are one of its defining features. 

    An enduring objection to delight as aesthetic experience is political. Is there such a thing as political delight? Political art might embrace sentimentality or the sublime, it may inspire or cast one down, but it has little patience with delight. Political art frets about evildoers and the workers of iniquity. It can be subtle and it can be marvelous as art, but at the very least political art must advocate. It must carry a message that can be broadcasted and received and sustained. That is its truest function. Upton Sinclair’s masterpiece of social protest, The Jungle, from 1906, channels the superior novels of Charles Dickens (who was an avowedly political writer) and the superior novels of Emile Zola (who was nothing if not a political writer). Sinclair was right about the intolerable labor conditions in Chicago. To remain right about this Chicago, he had to write a novel in which the modern American city is oppressive. Its stockyards are awash in blood. The city around them is dense with unhappiness. The sheer length of The Jungle makes it oppressive to read. Because the novel breathes the air of unhappiness, so, too, must the reader. Anything else would be a betrayal of its political purpose. In this context the genius of Dickens becomes even more pronounced. He produced novels that analyze and indict social conditions but somehow manage to layer passages of sheer delight into them, most palpably the delight Dickens always found in the written word. 

    If delight is not entirely an orphan, it is because it has a parent or a guardian angel in comedy. Conventional comedy has its genre requirements: the smooth passage past discordance and dissonance to resolution — the progression in romantic comedy, for example, from a relationship that makes no sense to the perfect marriage. All’s well that ends well and so on. Comedy traffics in laughter, which is an outward expression of delight (among other things). The parallel between laughter and delight lies in their physicality, in the force of laughter, which mirrors the motion of delight. Laughter is sudden, it comes as a relief, it cuts through, it pulls up, it breaks through boredom, anger, anguish, complacency, worry, grief. Beckett was the great master of such laughter. Of course not all comedy plays by the conventional rules. It can mix and combine with other emotions and genres, particularly with tragedy, its frequent fellow-traveler. Whether full-fledged or only a piece of the puzzle, well-fashioned comedy is pedagogic. By provoking laughter it teaches laughter. In this it once again resembles delight, which by provoking joy teaches joy.

    Satire, an uncompromising version of comedy, is tied organically to delight. Satire takes as its point of departure evil, disaster, sanctimony, hypocrisy, vanity, and pomposity — and transforms them into laughter. Satire does not promise the eradication of misfortune. If anything, satire promises the intractability of evil. Satire and political art branch out in two separate directions: one toward reform and the other toward survival skills, the ones that can help us to co-exist with the never-ending foolishness and injustice. True satirists are not reformers. They are noticers, not just of evildoing but of the indifference that is so often the response to evil. The satirist depicts malice meticulously — most famously Swift observing how little people care about poverty in Ireland and then proving the point in his “Modest Proposal,” in which he made the policy recommendation that Irish children be eaten. The laugher that Swift incites is complicated. The dark delight lies not in the mention of poverty but in Swift’s complete psychological command of our unconcern. To laugh at ourselves is in this instance to see ourselves in a very unflattering mirror.

    A less exacting species of delight resides in parody. By shifting registers, by altering the tone, parody exposes formula for what it is. In the film Blazing Saddles, Mel Brooks accomplishes a ferocious parody of the Western. Brooks gets us to laugh at ourselves in Blazing Saddles — at our enthusiasm for Hollywood formula — by rearranging the cowboy movie’s cliches. In Blazing Saddles, a man punches a horse, a visual gag and a joke about the movies. It would be nothing for a man to kill another man in a Western: the genre thrives on violence and on outlaws who upend social and ethical codes. Yet in Blazing Saddles the violence goes too far, exposing violence as not only wrong but absurd. A man punches a horse, and Brooks prods us to laugh at our shock and outrage. If we do, we are in the zone of delight. In 2022, one could easily imagine the film getting banned for its depiction of cruelty to animals, confirming the brilliance of Brooks’ joke. In 2022, indeed, Brooks’ whole film, with its parodies of racism, misogyny, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and religious piety, could never get made, which is a shame.

    In 1964, Susan Sontag brought together satire, parody, and delight in “Notes on Camp.” Sontag captured a well-established cultural style — she traces it back to the eighteenth century — that thrives on responding with comic appreciation to art that is overdone, that is too much, that dramatizes itself far past the limits of good taste. The epitome of such comic appreciation, Camp is “the farthest extension, in sensibility, of life as theater,” Sontag writes. In this theatrical sensibility, “things are campy not when they become old — but when we have less invested in them, and can enjoy, instead of be frustrated by, the failure of the attempt.” The enjoyment of failure, Camp is “a seriousness that fails” and that by failing succeeds as Camp. Less investment, greater enjoyment. Without apology, seriousness is exchanged for lightness. 

    Sontag was writing against the literary-critical grain of her time. She was throwing down a gauntlet to the recondite academics and to the dour servants of the avant-garde. One sees this dual program in her defense of Camp, which “refuses both the harmonies of traditional seriousness and the risk of fully identifying with extreme states of being.” More than a take-down of the overly earnest and the overly intense, “Notes on Camp” is a celebration of “the consistently aesthetic experience of the world.” Camp is a method of appreciating some popular culture — or mass culture, as the editors of Partisan Review, the magazine in which “Notes on Camp” first appeared, would have put it. Camp is a method for having cultural fun, one that “makes the man of good taste cheerful.” Not quite the thirty-seventh Psalm, this, too, is nevertheless a way of reaching the desires of one’s heart. “The connoisseur of Camp is continually amused, delighted,” Sontag continues. Sontag’s argument for Camp is precisely that it delights. 

    Granting laughter and enjoyment their due as tools of delight, one must immediately add that there is a variety of delight that is not entangled in Camp’s ironies or in satire’s aggressions. Irony and satire are stances or attitudes. Delight is an experience. The purest delight arises from the aesthetic experience of it, as it might from experiences untethered to art: the easy delight that nature gives off, or the delight encoded in the giddier moments of friendship and love. Sensual or sensuous pleasure might issue in physical or psychosomatic symptoms — the fabled “Stendhal syndrome” induced by art or antiquity, or in Stendhal’s case, “a fierce palpitation of the heart” and “an attack of nerves” that followed a rapturous encounter with Volterrano’s frescoes in a chapel of Florence’s Santa Croce church. Delight is a different and less dramatic response. And yet, like the aesthete’s ecstasy, delight is more mystical than rational; and it transforms, not forever because it passes, but still it transforms. In its own way, the art of delight elevates. It juxtaposes two contrasting truths: that we do not live elevated lives most of the time, since we always carry many burdens; and that we are capable of elevation, even of levitation, though down we will go soon enough. The first truth might well be unbearable without the second. Delight defies the difficulties of life. 

    Case studies can lend these claims specificity, and I will provide three of them, traveling backwards in historical time. The first is the Chrysler Building, which was completed in 1930. This extraordinary skyscraper is profligate in the delight that it bestows on onlookers and passers-by. The second is Louis Armstrong’s 1928 recording of “West End Blues,” a studio performance that is evidence of Armstrong’s early mastery. The third is Mozart’s opera, The Marriage of Figaro, an opera buffa, which first appeared on stage in Vienna in 1786 and brings us (inevitably) back to comedy as well as pedagogy. Mozart’s Figaro shines with delight. No less does it teach its listeners or viewers to know delight, even though the story it tells is often harrowing. Like the classical style more generally, Figaro punctuates delight with poignancy. And the opera is an experiment in delight as philosophy, as a way of being, through which Mozart does the impossible: he sustains delight for hours, reversing the standard ratio and thereby arguing provocatively, in agreement with the thirty-seventh Psalm, that suffering is temporary but delight as eternal.

    The Chrysler Building is a great work of art. It came about, though, for reasons that were to the side of artistic intention. Its architect was William Van Alen, who was born in New York City in 1883. From modest beginnings, he made his was to Paris in 1908, where he studied at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts, a traditionalist haven, and then gradually acquired a taste for modernism. Van Alen’s great patron turned out to be Walter Chrysler, also of modest background. He was a man without much education and with an extreme talent for business. By 1928, Chrysler was promoting his Silver Dome car, running a booming company and seeking a prestige building in New York. He wanted it to bear the insignia of his name and his company. He wanted the advertising, and — as many did at the time — he wanted to be in on in the construction of the world’s tallest building. Van Alen delivered the goods, after which their relationship soured into acrimony with a court case about payment. Van Alen won the case, but by having brought it to court he lost his professional reputation. The Chrysler Building was his only major commission. He is an artist who made only one work and it is a masterpiece. 

    Up into the sky it rose, between 1929 and 1930. The distinctive steel used for the Chrysler Building, Enduro KA-2, was created not much earlier, in 1926. It must have mingled in Walter Chrysler’s mind with the Silver Dome, and cars were suggested and represented across the building. Its gargoyles, inspired perhaps by Van Alen’s time in Paris, look like gigantic hood ornaments. The building’s most notable feature, after its silvery steel, is its decorative spire, an unforgettable pattern of curving lines that suggest a sunburst, a pagan accent, and — more prosaically — the hubcaps of a Chrysler automobile. Pagan hubcaps! The Chrysler Building never shies away from business; it is all business. It bypasses the alleged tension between branding and art and between art and commerce, which curiously is a part of its glamour. Claudia Roth Pierpont once described the Chrysler Building as “the quintessential jazz baby of buildings” and as a specimen of “the honky-tonk sublime.” 

    Ever since it went up, the Chrysler Building has sparkled in films and photographs. The photos highlight the charm and exuberance of its many ornaments, while the aerial photographs divinize the building. Located on 42nd Street and Lexington Avenue, it is far enough from the downtown and midtown forests of skyscrapers to stand out, and to contrast its slender beauty to the many less sublime structures of the Manhattan skyline. It is less squat than the Empire State Building, less severe than the Twin Towers, of blessed memory, with less matter and more art than any of the countless other attempts to brand the New York City sky. The photographs are persuasive in admiring the Chrysler Building as New York City’s loveliest skyscraper. Postcards and refrigerator magnets tell us that what the Eiffel Tower is to Paris and the Coliseum is to Rome and the leaning tower is to Pisa, the Chrysler Building is to New York. Walter Chrysler could not have been more pleased with what his building has achieved. More than the car company, the building will immortalize his name.

    The Chrysler Building’s involvement with delight runs along other grooves. It comes from seeing the building from the street. It comes by surprise, which is a feature of delight, when art or aesthetic experience is not what one was expecting. It comes either by day or by night. The day should be sunny. Street-level New York is loud. It overfills the eye: the signage, the foot traffic, the flood of cars. Above it are the usually multi-storied buildings, many of the them handsome, but they cannot compete with the spectacle of the near-at-hand. But cross a street, or walk into Bryant Park, and the sky reappears, and there, demarcating this blue sky perfectly, stands the Chrysler Building, its gleaming silver cleansing the eye and drawing it up to the crowning sunburst that, because it is so high, belongs more to the sky than to the city or the street. Seen purely, as an optical experience, the Chrysler Building signifies nothing but its own exquisite form. It promotes nothing. It is a building rather than an icon, but a building that transforms stone and steel and masonry into the visual stuff of levitation. In this way it surprises and delights its accidental viewers. When you look up you are lifted up. 

    In the evening, the Chrysler Building’s steel is invisible. It is one of a thousand skyscrapers. Its sole uniqueness is its domed top, the curves of which are lit up — something that Van Alen had contemplated but was not realized until the 1980s. The curves of light belong to the building, which at night is a metropolitan lighthouse, lending the city coherence and staving off disorientation. New York is too bright, even at the darkest pitch of night, to see the stars. The Chrysler Building takes their place, the city’s North Star, merging the delight of its design with the comfort of its identifiable presence. Amid the visual chaos of Manhattan the nighttime Chrysler Building is a constant, like its cousin the Empire State building, there to guide the late-night walker in the city. In the nocturnal city, which can inspire anxiety, the spire of the Chrysler Building comes as a great relief from darkness, as an answer to darkness, an image of form that playfully, cheerfully, solicitously oversees the endless city. 

    The Chrysler Building is a work of art ironically. Much as New York City does, Walter Chrysler wanted to impress. His adolescent eagerness to own the world’s tallest building, which for a while he did, was outpaced by this same adolescent eagerness in others. By 1932, the Chrysler Building was demoted to being the world’s second tallest building; and it continues to be so demoted; and it hardly matters. The Chrysler Building makes no secret of its impurity. It is neither a museum nor a monument, and it is no cathedral, except maybe to capitalism. It is an office building. Yet the sincere impurity of a building put up to celebrate gas-guzzling Chryslers does nothing to tarnish its gift of delight. Its form is unimpaired by what goes on inside it. To the contrary: by asking so little of its viewers, by not being Saint Peter’s Basilica or Notre Dame de Paris, it forces them to receive its gift with no expectations, without having to be aware of anything (other than the building’s name), without having to give it their religious or political allegiance. It lets them be merely delighted, and the surrounding city obliges as a foil, with its fumes, its din, its grays, its gaudy colors, and its unforgiving proportions. New York’s overwhelming density paves the way to the delight of a building that leaves it all behind and melts into a colorless, self-illuminated verticality. If fretful New York is the call, the Chrysler Building is the response.

      Louis Armstrong came to New York in 1924. Born in New Orleans in 1901, he had moved to Chicago in 1922, a prominent member of the Great Migration from South to North. At age seventeen, Armstrong had begun playing on riverboats near New Orleans, and it was in 1923 that he made his first studio recording (in Indiana). New York, the big leagues, had the Fletcher Henderson band; but Armstrong went back to Chicago, where he made some of his most extraordinary music. Between 1925 and 1928, he recorded sixty songs — for which he received modest payment and no royalties — with different groups. Jazz was a new and fluid musical form, a work in progress, and Armstrong’s recordings in these years were some its greatest revelations — jazz’s scripture. There was the quality of the ensemble playing, which no other musicians could match. There were Armstrong’s improvisations, which no one could match. He did not improvise decorative ornaments. He improvised everything, the whole melodic line, playing with the total assurance that was his signature. Rather than find his way to a new style he brought to his recordings a new style fully formed.

             A gem among these bejeweled recordings is “West End Blues.” The song had been composed by Armstrong’s mentor, Joe “King” Oliver, a cornet player. Its name evoked New Orleans and in particular a neighborhood, the West End, known as a summer resort. It was a popular venue for music — and the last stop on a New Orleans trolly line. On June 28, 1928, Armstrong came to the studio with the pianist Earl Hines, the clarinetist Jimmy Strong, the trombonist Fred Robinson, the banjo player Mancy Carr and the drummer Zutty Singleton. By the racial and popular-culture strictures of the day, Armstrong was an entertainer. He resented his wife (the pianist Lil Hardin) for promoting him as “the greatest trumpet player in the world.” He could not have been unaware of his genius, so fluently did it display itself in his recordings and in his concerts, but his own genius was not the point of these recordings. That much can be surmised from Earl Hines’s recollection of their reaction to “West End Blues”: “When it first came out, Louis and I stayed by that recording practically an hour and a half or two hours and we just knocked each other out because we had no idea it was gonna turn out as good as it did.” They had no idea!

    A bit over three minutes long, “West End Blues” has several discreet parts. Armstrong starts alone with a baroque chain of arpeggios and clustered notes, all bravura and virtuosity. The next part is the song’s melody, a straight-up blues played by Armstrong to the underlying soft thump of his rhythm section. Armstrong makes way for a lazy trombone solo and then a clarinet solo, to which he added his voice, scat singing in dialogue with the clarinet. (Throughout his life what made Armstrong’s raspy voice into a lovely voice was the sound of delight within it.) What follows is an intricate, elegant piano solo from Earl Hines, going up the piano, staying momentarily high, shifting to the piano’s middle registers and then bringing out its bass notes — urbane blues par excellence. Armstrong hits a high note in the song’s climax, lingers over it and then plays a few blues figurations, after which he and Hines trade punctuation marks, giving the song a soft landing, a minimalist conclusion to its baroque beginning. However rehearsed it was, “West End Blues” is free and seamless and floating and seemingly effortless, a languorous summer afternoon in the West End of New Orleans.

    The ensemble contributes a lot to the song’s delight. For its three minutes, the song moves through many textures: the cerebral clarity of the piano, the weary thickness of the trombone, the earthiness of the clarinet, and the conversational whimsicality of Armstrong’s vocals. As for the solos, Armstrong generously passes the baton, which continues to get passed, a touch of competitiveness flashing when Hines dares to play with no less imagination than Armstrong, and no less flair. None of the musicians reduces the number to a personal flight of fancy. “West End Blues” is a self-creating poem in which each verse is written with a new instrument or combination of instruments, a classical drama with a beginning, a middle and an end. Nothing intrudes. Nothing obtrudes. Nothing distracts. Nothing detracts. Nothing conflicts.

             The ensemble is Armstrong’s of course, as is its approach to the song. His voice is lighthearted, imitating first the clarinet and then with a “wah wah wah” the trombone, not making fun of them but not taking them very seriously either. Armstrong’s trumpet is the song’s incomparable instrument of delight. The sound is bright and high, neither celestial (as a violin might be) nor melancholic (as a cello might be). “West End Blues” radiates delight much as the Chrysler Building does. As with the Chrysler Building, it uses altitude for effect. Armstrong’s introduction plunges down, a waterfall of notes that zig-zag lower and lower. Later, in his short solo, Armstrong flies up, staying as he liked to do for several seconds on a single note, the ensemble going on almost without him, as if he had forgotten about them and about the rules of gravity. Just as the eye sweeps up the Chrysler Building, the ear — and the soul — sweeps up with Armstrong’s high note and briefly remains ascended, standing with the trumpeter at the top of the mountain and relishing the height and the view and the cool air.

             Armstrong’s rhythms complete the picture. Speeding up, slowing down, staying silent, he divides and subdivides time. The song starts with the jagged complexity of his introduction, brilliantly breaking down time and folding it in upon itself, after which Armstrong’s rendition of the melody is low key. A bit faster and it would be dance music, something at which Armstrong excelled: it was Armstrong’s marching-band and blues rhythms that formed the foundation for swing in the 1930s. Throughout “West End Blues” and without playing many notes, Armstrong uses syncopation to give the music its energy, its tension, its forward momentum. The biggest delight of all is that we can hear him improvise in “real time.” Though the number has structure, there is something blithe and serendipitous about it — its sophistication gives way to joy. If Armstrong and Hines had no idea what they had accomplished with “West End Blues,” it was not necessarily because they were modest or because they had been labeled entertainers rather than artists. They may have entered too blissfully into the moment and been too fully enchanted by the rhythms of their ensemble and solo playing to assess their handiwork. If so, they would have something in common with those who can listen to them play — on a record, on a CD, on a phone — and be startled and delighted (delight is always startling) by the music together with the musicians who were making it on June 28, 1928.

    The Marriage of Figaro is perhaps the last word on delight. Listing the greatest hits of Camp, Sontag included “much of Mozart.” This is not quite right. Mozart could not fail musically, though he was certainly theatrical, and his operas were the apogee of his theatricality. Figaro and many of Mozart’s other operas do not skimp on ridiculous plot twists and on the silliness endemic to opera, especially to opera that does not declare itself to be comic — but Figaro has nothing in common with the bad Broadway musical that can be twisted, by a sophisticated viewer, into a fabulously bad Broadway musical. Figaro is an aesthetic experience for what it is, beginning with its marvelous plot and continuing in the music, which is psychologically astute and a kind of storytelling art unto itself. Averse to glum seriousness, though the pains of love and the injustice of class relations are among its subjects, and thrillingly comic, Figaro is as ambitious a work of literary art as there could be. It surpasses even Don Giovanni, the opera that Mozart would write a year after finishing Figaro. By placing the laurel wreaths of artistic perfection on a comedy, Figaro is an invitation, in its details and in aggregate, to ponder the exquisiteness of delight. 

             Figaro’s libretto came from the pen of Lorenzo da Ponte. Jewish by birth, Da Ponte grew up near Venice and became a less than proper Catholic priest. Having made his way to Vienna, he was a sought-after librettist who collaborated with Mozart on Figaro, on Don Giovanni, and on Così fan tutte. As if this were not enough for an interesting life, Da Ponte eventually settled in the United States. In New York City he ran a bookstore and served as a professor of Italian literature at Columbia University. He made many contributions to the musical arts in the early republic, helping to build up an opera house that was a predecessor to the Metropolitan Opera. With Figaro, Da Ponte was repurposing a controversial play, La folle journee, ou le Marriage du Figaro, written by Pierre-Augustin Beaumarchais, an avid supporter of the American Revolution, who portrayed a world of culpable aristocrats and admirable servants. Many readers of the play, including Danton and Napoleon, regarded it as an act of political subversion. Converting the play into an opera, Da Ponte took much of its political edge off. His Figaro is neither radical nor sanguine about what a college student might today call privilege. It is very canny about privilege.

    The story is about an errant employer. He is the Count Almaviva, who eliminated the droit du seigneur from his Seville household but then tries to bring it back. Count Almaviva, an obstreperous baritone in the opera, has lost interest in his wife, even in her unhappiness. The libretto implies that he has seduced the gardener’s daughter, Barbarina. The action of Figaro revolves around Susanna, whom the servant Figaro wishes to marry and whom the Count wishes to seduce. The opera begins with Susanna’s fear, which the music makes clear: a servant’s bell doubling, while she sings, as an alarm bell. She is right to fear the Count’s lust and his will to power. Though Figaro has the happy ending that comedy seems to promise, and the resolution that is a formal requirement of the classical style, its exploration of barely restrained coercion, of jealousy, of emotional abandonment, of transgression hoped for if not always consummated, is rich and moving. In Figaro, these attitudes and conditions are not smothered in the myth and in the histrionics that make many operas famous for their music and infamous for their plots. 

     

    Delight has two guises in The Marriage of Figaro, the music  of course and the narrative. They are not separable. A simple delight of Figaro’s story, augmented by its Spanish setting, is a house full of young and amorous people. It is la folle journee, the topsy-turvy day, on which two people are about to wed. Figaro and Susanna lend their anticipation to Figaro. Its first scene is Figaro measuring out the space for their marriage bed. Excitement is also instilled by Cherubino, a boyish man whose role Mozart wrote for a soprano. A character plucked from Da Ponte’s libertine past, Cherubino is the eroticized cherub. He cannot hide his attraction to the Countess, to Barbarina, to love itself. Cherubino is perpetually enamored — voi che sapete, tell me what love is, he sings in one of the work’s finest arias. No longer young, the Countess gets the opera’s most heart-breaking aria, its show-stopper. “Where have the sweet moments gone?” she asks with almost unbearable regret about her wayward husband in Act Three. Lamenting the loss of love, she is pure tenderness in this aria, foreshadowing the reconciliation with the Count destined to come in Act Four.

             A less simple delight in Figaro crystallizes around perseverance and forgiveness. Resourceful Susanna, not simple-minded Figaro, is the opera’s protagonist, its heroine. Echoing the Beaumarchais play, Figaro celebrates Susanna as someone who can outsmart the Count. She has to outsmart her fiancée Figaro in the process. His insufficient and then overabundant jealousy threatens their relationship with ruin. Susanna’s soulful perseverance, embedded in everything she sings, rises far above the aloof Countess and above the narcissistic Cherubino, not to mention the bombastic Count. But it is this same fallible Count who breaks through to introspection and regret, getting down on his knees to beg forgiveness of the Countess, when the four-act merry-go-round of intrigue and impersonation comes to a halt and the Count finds himself eagerly trying to seduce his own wife. His missteps are certainly familiar from comedy, whether from the romantic comedies of Shakespeare or the romantic comedies of Hollywood. Yet when confronted with his wife, when recognizing her, he steps away from comedy. His request for forgiveness — the music leaves no doubt about this at all — is from the heart.

    The Countess’s forgiveness of the Count captivated Lionel Trilling, who slipped a mention of it into his novel, The Middle of the Journey. Its main character, John Laskell, is listening to Figaro on the radio: “it was in full flight and nearing its end in the magical last scene where farce moves to regions higher than tragedy can reach.” What are these higher regions? Why can farce reach them when tragedy cannot? Ever the teacher, Trilling liked to give his readers questions without being so forward as to answer them himself. Tragedy scrutinizes error, loss, and death through nobility: the tragedy of King Lear, the tragedy of Prince Hamlet. Tragedy is surely the gateway to higher regions. Farce, if it goes higher, corresponds to daily life. It has the space in which to go up, to ascend, to gain altitude and to demonstrate — by means of delight, which is second nature to farce — that error is not necessarily followed by loss and death. Errors can pile up in such a way that from them love and forgiveness might materialize. Farce is not tangential to Figaro. Farce, the comedy of perpetual human error, and therefore a genre of eventual or sudden self-overcoming forgiveness, is what makes it move and what makes it moving. 

    Mozart’s music does the rest. It is the story and the commentary on the story. Mozart is the composer for whom the prime mover is usually delight. Simplicity is one factor, because it brings out the uncluttered melodic line, which is a vocal line in all of Mozart’s music, rising and falling in synch with the human voice. Mozart’s melodic line is lyrical, tinged with the pastels of his harmonies, not without darkness but suffused with light. Figaro’s music capitalizes on the conventions of opera buffa, mocking the Count’s vanity, cherishing the mistaken identities, and honoring Mozart’s own character, his irrepressible, almost angelic mirth. Mozart was born for farce. Yet his music wraps opera buffa in beauty, not in slapstick. The music is designed to provoke not wild laughter but a wise and grateful smile. Jealousy and self-understanding, love and deception, seesaw throughout Figaro in actions so petty, so humdrum, so familiar that they remind the viewers not of a fantasy-land eighteenth-century Seville but of their own twenty-first century dailiness, their own quotidian dramas. If it is “we” who are on stage in Figaro, failing to persevere or to forgive, misunderstanding and then misunderstanding again; it is also we who inhabit and are irradiated by the music’s beauty, and it is we who can wind our way through the convolutions of farce into the higher regions of delight. In this empyrean, delight feels almost like a worldview. 

             Art and the artist are said to have responsibilities, especially these days. One of those  responsibilities is to respond to the surrounding circumstances and to take them into account. The word “novel” derives from the French word nouvelle, which is less about novelty than the news. Novels bring us the news. So too do all the arts, and these days the news is bad. Climate change has begun, standing like a roadblock before the future. Russia’s war in Ukraine, which already is a long war, is not a local war. It is an attack on international comity, an attack on American aspirations to global leadership, and an attack on peace in Europe. The record of atrocities is large and getting larger — committed sometimes on the same terrain whose previous experience with mass murder yielded the phrase “never again.” Climate change and war are occurring in the midst of pandemic, food shortages, and the gradual replacement of globalization (mixed blessing that it always was) with war economies guided by sanctions, military spending, and the rationing of goods that the war will soon demand. And China is on the march.

    In the 1930s, the United States was an antidote to the bacillus of worldwide chaos and aggression. Italy had Mussolini, Germany had Hitler, Spain had Franco, Portugal had Salazar, and the Soviet Union had Stalin. The United States had Franklin Roosevelt. For Joe Biden’s America, the bacillus is foreign and domestic: the zombie-like nature of Donald Trump, who refuses to stay buried in the political grave of his electoral defeat; an intractable economic inequality; a Congress trapped in performative outrage and real gridlock; a polarized society intoxicated by its respective particularisms that is less and less curious about its own members, less and less capable of the empathy, compromise, patience, and calm that enable democratic practice and social peace; a civil society armed to the teeth in which massacres are a regular feature of civic life; a culture that vacillates between sanctimony and indifference, egotism and self-abasement, ivory-tower jargon and social-media vulgarity. The common impulse is not so much to analyze as to diagnose the United States, though nobody seems to know what the disease is. No matter: we are all advocating cures — more democracy, less democracy, more secularism, more Christianity, more civility, more fight, more rule of law, more attempts to storm the cockpit and prevent United 93 from crashing. 

    Artists have taken heed. Climate change and its causes are a more than valid subject for art. And not a new subject: you can spot an objection to industrialization in many landscape paintings of the nineteenth century, such as the train in the distance in Thomas Cole’s verdant mountains. The campaign to reverse climate change speaks to greed and moral escapism. Don’t Look Up, the recent movie on climate change, was Swiftean in its set-up, though neither clever nor cutting enough to be Swiftean in its execution. Responding to war is similarly one of the constants of art, which will be crucial to any reckoning with the war in Ukraine. Art eclipses the writing of historians in the public memory of war; it — Goya is the most powerful example — is the best aid to moral reflection, especially for events that disturb us into confusion and numbness. Art also crosses the borders that wars impose, taking people out of uniform, out of victimhood, and back to their humanity. But generally political art does not accomplish the restoration of humaneness. Art will not be capable of untangling the crossed lines of American politics, in the short term at least. Too often twenty-first century American artists surrender loudly to their politics and themselves become instances of the overarching political polarization that ails us. Needless to say, art does not come up with political solutions. To ask solutions of art is to ask a misguided question, to ask of art, even political art, more than it is able to give. Artists may think they have solutions to political problems, but the solutions will not be their art. 

    The mistake is to assume that art must take its inspiration from climate change, from war, from political dysfunction or from similar crises and public disfigurations. The irony is that these grand disturbances are far too small a palette for any artist. Art answers to a fuller spectrum of emotions and imperatives. Among them is the emotion and the imperative of delight. Even in dark times, or perhaps especially then, art cannot forgo the resources of delight, or ignore its utility, the temporary salvation from bleakness that delight provides. These three practitioners of delight, Van Alen, Armstrong, and Mozart, were not coincidentally innovators. Van Alen invented a skyscraper unlike any other, employing new materials, configuring the architecture to go as high and reflect as much light as possible. In 1928, Armstrong was pioneering the sounds and structures of jazz, and imparting its astonishing originality in the relatively novel setting of the recording studio. Mozart remade opera buffa into a high art form and did so with an edgy and transgressive story. (The original Beaumarchais play was banned from the Habsburg empire, a portend in 1786 of the revolution three years later.) Van Alen, Armstrong, and Mozart had problems aplenty. They did not bleach them out of their art. Neither did they fall so in love with their problems that they lost sight of their joy in creation, and in their individual genius for giving others delight.

    Delight is, or had better be, an essential part of culture. It softens the rough edges. It opens the window. It balances out the indignities. It dissipates anger. It separates beauty from sadness. It converts the grapes of wrath into the wine of extreme satisfaction, of lively pleasures, of gratification of mind, when the weight of events does the exact opposite. Much as Van Alen’s Chrysler Building mutely witnessed the Great Depression, before which it was designed and during which it was built, art aligned with delight will not cast off or lessen the weight of events. Delight is impermanent. “West End Blues” lasts only three minutes. When it reaches its fourth act, The Marriage of Figaro is almost over, its plot about to resolve. Delight is so necessary because it will never be the rule; it is relief from the rule. Once one sees the Chrysler Building from the street, New York will heartlessly reimpose itself. It will not let you rest in that spire’s glistening ambience. The Chrysler Building was not placed gracefully in a planned city. It offers momentary respite from the frenzy of promotion, the money making, the reputation making, and the thrill seeking to which New York City is unashamedly devoted. Delight’s victories never last.

    Yet its victories are precious nonetheless. They are restorative. While the sensation of delight passes in a rush, delight’s invigorations remain. Delight is the secret spring. It reveals an entire vein of possibility. It furnishes energy for the walk through the shadows that inevitably follows an interlude of delight. The memory of delight is one of our most valuable inner resources, internalized for the undelightful longue duree. Delight and dread are formidable antagonists, and delight teaches us to live with those elements that engender worry, sadness, oppression, and horror. Delight was Proust’s response to the scent of the madeleine: “An exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses, but individual, detached, with no suggestion of its origin,” he wrote. “And at once the vicissitudes of life had become indifferent to me, its disasters innocuous, its brevity illusory.” Proust started In Search of Lost Time before World War I, and he set down much of it during and after the war. As he rigorously documented malice and prejudice and desperation and cruelty in the people he knew and invented, he remained devoted to delight, as a principle and as an experience, without which he could not have begun his novel or continued it or come close to completing it. It was indispensable for his spiritual survival and his exploration of the vicissitudes of life, reason enough to be forceful but never to be uninterruptedly fretful.

    Figs

    Figs are sweet, but don’t last long.

    They spoil fast in transit,

    says the shopkeeper.

    Like kisses, adds his wife,

    a hunched old woman with bright eyes.

     

    Translated by Clare Cavanagh

    The Allegory of Good and Bad Government

    Good government, Buon Governo,

    and the good judge — we see

    how Siena thrives

    under the just ruler.

     

    Peace reigns over all, revealed.

    The peasants work serenely,

    grapes swell with pride,

    a wedding party dances in the street.

     

    But bad government sets out

    to torment justice,

    who bears the lovely name Iustitia,

    it lies, it sows Discord,

     

    it delights in Wickedness

    and Deceit; it ends by hiring assassins.

    The town empties, fields cease

    to bear fruit, houses burn.

     

    Still, after seven centuries, just look,

    (compare the two frescoes)

    Evil is pale, barely legible

    while Good compels our gaze

    with its rich colors.

     

    Only seven hundred years

    of waiting.

    The Twentieth Century in Retirement

    Let’s try to imagine it:

    a little like old Tolstoy

    he strolls the fields of Picardy,

     

    where funny tanks once

    clumsily defeated

    the terrain’s slight elevation.

     

    He visits the town

    where Bruno Schulz died

    or sits on a riverbank 

     

    above the Vistula’s dim water,

    a meadow scented with warm

    dandelions, burdocks, and memory.

     

    He doesn’t speak, rarely smiles.

    Doctors warn him 

    to avoid emotion.

     

    He says: I’ve learned one thing

    There is only mercy —

    for people, animals, trees, and paintings.

     

    Only mercy —

    always too late.

    In the Garage

    And then when you entered

    the empty garage

    a trumpet called 

    as in the Fifth Symphony

    And it suddenly grew clear

    that there is joy and death

    and mad flies

    that circle the table

    where all of you sat

    just moments ago

    calmly chatting

    The Old Painter

    The old painter stands by the studio window,

    where his brushes

    and colors lie.

     

    Poets wait for inspiration, but objects

    and faces assault the painter,

    they arrive shrieking.

     

    Their contours, though, have

    blurred and faded.

    Objects turn blind, mute.

     

    The old painter feels only

    a dim wave of light,

    a longing for form.

     

    And he knows even now

    that he may see again

    the bitter joy of indistinction.

    Another Life

    You like to read biographies of poets

    You rummage through another life

    That sudden shock

    of entering another life’s dark forest

    But you may leave at any moment

    for the street or the park

    or from a balcony at night

    you may gaze at stars

    belonging to no one

    stars that wound like knives

    without a drop of blood

    stars pure and shining

    cruel

    The Fashions in Trauma

    In articles that appeared in the American Journal of Psychiatry in 1969 and 1971, three army psychiatrists boasted that the policy of embedding psychiatrists in Vietnam’s combat units had been a wonderful success. And so the army’s statistics seemed to show. Peter Bourne, who headed the army’s psychiatric research team, announced that henceforth “psychiatric casualties need never again become a major cause of attrition in the United States military in a combat zone.” It was an assertion that provoked fury among many of those who had been sent to fight in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Soon enough, that anger had tangible consequences of a profound sort.

             Bourne was not the first psychiatrist to claim that his profession had the capacity to ward off the effects of war on the troops. As entry into the Second World War loomed, American psychiatry mobilized. It persuaded Washington that if it wanted to avoid the epidemic of shell-shock that had disabled so many soldiers in the First World War, the government should allow it to screen out the psychiatrically vulnerable. In that way, the damage to morale and to the army’s ability to fight could be avoided, as could the waste of resources involved in training soldiers incapable of enduring combat. 

             One and three quarter million potential recruits were rejected on psychiatric grounds. It was a triumph of science and forward planning. Except that once combat began, it swiftly became apparent once again that modern industrialized warfare was not ideally suited to the maintenance of mental health. Placed under sufficiently appalling stress, the soldiers of the greatest generation broke down between two and three times as often as those who had fought in the First World War. At war’s end, fifty thousand veterans, not all of whom had actually faced combat, languished in mental hospitals, and another half a million received pensions for psychiatric disabilities. Trauma and psychological stress, it seemed, could cause even the most apparently stable individuals to break down, to become maddened with fear, disgust, and horror.

             The traumatic effects of modern military conflict had, in fact, surfaced many decades before even the mass slaughter and maiming that marked the First World War. In the aftermath of America’s Civil War, the newly emerging subspecialty of neurology expected that much of its practice would consist of treating soldiers with obvious wounds of the brain and the nervous system. But such casualties were far outnumbered by veterans who displayed no obvious physical pathology, but who insisted that they were ill and incapacitated. By the end of the war, eight percent of the Union army alone, some 175,000 men, were found to be suffering from “nostalgia” (usually a synonym for depression or panic), or from a variety of “nervous” complaints extending all the way to outright insanity.

             Nobody thought to suggest that these men suffered from trauma, because in those years the word retained its original meaning. Derived from the ancient Greek word Τpαúμα, it had entered the English language in the late seventeenth century, and was used to refer to physical wounds. It was derived from other words meaning twisting, bruising, piercing, and the like. Its extension to encompass emotional wounds would not occur till the late 1880s, when the French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot and then Sigmund Freud began to employ it in a more extended sense to mean psychological responses to deeply distressing events, and to suggest that the origins of the neuroses lay in shattering emotional disturbances.

    Even in contemporary medicine, of course, the original meaning persists in the designation of certain hospitals as “trauma centers,” that is, places that treat physical injuries of sudden onset and severity that require immediate interventions to save live and limb. Though the psychiatric casualties of the two World Wars gave greater cultural salience to the notion of psychological trauma, the word’s primary reference to physical injury still dominated. For example, when the American Psychiatric Association published the first edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1952, psychological trauma was entirely absent from its pages. The only mentions of trauma referred injuries caused by force or by seizures that were experienced by patients treated with electroshock.

             If the concept of psychological trauma enjoyed greater cultural and professional salience in the following two decades, this largely reflected the fact that psychoanalysis had come to dominate out-patient and academic psychiatry, at least in the United States, and to have an ever- greater influence in American culture. Freudians gave pride of place to the concept of repression and its traumatic effects in accounting for mental disturbances. Trauma in the sense of psychological injury entered common parlance.

    In this changed context, Peter Bourne’s suggestion that traumatic injuries were largely non-existent among the grunts who fought in Vietnam soon came under attack. Embittered veterans who were among the vocal minority that joined the anti-war movement fiercely rejected that pollyannaish narrative. On the contrary, they insisted, their experiences had left them traumatized, and they mobilized to secure official recognition of the damage that the war had done to their mental health. Sleepless nights, nightmares, flashbacks to scenes of sickening horror, unpredictable and uncontrollable episodes of anger, panic attacks, blackouts, emotional numbness, depression — a host of ills was blamed on the war by those who regarded it as an abomination, a crime against humanity in which they had been forced to collaborate.

             Crucially, amid a rising tide of anti-war sentiment, these veterans soon secured allies among the psychiatric establishment, especially two prominent psychoanalysts and psychiatrists, Chaim Shatan of New York University and Robert Jay Lifton of Harvard. Shatan and Lifton joined forces to secure an official psychiatric diagnosis that recognized the reality of these men’s suffering. Shatan published a piece in The New York Times in 1972 in which he coined the term “post-Vietnam syndrome.” He and Lifton insisted that its symptoms — the product of psychological damage inflicted on soldiers by a vicious war — could emerge and persist long after the trauma that caused them. Within eighteen months, Shatan and Lifton were campaigning to have the diagnosis recognized as a distinctive form of psychiatric illness by the American Psychiatric Association.

             They chose a propitious moment. For more than a decade, evidence had been accumulating that psychiatrists had a terrible time agreeing about diagnoses. For example, one important study comparing diagnoses of patients in London and New York found that while Americans called sixty-two percent of their patients schizophrenic, doctors in England gave only thirty-four percent that label. On the other hand, while less than five percent of New York patients were diagnosed with depressive psychoses, the corresponding figure in London was twenty-four percent. But studies like these were buried in academic journals and monographs, and drew little attention outside the profession.

    Then a sensational article appeared in Science in January, 1973. It recounted an experiment in which a series of pseudo-patients presented themselves at a variety of mental hospitals claiming to hear voices but otherwise acting normally. All were admitted, and all but one were diagnosed as schizophrenic, and they were generally institutionalized for weeks before being released as schizophrenics in remission, a devastating diagnosis. Massive media attention to the study, authored by the Stanford social psychologist David Rosenhan, held the profession up to ridicule, and in a panic the American Psychiatric Association formed a task force to revamp its whole diagnostic system, and ensure that such embarrassing findings would not be repeated. Nearly a half century later, a New York investigative journalist, Susannah Cahalan, showed that Rosenhan’s study was one of the great scientific frauds of the twentieth century. But it was a highly successful fraud, one that transformed psychiatry in ways that are still evident today.

             The charge of reworking psychiatry’s diagnostic system to deal with this crisis was entrusted to a Columbia psychiatrist, Robert Spitzer, who had trained as a psychoanalyst but by then had become hostile to its doctrines. He was given almost carte blanche in selecting the members of his task force, in part because the psychoanalysts who then dominated academic and high-status psychiatry regarded the assignment of diagnostic labels as silly and unworthy of their time. He and those he selected were the ones who were in charge of developing and writing the new edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM, as it was called for short). Spitzer, who was targeted by Shatan and Lifton and their allies in the veteran community, and their efforts were in most respects remarkably successful.

             Publicly, Spitzer and his colleagues on the task force presented themselves as driven by data and science. The claim to scientific objectivity was a pose, an ideological proclamation that was sharply at odds with the way in which the DSM task force actually conducted its business. In reality, Spitzer was a politically savvy operator, and the decisions of his committee rested upon the same sorts of clinical intuition that they attacked as unscientific when proffered by psychoanalysts. Consensus was created by horse-trading and then ratified by votes of the members. Yet in trying to convince Spitzer to agree with them, Shatan and Lifton faced a difficult problem. The majority of the task force was determined to purge everything in the diagnostic manual that made reference to psychoanalytic ideas and claims. To do so, it had adopted a resolutely a-theoretical stance on the origins of the various disorders it recognized as varieties of mental illness, and instead undertook to define them via check lists of symptoms. Creating a new diagnosis of a mental disorder whose origins were trauma and its impact would represent a stark exception to the approach that the task force otherwise embraced. Worse yet, the proposed category of post-Vietnam syndrome would entail a particular moral and political stance toward the war, one that was intensely controversial.

             Spitzer, it turned out, was highly sensitive to political pressure. In particular, unlike some of the more obdurate members of the task force, he understood that the dramatic changes the group was preparing had to pass muster with the membership of the American Psychiatric Association, whose ranks were dominated by clinicians, many of them psychoanalysts. Hence he was willing to concede principle in order to make room for the whole range of problems that brought patients into psychiatric waiting rooms, if such a concession proved necessary to gain acceptance of the revised manual. Yet his willingness to embrace the arguments for a trauma-based pathology did not extend to accepting a politically charged label. What materialized, therefore, was a much broader term: post-traumatic stress disorder was born, commonly known by its acronym, PTSD.

    No field tests and no tests of reliability attended the birth of this new disease. In this way it differed from virtually all the other hundreds of diagnoses that made up the new third edition of the manual, commonly referred to as DSM III. The official recognition of PTSD marked a significant broadening of the conditions brought into the ambit of psychiatry, but just how much of an expansion it would create was not immediately apparent. At this stage, the traumatic stress that was seen as precipitating the disorder had to be a major or life-threatening event that would “evoke significant symptoms of distress in almost anyone.” One obvious example was exposure to the horrors of combat, but others were recognized as similarly traumatizing and liable to cause breakdowns. Rape and sexual assault, witnessing one’s parent or child being shot, and being victimized by a major natural disaster were obvious comparisons. Proponents of the new diagnosis argued that for some people, though they were a minority, traumatic experiences such as these produced involuntary, recurrent, and intrusive memories, hypervigilance, emotional numbing or outbreaks of explosive anger, and persistent and deeply troublesome emotions. These in turn often produced reckless or self-destructive behavior, or violence directed at the self or others.

             Embroiled in its foreign wars from the 1990s onwards, the American military and the Veterans Administration have by necessity had to grapple with a burgeoning group of veterans claiming disability and treatment for PTSD. By the late 1980s, the quarter-century long Freudian domination of American psychiatry that had marked the years after 1945 had almost completely faded away, and biology ruled the roost. The psychoanalytic perspective that had animated Shatan and Lifton’s campaign was largely sidelined in the United States, replaced by a search for neurological and biological foundations for PTSD. Many veterans were tempted to embrace the idea that PTSD was a brain disorder because, like comparable myths about the chemical origins of depression, it made the condition “real” and medical, and might thus reduce some of the stigma surrounding the condition. Logically, the explanation suggested to those in charge that PTSD would best be treated with the magic bullets of modern psychopharmacology.

             But, as with the drugs used to treat depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia, those magic bullets, when shot at PTSD, turn out to be not so magical after all. Despite the presence of little systematic research to support their use, antidepressants such as Zoloft, Prozac, and Paxil were prescribed to deal with the symptoms of PTSD. Weak evidence in their favor persuaded the FDA to license them in 2002 as a first line treatment of the disorder. 

    A series of subsequent reviews of research on the pharmacological treatment of PTSD, the most recent of which was published by Matthew Hoskins and his colleagues last year, have repeatedly reached similar conclusions. As in the treatment of depression, drugs prove more effective than placebo in treating PTSD, but the differences, while statistically significant, are clinically quite modest, and the drugs fail to help many patients. Around forty percent of patients fail to respond to medication therapy, and of the remainder, the majority get some relief of symptoms, but not complete remission. At best, research to date shows that pharmacological interventions are a useful adjunctive therapy for patients with PTSD, not the gold standard of treatment they were once heralded to be.

             So back to psychotherapy — not Freudian analysis, but the briefer forms of treatment provided by cognitive-behavioral therapy and its analogues. Often these involve prolonged exposure to materials designed to flood patients with memories like the ones that originally produced their trauma, but in safe surroundings. The expectation is that these recollections will, over time, desensitize them, wean them from trauma-induced bad behaviors, and transform the original horrors into something like fiction. Unfortunately, that does not always happen. The Israeli army conducted a controlled study of the technique on soldiers traumatized by the intifada, only to discover an increase in the soldiers’ psychotic symptoms, post-flooding. The Cochrane Library, which publishes high-quality independent assessments of all sorts of medical interventions, recently surveyed the available evidence on the efficacy of psychological treatments for patients with PTSD and the substance abuse that commonly accompanies it. The paper’s authors comment on how clinically challenging such cases are, and they conclude that here, too, the benefits are modest, with very high dropouts in all trials, and no evidence that the forms of psychotherapy they examined provided any benefit in the treatment of the substance abuse. Of all these interventions, exposure therapy is the least popular and produces the highest drop-out rates. One expert has dubbed it “among the worst possible treatments” for trauma. In sum, though helpful for some, the various forms of psychotherapy are of only limited utility.

             If the proximate cause of the inclusion of PTSD in psychiatry’s diagnostic manual was pressure from some Vietnam veterans, and granting that a substantial fraction of those who have served in the armed forces from 1990 onwards have eventually been diagnosed with PTSD (estimates generally range north of ten percent), still the diagnosis that entered the DSM potentially encompassed a much broader range of precipitating events than combat exposure. As soon became apparent, the inclusion of a trauma diagnosis in the new DSM opened a Pandora’s box. 

    The first manifestation of the potential for diagnostic creep that the new category invited did not take long to surface. Enterprising psychiatrists and psychologists soon claimed to have uncovered a whole new category of victims, those who remembered not too much, but too little. Freudians had long argued that the origins of mental illnesses were murdered memories that refused to stay dead, their repression triggering the patient’s symptoms and persisting till the probing of the analyst made the unconscious conscious. Proponents of the recovered memory syndrome deployed an analogous argument: they claimed that they had found a host of new patients, people (often children) so traumatized that they had buried the memory of the horrors they had experienced, and now suffered from seeming unrelated mental disturbances. Perhaps the most famous explication of this argument, and certainly the most commercially successful, was The Courage to Heal, the best-seller written by Ellen Bass, a poet, and Laura Davis, a short story writer, in 1988. It sold three quarters of a million copies. It compiled an extraordinary laundry list of symptoms that could be indicative of past abuse. Some examples included feeling powerless or unmotivated; lacking interest in life; neglecting or minimizing one’s talents. Borrowing from Freud’s notion of resistance, the book suggested that even denying that one had been the victim of abuse could be a sign of past abuse. Accounts of abuse, Bass and Davis asserted, were never false, though their acknowledgement was complicated by the repressed memories that the abuse provoked.

    As Bass, Davis, and others emphasized, patients whose early sexual traumas were so powerful that they had suppressed all memory of them could, in the hands of skilled therapists, subsequently recall them in vivid and exacting detail. It was the return of the repressed with a vengeance. And vengeance was soon unleashed. A moral panic ensued, extending across the United States and rapidly creating echoes in Europe. Children, it seemed, were being abused on an extraordinary scale, often by parents (especially fathers), but also by other caretakers, such as the staff of preschools. An early example of mass hysteria was the McMartin preschool scandal, a gothic tale that gripped the media for months, and ruined many innocent lives. 

             Over the course of nearly a decade, beginning in 1983, members of the McMartin family, who ran a daycare center, were accused of hundreds of acts of sexual abuse of the children in their charge. The claims soon extended to allegations of satanic abuse, witchcraft, and orgies in secret tunnels under the school where unspeakable acts were perpetrated. At the hands of their “therapists,” children were induced to confirm even the most bizarre stories, and two of the longest and most extensive trials in California history eventually followed. The total costs of the investigations and trials were estimated at upwards of fifteen million dollars, and they received widespread coverage in the print and broadcast media, most of it highly biased in favor of the accusers and the prosecution. It was a modern-day Salem witch trial, and even the failure to secure any convictions failed to dent the confidence of many in the truth of the allegations. Besides ruining the lives of the accused, the episode left behind hundreds of emotionally damaged children.

             Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, cases of recovered memory proliferated. In Teeside, in northeast England, for instance, during five months two pediatricians diagnosed 121 local children from 57 families as suffering from sexual abuse. Numbers grew to crisis proportions, and hundreds of children were removed from their homes and placed in care. In this instance, however, the police remained highly skeptical of the doctors’ claims, though once more the accusations received massive media coverage. Eventually, the vast scale of the allegations and their growing implausibility led many to conclude that the crisis was manufactured. 

    But still reports kept surfacing elsewhere in Britain (as in the United States) of child abuse and satanic rituals, and academic conferences and some feminist writers insisted on the reality of recovered memories and the ubiquity of early childhood abuse. Such beliefs persist in some quarters even now, and are fiercely held, notwithstanding accumulating evidence that discredits the central tenets of recovered memory syndrome and demonstrates the suspect and deeply unsatisfactory quality of the “evidence” once proffered in its support.

             The models of human memory on which the enthusiasts for recovered memory syndrome relied were increasingly undermined as those studying the subject put them to the test. Those who experienced repeated trauma, it turned out, far from forgetting, remembered being abused all too well. In the words of the Harvard psychologist Richard McNally, “The notion that the mind protects itself by repressing or dissociating memories of trauma, rendering them inaccessible to awareness, is a piece of psychiatric folklore devoid of convincing empirical support.” Additionally, as critics examined how therapists had “helped” their clients to recover memories of past abuse, it became increasingly apparent that suggestion and even outright coercion had played vital roles in creating and structuring the patients’ reports. None of these counterfactuals convinced the true believers in recovered memory syndrome. “Trauma,” one of them truculently asserted, “sets up new rules for memory.” Just as recent public opinion polls show that seventeen percent of Americans accept that “a group of Satan-worshipping elites who run a child sex ring are trying to control our politics and media” and are impervious to any evidence to the contrary, those promoting recovered memory syndrome rejected the researchers’ criticisms out of hand. 

             By the turn of the century, though, the movement was facing rapid eclipse. Allan Horwitz has suggested that a major factor in its decline was a spate of lawsuits against some of the more prominent therapists, one of whom was forced to pay nearly eleven million dollars in damages in a case brought by one of his patients. The increasingly outlandish recovered memories also invited skepticism. Claims of Satanic rituals, murder of babies, and cannibalism ran aground when not a single such incident could be uncovered. And the media, having once embraced and spread the movement’s stories grew skeptical and then hostile, following the courageous lead of Dorothy Rabinowitz of the Wall Street Journal, who journalistically damaged the whole notion of repressed memories beyond repair. Within the academy, once in thrall to Freudian ideas, apostates such as Frederick Crews repeatedly ferociously dismissed Freud’s ideas about the authenticity of repressed memory. (Crews and other renegades regarded Freud as a complete charlatan.) And when insurance companies ceased paying for long-term treatment of the condition, it almost miraculously disappeared from the scene.

             That was not, of course, because child abuse somehow vanished as a precipitant of mental health problems, including major depression, substance abuse, and suicide. On the contrary, to cite just one major example that has proved international in scope and massive in scale, the Roman Catholic Church has had to deal with an avalanche of lawsuits and pay billions of dollars in damages for the sexual assaults of pederastic priests and the decades (if not longer) during which the church hierarchy connived in and covered up these predatory behaviors. Notably, however, the victims of these horrors did not forget the traumas they had experienced. Rather, for years they were intimidated into silence, or were afraid or too ashamed to make public what had happened to them.

    At the height of the moral panic about recovered memory, American psychiatrists had themselves contributed to the epidemic by modifying the definition of PTSD that appeared in the revised edition of the DSM that was issued in 1987. DSM IIIR, as it was called, added a clause to the diagnosis that allowed that trauma might not rapidly produce PTSD, but might emerge later in those with an “inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma.” A subsequent revision, DSM IV, loosened the diagnostic criteria even further. Before the trigger had been the experience of extraordinary trauma, far outside the range of normal human experience, something that would “cause distress in almost everyone.” The new edition dropped these criteria. Instead, it pronounced that PTSD could be provoked when “the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or involved a threat to the physical integrity of self or others” and felt “intense fear, helplessness, or horror.” That meant that those who witnessed a loosely described traumatic event, even those who saw it on television and experienced an intense emotional reaction to it, could qualify for the diagnosis. With a new emphasis on the subjective response of the individual, the stage was set for claims that all sorts of daily setbacks and experiences could suffice to induce PTSD. 

             Marital infidelity, the break-up of a relationship, the sudden and unexpected death of a loved one, unwelcome sexual attention that stopped well short of assault, reading upsetting material in academic classes, hate speech — any number of triggers could prove powerful enough to induce the requisite trauma. Other extensions were more plausibly related to the battlefield trauma that had led to the new diagnosis. First responders —- police and firefighters in particular — have come to be seen as especially vulnerable, since their work exposes them to highly stressful and traumatic situations on a regular basis. (The evidence that these encounters actually do heighten susceptibility to PTSD is thin, but the assumption certainly makes claims for compensation easier to establish, given the unavoidable diagnostic dependence on self-reporting.) 

             Symptoms might surface promptly, or manifest themselves months or years after the fact, and might change over time, in keeping with the chameleon-like and utterly protean character of the disorder. And since the diagnosis often rested on subjective complaints, and what counted as evidence of PTSD was so variable and capacious, it comes as no surprise that the number of patients given the diagnosis has soared. Given the poor track record of available treatments, that has ominous implications for the fiscal burdens that American society will face. The new edition of psychiatry’s diagnostic manual, DSM-5, published in 2013, did make some effort to tighten PTSD’s definition, so that watching something on television, for example, is no longer to be seen as a sufficient trigger, and it removed references to one’s emotional response to trauma, but in many ways the genie was already out of the bottle. The loosening of the definition of trauma became a fact of American culture.

             If we look first to the figures for America’s fighting forces, the magnitude of the problems associated with trauma begins to become apparent. Military leaders have routinely been profoundly suspicious of complaints of combat-related trauma. They had and have a disposition to dismiss those who exhibit its symptoms as cowardly malingerers or worse, and sometimes they have acted on those beliefs, as when the British army executed some of its shell-shocked soldiers as deserters. The secondary gains of succumbing to shell shock or combat neurosis or PTSD were only too obvious: escape from the imminent probability of mutilation or death. In the end, though, the preternatural tenacity with which shellshock victims, for example, clung to their symptoms made simple claims of malingering hard to sustain. All but the most benighted generals (George Patton comes to mind) eventually acknowledged what trauma could do. Yet the problem of distinguishing the genuinely traumatized persisted, and was magnified after the World Wars and their successor conflicts by the pensions, free medical treatment, disability payments from the Social Security Administration, and other benefits a psychiatric diagnosis brought in its train. 

    Some statistics indicate how difficult it has become to keep the epidemic of trauma-related disorders within bounds. Between 2003 and 2012 alone, the number of veterans seeking PTSD treatment from the VA grew from 190,000 to more than half a million. In just three years, 2010-2012, the VA spent $8.5 billion on PTSD treatment, and the Department of Defense another $790 million. More than forty percent of the troops who served in Iraq and Afghanistan have already been approved for lifetime disability benefits. Although those numbers include compensation for medical as well as psychiatric disorders, a substantial fraction of the costs of disability is being incurred for mental health treatment. Before 9/11, ten percent of veterans sought assistance for trauma-related disabilities. That fraction has recently risen to thirty-six percent. Perhaps, though it has become heretical to broach the subject, that rise is not unconnected to the very substantial monetary and other benefits the diagnosis brings in its wake. In 2014, for example, as Allan Horwitz points out, “successful claimants with 100 per cent disability received an annual tax-free benefit of $34,884 if they were single and $39,216 if they were married with two children.”

             In the civilian world, new legions of trauma therapists stand ready to help, attending not just to those actively complaining of traumatic disorders, but to those thought to have been exposed to traumatic events. The destruction of the Twin Towers in Manhattan, the widespread damage and destruction associated with Hurricane Katrina, the horrific aftermath of the multitude of school shootings that are now such a routine and appalling feature of American life: natural and man-made disasters are everywhere, and now are accompanied by an influx of trauma counsellors, often funded by special appropriations from Congress. Yet those moneys generally go unspent. Only a fraction of the large amounts Congress provided to treat the traumatic effects of 9/11 were used. Most people turn out to be quite resilient even in the face of these horrors, and even the great majority of those who are initially traumatized seem to recover quite promptly without professional treatment. By contrast, others exhibit symptoms of PTSD and claim the diagnosis in the aftermath of what most would regard as a quite minor stressor.

               

    This massive broadening of the concept of trauma has had a host of undesirable effects. Perversely, encouraging people to see themselves as victims of trauma pushes them to embrace that identity. In Nick Haslam’s words, we “risk over-sensitivity: defining relatively innocuous phenomena as serious problems that require outside intervention.” Adversity and emotional upset are, after all, inevitable parts of all our lives. To label such misfortunes as trauma and thus to suggest that they may trigger permanent psychological damage is all too likely to prove a self-fulfilling prophecy, provoking people to see themselves as irretrievably damaged, wounded, or disordered. Such diagnostic creep gives those afflicted with the minor challenges of everyday life the same label as those who are forced to cope with catastrophically severe and life-threatening events, thus devaluing the suffering of the latter group. It conflates things that distress, disturb, or upset us with events that crush us, that shatter our lives. 

             There is another danger that arises from the broadening and devaluing of the concept of trauma. Universities proclaim themselves bastions of free speech. Increasingly, however, students have begun to complain about readings, discussions, and course materials that they find distressing. Their claims are amplified by the assertion that these encounters are traumatizing them. Hence the demand for so-called trigger warnings, even though there is evidence that they do not work and may even be harmful. Worse yet are demands that certain readings and viewpoints be banned because some find them injurious or “traumatizing.” Those demands have come mostly from people who call themselves progressive, and it is clear they have had some success in intimidating faculty who want to consider themselves “progressive,” sometimes even securing the termination of those who fail to go along, as in two notorious cases at Yale. But the new fashion in trauma is not limited to the left. Thirty-two states in the more conservative parts of the country have employed similar arguments in arranging to restrict the teaching of the racial history of the United States. Students, as the Florida legislation proclaims, should not be made to “feel discomfort, guilt, anguish, or any other form of psychological distress on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin.”

             The specter, and even the reality, of censorship (or self-censorship) predicated on the need to avoid distress and trauma is real and immensely troubling. Many universities, institutions that ought to know better, have instead fudged the issue or actively failed to mount a principled defense of what is supposed to be their core value. In 2014, the University of Chicago spoke vigorously against the climate of intimidation. “Concerns about mutual respect,” the university said, “can never be used as a justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members of our community…. In a word, the University’s fundamental commitment is to the principle that debate or deliberation may not be suppressed because the ideas put forth are thought by some or even by most members of the University community to be offensive, unwise, immoral, or wrong-headed.” At last count, eighty-seven other universities have signed this statement. What is remarkable, and disturbing, is the long list of those that have not, a list that includes Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and my own institution, the University of California.

             Traumatology is now a major industry. Estimates are that the market for its wares in 2021 exceeded $1,740 billion, and it is forecast to grow even larger over the next decade. Originally an American-made diagnosis, PTSD has spread world-wide, and aggregating the United States, five major European countries (Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Spain), and Japan, the total number of diagnosed cases of the disorder now exceeds five million a year. As with the statistics for major depression, that number includes under one umbrella a vast spectrum of sufferers. What Chaim Shatan and Robert Jay Lifton thought was a cultural and time-specific disorder brought into being by the impact of an immoral war on American soldiers has become a platitudinous and ever-expanding part of the psychiatric universe. Its continued growth and cultural salience are the more remarkable given the feeble therapeutic weapons that the profession is able to muster against its depredations, and given growing evidence that early interventions often prove unhelpful and even actively harmful. But as Nancy Andreasen, a leading American psychiatrist, commented at the end of the last century, “It is rare to find a psychiatric diagnosis that anyone likes to have, but PTSD seems to be one of them.” If the mid-twentieth century was, in Auden’s words, the Age of Anxiety, perhaps the early twenty-first century is the Age of Trauma.

    Proust and the Mystification of the Jews

             The controversy over whether Proust was in any sense a Jewish writer or, on the contrary, in some way essentially a Jewish writer, began in France only weeks after he was buried. It still persists there. But before we dip into these muddied waters, some clarifications are in order about the contradictory milieu from which he sprang.

             Proust, who was born in 1871 in Auteuil near Paris, was, of course, a half-Jew, though that is not how he defined himself to others. His mother, Jeanne Weil, was the daughter of a wealthy Jewish stockbroker. Her son remained deeply attached to her all his life, and her image is affectionately inscribed in In Search of Lost Time in the figure of the Narrator’s mother and to some degree in that of his grandmother as well, together with his actual maternal grandmother. Jeanne’s marriage with Adrien Proust, a perfunctory Catholic, was undertaken for social reasons on her part and for economic reasons on his. He was a highly ambitious physician who would attain considerable professional success, and the substantial dowry that Jeanne Weil brought to the union helped launch him on his career. The son of a grocer, he could not offer her lofty social standing through his background, but his identity as a Catholic gave her and the two sons she would bear him the necessary entrée into French society. A stipulation of their marriage contract was that any children of their union would be baptized as Catholics. Jeanne, however, never contemplated conversion, nor did her husband attempt to persuade her to convert, as far as we know. 

             There appears to have been no great romantic element in the marriage, and as was very common in haute bourgeois circles at the time, he had mistresses, including, it seems, one that he shared with his wife’s uncle, Louis Weil. Proust himself was by no means a pious Catholic, though for a brief period around the age of twenty he actually thought about a vocation as a priest. The abiding appeal of Catholicism for him was aesthetic, as well as serving as a marker of identity. In 1896, in an often quoted letter to his friend Robert de Montesquiou, he states flatly that “I am Catholic like my father and my brother; on the other hand, my mother is a Jew.” Why this attenuated connection with Jewish origins of a self-affirmed Catholic should enter into his enterprise as a writer is by no means evident, but the connection cannot simply be dismissed. To address this question, one must understand something of the ambiguous — or perhaps one should say, amphibian — nature of the Parisian Jewish milieu of which the Weil family was a part.

             A recent book by James McAuley, The House of Fragile Things: Jewish Art Collectors and the Fall of France, happily offers a vivid and detailed account of this milieu. During the nineteenth century, a concentration of vastly wealthy Jewish families gathered in Paris. Many of them came from Germany or from Alsace-Lorraine (Balzac’s Jewish banker speaks with a heavy German accent), though one prominent family, the Camondos, were Sephardic, their origins in Istanbul. To get some idea of the wealth these families possessed, the family patriarch Salomon Camondo was said to be the richest man in the Ottoman Empire. Many of these people remained for a time self-identified Jews, supporting synagogues and communal institutions, marrying and burying as Jews, and mostly wedding within their own social circles. The list of the affluent Jewish families is long: the Camondos, the Rothschilds, the Ephrussis (chronicled by their descendant Edmund de Waal in The Hare with Amber Eyes), the Reinachs, the Cahen d’Anvers, the Weils. Everyone in this milieu aspired to enter the highest echelons of French society. 

    Given that aspiration, it is hardly surprising that many of them intermarried, like Jeanne Weil, or converted to Catholicism, as she did not, and sought to put entirely behind them any traces of their Jewish origins, as she also did not. Alas, in the early 1940s the descendants of these families, including those who thought their Catholicism and their high social standing would protect them, were deported and murdered in the Nazi death camps. One must, of course, resist the temptation to say haughtily, “Little did they know…,” an attitude against which Michael André Bernstein argued vigorously in Foregone Conclusions, his indispensable book on thinking about past lives after historical catastrophe. But for a time — and certainly in Proust’s lifetime — it seemed as though the offspring of these wealthy Jewish immigrants to France would continue to flourish splendidly, shining at the heights of French society and culture, whether as Jews or otherwise.

             As McAuley’s fine book richly illustrates, a principal avenue for this flourishing was aesthetic, and this aspect of upper-class French Jewish life has obvious relevance to Proust. Many of these families became great collectors of art. McAuley shows that their tastes tended to focus on paintings, furnishings, and objets d’art from the ancien régime, evidently out of a desire to identify with the traditional and aristocratic elements of French culture. There is an approximate analogy in this drive to collect with the wealthy New York families of the Gilded Age — one thinks of the Fricks, who left a legacy in the museum that bears their name — a group that was mainly nouveau riche. But the aestheticism of their French counterparts was more pronounced. In due course, they would leave their collections to national museums or turn their own grand mansions into museums. To get some notion of the sheer opulence of these collections, one has only to visit the Musée de Camondo, once the family’s Paris residence. 

    All this ostentation of wealth in the collections elicited contradictory responses from those who considered themselves Français de souche, authentic native French. As the great Jewish collectors became public benefactors, they were appreciated by some for contributing to French culture. Others, predictably, resented them for their display of wealth, which in their eyes confirmed their preconception that Jews, inevitably vulgar, were concerned with nothing but the conspicuous display of wealth. The very taste of their collections was excoriated by some as a violation of true French aesthetic values, an act of cultural subversion. 

    Such conflicting views are brilliantly etched in the representation of Jews and of the responses to them in the pages of In Search of Lost Time. This, after all, was the milieu that Marcel Proust knew through his mother. And it should be said that, Catholic though he officially declared himself to be, many of his schoolmates were acculturated secular Jews, mostly unbaptized. Although the young Marcel certainly had no desire to be thought of as a Jew, or even a so-called half-Jew, he could scarcely disengage from the awareness that the Jews were a distinct social constellation in France, encompassing even those who did not see themselves as part of it, and this visceral awareness came to play an important role in his novel.

             Where does this ambiguous status of Jews in France lead one to think about the Jewish dimension, if there is one, of Proust’s writing? If one may judge by the range of responses to his novel from the 1920s to the present, it leads to some strange places. Many of these responses have been documented in detail in an exhaustively researched new book by Antoine Compagnon called Proust du côté juif. (The extreme systematic thoroughness of documentation is perhaps not surprising in a country where doctoral dissertations often run to a thousand pages.) Compagnon is a prominent literary scholar who has written on Montaigne, Baudelaire, literary theory, and, repeatedly, on Proust. In this book, he tracks the published responses to Proust by Jewish writers from the early 1920s and then forward decade by decade. Many of these responses are rather curious. Let me add that Compagnon is party to a current debate on Proust’s Jewishness, to which I shall presently turn.

             Perhaps the oddest thing about the early views of Proust is that a group of young French Zionists, writing in La Revue juive, Menorah, Palestine, and sometimes in other journals, recruited him as an inspiration for their movement. They did not claim that he was actually a Zionist, and the famous — for some, notorious — remark in the introductory chapter of Sodom and Gomorrah — that “the fatal error [of homosexuals] would consist, just as a Zionist movement has been encouraged, in creating a sodomist movement and in rebuilding Sodom” — clearly does not make him a Zionist. The reasoning of those young Jewish intellectuals was along the following lines: Proust was already widely regarded as one of the major French novelists. In his big book, as they wanted to see it, this great writer offered a compelling example, chiefly through the character of Swann, of a staunch Jewish identity that was entirely secular. And this was precisely what they hoped to achieve through Zionism. In this oblique way, they contrived to see him as a Jewish writer, an extraordinary novelist they could claim as their own. The argument hardly requires refutation.

    Another line of argumentation for claiming Proust as a Jewish writer was taken up in these early responses: that it was a matter of heredity. This view was typical of the common tendency to create a mystique about Jews. Frequent comparisons were made in those journals between Proust and Montaigne as purportedly Jewish writers — to be sure, with some pushback in the publications of the era. Montaigne had a grandmother whose maiden name was Lopez; she was a convert to Catholicism, and some have proposed that she was a Marrano, a crypto-Jew, despite her outward Catholicism. She was, of course, a forebear two generations removed from the writer, and there is no evidence that she could have influenced him, even if in fact she did remain a secret Jew. Yet these young Zionist writers assumed that she preserved a distinctively Jewish consciousness which somehow percolated down to her grandson. Perhaps it was through “the blood”? 

    In this uncertain light, it was claimed that Montaigne’s strikingly innovative mode of writing, with its frankness, its unblinking reflectiveness, and its bold analysis of mores and men, derived from his supposedly Jewish identity. Montaigne, it should be said, remained a loyal if not entirely a devout Catholic, taking care to leave instructions that he should be buried according to the Catholic rite. In the famous tower where he wrote, he arranged for a balcony to be built so that he could participate in mass being conducted down below. He had, moreover, nothing like Proust’s intimate relationship with a mother who remained a Jew. Yet he and Proust were said to share a distinctively Jewish ruminative style, even if the prose of one does not read much like the prose of the other. This mode of thinking, sad to say, is the positive mirror-image of the negative idea of heredity — the racist idea — that flourished after 1492 in the Spanish notion after of limpeza de sangre, or “purity of blood,” which must be preserved by Old Christians against invasive aliens. The notion reached its monstrous apotheosis in Nazi Germany — namely, that a few drops of Jewish blood were forever determinative.

             Another method of claiming Proust as a Jewish writer was through a proposed link with traditional Jewish sources, and this has persisted until our day. In the 1920s, it was contended by some that his innovative and often complicated style was “talmudic,” although there is no evidence that he had the slightest acquaintance with the Talmud. The Talmud is an important Jewish text that is exotic and seemingly impenetrable to outsiders, and so it has been tempting for some as part of a general process of exoticizing the Jews to attribute a “talmudic” character to any writer having a Jewish heritage. But “talmudic” means much more than dense or allusive. The association of Proust with the Talmud met published resistance in this early period, the objectors rightly countering that Proustian prose, however original, was thoroughly rooted in French literature.

             The “talmudic” argument, with occasional exceptions, has not persisted, but an even stranger one, the association of Proust with another quasi-canonical Jewish text, the Zohar, still flourishes. The seductive appeal of the Zohar as a ground of Jewish writing is clear. If the Talmud is exotic, the Zohar, a mystical text composed in thirteenth-century Catalonia that is often deeply mystifying, is exotic to the second power. No less a French intellectual eminence than Julia Kristeva, in a study of Proust in 1994, stated with perfect confidence, though without any evidence (as Compagnon notes), that Proust drew on a translation of the Zohar when he was writing his novel. She throws into the mix of sources, moreover, the old contention about the Talmud: “One knows that Jewish tradition” — about which, of course, “one” knows almost nothing — “and especially the talmudic, to which Proust was responsive, proliferates interpretations.” Having established by fiat that Proust was responsive to talmudic tradition, she confidently concludes that “in this light, Proust’s experience can be said to be talmudic.” This is all nonsense.

             In the current French scene, the Zohar connection has been revived by Patrick Mimouni in a series of articles and in a recent book called Proust amoureux: Vie sexuelle, vie sentimentale, vie spirituelle. Mimouni, born in Algeria to a Jewish family, began his career as a film-maker with a sequence of films about AIDs and homosexuals. In the 1990s he began writing about Proust, soon immersing himself in the minute details of Proust’s biography and repeatedly focusing on the role of homosexuality in Proust’s work. In his new book, he conveys a clear sense, following others, that Proust was not a garden-variety homosexual. It is known that, though he had a few lasting relationships, he frequented the kind of homosexual brothel catering to special tastes in which Baron Charlus is seen in the novel. Reports have circulated, passed on by Mimouni with, I think, a certain relish, that Proust attained orgasm by watching two rats savagely attacking each other, and Mimouni accepts the story that the horrific scene in the novel in which Madamoiselle Vinteuil, in the presence of her lesbian lover, spits on a photo of her dead father, actually mirrors an act by Proust in a gay brothel spitting on the image of his beloved mother. 

             For our present concerns, however, Mimouni devotes attention to what he contends is an important connection between Proust and the Zohar. This would be a significant feature of his vie spirituelle, the term in French spanning “spiritual” and “intellectual.” The slender basis for this proposed familiarity with the Zohar is a passing reference by Proust to “reading” the Zohar around the time of his journey to Venice in 1900. But when he was working on In Search of Lost Time, a French translation of the Zohar was not available. His only access to the arcane work would have been through a Latin version. It is far from clear that his lycée Latin would have enabled him to get anything out of such a difficult esoteric text. Thus, Compagnon, in a rejoinder to Mimouni, expresses warranted skepticism about the notion that Proust was acquainted with the Zohar in any way. Mimouni on his part has accused Compagnon of deleting a reference to the Zohar in his edition of Proust’s notebooks — a rather grave charge. The weight of evidence looks to be in favor of Compagnon, but for Mimouni and others determined to make Proust into a Jewish writer the temptation to see a link with the Zohar is irresistible. And since few actually know what is in the Zohar, it is easy to claim that Proust drew on it, a claim that will be attractive to the many who have no informed connection with Jewish tradition but are either striving to be affirming Jews or are philosemitic gentiles, thinking of Jewish culture as something magical and mystical that was somehow transmitted to writers of Jewish extraction, however removed they were from Judaism and the Jewish tradition. To cite a small symptomatic instance in Proust’s case: a brief mention in a letter to a friend in 1908 of the Jewish mourning custom of laying a small stone on the grave of the departed has been leaned on heavily by some commentators as a sign of their hero’s extensive familiarity with traditional Jewish practices.

    What, then, can reasonably be made of the Jewish side of Proust’s great novel? A kind of baseline proposition was put forth by Edmund Wilson nearly ninety years ago in Axel’s Castle, his pioneering study of literary modernism. With a flourish of characteristic common-sense intelligence, he wrote that “it is plain that a certain Jewish family piety, intensity of idealism and implacable moral severity, which never left Proust’s habits of self-indulgence and worldly morality at peace, were among the fundamental elements of his nature.” This seems just, though I am not quite sure about the intensity of idealism. One readily sees how he could have drawn these attributes from his mother, with no mystery of the blood as conduit. But the picture requires some complication.

             In Search of Lost Time is certainly not a Jewish novel, but there is a noticeable presence of Jews within it, one that becomes increasingly evident in the last stages of the book. Snobbery is involved in much of this. Proust is surely one of the most probing and subtle anatomists of snobbery in the history of the novel. He himself could definitely be regarded as a snob, but this only enabled him to understand the phenomenon all the more keenly. He was a man who loved to be loved — in the first instance, of course, by maman, but then especially by well-placed people in society. He did not hesitate to hobnob with vicious antisemites as long as they were sufficiently prestigious. Thus he dined at the home of Lucien Daudet, son of Alphonse Daudet, a contributor to Edmond Drumont’s violently antisemitic La France juive, while Lucien’s brother Léon belonged to the extreme nationalist right. Proust sat in silence while his host delivered himself of vituperative pronouncements on the Jews, and only later did he object in a letter to a friend. Similarly, he said nothing when his friend Robert de Montesquiou spewed a tirade against the Jews, though the next day he wrote a letter to Montesquiou, which I cited above, saying he had to differ with him on this because his mother was a Jew, though he himself was a Catholic. Evidently, he saw as the admission price to French high society a willingness to hear Jews vilified and to bear it in silence.

             The vehemence of French antisemitism in this era may be a little hard to imagine now. It scarcely yields pride of place to the growing anti-Jewish fury across the border in Germany over the next several decades. That widespread hostility toward the Jews is the context of the Dreyfus Affair that split France apart as Proust was coming of age, and put a decisive stamp on the later pages of In Search of Lost Time. Drumont was the leading spokesman for this unrestrained hatred. Characteristically, early in the Dreyfus Affair, he writes of Joseph Reinach, who belonged to one of those wealthy Parisian Jewish families, “If his ape-like face and his deformed body carry all the stigmata of his race, all the faults of the breed, his hateful soul swollen with venom better sums up all its evil, all its genius, disastrous and perverse.” Der Stürmer did not invent anything new. It is important to realize that Proust, longing to be accepted in the best French society, was hardly moving through a neutral environment.

             A number of Jewish characters, for the most part in relatively walk-on roles, cycle through the many episodes of In Search of Lost Time. Two of them are rather important in the imaginative economy of the novel. They are, of course, Bloch and Swann. In most respects they are altogether antithetical portraits, negative and positive, respectively. The Narrator has been an acquaintance of Bloch since the early days of both, and the Narrator has taken care to preserve a certain distance from him. Bloch is in certain ways the embodiment of the off-putting qualities that antisemites attribute to Jews. He is vulgar, unpleasantly assertive, conspicuously ambitious, and a social climber. 

    One of the hallmarks of Proust’s greatness as a novelist is that in the course of time Bloch undergoes a transformation, whether seeming or real, like many of the other characters. When we encounter him later in the novel, he has assumed a noble-sounding name, Jacques de Rosier, married a Christian from a well-placed family, refined his manners, and contrived to attach himself to the French aristocracy. The Narrator may well invite us to regard this self-transformation as a disguise, perhaps a different manifestation of Bloch’s initial vulgarity. The portrait of the new version of Bloch is amusing and etched in acid: “Thanks to the haircut, the removal of his mustache, to the general air of elegance, to the whole impression, his Jewish nose had disappeared, in the way a hunchback, if she presents herself well, can seem almost to stand straight.” 

             Yet there may be a certain element of the author in Bloch. He was, after all, the son of a Jewish mother and on his father’s side a grocer’s grandson. He by no means grew up as a Jew, like Bloch, but he must have been perceived as a Jew by at least some in the social stratosphere that he chose to inhabit. It was widely asserted that in the famous Nadar photo of a bearded Proust on his deathbed he looked like an Old Testament prophet — though not to me — as though at the end the Jew had emerged from the mondain. Even more pointedly, some months earlier, an acquaintance, Fernand Gregh, remarked: “One evening, after for a time he had let his beard grow, it was suddenly the ancestral rabbi who appeared behind the charming Marcel we knew.” Endowed with a good education and impeccable manners, Proust cultivated a polished persona that gave him easy entrée to exclusive places, and in those places he tolerated vehement antisemites. Proust certainly disapproved of Bloch, the character he invented, but I suspect that he put a little of himself in Bloch.

             Swann, of course, is a much more substantial figure. Indeed, he is arguably the most complex and attractive character in the novel. Readers will recall that in the first pages of In Search of Lost Time, it is Swann as the dinner-guest of the Narrator’s parents who distracts maman from going upstairs to her child desperately awaiting a goodnight kiss, although we do not immediately realize his identity. For a while in the novel we do not even know that Swann is a Jew, and I think this is a shrewd strategic choice on the part of the writer. Unlike Bloch, there is no suggestion that he has hidden his origins, but he does nothing to make people conscious of his ethnic identity. This is not a matter of pretense or disguise. Swann is what he appears to be — a perfect gentleman, a poised socialite, a person of exquisite taste (one recalls the care he takes to go from florist to florist in order to assemble the perfect bouquet for the hosts who have invited him to dinner). He is also a loyal friend, something by no means true of everyone in this world. 

    Swann’s one major slip is to fall in love with Odette, a young woman not as refined as he is and also a woman who has been far from chaste. She is, as the Narrator tells us more than once, not really his type. This paradox derives from Proust’s always interesting assumption that the psychology of love is often quirky, unpredictable, contradictory. Proust’s hapless love for his chauffeur, Alfred Agostinelli, who was obese when they met, uncultivated, and never much cared for his extravagantly indulgent benefactor, is a case in point from the writer’s own life. 

             It is the Dreyfus Affair that flips our perception of Swann’s Jewish identity. It may also have flipped something in Proust. The trumped-up charge that Dreyfus, a Jewish army captain, was guilty of treason in passing military secrets to the Germans became a litmus test for where one stood in French society. The accusation was widely believed; Dreyfus was convicted, stripped of his rank, and sent to imprisonment on Devil’s Island. A retrial four years after the initial one in 1896 issued in another conviction. Only in 1906 was he exonerated and his military appointment restored with a promotion to major, after the real culprit had been exposed and fled the country. The false accusation, however, gained considerable credence and was embraced by staunch Catholics, conservatives, aristocrats, and also by some of the leading artists of the period (Degas, Cézanne, Renoir). The readiness of large numbers of the French to embrace a blatant and bigoted falsehood has one sad explanation: there was a widespread suspicion, even among many one would have thought should have been better informed, that the Jews had never been altogether French. Their indelible foreign character thus made it plausible that one of them would be prepared to betray the vital interests of the nation to a foreign power. In Proust’s novel, after Swann has declared himself a Dreyfusard, it occurs to the Duc de Guermantes that though he had always thought of Swann as a Frenchman, now he realizes that he was mistaken.

             Proust himself became a defender of Dreyfus, even attending sessions of the first trial. His character Swann emulates him as a Dreyfusard. The aristocratic Guermantes, on the other hand, with just one exception, were anti-Dreyfusards, and they were prepared to discard their friendship of many years with Swann, now seeing him as a Jew. It even strikes them that Swann has been revealed to look like a Jew. The last physical description offered of him in the novel is shocking. He appears at the kind of elegant social gathering he has always frequented, but now he is wasted by old age and disease:

     his nose, for so long reabsorbed into a pleasing face, now seemed enormous, tumid, crimson, more of an old Hebrew than an inquisitive Valois [The Valois were a French royal line.]. Perhaps in any case, in recent days, the race had caused the physical type characteristic of it to reappear more pronouncedly in him, at the same time as a sense of moral solidarity with the other Jews, a solidarity that Swann seemed to have neglected throughout his life, but which the grafting, one onto the other, of a mortal illness, the Dreyfus Affair and anti-Semitic propaganda, had reawakened.

    When Proust wrote these lines, he could have not known that he himself would be perceived by many in his photographic desk-mask as a Hebrew prophet. For the purposes of his novel he was drawing a polemical antithesis: Bloch’s Jewish nose has receded through a kind of illusionist’s trick while Swann’s, hitherto barely noticed, had emerged in the uncompromising authenticity of his impending mortality.

             A complement of sorts to this last image of Swann become a Jew occurs in the famous moment in which the Duchesse de Guermantes can spare no attention for her dying friend as she prepares to depart for a ball because she is entirely preoccupied with finding her red shoes to wear for the occasion. Proust’s point in showing her in this light is clearly to illustrate how for women like her social vanity takes precedence over the mere human obligation of kindness and concern for a friend in extremis. One suspects, nevertheless, that her discovery through the Dreyfus Affair that the dying Swann is, after all, merely a Jew may have encouraged her to ignore Swann in his ultimate hour of distress.

             Proust’s ability to show how someone may change through time, both in regard to identity and in what happens to one’s physical presence, is a signature aspect of his greatness as a novelist. It is a corollary of the long duration that he has devised for his novel, and one finds few parallels to it in other novels. One surely cannot detect any sign in this of those putative Jewish sources for his writing, the Talmud and the Zohar. Two rare precursors may be the Biblical stories of Jacob and David in the Hebrew Bible, and though these are texts that Proust knew, there is no evidence he paid any attention to scriptural precedents.

             So it is hardly helpful to think of Proust as a Jewish writer, much as some have sought to do so. He evinces no distinctive cast of mind, no special mode of writing and thinking, that can plausibly be attributed to the Jewish side of his family background. He writes about Jews in his novel because they were a visible part of the world that he set out to represent. In this limited respect, he does not differ from Philip Roth, who always objected to being labeled a Jewish novelist, even if the presence of Jews in Roth’s fiction is much more predominant than in Proust’s. As the son of a Jewish mother, Proust was acutely attuned to the precarious location of Jews in French society in his time, and he represents this fraught condition with penetrating understanding. If his Jewish background enters at all into the achievement of his novel, it is that, as a person pulled between two forces, something that perhaps he would not himself have admitted, he proved to be an unusually keen observer of both the French and the Jewish side of the tension. A writer needs to stand a little on the outside to see things with the greatest clarity.

             The general lesson to be drawn from this strangely persistent controversy over Proust’s identity as a writer is that there is nothing particularly mysterious or unique about the Jews. Granted, they are a people that has persisted in history over many long centuries, during which they produced remarkable cultural and spiritual achievements. But the Jews are like everybody else, and not even more so. To think that they possess some magical esoteric heritage that is manifested in the creative work of many writers of Jewish extraction is in the end foolish, and sometimes racist. Proust is pre-eminently a French writer whose literary lineage includes La Rochefoucauld, the philosophes, Stendhal, and Flaubert. Inevitably, he made use of what he knew from his mother’s world and from his sometimes uneasy negotiation as his mother’s son with the French world beyond it, but then most writers make use of whatever is part of their familiar experience. Proust provides no inspiration for Jewish identity, and why should he?

     

    What is a Statesman

    We yearn for great leaders, but we seem to resist them when they come along. This is a paradox inherent to democracies, between the demand for liberty, equality, and self-reliance among citizens and the continuing need for leadership in the unruliness of an open society. We vacillate between power and drift, between embracing strong leaders and endorsing a kind of leaderless rule. Our confusion about statesmanship is partly because we have lost the language in which to understand the term.

    The term statesman has an old, even an antiquarian ring about it. Herbert Storing, a great historian of the American founding, once noted that there seems something almost “un-American” about the word. While politicians pay lip service to the concept, for the most part the term is regarded as outmoded, elitist, and vaguely anti-democratic. Harry Truman once joked that a statesman is just a politician who has been dead for ten or fifteen years. 

    Yet it is hard to deny that today we are experiencing a dearth of statesmanship. With the exception of Volodymyr Zelensky, bless him, who is doing a stirring impression of Winston Churchill, statesmen are in short supply. Our current moment has certainly witnessed a renaissance of authoritarian figures — Putin, Xi, Modi, Bolsonaro, Orban, Trump — but none of these seem to qualify as statesmen. What is a statesman, and how do we know one when we see one?

    The confusion about the concept is due in part to its unavoidably normative character. Isn’t one person’s statesman another’s demagogue? Historians are often wedded to a kind of social determinism that regards the statesman as an agent of powerful classes, interests, and social forces which he or she may only dimly understand. Political scientists, who only feel at home in the world of big data that can be quantified and analyzed by mathematical methods, contribute to the flattening out of experience. But it is impossible to study political phenomena without evaluating them. If we are unable to distinguish a magnanimous statesman from a humble mediocrity from an insane imposter, we will be unable to understand anything about politics. 

    Like much of our political vocabulary, the concept of the statesman is of ancient origin. It is a translation of the Greek word politikos. Plato devoted an entire dialogue to this concept, although his most famous discussion of the statesman occurs in the Republic, where he famously asked what kind of knowledge a statesman had to possess. His answer was that the politikos was required to be a philosopher-king, someone who blended a high degree of intellectual excellence or expertise with the skillful management of public affairs. Many people disagreed with Plato’s answers — most notably Aristotle, his student — but his question is the one we have been grappling with ever since.

    The understanding of statesmanship has been compromised by two tendencies fostered by modern democracy. The first view conceives the statesman as a technocrat, someone who is guided by scientific experts and who is then able to apply this knowledge to the various problems deemed to be plaguing society. This kind of statecraft is rightly called “progressive” because it regards progress in politics as dependent upon advances in scientific (and social scientific) knowledge. According to this view, as scientific knowledge increases so, too, does our ability to apply its insights to the most pressing issues of society, whether these are hunger, disease, poverty, inequality, or climate change. Social problems are regarded here as largely technical in nature and politics is seen as a form of policy science.

    The idea that politics is reducible to policy is at the core of what is sometimes referred to as the administrative state. This view was imperishably expressed in Alexander Pope’s couplet:

    For forms of government let fools contest;

    That which is best administered is best. 

    On this account, politics can be reduced to a form of problem-solving not unlike that encountered in the worlds of science, technology, business, and other aspects of a modern capitalistic economy. The claim that we frequently hear from public officials that they are just “following the science” is a perfect illustration of this approach. Politics becomes a matter of implementing the insights of scientists, medical professionals, and other policy experts. We do not necessarily expect our leaders to be experts, but we expect them to follow the advice of experts, certainly in arcane areas such as public health and monetary policy. 

    The second misunderstanding confuses the statesman with the populist leader. As William Galston has argued, populism and democracy are to some degree inseparable. Every democratic leader claims to have the mandate of the people even if he holds power by only the slimmest majority, and sometimes not even by a majority at all. The populist leader was best characterized by Max Weber with the term “charisma”. In his renowned essay “Politics as a Vocation,” he invoked this term to distinguish the charismatic leader from the party politician. The charismatic leader is someone who claims to stand above special interests and party loyalty and speak directly to the people, and who can serve as their voice. In modern American politics, Woodrow Wilson was the greatest representative of this viewpoint.

    The test of the charismatic leader is the claim to authenticity, that he speaks for the people. But how does one measure the authenticity of a leader? How does one distinguish the charismatic leader from the demagogue, the mountebank, and the fraud? How does one distinguish the true prophet from the false prophet? This is one of the oldest questions in the history of human affairs. Weber provides no acid test for charisma. There are no fixed principles, no program for action. There is only the personality of the leader. As Machiavelli said about the charismatic preacher Savonarola, he lost authority only when the people ceased to believe in him. Charisma is very much in the eye of the beholder. 

    The problem with charismatic politics is its almost complete lack of content. In recent American history, Barack (“Yes We Can”) Obama and Donald (“Make America Great Again”) Trump have been regarded as charismatic leaders, but George H. W. Bush and Joe Biden have not. Yet a leader’s charismatic properties have no bearing on the quality of his or her governance. Charisma is value-free: it can be used for good or evil. It is a means, not an end; except when it becomes an end in the form of personalist dictatorship. It is a kind of political mesmerism. There are no fixed principles of action beyond a certain theatrical gift and a demand for authenticity. In charismatic leadership, the message of the leadership is the ruler himself. Underlying this is a complete absence of, even contempt for, constraints on power. For this reason, charismatic leadership is often a recipe for extremism and violence. Weber regarded the charismatic leader as a remedy for the problems of political gridlock and stalemate, but there is only a short step from the populist leader to the Duce and the Führer. Charisma may not be incompatible with democracy, but it is dangerous to democracy. 

    To start at the beginning, statesmanship is about the care and oversight of states. It presupposes the bounded political units — call them states or nation-states — that have been the basis of international order ever since the Peace of Westphalia. The leaders of empires — Cyrus, Alexander, Napoleon — no matter how gifted they were in other respects, were not statesmen but conquerors and military despots. The same is true for those who exhibit leadership skills in business, university administration, and criminal enterprises. They may express expertise but not political know-how. Statecraft fundamentally concerns securing the conditions of political legitimacy.

    There are three kinds of statesmen I wish to consider: founders, preservers, and reformers. 

    The greatest statesmen in history are political founders, lawgivers, responsible for introducing “new modes and orders.” These are inevitably revolutionary figures, people like Machiavelli’s “new prince” who promise freedom and redemption from an oppressive political order. Founding statesmen have no authority other than their own words and deeds to justify them. It is their capacity to mobilize and to shape opinion that is the basis of their legitimacy.

    Political founders come in all shapes and sizes, from mythic figures such as Moses, Lycurgus, and Romulus to Oliver Cromwell, George Washington, Lenin, and Mao. I would also add less well-known figures such as Atatürk in Turkey, Bismarck in Germany, Ben-Gurion in Israel, Sun Yat-sen in Taiwan, Nkrumah in Ghana, and Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, as further examples of this creative type. These are all the “fathers of the Constitution” who create the frameworks within which later and lesser statesmen can handle changing situations.

    The study of political foundings is exciting, as the never-ending flow of books, movies, and musicals about the American founders illustrates. Political founders typically try to set up the widest possible gap between themselves and the old regimes that they are attempting to overthrow. They wish to represent a rupture. In France in the 1790s, they renamed streets, remade the calendar, abolished historical provinces, reformed the language, and created new religious cults. William Wordsworth famously recalled his own enthusiasm at the outbreak of the French Revolution, 

    Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,

    But to be young was very heaven!

    Books such as Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution and J.G.A. Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment celebrate revolutionary beginnings as the only times of truly creative political action. Such revolutionary moments seem almost to be breaks in political time, as Stephen Skowronek has argued. 

    But while it is easy to romanticize revolutionary moments in history, it is just as easy to forget precisely how tenuous and dangerous such moments are and how easily things can turn dark. Consider how quickly the Arab Spring turned into the Arab Winter, as exhilarating hopes for democracy foundered on the shoals of political reality. Even at their best, founding moments introduce a principle of disruption into political life that, once started, cannot easily be stopped. As Aristotle warned, the habit of disobeying law, even a bad law, has the tendency of making people altogether lawless. Revolution is not a bus that you can get off at will. 

             In 1838, in his speech on “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions,” Lincoln warned against the dangers of the “towering genius” in politics. The American founders were men who staked their all on creating free institutions. But their nobility and their sincerity of democratic purpose does not preclude the possibility that later generations will produce Alexanders, Caesars, and Napoleons of their own. Such men will not rest content with perpetuating what has been established; they will seek new fields of glory as a testament to their own ambition and love of fame, and often this will involve the repeal of the accomplishments of those who preceded them. “Towering genius disdains a beaten path,” Lincoln warned. “It thirsts and burns for distinction and, if possible, it will have it, whether at the expense of emancipating slaves or enslaving freemen.” How to channel this overreaching ambition remains a permanent challenge for any theory of statesmanship. What is a durable constitutional republic, after all, if not a beaten path? 

    If the political founder is the rarest type of statesman, the most familiar type is the preserver, who works within an established set of laws and institutions to maintain the coherence of a tradition. Preservers are typically conservatives such as Walpole, Burke, Adams, and Disraeli, who are responsible for maintaining the social fabric often after periods of war or social upheaval. They see themselves as custodians of continuity. Preservation is the policy of adjusting old traditions to fit new situations. Like the “Parting Hours” described by George Crabbe,

    The links that bind those various deeds are seen,

    And no mysterious void is left between.

    The art of preservation may seem an unambitious role in comparison with founding, but it is the mode of political action fitted for most occasions. A founding that is not followed by preservation is doomed. Few will ever have the chance to construct a political order de novo, but many have the opportunity to shape and secure the polities that they already inhabit. Preservation is distinctly non-charismatic in tone. It must present its innovations as derived from traditions, law, and institutions in order to give its methods an air of legitimacy. 

    The classic study of statecraft as the restoration of order is Henry Kissinger’s A World Restored, which analyzed the role of two great European diplomats — Metternich and Castlereagh — and their part in the restoration of the balance of powers after the Napoleonic wars. Other notable restorationists were Konrad Adenauer, who helped to restore the moral and political dignity of Germany after a time of war and dictatorship, Angela Merkel, who did so much to restore a sense of German unity after the fall of communism, and Margaret Thatcher, who restored a sense of order and stability in Britain after a period of strikes and moral decay.

    The best description of this form of statecraft was provided by the English Whig George Savile, Marquis of Halifax. In 1688, in his classic essay “The Character of the Trimmer,” Halifax defended a policy of what might be called principled inconsistency. The first goal of the statesman, he argued, is to keep the ship of state afloat. The true statesman — or trimmer: he was not using the word pejoratively — must be prepared to shift his position, moving from one side of the boat to the other in order to correct its list. If this offends the demand for adherence to principle, so much the worse for principle. While such a policy might be condemned as opportunism or flip-flopping, Halifax argued that such prudent flexibility was the essence of political wisdom.

    This image of the ship of state was repurposed by the English conservative philosopher Michael Oakeshott in his lecture on “Political Education” given at the London School of Economics in 1951. For a people who had only recently emerged victorious from a world war, Oakeshott offered only words of caution, describing himself as a skeptic “who would do better if only he knew how.” Rather than speaking about justice, liberty, or equality — the standard fare of political philosophy — he insisted that politics consists of “the pursuit of intimations,” by which he meant acting in a way that is most likely to retain or to restore the coherence of a tradition. “In political activity,” Oakeshott told his listeners, “men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbor for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel.” 

    These words capture concisely the image of the statesman as preserver, not the larger-than-life personalities of a Churchill or a de Gaulle who led their countries through times of crisis, but the George Marshalls and George Kennans charged with preserving peace and stability. Preservers are typically not futurist visionaries possessed of a grand strategy and a singular sense of purpose; they are more often diplomats and parliamentarians accustomed to working the back rooms and the corridors of power. In Machiavelli’s metaphor, they tend to be foxes, not lions. Their goal is not to create justice on earth, but to establish legitimacy where this means the maintenance of stability and authority. 

    Finally, the third type of statesmen are the reformers, who regard statecraft as a means of affecting moral and political change. Reformers are often, but not always, outsiders to politics who agitate for change through popular protest and acts of civil disobedience. This may be because the path of ordinary political participation is closed to them, as was the case with the abolitionists and suffragettes of the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, or because it may seem to them that agitation and protest are the only ways of effecting meaningful change, as Black Lives Matter advocates today seem to believe. In either case, this outsider status often gives reformers a richer sense of possibilities that may not occur to those who have spent their lives operating inside the corridors of power. 

    The classic expression of this kind of protest politics was Thoreau’s On Civil Disobedience, which argued that any law that violated the sacred right of conscience has no claim on our loyalty. For Thoreau, this line was crossed with the American war with Mexico and the annexation of Texas, which he considered little more than a land grab. His appeal to conscience has had a powerful hold on our moral imagination, and has been an inspiration to generations of peoples worldwide, but there is a problem. This particular brand of conscience politics is essentially empty. Conscience politics has inspired everything from the abolitionist movement, to protest against the Vietnam war, to the refusal of the Kentucky county clerk who refused to issue licenses for gay marriages. Are all expressions of conscience equally valuable? Is radicalism a mark of truth? How do we know when appeals to conscience are sincere expressions of a person’s deeply held moral and religious beliefs and when they are just a mask for prejudice and self-delusion? What happens when it is hard to draw the line between beliefs and prejudices? One person’s voice of conscience may be another person’s hypocrisy.

    The task of the reformer may be the most difficult of all, because she must know how to split the difference between revolution and restoration. The question posed by the reformer is not “all or nothing” but “how much or how little.” Exemplary reformers have been men such as Mikhail Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union trying to navigate the transition from communism to democracy, Deng Xiaoping opening China after the disasters of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, and Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk in South Africa working to bring an end to apartheid. The interesting feature of leaders such as Gorbachev, Deng, and de Klerk is that they were once insiders who ended up advocating for change and leading their countries, at least temporarily in the case of Russia and China, into a more hopeful democratic future.

             The best kinds of political reformers are those who manage to hold together both loyalty to founding principles or ancient traditions with agitation and critique. They are examples of what Michael Walzer has called “connected critics,” because their standards for reform do not come from some private voice of conscience or some putatively universal principle of natural right, but from an appeal to the very standards of justice espoused by the systems they were criticizing. Examples of connected critics are Camus but not Sartre, Orwell but not Lenin, Gandhi but not Fanon, Martin Luther King but not Malcolm X. This is an idea that would benefit many social justice advocates today. 

    Statesmanship, as I noted earlier, rests on knowledge, but what kind of knowledge? Is statecraft a science, like mechanics or engineering, that can be codified in rules and then learned, memorized, and put into practice, as Machiavelli seems to have believed? Or is it more like an art that can only be mastered through practice and experience, and that requires the capacities of insight, imagination, and intuition, like having an ear for music or a knack for languages? I want to consider statecraft as more of an art than a science, based on the mastery of three essential skills. 

    The first is the statesman’s role as teacher. The statesman is not simply a problem-solver in possession of technical expertise or a tribune of the people’s will, but an educator who is able to shape a vision of the political regime. By a regime I mean not just a form of government but an entire way of life, what gives a people’s collective life a sense of wholeness and meaning. Each regime type creates in turn a different range of human possibilities. The differences between regime types form the basis of our ability to distinguish between the various politically relevant ways of life.

    As educator-in-chief, the statesman must always be aware that opinion is the medium of society. As Hume ringingly observed, “It is on opinion only that government is founded.” By opinion he did not mean the kind of information elicited through polling data or focus groups, but a structured set of sentiments, habits, and beliefs that shapes a people’s character and way of life. Without a settled body of opinion, no government, not even the most authoritarian, could last a single day. No one understood the importance of opinion better than Lincoln. “With public sentiment,” he wrote, “nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed.” He then went on to add: “Consequently, he who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions.”

             The statesman’s art consists, then, in the ability to educate the public mind by helping to form its beliefs and opinions. In the American case, these opinions are rooted in our founding texts — the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution — as well as the immense superstructure of laws, interpretations, and rulings that have been built upon them. These texts have in turn shaped our fundamental experiences of right and wrong, of who should rule and who should be ruled, of who governs and why. These structures of opinion are what make future change possible.

    A second feature of statecraft is the capacity for communication. In the phrase frequently applied to Ronald Reagan, the statesman must be a “great communicator.” This is what used to be known as the art of rhetoric. The importance of rhetoric is especially true for democracies, where statecraft consists in the ability to communicate with fellow citizens whose views are decisive in politics and to some extent in governance. It is not enough for a statesman to craft a vision for society; she must be able to harness it in language and persuade others of its power and beauty. As Edward R. Murrow said of Churchill, “He mobilized the English language and sent it into battle.” This is what the greatest leaders have been able to do, namely, to immortalize in words and images what a people stand for, what they believe in, and what they look up to. 

    More than any other regime, democracy gives to speech a pride of place in determining the legitimacy of policy. Unlike autocracies that are governed from above, democracies require a continual flow of communication not only from the top down but from the bottom up. Democratic politics has for this reason rightly been called “logo-centric” or talk-centered, because most of what goes on takes place through the medium of language, whether in legislative assemblies, jury rooms, courts of law, newspapers, and increasingly the internet. Mill said that democracy is government by discussion.

    To be sure, the importance of speech can be vastly overstated. The ideal of a rhetorical democracy — parrhêsia in the Greek sense of “to speak boldly” — is at the core of what Jurgen Habermas has called “an ideal speech community.” Habermas apparently considers politics as a vast public seminar that should be adjudicated by the neutral standards of “public reason,” in which only the force of better argument decides policy outcomes. There are two significant problems with this view. First, it holds public deliberation to a high standard of language and thought that is rarely realized in existing democracies and their media. Consider only what passes for public deliberation in contemporary America: our debased discourse does not exactly rise to the standard of parrhêsia. Second, this view too quickly ignores the more coercive and disciplinary aspects of politics. Democracy is about public deliberation, but it is also about authority, command, and decision. A country, or a legislature, or a court, is not a seminar. The reduction of politics to speech is at the root of what the ancients called sophistry. 

    The dependence of democracy on speech or rhetoric can be both a strength and a weakness. This focus on speech may be a source of frustration to those who demand swift, decisive, and concerted action. But deliberation is also necessary for providing a sense of legitimacy for public decisions. As Pericles said of Athenian democracy in his Funeral Oration, “instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all.” 

    The third characteristic of the statesman is political judgment. Aristotle named this capacity phronesis to indicate the sphere of prudence or practical reason that he regarded as the political virtue par excellence. Judgment is the form of reasoning appropriate to citizens situated in juries, legislative assemblies, and deliberative bodies of all sorts. It is knowledge of the fitting or the appropriate thing to do under the circumstances. He associates it with the man — and for Aristotle it is always a man — who possesses the skills necessary to manage well the affairs of the political community. 

    The knowledge of the statesman differs from both the theoretical knowledge of the philosopher and the technical expertise of the specialist. While philosophical knowledge aims at the true or the universal — the ideal regime, the idea of justice — and technical knowledge with the mastery of rules, political judgment is necessarily local and improvisational. The relation of judgment to circumstance is essential for successful statecraft. “Circumstances,” Burke wrote, “give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing color and discriminating effect.” In politics, circumstance is everything. 

    No one has thought more deeply about the role of political judgment than Isaiah Berlin. Berlin was especially interested in what distinguishes successful statesmen from philosophical genius and why, by implication, the latter often appear politically foolish. Albert Einstein may have been a brilliant theoretical physicist but his reflections on world peace seem almost touchingly naïve. Bertrand Russell was a brilliant logician but his writings on marriage, religion, and war display an alarming indifference to the complexities of political reality. What Berlin deemed essential for the statesman was what he called “a sense of reality.” This meant not merely possessing more facts or information about society but having an almost intuitive grasp of its texture, both its constraints and potentials.

    Judgment in politics is the ability to see possibilities that had not previously been seen or imagined. It not a matter of knowing more but of seeing further than others. It is the capacity that we associate not with the scientist who uncovers laws and uniformities, but with the creative artist, the poet, the novelist, and the playwright who seeks patterns and connections between colors, shapes, characters, and words. Judgment is almost an aesthetic perception, something like the ability to see pattern and coherence in a painting or work of art where others see only chaos and confusion. It is not just a quality of the mind but involves the entire personality, the unique temperament, of the individual. 

             Good judgment consists not least in the ability to improvise on the spot. Like a musician creating unfamiliar riffs on the familiar chords of a jazz standard, having judgment consists in the skill of working within an established idiom but expanding upon and developing the possibilities that are latent within it. It is a kind of analytical imagination. It is the same skill possessed by the master chef who is able to create new combinations of tastes from a familiar palette of choices. Judgment is not the mechanical application of a rule or a fixed standard to changing circumstances — something like the demand for strict consistency — but the ability creatively to adapt rules to new and unforeseen situations and master them. 

             Good judgment in politics is the quality necessary for successful statecraft. This is not to say that good judgment necessarily guarantees success. It is often difficult to say whether success is the outcome of judgment and foresight or just good luck. Sometimes even the best plan may need a little luck. The wisest historians have often considered luck — accident, happenstance, contingency — as a causal power in history. Machiavelli could speak of fortuna as a goddess that can dispense as well as withhold her favors. He claimed that even the most far-seeing statesmen could only control events half the time, leaving the other half to the vicissitudes of fate. In Guys and Dolls, Sky Masterson pleaded that “luck be a lady tonight.” It is a sign of wisdom to recognize the limits of our capacities. Near the end of the Civil War, Lincoln confessed to Albert Hodges that “I claim not to have not controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me.”

    Great statesmen are judged not only by how they respond to success but how well they handle failure. Do they respond with bitterness and resentment or with a sense of magnanimity in the face of defeat? Contrast, if you will, Richard Nixon’s petulant concession speech after his failed gubernatorial run in 1962 to Al Gore’s magnanimous concession speech after the Supreme Court stopped the Florida recount in 2000. The statesman must know how to turn failure into success. FDR’s defeat for the Vice Presidency in 1920 and then his struggle with polio was a better training for leadership than his earlier life of privilege. Occasional setbacks are a valuable test of character. Churchill is reported to have said that the mark of success is the ability to go from failure to failure with no intervening loss of enthusiasm. This is witty, but it cannot be true. A person who has met with repeated failure, however enthusiastic, could not possibly be said to have good judgment even if such a person meets with occasional success. As the saying goes, a stopped clock is still right twice a day.

    Judgment is, finally, the ability to respond to unforeseen situations. Preparing for the unpredictable is always the better part of judgment. To be sure, there is no one model for the exercise of judgment. It is all a matter of context and circumstance, but if there is one feature that distinguishes the successful statesman from the day-to-day politician, it is the ability to articulate the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. This requires the ability to plan not just for today or tomorrow but for the future. As Tocqueville — who has acted indirectly as the educator of many statesmen and legislators — said in the introduction to Democracy in America, his book was written not to satisfy any faction or class but to see deeper and further than the different parties. “While they are occupied with the next day,” he wrote, “I wanted to ponder the future.”

    I have said, ruefully, that the concept of statesmanship seems old-fashioned, out of touch with the times. Perhaps it is. We vacillate between the view that all politics is essentially a power struggle while at the same time holding our leaders to impossibly high standards of moral perfection. We either expect too little from our public figures or too much.

    The ethics of statecraft can be summarized, I believe, in a single word: responsibility. The concept of responsibility grows out of moral and legal language. A person can be called responsible for something when she acts on her own initiative or when her actions can be regarded as the cause of some state of affairs. To be held responsible is connected with terms like causation, guilt, and accountability. Responsibility may seem to lack the grandeur of such ancient moral terms as “duty,” “conscience” and “virtue,” but it is also more suited to the politics of a democratic age. 

    This brings us back to Weber. He explored the theme of political responsibility in great depth, and regarded it as the defining characteristic of the statesman. Political life, Weber argued, is torn between two competing moralities. The first he called an ethic of conviction, which takes different guises but is typical of the moral idealist in politics. The classic form of this ethic was the Sermon on the Mount, with its injunctions to “turn the other cheek” and “resist not evil with force,” but it finds similar expression in the Kantian demand that politics must give way to morality or in the Rawlsian claim that justice is “the first virtue of social institutions.” In each case, politics is regarded as morality by other means. “The believer in an ethic of ultimate ends,” Weber wrote, “feels ‘responsible’ only for seeing to it that the flame of pure intentions is not squelched.” 

    Weber tended to associate conviction ethics with the Christian pacifism and revolutionary socialism of the World War I generation, but it is in fact a category of belief and sentiment that has manifested itself throughout history in various times and places. It is the attitude of the moralist who identifies a particular evil — slavery, war, exploitation, injustice — and demands its eradication, not tomorrow, not next year, but today, here and now, immediately, regardless of the cost. A sense of indignation, no matter how well-meaning, then gives rise to the demand for moral action, and soon after issues in fanaticism and violence. “Those, for example, who have just preached ‘love against violence’ now call for the use of force for the last violent deed,” the conviction ethicist proclaims, in Weber’s words, “which would then lead to a state of affairs in which all violence is annihilated.” Needless to say, the final act, like the end of history, is a condition that never arrives.

    A pure example of conviction ethics was the radical abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, who advocated no compromise with the Constitution in his opposition to slavery. On an issue like slavery, certainly, it is important to keep alive a pure moral vision, but such visions can only be held by saints, reformers, and “intellectuals.” It took Frederick Douglass and Abraham Lincoln to understand that if slavery were to be abolished, it would be not be by shredding the Constitution but by embracing it. Or consider two more recent cases: the journalists Daniel Ellsberg and Julian Assange both published official state documents during wartime without considering how such materials would inevitably be distorted and misused. Men such as Garrison, Ellsberg, and Assange are what Raymond Aron once called “technicians of subversion,” who prefer to see their country dismembered or defeated rather than compromise the purity of their ideals. 

    At the other end of the spectrum, in Weber’s analysis, is the ethic of responsibility. This phrase has been often understood to mean a form of consequentialism, a concern with what will work and what will not, or what is expedient over what is morally right. This description is not false but it fails to grasp what philosophers often call “agential” responsibility. This ethic is concerned not with the purity of intentions but with the consequences of action, especially the unintended consequences, that may follow from them. This is not to say that it is simply Machiavellianism by another name. Rather the art of the statesman is concerned with the uses of power and its moral and psychological effects on those who wield this power. What, exactly, are these effects?

    First, the ethic of responsibility requires taking ownership for decisions that will invariably inflict harm upon others. Politics, as Weber warned, is always a bargain with infernal powers. There will always be situations where even the nobility of the end will be compromised by the sordidness of the means necessary to achieve it. Lincoln’s decision to prosecute a war to end slavery ended up costing over six hundred thousand lives. He never doubted the rightness of the cause, but the length and the destructiveness of the war took an immense psychological toll on him. Sometimes anguish accompanies virtue. Consider Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima effectively ending World War II. The decision was, in retrospect, the correct one, but it cannot help leaving a sense of disgust in its wake. Truman never second-guessed his decision, believing that in the end he saved lives, especially American lives, although the philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe subsequently attacked him as a mass murderer. Whatever Truman’s faults — he was not particularly given to moral self-reflection — his decision ended a terrible war and brought peace more swiftly than any other option. 

    Anscombe’s protest over the decision of the University of Oxford to confer an honorary degree on Truman is a clear example of the kind of conviction ethics that Weber deplored. No complex decision will be morally blameless, and those who seek a clean conscience and a pure heart should pursue their satisfactions in private life. “The safety of the morally innocent and their freedom to lead their own lives depend upon the ruler’s clear-headedness in the use of power,” the philosopher Stuart Hampshire wrote, perhaps with Anscombe in mind. I would only add that whereas we should not necessarily expect our leaders to be morally paradigmatic human beings, we should at least expect them to be attentive to the needs and the interests of their fellow citizens and call them to account when they fail in this task.

    Second, the ethic of responsibility accepts that moral conflict will always be the norm in politics. “We are placed into various life-spheres each of which is governed by different laws,” Weber wrote. Unlike the idealist convinced that all issues must be subordinated to a single cause, the responsible statesman is aware that he operates in a world of conflicting values that are qualitatively heterogenous. There is no summum bonum that is equally good for all individuals, there is only a range of values the importance of which will be determined by circumstances, education, and personality. The thesis of “value pluralism,” which is now most associated with Isaiah Berlin, has led some critics, notably Leo Strauss, to label Weber (and Berlin) a moral relativist who accords equal legitimacy to all values, however evil, base, or insane. This is an unfortunate misreading that robs moral life of its difficulty and its pathos. The fact that our deepest commitments stand in inalterable conflict was not meant as an exhortation to extremism or to nihilism, but as a counsel of sympathy and moderation. To Barry Goldwater’s call that “extremism in defense of liberty is no vice,” Weber would have replied that not all things are permitted even in the pursuit of a just cause. 

    Statecraft is ultimately a matter of choice, not so much between good and evil, but between rival and competing goods that cannot be tidily ranked by some hierarchy of ends or derived from some first principle. There is no one value, whether it be peace, equality, freedom, justice, or rights, that always trumps all others. Rather than seeking the best, responsible statecraft seeks to avoid the worst. If we cannot expect our leaders to follow the Hippocratic Oath to “do no harm,” we should at least expect them to do as little harm as possible. In politics, as in love, a sound maxim is “you can’t always get what you want,” which means that statecraft will always involve the art of balancing conflicting ends and purposes. Deal-making and compromises are the inevitable costs of a morally diverse and politically conflicted society. And the problem of “dirty hands” remains an ever-present possibility.

    Third, an ethic of responsibility suggests responsibility to oneself. “Whoever wants to engage in politics at all,” Weber warned, “is responsible for what may become of himself.” Politics can do strange things to people. It can turn ordinary men and women into monsters. What Reinhold Niebuhr once said of religion is equally true of politics: it makes good people better and bad people worse. Only those who can approach politics with a sense of self-restraint — a feat akin to Ulysses having himself bound to the mast — are capable of responsible leadership. Responsibility requires a “sense of proportion,” the control of the passions, and a degree of detachment from friends and associates. When presidential candidate Bill Clinton told a supporter, “I feel your pain,” he was deliberately attempting to create a sense of intimacy between them, breaking down barriers of formality and restraint, yet it is a characteristic of the greatest leaders to put a sense of distance between themselves and their followers. Lincoln remained aloof even from those who knew him best. In The Edge of the Sword, de Gaulle wrote movingly of the loneliness of command.

    Finally, statecraft is an autonomous sphere of political activity related to but under-determined by external moral, legal, scientific, or economic principles. It must be distinguished from the narrowness of the administrator, the dogmatism of the moralist, the pedantry of the lawyer, and the zealotry of the partisan. It is a realm of its own. Statesmanship is not something for which rules — natural law, the Categorical Imperative, the greatest happiness for the greatest number, even raison d’etat — can be given precisely because statecraft requires a freedom or latitude to act as the situation requires. Strategy without flexibility is futile. Statecraft consists in the concrete decisions made under the force of circumstance. When the moment of truth arrives, when it becomes necessary to say, “Here I stand, I can do no other,” then the statesman has found his calling and this calling will not be provided by Morality, Science, or History, or by any power other than one’s own individual judgment, which is formed by education and experience. There is no set of principles that can define in advance what is to be done in all situations, because no set of principles can control for the mutability of life. 

    Man’s yesterday may ne’er be like his morrow;     

    Naught may endure but Mutability.

    The Shadow Master

    On July 15, 1945, Rembrandt’s 339th birthday, the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam re-opened with the most emotionally charged exhibition in its history. Called “Weerzien der Meesters,” or “Reunion with the Masters,” the show gathered one hundred and seventy-five paintings that had spent the five years of the Occupation hidden in bunkers. During those five years, private collections were looted and museums stripped of their greatest works. For all the average person knew, these treasures, like so many others, had been stolen or destroyed in the Nazi terror.

    Now they were making a triumphant return to the center of Amsterdam. From The Hague came Fabritius’s little goldfinch, Potter’s big bull, Vermeer’s pearl earring. From Haarlem came the great Hals group portraits, which were displayed alongside the Rijksmuseum’s own collection — including, of course, the nation’s famous Rembrandts. 

    In 1939, with war looming, the huge Night Watch, eleven by fourteen feet, had been taken to a castle in North Holland, where it was stored in a vault of reinforced concrete. The location proved too dangerous. In 1940, when the Germans invaded, the masterpiece was covered with a canvas borrowed from a local farmer and hastily removed to a bunker in Castricum, closer to Amsterdam: a journey of fifty kilometers that took twelve hours. At one point, when an enemy plane appeared overhead, its escorts took refuge in neighboring fields, leaving the great painting alone in the middle of the road. 

    When it finally reached its destination, its caretakers discovered that it was too large for the entrance, and they had to roll it up. Finally, in 1942, it was taken to a special storage site near Maastricht, where it was kept in a limestone quarry, thirty-three meters underground. The director of the Frans Hals Museum, Henk Baard, recalled the scene: “Through the slow progress of the silent bearers the remarkable spectacle, under its ghostly lighting, recalled a princely funeral.” 

    Now it was back. One hundred and sixty-five thousand people eventually visited the show. In a country that still lacked basic provisions, many of these visitors came on an empty stomach. All understood its promise: that past glory would bring future resurrection. “A people that can display such a parade of greatness shall reclaim its special place,” a journalist wrote. At the opening, a minister declared that the Canadians who liberated Holland “have also liberated Rembrandt and Frans Hals.” 

    More than Hals, Rembrandt needed that liberation. He needed it more, in fact, than any other Dutch artist. Hitler himself had declared him “a true Aryan and German,” and under the quisling regime he had become the focus of a bizarre cult, his birthday even replacing the exiled Queen Wilhelmina’s as the national holiday. Now this unwitting German hero could become, once again, the symbol of the dignity of a free people. 

    Light had chased out darkness. It was precisely the kind of cosmic struggle that Rembrandt had illustrated in his works, though that struggle rarely had such a clean outcome. History was recapitulating the trajectory of Rembrandt’s own evolution. If Vermeer was a painter of light, Rembrandt was a painter of dark, or more precisely, of dark commingled with light; and in his work the question of evil recurs more than in any other Dutch artist’s — so insistently that looking at his pictures is sometimes unbearable. There are more scenes of murder, cruelty, torture, rape, betrayal, malediction, and death in Rembrandt than in any other Dutch painter’s work — by far. 

    Vermeer painted no such scenes. Neither did Hals. Neither did any of the blither spirits, Avercamp or De Hooch or Jan Steen. At the very most, the landscapists and the still-life painters will allude, with a graceful symbol, to mortality, to the passing of time. Most Dutch paintings were made for the wealthy middle-classes, and they show things that those people liked to see. Who among them would have wanted a picture such as The Blinding of Samson, in which a silver dagger is plunged into the protagonist’s eye? The painting is so gigantic, two by three meters, that it is hard to look away from it. It is just as hard to look at it: even Delilah can hardly contemplate her victim without a shiver. 

    Rembrandt was so prolific that even the most ambitious museum survey will never capture more than a slice of his work. Books aren’t much use, either: the images end up crammed onto the page, and that monumental quality of Rembrandt’s paintings — their patina, their glow, the sense that they give of something physical, like an extraordinary geological phenomenon — goes missing too, flattened onto smooth paper, removing the tactility, the brazenness, of his surfaces.

    The etchings and drawings, originally made on paper, fare better in reproduction. But there are hundreds of them, and even the most avid eye can only absorb so much. To try to see more than a few at a time is to be reminded that, as with Dante and Shakespeare and Bach, you cannot rush an acquaintance with Rembrandt. His work took a long time to make, after all: nearly half a century between his earliest productions and the works he made in the days before his death at sixty-three. 

    Add, to the quantity of works and media, the quantity of genres. In England, writers were comedians or tragedians or poets, but only Shakespeare was acknowledged as the greatest in every field. In Holland, Rembrandt, who was ten when Shakespeare died, worked in nearly every specialty known to Dutch art, each of which absorbed the energies — the entire lives — of his most talented contemporaries. 

    And then there is the profusion of his styles. What makes it even harder to form a coherent image of Rembrandt is that he painted in so many different styles. Many Rembrandts do not look anything like the popular idea of a Rembrandt. His early work looks so different from his later work that the early works were not even recognized as such until deep into the nineteenth century. Over the years, all sorts of ghastly paintings have been attached to his name — including some that he actually painted.

    There are still rediscoveries today, though these are nearly always of lesser works that seldom add more than a footnote to the image that has emerged from two hundred years of dogged scholarship. The lacunae of that scholarship only yawn in comparison to a demand for completeness. We now know as much about Rembrandt as we know about almost any figure, artistic or otherwise, of his century. We have a large group of works. We know what they show. We know when they were painted—and, often, why and for whom. We can see that some themes interested the master only for a short period. We can see that others were there from the beginning and stayed with him until the end. Some come back in every medium, in every style, at every point in his career. 

    One such recurring theme is violence — evil — darkness.

    The spectacle of cruelty is there in his earliest signed painting, The Stoning of St. Stephen, painted in 1625, when he was nineteen. This work shows a crowd surrounding the first Christian martyr: stones held high, ready to smash him to pieces. Unlike the Samson, it is not hard to look at — it is too much of an apprentice piece to stir real emotion; but though he is not visibly joining in, it is a bit disturbing — and premonitory — to find a chubby teenaged Rembrandt among the crowd. 

    A few years later, the novice has matured into a master. Rembrandt was twenty-six when he painted The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp. This is a group portrait of eight men around the corpse of Aris Kindt, who had been convicted for armed robbery and executed earlier that morning. The men are wearing neat clothing, and their expressions range from technical curiosity to a keen realization that they themselves will soon be just as dead as the body that lies before them. The way they are arranged around the body is such that you, the viewer, step right up to the circle, invited to join the grisly academic proceedings. Despite the decorous scientific proceedings and the sober expressions on the doctors’ faces, the smell of rot tickles your nostrils. 

    You could derive a positive message from this painting. You were, in fact, intended to derive uplift by those who commissioned it, if not by the artist. The march of science! The doctor is instructing the public with lessons that demonstrate the Dutch commitment to progressive education, lessons that were commemorated with such paintings because the Dutch medical societies were prestigious and famed; Rembrandt was one of many artists invited to paint them. When, thirty years later, he returned to the theme, he showed Dr. Jan Deyman dissecting Johan Fonteyn, who had committed the crime of breaking into a draper’s shop and pulling a knife. This anatomy lesson took place on the day after his execution. Of this painting, damaged in a fire in the eighteenth century, only two central figures, a spectator and the criminal, survive. All we see of Dr. Deyman are the hands peeling back Fonteyn’s bright red brains.

    Rembrandt’s criminals have a presence that bodies in other portrayals of anatomy lessons do not. Sometimes, in these, the doctor is showing a skeleton. Frederik Ruysch, father of the still-life painter Rachel Ruysch, who succeeded Dr. Deyman as Amsterdam’s city anatomist, was painted with rosily blooming cadavers, like Greek nudes, on the dissecting table. He was famed for making dead bodies look alive. Rembrandt’s bodies, by contrast, are unequivocally dead—and he arranges us, like the doctors, around them. 

    We have to look at these cadavers, just as we have to look at poor Elsje Christiaens, a teenage girl who was strangled in 1664 for killing her landlady, apparently in self-defense. She was executed on the Dam, the central square from which the city takes its name (“the dam on the Amstel”). Her body was hung on a gibbet in Volewijk, across the River IJ, where it was to remain “until the winds and birds devour her.” It was there that Rembrandt saw her, strung up like a doll. He drew her twice. 

    Did any other Dutch artist show a dead body this way? A well-known image of the disemboweled De Witt brothers, murdered by a mob in 1672, comes to mind; but the painter, Jan de Baen, was undistinguished, and the picture is remembered mainly because the De Witts were among the most powerful politicians in the Netherlands. The painting, shocking and grotesque, shows a significant historical event — not the death of an obscure eighteen-year-old girl.

    So it goes with many other themes. Often enough, you can find something comparable, somewhere. There are plenty of dead animals in Dutch painting, for example, but there is no picture quite like the Still Life with Peacocks in the Rijksmuseum. Here one bird lies in a pool of its own blood. Another is hung by its feet, its mouth still agape, as if to protest its murder. It is both exquisite and excruciating: the hallmark of Rembrandt. 

    Look, too, at The Slaughtered Ox. Red as the brains of Johan Fonteyn, the dead animal hangs from a wooden beam. “Slaughtered” is not quite the right word. The French title uses écorché — mangled, flayed — and no Christ in the whole Louvre captures the pathos of sacrifice like this harrowing carcass. The painting contains no religious references. But it stirs the same feeling that the most sacred mysteries evoke. 

    Do we identify with the ox? Or with the servant girl, barely visible, looking at it? If the anatomy lessons invite us into the circle of the learned doctors, into their progressive and prosperous institutions, our eyes go nonetheless directly to the dead men at their center. The light is on them; they radiate sanctity. They are not martyrs, but they are somehow numinous. It is not an accident that Rembrandt placed the criminals in the position where the dead Christ was placed in earlier paintings — or that he crucified the ox, and Elsje Christiaens.

             These works are not overtly religious, but Rembrandt painted plenty of religious works, too. If their contents reflect the mood of the man who created them, so does their very existence, since there was so little commercial incentive to create them. In post-Reformation Holland, to the contrary, they were unfashionable to the point of career suicide. The great German art historian and curator Max Friedländer (who in 1939 had to quit Berlin for Amsterdam because he was a Jew) could credit an entire tradition to a single artist:

    A view of the whole of Dutch production in the seventeenth century tells us that, where it was animated by any receptive interest in the religious picture, this was Rembrandt’s personal achievement or was at least set in motion by him. It was Rembrandt who, from spiritual predilection, bequeathed the non-ecclesiastical religious picture to the reformed North, which was ready to only a very limited extent to accept this present with gratitude.

    Rembrandt’s “spiritual predilection” sought extremes, and ways to portray them. Bourgeois moderation was not to his taste. The rough clash of light and dark could be rendered graphically, in paint, as in The Supper at Emmaus, painted when he was twenty-two: as the resurrected Christ reveals himself to a disciple, the dark Savior is surrounded by a halo of blazing light whose hidden source lends him the majesty of a mountain. Light triumphs over darkness. 

    But not always. Often light does not have the last word. Rembrandt shows the damned as well as the saved. In Belshazzar’s Feast, the impious Babylonian king gazes in terror at the ominous writing on the wall. In Uzziah Struck With Leprosy, a Judean king is punished for profaning the temple. There is nothing picturesque about these exotic scenes of hubris humbled. They fulminate, they rage, they terrify, they denounce; and if their warnings are warnings to others, they are also, you feel, warnings to the artist himself. 

    There is no gentleness here, nothing tame or easily digested. We are in the presence of an Old Testament prophet — he painted many — who, we sense, was well acquainted with the extremes that he depicted. The biographical evidence bears this feeling out. Though Rembrandt became a kind of secular saint in the nineteenth century, twentieth-century researchers discovered that he was, in Gary Schwartz’s words, a “cocktail of litigiousness, untrustworthiness, recalcitrance, mendacity, arrogance, and vindictiveness.” It turned out that Rembrandt’s contemporaries had almost nothing nice to say about him. No artist of his time could boast the number of disagreeable incidents that peppered his life. He didn’t pay his bills; he was tactless and rude and prickish; he was cruel to his mistress. “To sum it up bluntly,” Schwartz writes, not uncontroversially, “Rembrandt had a nasty disposition and an untrustworthy character.”

    In a list of appalling incidents, Rembrandt’s treatment of Geertge Dircx stands out. When his wife, Saskia, died at the age of thirty in 1642, she left him a nine-month-old son, Titus. Rembrandt hired Geertge to take care of Titus. He and Geertge became lovers, and they were together for six years. Geertge intended to marry the widower, and she claimed that he had promised to do so — until he began a relationship with his housekeeper, Hendrickje Stoffels. Lawsuits ensued. Rembrandt promised Geertge alimony. In the meantime he collected unflattering testimony about her, which he used to have her committed to the Gouda spinhuis, an atrocious institution for women who had “fallen” for a long list of reasons, from prostitution to insanity. She was desperate to get out. Rembrandt was desperate to keep her there. After five years, she was released, and died soon thereafter. 

    A long-ago dispute between embittered former lovers can be read in any number of ways. In books and films, Geertge has been portrayed as a conniving, gold-digging temptress — and, more recently, as a victim of a man’s determination to get her out of the way. If it weren’t for all the rest of the abundant evidence of his rebarbative personality, we might, in this case, be more inclined to give Rembrandt the benefit of the doubt. 

    Why, in any case, should we care? Surely other painters were obnoxious in ways that history has hidden. For all we know, Adriaen Coorte liked little girls, and Jacob van Ruisdael cheated on his taxes: when names fade and personalities fall away, only an artist’s work — and then usually only a portion of it — remains for us. We do not wonder whether the painter of an Egyptian fresco was likeable. 

    Four hundred years later, we wouldn’t wonder about Rembrandt either — except that the conflicting accounts do bother us. The reason is that we love him. We know him so well, after all. We can see him: his work, and also him, since no artist ever exposed himself as repeatedly and as nakedly. From the adolescent among St. Stephen’s tormentors to the valediction that Jean Genet described as “a sun-dried placenta,” around eighty of his self-portraits survive. The number is astronomical. We have no idea what most painters look like, but except for his childhood we can see Rembrandt at every phase. From the proud young man to the imperious genius to the wrecked patriarch, we can watch his life pass before us; and when, in a museum, we come across him in a new guise, we greet him as an old friend. We know him so well. Is this despite his darkness, or because of it? 

    The darkness is not, in any case, a secret. Even today, when personal confession has become a painterly genre of its own, it is hard to think of an artist who revealed himself so remorselessly. We see him as we see Aris Kindt or Johan Fonteyn or Elsje Christiaens. The difference is that, if the ox was flayed by the butcher and Aris Kindt was dissected by the doctors, Rembrandt did this to himself. In the light of this destiny, do earthly transgressions matter?

    “The West too has known a time when there was no electricity, gas, or petroleum, and yet so far as I know the West has never been disposed to delight in shadows,” the Japanese novelist Junichiro Tanizaki wrote in 1933. He described traditional lacquerware that “was finished in black, brown, or red colors built up of countless layers of darkness, the inevitable product of the darkness in which life was lived.”

    Was Tanizaki familiar with Caravaggio, whose tenebroso style, which used darkness to make light shine all the more radiantly, Rembrandt perfected and transcended? (In contrast to much Japanese painting, which dispensed entirely with light and shade.) In the West, the age without electricity had not quite ended when Tanizaki wrote those words. It stretched into living memory: the Mauritshuis, where The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Tulp hangs, did not acquire electric light until 1950. How did these paintings look when our grandparents saw them in “the darkness in which life was lived” — and how did they change when first seen under artificial light? Nobody I know of recorded their impressions. 

    Did the Japanese really assign a moral value to darkness? The temptation to such symbolism is universal. Perhaps Tanizaki was a romantic, but at the very least — as you feel that Vermeer’s light has a meaning that exceeds the visual requirement to illuminate — it is possible that Rembrandt’s darkness has a role akin to the one that Tanizaki describes: “Our ancestors presently came to discover beauty in shadows, ultimately to guide shadows towards beauty’s ends.” 

    Yet Rembrandt’s contemporaries did not always consider his shadows beautiful. In his lifetime and beyond, they were often criticized as no more than a murky waste of space. Many great Rembrandt portraits are indeed little more than heads, and sometimes hands, peering out of the gloom, or floating in it, and if we imagine them in pre-electric rooms under the moody skies of Holland, we have to imagine them even darker.

    Look at the late portrait of Margaretha de Geer, from 1661. In the alert and penetrating eyes, and in the right hand that grips a handkerchief, and in the left hand that resolutely holds on to the arm of her chair, as if to launch her at the viewer, you can see her great power. She is one of the richest women in Europe — yet she is very old, and her face, served on a bright round millstone collar as on a platter, seems about to dissolve into the darkness that surrounds her. 

    For all the startling physicality of their surfaces, there is a ghostliness to these portraits, an immateriality, including to those that Rembrandt made of himself, that makes them more haunting than any other art of their time. If The Blinding of Samson is awful to look at, it is so theatrical that it troubles us less than Margaretha. The picture was designed to hang in her children’s house. One shudders to imagine them walking past it at night, the matriarch illuminated by flickering candles.

    Eventually the critical tide turned. Rembrandt’s darkness acquired a positive value, eventually coming to form a crucial part of his myth: a forerunner of the nineteenth-century Parisian bohemian. Especially the tenebrous late works — those final utterances of the discarded old genius, scorned by those who once had courted him, rotting in his cheap lodgings in the Rozengracht — were equated with spiritual profundity.

    Rembrandt’s darkness was viewed so positively that his works were even darkened artificially. The varnish that protects paintings needs to be replaced every fifty or so years, before it decays and darkens; but sometimes, at the insistence of curators, it was deliberately left on, so as not to lighten the work. Deep into the twentieth century, some restorers added pigments to new varnish to darken the pictures. The practice was not restricted to Rembrandt. “A good painting, like a good fiddle, should be brown,” wrote the painter and patron Sir George Beaumont in the nineteenth century. This brownness, known as “gallery tone,” may have seemed appropriate to objects prized, among other qualities, for their antiquity; perhaps here is an echo of the “beauty in shadows” that Tanizaki did not believe existed in the West. 

    In unlit galleries, covered with decaying varnish, how shadowy these paintings must have been! Did the darkness make Rembrandt more mysterious, more de profundis — or did it make him illegible? If darkening seems inappropriate from a scientific perspective, it doesn’t strike us as inappropriate for Rembrandt as it would for another painter. You wouldn’t darken an Avercamp or a Metsu — much less a Vermeer, whose genius lies in the uncanny suffusion of light in space. 

    But Rembrandt is, after all, dark. Yet his darkness does not always have a negative implication. In his several renderings of the apocryphal story of Tobit, for example, he shows the old man whom God has blinded in order to test his faith. While their son Tobias seeks a cure — this turns out to be the entrails of a monstrous fish — Tobit and his wife Anna stay home, patient and impoverished: resigned to their lot, firm in their faith. In Anna and the Blind Tobit, the old man sits in a ramshackle room, his face turned from a light he cannot see. Anna uses a ray from the window to wind wool on a frame; but most of the room, and most of the painting, is dark. The mood is of humility, not of expectation. We know that Tobit will be cured, but he himself has no such knowledge. His reward is unseen, and unforeseen. Faith — darkness — faith in darkness — is all he has.

    In her preface to The Passion According to G.H., Clarice Lispector warned that the book should only be read by “those who know that the approach, of whatever it may be, is done gradually and painstakingly — passing through even the opposite of what it’s going to approach.” The phrase applies to Tobit — and to Rembrandt too, since his darkness, even in his bleakest paintings, always contains an admixture of light. 

    The master was a moralist. He was a sensualist, too. The early works reveal a love of splendor — ostentation, even — and the paintings often contain a glint of gold. This was more than a color, or a taste. In the dark rooms where these paintings hung, it had a practical purpose (“the extravagant use of gold,” Tanizaki wrote, “gleams forth from out of the darkness and reflects the lamplight”) and a representational one. And in their way they reflected the shiny prosperity of the society in which they were painted. 

    In the self-portraits, as life takes its toll on the cocky young man, the light that had illuminated his figures from the outside begins to move inside. The background darkens, the atmosphere turns into mist — and the figures glow, like the fierce eyes of Margaretha de Geer, with something otherworldly. The artist becomes sadder and older — and grander, more imposing, more profound, the inner light shining all the more intensely — because of the approaching dark.

    As Rembrandt ages, the light in his paintings takes on an added luster, and with it an added meaning. It reveals a view of the world as a contest between light and dark that is, at heart, religious: of the world as a theater in which good and evil are intertwined, and in which good only occasionally triumphs. Sometimes, as for Belshazzar, crime meets its just punishment. Often, as for Samson, it does not. Does Rembrandt think it matters? “He didn’t care about being nice or mean, surly or patient, grasping or generous,” wrote Genet of the late Rembrandt: “He didn’t have to be anything more than an eye and a hand.” Now life has taken everything from him. All that matters was his art — and so, “with dirty fingernails,” the erstwhile lover of gold is now shuffling “from the bed to the easel, from the easel to the shitter.” He is beyond good and evil, or trapped in their mixture, living with light and with dark, beyond perfect clarity.

    A conflicted personality has been reconciled. The artistic and the spiritual are no longer in conflict; and in his last months Rembrandt returned, after thirty years, to the parable of the prodigal son. This is the story, from the Gospel of Luke, of two brothers. One stays home faithfully with his father while the other squanders his fortune carousing with whores. Eventually, forced to work as a swineherd, he envies the pigs. The theme had occupied Rembrandt since his youth. In the mid-1630s, he painted himself and his wife Saskia in a tavern scene, The Prodigal Son in the Brothel. There is a peacock pie on the table, and Rembrandt’s golden sword pokes out at the viewer. It is not conventional for a painter to portray himself as a wastrel, or his wife as a hooker; but this, the painting declares, is not a man interested in convention.

    Thirty years later, Saskia was dead. Titus was dead. Geertge and Hendrickje were dead. He himself would follow soon; but before he went, he painted the story one more time. Yet this time he chose another moment: the return of the prodigal son, when he comes back, humbled and repentant, causing his father to rejoice. He dresses him richly, “putting a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet,” and orders the fatted calf killed. “Lo, these many years do I serve thee, neither transgressed I at any time thy commandment: and yet thou never gavest me a kid,” the virtuous son protests. “But as soon as this thy son was come, which hath devoured thy living with harlots, thou hast killed for him the fatted calf.” But as Christ explains, one repentant sinner causes more joy in heaven than “ninety and nine just persons, which need no repentance.”

    Rembrandt, who painted so many Hebrew scenes of vengeance and sacrilege, now paints this epitome of Christianity, a scene of forgiveness and redemption and love that, even by the master’s own standards, is stately and symphonic: the ragged, pathetic son kneeling before his old father, who gazes at him through half-open eyes. Though they are surrounded by darkness, the light is upon them.

    Without passing through darkness — through the opposite of what he meant to approach — the son could never come into the light of the father. Light cannot exist without darkness, nor virtue without sin. They are intertwined in every life. The electricity coursing between these magnetic poles — between Dr. Tulp and Aris Kindt, between Delilah and Samson, between the butcher and the ox — was the very subject of Rembrandt’s art.

    Forced to a Smile

             An epitaph — the short inscription on a tombstone — normally names and praises admirable qualities of the person buried there, and then hopes for a benevolent future after death. The gravestone may speak to the viewer in the dead person’s voice (as Coleridge imitates the Latin Siste, viator: “Stop, Christian passer-by, stop, child of God! / O, lift one thought in prayer for S. T. C.”) or it may speak as a mourner addressing the buried person (as in the Latin, Sit terra tibi levis, “May the earth lie light upon you”). In his Essay on Epitaphs, written a few years after William Cowper’s birth, Dr. Johnson restricts epitaphs to “heroes and wise men” deserving of praise: “We find no people acquainted with the use of letters that omitted to grace the tombs of their heroes and wise men with panegyrical inscriptions.” The readers of “Epitaph on a Hare” by William Cowper (pronounced “Cooper”) would have expected just those qualities in any epitaph: it would celebrate a male either wise or heroic, and its praise would be public and formal. (The Greek roots of “panegyric” mean “an assembly of all the people”.)

             Against such prescriptive forms, the only obligation for an ambitious poet writing an epitaph is to be original. The form becomes memorable by dispensing with or altering conventional moves: Yeats brusquely repudiates Coleridge’s Christian “Stop, passer-by,” in his own succinct self-epitaph: “Cast a cold eye / On life, on death. / Horseman, pass by!” Keats, dying in his twenties, refused the first, indispensable element of an epitaph, a name, and wanted only “Here lies one whose name is writ in water.” 

             As soon as animals became domestic pets, they could become the subject of an epitaph; Byron wrote a long epitaph on his dog, and had it inscribed on a large tombstone. (On the grounds of at least one of the colleges at Cambridge, there is a cemetery for pets of the dons which includes inscribed tombstones and small sculptured monuments.) Nowadays, in a practice that would have scandalized the pious of past eras, newspaper death notices in the United States commonly include, among the named survivors, domestic pets. The subject of Cowper’s epitaph is not domesticated, but wild — “a wild Jack hare” — not a hero, not a human being, hardly even a pet, but one nonetheless named and distinguished from its fellow hares.

             The most original epitaph for a pet in English literature, Cowper’s “Epitaph on a Hare” is a poem utterly dependent on charm. Poets writing on death have traditionally preferred to create either a somber “philosophical” meditation (on time, regret, the afterlife, and so on) or a direct expression of personal grief. By contrast, charm in lyric requires a complex management of tone: it cannot be single-mindedly earnest nor single-mindedly sorrowful, nor can it be unconscious of its hearers. It is a social utterance. It needs a stylized attitude of wistfulness and irony, a blending of the impersonal with the personal, of the independent mind with the troubled heart, and above all, it requires an evident awareness of itself and its listeners. 

             In real life, charm is almost as rare as exceptional beauty: beauty is Fate’s gift, but charm is a quality of personality and behavior. And charm is always remarked with a lightness of tone; it concerns something small, not sublime or heroic. The praise of charm is always tinged with pathos, charm being such a transient quality. Yeats, reflecting in “Memory” on the women he had loved (if imperfectly) over a long life, comments on the relative rarity of loveliness and charm among those women: “One had a lovely face / And two or three had charm.” But neither loveliness nor charm could transfix him for life, as had the wild beauty of Maud Gonne’s presence:

    One had a lovely face,

    And two or three had charm,

    But charm and face were in vain,

    Because the mountain grass

    Cannot forget the form

    Where the mountain hare has lain.

    That his love for Gonne was a quality of the flesh is stipulated by Yeats’s finishing this little poem with an unignorable match of the botanical and the animal: the mountain grass cannot forget the “form” (the image impressed on it) by the couched mountain hare. Grass-bed and hare belong to each other not because of any human kinship of “mind” or “soul,” but because (Yeats’s repeated noun tells us) both are denizens of the mountain, grass and flesh born of the same territory. 

             Yeats chooses a formal rhyme scheme for his poem on unforgettable beauty, but his slightly unsettling scheme does not employ the familiar couplet or quatrain; instead, it is a freestanding sestet, abcabc. And its slant rhymes are at first uncertain: does “grass” indeed rhyme with “face?” Will “form” eventually rhyme with “charm?” Only at the sixth line, where “lain” emphatically rhymes with “vain,” is the scheme fully intelligible. So unprecedented, so confusing, is heroic beauty that an unsettled air must hover over the lines until the conclusive arrival at “lain.” 

             In Yeats’s “Memory,” charm is somewhat bewildering, a possession of only “two or three” in an erotic lifetime; it comes etymologically from the Latin carmen, “song,” and is related to “incantation.” It has magic power, it lays a spell, it is alluring, it overcomes resistance, it “pleases greatly” (according to my dictionary). On the other hand, unlike striking beauty, charm has to be ascribed to something relatively approachable, of a domestic size, like the “charm” on a “charm bracelet.” It never claims too much; it can never be theatrical. And something about it is odd, as Robert Herrick knew: it is odd to be sexually “bewitched” by something which is rationally off-putting (distracting, neglectful, careless) but psychically fascinating, since it intimates a “wantonness” within: 

    A sweet disorder in the dress

    Kindles in clothes a wantonness;

    A lawn about the shoulders thrown

    Into a fine distraction;

    An erring lace, which here and there

    Enthrals the crimson stomacher;

    A cuff neglectful, and thereby

    Ribands to flow confusedly;

    A winning wave, deserving note,

    In the tempestuous petticoat;

    A careless shoe-string, in whose tie

    I see a wild civility:

    Do more bewitch me, than when art

    Is too precise in every part.

             Our contemporary master of charm in verse was James Merrill, who, at 62, dared to close his eight-sonnet sequence on opera, “Matinées,” with a version of the “naive note of thanks (made into halting verse) that he had sent, at the age of twelve, to his mother’s friend who had invited him to join her at the Metropolitan Opera for Das Rheingold. Miraculously, the note has mutated into a childishly “awkward” sonnet (following on seven sonnets of symphonic eloquence):

    Dear Mrs. Livingston,

    I want to say that I am still in a daze

    From yesterday afternoon.

    I will treasure the experience always — 

     

    My very first Grand Opera! It was very

    Thoughtful of you to invite

    Me and am so sorry

    That I was late, and for my coughing fit.

     

    I play my record of the Overture

    Over and over. I pretend

    I am still sitting in the theater.

     

    I also wrote a poem which my Mother

    Says I should copy out and send.

    Ever gratefully, Your little friend . . .

    The “little friend” is still shaky on prosody, while proud of his rhymes. And by replicating, mistakes and all, the perfect rapture he expressed at twelve, Merrill demonstrates with witty charm that he is as susceptible now as then to the effect of the rising of the curtain on the music of the Rhine maidens, “Nobody believing, everybody thrilled.” The charm also lies in his decision to let his youthful mistake stand: Das Rheingold has a Prelude but no “Overture.”

             Some usual elements of poetic “charm” in lyric, then, are a slightly perplexing initial effect, unconventional elements (of topic, of addressee), a wayward use of genre, ironic sidelights, and a playful spirit. They all meet in William Cowper’s surprising epitaph-poem. 

    Seeing an elegiac commemoration of “a wild Jack hare,” we wonder how such an epitaph came to be composed, and why it is so moving. Its success arises from the double self-awareness of the poet; he is fully conscious of his own actual grief and equally conscious of the unconventional and comic way in which he is speaking. Above all, he expects his readers to follow his own amusement at the mixed language that he must invent for such an unlikely subject without losing sight of what exigencies call forth its parodic features.           

             William Cowper, who was born in 1731 and died in 1800, was an English clergyman and the son of a clergyman. After a beatific episode in which he felt close to, and loved by, God, he fell into a lifelong despairing conviction that he was predestined to be damned, eternally unredeemable. He was hospitalized for months after a suicide attempt, and was unable in life to function as a clergyman. Retreating from the practice of his profession, but with a small inheritance, he took up residence with Morley Unwin, a clergyman friend, and his wife and child; and when the clergyman died, he continued to live with the compassionate wife, Mary Unwin, who devoted herself to him and was his chief human comfort during his recurrent periods of insanity. 

    Over time, in his saner periods, Cowper became the author of many essayistic pentameter poems that range from peaceful descriptions of pastoral life to outspoken denunciations of colonial slavery. But he also wrote trenchant introspective lyrics, of which the most famous is “The Castaway,” a “posthumous” past-tense description of his own death, comparing it to the fate of a sailor who fell overboard and could not be saved. Recalling Jesus’ calming of the waves of Galilee with “Peace, be still,” Cowper says bitterly that he and the doomed sailor had no such resource, none:

    No voice divine the storm allayed,

    No light propitious shone;

    When, snatched from all effectual aid,

    We perished, each alone:

    But I beneath a rougher sea,

    And whelmed in deeper gulfs than he.

    The devastating effect of “We perished, each alone” is outdone by Cowper’s two-line tragic footnote, a trapdoor to a worse hell than the sailor’s: a “rougher” and “deeper” fate lies in religious despair than in bodily death.

             Cowper’s mother died at his birth, and five of his siblings also died. As an adult — unmarried, childless, profoundly melancholy, suicidal, on several occasions wretchedly confined for insanity — Cowper must have been one of the loneliest poets of our language. Isolated at the house in Olney that he shared in his adult life with Mary Unwin, he built wooden cages in which he kept as pets first a single hare, which he received as a gift, but eventually three wild male hares. They spent the day in the garden, and at evening Cowper would admit them to the parlor, tenderly watching them play together in his presence. He wrote an essay-letter for The Gentleman’s Magazine describing them — “Puss, Tiney, and Bess” (all males) — and revealing, though reticently, the extent to which they benefited him during his anguished depressions. He perceived, he confessed, “that in the management of such an animal, and in the attempt to tame it, I should find just that sort of employment which my case required.” 

    Cowper nursed his hares when they were ill, carried them about in his arms, and dutifully took to obeying their wishes, studying their disparate temperaments. Puss, as he explained to readers of his magazine piece, was grateful to him for the care he showed, but “Not so Tiney. . . if, after his recovery I took the liberty to stroke him, he would grunt, strike with his fore feet, spring forward and bite. He was, however, very entertaining in his way, even his surliness was matter of mirth.” Bess was “a hare of great humour and drollery,” and became tame “from the beginning.” Cowper’s letter describes dispassionately the hares’ diet and their seasonal preferences (“During the winter, when vegetables are not to be got, I mingled their mess [i.e. meal] of bread with shreds of carrot,” and so on). Throughout the essay, Cowper endeavors to persuade his reader that hares are the most appealing of animals: the “sportsman,” hunting not for food but merely to kill, “little knows what amiable creatures he persecutes, of what gratitude they are capable, how cheerful they are in their spirits, what enjoyment they have of life.”

             Besides this reminiscent essay and his “Epitaph on a Hare,” Cowper added, to keep Tiney alive in memory, a Latin epitaph in prose: “Epitaphium Alterum” (“Another Epitaph”). Like the English poem, it begins with the conventional “Hic jacet, “Here lies,” and repeats the conventional address to the passer-by, but it still divagates from the classic human epitaph in celebrating Tiney’s lucky life, sheltered by his owner from both human predators and the unkindness of nature: “No huntsman’s bound, no leaden ball, no snare, no drenching downpour, brought about his end.” The epitaph closes unconventionally, too, as the mourner unexpectedly assimilates his own death to Tiney’s: “Yet he is dead— / And I too shall die”: “Tamen mortuus est— / Et moriar ego.”

    So, flanking the verse “Epitaph on a Hare,” we find the detailed gentlemanly letter and the Latin epitaph, both in prose, each more public than the poem; and it is against such relatively impersonal documents that the “Epitaph on a Hare” shines in its humor and its sadness. Almost every stanza contains a surprise. In the first, we are introduced to the mysteriously protected life of an unnamed wild, not domestic, animal; in the second, we encounter the initially withheld pet-name (which “should” have immediately followed the “Here lies”) and also the reversal of the usual superlatives (not “noblest” but “surliest”); in the third, the mounting list of the hare’s doings, climaxing not with a heroic or saintly action but rather with the doubly stressed comic end-words, “would bite.” The mourner has been obscured, too; his relation to the hare is given only meagerly in the third stanza, with the unrevealing phrase “my hand.”

             These strange and deviant beginnings are, as I say, surprising in themselves, but the great triumph of the poem comes in its next four stanzas, the ones on Tiney’s diet and behavior. It takes a bit of time for us to understand that Cowper is parodying the doting diction of a young mother, who assumes, in her maternal fondness, that her interlocutor-bystander is as interested as she in her baby’s important dietary preferences and daily amusements. Translated to our contemporary moment, the young mother would be earnestly explaining her endeavors to feed her baby the choicest of items and expressing her chagrin when a store has run out of a favored ingredient: “Jimmy really adores the Gerber mixed berries, but there wasn’t a single jar on the shelf, and I was worried, but I did find the cereal and the applesauce that he usually has for breakfast, and some favorite vegetables puréed peas and squash. And then I found a new mix, too, with chicken in it, that he was willing to try when I gave it to him for dinner.” The bystander hopes that this is the end of the recital, but no, now it is her Jimmy’s behavior — how much he clings to his stuffed animals, especially the pet elephant, and how vigorously he pedals in his little swing. Nor does she stop there, but advances to her baby’s preferred time of day and his response to a change in the weather: “You know, when everything settles down after dinner, he’s much more playful, and then, when a storm is coming, he senses it and gets really excited.” By this time the bystander is backing away.

             Cowper parodies the dilated intimacy of the mother’s discourse with much amusement, listening to himself. The interminable list of foods, and the owner’s anxiety if something cannot be found, spill out on the page in an excessive inventory of ten items. Difficulties yield to happy solutions as Cowper continues to imitate “maternal” anxiety (“and then, if I lacked thistles, I’d find lettuce for him”). We are made to feel the wild hare’s joy as he “regales” on his special provender. (The Oxford English Dictionary cites John Adams in 1771, resolving to make a pool with clear water, so that “the Cattle, and Hogs, and Ducks may regale themselves here.”) As the named foods become more adjectivally specific — “twigs of hawthorn,” “pippins’ russet peel,” “juicy salads,” “sliced carrot” — the owner’s extravagant affection mounts. The list ends with the unconcealed triumph of the owner over seasonal scarcity, as he succeeds in substituting alternate foods for scarce ones. Has there ever been a more absurd climax than the proud victory of Tiney’s owner announcing that “when his juicy salads failed, /Sliced carrot pleased him well”? And has there ever been a public epitaph that listed the epicurean delights of a lovingly chosen cuisine for an ungainly pet?

             Cowper is a past master of tone and detail. Not only can we hear the tone in which each detail is given, we are even prompted to intuit tones that must have preceded the present ones. We can infer the owner’s anticipatory devotion in slicing up all those carrots, reflecting how pleased Tiney will be as he approaches his dish. And Cowper is also a master of diction, knowing just how to join Tiney in his “gambols” by releasing a coarser language: Tiney “loved to . . . swing his rump around.” The anatomical phrase brings a farmer’s speech hovering into view.

             The owner of the hares mimics his own worry about Tiney’s aging by slipping directly into Tiney’s very mind, imagining him counting down his years and months of self-indulgent life:

    Eight years and five round-rolling moons

    He thus saw steal away,

    Dozing out all his idle noons,

    And every night at play.

    The poet’s worry was warranted; Tiney died at nine. And here Cowper at last reveals why Tiney is allowed into his house. It is the poet’s first-person confession that makes the whole poem grow in stature and grace:

    I kept him for his humor’s sake,

    For he would oft beguile

    My heart of thoughts that made it ache,

    And force me to a smile.

    The anxious diet-procurement, the seasonal schedule of feeding, the protection from predators, the nightly play — these indeed “beguiled” the poet, as they beguile the epitaph itself, until aching thoughts and a forced smile expose the death’s head of the poet’s suffering being. Between the separated words “heart” and “ache” lie the terrible fears and the hopelessness in which the poet lives. Those two monosyllabic lines — like the fatal “deeper” and “rougher” comparatives of “The Castaway”— intensify the atmosphere to an acute register of pain. That intensity then casts a piercing backlight on the whole epitaph: back over the startling characteristics in “surliest” and “would bite”; over the foolish fondness of “juicy salads” and “sliced carrot”; over the aesthetic appreciation of the contrast between the hare’s skips and gambols and the heartier pleasure when he would “swing his rump around”; and over the poet’s “beguiled” observation of the hare’s vicissitudes of response to the weather. The watching, the devotion, the feeding, the cherishing — all the instances of care — are then decoded, with hindsight from the reader, as daily evidence of the aching thoughts and the rare smiles. The unsettling strobe-effect (charm/sorrow, beguilement/ache, play/loneliness) persists in every rereading. The flicker between comedy and heartache is the chief resource of Cowper’s charm.

    But there are many others: the genuineness of Cowper’s loss flickers between the solemn epitaphic frame (from “Here lies” to the ecclesiastical “long, last home,”) and his elation at Tiney’s animal liveliness, between “here lies” and “would bite.” We are charmed not only by the proprietorial boast of the opening: that Tiney was successfully spared, by his assiduous owner, the ritual danger of the morning hunt, but also by the closing view of the hare’s affection for his two precariously remaining companions. Finally, we are touched by the way Cowper’s past-tense narrative presses forward to amalgamate itself into the “now” and the “this” of the imminent moment of parting. We are made to feel the gap between the poet’s relish in his pets and the implication (explicit in the alternate Latin epitaph) of the poet’s own death in the closing word, “grave.”

             Cowper’s means are simple: he offers a monosyllabic poem composed largely of monosyllabic lines cast into the familiar form of the ballad stanza, with rarely disturbed iambic rhythms. And it all appears to lead to a “Christian” pathos as Tiney “in snug concealment laid” consciously “waits” for “Puss” to keep him company in the grave. Yet once again, as in “The Castaway,” Cowper adjusts the end of the poem to a darker note: Puss feels his irrevocable destiny in “the shocks from which no care can save” and knows he will eventually “partake” (take up space) in Tiney’s grave. All communication then ends — between owner and hares, and among the hares themselves, as a long silence — of the shocks, of the grave — ends the poem.

             Lest charm and humor wane in a poem so mixing the two with mourning, the harsher edges of life and expression must be framed in a “softer” vision, through which nonetheless — if the poem is to ring true — the death’s head must be glimpsed. Others have elegized their pets with playful fondness and appreciation, those natural emotions on losing a companion, but Cowper’s many sophisticated and whimsical tones and tableaux of mourning — for himself as well as Tiney — make his epitaph a deeper commemoration. 

    Is charm still exerted in poetry? I have found it recently not only in Merrill but also in A.R. Ammons’ no-holds-barred final book, unceremoniously titled Bosh and Flapdoodle. The poems, written in old age and illness, combine self-mockery and a basso continuo of fear. Ammons calls them “prosetry.” At first I didn’t know what to make of some of them, their slangy and farcical impudence routing Ammons’ general inclination to serious poetry of science and nature. The charm of these “last words,” is, as usual, bewildering to the reader. Incomprehensibly and grandly, one poem flaunts the title “America,” even though its titular scene — the entire country — seems attached to the minor geriatric problem of dieting. Eventually, the second part of the poem enables another view: America is both personal — when you are chastised into dieting — and grand in landscape and weather when you delete personal annoyances in favor of casting your glance more widely. At the close of the poem, which I omit here, the charm lies in the weird separability, and ultimate twinning, of the two points of view: individual and cosmic.

    The aging Ammons (in the implied narrative of the first part) has chronically bad dietary habits, and his doctor, wanting him to reform, sends him to a dietician. The poem opens on the poet’s “counseling” session with the dietician. Ammons chooses to charm us here by jolting us from voice to voice: one is the voice of the severe dietician, recommending unattractive diet items (and reproving disobedient choices); the second is the voice of the adult poet satirically rephrasing the unwelcome advice; and the third is the undersong of the resentful sotto voce id of the patient, who defensively luxuriates in asides as he solicits the memory of appetizing items of past meals, and slips in, at the end of the diet-poem, a resolve to transgress with “an occasional piece of chocolate-chocolate cake.” I have sorted out the voices here, but imagine what it feels like to read “America” fresh off the page, realizing that the title means, for part one, that everyone in the country is endlessly attempting counseling and self-discipline in eating, and endlessly falling back into appetite: 

    Eat anything: but hardly any: calories are

    calories: olive oil, chocolate, nuts, raisins

     

     — but don’t be deceived about carbohydrates

    and fruits: eat enough and they will make you

     

    as slick as butter (or really excellent cheese,

    say, parmesan, how delightful); but you may

     

    eat as much of nothing as you please, believe

    me: iceberg lettuce, celery stalks, sugarless

     

    bran (watch carrots; they quickly turn to sugar):

    you cannot get away with anything:

     

    eat it and it is in you: so don’t eat it: &

    don’t think you can eat it and wear it off

     

    running or climbing: refuse the peanut butter 

    and sunflower butter and you can sit on your

     

    butt all day and lose weight: down a few

    ounces of heavyweight ice cream and

     

    sweat your balls (if pertaining) off for hrs 

    to no, I say, no avail: so, eat lots of

     

    nothing but little of anything: an occasional 

    piece of chocolate-chocolate cake will be all

     

    right, why worry:

             The serve-and-return pattern of contradictory voicing parodies the counseling session by allowing the things the patient cannot in fact say aloud to rise to the surface. We hear not only his irritation at the attempted control by the dietician, but also his wistful glances back to the delights of parmesan cheese. The smallness of the occasion, the pathos of the geriatric plight, the defiant humor, the fluctuations of tone, the awareness of a reader of unknown gender —”sweat your balls (if pertaining) off” — the witty play with e-mail brevity (“hrs”) are all characteristic of charm, in Ammons as in Merrill and Cowper. Trifling with genre always delights the poet: whether Cowper is upending the epitaph, or Merrill is inventing a child’s thank-you sonnet, or Ammons is parodying patronizing advice, the poet’s self-awareness together with his awareness of an audience makes for a gaily sympathetic and sophisticated performance.

             But why is the title of the poem “America?” The first answer, the comic one, the poet would say, is because this is what all America (myself included) is doing — dieting while resenting dieting. But the second answer, the sublime one, arises from the last seven lines of “America,” as the declining poet finds when he turns his gaze from the indignities of age to the grandeur of the American landscape. In the landscape he finds an impersonal reassurance in “disaster renewal,” the cosmic self-repair of the natural seasons. Satiric “charm” falls away, replaced by awe at the natural resurrections of Spring.

             “America,” with its two contrasting parts, shows that the spell of charm need not be maintained throughout a poem. But the advantage of lyric charm is its capacity to relieve the unreality of an unmixed high seriousness. Instead, one sees oneself as an unimportant speck in an indifferent, if exciting, universe, finding a point of self-regard more independent than earnestness, one not omitting comic truth. Ammons is unsparing on the fact of cosmic indifference; Merrill demonstrates how a more ironic vision has replaced, in adulthood, the naive sweetness of childhood; and Cowper, like our later poets, does not obscure either the ravages of time or the power of sympathy. Cowper ranges through so many tones and tableaux while mourning his beloved hares that the poem seems not a pet-elegy, but rather a human one. As we follow its exquisite variations on charm and grief, classical reminiscence and personal hardship, we are instructed how three improbable pets, more than two centuries ago, could force a despairing poet to a smile.