The Anabasis of Godspeed

                        

    Above deck, ice-scarred, off to Albion.

    ___

    Let it be named so, for the dynastic 

    furies combed into heads, pressed into lines

    of boys shouting ‘here, sir,’ and ‘not here, sir’ 

    at devotion or on the parade ground, 

    leaping over shadows as the sea broke 

    with their names interred in the same roster,

    fidgeting with oceanic sorrow.

     

    Happy Grove. They climbed the sea-charged cannons. 

    They looked up the school’s purple and gray walls. 

    They chattered like parakeets in the breeze. 

    Then their scurrilous voices crossed strict waves,

    bound by an ardor to move while standing 

    hidden in the open, an infantry 

    stalled in the holy metal of the sun. 

     

    Flecked dust and heat. Melting vellum. Lament. 

                         ___

    A boy struggled with the flag, crack-lashing 

    from his hands like a fer-de-lance. Scorched, turned

    and watched

                         charcoal burners; shipwrights; tailors; clerks; fishermen;

    motor engineers; blacksmiths; cooks; mechanics 

     

    as it whisked away in the grass. 

    Laughter broke across ranks. The chased earned him

    his name: Godspeed. Godspeed! A khaki blitz

    chorused their mute, fettered pain, the future’s

    fata morgana raging 

     

    sargasso eyes bulge as if a mirror lapses 

    time: Jesus of Lübeck? Braunfisch? No: iron twins

    Karlsruhe and Dresden, incandescent drift amid

    reefs at sunset rumoured to be wedding-torches

     

    to puncture      

    these poppies blackened with the unknown names

    stung to their chests each morning like courtiers

    of empire, primed to rake the play field 

    small wars erupted noon: “A Ras! a Ras!” 

    aimed at the Zion-haired boy, who mirrored 

    the sound, that broken water place gurgled 

    from poppies: the dread Arras. 

     

    Through bells 

    he heard this, mouths gashed with ringing, fell in 

    ordered rows, tilted like ships in the glare. 

     

    So many, 

     

    sugar; rum; cocoa; coffee; rice; logwood; bauxite;

    oranges, lime juice (for prevention of scurvy);

    mahogany propellers and 9 aeroplanes;

             11 ambulances; cotton (for balloons)

               

                                                 15,600

    drawn into the affray cousins make,

    mortared to haul martyrs from mud trenches,

    then the sand trenches, where the anonymous 

    sprung up a permanent humility. 

     

    Recover, 

    ice-scarred, above deck, 

    back to Old Britain. 

     

    2

    No. 46 Sgt. A.V. Chan “A” boy killed in action on the ROMAN ROAD between GRANT RIDGE and BAGHALLAT. He was buried at the foot of         MUSSELABEH. Veni redemptory gentium sang the celestial voice men of   SAINT VINCENT. Yes come gently. Gently like the small rain 0f rosewater      murmuring from a black hand. 

     

    It was around this time the principal cutoff Godspeed’s dreadlocks. His mother    slapped the daylights out of the principal and was thrown into the jail at           GOLDEN GROVE. Godspeed wept in his khaki as by GAZA when    Samson felt the pillars breathed in his palms. 

     

    He lit tails of foxes mongooses cats snakes and cousins with lightnings. He      poured rubbing alcohol in his jam jar of fireflies and set it ablaze. He was         knife scissors razors with a sharp ringing in his ears and bald head and he        hid in the bosom of stars bald and chalked a circle of misery bald to place    every principal in and then buried the sheaves of his head bald and with   a jackass jawbone he stormed the jail and fed his mother roasted corn         thundering “It is easy to remember and hard to forget I Bop I own the  trumpet I am the Gorgon.”

     

    To fierce Kumina drumming and rum at midnight No.46 Sgt. A.V. Chan soul   flew to MIDIAN accordingly. 

     

    After Godspeed lost the precept of his head he lost his mind and found it in the    larvae   of bees outside EIN GEDI where he exalted himself like a young         palm tree. 

     

    The following other ranks boarded at “M” Special Hospital at ABBASSIA      awaiting passage to the WEST INDIES. Dark matters in the sun they         resembled prehistoric hills of charcoal soaked by rain mouthing bits of the       Sixth Book of Maccabees. In KANTARA one handed his lice eaten mantle to the other and neither saw death nor his island home again then         proceeded by barge to TARANTO. 

    Vulnerability in America

    Six months ago, my yoga teacher decapitated his girlfriend. The police found her torso in the refrigerator of the RV he drove from New Orleans to Black Rock Desert every September for Burning Man. In this mid-size, decidedly regional Southern city — a site of national myth if not national importance — wars take place on Instagram rather than Twitter. There, the usual parties joked that “he tried Burning Man before Freezing Woman.” Injunctions not to read the comments are made for crimes like this, because they are where temptation lives. (I followed temptation.) Progressive commentators found it appalling that the murderer parked his crime scene in a gentrifying neighborhood, with no care for the residents’ fight against displacement. Rightists publicly brayed that he ought to be raped and murdered in prison. Novices on gender violence wondered aloud if they should have known — read the signs, assumed that belligerence was escalating towards murder. Self-appointed experts assured them that they should have. Somewhere in between, we agonized about whether to say they/them or he/his for an accused murderer whose pronouns shifted more than once in the previous year. I confess I chose “his” in the first sentence because once you heard about a dead woman you began looking, like any assiduous detective, for a man with blood on his hands.

    Both parties, I should note, are white. Despite the details — neck tattoos, semi-naked festivals, meth addiction, and fibrillating pronouns, all placed in a haunted gothic city — the story never attracted national attention. One might count as an exception Reddit, where Burners questioned one another about who had partied with the victim, the murderer, or both on the Festival’s Playa. It is hard to predict what crimes become “red balls”: police slang for cases with sufficient attention and resources to warrant closure, cameras, podcasts, new surveillance architecture, and think pieces. Certainly violence must surprise in order to terrify, but New Orleans is a high-crime city where tourists are warned to stay on the beaten path and to keep their wallets close. Crimes against visitors get more attention. Photogenic victims attract consistent coverage. Years into methamphetamine addiction, few people look good enough for the cable news B-reel. But how do we do the work of parsing reasons that are, by nature, multiple, in a political climate that encourages unitary, withering diagnostic certainty? 

    I bear witness to violence. During the high crime 1980s, my parents moved their four children from New York to Appalachia in hopes of keeping us alive. The shift brought violence closer. Our neighbor in South Carolina murdered his uncle in retaliation for childhood abuse. At a laundromat near Clemson University — the nearest cultural institution — an international graduate student was kidnapped the year of our arrival. The only sign of foul play was a pool of blood on the concrete floor where she kneeled to switch her laundry from washer to dryer. Her skeletal remains were found a few months later on the grounds of the county’s nuclear power plant; the crime remains unsolved. A woman I grew up with was “murdered on the interstate,” as in Neko Case’s best murder ballad; my brother’s dear friend died in a drive-by shooting.

    By the time I returned to New York — upstate this time — for graduate school, a certain amount of violence felt quotidian. An FBI investigation exposed a child pornography ring on my campus. Cue the newspaper euphemisms: we can’t tell you what we saw on those hard drives, but it’s your worst nightmare. It interrupted my slow slog toward the dissertation, though this was hardly the most tragic outcome. Local news cameras appeared on campus. Amateur actors in search of accolades found the microphones into which they intoned that they felt so unsafe, though it was children — by definition, almost none of us — who had been harmed. 

    “We” are in danger whether from strange men or familiar ones, whose bullying in the workplace or at home indexes far more pathological sexual impulses that we cannot see. The behavior is always “escalating”; the mundane manipulative boyfriend bears the seed of Ted Bundy’s evil. Victimhood does not hold as much capital as bullets dodged or predators outwitted. Potential victimhood — always waiting, kept at bay by our own will and ability to translate quotidian behaviors into “red flags” — pays emotional dividends. It is a boundless energetic well. Walking among us are people who have never been hurt; they are confident that they remain unhurt because they have taken care. (“Be careful!” they say, when we leave their company.) Meanwhile, many of us live hurt, live unprepared for future hurt. I am confident that I am living because no one wants me dead. And I call this optimism. 

    In Conflict Is Not Abuse, her study of the damaging consequences of overstated harm, Sarah Schulman notes that the “fear of potential threat is not always based in actual experience…. It can also be a political construction, one that is fabricated and then advertised through popular culture, or enforced through systems of power.” Sometimes, we phantasmatically build those systems, imposing them on our own experiences and fleeting encounters. Consider the poem “On the Subway” by Sharon Olds, in which she imagines a young black man measuring the bodily signs of a white woman’s wealth.

    I look at his raw face,

    he looks at my fur coat, and I don’t

    know if I am in his power —

    he could take my coat so easily, my

    briefcase, my life —

    or if he is in my power, the way I am

    living off his life, eating the steak

    he does not eat, as if I am taking

    the food from his mouth. And he is black

    and I am white, and without meaning or

    trying to I must profit from his darkness,

    the way he absorbs the murderous beams of the

    nation’s head, as black cotton

    absorbs the heat of the sun and holds it. 

    The charge in the ocular cable between the benches lies not in the wealthy, fur-clad woman’s observation of the potential mugger, but in his glance back at her. She imagines their lives as a zero-sum struggle and takes the “casual cold look of a mugger” on her possessions as a sign that he too weighs his costs against her benefits in a racist society. No words pass between them; we know that the man appraises the speaker only because she says so. City life is organized around someone else’s glance at the wall; we flatter ourselves and think that they land on us. Race charges the danger of the stranger’s gaze, though in truth we have likely already invited our killer to sit beside us.

    Olds’ poem was published in The Gold Cell in 1987. That is, it appeared in an era bookended by Bernard Goetz and the Central Park Five; call it the Paranoid Epoch of New York Public Life. Even a serial killer will pass, over the course of the day, several hundred or thousand people to whom he intends no harm, but there is no pleasure for Olds’ speaker in imagining that the man she indicts as a mugger does not notice her. This delusion that we are recognized by the perpetrator is the animating idea of so much of the genre known as true crime. Now that our midcentury marquee serial killers are dead or imprisoned, the genre has gorged itself down to the crumbs. My Favorite Murder, a two-woman podcast that sometimes markets itself as a primer on how not to be killed, features a Monday “mini-sode” in which callers send in overwrought letters about fleeting encounters with serial killers. Six degrees of John Wayne Gacy; I was Jeffrey Dahmer’s greengrocer; et cetera. If you doubt me, I’ll be specific: Episode 145 features the thrilling tale of an encounter with the murderous partners Gerald and Charlene Gallego by the former valet who sometimes parked their car at a Sacramento restaurant. 

    The postmodern genre of true crime — as feminist parable, as self-help — begins with an account of referred fear. Ann Rule worked at a crisis hotline in Seattle with Ted Bundy; she thought of him as brilliant and charismatic, though he possessed neither resource in sufficient quantity to secure an acquittal when he acted as his own counsel in his capital murder trial. In The Stranger Beside Me, Rule built the colloquial profile of the psychopath, not in proximity to his violence but to his seeming normalcy. True crime consumers learned that the normalcy was a mask for the violence, that cause-and-effect could not be reversed. That the killer’s virtues were his greatest vices. It seems obviously true that Bundy never injured Rule because he never intended to do so, that dangerous men are not equally dangerous to each person they meet. They might even love their friends, and provide admirable service at the crisis hotline. But this is an unsatisfying conclusion for true crime, where an absence of suffering makes you the greater victim. In it, you are betrayed by the sociopath’s superpower: his stealth. Rule rejected, as she later told The Guardian, stories of killers who were “ugly, mean, or had no charm. We’re not interested in the kind of man who looks like he could commit a murder.” Who looks like that? Upon his capture in 1978, Bundy purportedly pleaded with the Florida highway patrolman David Lee to kill him; one wonders what he looked like then. There is a comfort in imagining him smirking in the back of the police car — it validates his state-sanctioned death — but I wager that violent men feel little pleasure in feeding compulsions. 

    Years ago I fell in fascination — not love — with a man who, I belatedly discovered, had a distressing history of violence. Taking beatings from his fellow men and giving them to women, as is often the case. An hour late for a date, he inadvertently offered me a few minutes of fiddling with my phone on the sidewalk outside the locked New Orleans restaurant where we sometimes met for shots of Death’s Door gin and sex in the afternoon. (Literature wasn’t his métier, but the shape of these afternoons taught him to love Cavafy.) From a single, fatal Google Search, I learned all the varieties of charge intensifiers that police append to the phrase “domestic violence.” I neither confirmed preexisting suspicions nor explained quotidian bad behavior as a symptom of psychopathy. Those are the tent poles of true crime’s deep fiction. Weeks after my discovery, in a frenzy of grief and lust, I thought about the crumbling plaster in that attic room above the bar where he reeled at the force of my appetite. If you’d given me a line-up of men — this lover, the lover that preceded him, and Ted Bundy — and asked me to rank the dangers they might do to me in that room, I would have placed this man last, Bundy in the middle, and the previous lover, an otherwise mild-mannered scholar with an electric temper, first. Nothing we did together provoked fear, only sorrow in its departure. I served time in hell later, when his estranged wife picked up his phone and learned my name. A vain and fearful woman, she professed to be broken not by beatings but by cheating. These days, I keep a velvet drawstring bag of jewelry broken between the sidewalk and the attic room. When I pull the strings it is with gratitude that he never had the occasion to love me, such as love feels for him. And for her. 

    Empathy is not finite, but it is a resource that we apportion selectively, based on our own need. I won’t condescend and tell you that I have abundant empathy for the wife of my former lover; it is an obvious lie. She enforced compulsory ghosting, as though the balance of her marriage could be restored in inverse proportion to the cruelty with which her husband treated his mistress. That is, she punished the distant perpetrator to protect her bond with the proximate one: an inversion of accountability. She followed me into a public restroom to pelt me with crumpled-up damp paper towels, an offense with far less pain than she received from him. But for a year or more I was certain a greater revenge was coming. I believed I deserved it. On our first date, this man reached to touch my hair, only to have my earring shatter under his hands. In some other universe, I am writing a letter to My Favorite Murder using this broken earring as an apotropaic mark against violence he would have done to me. In that universe, I leave out a tender detail: that he saved the broken half for months during which he thought we were through. I can omit and disclose details to conjure up the Devil, but the end-product looks as lifelike as a hand-tinted photograph. I live in a universe of muddier hues.

    Sometimes I joke that I am the only feminist in America to listen to Beyoncé’s Lemonade and identify with the adulterous Jay-Z. The exposure. The humiliation. Skinlessness is the stuff of my nightmares; surely my rival’s nightmares vary. The distance between us is not that she has experienced violence and I have not. From slaps and shoves to terrifying lapses in consent with another ex to a sucker punch from a beloved relative, my body has been a target. If you tell me I lack empathy for “abuse survivors” as a category, you are telling me that the rough men in my life didn’t hit me hard enough for correction. (I assure you that there was pain to spare). My failing is not that I lack empathy for the wife — we are all dangerous to someone, lacking feeling for someone else — but that I possess empathy for her husband. His entry into a room makes me recoil with identification. I see in his posture precisely which of his twenty-four ribs pains him after a long workday. In the frame of his hands, I see the fractions of his body that he would like to conceal. I hear the struggle for control in his incongruously soft voice. And I see in him what philosophers call moral luck. Like you, I am selfish, wicked, and vain, but the actuation of my vices stops short of assault. What we call morality is often good fortune, an arrogant survey of all the noxious compulsions we lack. When I gave up booze in 2019, I left behind the urge for self-annihilation, but I have never been able to shake empathy for my former lover. If we met again on some distant sidewalk, we could skip the shots of gin; I’d sate the greater thirst.

    Gabby Petito died with her fiance’s hands around her throat, but it is her disappearance, not her death, that rivets and remakes the landscape of true crime. Late in August 2021, Petito — a would-be Instagram influencer and #VanLife acolyte — went missing in the High Plains: symmetry between a photogenic subject and setting. That same week, a Jane Doe found forty years ago in the mythic landscape of the Mississippi Delta was confirmed to be a victim of the late Samuel Little, the South’s most prolific serial killer. Petito’s case, trending on Twitter and burned on twenty-four-hour cable news chyrons, stoke the appetites of a media underbelly: the obsessive true crime fans hungry to watch a murder investigation in “real time” and the detritus of the mainstream media, whose chyron coverage of photogenic missing persons cases borders on the lustful. The long-dead, newly identified Clara Birdlong appeared on less-traveled media pathways with a computer-generated portrait, rather than the minute-by-minute Instagram diary of Petito’s doomed road trip with Brian Laundrie, her lover and killer. 

    No photographs exist of Birdlong, whose body was found where the Yazoo and Sunflower Rivers run. Many of Little’s ninety-three victims are identifiable only by the prison portraits he made of them on yellow legal pads. He was twice acquitted of murder, and once served a paltry three-year sentence for two attempted murders in one evening. After his release, he accumulated a massive body count. He died in California State Prison in Los Angeles in 2020. Both Birdlong and Little, I should note, are black. Despite the details — prison art, multi-state killing sprees, close calls, and stunning escapes — Little never held national attention like Bundy or Henry Lee Lucas. There are few pictures of the victims; images of the killer appear in decades-high stacks of mug shots, evidence of a criminal record that was never taken seriously. Birdlong had gold-capped teeth, walked with a limp after botched surgeries on her ankle, and worked at Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi; that biography is mostly written on her body, not in her own words. Change a few factors and the relative interest in her case and Petito’s might change. If her killer had more often killed across racial lines, like Jeffrey Dahmer, perhaps his nearly triple-digit body count would attract more attention. Who can say? Again, how do we do the work of parsing reasons that are multiple, in a political climate that encourages unitary, withering diagnostic certainty? 

    Under other circumstances, interest in Gabby Petito’s case would wane and crest with legal developments, arrests, trials, and sentencing. But after the so-called racial reckoning on crime, race, and punishment in 2020, headlines were instead sustained by “Missing White Girl Syndrome.” Coined by the journalist Gwen Ifill, the phrase indexes white women’s outsized placed in crime coverage. They lead, even before the public is sure that they bleed. On September 19, 2021, Gabby Petito’s remains were found in Teton County, Wyoming. It was punctuation to weeks of video forensics on body camera footage showing her and Laundrie questioned by Utah state troopers who answered a domestic distress call from passersby on the road. They are separated, but the acted-on may contact their aggressor. Punishment is required but haphazardly apportioned. Witnesses had only seen Petito hit Laundrie, so she was punished for grazing the man who would eventually kill her. Laundrie negotiates for Petito’s release with the Moab Police Department. 

    Police Officer: “You do have injury….She was the primary aggressor, and she was striking you and you received injuries….At this point you’re the victim of domestic assault….Now I don’t want to take this small — what is she — ?” 

    Laundrie [laughing]: “Twenty-two year old blonde haired blue eyed girl…”

    Police Officer: “….that you could definitely defend yourself against — to jail.”

    A month later, Laundrie committed suicide in the Florida swamps; his notebook contained a provisional confession. He claims to have killed Petito because she wanted to die. But it was the murderer’s other descriptions — the laughing dismissal of her as merely a young, small blue-eyed blonde — that neatly rhymed with the mainstream coverage. The night Petito’s body was found, MSNBC’s Joy Ann Reid hosted a panel of advocates for missing women of color to discuss the disproportionate interest in Petito’s case. The same week, news anchor Frank Somerville was suspended by San Francisco’s KTVU for appending a note about Missing White Girl Syndrome to coverage of Petito. Take these rejections of a Jon Benet-like ubiquity as an affirmative sign if you are inclined to think that Petitto’s family is better off grieving without cameras at their door. But the debate pretends to critique Petito’s ubiquity while using it as a journalistic peg, thereby extending rather than dismantling her hyper-visibility. Framed as awareness campaigns, diagnoses of Missing White Girl Syndrome operate with the usual short-lived, burn-out heat of social media outrage. Absent policy arguments, fueled only by awareness, this rhetoric feeds the punishment bureaucracy and, before that, the social justice tendency to make white women the center of the universe even as it purports to tumble their pedestals. White women’s privilege. White women’s tears — which, Robyn D’Angelo confidently asserts, simultaneously remind every black person of Emmett Till’s accuser Carolyn Bryant. Missing white women. Karens. Surely photographing these sobbing, raging, phone- and leash-wielding women in shaky, saturated iPhone footage will redistribute our attention by riveting it to the same target.

    The threat inflation described by Sarah Schulman rests parallel on a scale with the threat-negation of contemporary confessions of social privilege. Think of all the loud declamations by white people that they will never be shot by a cop because of their race, even though they live in the country that leads the world in police-involved shootings, that they will never be shot at prayer, though they were in Sutherland Springs and Squirrel Hill. They are invulnerable under regimes of power as currently constituted, or so they think. Their certainty offers a tremendous psychological benefit to those regimes. One thinks of Twitter’s cancellation of Justine Sacco, a PR director with less than two hundred followers, in 2013. “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!” she tweeted. Change the tone a fraction and place Sacco in the middle of a learning circle. Place the items from the list (whiteness, able-bodiedness, Americanness) in a privilege walk or a story circle, and the utterance becomes an act of anti-racist allyship — that is, an assertion of one’s immunity to the suffering they work to ameliorate. 

    This is an inversion of fifty years of storytelling about white women’s peculiar risks. Stories of decapitation and strangulation, of drifter-killers and wife-beaters, function as allegories. True crime critic-practitioners Rachel Monroe and Sarah Marshall have both described the genre as operating on a kind of fairytale logic. It offers a prescriptive utterance, a warning against walking alone or going home with a stranger that simultaneously blames the victim and assures the audience that violation was inevitable. The monsters are impervious to intervention save the ones that come after the crime: long criminal sentences and lethal injection. I fantasize about a return of Netflix’s Mindhunter — a scripted series about the team of profilers who invented the “serial killer” through jailhouse interviews — that features a key scene in which a killer speculates on why he had to murder many times to earn the attention of social workers and psychiatrists. Our imaginary serial killers instead fold into the real ones, promising that the work of mass incarceration exists only to contain sourceless, boundless evil. “Nothing happened to me, Agent Starling,” says hyper-real serial killer simulacra Hannibal Lecter in The Silence of the Lambs. “I happened.” 

    Dehumanizing the killer dehumanizes the victim, turning them into a mute repository of the spectator’s collective need. Poor Petito, described by the commentariat and her murderer alike as just a “blonde-haired blue-eyed” white girl, arrived too late to the genre of true crime, when her identity was crafted as an obstruction to the justice that is supposed to await the reader at the end of the story. Decades ago, advocates intent on bringing greater attention to murdered and missing women imagined themselves as ventriloquists for the mute, carrying a maximally punitive message from a sunlit afterlife. High-profile crimes like those committed by Ed Kemper and the Manson Family proffered privileged women as peculiarly vulnerable. Targeted mass incarceration and concentrated crime meant that the end of furloughs and widespread parole would affect more quotidian offenders. The Victim’s Rights Movement of the 1970s aimed at Cielo Drive but landed in far poorer neighborhoods. Soon, long sentences would bring new residents to places like Chowchilla and St Francisville and Tutwiler and Norfolk and Moundsville: the capitals of mass incarceration in the nation’s poorest provinces.

    The historian Jill Lepore describes the Victim’s Rights Movement as a compromise between feminism and the law-and-order New Right of the 1970s. Perhaps it is a depressing realization, that some of feminism’s greatest gains have come through compromises with its traditional enemies. With the punishment bureaucracy, it produced a culture of protectionism that relies on violence against women and children for moral force even though both victims and perpetrators of violent crime tend to be poor men. For the purpose of forming a realistic sense of threat in our society, that is not an insignificant fact. In the 1970s, the National Organization of Women’s demand for Social Security wages for carework fell by the wayside in pursuit of more women executives among mainstream feminists, thereby endorsing the end of the family wage and the further immiseration of the working class. The movement to prevent sexual violence produced an alliance with prosecutors leading witch hunts against “Satanist” childcare providers accused of ritual abuse. (#MeToo also produced its own share of inquisitorial excess.) No less an institution than Ms. magazine participated in the frenzy, with a series of headlines: “Surviving the Unbelievable: A First-Person Account of Cult Ritual Abuse” and “Believe it! Cult Ritual Abuse Exists!” Over the next twenty years, massive rape rings were exposed within the hierarchies of the Catholic Church and USA Gymnastics, but the intimacy of authority created the conditions of abuse and their concealment. Stranger danger moral panics did not redress sexual violence; they only delayed redress.

    The cable news ubiquity of missing white girls is not evidence of privilege, though they might possess that in abundance. Rather, the interminable coverage makes their bodies consumable, appealing, saleable, violable. Endless replay of these cases produces undue vigilance among white women that harms young men of color, as in Sharon Olds’ “On the Subway.” Parasocial relationships spring from these cases, and with them false confessions from fame-seekers, “recovered” memories from the deeply unwell, and internet sleuthing. Older crimes increasingly get this treatment, too. No fewer than three books and documentaries have credibly claimed that the author’s father was the as-yet unidentified Zodiac Killer. Consider this curious desire to be close to a killer, to be in mediated danger, to explain one’s suffering as evil rather than dysfunction; in it, one can observe the tragedy of how America serves and consumes its spectacles of violence. For some the sign of danger is a broken earring; for some it is a distant father.

    Indignant evocations of the Missing White Girl Syndrome seek to widen the offerings of victims on the table, to expand — rather than right-size — the collective sense of danger. Both the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women (MMIW) and Black and Missing Foundations admirably call attention to the disproportionate rates of violence for people of color, but it is unclear what they intend to do with this raised “awareness,” always an erratic instrument. In fact there is near-parity in missing rates among black men and women, but the Black and Missing Foundation tends to push women to the front in their awareness campaigns, raising sinister specters of pimps and human traffickers to fuel a sense of imminent sexualized emergency: the kind that has aroused the culture for centuries. The foundation’s four-part documentary series on HBO begins with a recitation of sex crimes, then shifts to a missing poster of Brittany Michelle Davis and an interview with the family of Keeshae Jacobs. No men in sight. Founded by Natalie and Derrica Wilson — sisters-in-law who worked in law enforcement and public relations, respectively — the organization raises the profile of missing people, showing how one might productively use social media as a tool to bypass legal negligence toward missing persons of color. Yet the fields in which its founders were embedded structures much of the rhetoric and the reception, cultivating a fear of profound evil lurking at the gates: an enemy-image that, in this instance ironically, has always harmed people on the margins. One pernicious instrument of racism is indifference. The opposite of indifference is infamously difficult to define, but in the realm of criminal justice, it is concrete enough to build more prisons.

    What would it look like to right-size risk, especially after a recent spike in crime that followed exponentially larger decreases of the previous three decades? Our safety and collective self-conception depend on getting the magnitude of our vulnerability right. Mastering fear is hard enough without demagoguery or panic. I have no definitive answer, though as a child of the 1980s I am quite certain that awareness of high-profile crimes offered little protection to their vulnerable targets. Etan Patz disappeared when my mother carried me in her body; Adam Walsh disappeared on my second birthday. The whiplash that followed those crimes made my childhood more terrifying, but I doubt that it made it significantly safer. These days, I banish my fear by taking risks that I survive (thus far). 

    Expanding awareness may, in the end, produce unintended consequences from the punishment bureaucracy. In the realm of high-profile police-involved shootings, awareness enshrines a vision of peculiar evil — the iconic image of a police officer coolly kneeling on the neck of an unarmed man — a theological notion that is the enemy of the “structural.” To call violence structural is to say, simply, that for the most powerful precincts of our society the “crimes” are legal. I am not the first critic to note that the endless coverage of sexualized sprees and serial murderers in the ’70s and ’80s corresponded to a backlash against women’s rights. Our presence in public space became vexed. Don’t walk alone, don’t forget your rape whistle, don’t wear a scarf that a man could seize from behind. This folk wisdom trickled down to me, who came of age rather late to spend freshman year dodging “co-ed killers.” A certain amount of caution protects, but a surfeit of it hobbles. Whether I am teaching in prison or cycling at night in my neighborhood in a city with an intractable murder rate, I take the pleasure I can in this life. (I mutter words of protection for you.) Two mantras guide me. One I lifted from a different yoga teacher, who translated the Buddha into colloquial English: the bullet that kills me has already been fired. Another is the advice of an old neighbor from pre-Katrina New Orleans: bullets do not have names.

    The Once and the Now

    You will never be again

    What you never were before.

     Theodor Storm

    Every morning Odysseus sits on the beach and casts his eyes across the sun-freckled water. The breeze is fresh and the waves rumble gently as they break. He is crying. For seven years he has been a prisoner in paradise, the unwilling consort of the beautiful nymph Calypso, who loves and fawns on him. Odysseus can’t bear it. Since leaving Troy victorious, he has wandered the seas, hounded by the god Poseidon, who would prevent him from finding his way home to Ithaca. Eventually Zeus is driven to pity and orders Calypso to release him. “Where shall a man find sweetness to surpass his own home and his parents? In far lands he shall not, though he find a house of gold.” Odysseus builds himself a raft, and after one last night of lovemaking and weeping he sails off alone.

    The home we return to is never the home we left. When Odysseus lands on Ithaca, he learns that his estate has been occupied by suitors vying for the hand of his wife Penelope, and dissipating his fortune while they wait. Odysseus comes to her, disguised as a beggar, and kills the suitors. After he proves to her who he is, the couple goes to their bed, which Odysseus had made with his own hands, using a tree planted in the ground as one of the bedposts. They make love and fall asleep. There is no space between the two of them, between the couple and Odysseus’s handiwork, between the bed and the tree, between the tree and the earth. It as if they all sprang fully formed from the soil of Ithaca. Oneness has been restored. At least for now.

    The fate of Aeneas was to be different. Troy was no more, vanquished by the craven guile of the Greeks. As they poured from the belly of the wooden horse to destroy the city, Aeneas reached for his sword to resist. But Venus in a vision urged him to flee with others. A priest grabbed the fetish statues, their defeated gods, and headed for the ships, while Aeneas lifted his father onto his back and followed. In the confusion he became separated from his wife, and would never see her again. As the ship made for open seas, he watched the flames consume everything he had ever known, then turned his back on Troy forever. Odysseus would face many more dangers and suffer worse deprivations than Aeneas would on his journeys, but the Greek knew that Ithaca still existed in time and space, that hope for return was not vain. This balm is denied Aeneas. Only ashes litter the site of ancient Troy, and no Penelope awaits him.

    The Aeneid is not about loss, though. It is a phoenix story of rebirth, about a city rising, quite literally, out of the flames. While on his journey Aeneas makes a stop at Delos to consult the oracle about his fate, and he receives an enigmatic reply. The land of your ancestors will welcome you again, return to her generous breast. Seek out your ancient mother. He is baffled. But soon he has a dream in which his fetishes confirm the prophecy: your home is elsewhere.

    That elsewhere would turn out to be Rome. The fetishes convince Aeneas that his ancestors were originally from the Italian peninsula, and not from Anatolia. By migrating to Italy, Aeneas will only be recovering what was rightfully his, just as Odysseus did when he returned to Ithaca. By building a new city inspired by Troy, and by making it more magnificent than the one he came from, invincible and prepared to conquer the world, Aeneas will in a sense be moving backward and forward in time simultaneously. Throughout his journey the gods confirm that this is his destiny. He is made to visit Hades and finds it crowded with Roman heroes of the future, who all look up to him as to a father. He is called to be the redeemer of history, the link between past and future. He accepts, and the poem then recounts in bloody detail how he conquered the native tribes and, in the book’s last lines, brutally killed a rebel leader who had come to surrender. Yes, he thinks, laying down his sword in extreme fatigue, I have had my vision.

    Nostalgia is a mood that mixes pleasure and pain in equal measure. Consider photographs. Why do we take them? Ask parents this question and they are likely to say that they want to preserve the memory of their children at every stage of development, so that one day they can look back and measure the time traversed. Photography is an exercise in anticipatory nostalgia. We foresee that come a certain age we will want to experience an odd pleasure that comes from reflecting on what has been lost.

    Yet how to describe the flood of feelings set off by seeing all those pictures? There are the simple pleasures of self-recognition, of recalling happiness and pride, of seeing life as a continuum, of reliving the journey. There is also bitter with the sweet. Baby pictures bring out longing for a time when the child was an innocent wonder, and regret over not having appreciated how fleeting it would be. It is a pain that the arrival of grandchildren only partially relieves. Vacation pictures remind us, or delude us into thinking, that family relations were once simpler and happier than they are now. We see ourselves, thinner and with more hair, looking carefree as we cradle the nursing baby or put our arms around wet, shivering, reluctant teenagers on a beach. This brings pain, then pleasure in the pain. There is something mildly masochistic about the family album.

    Do we really want to return to the past conjured up by the images? In the end, no. Whenever we have tried to relive moments from the past, we have almost always experienced disappointment. The old neighborhood we visit looks shabby and dull. The ex-lover we invite for a drink does, too. Psychologists suggest that the suffering nostalgic does not really want to possess the lost object, he only wants to preserve the bittersweet desire for it. Actually retrieving it or accepting its loss would rob him of a feeling he has structured his life around. He is stuck, unable to let the past go. And his resistance to getting unstuck is tenacious, since it would force him to acknowledge the open horizon before him. Freud developed psychotherapies to free people of that fear. No such therapy has yet been found for nostalgic societies.

    Nations and peoples fall into nostalgic moods just as individuals do. It is hard to think of societies that don’t romanticize their origins. The myths they conjure up combine innocence and grandeur in varying proportions. Once we were simple and pure! Once we were strong! Or, most powerfully of all, Once we were strong because we were simple and pure! The parallel between individual and collective nostalgia only takes us so far, though. No matter how much I embellish my memories and force them into neat narratives to make sense of myself, the experiences I remember are my own, not someone else’s. The first-hand memory of nations does not extend further back than a single human lifespan, less than a century. Every literate society’s image of its past is necessarily mediated by embellished accounts handed down over the years, even millennia, and modified at each step. Or by retrospective attempts to reconstruct events and past psychological experience from shards that we in the present deem to be relevant. All history is pastiche. In pre-literate societies, collective memories from the distant past are imbedded in rituals; they are remembered by being reenacted, not heard or read. Literate societies remember through articulate myths and narratives whose second-hand, constructed nature has to be veiled if the stories are to hold their power.

    It is always surprising to learn that an ancient tradition is not so ancient after all. Two amusing examples happen to concern the Scots. In the mid-eighteenth century, a poet of some talent named James MacPherson published what he claimed to be the English translation of fragments of an ancient Gaelic epic. It had been composed, he asserted, by a mysterious blind bard of the third century C.E. named Ossian — the Homer of the Scottish Highlands, a lie that appealed to the proto-Romantic mood of European letters at the time. The poems —— which MacPherson seems to have written by drawing from Irish poem cycles — were welcomed not only by his fellow nationalists but also by some of the greatest thinkers and poets of the age, including Goethe, who placed translated fragments of Ossian in one of his works. Dutch and German artists painted scenes found in the tales, Napoleon read and admired them, and a French opera based on them was a smash hit during his reign. From the start doubts were raised about the epic’s authenticity by, among others, Samuel Johnson, who when asked whether he thought any man from the present age could have written it, replied, Yes, sir, many men, many women, and many children. MacPherson never produced the Gaelic manuscripts that he claimed to have translated. Still, the poem continued to be read and translated throughout the nineteenth century and fed nostalgia across Europe for a pre-imperial, pre-industrial age.

    Another symbol of Scotland’s heroic age, the clan kilt, has little more foundation in history than do the Ossian poems. There is no evidence of distinctive Highland dress before the sixteenth century, when Scots typically wore a long shirt covered by a belted cloak, sometimes made of murky tartan. The skirt we now call the kilt was in fact invented in the eighteenth century by an English Quaker manufacturer who wished his scantily clad Scottish factory workers to be properly dressed. Once kilts caught on, regional stylistic variations developed, but there were no distinctive clan tartans. The skirt experienced some popularity among workers, until it was banned by the British after the rebellion of 1745. Not until the English ban was lifted in 1782 did the kilt become a nationalist badge of honor, worn mainly by gentry wishing to play up their real or imagined highland roots. After the Napoleonic wars, during which the Scottish kilt was observed by armies across Europe, it was extolled by Romantics fascinated with noble primitives, which is what they considered the Highlanders to be. Only thereafter did distinctive plaids become associated with clans, thanks to the marketing genius of a clothing manufacturer who developed his own fanciful pattern book, arbitrarily assigning this or that tartan to particular clans.

    The practice continues to this day. In 2016, a Scottish rabbi registered a “kosher Jewish tartan” with the official Register of Tartans, which itself had only been established in 2008. The garment has gold to represent the Ark of the Covenant, silver to represent the Torah, and blue and white to represent the Israeli flag. It now festoons kilts, neckties, and yarmulkes. Golf balls with the tartan pattern are also available for purchase.

    Nostalgia can be fun. Anyone with a good internet connection can now research his lineage himself or with the help of very profitable businesses that promise an ancestry worth celebrating. But when an entire nation or people or faith begins searching for lost time, darker emotions and fantasies emerge. Political nostalgia transforms a feeling that things are not as they should be into the conviction that things are not what they once were. Everything hangs on that once. Once we were innocent and pure, now we are not. Once we were kings, now we are slaves. Once we lived in Eden, now we live in Los Angeles or Cairo or Dubai. Once we were nigh unto gods, now we are all too human.

    The impulse to see the human condition as the result of a temporal fall from perfection is widespread in human culture, and there are numerous versions of the myth of the Golden Age. The one told by the ancient Greek poet Hesiod is the most familiar to us. Frustrated by his lazy, shiftless brother Perses, Hesiod wrote a poem to explain to him why human beings had to work. He described a divinely created golden race that once lived off of the fruit of the earth without toil. But when this race disappeared, each subsequent one was fatally flawed and now we must live in the age of iron. For us, life is toil and suffering, and so it will remain until our destruction. That end is inevitable, but it can be postponed if we are decent, law-abiding, and respect the gods. Hesiod does not dangle before his brother any hope of returning to the Golden Age or of entering a new one. His message is: back to the plow.

    The modern historical imagination is not terribly drawn to moral parables like this one, but it is still subject to the entwined emotions of hope in the future and nostalgia for the past. No sooner had poets and thinkers in the Renaissance announced the rebirth of ancient learning than their adversaries began romanticizing the older darkness. It is remarkable how quickly nostalgia for the Middle Ages grew up in Europe after they ended. Already in the seventeenth century there was a vast literature, mocked by Cervantes in Don Quixote, that extolled the medieval chivalric virtues of simplicity and valor, which stood in contrast to the new bourgeois spirit of gain and the terrifying impersonal mechanization of warfare. By the nineteenth century, Romantics such as John Ruskin were stoking a passion for Gothic architecture and the ruins of Catholic Europe, and encouraging architects to return to the old forms. The more advanced the nineteenth century became in science, industry, and even politics, the more nostalgic it became in spirit. Such are the hydraulics of historical consciousness.

    The modern literature of nostalgia is enormous. Rare, though, are writers who explore the psychology of this longing without succumbing to it themselves. The Sicilian writer Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa was an exception. His only novel, The Leopard, published posthumously in 1958, is the most poignant portrait we have of nostalgic melancholy — and its futility. It concerns a fictitious Count of Salinas, the last of a line of Sicilian aristocrats, who can only be a spectator as the world familiar to him evaporates before his eyes in the late nineteenth century. Trains replace carriages, revolutionaries demand a democratic state, and a new class of greedy, untrustworthy arrivistes take advantage of distracted nobles who care more about observing the gentleman’s code than turning a profit.

    Lampedusa, himself the last prince of his line in Italy, is subtle. The aristocracy that he portrays is no longer glorious; it is lethargic, anemic. It is dying of wounds self-inflicted over centuries and prefers ruminating on the past to seizing the present. When the Prince’s forward-looking nephew tells him, famously, that if we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change, he sees the point. But he and his class are incapable of acting on it. They are coming to teach us good manners. But they won’t succeed, because we think we are gods…We were the Leopards, the Lions; those who will take our place will be little jackals, hyenas. There is no anger in his voice. He knows himself and his class, and he has reconciled himself to its fate. The Leopard is an elegy, not a tragedy. The sun has set. It takes a great soul to recognize this without betraying memories of the past or succumbing to hatred of the present. The prince gives all honor due to the lost world, but he is immune to fantasies of recovering it.

    Feeling inferior is no easier for nations and cultures than it is for individuals. Powerful empires can also live with chips on their shoulders — even the greatest of all, Rome. It grew from a small city into an extensive empire within a cultural arena dominated by the Greeks. The religion, the art, the architecture, the literature, the philosophy, the sciences — to none of these could the Romans lay exclusive claim. Their cultural dependence made Roman elites double-minded. On the one hand, they had Greek masters educate their children, knowing that their cultural status in society would depend partly on how well they spoke the language and mastered the literature. Their palaces were full of copies of Greek sculptures. On the other, the Romans felt shame at their own belatedness and their dependence on the achievements of another people. Imitators can never fully respect themselves. And so, at different points in their history, even after Rome had entirely subjugated Greece militarily, they rebelled against Greek high ideals and asserted pride in things that distinguished themselves from their rivals. Romans, they told themselves, are simple and direct, not slippery and refined like the Hellenes. They are doers, not talkers, honest, not treacherous, courageous, not cowardly, tanned and strong, not pale and weak. Roman-ness (Romanitas) was the pinnacle of virtue and everything that came from the Greeks carried a disease (morbus graecus)

    The Romans were always haunted by the specter of decline, always worrying that their vital essence was being sapped or had already disappeared. Fixing the moment when Roman decadence began was a parlor game that educated Romans loved to play. Already in the late republican period, when Roman power was rapidly expanding, nostalgic patricians such as Cato the Elder were railing against the effects of luxury, declaring that Rome was losing its rustic virility and becoming effeminate. He was especially obsessed with Greek philosophers. When a group of them visited Rome he made speeches against them, declaring in the Senate, as if he were a prophet or a seer, that Rome would lose its empire if its youth listened to them. He then managed to get them banned from the city and transported back to Greece.

    Rome’s experience with Greece has become a global psychological experience. Beginning in the eighteenth century, due to trade and then to colonialism, and today with travel and the internet, non-Western countries and cultures have had no choice but to confront the modern West as idea and reality. And simultaneously to confront themselves. For all their interest today in cultural encounter, contemporary historians generally lack the psychological acuity that ancient historians once brought to the study of relations among peoples. Herodotus would not have been surprised to learn how significantly the dynamics of cultural pride and shame have shaped global history in the modern era, since they did so in the ancient world as well.

    Nineteenth-century Russia was an extraordinary theater for this kind of drama. Long before Napoleon tempted the fates by marching on Moscow, Russia felt itself invaded by the West. Ideas associated with the Enlightenment were first introduced by Peter the Great at the beginning of the eighteenth century and inspired his radical, and much resented, reforms. Catherine the Great, who cultivated personal relations with the French philosophes, pushed those reforms further. More important, the French-speaking elite also embraced these ideas and began educating their children along modern European lines, much as the Romans used to send theirs to Greek tutors. And as in Rome, a powerful intellectual and political reaction to these changes then set in.

    In the great novels of Turgenev and Dostoevsky, we are witness to clashes between modernizers and anti-modernizers, Westernizers and chauvinists, atheists and neo-orthodox Slavophiles, fathers and sons. The Russians were perhaps the first to go through a political-intellectual cycle that has become familiar elsewhere in the world: a nation or culture encounters the modern West and, at first, feels backward and humiliated, and so begins to slavishly imitate its ways. When the expected benefits of modernization do not materialize — or when they do, but with unexpected consequences — a reaction sets in. At that moment there arises from the depths of the nostalgic imagination the idea of returning to an idealized past. Then ideological movements spring up promising to do just that, to lead the way out of Egypt and back to the Promised Land.

    The Slavophiles were one such movement, or family of movements. The questions that they asked were not foolish ones. What will happen to religious faith if we modernize? How can traditional authority be maintained? Will common decency and fellow feeling die out? And art as well? As Dostoevsky once put it, will a pair of boots or a barrel of oil become more valuable than Shakespeare or Raphael? For the Slavophiles, modernization meant the destruction of all that was virtuous and noble in the traditional Russian way of life. But like so many nostalgic political activists, they had trouble distinguishing the modern innovations themselves from the Western countries that had brought them to Russia. They were incapable of seeing modernization as a general historical process that only happened to begin in the West, and was originally directed against traditional life there as well. Instead the Slavophiles convinced themselves that modernization was the fullest realization of a distinctive Western culture, and all that was wrong with it. The struggle that they saw was not between pre-modern and modern life everywhere, it was between the West and the rest. Their writings endlessly repeat the same refrain: the Western mind is rigid, abstract, rationalistic, and so fixated on the future that it destroys life in the present, while the Russian soul and heart are authentic, charitable, devout, and bring everything into harmony. The same tropes litter the literature of political Islamism, which purports to explain the obvious incongruity between the Once and the Now, as one revered thinker put it.

    When Augustus declared himself emperor in 27 BCE, nostalgia became official state policy. After the Civil Wars, with their intrigues and senseless slaughter, at a time when the urbs romana was already sinking into the decadence that Tacitus and Suetonius would later chronicle, Augustus made an effort to re-instill civic virtue by giving patronage to artists and writers who were to celebrate ancient Romanitas. Bucolic poetry — a Greek invention, as it happens — became the rage and invoked a mythical past when Latin shepherds led simple lives tending to their sheep, playing the flute, and singing of love to blushing maidens. Other works, such as the Aeneid, gave Rome a noble mythical history independent of the Greeks, something crucial for self-respect. Its great innovation, though, was to redirect nostalgia for the past toward the future and raise the prospect of leapfrogging over the present to arrive at a utopian world to come. All the energy that old republicans such as Cato once wasted trying to call Romans back to a lost Golden Age was now freed up to inaugurate a new one.

    The ideologies of modern fascism are all heirs to the Aeneid. Nazism, though, was also inspired by an obscure work of Tacitus’s called On Germany. It was an odd choice of subject for the ancient historian, since it seems that he never once set foot in Germany. His account, drawn from various sources including Caesar’s memoirs, appear to have been written largely for contemporary polemical purposes. Tacitus deplored the decadence of the empire, which he later evoked so vividly in his Annals and Histories, and On Germany appears to be an early, veiled attempt to criticize it. The book describes a strong rustic people resembling the ancient Latin tribes: rude, truthful, loyal, united, proud, belligerent. They knew neither luxury nor adultery. Encouraged by women baring their breasts, men marched off singing into battle, indifferent to cold and hunger. And any man who had not killed an enemy had to go unshaven and wear a ring in his nose, as signs of his shame. The contrast between these Teutons and the imperial Romans could not be greater, which was Tacitus’ point. Over the centuries On Germany became a reference for writers in many countries who condemned the decadence of their time, and it contains many of the commonplaces about noble savages that one finds throughout European literature. The book became particularly popular in German lands after Luther translated it, no doubt to contrast the corruptions of papal Rome with the virtuousness of his own flock.

    Luther’s translation also became a key source for völkisch thinkers of the nineteenth century who wanted to distinguish the earthy culture of rural Germany from the salon culture being imported from effeminate France. They quoted approvingly Tacitus’ report that the Teutons practiced a brutal justice, killing slaves if they seriously disobeyed, drowning traitors and deserters in the swamps, and in some cases practicing human sacrifice. But one sentence in particularly drew their attention. It is where Tacitus says, in passing, that I accept the view of those who think that the peoples of Germania have never been tainted by intermarriage with other nations, and stand out as a race distinctive, pure and unique of its kind. He goes on to describe them as blue-eyed and ruddy-haired, with immensely strong bodies that could bear severe cold and hunger. In these passages the modern racial “theorists” found their ur-text. Just as Rome was supposedly weakened and collapsed due to racial mixing with the peoples it conquered, so Germany was threatened by mixing with alien races and cultures, particularly the Jews. This is how On Germany became, in the words of one Nazi propagandist, a bible that every thinking German should possess, as this booklet by the Roman patriot fills us with pride in our forefathers’ superior character.

    For a nostalgic like Heinrich Himmler, Tacitus’s portrayal of racially pure and belligerent Teutons in their dark forests provided sufficient mythological inspiration for the Nazi  policy of racial extermination. For Hitler, it did not. While he recognized the usefulness of völkisch propaganda, he also understood that idealizing such an undeveloped culture would keep Germans’ attention focused on the impossible task of restoring the past, rather than on the future they were capable of building. As he already complained in Mein Kampf in the 1920s, the imagination of many of his dreamy early followers, meeting in the back rooms of seedy taverns, clad in lederhosen, did not extend beyond the romance of conservative villages nestled in Bavarian valleys. Hitler wanted to create an empire that would be mentioned by posterity in the same breath as those of classical antiquity, and be remembered equally for its military conquests and its cultural achievements.

    Associating the Germans with ancient high culture has always been a fraught and dubious enterprise, given that Germany was well outside the orbit of classical culture in antiquity, and slow to participate in its revival in the Renaissance. Mussolini, by contrast, had only to give a speech in front of the Colosseum to drive the connection home. In one such speech he declared, “the Rome that we contemplate with pleasure and are preparing is a different one. It’s not about the stones of the past, but a difficult preparation for the future. Rome is our point of departure and point of reference. It is our symbol. Or, if you like, our myth…Civis romanus sum.” The Nazis had to find some other way to connect Walhalla with the agora, the fur-clad Germans with the toga-clad Greeks.

    They eventually did so in the racial theory of the Aryan people. The term “Aryan” was first adopted by Western linguists in the late eighteenth century to describe a family of Indo-European languages, not a race or a people. But in the nineteenth century, when romantic nationalism was at its peak, European scholars began to speculate about the existence of an Aryan ur-race. And as the century progressed, that speculation became for many a scientific certainty, which was used across Europe and the Americas to justify slavery, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and much else.

    In its original form, Aryan race theory suggested that all the European peoples — French, German, English, Spanish, Italian — had a common ancestry, and so in racial terms were fundamentally equal. Nazi race theorists came up with a brilliant, and in the end lethal, variation of this idea. They argued, on the basis of no evidence whatsoever, that the original Aryans had not spread out from the Indus Valley into Europe. Rather, just as Aeneas had discovered that the Trojans were originally from Italy, so these “scientists” discovered that the Aryans’ original home was actually in the German forests (and probably, as one straight-faced Nazi scholar suggested, near the port city of Lübeck). The Aryans subsequently spread out from Germany into the rest of Europe and thence into India — and not the other way around. The Nazi regime invested enormous energy into propagating this myth, and through its own Department of Classical Antiquity — yes, you read that right — supported pseudo-academic research in history and anthropology to demonstrate its truth.

    Once this Aryan racial link was made, the full range of symbols from the ancient world lay at the service of Nazi propaganda officials. All the cultural achievements of ancient Greece could now be claimed as German. And all the military achievements of Rome as well. Pericles was blue-eyed, Augustus was blond. And the Spartans offered the model for a new system of education giving precedence to physical prowess and toughness over intellectual inquiry. Hitler declared Sparta to have been the first racist state, and sycophantic Nazi scholars called them the Prussians of antiquity. In 1933, the race-obsessed German philosopher Alfred Baümler gave a lecture in Berlin titled “Against the Un-German Spirit,” in which he contrasted the manly political education of the Spartans, who aimed to form citizen-soldiers, with the effeminate, Jew-infected democratic education of the Weimar Republic. He then called out to his student audience, many in SS uniforms, to take the first step toward restoring the Spartan spirit by burning all books poisoning the German soul. That night they did just that, heaping twenty thousand volumes from the University of Berlin library into a pile and setting it alight.

    Hitler was also fond of drawing a parallel between the Spartan practice of abandoning handicapped children in the wild to the Nazi’s industrialized-scale eugenic cleansing. The difference was that the Spartans were amateurs who acted out of instinct. Modern racial science had discovered that the only way for a people to be genuinely reborn is through self-conscious selection. The future was to be won by the first modern people that returned to this ancient practice, but carried it out with the most advanced scientific and technological means available.

    Political nostalgia has lost none of its allure or destructive potential. And since the end of what now must be called the First Cold War, it is filling the vacuum left by the abandonment of progressive ideologies like socialism and democratic liberalism. Even Aryan race theory has been revived, in the Hindutva movement that inspires the core of Narenda Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party which dreams of driving Muslims out of the country.

    In China and Russia the nostalgia is more complicated, since they live with double historical legacies: that of modern revolutions inspired by universalistic political ideals, and that of the traditional societies which those revolutions destroyed. Call it the Two Edens Problem. The link between them that Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin seem to be trying to articulate is a new ideology of longue-durée imperialism that is supposedly the deepest expression of the national essence. Whatever the differences between Puyi and Mao, or Alexander II and Lenin, they were all leaders of great empires, and it is these empires that must be restored or expanded. The Soviet one was abandoned with hardly a shot being fired; the Chinese one still lacks Taiwan, and Xinjiang Province refuses to bend its knee. Now we have a goal, now we have a historical destiny: to restore our lost wholeness. The Uyghurs and the Ukrainians are only the latest victims to be sacrificed on the altar of this fantasy. There will be others.

    The Abjection of Albert Cohen

    Albert Cohen died in 1981, hailed in France as one of the greatest writers of the twentieth century. His passing barely registered in the English-speaking world; not even the New York Times ran an obituary, and it is unlikely to correct this particular mistake in its “Overlooked” feature. Cohen was the author of a fictional tetralogy that included a masterpiece called Belle du Seigneur, as well as three volumes of memoirs, but at the time of his death he had not been translated into English since 1933. In that year his first novel, Solal, published in 1930 in France, appeared in English to dithyrambic reviews. The vagaries of the translation market deprived us of translations of Belle du Seigneur until 1995 and of The Book of My Mother until 2012. The rest of Cohen’s work remains untranslated.

    Lost to Anglophone readers is a body of work of real genius, books that are humorous, romantic, tragic, sensuous, challenging, enthralling, and occasionally exasperating and even repugnant. They are books that are overflowing with love, thought, and ambiguity; that are extremely Jewish and extremely French, and explore the ties and the disjunctions between those two adjectives of belonging. There is much in them to admire and even to adore, and much that will enrage. Cohen really does contain multitudes, a writer roaming in style and form — there is humor, there is Biblical narrative, there is stream-of-consciousness realism, there is exalted lyricism, there is even the language of swashbuckling tales and serial novels à la Eugène Sue. His language flows drunkenly and freely yet also precisely, with a seeming infinity of verbal resources, able to change tone on a dime. The result is a body of work that is utterly unique. It is also, in both its fictional and autobiographical forms, an oeuvre that contains a philosophy of love, mortality, and Jewishness that is complex and sometimes shocking.

    Cohen was born in Corfu on August 16, 1895 to a Jewish family involved in the soap trade. The Jewish settlement on Corfu dates back at least to the High Middle Ages, and in the early modern period the community — which developed customs and liturgies uniquely its own — suffered many anti-Semitic adversities, and so into the modern centuries, until in 1891 a blood libel forced many Jews to flee the island. In 1944 almost two thousand Jews were deported to Auschwitz. As for Cohen’s family, business difficulties led them to move to Marseille in 1900. He attended school there and began a lifelong friendship with Marcel Pagnol, the novelist and filmmaker, the bard of Marseille and the Midi. Cohen adapted well to the Midi — but on the day of his tenth birthday he experienced the central event of his life, the formative event that “drove [him] from humankind.”

    On August 16 at 3:05 in the afternoon, as he was leaving summer school, Albert saw a street vendor selling stain remover. He listened with delight to the seller’s pitch and held out the coins to him. As he later recalled, the vendor addressed him directly: 

    “You, you’re a kike, right?” said the blond street merchant with his thin mustache whom I’d gone to listen to with faith and tenderness on the way from school. ‘You’re a filthy kike, right? I can see it in your mug. You don’t eat pig, right? Given that pigs don’t eat each other you’re a miser, right? I can see it in your mug, you eat gold coins, right? You like them more than you do candy, right? You’re a fake Frenchman, right? I can see that in your mug, you’re a filthy Jew, right? A filthy Jew, right? Your father is in international finance, right? You’ve come here to eat the bread of the French, right? Ladies and gentlemen, I present to you a buddy of Dreyfus, a little purebred yid, guaranteed member of the brotherhood of the snipped, shortened where he should be. I recognize them on sight: me, I can’t be fooled. Well, we don’t like Jews around here, it’s a filthy race, they’re all spies in the pay of Germany, look at Dreyfus, they’re all traitors, they’re all bastards, they’re as awful as the mange, bloodsuckers of the poor world, they roll on gold and smoke big fat cigars while we have to tighten our belts: am I right or am I right, ladies and gentlemen. Get lost, we’ve seen enough of you, you’re not at home here, this isn’t your country, you have no place here in our home, c’mon, get lost, take a hike, get going, go see if I’m in Jerusalem.”

    Cohen never recovered from this tirade, though he later declared that his love of the country that had “rejected” him did not waver, finding its focus instead in literature. Cohen’s suspicion of all claims about universal brotherhood grew from this early confrontation with the actual, smiling face of hatred. 

    Cohen attended law school in Geneva from 1914 and took Swiss citizenship in 1919, the same year in which he married his first wife, Elisabeth Brocher, a Protestant pastor’s daughter. He published his first book, a volume of poetry called Paroles juives, in 1921, a volume that he refused to republish during his lifetime though it was eventually included in the Pléiade collection of his work. The poetry of the young Cohen bears within it the same pride about Jews and Jewishness, later diversified by ambiguity, that will persist throughout his writing life. In the first lines of the collection Cohen writes:

    Listen

    My People.

    My people

    I looked upon you.

    You taught me.

    As he admits, “my words are crude.” These poems are exhortations to his people, which sometimes involve criticism of them.

    I know only how to shout

    I know only how to shout.

    I come to you

    My people lacking in courage.

    Ah, how my words burn you

    Ah, rise and go forth.

    Ah, puff up your mane and growl

    Indolent lion

    Lion that awakens the flame of the south.

    The young Cohen was a muscular and unapologetic poet of Jewishness, and of Zionism: 

    You drink the wine of joy.

    And you cry out

    This year we sing in a foreign land

    And next year it is certain

    A free people in Jerusalem.

    And you do not smile at each year that passes

    Stubborn people

    Strong people.

    And his national pride extended also to metaphysical matters. Paroles juives contains Cohen’s love of a god in whom he is unable to believe:

    I lost my God

    I no longer know my God

    But I know that my God is stronger than your gods.

    That last line is childish and coarse, but Cohen was writing when Jews were increasingly in jeopardy, and like some other Jewish intellectuals of his time he chose to respond to the threats with defiance and Jewish self-assertion. Paroles juives, a slight volume, is nevertheless a key to much of Cohen’s thought, to his feelings about the Jewish people, his “brother slaves.”

    Cohen’s wife died in 1924, leaving him a daughter, Myriam, born in 1921. The following year he became editor of a new Zionist publication, La Revue juive. It published work by Einstein, Freud, Buber, Max Jacob, Elie Faure, Max Brod, and Louis Massignon — and, most notably, Proust, with a previously unpublished chapter of À la recherche du temps perdu. But its life was short; it lasted six issues.

    Cohen lived parallel lives in literature and world affairs, publishing in 1930 his first novel, Solal, as well as his sole theatrical piece, Ezéchiel. During this period he was employed at the Geneva-based International Labor Organization, and served also as the Zionist Organization’s representative to the League of Nations. In 1931 Cohen married his second wife, Marianne Goss. His involvement in these two spheres continued into the late 1930s: in 1938 he published Mangeclous, the second novel of what would be his tetralogy, while continuing his Zionist labors, serving as Chaim Weizmann’s personal representative in Paris in 1939. He fled France for London in June 1940, where he served as the Jewish Agency’s special representative to the Allied governments in exile, and worked with De Gaulle’s Free French, publishing regularly in their journal, La France libre. At war’s end he worked as assistant director of the International Refugee Organization, retiring in 1951 and dedicating the rest of his life to his writing. Cohen wed Bella Bercovich in 1955, the only Jewish woman among his spouses. 

    Cohen’s first autobiographical book, Le Livre de ma mère (The Book of My Mother), appeared in 1954, and the two final novels of his tetralogy, Belle du Seigneur, his masterpiece, in 1968 and Les Valeureux (The Valorous) in 1969. He published two further autobiographical volumes after that novel, O vous, frères humains (O You, Brother Humans) in 1972, and his final book, Carnets 1978 (Notebooks 1978), in 1979. Abraham Albert Cohen died in Geneva on October 17, 1981, and was buried two days later in the city’s Jewish cemetery.

    Solal, Cohen’s first novel, was published to great acclaim in France in 1930. The critic for Comoedia, for example, concluded that it “marked perhaps the rebirth of the novel of imagination in our literature,” continuing that it is “certainly the masterpiece” of Jewish literature. (The latter remark is certainly excessive.) Its translation into English in 1933 was also highly praised. Its overwhelmingly Jewish otherness was stressed by the critics. The New York Times’ reviewer wrote of the exoticism of the author and his cultural distance from “us”: “There is a subtle Oriental hormone in M. Cohen’s blood which separates him from us by leagues and centuries. It will be difficult for the Western mind, which is still subconsciously dominated by inherited Greek notions of form and unity, to comprehend this strange, Byzantine composite, this magnificent, disordered work.” (A backhanded compliment if ever there was one.) Time magazine said of the book that “though Jewry has given the world many a magnum opus, including Christendom’s best-known book, few true-blue Jewish novels aim at or succeed in putting Christian readers in a state of grace. Solal does just that; it is a wild, melodramatic romance, stuffed with grotesque comedy, Old Testament lamentations, sensual psalms, shrewd cynicism and shrewder kindliness, ending finally in pure parable.”

    An uncommon book, obviously. Solal is the story of Solal des Solal, a dashing young Greek Jew born on the island of Cephalonia, for whom the tiny world of a Greek island and its even tinier Jewish ghetto are not big enough to satisfy his hungers and ambitions. Bursting with confidence, Solal des Solal — the firstborn son of the head of the Solal family in every generation bears this doubled name — is the apple of his family’s eye. He is above all a boy who never allows anyone or anything to get in his way, capable even of knocking his tutor unconscious in order to steal the latter’s invitation to a party hosted by the woman he loves. All that Solal will later show himself to be — impetuous, foolhardy, selfish, romantic, dominating, and cruel; Jewish and anti-Semitic — can be found in Cohen’s first novel. It is not without reason that Cohen’s great admirer Bernard-Henri Lévy described this novel as a “draft” of his great work of almost forty years later, Belle du Seigneur. 

    Solal recounts the title character’s youth and early manhood, whose life is ruled by his ambition, his love of women, and his tormented Jewishness. When it opens the day before his bar mitzvah, Solal is in love with Adrienne de Valdonne, the wife of the French consul, ten years his senior, a woman he has adored “since he saw her at the distribution of prizes at the French high school.” After three years of pursuit, the now sixteen-year-old Solal succeeds in winning and abducting Mme. de Valdonne, with whom he runs off to Italy, an event taken from Cohen’s life and his abduction at sixteen of an opera singer in Marseille. In the first instance of what will become Solal’s normal course in love, he quickly begins to tire of his lover. He meets Aude de Maussane, whom he will court and, as if a character in a Dumas or Sabatini novel, pursue on horseback and capture on the day of her planned marriage to another man. 

    Solal is irresistible to women, described in the act of love as a “god” and “master,” with women his “slaves.” Solal and Aude wed, and Solal, this Greek Jew, skillfully exploiting his new relations — Aude’s father is highly placed in the French government — and his almost magical charm, is named to a post in the ministry of foreign affairs. He is dauntless and will not be denied: when he loses that position, he recovers quickly to become the editor of a socialist newspaper and a power in the French Chamber of Deputies.

    His personality and his actions throughout the tetralogy induce an almost unbearable tension in the reader. Cohen seems to acknowledge that his protagonist is somewhat hard to take, and he offers relief with scenes of a group of Cephalonian Jews, known as the Valorous of France — five relatives of Solal who, by a twist of Jewish fate, are citizens of France thanks to their descent from a line of the Solal family that traces its roots to that country. Like Solal, they will be recurring characters in Cohen’s novels and the central figures in two of them. They serve as comic relief, but more than that, they represent Solal’s roots, which he has chosen to deny in order to reach the heights that he attains. 

    In Solal, the hero’s attraction/repulsion for his roots will ultimately be his undoing, costing him his career, his wife, his son, and (temporarily!) his life. As the novel ends, Solal’s acceptance of his Jewishness, of his filiation with the “grotesque” Jews of his native isle as represented by the Valorous, have led to his descent into abject poverty. His wife leaves for parts unknown with their son, their love twisted and killed by her rejection of his background and his refusal to wash his hands of it. He succeeds in tracking down his estranged spouse and their child and, with a medieval dagger, holding his baby in his arms, he stabs himself and dies. But death is unable to hold Solal and he revives. His imperviousness to death is expressed in the final words of the novel: “The sun illuminated the tears of the bloody lord with his rebellious smile, mad with love for the earth and crowned with beauty, headed to tomorrow and his marvelous defeat. In the sky a royal bird spread its wings. Solal rode off on his horse and looked the sun in the face.” There are moments in Cohen’s flamboyant novels when he seems to have hit upon magical realism.

    In all Cohen’s novels, Solal des Solal’s great loves are gentile women, as were two of the author’s three wives. In Cohen’s appearance on the French literary talk show Apostrophes in 1977, he accepted the host’s observation that this was a fruit of the desire for “integration” into the larger society. Solal is motivated by love, desire, and ambition: his ambition to possess any woman he is drawn to, but also the ambition to get ahead, which requires leaving Cephalonia and his religion behind. His inability to shed his Jewish self and to avoid the label “Jew” attached to him by the non-Jewish world will be his downfall. Solal learns that in his world success is possible for a Jew, but only at the cost of denying his Jewishness. The modern Jewish drama of assimilation and allegiance is played at a very high pitch. 

    If Solal’s Jewishness is replete with contradictions, the Valorous of France, his comically “grotesque” Greek family, live their Jewishness to the hilt. Cohen, the proudly Zionist editor of La Revue juive, has them emigrate to Palestine. There they join with a group of Polish Jews, a Jewry unknown to these simple Sephardim, in the shared objective of making the land flourish in the face of Arab opposition. The Valorous give their hearts to the Zionist task, though they are more than somewhat lacking in the skills needed to make the land fertile. Uncle Saltiel and Salomon joins the workers in the fields, with less than sterling results. These pioneers from a Greek island struggle mightily. Salomon almost cuts off his own foot with his scythe, and he is foiled in his effort to “decipher the Zionist anthem that he had had sent from Jerusalem… He quickly grew tired of it, realizing that he understood nothing of these five lines and the accursed little circles, sometimes round, sometimes black, sometimes white. He scratched himself and sought other amusement.” Though their undertaking ends in disaster, Cohen finds them admirable: “All these former nomads knew they were clumsy. But what did it matter? They were working in the sun and their children would find fertile fields. Sweating and peaceful, they carried on. Honor to the new children of Zion.” They are attacked by Arabs, and the saintly Valorous Salomon and Uncle Saltiel are killed. The survivors decide to quit Palestine. Mangeclous, a schemer of the first order interested primarily in his own well-being, explains that “I’ve had enough. To tell you the truth, there are too many Arabs around here and it’s not hygienic for my health.” We last see them setting out for Greece and safety.

    “Israel,” in Solal’s eyes, “was a poor nightingale, an old, plucked bird that sang in the night of centuries while young nations constructed their empires.” The contradictions of Solal’s Jewishness are strikingly drawn. Solal is capable of tossing a tallis out the window, but also of destroying his future by making sure that his wife sees him praying in the traditional way, rocking back and forth. She is horrified by the spectacle, and his carefully constructed French life collapses. This wavering in his attitude towards his religion plants the seed of his destruction: as his father-in-law and boss tells him, “No ambiguity. French. Solely French and all that that means.” Try as he might, Solal can never totally adopt this attitude. As a Jew he refuses to vanish. His is the tragedy of the figure who lives on the seam and straddles it, for whom the only life he can live with integrity is a dual life. 

    Cohen gives Solal’s Jewishness a moving spatial and symbolic representation. Using Aude’s money, Solal purchases a chateau in France, solidifying his French bona fides: the foreign Jew is now the lord of a manor in the countryside. But one night Solal slips out of the marital bed, and Aude sets out to find him. She discovers that a wooden chest has a false bottom that opens onto a staircase. “She walked down fifty steps, followed a dark corridor at the end of which a lit candle cast shifting shadows. She cracked open a studded door and glimpsed a hall with a vault sprinkled with stars, supported by great pillars. At the back, the seven branches of a candelabra shone before a velvet curtain embroidered with square and triangular letters.” Unbeknownst to his wife, Solal, this modern marrano, had constructed his own synagogue beneath their ostensibly Christian home. Ultimately she makes for Solal the choice that he cannot make, the choice between being Jewish and being French, and abandons her husband to his Jewish fate.                                                            

    In 1938, Cohen followed Solal with Mangeclous, its plot dedicated primarily to the Valorous, and in particular to its title character, Pinhas Solal: Mangeclous. Mangeclous means Naileater. The Rabelaisian tone of the book begins on the title page, where we are told that its hero is also called “Long Teeth and Satan’s Eye and Lord High Life and Sultan of Coughers, and Saddle Skull and Black Feet and Top Hat and Bey of Liars and Word of Honor and Almost lawyer…” and so on and delightfully on. Mangeclous is for most of its length a radical departure from Solal. In his first novel the Valorous were injected into the story as comic relief, and as exemplars, in burlesque form, of an authentic Jewishness, one lived with no ambiguity, far from that of the tortured Solal. But Mangeclous is in its entirety a comic novel. With its improbably eccentric characters and its almost steadfast refusal to advance in a straight line, it feels very much like a French Tristram Shandy, though in Mangeclous every character is Uncle Toby. 

    When we had last seen the Valorous, they were leaving Palestine after a disastrous attempt at settlement, leaving two of their number dead. Now both of the formerly deceased, Salomon and Saltiel, have returned from the dead. Verisimilitude takes second (or third or fourth) place to the writer’s love for his characters. Cohen is a gifted fabulist. The novel’s extravagant plot is set in motion by a mysterious letter telling Salomon and Saltiel that they are the recipient of a munificent sum of money. They are instructed to travel to Geneva. From that point nothing goes simply, as the correct distribution of the funds becomes a matter of debate, this debate giving rise to the group’s self-induced notion that there is actually more money involved than the mysterious letter claims. A secret code is then assumed to exist that will lead to more money still. Finally all this is settled, and they depart for Geneva and a meeting with an unknown individual who will turn out to be Solal.

    In Geneva, the Valorous, misled by a telegram that they think authentic, constitute themselves as a Zionist government and attempt to extract a promise of land in Palestine from the League of Nations. During Solal’s brief appearances in Mangeclous we learn he has climbed back up to the heights and is now under-secretary general of the League of Nations. (Again, the strange mixture of high politics and florid narrative, of history and fantasy, that is characteristic of Cohen.) And Solal is again madly in love with a gentile woman who is as beautiful as he is handsome. Though he has brought his eccentric relatives to Geneva and is ostentatiously generous with them, he remains deeply ashamed of the Jew in them that he sees reflected in himself. “Enough, enough of this Jewish leprosy.”

    His own Jewishness is not all that Solal finds repulsive. The League of Nations, which at the time of the novel’s appearance had not yet definitively proved its uselessness, is shown to be a den of laziness, sycophancy, and social climbing. The goal of those employed there (I use “employed” because no one actually works there) is to do as little as possible, and we are treated to the workday of one of them, a certain Adrien Deume — the husband of the woman Solal is in love with as the book ends — as he spends an entire day avoiding writing a letter on his boss’ behalf. “The ideal of Adrien Deume was to live in proximity to his superiors and to raise thanks to them in order to know superiors. In short, he aspired to forever live as an inferior.”

    In true Solalian fashion, in this wild tetralogy of identity, when he finally meets his Greek relatives at the fanciest hotel in Geneva, the cost for which he is covering, he is disguised and his face covered in bandages. He loves the Valorous, but in a way that only Solal can love a Jew: “Yes, he was the only one to respect these Jewish grotesques, these ill-bred Jews with their noses, and their humpbacks and fearful gazes.” That one sentence can serve as a summary of the psychological complexity of Solal’s attitude to Jews, Jewishness, and that part of himself that is attached to his origins. It is difficult to imagine feeling “respect” for “grotesques” who are described in the tropes of anti-Semitism. The oscillation in Solal’s feelings is a constant in Cohen’s tetralogy. But just as clearly as it demonstrates a certain hatred, it demonstrates an unquestionably love. Yes, they are “grotesque” in the eyes of the striver Solal, forever in conflict with the Jew Solal — but what better way to stick a thumb in the eye of the non-Jewish world than to respect, and even love, these Jews in their grotesqueness?

    As the book draws to a close, we are introduced to the Deume family in their Geneva home, where Solal has spent the night hidden naked in the bedroom of Ariane Deume, the beauty whom he now loves. He finally covers his nudity not with the clothing of the diplomat that he is, but with the ragged clothing that he had purchased from a poor Jew who had been traveling with the Valorous. Along with his ragged attire, Solal applies makeup that reduces him to the appearance of a toothless vagabond. Once again, it seems, Solal, having achieved all a young man could desire, rejects it in the most blatant way, assuming as a disguise the image of what he actually is: a Jew. The emblem is wrenching. But there is more to it than this, as we will learn in Belle du Seigneur. Cohen’s readers would have to wait thirty years, until 1968, to learn of the events of that night and its consequences.

    Translated into English (after an unconscionably long time and under a strange title) as Her Lover, Cohen’s massive novel was hailed as a classic upon its publication. Bernard-Henri Lévy, who has written eloquently and perceptively of the novel over the years, described it as “the most sublime love novel of the twentieth century,” a characterization that, as we will see, is difficult to support. It is a novel of extremes; of love and hatred, of tenderness and cruelty. It is a profoundly Jewish novel that at once exalts and expresses the misery of the Jewish condition. It is a pure distillation of the Cohenian worldview: his recognition of the impossibility of love and the impossibility of living happily as a Jew. (Zionism was created in part as a solution to Jewish unhappiness, and there is a deep connection between Cohen’s Zionism and his explorations of eroticism.) It is a book that contains passages that reach the romantic heights, and others that describe a cruelty that many will find unbearable, even unreadable. 

    Belle du Seigneur picks up almost exactly where Mangeclous left off, making this a single continuous tale. Solal is hiding in his disguise of a hideous Jew in the bedroom of Ariane Deume. For the novel’s length, its plot is actually a simple one: Adrien Deume’s ambition to become a highly placed functionary of the League of Nations is fulfilled, but he owes his rise to Solal who, in love with Deume’s wife, has Adrien sent away on a lengthy diplomatic mission. In his absence, Solal and Ariane embark on the love affair that will fill the second half of the book. Solal loses his French citizenship (an anonymous letter sent to the French government informs them that Solal is not yet entitled to citizenship, a letter that he himself had sent) as well as his post at the League of Nations. The two lovers live in isolation, loving and tormenting each other, Solal doing almost all of the tormenting, Ariane almost all of the loving. 

    His rage is increased by the thought that she had a lover prior to him. No baseness is beyond him. He asks Ariane, “‘Tell me darling, have you had other men?’ ‘My God, who do you take me for?’ ‘For a whore,’ he said melodiously. ‘For a tricky little whore.’” Physical violence and abuse are not beyond Solal, but he multiplies its horror by adding emotional cruelty to it: “Holding her by her hair he struck her beautiful face. ‘I forbid you,’ she said in her magnificent child-like voice. ‘I forbid you! Don’t hit me again. For you, for our love, don’t hit me again.’ To cover his shame with an even stronger shame, he struck her again.” At another moment, as Solal’s cruelty grows ever more extreme, the volatile nature of his moods horrifically clear, he throws a cup of hot chocolate in Ariane’s face, though he had tried to miss her. Struck momentarily with guilt, “he rushed into the bathroom, came back with a towel and rubbed the damp corner on the dishonored face. On his knees, he kissed the hem of her dress, kissed her naked feet, raised his eyes to her…” Ariane, as always, forgives him, telling Solal: “Go to bed, I’ll cuddle next to you, I’ll caress your hair and you’ll fall asleep.” He proposes to cut up his own face to make up for his misdeed, but he quickly changes his mind. “Archangel of rage, he moved closer to the bed and, handling the belt of his dressing gown as if it were a whip, threatened her with it.” Their paradisiacal life eventually becomes infernal, and Cohen offers them only one way out, the most darkly romantic one of all: a double suicide.

    In the decades between Mangeclous and Belle du Seigneur, much had occurred on the world stage upon which Cohen’s novels moved, and Cohen’s biting satire of the functioning of the League of Nations, which formally expired in 1946 but was effectively dead in 1939, takes on a different edge, a harsher valence, in Belle du Seigneur, Cohen is a brilliant and coruscating satirist of bureaucracy, its vanity and its impotence against the larger forces of history. He gives abundant evidence of his comic genius in the first half of Belle du Seigneur, expanding mercilessly on the description in Mangeclous of the daily life at the League of Nations of Adrien Deume, the soon-to-be-cuckolded husband of Ariane. Later in the novel, Cohen drops a hint about the model for his satire of the League of Nations, when Solal picks up at a bouquiniste’s stall a copy of Saint-Simon’s great memoir of the court of Louis XIV. Very little needs to be changed for that portrait of life at the court of the Sun King to fit the doings at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Reading in his stolen copy of the book — in Solal’s view, a Jew has no need to obey the law in a land where “Death to the Jews” is written on the walls — he is struck by a passage in which the author is “complimented by the entire court, for His Majesty honored him with a phrase.” As at Deume’s office, the goal is “to learn who is in favor and who in disgrace in order to be looked on kindly by the former and to avoid the latter.” The magnificent pages in Belle du Seigneur on the social and professional climbing of the staff at the League of Nations, on their craven careerism and their hunger to rise by being looked upon kindly by those above them, are all drawn from the marvelously absurd life described by Saint-Simon.

    Time is itself a character in Belle du Seigneur, counted in minutes, hours, and years. Adrien’s entire work life is based on killing as much of it as possible, in doing as little as he can in the time he spends at work. Perhaps the funniest pages in the novel are those in which Adrien demonstrates to his wife, with great pride, that thanks to vacation time, weekends, and professional breaks, he works less than half the days of the year. But the most weighty and weighted count of time is the mortal distance that follows the first moments of the love of Solal and Ariane. Time is, for Solal, a murder weapon: every minute that takes Ariane and Solal further away from the birth of their romance is a step closer to its — and their — death. Love, and the fact that its death is present in its birth, and the way physical death haunts everything in life, are the central themes of Belle du Seigneur. It is an epic repudiation of the certainty in the Song of Songs that “love is as strong as death.” Solal repeats constantly in the novels, as does Cohen in all his works, that those walking the earth are nothing but “future corpses.” That is Cohen’s view of the world: bitter, morbid, disillusioned, hurt. 

    The love affair between Solal and Ariane will fail, like all of Solal’s previous ones, and fail dismally. Solal always falls madly and unlimitedly in love, from the wife of the French consul in Solal to Ariane, in the belle du seigneur, her lord’s beloved. But Solal almost immediately grows tired of women once conquest (and that is the only word that fits) has been accomplished. Love not only does not last; it cannot last. Solal knows that his loves are doomed, because he dooms them. Love must fail, for him, given the very nature of attraction, which for Solal is always based on falsehood. The hideous disguises that he assumes, starting with the night of his initial attempt at the seduction of Ariane, the ragged clothes, the tape over his teeth to make it appear that he is a pathetic husk of a man — all this was a test. He obsesses over the three grams that a tooth weighs and how love, in all its falsity, depends on those few grams. For Solal, would any woman love him or any other man, if, when he opened his mouth, the spectacle was ugly? Solal’s answer is no. That being the case, what is there to love and attraction artifice, deceit, falsehood? He is as a lover what he is as a Jew — a pessimist. 

    Late in the novel, he challenges Ariane, who loves him beyond all measure, to agree that she would have loved him if he had no arms or legs, “Me, a little nauseating trunk… without arms, without legs, without thighs, but still, unfortunately and disgustingly for you, possessing the principle of virility.” He goes even further: “My God, there’s no need to even slice me up; a few missing teeth would be enough for your soul to no longer find any pleasure in mine.” He is certain that she would not, which is further proof that love is a lie. As he “rubs his hands together” at the joyful idea of rendering himself hideous, Ariane, faithful to her love for him, cries out: “Beloved! Enough of this. Why do you want to destroy everything?” This last is the question that can be applied to almost all of Solal’s actions. 

    Love, all this implies, can only be love if it exists outside the body and the appearance of its beloved. “Baboonery” is the cruel and angry word that Cohen employs to signify the love that women feel; it is animalistic, enamored of violence. And the body, whose pleasures Solal has pursued his entire life, is also the enemy of enduring love. Not just its inevitable degradation over time: no, any deviation from perfection in daily life, however natural, is fatal to love. With their love still fresh and new, Ariane and Solal struggle to hide anything pertaining to the body that mars the image of perfection that they consider essential to protracting the purity of its beginnings. Rings under the eyes, the rumblings of the stomach, all these concessions to the slow ravages of the clock and the calendar, must be hidden at all costs, because they can damage or even destroy desire. Even contact with others is forbidden, since it might soil the lover or the beloved. Running off with Ariane has cost Solal his prestigious post, and they live in isolation in a hotel; and this isolation, too, is not a means of exalting their love, but also a magnifier of all their perceived or invented flaws. Both lovers share these unreasonable expectations, Ariane in her innocence, Solal in his brutal cynicism. For Cohen, the heights are the only place where love should reside, and where it can flourish. When it doesn’t, when it can’t, it dies, as it should. His pessimism was the outlook of a disappointed purist. 

    Solal is a deeply unattractive figure. He is not just an extraordinarily complex personality, but also an unpleasant one. His overwhelming selfishness, his insistence upon extremes, has led to the suicide of several of his lovers, starting with his first love, Adrienne de Valdonne. His discarded lovers sacrificed everything for him, but none of their sacrifices seem to have had any impact on him. He is often, especially in Belle du Seigneur, quite reprehensible. How else describe a man who slaps Ariane, the woman he claims to love, who pulls her hair, who calls her a “whore,” who tortures and torments her mentally concerning an affair that occurred before she met him? 

    Bella Cohen, the writer’s third wife, defended her husband against the charge of misogyny in her Autour d’Albert Cohen. Her defense of her husband is, to put it mildly, weak. “How can one be a ladies’ man yet hate and scorn women?” That there is no contradiction between the two is too obvious to require refutation. She also wonders how he could have been a misogynist when “so many female readers wrote to tell him of their happiness at having read him or, for some, at having met him.” (Her final proof of Cohen’s lack of misogyny is that Simone de Beauvoir “that pioneer of feminism, wanted to meet him.”) She also draws Cohen’s defense against this charge from the pages of Belle du Seigneur. Solal wonders, for example: “How is it possible that these women, so sweet and tender, these women, my ideal and my religion, how is it that these women love gorillas and their gorillaness?” From statements such as these Cohen’s widow concludes that far from “attacking women… Albert Cohen essentially says that women are superior to men. He attacks only those women who betray themselves by accepting being treated not like women, but as femelles.” 

    If Bella Cohen is right, then Belle du Seigneur and the rest of Cohen’s fictional work is the vision of a man who knows what is best for women far better than they do themselves. But is that not one of the characteristics of the misogynist? His is a world in which every woman whom he encounters, for the mere fact of loving him, and for other reasons as well, fails to be a woman and lives as a mere animal. This would be painful enough if it were a passing event, but it is his very nature as an amorist. Lengthy chapters are dedicated to Solal’s degrading and insulting of Ariane, and they are hard to read without disgust; and even when she occasionally rebels, even if only for a moment, the dynamics of scorn and “lordship” remain the same. The love of Solal and Ariane is not remotely one of the “great romances.” The lovers live cut off from the world, shunned by all who knew them, in a world of hotel rooms, where they disappoint and torment each other. In this way Belle du Seigneur is an heir to the punishing novels of the Marquis de Sade, which take place in locales cut off from the surrounding world. Sadean physical torture is replaced here with mental torture, but it is torture all the same.

    Jewishness forever hovers over the novel, appearing in a strange chapter in Germany where Solal is held underground by a group of Jews in Berlin hiding from the Nazis. The theme explodes late in the book in a long and almost biblical section in which Cohen sings the praises of Jews and Judaism, of the Eternal in whom he does not believe. He writes lyrically of Jews’ fidelity to their faith despite centuries of massacre. And he has a theory about the special destiny of the Jews, one that he repeats in his volumes of memoirs: that Judaism stands for “anti-nature,” in contradistinction to the Nazis, but not only to them, who valorize nature, which unleashes the beast in humans. Judaism is great, and Jews are hated, because their religion is not a part of nature and rises above all that surrounds them. The laws and the prohibitions of the religion, which extract the Jews from the immanent terrestrial world, are Judaism’s grandeur. (Cohen did not practice them himself.)

    “One beautiful day that was the glory of the universe,” he writes rhapsodically, “one of my ancestors, a being who was part of nature and member of the animal species, madly decided on the schism, ridiculously decided on his two hairy and still deformed legs, that he no longer wanted to be part of nature and obey its laws. He decided that he would obey the new Commandments that he invented in the name of God, whom he also invented.” When the anti-Semites “massacre and torture my Jews,” it is because they “know or sensed that they were the people of nature and that Israel was the people of anti-nature, bearers of a mad determination that nature abhors. They are instinctively the people on the other side, who made God its chosen one and who, on Mount Sinai, declared war on nature and all that was animal in man.” The notion that Judaism has an anti-naturalistic bias is not Cohen’s invention, of course; to some extent it characterizes all the monotheisms, in which the Creator, and not the creation, is to be worshipped. For Cohen, this notion of the Jewish secession from nature was important in explaining his own abjection as a Jew and a lover. How can a libertine be opposed to nature?

    Yet Cohen’s quasi-philosophical paean to Judaism did not clinch the matter for him. Solal, remember, is dramatically torn between accepting his Jewishness and rejecting it. Solal only loves non-Jewish women, and the passages in which Jewish wives are proposed to him by the Valorous are treated as comic; he is attracted to beautiful non-Jewish women, some of whom are not uninfected with anti-Semitism — in the same way that his creator, the Zionist editor and activist, married two non-Jews before finally marrying a Jewish woman. Lévy gets to the heart of this: “One could — one can still — read this book as an allegory of Jewishness in the West and a wager on the inevitable tragedy that results from it… One could read it as a novel that spoke of the temptation to deny oneself, the temptation, as Solal says at one point, to “play the monkey” with Christians and to be more Christian than the Christians… One can read this novel — and it’s how I would reread it today — as the great novel of contemporary neo-Marranism, the great novel that expresses the internal torment of neo-Marranism: a goy outside, a Jew inside, living during the day in the world and returning at night to one’s internal ghetto.” 

    Lévy ultimately rejects such a reading in favor of viewing Solal as the “Juif heureux,” the happy Jew, a “Nietzschean” character, a “neo-pagan” reveling in the body. For Lévy, the voluptuary Solal is a response to the image of the Jew as a “being of reason”; Solal is defiantly, Jewishly, a “being of flesh.” I am not so sure. For a start, such a view of the Jewish difference is an unwitting confirmation of the ancient Christian charge that Judaism is essentially, and nothing more than, carnal. And contra Lévy, it is precisely the contradiction between reason and flesh, the presence of both modes of being, and Solal’s imposition of a twisted reason on the pleasures of the flesh, that makes the latter so fleeting. It is Solal’s reason that leads to his death, to the suicide pact that ends the novel. A being of flesh, a “happy Jew,” would accept the joys of this moment, and then of the next; but Solal is reason exacerbated — a fevered reason, if that is possible; reason finally heeded.

    Cohen wrote one more novel after Belle du Seigneur, Les Valeureux, which appeared in 1969. Like Mangeclous after Solal, a comic novel following one drenched in Solal’s rage at himself and his world. Les Valeureux is pure comedy; or almost so.

    Cohen retreats here to the island of Cephalonia and the five oddballs who make up the group of Jews who have dubbed themselves les valeureux de France. The claustrophobia and the refusal of happiness of Belle du Seigneur is replaced here by a rocambolesque tale of five poor but joyous Jews making their difficult way in life. As in all their other appearances in Cohen’s writing, no scheme is too wild for them in order to get by. Pinhas Solal, alias Mangeclous, is again at the heart of the story. Once again, no idea is too absurd to be entertained in his ceaseless search for wealth and prestige. For him, the only obstacle to publishing a newspaper in almond paste printed on chocolate is that the materials are too expensive. Here Cervantes meets Sholem Aleichem, sort of.

    Mangeclous hits on the idea of establishing a university of which he will be the rector, the Université Supérieure et Philosophique, its classes held in the kitchen cellar of his home. To save money, no chairs are provided and students are charged for courses in subjects such as “amorous seduction in the Europes” at a rate of one drachma per hour, though food is accepted in its stead. “The intellectual elite of the ruelle D’Or,” the main street of the Jewish quarter, attends its opening lecture, with fifty-nine eyes trained on Mangeclous, since one of the thirty students had only one eye. Students were taught that Vronsky was a close friend of the Tsar and made him laugh by tickling his feet. Between classes Mangeclous, not wanting to waste an opportunity to turn a profit, makes himself available to trim corns. 

    Solal figures nowhere in the book, whose events take place before those in Belle du Seigneur. Disturbingly and unexpectedly, however, his spirit suddenly seizes control of the novel, taking over the comic, egotistic character of Mangeclous. Professor and Rector Pinhas Solal, dressed clownishly in a robe decorated with fabric cut from his skinny daughters’ Sabbath dresses, in the middle of his analysis of Anna Karenina, suddenly begins espousing the theories of Solal. “European ladies are mad about the soul and what they call invisible realities, but they demand that the canines be visible,” Mangeclous lectures his students. Women demand a full mouth of teeth, or love cannot arise; their potential lovers must be just the right height, just the right weight. Karenina, he says, is disgusted with her husband because of his trips to the bathroom, an act of daily life that Ariane and Solal held in contempt as well. What is “important for [women]…is the gorilla who delivers blows while looking like a man.” “In short,” Mangeclous tells his assembled pupils, “in order to feel true love they need a gorilla.” 

    These grotesque passages mar a book that is a minor masterpiece of comic literature, but this seeming retreat from its bitter predecessor has a purpose. Les Valeureux is a valedictory work, returning Cohen to his native land for a final farewell. When we think of the vanished Jewish world, we most often think of the destruction of Eastern European Jewry in World War II, but this book is a reminder of another loss: the destruction of Greek Jewry, one of the grandest Jewries of all. The Jews of Cohen’s Cephalonia are no more, nor is their ghetto. Les Valeureux is not just a depiction of five eccentrics. It is a memorial to a whole world. Cohen makes this movingly clear: “Praise and glory to you, brothers in Israel, you, adult and dignified, serious and sparing of speech, courageous fighters, builders of the fatherland and justice, Israeli Israel, my love and my pride. But what can I do if I also love my Valorous, who are neither adult nor dignified nor serious nor sparing in speech? I will thus write about them again, and this book will be my farewell to a dying species about which I wanted to leave a trace behind me, my farewell to the ghetto where I was born, the charming ghetto of my mother, a homage to my dead mother.”

    The dead mother haunts and dominates Cohen’s three volumes of memoirs. He wrote three autobiographical books, Le Livre de ma mère (published in 1954 and translated into English as The Book of My Mother), O Vous, frères humains (O You, My Human Brothers) published in 1972), and Carnets 1978 (Notebooks 1978). In a very real sense they are one book, for the central concern of all of them is Cohen’s undying love for his mother. All of them are what Cohen calls in Le Livre de ma mère, “a song of death,” the title he gave an article on his mother’s death in Occupied France in 1943 (during the war but not as a direct result of the Holocaust) that he published that same year in La France libre. He is tortured by the thought of her buried in her coffin, the earth weighing her down, hiding her forever. In Le Livre de ma mère, Cohen describes her lovingly preparing the Sabbath meal. Even the act of making meatballs is invoked movingly: “From time to time she went to the kitchen to make, with her tiny hands on which shone an august wedding ring, useless and graceful artistic tapping sounds with the wooden spoon on the meatballs simmering in the dark red coulis of the tomatoes. Her tiny hands, pudgy with delicate skin, for which I complimented her with a bit of hypocrisy and much love, for her naïve happiness delighted me.” He expressed his filial devotion most fully in his final book: “In my old age I turn again to you, my dead Maman, and it is my pathetic joy to again bring you back to life a bit, holy sentinel and guardian of your son. To bring you to life again just a little bit before soon joining you, this is my pitiful magic and my poor trick in order not to have entirely lost you, Maman to whom I absurdly love to talk, dead Maman to whom, stupidly smiling, I want to recount the days of my childhood.” Cohen presents his mother as a saint, as his “beloved.” She is the exception to his fatalism about love: “my mother’s love, unlike any other.” 

    His love for his mother excluded his father, who barely figures in his memoirs, and is all but cast from out of the author’s life in his final book. “As I child,” he says “I told myself that my father had nothing to do with my birth, that I was born magically, that a prince arranged my birth through powerful words, that he is my true father, a magnificent prince and father.” By the end of his life Cohen all but stripped his father of that title, calling him his “mother’s husband.” His hatred for his father is as unbounded as his love for his mother. His father is a monster: one “horrible day when, having found that the moussaka was not in conformity with that cooked by a famous great-aunt Rebecca, the persnickety gastronome had, with indignation, pulled to him with one tug the entire tablecloth as a fine for imperfect moussaka.”

    Cohen claims to have hated his father above all for his treatment of his beloved mother, whom he calls “the slave of her husband.” “She worked, worked, the slave queen without music without literature and without thoroughbred horses, worked, worked, then came upstairs to take care of me, then went back downstairs, then came back upstairs, for years and years.” But he was himself also a little culpable for her anxieties. She suffered, he says, from an “inferiority complex” towards the cultivated people that her son frequented: he once left her sitting in a park for five hours while he was with a woman, and he never introduced her to people in the social world in which he moved. Decades later he was consumed with guilt for all this, and tried to make amends for it with his pen. And at the end: “My beloved, I introduce you to them all now, proud of you, proud of your Oriental accent, proud of your mistakes in French, insanely proud of your ignorance of high-class usages. A little late, this pride.”

    Though he preached the failure of love, Cohen was an ardent creature of loves. His books are full of them: of women, of his mother, of Pagnol, of literature, of the Jews and Judaism, of France, of God. (If one can hate a God in whose existence one does not believe, as many atheists have done, perhaps it is possible also to love a God in whose existence one does not believe.) Even as a Swiss citizen, Cohen faithfully loved France all his life, defending its honor as a participant in the Free French movement during the war. As a child he constructed an altar to his adoptive homeland. Along with a torn flag “to make it more glorious,” a small cannon, and a picture of the president of the Republic, his “reliquary” to the glory of his adopted nation included “portraits of Racine, of La Fontaine, of Corneille, of Joan of Arc, of du Guesclin, of Napoleon, of Pasteur, of Jules Verne of course, and even of a certain Louis Boussenard.” (Boussenard was a late nineteenth-century writer of exotic adventure novels.)

    Cohen remained proud of the monumental philosophical revolution that his people had enacted in their rejection of the natural. There are many dazzling pages about this in Belle du Seigneur, and some of them belong with the epiphanic beauties of Joyce. But his pride in being a Jew remained tainted by the hideous event of his tenth birthday. In the final pages of his final book, he could only say that “that day when I turned ten was a day of new birth in which I lost all faith, the day of a new gaze, a Jewish gaze that came to me forever.” Given how disabused and disappointed Cohen was, how damaged he was by the effects of reality on his ideal, his achievement as a writer of both comedy and rhapsody is sort of miraculous. Yet his harshest truth, one that fills his autobiographical volumes, is this: that the love of one’s neighbor is nothing but “futility and a gust of wind.” “How,” Albert Cohen asked, “can you sincerely love strangers? How can you love them in their thousands or millions, how can you love them with a real love?” Who, really, has an answer to his lonely question?

    How Dictators Use Refugees

    2014 

    On September 4, 2014, the top brass of the Hellenic Coast Guard held a rare press conference at their Piraeus headquarters. Commodore Yiannis Karageorgopoulos presented a series of slides showing the Aegean and Ionian seas, plus a portion of the east Mediterranean south of Crete, which comprise the Coast Guard’s vast jurisdiction. Against this he flashed the number of intercepted entries of migrants seeking refugee status — 1,627 in 2012, followed by 12,156 the following year. Arrivals in 2014 suggested that Greece was on track for 31,000 arrivals. This was an underestimation. The annual total that year would almost quadruple, to 43,938. 

    The Coast Guard’s concerns were very clear. Half of all the arrivals were Syrians. A third were Afghans. The Arab Spring that had resulted in regime change in Tunisia and Egypt and plunged Syria into catastrophe three years earlier was compounding the effects of America’s regime change efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, which created lengthy insurgencies, to produce unprecedented waves of refugees, and these crises were growing worse. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which emerged in Iraq’s insurgency, had that summer taken control of Mosul, was slaughtering Yazidi in northern Iraq, and was marching across Syria. NATO’s destruction of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya had led to civil war there, further inflaming regional instability.

    The Greek authorities knew that this spontaneous population of asylum-seekers had created a human trafficking industry in Turkey, just a few miles from Greece’s easternmost Aegean islands. The vast majority of Coast Guard interceptions had taken place in the narrow straits between the Anatolian mainland and the Greek islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Kos, and Leros. The smugglers were astute. They had launched refugees on inflatable dinghies with the following instructions: “When a Greek patrol boat appears, let them approach and THEN make a hole in one of the air tubes with the knife… Don’t be afraid. Greeks will rescue you. They cannot repatriate you back to the Turkish mainland.” (This note was found by the Coast Guard in the possession of asylum-seekers, and it is corroborated by my own interviews with refugees.) This was true. International maritime law obliges any sailor to rescue anyone who is shipwrecked, and the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees prevents national authorities from repatriating asylum-seekers to areas where they may be in danger — a hazard accurately known as refoulment. 

    The fact that Turkish smugglers were taking commercial advantage of humanitarian law struck the Greeks as cynical, but what alarmed them were changes in trafficking methods. “Because of the geographical configuration of the east Aegean islands and their proximity to Turkish coastlines,” Karageorgopoulos said, “facilitators may no longer be needed and it is the migrants themselves who navigate the small boats.” Earlier that year I had travelled to Kos to report on this shift in tactics. Two boatyards were full of court-confiscated speedboats that had come from Turkey, filled with refugees. Some of their outboard engines had bullet holes — even those whose owners had fitted them with additional fiberglass casings. “Last year we were facing a kind of invasion of very fast boats with a smuggler on board, and we needed to deploy our patrol boats to tackle this situation, and make some hot pursuits as well,” the harbor master Ioannis Mispinas explained to me. 

    The loss of these vessels had raised smugglers’ costs and led to lengthy imprisonments of up to twenty-five years. 2014 was the year in which smugglers realized that they could reduce their legal risk and costs by setting up production warehouses of two-tube rubber dinghies with plywood floors and small outboard engines assembled in Turkey. This worked. The proportion of arrested facilitators to refugees went down over two years, from 1.2% to 0.8%. More importantly, it meant an inexhaustible supply of boats and an explosion of turnover, and it was beginning to overwhelm the Greeks. 

    The authorities were looking at the numbers and had become genuinely concerned about their ability to police their borders. But asylum law is concerned with individuals, not masses, and balancing national security with humanitarian values was now a challenge. I remember meeting a Syrian man as he huddled with his children on the harbor wharf on Kos, having just been picked up by the Coast Guard. “I want safety,” Hany Asef told me. “I am coming from death — I am and my family — coming from death. I want any safety.” Asef’s children had seen Aleppo reduced to rubble. More than once, their parents said, men’s throats had been cut before their eyes. The Asefs were not rich. Hany worked in the water utility. His wife, Bara’a, was a teacher. They had spent all their savings — $3,500 dollars — on this crossing. It is precisely for people like them that the Geneva Convention was drafted. 

    How was Greece to reconcile its obligations towards individuals under the Geneva Convention with its obligation to safeguard its borders, which are also the European Union’s external borders? 

    2015 

    If 2014 had troubled the Greeks, 2015 was apocalyptic. The September 2014 press conference had been held out of alarm at more than 17,000 refugee arrivals so far that year. At another press conference in September 2015, it was revealed that January-to-August arrivals numbered over 230,000. 

    Showing aerial photographs of dinghies setting out from Turkey, Deputy Merchant Marine minister Christos Zois told journalists, “Here you see a dozen craft setting sail within thirty or sixty minutes of each other — in other words, almost simultaneously. I’m not allowed to use the phrase ‘sea landing,’ because it’s not one in the strict sense. But these pictures show that we are talking about an organized industry that takes advantage of human pain and human need. And it’s up to the Hellenic Coast Guard to respond in real time.”

    The Hellenic Coast Guard wasn’t by then responding in real time. Only fifty thousand asylum-seekers had punctured their boats to be plucked from the sea. Many had beached their dinghies on Greek islands without ever encountering the Coast Guard. It was simply overwhelmed. What Zois didn’t show was photographs later made public by the Coast Guard showing Turkish gendarmes helping direct asylum-seekers onto boats. The collusion of  the authorities was known at the time, but the Greeks were trying not to antagonize the Turkish government. 

    Shortly afterward I found myself on Lesvos’ north shore. Dinghies loaded with upwards of fifty people were coming in every few minutes. Even though they didn’t need to wreck themselves to be rescued, they ceremoniously punctured their boats as if to say there was no going back, so that each arrival was marked with an explosion of air. They splashed into the shallows with cries of Allahu Akbar! and indiscriminate cries from the elderly Afghans, who never having been suspended over a body of depthless water now gave vent to their accumulated terror. Some kneeled and prayed gratefully. The beach was littered with deflated vinyl, plywood, and 25hp engines. Scavengers picked up the engines and the plywood. Authorities trucked the vinyl and lifejackets to a nearby landfill, where black and orange mountains accrued. Just behind the beach, volunteers had set up makeshift shelters where they provided gold foil capes, dry clothes, Nutella sandwiches, and juice. The island’s taxi drivers had abandoned their Greek clients and lined up to ferry refugees to the reception center for fifty euros from dawn till dusk. All had been years behind on their social security payments, the mayor later told me, and all had now caught up. 

    The phenomenon caused alarm in Europe as well. The islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros, and Kos, which had Reception and Identification Centers, were not sufficiently staffed or equipped to cope with these numbers. It was difficult to fingerprint and register everyone on arrival. Nor was there room enough for new arrivals to stay. The government chartered ferries to take people to the mainland, where they pursued their journeys inland. There was concern that Islamic terrorists could infiltrate, as indeed they did. On November 13, 2015, three simultaneous suicide attacks in the northern Paris suburbs killed one hundred and thirty people, ninety of them at the Bataclan theater: at least two of the attackers had arrived on Lesvos a month earlier, where they had been registered as asylum-seekers. Two villains out of many thousands may seem a mercifully small proportion, but at the time it unnerved northern Europe, where the 9/11 attackers had been recruited. 

    “2015 was for Europe what the Twin Towers was for the US,” says a retired senior police officer who was responsible for refugee affairs. “After Bataclan, France insisted that the European Commission pull out of its drawers whatever proposal existed regarding security on the migration issue. In 2016 Greece signed an agreement for Europol guest officers to conduct secondary security checks on asylum-seekers. Europol signed a memorandum with Frontex [the European border and Coast Guard, which interviewed refugees] to further analyze information from asylum-seekers’ debriefings, when they explained what route they took and what smugglers they used. At the same time, Europol demanded the data from suspects’ cell phones.” 

    If Europe was worried about terrorists, Greece was worried about a Turkish provocation. In March 2015, Andreas Iliopoulos was Deputy Chief of the Army and oversaw the Supreme Military Command for the Interior and Islands (ASDEN), which is in charge of the National Guard in the Aegean. “I became extremely worried, because it was impossible to fend off a potential malicious act by Turkey under the guise of the refugee crisis,” he told me. “It’s very easy for commandos to infiltrate that crowd and stage a surprise.” 

    The risk of infiltration by Turkish commandos was real to the Greeks. In 1996, Turkey had landed commandos on the islets of Imia, between Kalymnos and the Turkish coast. Greek sovereignty over Imia had never been questioned before. Greece responded with a naval deployment. President Clinton told both NATO allies to pull back, and put the islets out of bounds to both. What had been Greek territory was now a grey zone. Since that incident, Turkish nationalist think-tanks circulated a list of one hundred and fifty two Greek islets and islands whose sovereignty should be similarly disputed. (That has now percolated into official policy in virtually every Turkish party.) By 2015, many Greek officials were concerned that Turkey might land refugees instead of commandos on islets that it wished to claim, and then ostentatiously rescue them to demonstrate Turkish search-and-rescue jurisdiction in those areas. This soft form of sovereignty could gradually harden through a subsequent threat of confrontation.

    Not all Greek political parties saw refugees as a potential cloak to a security threat. The conservative New Democracy party had in January 2015 lost power to the Coalition of the Radical Left, or Syriza — the result of a deconstruction of Greece’s bipartisan political system wrought by five years of austerity policies, which flung voters to extremes like a centrifuge. The Conservative Prime Minister Antonis Samaras had come to power in 2012 referring to irregular migration as “an unarmed invasion.” New Democracy had prided itself on cleaning the streets of unregistered migrants and putting them into camps: the first time this had happened in Greece. The government had been accused of pushbacks — turning people around at the border without the chance to apply for asylum. 

    But the tenor under Syriza was very different. “It was the first time we heard a cabinet minister say the word ‘refugees.’ Until then we heard ‘migrants’ or worse — illegal migrants, and so on,” said a retired senior Coast Guard officer. “We heard the prime minister [Alexis Tsipras] wondering aloud whether there is such a thing as a border at sea. This suggested a different school of thought, one that was very friendly to the entry of these many thousands of people by land or sea.” Government statements reflected this. In September 2015, the Migration Minister Yiannis Mouzalas told journalists that “the problem is a refugee problem, not a migration problem. Eighty percent of these people are refugees.” This assumption in turn suggested that Turkey was not the problem. “Turks say they do not actively promote these people to our shores. If they say so, I do not wish to doubt it,” Antonis Makrydimitris, the Deputy Minister of Public Order, said at the same press conference. With respect to pushbacks, the Deputy Minister of the Merchant Marine Christos Zois now said, “To ask us to send them back is irresponsible. This cannot form a strategy or a tactic. Our country is a law-abiding member of the EU and international law is a code we must follow.”

    When this principled position was voiced by the leader of Europe’s biggest economy, it became more consequential. “It is certainly correct, that whoever wants to come to us for economic reasons, must be told, ‘you cannot stay long-term, we cannot manage that,’” Chancellor Angela Merkel told the Bundestag on September 4. “But who flees misery, war, political oppression, there we have the responsibility to help, based on the Geneva conventions for refugees, based on our asylum policy and on article one of our constitutional law, whether we want to or not.” Arrivals in Greece for August 2015 had been just under 108,000. In September, after Merkel’s historic speech, they shot up to 147,000, and in October to nearly 212,000. They began to fall again in November and December as winter made crossings more difficult and dangerous. Germany had expected its open-door policy to bring eight hundred thousand asylum-seekers, and that number had been reached by the end of the year, as European border controls were suspended and asylum-seekers were allowed to walk through Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Austria into Germany. 

    But Europe feared a repeat performance in the spring. In February 2016, Austria created a separate refugee monitoring system with the police chiefs of the former Yugoslavia, prevailing on North Macedonia to put up barbed wire along its border with Greece. This effectively closed the Balkan route, bottling up arrivals in Greece. On March 20, Merkel engineered the EU-Turkey agreement, calling on Turkey to “readmit, upon application by a Member State… all third-country nationals or stateless persons who do not, or who no longer, fulfill the conditions in force for entry to, presence in, or residence on, the territory of the requesting Member State.” 

    Turkey now demonstrated its ability to hold back flows when it wanted to. Arrivals on the Greek islands dropped dramatically, from an average of 2,700 a day in early 2016 to 300 a day by the end of March, and double digits shortly after that. But Turkey never fully implemented readmission clauses, and in July 2019 it unilaterally suspended them, saying that from its point of view these had always been meant as quid pro quo for visa-free travel for Turkish nationals in the EU. This was Turkey’s first open admission that it meant to instrumentalize the refugee issue to bargain with Europe. 

    Some officials believe that Merkel had struck a secret deal with Erdogan to allow eight hundred thousand refugees into Europe. Whether that is true or not, Merkel’s official deal with Erdogan, known as the EU-Turkey Statement, handed him control of the sluice gate. He had uses for Europe’s fear of immigrants. And impotently stuck between the North Macedonian barbed wire and the discretionary arrangements between Ankara and Berlin, Greece was manifestly unable to manage its maritime border. 

    Those Turkish uses for the crisis soon became clear. The spike in refugees in 2015 dovetailed with the launching of a new Turkish doctrine called Mavi Vatan, or Blue Homeland — an expansionist claim of sovereign rights to search for undersea oil and gas. Maps circulated by the Turkish admiralty cut the Aegean Sea in half, claiming as Turkish all sovereign rights east of the 25th parallel. This includes the islands of the east Aegean, where refugees alight. 

    Mavi Vatan was a direct reaction to two things. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the international standard law for maritime rights and borders, Greece’s islands give it half a million square kilometers of Exclusive Economic Zone in the east Mediterranean — an area beyond territorial waters where sole sovereign rights to exploit undersea wealth apply. That is four times Greece’s territorial expanse. A map of the EEZs of Greece and Cyprus under UNCLOS, published by two researchers at the University of Seville in 2004, shows a vast maritime area described by one expert as “a continuous Cypriot-Hellenic maritime area, encircling almost the entire Anatolian peninsula and enclosing Turkey in its land space.” Turkey violently disagrees with UNCLOS and walked out of the negotiations that shaped it in the 1970s. 

    The second development to which Mavi Vatan was reacting was the discovery of undersea oil and gas by Israel in 1999, Cyprus in 2010, Greece in 2014, and Egypt in 2015. In 2014, seismic explorations across Greece’s EEZ suggested that it may have natural gas reserves of 70-90 trillion cubic feet — almost as much as Israel, Egypt and Cyprus have discovered since the turn of the century combined, with a pre-Covid market value of about two hundred billion dollars. Mavi Vatan was a directly competitive claim for the sovereign rights of Greece and Cyprus, and it reinvigorated a Turkish policy to challenge all forms of Greek jurisdiction and sovereignty in the Aegean and east Mediterranean. This policy aims to press Greece into a discretionary political delimitation of maritime boundaries, rather than a legal one at the International Court of Justice at the Hague, as Greece has suggested.

    Turkey has intensified every tactic short of war to realize this aim. Turkish violations of Greek territorial waters numbered in the dozens per year until 2009. Since 2017 they have been in the thousands. In 2014, the year Greece discovered natural gas in its Aegean, Ionian, and Mediterranean EEZ, violations quadrupled to over two thousand two hundred. After that, they rose to about four thousand annually, and included overflights of inhabited Greek islands. Last year they reached a new record of over ten thousand. 

    Search-and-rescue with respect to refugees and shipping has also been mobilized as part of this jurisdictional dispute. Ten years ago, the Turkish Coast Guard changed tactics. Instead of patrolling along the length of the coast of Asia Minor, it launched sorties towards the puddles of international waters that lie in the middle of the Aegean — areas that would become Greek if Greece were to exercise its right under UNCLOS to claim twelve nautical miles of territorial waters around its islands — double what it claims today in the Aegean. Turkey has issued a threat of war if that happens. “These are the waters ships sail through when they clear the Dardanelles, so the first thing they see when they enter the Aegean is a Turkish boat,” says the retired senior Coast Guard officer. “There the ships operate as hailing platforms, and they show the flag.” 

    Hailing, like flag-showing, is a way of projecting power. “Let’s say a merchant vessel is sailing off Sounion,” says the officer, referring to the cape that lies just forty kilometers south of Athens. “Around 3 a.m. there is a lone officer at the helm, and he is hailed by the Turkish Coast Guard: ‘What are you carrying? Where did you load? Where are you unloading? What is the nationality and number of your crew? And by the way, if you need anything, call us.’ This happens hundreds of times a year,” he says. “The tactic is to hail boats crossing through Greek territorial waters. Then shipowners from around the world are under the impression that the Aegean is under joint management with Turkey. Their feeling is that their ships are safe, and they thank Turkey for showing an interest. Anything to do with accidents, groundings, refugees, accidents and so on — Turkey turns it into a race with the Greek authorities. They force us to defend our turf daily.” The Turkish regime saw the refugee influx not as a humanitarian crisis but as a strategic opportunity. 

    2020 

    On February 27, 2020, Turkey lost at least thirty-four military personnel to advancing Syrian forces in Idlib. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan held an overnight national security meeting, after which he announced that Turkey would open its borders to asylum-seekers crossing to Europe. Erdogan wanted to involve NATO in policing a thirty-kilometers-deep military zone that it had created on the Syrian side of the border, and he was leveraging the threat of a replay of the 2015 refugee crisis to put pressure on the EU, whose members make up most of NATO. “Europe cannot endure this, cannot handle this,” Erdogan’s Interior Minister, Suleyman Soylu, told CNN Turk. “The governments in Europe will change, their economies will deteriorate, their stock markets will collapse.” 

    Erdogan had often used the threat of unleashing refugees on Europe before. Now it seemed that he would act on his threat. The news fell like a bombshell in Greece and Bulgaria, which braced themselves for the expected influx; but over the next two weeks only Greek borders would be assailed. To the Greeks it was apparent that Turkish pressure on NATO dovetailed with its Mavi Vatan territorial ambitions against them, because a demonstrable Turkish ability to render Greek borders ineffective would be a display of power to control those borders. 

    Erdogan advertised free bus rides for asylum-seekers from Istanbul to the Greek-Turkish land border. On Lesvos, I spoke with asylum-seekers who told me that they had been plucked out of church, or stopped on the beach, by smugglers who offered them free passage. Typical fare for the crossing a few days earlier was five hundred dollars. The smugglers did not say who was paying them to waive their fee now, but Greek suspicion fell on the Turkish government. Soon the suspicion was confirmed. The Hellenic Coast Guard released video of Turkish Coast Guard vessels escorting refugee boats to the edge of Turkish territorial waters and directing them to continue towards the Greek islands.

    Turkey consciously manufactured this refugee crisis to demonstrate that it was disputing maritime jurisdiction and had the Greeks on the run. It repeatedly released videos showing Turkish Coast Guard boats pursuing Hellenic Coast Guard boats to the point of nearly colliding with them, while the Greeks stayed on the defensive and conducted evasive maneuvers. 

    It was a different story on land. Only one hundred and sixty kilometers long, Greece’s land border with Turkey follows the natural defenses of the Evros river and its marshy delta. Tens of thousands of Greece’s best trained and equipped troops are stationed there. Greece built ten kilometers of double chain link fence along the most vulnerable stretch in 2012, and this helped it to repel asylum-seekers who had amassed on the Turkish side of the border. Europe came to its aid, politically and practically. First Austria and later other EU member states sent elite police units to help patrol the Greek side of the border. The EU pledged seven hundred million euros in emergency aid. Visiting the Evros on March 3, the European Commission president Ursula Von Der Leyen called Greece “our European shield.” By March 9, Greece registered 2,164 successful crossings, of which 313 by land and 1,851 by sea. This was by no means the deluge that would bring down European governments.

    “What Turkey tried to do in March 2020 was to have a mass intrusion of more than one hundred and fifty thousand people in the north within a few days,” a Greek government official who was present at prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ crisis meetings in 2020 told me earlier this year. The sudden influx of even one hundred and fifty thousand “would obviously be beyond any capacity to sleep, feed, protect this population,” the official said on condition of anonymity. “And that would have led to a collapse of the country in the north. If we… were a failed state, unable to provide for anything, and there were people breaking into houses to eat because there would be no food because there are no camps for one hundred and fifty thousand people… I don’t know what would be the military implication if that happened.”

    The Greek government had decided that this was a state-backed mobilization requiring a security response unburdened by humanitarian concerns. Officially the HCG denied conducting pushbacks, but the Migration Minister Notis Mitarakis stated on March 1 that “the Hellenic Navy and Hellenic Coast Guard have prevented many, many cases of migrant entry by sea,” effectively admitting to the policy. But the European Commission also reined Greece in from abandoning the Geneva Convention altogether. Greece initially denied new entrants the right to apply for asylum, saying they were acting as Turkish agents. Under pressure from Brussels, they reinstated the right in early April. 

    After the events of 2020, Greece replaced the Evros chain link fence with a four-meter-tall steel palisade capable of stopping armored vehicles, reinforced with extra patrols, thermal and visual cameras, ground sensors, drones, and other high-tech equipment linked to software designed to alert guards to suspicious activity. It extended this palisade to forty kilometers and in May 2022 said it will extend it to one hundred and twenty kilometers. It is arguably the European Union’s most heavily fortified and monitored external border. 

    Turkey failed to blackmail the EU and NATO into backing its operation in Syria, and EU-Turkey relations have since darkened. Europe is amending the Schengen Code, which allows borderless travel within the European Union contingent on strong external borders, to reflect the events of 2020. “The instrumentalization [of refugees] was discussed, and this will be put into the Schengen code as a legal term,” says a Brussels diplomat involved in the discussion. “Everyone remembers the 2015-2016 experience, and the fact that 2020 was an attempt to recreate it. So Greece remains on the agenda. Everyone is very happy that Greece is guarding its border effectively,” the diplomat told me. 

    This securitization of borders, apart from keeping freedom of movement within the EU intact, serves another purpose. “There is a discussion on the right to access to asylum,” the diplomat said. “In this context, anyone needs to be able to enter European borders and then we will see what we will do with them. But to all intents and purposes that means we keep them, because statistically 85% of those who enter remain. It is extremely difficult to do deportations.” Keeping people out therefore means fewer asylum acceptances and less politically toxic debate about how many non-European Muslims the EU can integrate. 

    2021

    Shortly after an election in August 2020 returned Alexander Lukashenko to a sixth term as president of Belarus, riots erupted in the streets of Minsk. Lukashenko’s margin of eighty percent of the popular vote was not credible to many who had voted for his opponent, the thirty-eight-year-old school teacher Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who claimed that she had won sixty percent of the vote. (She was running in place of her husband, whom Lukashenko had jailed.) 

    Lukashenko’s ensuing crackdown prompted EU travel bans and asset freezes on dozens of businesspeople and individuals in the state apparatus that was responsible for the repression, and eventually included banning Belarusian carriers from EU airspace. On May 26 2021, Belarus’ president Alexander Lukashenko retaliated, threatening to flood his neighbors with “refugees and drugs.” Another dictator had found his own political use for refugees. Refugees crossing into Lithuania from Belarus, most of them Iraqis, were reported to number 4,100 by September, fifty-five times the previous year’s flows. 

    In the autumn Lithuania began building a five-hundred-kilometer-long fence along its border with Belarus. By then refugees were walking over Belarus’ borders with Latvia and Poland as well. The European Union condemned Lukashenko’s policy as an attempt to destabilize its neighbors and press the bloc to lift sanctions. Belarus said sanctions were depriving it of the ability to control its borders. The instrumentalization of migrants for political purposes by Belarus is unacceptable,” Ursula von der Leyen said on November 8. “Instrumentalization” was a phrase first used in the context of Turkey’s 2020 operation against Greece, and the reference was not coincidental. Unlike Turkey, Belarus does not border on refugee-producing states, but its state airline, Belavia, was offering visa-free travel to refugees from Istanbul, as were Turkish Airlines, and those flights were enabling it to stage a refugee crisis in Central Europe. 

    The EU slapped sanctions on Belavia in December. “Migrants wishing to cross the Union’s external border have been flying to Minsk on board flights operated by Belavia from a number of Middle Eastern countries, in particular Lebanon, UAE and Turkey,” said the European Commission. “In order to facilitate this, Belavia opened new air routes and expanded the number of flights on existing routes.” Von Der Leyen told the European Parliament that traffickers were acting as “specialized travel agents offering all-inclusive deals: visas, flights, hotels and, somewhat cynically, taxis and buses up to the border,” which was independently verified by media reports. 

    The Commission began to methodically disarm Lukashenko. It gave Iraq three and a half million euros to repatriate its nationals, and threatened airlines carrying refugees to Belarus with deprivation of overflight and landing rights within the EU. Within days, several airlines had said they would only transport Belarusian nationals and those with residence rights. The Commission also funded border protection measures, as it had done on the Evros. It tripled border management funds to Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to two-hundred-million euros for 2021-2022. It put forward a set of temporary asylum procedures which allowed the three countries to apply “simplified and quicker national procedures” to deport those whose asylum applications are rejected. It was an attempt to hew to the Geneva Convention, but the three member states were reluctant to follow even accelerated procedures, preferring to eject asylum-seekers outright, as Greece had done. 

    “The feeling was that Europe is being attacked and needs to respond dynamically,” said the Brussels diplomat. “There was a lot of tolerance for strict border control… The Commission believes its reaction [to Belarus] was a success,” he said, but cautioned that legislative efforts to achieve greater solidarity and burden-sharing of asylum processing within the EU will fall by the wayside as a result. “I think the tendency will be to leave legislation untouched and to tighten procedures — exchanges of information, databases, etc. You have better border protection, the EU spending money on surveillance.” 

    2022 

    Vladimir Putin is the latest elected dictator to utilize refugees as an instrument against Europe. Russia has already achieved a refugee crisis on the continent. The United Nations says that fourteen million Ukrainians, about a third of the population, are displaced as a result of the war, six and a half million inside Ukraine and almost eight million in Europe. Moreover, European leaders believe that in blockading the export of Ukrainian wheat through the Black Sea, Russia is consciously trying to create a famine in Africa, leading to a new refugee wave. Europe’s High Representative put it this way to Journal du Dimanche: “Russia is using the grain blockade as a weapon of war, everyone should be aware of that. And if the two great sources of grains and oilseeds cannot leave Ukrainian ports, yes, there will be famines in the world.”

    In 2021, Ukraine produced almost forty percent of the world’s sunflower seed oil, fifteen percent of its barley, and ten percent of its wheat and maize. Wheat prices jumped from about $800 a bushel to around $1,100 after the war in Ukraine began. The EU estimated that twenty million tons of grain remained in storage in Ukraine last summer, and ships were needed to move them. “Whole trains and river barges in the thousands will not be enough,” said the European Council President Charles Michel. And Russian commentators confirmed the tactic. The Kremlin propagandist and editorial director of Russia Today Margarita Simonyan told the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June that Muscovites were joking that “the famine is our only hope.” She explained that this was a reference to Russia’s blockade. “The famine will start now, and [the West] will lift the sanctions and be friends with us, because they will realize that it is necessary.” 

    The head of Ukraine’s presidential office, Andriy Yermak, said that Ukraine had evidence that Russia, apart from shipping thousands of tons of captured grain to Crimea, was attempting to destroy unharvested fields with incendiary bombs. North African countries have already felt the pinch, and those that have the money, like Egypt, have negotiated block purchase agreements. But what such a food crisis will do in war-torn Libya and the unstable countries of the Sahel is anyone’s guess.

    Imperiling food security so as to create conditions that will produce a strategically useful eruption of refugees: this seems to be Russia’s plan. And Turkey’s ambivalent stance towards Russia raises questions about possible collusion. In contrast to other NATO members, who are donating weapons to Ukraine, Turkey is selling it hundreds of TB2 drones at five million dollars a piece. (It has also donated four.) Turkey is the only NATO member not to impose sanctions on Russia, and encouraged Russian oligarchs to view it as a safe haven. Interviewed by CNBC at the Doha Forum in Qatar, the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Čavusoglu said in March last year that “if you mean that these oligarchs can do any business in Turkey, then of course if it is legal, and it is not against any international law, then I will consider.” 

    Cavusoglu’s comments came twenty-four hours after Turkey’s president Erdogan appeared to invite Russian oligarchs to relocate their assets in Turkey. Erdogan told journalists accompanying him home from the NATO summit on March 25 that he welcomed international companies departing Russia to establish operations in Turkey instead. He then added, “Apart from that, if there are certain capital groups that want to come to our country and ‘park’ their facilities with us, of course, we won’t keep our doors closed to them. Our door is open to them as well.” Satellite images show that Russian oligarchs have indeed been sending their yachts and private jets to Turkey. Data from last May show that Turkey is the top destination for Russian overseas home buyers and passport applicants. At best, this equidistance between Russia and NATO implies opportunism, since Turkey is in dire need of foreign currency reserves to bolster its sliding lira, and at worst an arrangement with Putin. 

    In Greece, meanwhile, refugee policy again hardened when New Democracy was returned to power in 2019. A new immigration law made appealing first-time asylum denials impossible without a lawyer. Applications began to be fast-tracked to match the speed of arrivals. “The rules have changed,” the Migration Minister Notis Mitarakis said in January, 2020. “We are not open to people without a refugee profile” — a phrase that remains undefined but is generally taken to mean nationalities not ravaged by war. A new generation of closable camps on the islands has expanded capacity from six thousand to twenty thousand. 

    Treating potential asylum-seekers as a security risk and even a military threat has a huge cost to those who are neither. Most of the Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans who crossed into Europe are middle-class professionals or, in some cases, productive farmers. They seek secular rule-of-law countries where they would be safe from arbitrary fiat and violence. They desire open societies where their children could be educated and free from discrimination. They are not in Europe to threaten its liberal order but to affirm it. I have come across this again and again. 

    Some examples: Annas Khalifa, a Syrian man from Aleppo in his early twenties, just wanted to finish his electronics degree when he fled the draft. I interviewed him on a ferry gangway in the Greek port of Igoumenitsa, moments after he was arrested trying to escape to Italy in 2014. “You will choose to fight with Assad or against Assad,” he told me. “My mission is to invent stuff because I love electronics… I don’t need to fight anybody. I just need to study.” Fatima Ahmadi, who was sixteen, and Zahra Teimouri, who was fifteen, when I interviewed them in 2016, left Afghanistan because the Taliban persecutes their Hazara sect of Islam. I spoke to them at the Melissa Network in Athens, which organizes language and skills classes for women. Zahra told me that she had seen fighting and explosions in her town since she was ten. “It was so bad, I cannot explain,” she said. She wanted to become a civil engineer or a chemist. Fatima wanted to be a doctor. Didn’t their parents expect them to get married at their age? “My parents said first study, and second get married,” Fatima said. Zahra had received the same advice. And in May 2015, I met Hashim, a Yemeni businessman, on the Greek border with North Macedonia. In the dead of night, he was trying to spirit himself and his two teenaged sons north. “I decided to leave Yemen so that I will never see my children fight for Al Qaeda or any other side. Sooner or later, one militia or another will approach them,” he told me. He had left his wife and four youngest children behind to face the perils of malnutrition, sickness, and war. 

    The values and the priorities expressed by these and other asylum-seekers essentially make them Europeans. They aspire to the same things as middle-class Westerners. They know that their own societies have failed, often catastrophically, and that their adult generations are lost. Many want to return and rebuild their homelands with the skills that they learned in the West when it is safe to do so. The idea of asylum was precisely this — to shelter and nurture until the storm has passed. It is difficult. People ripped out of their social context cannot be productive. They need investment and support. Often they are forced lower in the social order, but they are more than willing to undertake these sacrifices to save their families and improve their children’s lot. 

    Increasingly, though, asylum is being ignored — an inevitable consequence of preventing irregular entry at the border. What was meant to be an award on the merits of individuals is increasingly nudged in the direction of a summary judgment based on national profiling. Numbers are partly responsible for this, but so is instrumentalization. “The refugee crisis is a humanitarian crisis, and that’s how we should face it, but it is also used as an aggressive act — I’d say a form of hybrid war,” Iliopoulos told me. “The result is that the refugee issue has been transformed from a humanitarian issue into a form of attack.” The cynicism of this is breathtaking. 

    On March 2 last year, the Turkish government released video of the Hellenic Coast Guard attempting to push back refugee-filled rubber dinghies with long poles, maneuvering in front of them threateningly, and even firing into the water. Part of Turkey’s hybrid warfare was to trap Greece in a moral dilemma; Greece could either display the power to prevent irregular entry or the humanity to accept them in the spirit of the Geneva Convention, but not both. All of Europe is now caught in this moral dilemma, as dictators (and the would-be dictators of the new European right, who demagogically and proto-fascistically exploit the presence of refugees in their countries to frighten voters into supporting them at the ballot box) make it a priority to spin a narrative about the moral superiority of an imperiled West. 

    Legal aid NGOs in Greece, Germany, and France have begun to document evidence of summary expulsions without due process, especially at the Evros. They filed thirty-two lawsuits at the European Court of Justice last year alone. At least one case has been filed with the UN Human Rights Committee. The reason that these cases do not go to Greek prosecutors is that they are not prosecuted. The Greek Helsinki Monitor, a human rights watchdog, told me that over the past three years it has sent more than two hundred cases of summary expulsion — including torture, rape, and robbery — to twenty Greek prosecutors, to the National Agency for Transparency, and to the Greek Ombudsman. None has resulted in prosecutions. 

    This lack of accountability at home and mounting cases in international courts are a reputational risk for Greece. “Everyone can make the connection,” remarked Pavlos Eleftheriadis, professor of public law at the University of Oxford. “If you don’t respect the rule of law in one area, especially an area where you might get political benefit, you might not respect the law somewhere else, too… In terms of creating a hospitable environment for foreign direct investment, I’m sure it’s going to reflect very badly on the standing of Greece.” And not only Greece. The cases are also a reputational risk for Europe. More than once the European Commission has called on Greece to refrain from pushbacks, but more likely than not these remonstrations are phony, just high-level virtue-signaling. Spain has conducted high-profile pushbacks at its territories in Morocco; Lithuania and Poland refused entry to thousands in 2021; and Italy has paid and equipped the Libyan Coast Guard to retain asylum-seekers under inhumane conditions in North Africa. 

    All of these exclusionary practices were suspended during the Ukraine war, when the refugees were white, Christian, and European. Within days of the war starting, Europe activated Temporary Protection status for Ukrainians, an extraordinary measure first designed for Yugoslav refugees in the 1990s but never used. It meant that Ukrainians did not need to apply for asylum for a year, extendable to three years. They were considered de facto refugees. It was the right thing to do given that there was a war on European soil, but it underlined the discretionary way in which Europe is prepared to apply asylum law, and it had consequences. The civilizational triage was painful to behold. Germany evicted Afghan refugees from their temporary homes to make space for Ukrainians. 

    Many officials believe that after the Ukraine war is over, and with or without Putin’s famine, refugee flows to Europe will again increase due to wars, failed states, and a failing global environment. The question for Europe is whether it will continue to put itself in Turkey’s Machiavellian hands or develop a deeper and genuinely humane strategy. This could entail incentives to invest North Africa and the Middle East. Creating jobs and strengthening the middle class there would contribute immensely to Europe’s security. Europe could also circumvent human traffickers by allowing direct resettlement of asylum-seekers. Such a policy implies a solidarity mechanism within the European Union that would allow countries to share asylum recipients according to the size of their population and economy. It also implies solidarity between the United States and Europe to create a global movement for asylum, much as was done for Afghans fleeing the fall of Kabul in 2021. 

    Yet both Europe and America fear that a stable, principled, common asylum policy will act as an attraction for economic migrants and encourage dictators to take advantage of the instabilities. Nor is there support for an open-hearted policy among electorates, a reflection of the economic insecurity of our increasingly Darwinian societies in an age when the promise of capitalism to lift all boats has faded. And both in Europe and North America, it is clear that the Geneva Conventions are thought to apply primarily to the white Christians whose plight in World War Two inspired them, but not to different people from less economically developed societies. Human rights are not truly felt to be universal, but seem to be reserved for the societies that thought of them.

    The lesson of 2014-2022, however, is clear. It is that inhumanity gives dictators easier ways to shape narratives against us and politically to divide us. The West can decide to address economic inequality, organize society around centrist and humane policies, and adopt a common stance towards asylum-seekers, or it can continue to provide despots with ways to blackmail it and malign its otherwise glorious commitment to the Enlightenment and the individual rights that it inspired.

    Good Painting

    The temple is a latch on the skull where four bones fuse: the frontal, parietal, temporal, and sphenoid. In anatomy courses at art academies students study the latch and its quadruple planes with the help of diagrams and gypsum reproductions. Students draw and redraw these models, accustoming themselves to the relations of the shapes which make up the skull and the rest of the skeleton until at last they can consistently, almost perfunctorily, sketch the outline of a human form with precision. The pencil line will conjure the sweep of the collarbone into the shoulder blade, the spine’s curve, and the haunches above the hips as if the whole figure were fully formed in the artist’s mind and the hand holding the pencil was itself manipulated by the figure in the artist’s imagination — as if the pencil was automatically, without thought, acting on a directive issued by the artist’s subconscious. This automaticity is the point, the essence of the draftsman’s skill. Like a dancer whose knowledge of the choreography is not reflective but muscular, the artist will know the human body so well that even a sketch — say, a hastily rendered likeness copied surreptitiously into a Moleskine on a subway car before the unwitting model, a fellow passenger, has a chance to shift her weight, or to catch the snoop in action — will evince this understanding. The sketch is not just of a face, it is of a face which sheathes a skull, connected to a spinal cord and a ribcage, and even if the artist has not drawn these things she knows that they are all of a piece, smoothly fitted into one another, and the marks in the Moleskine are informed by this prior understanding. 

    If the flesh of a model is pulled tightly over the skull, then the planes which converge at the temple ought to be rendered by the painter in different hues, because the light will reflect off of these planes with stark contrast. This offers an opportunity for the artist to communicate, with a subtle shift in tone, that she has noticed and appreciated the peculiarity of each plane, and how the gradations of color and light border one another. If a model is made to sit for long hours while the painter toils, the light will shift, and then fade, as the day darkens, and the flesh will subtly change color. Fittingly, the word “temple” comes from the Latin tempus, or “time,” because the hair on the temporal bone is often the first hair to turn gray and recede, so temporal means both “pertaining to time” and “pertaining to the anatomical temple.” Take your forefinger and strokes the small field on the side of your head behind your eyes, between your forehead and ear. It curves gently down where the skull-sphere bends inwards at the earlobe and then up and out around the eye socket’s rim.

    In Vuillard’s Self Portrait, Aged 21, painted in 1889, the viewer can see precisely where the artist’s skull curves. That plane on the portrait — it looks like a slim, obtuse triangle — is yellow ochre, whereas the patch of skin below it which stretches out towards Vuillard’s high cheekbone is a fleshy pink. The temple’s highest point, the point at which the light source would have hit the plane directly, contains the most white. In this painting, the lightest stretch is the curve which lines the upper, outer edge of the eyebrow. The photo of Self Portrait, Aged 21 on the National Gallery in Washington, D.C. website is appallingly lit. One must visit the canvas in the Small French Paintings Gallery to relish the exquisite delicacy with which the painter established this passage. Generally, the temple offers a remarkably satisfying opportunity for portraitists because it is a point of complicated geometry (the four planes converging) and it is encased in the flesh which rests above the eye, so it is delicate. The severity of the edges and the softness of the flesh juxtapose deliciously. When exquisitely rendered, I find it more consistently delightful than almost any other passage of painted flesh.

    The severity of an edge in a painting, I mean the place at which a plane ends, can be immensely pleasing. From ordinary experience, from the edges that we see every day in buildings, bookcases, furniture, and so on, we are accustomed to an orderliness and a lucidity — not a perfect lucidity, which ordinary perception may not provide, but a clarity sufficient to establish the scene — which painters must render expertly in order to make the universe on the canvas convincing. The lines must be firm even when they are gentle. Geometries, even twisted or interpreted geometries, ground paintings; they are the scaffolding which the eye leans upon for elementary comprehension.

    Cezanne was a master of geometries. Look closely at the walls of Cezanne’s buildings: the contours of every wall and roof and object are established not just by lines (there rarely is a single line) but by the shape or stroke directly behind the object and the gradations of color within it and against it. A shadow behind the house establishes the end of the building as clearly as the edge of the wall itself. And the same is true of the apples in his bowls of fruit. Shapes and their limits are what interested him. There is a mathematical field called topology, a branch of geometry, that studies the properties of shapes that stay constant when they are stretched or twisted: Cezanne was a topologist. In a letter to Emile Bernard, he remarked that “you must see in nature the cylinder, the sphere, the cone.” The formal integrity of the object, which preceded the perception of it, had to survive the artist’s interpretation of it.

    The composition, or the relationships of the shapes within a painting, does not have to be complex in order for the painting to be accomplished, but it must be clean, coherent, and legible, and it must be as internally consistent, and with a structural logic, as the shapes which make up a skull. There must be a balance of its elements, an accounting of their internal relations. The painting must not look lopsided or unfinished (which is an internal measure and not an aspiration to “perfect finish,” as Cezanne’s unfinished paintings, with their stretches of bare canvas, demonstrate); the objects within it must appear as if they belong alongside one another, as if they are members of the same universe. They must be proportional, even if they are not governed by realistic proportions; the hues must vary complementarily so that it is clear they are lit by the same sources. Portraits are in some sense simple because the composition is given to the artist: the proportions are perfect because a face is already proportional, and when a face is distorted by the painter’s interpretation its features, its proportions, are nonetheless recognizable. The nose sits in the middle of the face directly between the eyes, directly about the mouth, and so forth. In a landscape, the artist must order the trees and the buildings such that the painting is as balanced and legible as the shapes which make up a face. Any casual museumgoer can tell immediately when this balance is lacking. It is difficult to maintain even the basic level of internal consistency which viewers take for granted when they visit a gallery.

    A good painting must be orderly, and it must be interesting. All these musts: am I being obnoxiously prescriptive? Haven’t we outgrown formulas and definitions? Are the painterly standards that I have just listed only an apology for traditionalism? I grant that these canons are hardly the only canons. The history of painting is a long parade of old and new rules. Modernism, too, had its rules, though it prided itself on its rule-breaking — the orthodoxies of the heterodox. I would like to dwell on one of its rules. Certain artists and critics since the nineteenth century have argued for an additional standard for artistic quality. It is that, in order for a work to be considered worthwhile, it must be new, and even revolutionary.

    The requirement of newness promoted by these aestheticians meant that the work has to usher art into the future. A painting may be nice to look at, but if it does not contribute meaningfully towards the advancement of art then it is a lesser kind of art, or even an obstacle to art. The painter is an agent of history. The story of art is governed by a progressive motion forward and upward towards the realization of an ideal. For the moderns, this ideal was the elimination of the third dimension, of illusionism, from the canvas, and the recovery of the primacy of the picture plane. It was this school that defended the movement towards abstraction and away from figuration. The shift into abstract art was, as all teleological thinkers like to say, no accident. Rather, as Alfred Barr, the formidable first director of the Museum of Modern Art instructed in an exhibition catalog in 1936, abstraction was “the logical and inevitable conclusion toward which art was moving.” 

    Paintings, Barr argued, were not interesting because of the narratives or the objects portrayed, but because of the beauty of the relations of the forms within them. A painting, whatever it showed, was chiefly an arrangement of its own elements. Verisimilitude and optical observation were abandoned in favor of pictorial logic. Painting from life, Barr ruled, had been “exhausted.” He declared that “the more adventurous and original artists had grown bored with painting facts. By a common and powerful impulse they were driven to abandon the imitation of natural appearances.” For Barr and his fellow teleologists, this development, ironically enough, was not new. In fact, the drive towards abstraction had been central to developed understandings of art for millennia. They were not overthrowing the tradition, but fulfilling it. Members of this school often cited Socrates, in the following passage from Plato’s Philebus:

    What I am saying is not indeed directly obvious. I must therefore try to make it clear. I will try to speak of the beauty of shapes, and I do not mean, as most people would think, the shapes of living figures, or their imitations in paintings, but I mean straight lines and curves and the shapes made from them, flat or solid, by the lathe, ruler, and square, if you see what I mean. These are not beautiful for any particular reason or purpose, as other things are, but are always by their very nature beautiful, and give pleasure of their own quite free from the itch of desire; and colors of this kind are beautiful, too, and give a similar pleasure.

    Why depend on models in order to paint the shapes and the colors that are what make representative paintings aesthetically valuable? If the essence of art can be distilled so that painting can be made totally independent of the external world, then the resultant art would be purer and higher than the sort of art that artists had thus far been producing, for which empirical observation had been a kind of crutch. The value of abstract art, Barr insisted, “is based upon the assumption that a work of art… is worth looking at primarily because it presents a composition or organization of color, line, light and shade.” Those are the qualities worth painting. “Resemblance to natural objects,” he continued, “while it does not necessarily destroy these esthetic values, may easily adulterate their purity. Therefore, since resemblance to nature is at best superfluous and at worst distracting, it might as well be eliminated.”

    Moreover, while nature can offer a painter models and objects worth painting, there is something cheap about copying forms instead of inventing them. (As if no invention was ever involved in artistic mimesis.) Naturalism, and its rich past, was overthrown: in the new dispensation, a painter should not imitate nature, but should instead conceive of a subject that can fully exist only within the ecosystem of the canvas. Otherwise, the original would always be preferable to the painting. Ceci n’est pas une pipe, alas. Representation is an embarrassing endeavor since it can only result in an adulteration, in the compression of a three-dimensional object into the flatness of the picture plane. And, Barr argued, “in his art the abstract artist prefers impoverishment to adulteration.” Abstract art was not just another kind of art: it was the only kind, the only real kind. Everything else was an anachronism, an error.

    The greatest theologian in the church of abstraction was Clement Greenberg, a brilliant and despotic critic who presided over New York’s art world in the second half of the twentieth-century. The rise and fall of his scepter ignited or foreclosed myriad artistic careers. He defended his favorites vociferously, and endeavored to condemn all others to obscurity. In 1944, Greenberg decreed that “the future of American painting depends on what [Motherwell], Baziotes, Pollock, and only a comparatively few others do from now on.” Baziotes! Morandi, by contrast, he dismissed as “just a bottle painter.” But who among the figurative painters delighted more in the relations of shapes and hues, and carried representation further to the brink of abstraction, than Morandi?

    Greenberg’s conception of modern art formed the basis of an art-world orthodoxy which still holds sway in certain precincts today. A flurry of recent biographies and reevaluations testify to his continued influence. Greenberg decreed that art history reached its apex with abstraction, that “modern figurative art” was oxymoronic, that contemporary representational painting was tantamount to an aesthetic devolution. He theorized that modernism itself was the “the intensification, almost the exacerbation, of this self-critical tendency that began with the philosopher Kant.” After Kant, every discipline was forced to justify itself on its own terms:

    The essence of modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of characteristic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence. Kant used logic to establish the limits of logic, and while he withdrew much from its old jurisdiction, logic was left all the more secure in what there remained to it. 

    Greenberg’s grasp of Kant on logic was a little shaky, but his point was this: just as logic should restrict itself only to subjects which can be properly understood using logic, so art should concern itself only with what naturally and totally falls within its jurisdiction. A painting cannot breathe or move, so it should not reproduce living things. Do not imprison a bird in a fish bowl and do not compress a human figure onto a canvas. “Realistic, naturalistic art had dissembled the medium, using art to conceal art; Modernism used art to call attention to art.” 

    Slowly, beginning with Manet, painters in Greenberg’s account began to respect the properties of their medium, and allowed their paintings to celebrate those properties rather than conceal them. The many isms that overflowed from the cornucopia of modern art — Cubism, Orphism, Futurism, Constructivism, and so on —were all a result of this inward-looking self-critical impulse. Greenberg hastily added that, for the most part, these artists were not consciously adhering to a theory of history when they stood before their canvases. It was an ache to paint more expressively and powerfully that led them towards abstraction, and they inadvertently fulfilled an historical imperative without noticing that this is what they were doing. Greenberg repeated often that “all artists are bores.” It is galling but not surprising that he viewed them as blind pawns in the grip of historical forces that they obeyed without comprehension. His superior ex cathedra attitude to artists was deliciously captured by Jeffrey Tambor, who played Greenberg in the movie Pollock, when he turns to the lost and struggling painter and in his condescending baritone chastises him: “You’re retreating into imagery, Jackson!”

    Rather than working in service to an artistic ideal, Greenberg and Barr believed that contemporary artists have always grown weary of, and then overthrown, the dominant style of the day. Art history, as they tell it, is a tale of endless revolution — a permanent revolution, to borrow Trotsky’s phrase. Viewed on a small scale, it appears as if every reigning style is the bastard child of the previous one, and that artists whored after the new, always hoping above all to topple the old. But the new decayed and became antiquated as soon as the most recent revolution succeeded and the rebels calcified into the establishment. (Corporations swiftly began to buy abstract and abstract expressionist art.) Somehow, some providential power shepherded all of these revolutions towards abstraction, as if a Hegelian demi-urge was pulling the strings. As Meyer Schapiro acidly summarized the idea:

    The theory of imminent exhaustion and reaction is inadequate not only because it reduces human activity to a simple mechanical movement, like a bouncing ball, but because in neglecting the sources of energy and the condition of the field, it does not even do justice to its own limited mechanical conception… And a final goal, an unexplained but inevitable trend, a destiny rooted in the race or the spirit of the culture or the inherent nature of art, has to be smuggled in to explain the large unity of a development that embraces so many reacting generations. 

    For all his intellectual rigor, Greenberg was, like all prophets of history, something of a mystic. He operated as if he had a privileged perception of the esoteric workings of art’s destiny. His theory of art history is stupendously dogmatic and, as regards the extraordinary variety of art that was produced in his own time, it makes little sense. It omits, or expels, all the artists that disrupt its smooth linear narrative — most unfortunately, those modern painters whose accomplishment was precisely to throw into doubt the distinction between representation and abstraction because their work contained both.

    Greenberg’s theory of art, when taken to its conclusion, becomes absurd. Greenberg argues, as Schapiro puts it, “that representation is a passive mirroring of things and therefore essentially non-artistic, and that abstract art, on the other hand, is a purely aesthetic activity, unconditioned by objects and based on its own eternal laws.” (It is true that Schapiro was in his early orientation a Marxist, but his Marxism certainly never blinded him to form.) Let us consider both propositions. First, “that representation is a passive mirroring of things and therefore essentially non-artistic.” It certainly is the case that there is a kind of virtuosic academic style, stultified by study and devoid of originality. Many excellent painters who started out in academies tracing gypsum skulls painted in this way and their objective was verisimilitude. Most students never develop away from it, and there are still legions of artists who make a career producing what laymen consider “real art” because it looks like a photograph. Artists as original and exciting as Titian, Rembrandt, Cezanne, Degas, Matisse, Derain, Soutine, and Balthus began their careers producing realistic drawings and canvases. But all of them turned away from that early academic style and created figurative paintings that were radical and singular — not reproductions of reality but interpretations of reality, and exceedingly painterly ones. “A passive mirroring of things?” Hardly. Not a single stroke on the weakest paintings of any of those artists is passive or essentially non-artistic.

    And second, “that abstract art, on the other hand, is a purely aesthetic activity, unconditioned by objects and based on its own eternal laws.” There is no way to produce any kind of art that is unconditioned by objects. There is no way to view any kind of art that is not informed by the objects that we are familiar with, and that constitute reality. Every aesthetic is developed through an interaction with the world. Color and form are all that painters have to create an aesthetically pleasing work, but color and form can only be studied in experience. This does not mean that they should be used only mimetically, to copy the world. But abstraction emerged out of the discoveries of representation, as in Kandinsky’s crinolines, or in Cubism’s still lifes, or in Brancusi’s Bird in Space. And many abstract painters believed that their rejection of representation was not a rejection of the world, but a deeper grasp of it. They were right, which is one of the reasons that we linger before them. Joan Mitchell’s paintings are vivified by a fantastic energy. They convey movement, though canvases cannot move. Even Jackson Pollock was simulating sensations and rhythms that he knew only through experience. If we can “read” such paintings, if they are coherent to us, it is because we have an eye for order that was learned from existing shapes and incidents in the world of material forms and living things.

    The balance, the fittedness, and the rhythmic consistency that we find, say, in Blue Poles are taken from the cognitive experience of both the painter and the viewer. An abstract painting must be as cohesive, complicated, and brilliantly ordered as a skeleton. Conversely, you don’t need putti or apples to capture the lived world. The problem with “a purely aesthetic activity” is not its aspiration to high art but its aspiration away from life. Greenberg’s Platonism bears little relation to what artists actually do. He once said that the first mark of paint on a canvas was an adulteration, since it disrupted the perfect two-dimensionality of the canvas. It would be impossible to produce an art that conformed exactly to what Greenberg wanted and was not sterile. Greenberg, Barr, and the other teleologists shrunk art in the name of its own climax. The future they demanded was anorexic rather than expansive. 

    And yet: for all his dogmatism and all his bullying, reading Greenberg now is nonetheless a relief. Even when he is wrong he is formidable, and even when he inserted what he saw into a dubious framework, his writings are a masterclass in how to pay attention to a painting. It is exhilarating to grapple with an art criticism steeped in learning and vitally invested in the quality of the art it was considering, even if its qualitative ideals were absurd. Today there are almost no art critics who are remotely analogous to Greenberg in intellectual seriousness or influence. Contemporary critics, far too often, are beholden to the art market. They pay too much attention to money. They do not champion unknown artists but lazily find their subjects in the system of established dealers and collectors and curators (which, in an age in which Instagram is full of the work of obscure but formidable artists, is sinful). The artists who win the attention of the art system fulfill two antithetical criteria: a thematic obsession with progressive politics, and an aesthetic in thrall to the sleek soullessness of capitalism. (There is a bit of good news in that these political preoccupations have licensed galleries to take a new interest in figurative painting, since it is easier to champion the downtrodden if you depict them.) There are serious and rigorous artists painting today who do not concern themselves with identity and do not produce paintings fitted for atriums on Fifth Avenue. The serious critics should find them.

    Kehinde Wiley is the perfect hero of our grim art system. Every one of his paintings is made in the Wiley brand image. The technical triumph for which Wiley is so admired — his sedulously detailed and decorative backgrounds against which he stages luxuriously rendered people of color — is in truth that he has succeeded in producing paintings, or in ordering a factory of assistants to assist him in producing paintings, that look as if they were generated by artificial intelligence. The meticulously rendered people in his canvasses do not look hyper-realistic; they look like crass digital art. And they look expensive. The backgrounds of a Wiley painting are intricate but digestible in precisely the same way that psychedelic wallpapers are. He is technically ostentatious and artistically bloodless.

    Julian Lucas’ recent profile of Kehinde Wiley in The New Yorker is a useful caricature of the new orthodoxy. The title, itself devoid of irony, betrays the overwhelming concern of both the interviewer and his subject: “How The Artist Kehinde Wiley Went from Picturing Power to Building It: His portrait of Obama sparked a nationwide pilgrimage. Now he’s establishing an arts empire of his own.” Power, by which Lucas means money, is the ultimate subject. “I wouldn’t even say that art is the greatest thing that Kehinde will accomplish before the Lord promotes him,” Wiley’s mother told Lucas. “I see him as a great entrepreneur.” Like court painters throughout history, Wiley has savvily capitalized on his slickness. The Obama portrait is only the most familiar example. He has collaborated eagerly with luxury brands such as Grey Goose and American Express, and he paints celebrity-porn portraits of figures such as LL Cool J and Michael Jackson. His portraits of pedestrians identified on the street and invited into his studio are no less rhetorical and formulaic; unlike the great portraitists, Wiley captures only a surface. Roberta Smith once compared him to the French painter William-Adolphe Bouguereau. The comparison is apposite: like Bougereau, Wiley produces highly finished kitsch. Warhol would have been just as apt a comparison. It is no sin to be a businessman, of course, or to use painting as a means of making money. But we must not mistake a genius for marketing for artistic prowess. The problem with Wiley is not that he is corrupting the pure tradition of great art. The problem is that he is uninteresting, in the way that brands are always uninteresting. 

    Brand development is not the same as artistic development, and an artist can develop a style or a tone or a unique voice without devolving into a logo or a look. A Rothko and a Warhol are both immediately recognizable, but after one has recognized a Rothko, one must reckon with it and this takes time. Warhol, on the other hand, is designed to be the sort of thing that one can slurp down and forget. Many years ago John Updike referred to Warhol’s art as “art for busy people. (He meant it as praise!) The same is true of Wiley. Warhol’s art demands no more than a glance. He made products that happened to be paintings. Similarly, Wiley produces designs that one can print on an AmEx card without the least bit of aesthetic distortion.

    Blackness, of course, is central to Wiley’s portraiture and to his success. As Julian Lucas says, the art world recently started “buying Black art like indulgences,” a remark that captures the mercenary quality of such racial solidarity. From the standpoint of art, however, the important point is that the paintings are not good because they are of black bodies and they are not bad because they are of black bodies. Compare the flesh in one of Lynette Yiadom-Boakye’s gripping portraits to the flesh in a Wiley painting. The subjects are the same race, but take a close look at the lusciousness of Yiadom-Boakye’s oils. There is nothing slick about her canvases. Her paintings are consistently intelligent. As Zadie Smith noted in a commendable profile of the painter, which appeared in The New Yorker five years before Lucas’ profile of Wiley, “the colors are generally muted: greens and grays and blacks and an extraordinary variety of browns. Amid this sober coloration splashes of yellow and pink abound, and vivid values and emerald greens, all tempered by the many snowdrop gaps of unpainted canvas, like floral accents in an English garden.”

    A melancholy inwardness permeates Yiadom-Boakye’s painting. They offer weather for quiet contemplation. Her painterliness, the thick wetness of the paints, adds a genuine sensuousness to the canvas which is markedly different from the sterile shininess of Wiley’s people. Since she paints quickly, usually finishing a canvas in a single day before her oils have a chance to dry, the facture of her surfaces dance with incident. No surface is purely flat, no surface is devoid of motion. The swiftness of her brush juxtaposes astonishingly with the delicacy of her touch. In her portrait “Highpower,” from 2008, the head of a man is rendered with many sweeping strokes. There is a glimmer of light in the high point of the temple plane, just above and behind the eyebrow, which is mesmerizing. Each painting is the fruition of a visual obsession. “A color, a composition, a gesture, a particular direction of the light,Yiadom-Boakye has said. “My starting points are usually formal ones.” Delight, an infectious delight in paint, vivifies her work. Yiadom-Boakye’s subject is not what makes her a fine artist, though her love for her people is affectingly evident and certainly enriches her work. If she were fascinated instead by furniture, landscapes, or people of varying hues, her paintings of those subjects would be no less fine. 

    A painting is good because of the colors and the forms that make it up. This is as obvious as it is shocking. And it is not “formalism” to say so. For a lover of paintings, for someone who has achieved an occasional moment of transcendence before a canvas, it may seem heretical or idiotic to point this out, the way that it is heretical or idiotic to point out that a book is simply a mass of typed pages or that a person is merely a mass of cells. But respect for the tactility and the materials of paintings is essential to a substantive appreciation of them. If there is soulfulness in a painting, it was put there by a paintbrush. This is so regardless of its subject or its subjectlessness. Can Rembrandt’s Biblical etchings, or Poussin’s mythological paintings, or Hals’ group portraits, be appreciated without reference to the narrative that they present? I think so. Such a distillation of attention must be possible, if they are to be viewed as art. Extra-aesthetic meanings may abound in a picture, but they have no bearing on the painting’s artistic quality.

    A painting can be devoid of narrative and still be good, but it cannot be devoid of some measure of freshness or originality. I do not mean the newness that was fetishized by the modernists and the historicists. The newness that I have in mind cannot be prescribed, it cannot be copied down in a lecture hall and spat out onto a canvas, and it does not have to fit neatly or at all into a theory of art history. The best way to understand and admire a painting by Cezanne is certainly not to view it as a precursor of Picasso and Braque. Cubism, after all, was not Cezanne’s intended end. Moreover, a painting can be great without having the slightest cultural effect. Soutine was an original; no one had ever painted like him before and no one ever will again. His influence endures regardless of the fact that he did not catalyze a movement. The same is true of many great painters who were obsessed with and dedicated to art, not to the arc of history. And, conversely, an artwork or a style that inspires a movement can still be artistically uninteresting or unaccomplished. Even works that are historically consequential must be judged first for their merit and only then for their impact. Les Demoiselles d’Avignon is a formidable painting before it is a revolutionary act, and so is Woman I. In this regard, a work of vanguard art is exactly like a work of classical art: it must be evaluated for its quality. And who is to say what the vanguard is? The Barr-Greenberg teleology is not the only teleology that has been proposed as a means of plotting the trajectory of Western art.

    Every artist will paint freshly, will create something that is new, if they have the courage of their own creativity. I will give an example. In Woman’s Back, painted last year by Yuval Yosifov, a naked woman is limned in a field of muted greens and blues which are subtly reflected in her flesh. Her back is modeled with gentle, luscious detail. The artist has scraped the paint so that no strokes are visible, but still the body appears soft. The metal of the black chair on which she sits cuts harshly against the woman’s supple flesh. The juxtaposition of the cool, rough metal against the woman’s body is enigmatic. This brazen choice, this lyrical oxymoron, grounds the composition, and it is the reason I often return to this painting.

    As in many of her paintings, Yosifov straddles the chasm between abstraction and figuration. The shapes and colors that make up the body are rendered with the same authority and precision as the space in which they are materialized. Background and foreground feed into one another. Yosifov is a precocious young painter based in Tel Aviv who has already achieved some international recognition. I found her on Instagram, where she shares her paintings and her muses and mercifully betrays nothing about her political leanings. Her influences are evident: Degas, Ingres, and Corot whisper in her ear while she paints, but she does not repeat them. They inform but do not dominate her work. Her colors and compositions are consistently interesting, authoritative, and beautiful. I have syncopated myself to the rhythm of her posts, expecting at distant but regular intervals to be enlightened by whatever she has most recently produced. Each painting is an internally fulfilled event, not one in a great chain of historical significance. Yosifov’s works are not revolutionary but revelatory. All good paintings are.

    The Troubles of the Jews

    The mind operates by means of emphasis, especially the mind in the grip of fear or anger. When it brings order to the welter of experience, the mind sometimes exceeds the requirements of coherence and proceeds to exercises in simplification. Out of our many identities, we select one; out of our many loves, we select one; out of our many threats, we select one. Life is more easily managed this way. And we fit in more easily this way: such choices are determined chiefly by how we wish to be known by others, and by what others demand of us in the way of personal validity in our time. And so we choose single symbols of ourselves, and the rest, which may include some of our strongest capacities, is left to languish, undetected and undeveloped. Complexity is never trending. It is true that the appeal to complexity can become complacent and ponderous and an alibi for mental inaction; but surely nothing of consequence is ever simple. Surely the truth about us is that we are many things, we have many commitments, and we suffer many troubles. We take our pleasures in many places. We fight on many fronts.

    Perhaps nothing is more responsible for our myopias than our politics. Identify friend or foe, to borrow the naval code, is the rule. Those appear to be the only kinds of other people in existence. The Schmittians among us should take heart: we are living in the dystopia that their sordid hero described. Consider the question of our security. Our future depends significantly on how we conceive of the “foe.” If we misdescribe the danger we face, our powers will fail us. But in keeping with our pathologically synchronized political culture, or, to put it another way, in keeping with the growing repudiation of the liberal mentality, we are losing our mental dexterity in the confrontation with what threatens us. “Precarity” is the shibboleth of the day, and there is certainly a basis in reality for the popularity of the term; but “precarities” would be more accurate. The weakening of our sense of multiplicity has become one of our most significant vulnerabilities. Ideology is a method for seeing less than is there. We elect to see less, in exchange for the confidence that what we have seen we have mastered. It is a satisfying contraction.

    Even if we cannot proceed without frameworks with which to interpret experience, frameworks are blinders. That is why we are so often surprised, and ambushed; why crisis always finds us catching up. I remember when I first learned this lesson. I was a young student of modern Jewish history, and in the study of Zionism and the creation of the Jewish state I came upon the famous pronouncement by David Ben Gurion in 1939: “We will fight the White Paper as if there were no Hitler and we will fight Hitler as if there were no White Paper.” The White Paper, an act of supreme callousness that would be right at home in our era of scorn for the stateless, was an instrument of the British government that severely curtailed Jewish emigration from Europe to Palestine, with the aim of eventually banning it altogether. In 1939! I took away a larger point from Ben Gurion’s strategy in extremis. It is that there is never only a single danger. The challenges are always multiple and simultaneous. This is not as obvious as it sounds, because it requires certain mental adjustments that do not comport well with simple pictures, with intellectual italics, with “systemic” analysis, with holistic explanations. In the Jewish community in Palestine, there were many Jews who overcame their opposition to the British occupiers to fight alongside them against the Nazis, and there were even some Jews who overcame their opposition to fascism to fight the British occupiers (the history of Jewish fascism did not begin with Kahane and Ben Gvir); but Ben Gurion was insisting upon a double struggle, because history had afflicted the Jews with more than a single enemy, more than a single cruelty. And sometimes the challenges are not all external: I was schooled in the art of the double struggle, the fight on many fronts, by some of my teachers, who were in the valiant minority of American intellectuals in the 1950s who denounced Joseph Stalin and Joseph McCarthy with equal vehemence. No excuses were accepted and no extenuations were made. And if the double struggle made no sense according to the politics of the day, so much the worse for the politics of the day.

    The contemporary Jewish community is now faced with the prospect of a double struggle, but so far it has demonstrated only a skill for singleness. The Jewish left wants to know only one thing, the Jewish right wants to know only another thing. Right now it should be the duty of American Jews to fight the anti-Semitism outside the Jewish world and the anti-democratic decay inside the Jewish world, and on the basis of the same principles.

    One of the most impressive accomplishments of the fight against anti-Semitism is the literature — scholarly and philosophical — that has been created about it and against it. There is very little new to say about it, except to insist upon its eternal recurrence and to document its recent manifestations. But a succinct characterization of the malignancy is useful, and the finest one I know was recently written by Anthony Julius, the British Jewish intellectual and lawyer who is an authority on the terrible subject.

    Antisemitism consists of false and hostile beliefs about Jews, the Jewish religion, Jewish institutions or Jewish projects; these beliefs often lead to injurious things being said or done to Jews or their projects, or said about them. It has several modes of existence. Principally: it is a family of discourses; it conditions or deforms institutions and institutional practices; it is a choice made by individual men and women. Antisemitism variously threatens Jewish lives, Jewish security, and Jewish morale. It would deny to Jews rights others enjoy; it would withhold from them equality of treatment and regard. Antisemitism does not just injure Jews. It also encourages misconceptions about the causes of social conflicts, and of human suffering and social deprivation, thereby prolonging their existence, to general disadvantage. By denying Jews the opportunity of making contributions to society, it injures all society’s members. It corrupts political discourse; it taints political life; its injustices towards Jews are precedent-establishing. It even injures antisemites, degrading them and making them stupid.

    By now it should not be controversial to say that no party or ideology or community or movement is immune to anti-Semitism. The Jews have been despised by universalists and by particularists, by cosmopolitans and by nationalists, by communists and by fascists, by socialists and by capitalists, by progressives and by reactionaries, by the secular and by the religious, by white people and by people of color, by intellectuals and by populists, by monarchs and by republicans, by philosophers and by farmers, by monsters and by nice people, in a multitude of languages and in a multitude of cultures, and in places where there were no Jews. The absence of the object of a prejudice does not weaken it, and sometimes strengthens it. (Anti-Semitism in German universities between the wars was highest in the universities where there were no Jewish students.) That is because a prejudice is not caused by its object, and the notion that it is caused by its object, a commonplace notion, is itself a repetition of the prejudice.

    It is racist to seek the cause of racism in black people. It is misogynist to seek the cause of misogyny in women. It is homophobic to seek the cause of homophobia in gay people. And it is anti-Semitic to seek the cause of anti-Semitism in Jews. Prejudice is an expression of the prejudiced individual, of his or her inner turmoil, which is the result of his or her education and experience; or of a society with its own inner wounds and needs, most notably its desperate desire for scapegoats for its failures. Nobody ever went looking for a scapegoat without finding one. Bigotry is an internal disfiguration, not an empirical inference or a conclusion warranted by facts from the outside. Its essentially subjective and fantastic character, its invincible indifference to evidence, is what accounts for its tenacity and its durability. Hallucinations cannot be refuted; they can only be delegitimated and disarmed.

    All this, as I say, should be uncontroversial; but it is not. Almost nobody acknowledges the politically non-partisan nature of anti-Semitism, its infernal ubiquity. In the United States, for example, many Jews are certain that anti-Semitism is mainly or solely a phenomenon of the right. The Trump years certainly gave them abundant reasons to think so. (Trump himself pioneered a new type of villain in this tale: the pro-Israel anti-Semite.) The massacre at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, the torch-lit Nurembergish march in Charlottesville, the dramatic statistical spike in incidents of anti-Semitic violence around the country, the mainstreaming of politicians who believe in Jewish space lasers — the anti-Semitism that has characterized the American right for a century and longer has finally been allowed to come out from under its rock and leap onto our platforms and take its seats in Congress. This remains a national disgrace, and no amount of trade between Israel and the Emirates, which was the Trump administration’s most significant contribution to the well-being of the Jewish state, can mitigate or erase the stain. (If we did have a space laser, who does Marjorie Taylor Greene think would be its first target?)

    These awful developments have left Jewish progressives with the warm feeling that the spread of anti-Semitism has little to do with them, that the fight against anti-Semitism is a progressive fight against the forces of reaction, which it partly is. Riveted by the bigot without, they overlook the bigot within. They are strangely unemphatic about the fight, for political reasons: the sane right, the saving remnant of American conservatism, and of course the Jewish right, has taken it up, and who would want to march with them? After all, some otherwise odious Republicans have been laudably exercised by Jew-hatred in America. Christian evangelicals have also risen to protest. Myself, I am grateful to them for their attention to the perils that beset my people, even if I cannot share their politics and their theological grounds for it. In times of trouble, friends are friends.

    Jewish progressives have spoken only softly, if at all, about the Judeophobia in their own midst. What has anti-Semitism to do with them? They appear to believe that they have clean hands in this matter. Jean Améry, writing in 1969 about earlier manifestation of righteous intolerance on the New Left, called this “virtuous anti-Semitism.” But now it turns out that some of the most glittering Congressional tribunes of the people, some of the stellar leftists in American politics, have required remedial training in respect for Jews. I am not especially moved by Ilhan Omar’s or Rashida Tlaib’s learning curve, because a lack of bigotry should be an elementary expectation in a decent society. They had no good reason to say anti-Semitic things in the first place. Were they ignorant? All racists are ignorant.

    I am not arguing against forgiveness; like you, I have needed it myself. But I have for a long time believed that the test of a person’s probity is his willingness to criticize his own community and to suffer unpopularity in his own congregation. Solidarity can sometimes make people stupid. The response of the progressives to the embarrassing revelations of their comrades’ bigotry was mainly to denounce the critics as racists and Islamophobes. They behaved like a sect. But my favorite example of progressivism’s tolerance of its internecine anti-Semitism is the somewhat hapless case of Trayvon White. He is a progressive politician, a young African American who represents underserved and disadvantaged neighborhoods on the city council in Washington, D.C.. In 2018, on a fine morning in March when the city was startled by snow flurries, the councilman posted this: “Y’all better pay attention to this climate control, man, this climate manipulation … And that’s a model based off the Rothschilds controlling the climate to create natural disasters they can pay for to own the cities, man. Be careful.” The Jewish community was offended, he met with a group of rabbis and lay leaders, he apologized, and he was sentenced to a visit to the Holocaust Museum. The tour of the museum was ninety minutes long. He left early. Everybody seemed satisfied by his promise to develop “a deeper understanding” of anti-Semitism. It was an admirable pledge. But how satisfied would he and his supporters be by the promise of a white supremacist to develop a deeper understanding of racism? Would the left leave it at that? White was reelected two years later with sixty percent of the vote.

    The sotto voce of the American left about anti-Semitism (there are exceptions) is owed also to its bizarre notion that the Jews are a race — more specifically, that they are white, and so the color of their skin invalidates their claim on empathy and enrolls them permanently in the ranks of the essentially privileged. Anybody who knows anything about Jewish history will acknowledge that this is meretricious nonsense. We come in many colors and no color has protected us. One afternoon I sat with Yehuda Amichai in a hummus joint in the central market in Jerusalem, and as we watched the polychromatic spectacle of the Jewish shoppers he turned to me and said: “Anybody who thinks that the Jews are a race should have some hummus here.”

    Which brings us, inevitably, to Israel. The diffidence of the American left about anti-Semitism is owed mostly to its diffidence about Israel. Well, not diffidence, exactly; hostility. Omar’s and Tlaib’s ugly comments about Jews were extenuated by their supporters as sympathy for the Palestinians. This, it was felt, pardoned their antipathy to — what? Israel? But they were not slandering Israel. They were slandering Jews. Tlaib is a Palestinian American. If you were Palestinian, wouldn’t you have mean things to say about Jews? Is this hard to understand? Actually, it is easy to understand: Jews, too, have been wounded and angry, and political expressions of Jewish rage are befouling Israeli politics and society. No, the Judeophobia of Palestinians is not hard to understand; but it is hard to tolerate. Are some bigotries more acceptable than others? The progressive patience with Palestinian anti-Semitism, like the progressive patience with the ruinous state of Palestinian politics generally, is an insult to the moral intelligence of Palestinians. It is rank Corbynism. A left-wing American Jewish writer, whose commitment to a better world carried him all the way to condemning the campaign against anti-Semitism (or “‘anti-Semitism’”) as “a threat to freedom,” helpfully explained that “Palestinians do not grow more tolerant of Jews when brutalized by a Jewish state.” Of course they don’t. But so what? The Islamophobia of the Israeli right is similarly absolved by reference to Palestinian violence. Or so they think. The misdeeds of the other cannot absolve one of the misdeeds of one’s own. It is not hard-hearted to denounce the racism of victims.

    The defense of criticism of Israeli behavior seems to have become a prohibition against criticism of Palestinian behavior. This, as Salam Fayyad once remarked, is no favor to the Palestinians. (And where exactly are the critics of Israel who are being muzzled? Criticism of Israel, right or wrong, is everywhere; it is the bon ton; a good career move. At least on the campuses, it is pro-Israeli speech that is mortally uncool, that struggles to be heard and even permitted.) Anti-Semitism, if this needs to be repeated, is a grave and primary sin. The occupation of the West Bank is not a sufficient reason to retweet the work of an anti-Semitic cartoonist, which Tlaib and Omar did after they were idiotically banned by the Israeli government from visiting Israel. There is never a sufficient reason to proliferate anti-Semitism. Tlaib’s anti-Zionism may be fueled by her family’s experience, but with her talk of American Jews’ double loyalty (are Israel’s supporters in Congress any more ardent in their support for Israel than she is in her support for Palestine?) and in her “from the river to the sea” language she went beyond anti-Zionism. She confirmed the view of those who believe that anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism.

    So is anti-Zionism the same as anti-Semitism? No, but anti-Semitism helps. If, by anti-Zionism, you mean that the Jews have no right to a state of their own, or are not a people with the same privileges and entitlements as other peoples in the era of nationalism and the nation-state; or that the Jewish state merits greater punishment than other states receive for the same, or greater, abuses and crimes; or that every Jew, and every Israeli Jew, is representative of all Jews and the entirety of the Jewish people, then you cannot be spared the most severe judgement: you are an anti-Semite. Go straight to the Holocaust Museum. Even though Israeli policies in the occupied territories are often indefensible, and even though Israel is partially responsible for the apparently indefinite deferral of a solution to the conflict, thereby preparing the ground for a historical catastrophe, the intensity of the hatred of Israel on this blood-soaked and nauseatingly unjust planet is psychotic — which is to say, it has morphed in many places from criticism into prejudice.

    Maligning Jews will do nothing to improve the lot of the Palestinians. While the history of anti-Semitism should not bar anybody from criticizing Israel, even ferociously, if you are going to criticize Israel, mind the line. (While the history of racism should not bar anybody from criticizing the African American community, even ferociously, if you are going to criticize the black community, mind the line.) I recommend this wariness not to suppress argument but to encourage humaneness. The distinction between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism may seem analytically sound, but this is historically inflamed territory, there have been too many injurious consequences of sloppy thinking, and suspicion is justified. The border between the critique of Israel’s policies and the critique of Israel’s existence has too often been transgressed. And the criticism of Israeli policies is hardly made more persuasive when it is accompanied by hatred — or perhaps it is, in certain quarters and factions. (Though some of us, it should be noted, chastise Israel out of love.)

    In his book Outsiders, the German literary scholar Hans Mayer, a Jewish socialist who fled to France in 1933 and after the war wandered homelessly between the two Germanies, wrote that “whoever attacks Zionism, but by no means wishes to say anything against the Jews, is fooling himself or others. The state of Israel is a Jewish state. Whoever wants to destroy it, avowedly or by means of a policy which cannot but result in its annihilation, is dealing in the anti-Jewish hatred that has been with us since time immemorial.” This, I’m afraid, is the burden that anti-Zionism must bear — its occupational hazard, if you will. The policy of annihilation against which Mayer warns, moreover, need not be violent; there are peaceful ways, demographic and political ways, to erase the Jewish state. The moral onus is on the haters. And, again, if you wish to understand their hatred of Jews, do not study Jews. They are not the anti-Semites. The notion that anything that Israel does is in any way a warrant for anti-Semitism is simply disgusting.  

    Synagogues across America are now giving classes in how to respond to an active shooter. Where on the left is the outrage? Surely this is no less outrageous than the grotesque composition of the Israeli government. Everybody has their favorite victims, of course, but this is nothing to be proud of. The expansion of empathy is the duty of every person and every party, but I know of none who have so far acquitted themselves completely of their duty. This ethical malfeasance is especially embarrassing in universalists. In 1917, in a letter to a friend, Rosa Luxemburg wrote these infamous sentences: “What do you want with this theme of the ‘special suffering of the Jews’? I am just as much concerned with the poor victims on the rubber plantations of Putumayo, the blacks in Africa with whose corpses the Europeans play catch… They resound with me so strongly that I have no special place in my heart for the ghetto. I feel at home in the entire world, wherever there are clouds and birds and human tears.” As it happens, in her political agitation Luxemburg was not as indifferent to anti-Semitism as she boasted here. But what sort of a boast is this?

    There are historical circumstances, I suppose, in which the universal must be most forcefully asserted, and historical circumstances in which the particular must take pride of place — but the goal of all these avowals must be the establishment of an equilibrium among our magnitudes, a truce between our generality and our specificity. We must try to be as moved by the plight of the far as by the plight of the near, by the misfortune of others as by the misfortune of our own. Yet the defense of one’s own is not a mark of smallness. It is not “tribal” to fight for your own existence. It is a sacred obligation and a rudimentary sign of self-respect. Nor does it foreclose “clouds and birds and human tears.” There are universal grounds for the defense of the particular, for the simple reason that there are no victims who are not humans. Indeed, dehumanization is the very condition of victimization. Luxemburg (and her spiritual heirs) never recognized the irony of her position: since one’s own origins are also contained in “the entire world,” the rejection of one’s origins, whatever else it is, is a flaw in one’s universalism. So there are no excuses for any of the orientations. A feral response to anti-Semitism should be a matter of honor, and not only for Jews. Like black lives, Jewish lives matter.

    The Jewish right has been more vocal about the anti-Semitic resurgence, which is admirable, though it teaches that all the anti-Semitism in America is the work of the woke left. Like the Jewish left, the Jewish right is partially right and partially wrong. It appears that nobody has an interest in the whole truth about anti-Semitism, because it is politically and philosophically inconvenient. Yet it should be recalled that the massacre at the Tree of Life was not perpetrated by the ACLU, nor were the attacks at Poway and Colleyville and Kansas City. Jewish Trumpists (the phrase itself is what is known in Judaism as a desecration of God’s name) must reckon with the incontrovertible historical fact that the alt-right, from Steve Bannon in 2016 to the Proud Boys in 2021, along with its white supremacism and its anti-Semitism, was regarded by the forty-fifth president as a political asset, as a part of his base. (His very base base.) At least Omar and Tlaib never killed anybody.

    The problem with the Jewish right’s efforts against anti-Semitism is that they are premised on the assumption that they are the best Jews. This self-congratulation, and its attendant condescension toward Jews who do not think or live as they do, runs through everything they say. (If Orthodox Jewry loved itself any more than it already does, it would violate the commandment against idolatry.) A sterling illustration of this was a piece in The New York Times, excerpted from a best-selling book, by the enterprising Bari Weiss, called “To Fight Anti-Semitism, Be a Proud Jew.” This is high school uplift; I wrote it in high school. It is also somewhat baffling as an analysis of the problem. Are the Hasidic men who are regularly beaten on the streets of New York ashamed of their Jewishness? Or the shuls in New Jersey that hold services under police protection? Weiss, like other Jewish right-wingers, commits the cardinal mistake of explaining anti-Semitism in terms of Jewish behavior. She poses a choice: “Does safety come from contorting ourselves to look more like everybody else? Or does it come from drilling down into the wellspring of what made us special to begin with?” In fact, safety comes from physical bravery and security systems and law enforcement and community discipline and political engagement and the support of government. (And in the Jewish state, an army.) Even Jews who may be wavering in their beliefs and their practices, whose pride may be mixed with ambivalence, even Jewish “nones,” deserve to be safe.

    Weiss contends that there are two arguments about the sources of safety. “The first line of argument insists that safety for Jews comes by accommodating ourselves to the demands of our surrounding society. If we can just show that we are perfect Greeks, patriotic Germans, and so on, then they’d love us.” And patriotic Americans, too? The Jewish right’s equivalence of Americanism and Judaism — to the absurd extent of having persuaded themselves that the American Founders were inspired primarily by Jewish sources — is reminiscent of nothing so much as German Jewry’s equivalence of Deutschtum and Judentum. “To the opposing side,” she continues, “this political and cultural strategy was only a recipe for delayed humiliation and pain. Lasting security for Jews, the counterargument goes, was always saved by leaders and movements, from the Maccabees to the Zionists, that urged us to be our fullest, freest selves — even if doing so made us deeply unpopular and despised.” Never mind that lasting security was precisely not what the Maccabees, or the Hasmoneans, achieved. Weiss has not thought very deeply about assimilation, integration, separation, and appropriation in Jewish history.

    “In these trying times,” the sermon continues, “our best strategy is to build, without shame, a Judaism and a Jewish people and a Jewish state that are not only safe and resilient but also generative, humane, joyful, and life-affirming. A Judaism capable of lighting a fire in every Jewish soul — and in the souls of everyone who throws in his or her lot with ours.” Amen, sister. Such a radiant Jewish civilization should be our objective even in times of perfect security, if there is such a time. But who, in this account, are the Jewish children of light and who are the Jewish children of darkness? The shameful thing about Weiss’ rhapsodic pride is that it holds other Jews responsible for their own imperilment. It repeats the old canard that Jewish self-hatred or Jewish inauthenticity or Jewish assimilation brought anti-Semitism upon us. Thus she taunts those Jews who insist that the “the real problem are those with their kippot.” She thinks they are spineless. This is very nasty. Pride takes many forms, especially in ethnicity-mad America. As far as I know, the young Jewish men who are removing their kippot on various campuses and in various cities are doing so not out of shame but out of fear. Should they be martyred for a yarmulke? (Judaism says not.) They are certainly not like “the Israelite slaves [who] chose to remain in Egypt,” as Weiss obnoxiously describes the millions of American Jews who are less noisy about their heritage than she is.

    Or is the problem really that so many of them do not wear kippot in the first place? But that is an entirely different question, having to do with the rise of secularism, the modern rupture of Judaism into the denominations, and individual freedom. A Jew has a right not to cover his head if a covering does not represent the character of his Jewish identity. The greatest Jewish leaders in modern history, the greatest leaders in Zionist history, were bare-headed heroes. Anyway, anti-Semites do not distinguish between types of Jews, or interest themselves in the dialectics of Jewish identity. For them, we are all the same. They vandalize synagogues and communal institutions of every stripe; they assault Jews with kippot and without kippot, our secular brethren and our religious brethren. We owe solidarity, therefore, to all our brethren. In the Jewish tradition this is called ahavat yisrael, the love of the Jewish people. Many Jews who proclaim it fall short of it; maybe we all do. But do not denounce Jews as a way of defending them. In 1939, in an essay called “When Facing Danger,” one of his profound studies of Jews under pressure, the social psychologist Kurt Lewin wisely observed that “it is not similarity or dissimilarity of individuals that constitutes a group, but interdependence of fate.”

    For Jews, the times are rich in tribulations. Even as we witness the resurgence of anti-Semitism and its sickening role in American politics, we behold also the ascendancy of chauvinism, xenophobia, intolerance, homophobia, Islamophobia, and theocratic hubris in the political success of the new Israeli right. In America, ethno-nationalism was in power for four years, and seeks to return to power; in Israel, it is in power now. I leave for another day the significant matter of ethno-nationalism as a deformation of nationalism, and more specifically of the liberal nationalism that established both the United States and Israel. Here I am more concerned with the descent of the Jewish right into the post-liberal swamp, with its apologetics for the Orbanization of Benjamin Netanyahu and his government, with its miserable indifference to millions of Jews in Israel and the world over. The Jewish right has an ahavat yisrael problem, even if no suggestion could offend it more.

    There is nothing incendiary about my characterization of the Israeli government. All the traits that I have listed are accurate, based on a plain reading of the pronouncements of National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich (who once described himself as “a fascist homophobe”) , and other members of the unholy union of their extremist parties Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) and Religious Zionism, and Deputy Minister Avi Maoz, and a variety of ultra-Orthodox and haredi figures (Sephardi and Ashkenazi), and some Likud hacks, and their leader Benjamin Netanyahu, who has undergone a transformation for the worse, if that was possible. He is exactly as opportunistic and ruthlessly self-aggrandizing as he always was, but he is no longer the “liberal conservative” whose years in America imbued him with a reverence for democratic principles and procedures. Netanyahu has become the patron of intolerance and corruption. He is the king of the rot. The strikingly large demonstrations against his government were provoked by more than partisanship. A kind of shock animated them, a horror beyond politics, a panicked feeling that in his pursuit of office Netanyahu was betraying the foundational values of the state; and also a kind of shame that it has come to this, that there are fascists in the halls of Jewish power. Many Israeli centrists and also some conservatives have participated in the mass indignation. Their objective is to prevent a crisis from becoming a turning point.

    In the view of Elliott Abrams, however, all this was “Jewish hysterics.” Writing in Commentary, Abrams begins by sensitively remarking that the “firebrands” Ben Gvir and Smotrich “have taken many highly incendiary positions. Not only are there doubts and concerns to be expected; opposition to them and criticism of them will be entirely an appropriate feature of the new Israeli political moment.” And having gotten his to-be-sure sentences out of the way, he goes to work. He is angry about the criticism, the “extreme rhetoric and extreme positions,” of American Jews in their strictures against the new Israeli government. These dissents originate, he writes ominously, in “deeper reasons than mere parroting of Israeli voices.” They express “long and deeply held positions.” What are those compromising positions? Be patient. Abrams cites the open letter that three hundred and thirty American rabbis signed declaring that representatives of Ben Gvir’s, Smotrich’s and Maoz’s parties would no longer be welcome in their synagogues, because they “deny our rights, our heritage, and the rights of the most vulnerable among us.” Every one of those allegations is verified by the policy proposals and the contemptuous language of Religious Zionism and Otzmah Yehudit (Jewish Power), the parties of the “firebrands”; but what strikes Abrams about this protest is that “not one Orthodox rabbi signed the petition.” We are getting warmer.

    The issue, in a word, is religion. Abrams disparagingly cites a remarkable essay by Hillel Halkin, one of the most formidable Jewish intellectuals of our day, in which he despairingly broke ranks (a neoconservative specialty in days gone by) with his right-wing Jewish comrades on the question of the new Israeli government, and (these are Halkin’s words about himself) “put [the blame] on Judaism, of whose fantasies and delusions Zionism sought to cure us only to become infected with them itself.” Halkin’s sin is secularism, or loyalty to the spirit in which the state was established. I would not myself dismiss Judaism as “fantasies and delusions,” not at all; but the truth or falsehood of Judaism should have no bearing upon the question of its place in an open Zionist order. Israel was founded as a secular state with freedom of religion. But “Halkin’s line,” Abrams writes, “is simply not a winner in Israeli elections,” in utter indifference to any integrity that Halkin’s Zionism might possess. Not a winner? In a war over identity, the primary consideration should not be expedience. In support of his operative’s view of the situation, Abrams cites Yossi Klein Halevi’s observation that Netanyahu’s voters wished “to save Israel as a Jewish state.” “While a majority of Israeli Jews are committed to maintaining Israel as both a Jewish and democratic state,” Klein Halevi explained, “if forced to choose between them, most would almost certainly opt for its Jewish identity.” (Abrams composed his essay before Klein Halevi came out against the Netanyahu government and implored American Jews to do the same.)

    Now, the only existing threat to the Jewish identity of the Jewish state is the one-state solution. But this is not what Netanyahu and his apologists have in mind when they seek to alarm Jews about the Jewishness of the state. They endorse not only a Jewish state, but a specific kind of Jewish state. “This is the struggle, if you will,” Abrams writes in a particularly imperishable sentence, “between those who go to the beach on Shabbat and those who go to synagogues.” A Kulturkampf in flip-flops! Abrams writes like a truant officer. The splendid pluralism of Israeli Jewish life, the coexistence of beachballs and kiddush cups, is not pleasing to him, just as it has never been pleasing to Israel’s ultra-Orthodox and haredi communities. Like them, he believes that we are witnessing a “Judaism/Zionism debate,” as if it must be one or the other, as if there have not been many interpenetrations of Judaism and Zionism in the years of Israel’s existence and before, as if the possibility that Judaism should have no political connection to Zionism is not worth considering. “Israel’s Jewish identity is the issue,” he writes, “and centrist voters, or voters on the left, must convince their fellow citizens they do not view Judaism and halakha as outmoded tribal customs that should be jettisoned as soon as public opinion permits.”

    Halakha! My blood ran cold when I read that word, and my tefillin are never far from me. Why on earth do Israeli centrists have to say nice things about halakha? It is not the law of the land. Let those who wish to observe Jewish law observe it. Let them build their yeshivas and their shuls and flourish within them, even if their neighbors dislike their way of life. The dislike anyway runs both ways. As far as I can see, nobody is preventing pious Jews from living according to their idea of Jewish piety. If they cannot bear to see other Jews living differently, then they were born two hundred years too late. As for Netanyahu, he has admitted that he fasted on Yom Kippur for the first time in his life before the recent election, thereby placing himself in the long line of Machiavellian conservatives for whom religion is of merely political utility.

    Abrams’ argument is that Israel is changing and that we, American Jews, must accept the changes. Needless to say, the Jewish right has demonstrated no such acquiescence to political facts when an Israeli government has pursued policies of which it disapproves, such as attempting to make peace. Hysterics, indeed. “The 1950s or 1960s Israel of Labor socialism may have resembled the Upper West Side,” Abrams continues,

    but the Israel that is developing before our eyes does not. It is truly a Jewish state, increasingly peopled — and in part now governed — by Jews who believe in the God of the Hebrew Bible and for whom the practice of the religion of Judaism is the most important aspect of their lives. Can American Jews accept this Israel, or will it alienate all but the Orthodox — who practice that same religion?

    Where to begin? For a start, there is no way in which the Upper West Side substantially resembled the Israel of the 1950s and 1960s — nobody made the desert bloom on Broadway; and I hasten to add that in those decades, the Orthodox Jews of Brooklyn, with not a single subscriber to Dissent among them, learned to admire the sun-tanned, beach-going, Torah-neglecting, collectivist Jews in Israel. Moreover, there is no reason to fear that, on the dark day when Hezbollah unleashes its arsenal of missiles on Tel Aviv, Israel will find American Jewish support only in the Orthodox community. (Abrams knows this.) But it is rattling to infer that in 1967 and in 1973, and in all of Israel’s campaigns in its defense, what was being defended was a deficient Jewish state, not “truly a Jewish state.” Where in the founding documents of Israel was it decreed that the Jewishness of the Jewish state was to be defined religiously? Zionism, again, is compatible with all kinds of Jewishnesses, religious and secular, because it defines the Jews as a people or a nation. Its capaciousness was one of the secrets of its success (though its spirit of welcome sometimes disappeared when Jews of non-European origin found refuge in the state).

    Abrams defines Israel’s Jewishness in terms of Judaism, which is bad enough. What is worse is that he defines it in terms of only a part, a small part, of Judaism. In his sectarian way, he cares only about Orthodox Jews; and his essay is an extended insult to all the Conservative and Reform Jews in America whose support for Israel, even when they criticize it, is beyond reproach. An insult, that is, to the overwhelming majority of American Jews. According to the Pew survey in 2020, Orthodox Jews comprised nine percent of American Jewish adults, and seventeen percent of Jews between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine identify as Orthodox. The fecundity of the Orthodox community is enormous, and mazel tov to them all, so let us for the sake of argument double the Pew figures and say that the Orthodox represent twenty percent of the American Jewish community. Is Abrams prepared, like Netanyahu’s government and like the haredim, to write off three quarters or so of his community? This is what I mean by an ahavat yisrael problem. Or does he not even regard them as his community? But they are our brothers and our sisters! They, too, deserve to be recognized as “Jews who believe in the God of the Hebrew Bible and for whom the practice of the religion of Judaism is the most important aspect of their lives,” because the defining feature of modern Judaism, like it or not, is that there is more than one way to believe in that God and to practice that religion. I confess that I have my own qualms about the spiritual and intellectual quality of some of the Conservative and Reform congregations that I have visited, but I do not have the temerity to expel them, on those grounds or on any grounds, from my conception of my people. 

    There is freedom of religion in Israel, but there is not freedom of Jewish religion. American Jews, Abrams remarks, “denounce restrictions on non-Orthodox worship that most Israeli Jews find to be second-tier issues at most.” When did questions of rights come to be decided by polls? Most Israelis find the Palestinian question, too, to be a second-tier issue, but it is not an act of friendship to encourage them in that delusion. Abrams says that “if one thinks of the leaders of major American Jewish organizations, and of the Reform, Conservative, and Reconstructionist rabbinate, is there any question which coalition they favored in the Israeli election — the one led by Lapid or the one led by Netanyahu?” But there is no mystery here. The coalition led by Lapid treated Reform, Conservative, and Reconstructionist Jews with dignity and the coalition led by Netanyahu did not. Do the Orthodox, too, not support Israeli parties that look favorably upon them? Or is everything they do for the sake of heaven? Their enforcer is the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, the most poisonous institution in contemporary Jewish life, which years ago was taken over by the least enlightened and least humane elements in the Israeli ultra-Orthodox community. The Chief Rabbinate was not created by God at Sinai. It was created in 1920 by an ordinance of the British Mandatory authorities in Palestine. It is a pontifical office in a religion that has no pope. The basis of its authority is not halakhic but political. It is an engine of exclusion, a pitiless enemy of Jewish unity. Why should Reform, Constructive, and Reconstructionist Jews passively accept its rulings, or the contempt that its political supporters have shown for them? And why should the state endorse halakhic notions of identity and membership? Was the state created by God at Sinai, or by His sages?

    The most disturbing sentence in Abrams’ diatribe is this one: “It is an obvious principle to American Jews that all people should be treated alike, while most Israelis would find it simple madness to apply that principle to Israelis and Palestinians.” If that is so, it is an occasion for sorrow; but I detect no sorrow in Abrams’ words. Make the appropriate translations and you will have the worldview of Donald Trump, in whose administration Abrams served. As for “most Israelis”: both blocs in the recent election emerged with 49.5 percent of the vote. Since the Lapid bloc included also Arab votes, it seems correct to say that a plurality of Jews supported the Netanyahu bloc, but this was hardly a mandate-conferring majority. A fight is on. And it is a fight over first principles. The anti-democratic view to which Abrams would have us accommodate ourselves represents nothing less than a rejection of the Israeli Declaration of Independence, which was a milestone in the reconciliation of the universal and the particular, and one of the glories of modernity. This is Article 13: “[The State of Israel] will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture.” Could it be more ringing?

    From a fine recent study of the historical and philosophical origins of the document by Neil Rogachevsky and Dov Sigler, I learn that its first drafter relied heavily on the American Declaration of Independence and the English Bill of Rights, and that it was Ben Gurion himself who, at the last minute, added the word “sex” to that wondrous inventory of rights. The Zionist founders were serious about democracy. (The Zionist state has practiced it imperfectly.) And along comes Abrams to tell us that most Israelis care more about security than about human rights, and that’s that. When governments in other countries adopt an anti-democratic ethos, when other peoples turn against liberalism and its ideal of equality, we — many American Jews — Commentary too, I believe — assail them and wage a war of ideas. Why should Israel be different? The Torah and the Talmud are full of injunctions to reprove and remonstrate with your own kind.

    But now some of the same American Jewish patriots who are hoarse with proud reminders that on the Liberty Bell there appears a verse from Leviticus — “proclaim liberty throughout the land unto all the inhabitants thereof” — these same people, Zionists all, appear to deny the relevance of this verse, this Hebrew verse, to the state of the people whose ancestors introduced its idea to the world. And appeals to security will not settle the matter, because it has been one of the controlling assumptions of the Jewish state since its inception that there should be no contradiction between safety and justice. The Declaration of Independence championed human rights in 1948, at the hour of Israel’s greatest vulnerability. The imminent invasion of seven Arab armies did not impede or impair its liberalism. Nor did its political liberalism abridge its national pride, or its proclamation of natural rights mitigate its proclamation of historical rights. In this way the Declaration of Independence, with its weak religiosity, was ironically consistent with a remarkable legacy of the Jews in exile: they never used their adversity as an alibi for a relaxation of their own ethical standards for themselves. The enmity that surrounded them was never taken up as an excuse for laxness about right and wrong.

    The opposition to Netanyahu’s shameful government is an expression of that old ideal of Jewish self-rigor in times of crisis. Abrams, by contrast, prefers that we make exceptions for ourselves. And finally he resorts to the cheapest argument of all. American Jews, he scolds, “do not live with the threats to safety and even life that face Israelis.” But neither does he! What if he is wrong, and the incitements of Ben Gvir and Smotrich, and the settler vigilantism that they have already provoked, lead to an intifada, and the Iranians instruct Hezbollah to launch? What if he is wrong, and the Netanyahu government enacts a revision of the Law of Return under the guidance of the ultra-Orthodox rabbinical establishment, so that Jews in flight from persecution will not be admitted into the country and Zionism will be thereby vanquished? What if he is wrong, and the judicial reform that Netanyahu seeks (and not exactly for reasons of philosophy) leaves Israel — a state without a constitution or a bicameral legislature or a federal system — with even fewer checks and balances than it already has, and at the mercy of executive power and even of authoritarian rule? None of these bleak scenarios are implausible, and if they come to pass Abrams will not be there to experience the consequences of his erroneous views. Which is not say, of course, that he should silence himself. It is to say only that he should desist from intimidating people with other opinions by suggesting that they are playing fast and loose with Jewish lives. Insofar as any of our opinions will be responsible for outcomes in Israel, we all run this risk. How, really, could he, or anyone in the American Jewish community, be silent? We criticize Russia when we do not live in Russia; we criticize China when we do not live in China; we criticize Venezuela when we do not live in Venezuela; but we criticize Israel, as Abrams too has done, even though we do not live there, because we are mingled with it, because we share a peoplehood with it, because our hearts easily defy our distance from it, because (as Kurt Lewin said) we are interdependent in fate.

    As with the great debate about America, there is nothing wrong with the great debate about Israel that would not be somewhat ameliorated if everybody were to locate their discomfort zones and learn to exist within them. Discomfort zones are the detox centers of identity. They cripple sectarian politics. They shake the walls. They introduce a therapeutic awareness of complexity and an invigorating sense of humility about the overwhelming reality of other people and their perspectives. They are the antithesis of anxiety, because they quicken. If the Jewish left and the Jewish right could only find their discomfort zones, if they could be made to feel uncomfortable about their smugness and their settledness, we might all be more comfortable, and therefore more courageous, in rising together to meet yet another century that will not leave the Jews alone.

     

     

     

    Epistemological Panic, or Thinking for Yourself

    I have been a college teacher for some of the happiest years of my life. When I tell people what I do for a living, what I really do, I say I teach people to think for themselves. It’s still a wonderful way to make a living, but over time I have begun wondering whether I have been fooling myself. I could just be teaching them to think like me, or how to package the conventional wisdoms that they have scraped off the Internet. I find myself wondering, therefore, what it really means to think for yourself, what it means for teachers, for students, and for a society that tells itself it is free.

    Thinking for yourself has never been easy, but the question of whether it is still possible at all is of some moment. The key ideals of liberal democracy — moral independence and intellectual autonomy — depend on it, and my students will not have much experience of either if they end up living in a culture where all of their political and cultural opinions must express tribal allegiance to one of two partisan alternatives; where they live in communities so segregated by education, class, and race that they never encounter a challenge to their tribe’s received ideas, or in a society where the wells of information are so polluted that pretty well everything they read is “fake news.” 

    Thinking for yourself need not require every thought to be yours and yours alone. Originality is not the goal, but the autonomous and authentic choice of your deepest convictions certainly is, and you are unlikely to make authentic choices of belief unless you can learn to wrestle free from the call of the tribe and the peddlers of disinformation and reach that moment of stillness when you actually can ascertain what you think.

    The contradiction that teachers face in their classrooms — are we teaching them how to think or how to think like us? — plays out across our whole society. From grade school through graduate school, in our corporate training centers, in our government departments, our enormous educational apparatus is engaged in training us in the ways of thinking appropriate to academic disciplines, corporate cultures, and administrative systems, but with the ultimate objective, so they proclaim, of independent thought. This contradiction – the simultaneous pursuit of conformity and independence — is also at the core of our anxiety about innovation. Our societies say that they prize “thinking outside the box,” whatever the box may be. Our political authorities tell us that the solution to every problem we face — secular stagnation, climate change, geostrategic chaos — depends on “innovation,” which in turn depends, finally, on somebody somewhere thinking beyond the cliches and the conventions that inundate us daily and keeps us locked in a state of busy mental stagnation. 

    Our culture tells us we either innovate or we die, but economists such as Robert Gordon point out that the capitalist economy of the twenty-first century has nothing on the horizon to rival the stochastic lurch of innovation in the Edison and Ford eras at the beginning of the twentieth century. The energy transition, when it finally comes, may yet unlock a new stochastic lurch, but so far progress is slow. Despite these warning signs of stagnation — even decadence, as some conservatives argue — our culture clings to the signs of innovation that we can identify, even to minor upgrades to the software on our phones, because such hope as we have for our future depends on faith that the onward and upward path of new ideas continues. But this hope soon collides directly with the unprecedentedly large pressures for conformity that are generated by those same institutions of innovation. The Pharaonic size of the corporations that control the digital economy raises not just a problem of monopoly or distributive justice, but also an epistemological quandary: are Google, Microsoft, and Facebook, these all-devouring machines, actually places where people can think for themselves? I refer not only to their customers but also to their employees. Is it likely that their well-compensated and disciplined workers can think against the grain of the corporate logic that they serve every day? If not, we may all be on the long way down to secular decline. An institution of innovation may be a contradiction in terms.

    The same question haunts the universities in which I have spent some of my life teaching. Every one of these institutions is devoted to what it calls “academic freedom,” but how much freedom do these institutions, their disciplines, their promotion and recruitment processes, their incentives, their intellectual fashions, actually make possible for the individuals inside them? Are they hives of orthodoxy or heterodoxy? Does the competitive search to publish, to earn grants, to make an impression on the public, create a genuine climate of intellectual liberty or just enclose everyone, willingly or not, in an organized, pious, censorious, progressive conformity? That is not a trick question.

    The academic fields in which I work — history and international relations — demand new thinking because the world that they study, and for which they train aspiring practitioners of diplomacy and finance and politics, is changing fast, yet it is unclear that any of us have the measure of the moment. To use the metaphor that everybody is using, we are observing a shift in the tectonic plates, a fracturing of what used to be called “the liberal world order.” Not a day passes without someone offering a new grand narrative to replace the stories that we told ourselves to make sense of the end of the Cold War. But each new claimant fades away, defeated by the complexity of the task; and in some cases, it may be the affirmation of the old wisdom that is a sign of intellectual independence. We are living in a dark cloud of crises — climate change, war, global inequality, economic turbulence, social intolerance — and nothing matters more than that we think freshly and clearly. 

    Recently, as the gloom has deepened further, our rounding up of the usual suspects — the incompetence of our leaders, the savage swamp that is the internet, the frantic polarization of politics — has given way to a kind of chronic epistemological unease, as if we have begun to realize that we have trapped ourselves inside frames of thought that point us away from reality and not towards it. The trouble is that too many people find comfort and safety in those frames and resist the instability — another term for open-mindedness — that results from questioning them.

    But sometimes there are exceptions to the retreat into platitudes. Let me give an example. I sit in on regular team calls by a company that advises major business clients on geostrategic risk. Everyone on the call is impressively well-educated and articulate and plugged into impressive information networks. Someone on the call has just returned from a highly regarded conference of experts. Others have just had confidential discussions with a government minister or a well-placed adviser. The calls review the world’s unending torrent of bad news — Ukraine, China-Taiwan, the climate change inferno in the Mediterranean and California, the repeal of Roe v. Wade — and all this calamitous news is parsed by knowledgeable principals and then packaged for the clients and “monetized” for the company.

    The calls are wonderfully informative, as well as scary. What is scary is the fear that this superbly informed group might be unable to see what may be staring us all in the face. On one such call, the CEO of the firm, after listening to an hour’s review of the US-China standoff on Taiwan in the wake of Nancy Pelosi’s visit, asked his team the right question: with all this privileged information, weren’t they just recycling what all the other shapers of elite opinion — The New York Times, Project Syndicate, The Economist, Le Monde, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the CIA, the State Department, the West Wing, and competing risk assessment firms — were also thinking? What are we missing? he asked. What are we not seeing?

    These are the right questions, and not just for his firm. Advanced opinion tends to run in herds, exactly like unadvanced opinion. It is increasingly useless. Epistemological panic — the queasy feeling that our time has jumped the tracks — has created a hectic search to create a new master narrative, a new single explanation, a new key to all mythologies. (How else explain the success of Yuval Noah Harari?) This frantic search to give our time a shape and a meaning makes me wonder whether the new technologies that so accelerate the exchange of information are in fact having a spectacularly ironic effect: instead of incubating new ideas, they are coagulating conformity. As a result, might our information elites just be sleepwalking their way towards the abyss, like our ancestors in 1914? But even this analogy to the sleepwalkers of 1914 is a little shopworn, another sign that I am no less trapped in my paradigms than anyone else.

    From the classroom to the engineering lab to the national security conclave to the geostrategic risk business, our future depends on our capacity to think anew. While thinking in a group can help, groupthink is the enemy of integrity and innovation. A truly new thought begins in a single insurgent mind. 

    Do we live in societies where such people are allowed to flourish? Do any of us actually still know what it means to think for ourselves? Or are we all just recycling opinion on our hectoring devices? It would not be right or good, at this late stage in the life of liberal democracies, to conclude that we live, despite our vaunted freedoms, in a state of unfreedom. The situation is more paradoxical than that. The paradox — Tocqueville and Mill warned us of it — is that free institutions do not create free minds. It is always possible that our institutional freedoms might still leave us chained in a state of epistemological unfreedom. So how, beyond re-reading Tocqueville on the tyranny of the majority and Mill on liberty, do we think about the obstacles to free thinking in our own day?

    For a start, we are confused about what thinking is. To think is not to process information. We have impoverished our understanding of thinking by analogizing it to what our machines do. What we do is not processing. It is not computation. It is not data analysis. It is a distinctively, incorrigibly human activity that is a complex combination of conscious and unconscious, rational and intuitive, logical and emotional reflection. It is so complex that neither neurologists nor philosophers have found a way to model it, and the engineers of artificial intelligence are still struggling to replicate some of the simplest forms of pattern recognition that human cognition does so effortlessly. We must beware that in our attempt to make computers think like us we do not end up thinking like them.

    Nor is thinking a matter of expressing yourself or having opinions. It is not about turning on the fountain of our personality. It is an exercise in finding reasons to persuade yourself and others that something is true, or at least plausibly true. Thinking has truth as its goal and its organizing discipline. Bullshitters, as Harry Frankfurt told us, are precisely those who do not think: they simply express what comes into their minds, without concerning themselves with whether what they are saying has any relation to reality. Every university is, or should be, properly worried that their classrooms are training generation after generation of accredited bullshitters.

    Nor is thinking about expressing your identity. It is not an intellectual achievement to parrot the truisms of your tribes. Indeed, thinking is about emancipating yourself from identity, insofar as it throws into question prior and unexamined ideas. Identity is a warm bath, but thinking is a discipline. Many important lines of thought are austerely impersonal, purged of the origins of those who thought them up. Think of mathematics, physics, and logic. These are great systems of thought made possible by thinkers who in the laboratory and the library neutralized or discarded their identities and lived, in their working lives, in the impersonal realm of signs and symbols. It doesn’t matter that perfect objectivity is impossible; imperfect objectivity, the progressive correction of biases, is certainly possible, and all that we need. Even in the social sciences, it is basic to our methods that we try to leave our personal “priors,” experiences, and histories behind, or in some way to bracket them, so as to see what the data tells us. In this work, thinking means leaving ourselves behind.

    In deep ways race, ethnicity, class, and gender do structure our thoughts, but they do not have to imprison them, and we certainly should not celebrate the intellectual limitations that they impose upon us. Thinking is communicative action, and the fact that we can communicate to each other across the limits imposed by our particularities is proof that we are capable not only of thinking for ourselves, but thinking about how other people, very different from us, might see the world. Thinking is therefore reflective about thought: we need to grasp how these factors of biology and sociology condition our understanding, so that we may, for the purpose of analyzing a subject and understanding it truthfully, neutralize those conditions. Lots of other animals engage in conceptual operations, but we are the only animals who have thoughts about our thoughts. Thinking, properly speaking, turns back upon itself. It is the attempt to understand how we end up thinking the way we do, and what we can do to transcend the boundaries set up by our identities. 

    One of the most important modern ideas about thinking is the recognition of the intellectual advantage conferred upon us all by social and cultural diversity. The best way to think through and beyond your own identity is to be in communication with other identities, different from your own, and to realize, as you interact, how their identities shape what they think. In realizing this, you realize something about yourself. Yet thinking is emphatically not about reproducing yourself, over and over, and confirming your starting point, as a male, female, white, black, rich, or poor person. That is not thinking. It is what Freud called repetition compulsion.

    Thinking can take us to a lonely place, where skill, technique, experience, even will power, sometimes are of no avail, where, to make progress at all, we have to step away and wait until a new path suggests itself. We can get better at thinking, to be sure, but there is always going to be someone who thinks better than we do. This is another reason why we are not like machines. They all compute the same way, while each of us is differently endowed. It is when we see others thinking, and so often more clearly, that we discover, once again, just how difficult it is, and also just how much it defines us, to think for ourselves.

    Not all cultures and periods of history have made this goal the basis of their society. Chinese mandarin education, under the emperors, was formidably egalitarian and proved to be a crucial avenue of mobility and elite renewal for a traditional society, but thinking for yourself was not its goal. Its purpose was to train bureaucrats in the routines and the skills required to administer an empire. The Greek city-states of the ancient world, the Roman imperial regimes, the medieval Christian states, and the Islamic empires, though they were all the settings of intellectual breakthroughs, all feared what would happen if women, or slaves, or the poor were allowed to think for themselves. They understood, quite rightly, that adopting such a principle — recognizing the essentially egalitarian and meritocratic nature of genuine thought — would be playing with fire, likely to blow apart systems of rank order and privilege. Perhaps only Western culture, and only since the Protestant Reformation, has embarked on the dangerous experiment of believing that everyone, literally everyone, is entitled to think for themselves, and entitled, furthermore, to that once exclusive privilege of male elites, the right to an examined life.

    To manage this revolutionary adventure, Western authorities took education away from the church in the eighteenth century and made a massive bet on secular learning, first by private charity, then by the state. As an English government minister said in the 1870’s, introducing an education bill, that “we must educate our masters.” The hope was that education would canalize the combustible thoughts of the newly enfranchised (male) masses into sober conformity. Education ever since has sought to manage the contradiction between what a free society preaches about the right to think for yourself and the lessons it needs to instill to maintain bourgeois stability.

    All of us have lived through that contradiction, first as pupils in primary school. Schools do teach you how to think and they do it (or they used to do it within living memory) by dint of repetition, boring exercises, lines written in a notebook, raps on your knuckles when your penmanship wobbles. Later, in college, you begin learning a discipline, and the experience shapes your thoughts ever after. No originality then, no thoughts you can call your own, before first learning how to think from someone else. Your thoughts do remain in that magnetic field of your primary and secondary education for your entire life. Looking back, once education is over, we can see just how halting and foolish our first steps into knowledge truly were. I still have a battered paperback of The Birth of Tragedy on my shelf, the same edition I first read fifty years ago in college, and I squirm when I re-read my marginal notations. Thinking for yourself is a humbling encounter with your own foolishness.

     One thing you learn, as you grow, is that you don’t have to think everything through to first principles; you don’t have to master everything. We cannot rely on ourselves for our understanding of astrophysics and medieval art and macroeconomics; we must rely on authorities. But we can arrive at strict standards for what counts as authority and choose to trust people who are in a position to know. A lot of what teachers do, when we try to get people to think for themselves, is to mark out, as best we can, the terrain of knowledge where relatively secure answers have been found and can be trusted.

     Learning to trust a discipline and the knowledge it has certified as true is the starting point for any venture into thinking for yourself. Most of what you know you take off the peg, like a suit or a shirt you buy in a store, or the furniture you get from IKEA. College is like an IKEA store. It does not include assembly. In the lecture hall, the concepts are delivered boxed and flat-packed. You take them back to your room, and with the Allen wrenches that the professors have given you, you put together the furniture to fill the rooms of your mind. No surprise, then, if your mind starts looking like everyone else’s. 

    This creates what Harold Bloom famously called the anxiety of influence, the sense of being derivative, the worry that you are not speaking your own truth but being spoken by the various discourses that you have assembled for yourself. There is even the anxiety that there is nothing left for you to say. “Born originals,” the eighteenth-century poet Edward Young wrote, “how comes it to pass that we die Copies?” You want to think for yourself because you want to be somebody. Thinking is how you create, over time, the feeling that you exist as a distinct individual.

    But originality, again, is not the objective of thinking. Bloom was writing about poets, and more generally about artists, for whom originality matters deeply, but the point of thinking is to say something true, not something new. Originality is not the only marker of individuality. Novelty cannot vouch for the truth of a proposition. And the obsession with originality eventually leads us to admire contrarianism — or as it is more accurately known, sheer contrarianism — which is a contentless and purely theatrical position, determined by no higher ambition than to say what is not being said, and thereby to draw attention to oneself. Sometimes a consensus is right and sometimes it is wrong; if you have thought the subject through and arrived at your own reasons to concur with others about it, then you have not surrendered your intellectual integrity; but a contrarian is just a reverse weathervane. The point is not to think originally but to think critically. 

    You free yourself from the anxiety of influence first by learning a discipline and then by casting a skeptical eye on the discourses that it seeks to make canonical. In my undergraduate and graduate education, spanning the 1960s and 1970s, discourses blew regularly through the campus, sweeping all right-thinking people into their clouds of abstraction. First it was Marxism, then structuralism, then post-structuralism, then discourse analysis. I forget the rest of them. They created fashions in thought and fashionable thinkers, lots of them French or German. Cliques arose in which the confident deployment of a certain jargon was the test of entry. Fifty years later many of these discourses seem comic or irrelevant, but at the time they were exciting and predominant, a mighty source of academic power and legitimation, and their successors today are no different, with the same unhappy consequences for freedom of thought.

    In evaluating the currently fashionable strictures on what can and cannot be said on campus, I find myself reaching back to my graduate education and remembering how the ascendant discourses liberated me only to suffocate me later. As a trainee historian, I was enthralled by the young “humanist” Marx of 1843-1844, and the Marxist historians of the British school, Eric Hobsbawm and E. P. Thompson. For a time, these brilliant Communists and ex-Communists were my maîtres à penser, even though I never ceased being a stone-age Cold War liberal. All apprentices need masters. Then there comes a moment, essential to any free and mature intellectual life, when apprentices need to break free.

    Intellectual independence always begins with a small act of rebellion. In the middle of reading a book, or during an experiment, or pondering the numbers spewing out onto your computer screen, you suddenly have a suspicion that something isn’t right, though you are not sure what. This is the decisive moment, when you have a choice to ignore this flickering unease or to begin to wonder why. Once this epistemological disquiet takes possession, the question becomes what you are prepared to put at risk to resolve it. There is always an element of oedipal struggle in any commitment to think for yourself — a moment when you break with a supervisor, an intellectual idol, a close friend. If the revolt succeeds in giving you your freedom, it leaves behind a lifelong watchfulness, a skepticism about authoritative academic (and non-academic) rhetoric and the prestige of maîtres à penser. At the end of this journey, you may end up feeling, like those radical Protestant sectarians of the sixteenth century, that you have earned the right to sola Scriptura, to read and interpret the holy scriptures for yourself, without the mediation of dogmatic authority.

    Here is where the individualism of modern liberal culture, derided equally on the right and the left, is so critical for the creation of free thought. For there must be a moment when a thought fails to convince you even when it appears to convince everyone else, or when you are alone with a thought that doesn’t seem to be occurring to anyone else. The communitarians would have you question this experience of independent reflection and wonder nervously whether heresy or apostasy is on the horizon. For some communitarians, other minds are more real than their own. But this is a fiction: like the specificity of your body, the specificity of your mind is evidence of your individuation.

    Yet it is always a struggle. Someone else is always quicker, cleverer, has read the book that you did not, seems to grasp things that you fumble for. So thinking for yourself quickly becomes a competition to think as quickly and as smartly as the others. Competing with others, you discover, is how you become like them, not how you distinguish yourself from them. Catching up is not an intellectual activity. So you begin to separate from the pack, from the people you eat with and go to the movies with. You choose solitude and study. You set yourself the task of mastering a book, a theory, a disciplinary approach, anything that will give you the sense that you have mastered what is necessary for serious thought about a subject, and so can rely, not completely but sufficiently, upon your own resources. When you have gained mastery, at least to your satisfaction, this gives you the confidence to go on, and you need confidence because everyone around you seems to be ahead of you. You discover that you have your own pace, your mind’s own tempo. As for those canonical books on the shelves, their authors remain in another league: austere, elegant, relentless, eternal; and thinking for yourself means respect for the canon, for the very few eternal works that set the standard for thought itself. But if the canon teaches anything, it is that you must not become enslaved to it, or anything else, only because it is venerable. 

    What you think about hoovers up the entirety of your waking and sleeping life, the eternal and canonical as well as the transitory and foolish. You work on the promiscuous stream of your own consciousness — memories, jokes, phrases, shameful incidents that will not go away, epiphanies that had better not go away, the babble of social media, the unending tide of information that sluices in and out of your machines, the data you collect and that collects you, the books you read and annotate. None of this stream counts as thought itself, and none of the processing of information counts as thinking. Actual thinking comes later, when the moment arrives to put order in the house.

    As I have aged, my own mind, originally furnished by Ikea, has gradually become more like those photographs of Picasso’s studio: palettes, brushes, sketchbooks, dusty photos, abandoned sculptures, paint tubes, knives, African heads, all lying around in an order that only he could understand. So thinking for me became an exercise in trying to remember where I put something in the studio of my mind, where I heard something, read something, since suddenly I seemed to understand what use to put to it. There must be orderly minds whose upstairs rooms are like an office, with filing cabinets, and books and manuals arranged in alphabetical order, affording instantaneous ease of access. Good luck to them. But thinking emerges from chaotic minds as well as orderly ones. What both have in common is tenacity, going on and on, when everyone else has turned out the light and turned in.

    When you have found an idea that is properly your own, you come back to yourself with a feeling of surprised discovery. You have revealed yourself, for the pleasure and satisfaction of it, surely, but also because you think it might make a difference, change somebody else’s mind, “contribute to the literature,” and so on. Many of the motives that draw you to an act of thought are extrinsic — like trying to impress, to get tenure, to make your mark; and extrinsic motives will lead your thought into certain grooves to meet certain expectations. Thinking guided only by extrinsic motives runs the risk of being captured by the institutions, the authorities, and the celebrities you want to impress. 

    Yet there is also a kind of thinking for yourself where you feel compelled to do it, intrinsically, for its own sake. The experience is of being taken possession by a thought. This is certainly the most perplexing, frightening, and pleasurable kind. For it feels like the idea is thinking you, thinking itself into being, inside your head. You go to sleep thinking about it; you dream about it; when you wake, you see some new element you want to explore; everything is murky, struggling to rise into consciousness, to get itself fixed in language, so that you can begin to understand what the idea is trying to say. The unconscious aspect of thinking is uncanny and suggests that part of what makes thinking for yourself so difficult is that it is never an entirely rational or conscious process, even when it prides itself on being so, but instead a thick and murky and subliminal experience, in which reason is never all there is, highly emotional, highly unstable, impossible to predict, difficult to control, and finally very hard to put down on the page. 

    Thinking a new thought can feel like a moment of self-expression, but it is actually a moment of self-distanciation in which, having searched your mind and memories for materials, you suddenly see that you can create something new from the materials that you had taken for granted. Thinking can feel like a surprise, in which you awake to what was in you, until then unsuspected and unrevealed.

    Thinking for yourself is not solipsism, a perfectly isolated and self-confirming activity that occurs only inside your head. It is social: you work within force fields of thoughts and ideas created by others, and good thinkers are often, though not always, generous ones, quick to acknowledge others and their dependence upon them. Since dependence creates anxiety, a worry about being derivative, the only way out of this worry is to gratefully acknowledge your dependence and then make sure to take the thought further than where you found it. From dependence on the thoughts and insights of others, you gain confidence in your own way of thinking. 

    With that confidence comes a responsibility to the field in which you work, a responsibility to your own reputation as a serious person who doesn’t play around with the facts. Thinking for yourself means taking responsibility for your thoughts when they enter public discourse. Fools are people who say the first thing that pops into their heads. (That is the deep problem with the spontaneity of social media; a person’s first thoughts are never his best thoughts.) Even bigger fools claim an originality that they do not deserve. The biggest fools of all think that everything they think is their own invention. Self-congratulation is never the hallmark of a real thinker. Instead, thinking people have a morality of knowledge: they accept the obligation to back up what they say with evidence, facts, footnotes, citations, and acknowledgement of where they got their ideas from; with a rigor of argument and an analytical care about concepts. They lose sleep about error and misinterpretation.

    In our thinking about thinking, we rarely pay enough attention to its ethical frames of responsibility to self, to method and discipline, to truth itself. Nor do we pay enough attention to its psychic requirements, to the kind of character that is needed to be a good thinker. The qualities that make a good thinker are not the same as make a good citizen. Civility and politeness are all very well in society at large. Good manners are a lovely attribute, but in intellectual life the instinct to be nice and to be liked can be fatal. Rigorous thinking must be followed wherever it leads. The unpleasantness of controversy is inevitable. Everybody cannot be right. This is yet another instance where the ethos that liberal democracy encourages — civility, deliberation, compromise — is in radical contradiction with the intransigence proper to scientific and humanistic discovery. In politics, in ordinary life, compromise is good, even necessary. In reasoning and research, by contrast, you must be a fighter, tenacious, persistent, stubborn in your insistence that someone’s argument is wrong and yours is closer to the truth that you are both pursuing. 

    Thinking for yourself also means honesty in defeat. It is hard for competitors in intellectual fields to admit when they are wrong, when the data fails to prove their point, when they cannot find a way to rebut someone’s devastating rebuttal. Thinking for yourself demands a difficult kind of honesty, a willingness to concede defeat when the evidence is against you, and enough resilience to resume the search for the answer that still eludes you. And these conditions for honest and public disputation are not only traits of thought but also traits of character. Liars, even brilliant ones, are useless to thinking.

     Liberal societies need this kind of character and this way of being, but it works against many liberal values: compromise, perfect reasonableness, the search for social accord, the desire to be liked and thought well of. There is something intransigently solitary about thinking for yourself, and a liberal society should want to encourage a temperament that is strong enough to endure solitude, contradiction, unpopularity, standing up for yourself against the tide of opinion. As Tocqueville and Mill, our greatest psychologists of liberal society, saw long ago, a society like ours that lives by and for progress and innovation cannot survive without protecting and fostering this type of intransigently individualistic character. 

    If thinking for yourself is the goal of your life, then it pays to maintain a certain distance from the institutions in which you work and live. Distance implies wariness about received opinion, about fashions, about the recurring tides of certainty and urgency that course through the places where we work and soon have us all facing the same way, thinking the same thing. The larger point is about liberal society: if thinking for yourself is your goal, do not go looking for the comfort of belonging or the certitude of faith. Do not expect a free society to provide these for you. Belonging is not the fondest dream of a serious intellectual. She dreams of other satisfactions first.

    Liberal society works best — it is most productive as well as most free—when its members all feel a certain alienation, a certain dividedness about the objectives and the values of the institutions inside which they work. Alienation is another term for distance and detachment; it need not be melodramatic or wounding. It is simply one of the epistemological conditions for a working mind, and for the pleasures of its work. Objectivity is a variety of alienation. Who would trust the views of a thinker who is not to some degree alienated – that is, detached – from her subject? One of the very first scientific societies in the world, the Royal Society, founded in 1661 by the likes of Isaac Newton and Christopher Wren, took as its motto: Nullius in Verba. Take Nobody’s Word for it. Imagine: the greatest scientists of their time set up an organization to promote scientific thinking, and their working rule was not even to take each other’s word for the truth. That is an ideal of truth that is also an ideal about institutions: to give us a place not to belong and imbibe the pieties of a tribe, but where we take nobody’s word for it.

    In case you were wondering, I doubt that I have myself measured up to these standards. I have lived in an orthogonal relation to the liberal institutions that have made my life possible: in academic life but not of it, in the commentariat but not of it, and so on, but whether this has enabled a genuine independence of mind, I cannot say, and in my own reckoning I come up short. So my strictures here are not an exercise in coyly concealed self-congratulation, so much as an effort to describe an ideal and to recommit myself to it in the classes that I teach.

    The larger question, beyond the type of intransigent individual that we want a liberal society to nurture and to protect, is how to manage the contradiction, at the heart of our institutions, between teaching people how to think and teaching them to think for themselves. This is an old contradiction, of course, but we need to understand how new conditions in the twenty-first century have sharpened it. Briefly, the answer is this: no society before ours has ever been so dependent for its economic progress and cultural self-understanding on knowledge. An entire literature — “post-industrial,” “knowledge is power,” “the information society,” “symbolic analysts” — has established this epochal difference. In such an order, the creators of knowledge possess enormous power; and we can measure it not least by the extraordinary financial returns that patented inventions, best-selling books, movies and TV shows, apps and other knowledge products earn for those who devise them.

    Having monetized the products of thinking in hugely valuable forms of intellectual property, corporations, governments, universities, and some especially successful individuals face the dilemma of how to institutionalize their creativity. The owners of ideas, whether they are individuals or corporations, have powerful new algorithms at their disposal, enabling them to canalize innovative ideas into opportunities for profit, market share, influence, and power. The new technologies have accelerated the concentration of economic and intellectual power in a handful of monstrously large corporations that run the Internet and thereby set the standards for university culture and learning world-wide. The issue hanging over all of this is whether new technologies for discovering and aggregating preferences in ideas helps or hinders the impulse — thinking for yourself — that drives the entirety of our society’s capacity to innovate.

    If you put these two factors together — new technologies to aggregate and identify preferences in ideas and an oligopoly of institutions that certify what profitable and useful knowledge is, together with their licensed authority to teach people how to think — what do we have? A society that teaches us how and what to think, or a society that teaches us to think for ourselves? Those who think that “surveillance capitalism” is the root of the problem, or who prefer to blame social media, or who wish to force-march us back to their old verities — all these people have their answers ready. But the question is more than a sociological or political one. It is, rather, a personal and moral one. It may be more useful to conclude that this is a question — whether thinking for yourself is possible — that cannot have a general answer. It must be asked by everyone who cares about an examined life and an examined society. A society will be only as thoughtful as the people who are its members; or as thoughtless, with all the terrible consequences that always issue from unfree thinking. Those who do think for themselves will have to answer the question for themselves. It is a condition of the proper use of freedom to ask yourself continually whether you are truly as free as you think you are.

    The Trials of the Young: A Semester

    In 2014 I was hired, for two consecutive spring semesters, to teach writing and literature at one of the officially happiest colleges in America. The place was located in a beatific, temperate environment, with mountain views and imposing, elegant architecture; extraordinary foliage and trees burst from the very pavement, flowers were everywhere. There were outdoor swimming pools, conveniently placed grills and fountains, the latter to be drunkenly danced in on graduation or really whenever somebody felt like it. Upbeat music emitted from invisible speakers, wafting constantly across enormous athletic fields; artistic performances and lectures were available almost every day or night. The faculty were erudite, dedicated, and inspiringly strange. Students were receptive, hard-working, and very well-prepared; they were the best undergrads I had ever encountered. They were also, with few exceptions, remarkably easy-going.

    There was something intimidating about the opulence of the place, and also a little eerie; to me, that kind of apparent perfection invariably holds the secret of its inevitable ruin. I knew it was perverse to feel that way in the midst of a wonderful opportunity for which I was grateful — but I did feel that way, almost on arrival. The stark rectilinearity of the architecture, the Triumph of the Will plazas, the huge terraced terracotta buildings — if you aren’t used to that scale of things it is disorienting, especially if you are the only human walking the huge expanse between the huge structures. So, at the end of what turned out to be a lovely semester, when one of my favorite students, a kid from India named Chetan (not his real name; all names in this essay have been changed) caustically informed me that this was “the happiest college in America” and that it got on his nerves, I sincerely replied, “Yeah, I know what you mean. What’s wrong with them?” 

             But whatever was wrong wasn’t wrong with all of them; some people apparently were not so happy at all. By the fall of 2015, the Dean of Students had been essentially forced to resign after a humongous campus-wide protest about her alleged racial insensitivity, which somehow got combined (in the media) with a Facebook photo of two grinning blonde students in Halloween costumes that featured ponchos, sombreros, and glued-on mustaches. A quivering apparatus sprang up to attack the unhappiness: more multicultural clubs, more diverse hiring, a mentoring program, and an administrator to oversee diversity came into being.

    But when I returned for another engagement in 2019 I noticed that students were no longer so easy-going: they were positively touchy. A higher percentage per class needed mental-health disability dispensations and a couple of students had to take time off due to breakdowns. During the semester a student published an essay in the school paper titled “On Being Unhappy at One of the Happiest Colleges in America.” The writer identified his experience of racism as the source of his discontent, but towards the end of his piece he broadened his focus to note that the happiness itself could create mental health stress across the student body. He mentioned the deaths of two white male students that had occurred within the same week that year, one a suicide, the other a drug overdose.

    An anecdote about those deaths that is minor but which seems relevant: in conjunction with mass counseling services and a candlelit remembrance, a community gathering was also held featuring a free food truck, board games, and coloring supplies.

    Fast forward to 2021. The unhappiness was continuing its upward creep, for obvious reasons: the pandemic, the exponentially growing climate crisis, political madness culminating in the attack on the Capitol, the ever louder voice of white nationalism, the murder of George Floyd, the vicious street attacks on Asian people which seemed to loom larger and more horrible in contrast with the extra anti-racist vigilance on campus.

    Anyone who isn’t living in off-grid isolation is aware of the tireless efforts by hyper-conscious campus administrations to create classrooms where everyone feels safe and as few people as possible will be made “uncomfortable,” let alone unhappy. Some institutions require “trigger warnings” to be announced before “problematic” material is read, and some classic texts might not be taught at all — for example, professors of literature might hesitate to include a story by Flannery O’Connor (featuring the n-word) on their syllabus. Title IX protects everyone from rape or harassment, and mandatory training “modules” educate faculty about proper codes of conduct and speech. In response to the stressors listed above, the response at the now less-happy campus was to double down on such efforts: fewer white male authors on the syllabus, please, and more instructional modules on how to engage students over Zoom, more anti-racist teacher trainings, more refinements of language (the n-word should not be uttered aloud for any reason by any not-black person, not even if the person is reading it from a hundred-year-old text), more polls on how more diversity might be achieved.

    Such strenuous gesticulation has been so widely mocked (even by academics who do it) that it is easy to forget why it started. Campus assaults and sometimes horrific drunken rapes were a part of campus life for decades and I don’t doubt that they still occur. (For a recent example, see the Hobart and William Smith frat rape, 2014.) In the almost thirty years in which I have taught as a visitor at various universities, I have witnessed or heard about disgusting and demoralizing racial insults (in 2005, for example, a program on the student TV station at Syracuse University featured images of an actual lynching on a comedy show) as well as the more subtly painful experience of isolation faced by minority groups — experience that professors could unintentionally exacerbate or not notice or not know how to address if they did notice. 

    But still, even people outraged by such cruelties might fairly mock the corrective apparatus, not only because it is ridiculous (which it often is) or dictatorial (which it often is, even if people on the ground are usually reasonable in its application). The deeper trouble is that it is ineffectual and confusing. It is confusing to conflate the reading of a hate word in a book from one hundred years ago with its actual use in the present time; it is confusing to treat the fictional expression of misogyny as if it is the real thing. It is desensitizing to hear a routine “land acknowledgment statement” read before every gathering. Anyone who thinks it’s funny to broadcast the image of a lynching victim or who would take part in a gang rape might grit their teeth and undergo the retraining, but I can’t imagine that their racism or misogyny would be moved by it.

    On a less drastic level, such statements and modules are too easily parroted and thus absorbed into the status quo that they are trying to challenge. In 2019, one of my male students repeatedly used the phrase “toxic masculinity” in an essay on Richard Yates’ Revolutionary Road, and while the words were not completely inappropriate, they struck me as empty. I asked him in a private conversation what he meant by the phrase, and he basically said that he learned it at a talk held during his freshman orientation; it meant entitled men treating women badly. I said I didn’t think that those descriptors applied to the character in the book exactly, that there are more interesting ways to talk about him. At some point in the conversation I asked him how he felt about the neutral trait “masculine” being linked with poison. He shrugged affably and said it was okay with him, he didn’t mind.

    Of course he didn’t mind. He was a handsome young guy with a perfectly good mind and a winning combination of confidence and politeness. I wonder, would anyone tell this guy that he had “toxic masculinity?” Maybe a girl angry because he failed to text her back, or a girl flirting with him—and now, courtesy of the mandatory talk, he can win points by saying it first, plus he can use it in papers and get points that way, too. Easy peasy! 

    But less confident, less sophisticated young men — those with the most vulnerable self-esteem — might find it disconcerting to be told, no matter how sensitively it was put, that the trait that they have grown up considering desirable, their most basic default identity is now toxic. This does not seem to me a minor side effect.

    So. My recent fiction writing class in this complicated environment was quite small, partly because a few of the people that I accepted had read an interview I did with The New Statesman in Britain which made them think that my “stance” regarding “SA” (sexual assault) would make them feel “unsafe” in class. But I was pretty happy with my group of eight, including one very animated and bright guy named Luke who on the first day told me that he couldn’t sit still, he needed to pace. He assured me that his pacing would not indicate disrespect of any kind; it was just part of his personal energy and he had to do it. But when I explained that pacing was okay during a Zoom class but in person he had to sit still, it turned out that he was able to do so.

    He could not refrain from pacing, however, when he came back to my office with me to discuss his first project. During that conversation he paced and paced, taking books off the shelves and commenting on them before focusing on his main question, which was: could he write his first story about someone who rapes, murders, and jerks off on the body of a little girl — in the first person?

    I replied: “No. Not in this climate. It would cause a big fuss and frankly I don’t want to deal with it. People would go nuts, the dean’s office would get involved, it would be a crisis. I mean, maybe later on you could ask the class how they would feel about it? Maybe if they got to know you? But — “

    In case you are wondering why the equivocation instead of a loud clear no, it was because I used to believe — it is almost instinctive for me to believe — that anything is fair game in a writing class, that even the most offensive subjects are open for exploration in the free country of art. But years of teaching experience (most specifically the year 1997, about which more in a moment) have persuaded me otherwise, at least when it comes to undergrads. Still, it was hard to be immediately clear-cut with this extremely enthusiastic, friendly, and intelligent kid. It was actually hard not to get up and start pacing with him.

    “The other issue with writing on that subject,” I continued, “is that it’s really hard to write anything good, especially in the first person. Because no one really understands why people do those kinds of crimes. The people who do them especially don’t understand why they — ”

    “You’re completely wrong,” Luke replied. “They do understand why they do it.”

    I asked why he thought so; he cited an interview that he had read in which a high-IQ serial killer explained the causes of his murderousness (basically, Mom Rage). I said, “Okay, I get that. But I don’t know if those explanations really explain anything and anyway I think you should come up with something else to write.”

    Eventually he did. He wrote about a double suicide featuring hallucinatory and extremely violent images of self-harm, the most violent thing about it being the total unreality of anyone in the story but the narrator. As writing it was good, even powerful in its efforts to render the self-hate it described, in layers of dreamish, hellish pictures that were truly painful to read. But the other students who expressed strong feelings about it disliked it for its solipsism; they disliked in particular that the female character in particular was a voiceless prop. That feature got some critical attention from me as well. But I think mostly the class, including myself to a degree, were unnerved by the sheer, unrelenting, unvaried rage-pain of it. Luke took it all pretty gracefully, even if the sexism part plainly irritated him.

    Minutes after the class ended, I got an email from Luke in which he described hitting himself in the face; he said he thought I would enjoy it. I wrote back, I’m sorry to say a little flippantly, that I hoped this didn’t mean he was upset by the reception of his story. He indignantly replied that it meant no such thing. Then he emailed again, attaching what he said he would really like to submit to the class though he knew it was too edgy for them. It was, basically, a description of a guy preparing to torture a younger guy who idolized him, including a detailed description of what he meant to do plus a vivid description of what some serial killer had done to his mom. I replied that he was right, this would not go over well.

    Then I emailed an administrator to tell her that I was concerned about a student. I met with her in person in an outdoor setting — covid was surging — which was as usual spectacularly beautiful. She asked me if I thought the student was presenting a “safety issue” for the class; I said I was not a hundred percent sure — you can’t be these days! — but he probably wasn’t going to come to class with an assault rifle and start shooting. I believed that he was more likely a danger to himself. She said she would put out feelers to see if he had “set off any alarm bells” for anyone else, or had in any way “gotten on the radar” of the mental health apparatus.

    We talked a little about the student body in general. She said mental health issues were “through the roof,” that a number of students had already been sent home in that calendar year to receive care; in some cases, their parents had to be persuaded to accept them back. She expressed the opinion that even before the pandemic, student mental health had been declining for… I don’t recall the number of years she gave. We talked about why this might be; our ideas were not original. She thought upper-class parents were so over-protecting their children that the kids could not deal with even a managed environment on their own. I thought they were disconnected from their own bodies because so much social life had migrated away into the digital ether. I thought they could not sit still and be with themselves or comfort themselves. We agreed that the world was going to shit.

    My mind was not put to rest by the conversation. Luke had disturbed me and I didn’t know what I felt: anger or compassion or real interest in his mind. And he was not my only concern. Another student had turned in a story about suicide, specifically an attempted suicide, which I foolishly assumed to be completely fictional because the protagonist was female while the writer was male, and because the details of the hospital in which the character recovered were completely unconvincing, as was the dialogue assigned to therapists and staff. Several other people in the class also felt that part of the story was unconvincing and, apparently, they spoke from personal knowledge. Almost half the class had spent time in a mental institution, enough to know what the experience was like. And the author, upon being critiqued, revealed, seemingly out of sheer exasperation, that he too had experienced this. The story was in part autobiographical, he said.

    It was a startling moment. It was also a softening moment. There was a beat of silence during which I felt the room become gentler, more empathic, a feeling so palpable it was akin to touch. It was natural for me to take advantage of the soft moment to say that I appreciated the writer’s will to tackle such a difficult subject; not only difficult personally, but, owing to the depth and the perversity of it, objectively hard to illuminate. Which made Luke protest loudly, insisting once again that I was completely wrong about the difficulty of the subject, and that writers should not hesitate to go there. I responded crabbily that of course writers could go there but they should understand that it was not easy, and they should not be surprised if they failed the first or second or third time.

    We then moved on to the next startling moment, which arose from a discussion about technique. The discussion concerned a moment of dialogue during a scene when the protagonist’s parents arrive at the hospital, right after she has come to consciousness; it was trite and emotionally flat. I allowed that sometimes in terrible situations people do say things that are trite, because they are overwhelmed. I suggested that the writer could add depth by describing the parent’s facial expressions, their voices and movements. “When the mother hugs her daughter, what does the hug feel like?” The student asked me what I meant. I tried to explain: her body could feel hard and tense, it could feel soft and warm. It could feel weak or strong. There are a lot of different gradations of touch, I said; a person’s body can say a lot of things that they don’t say in words. And the student replied, “I have no idea what you’re talking about. I’ve never felt anything like that in a hug.”

    The thought popped into my head: “That is why you felt suicidal.” Later, more sensibly, I thought that the student was possibly just being defensive. But I wondered. I meant what I had said to the admin person. I think people are becoming crazy because they have become too estranged from their own bodies to feel them. Or to feel other people.

    I am not alone in thinking that the pandemic made such estrangement worse. But I remember becoming aware of it many years before, during a discussion of internet porn with a nearly all-female class. The discussion was triggered by a story about the inhibiting effects of porn on girls who, because boys have become so habituated to it, feel obligated to imitate the actresses. Eventually I said that performance could never replace genuine bodily response. One beautiful young woman in her late twenties looked at me with troubled eyes and said, “But how do you know if it’s genuine?” I smiled and said, “You can feel it. Its unmistakable.” She just looked at me, her troubled expression deepening.

    After the suicide workshop, I emailed Luke and asked him why he was so sure he could understand a subject like suicide or murder. Really, I asked, you think you understand a serial killer? Can you explain that to me? He didn’t answer. He didn’t come to class. I reached out to the administrator to ask if she knew anything more about him. Before she responded I got an email from Luke telling me that he was going to be taking a leave of absence. He apologized for any inconvenience that he had caused; he said he was probably going to be kicked out. “You must be relieved,” said a friend. But I wasn’t. I was sad.

    I was even more sad — incredulous, actually — when another student wrote about suicide. During the course of the semester, four out of eight students wrote about suicide. Two wrote about attempts they had made themselves, the other two about friends, one of whom actually died. Something to be noted about these stories: there was nothing inert or passive about them. The despair that they expressed was vivid, intense, sometimes outraged in a focused political way, sometimes in a personal and flailing way. I had never experienced anything like it at this school—or any school—before. I asked the only other creative writing teacher in the department what his experiences were like that semester, and he said no suicide but lots of violence: siblings stabbing each other, a guy poisoning his mom, animal abuse.

    Which actually seemed more normal to me — not for that school, but over the course of my almost thirty years of teaching. People can let it all hang out in writing classes and sometimes “it” is very unpleasant. Prior to this particular semester, the record for unpleasantness had been held by an undergrad class I taught in Texas in 1997. By 2022, the experience of that class had become a distant, grotesquely comic anecdote. But during my most recent semester, the memory of it came back a lot. The students in both classes — the one twenty-five years ago and the one last spring — were unusual as a group (in the Texas case you could say actually kooky). Both included a strange maybe/maybe not menacing guy obsessed with violence. Both had the feeling of a controlled surface under which something awful and incoherent was making itself felt, demanding to be known. The “strange guys” in question were very different in character, behavior, and talent (which in this context matters). The more essential differences were about time and culture: these differences say a great deal about what was once not only tolerated but embraced.

    At the university in Texas in 1997, there was no concept of safe spaces regarding feelings, no idea of trigger warnings or racial sensitivity. The school was good, with a highly regarded MFA program, but otherwise not prestigious or physically opulent; there was no special claim to happiness. I was there for three semesters, and in all three of those semesters it was typical for undergraduate students, especially males, to write stories about murder. It was also normal for students, especially females, to write very sexually explicit stories; I had one girl who wrote something that was basically porn. Since she was older than average and frankly not attractive, I was afraid people would make fun of her, but to my relief they read and discussed her efforts politely.

    The thing about these stories was this: they were not disturbing to me or to anyone else, because, regardless of the content, readers sensed in them no malice or aggressive desire to shock. Plainly the writers just thought they were cool stories. In the class I am writing about, however, something different happened. There were the usual boys writing about murder; there was a woman in her fifties writing about rediscovering her sexuality (protagonist joyfully masturbates on lawn while husband looks on admiringly) and a thirty-something woman writing super-degrading sex stories (bisexual boy sodomizes heroine with a carrot while declaring “I can’t believe I’m attracted to such an ugly girl!”).

    And then there was a guy named Don — large, silent, pumped up, bald, in early middle-age — who wrote exhaustively, convincingly, and in the first person, about a sadistic killer of women. To say that one could sense malice in this project would be an understatement. His “novel” was carefully thought out, detailed, and realistic. I use scare quotes because the thing could barely be called a novel, it being rather a series of murder episodes void of character or dramatic tension.

    And the kids loved it. More specifically, the girls loved it. I remember the boys looking down nervously while the girls enthused:

    “I loved the part where he killed the middle-aged jogger! It was so specific, like the part where he stomped on her head and her eyeball started to come out? It was just better than when he killed the stripper because she fought back.”

    “I really loved it, but I thought it would be more sexual for him, and I wanted to know more about that” — meaty bald guy earnestly nodding and taking notes — “like before he kills the stripper, I thought it might be good to describe her dancing some more?”

    I had actually prepared a response to Don’s story that was meant to make the girls feel safe, and de-fang the narrative, and lead to a thoughtful discussion about the difficulty of writing well about violence. I don’t remember the actual words of my planned response; instead I remember the students’ comments, especially the following exchange:

    She: “So how old is this guy?”

    He: “I was twenty-five at the time.”

    Class: high, delighted laughter.

    She: “So, Don have you ever really killed anyone?” 

    He: “No, but I’ve known someone who did.”

    She: “Really?”

    I found the reaction very weird, but I decided to roll with it. This wasn’t sheer passivity: as noted, my ethos at the time, something I had spent energy on in classes, was the idea that art was a place to explore feelings and acts that we would avoid in life. I made a point of periodically reminding kids that some of the greatest art is about terrible people doing terrible things. In 1997 this ethos was, if not mainstream, well-represented: Natural Born Killers had been made only a few years earlier, Marilyn Manson was claiming in a print interview (in Spin, I believe) to have lit women’s breast implants on fire, and Dennis Cooper had become famous for writing novels about men sexually abusing and killing boys. In truth, I disliked all of the “art” listed above, found it shallow, grating, and gross. I felt the same way about Don’s writing. But it would have gone against my grain to tell him that he could not write it.

    And write it he did, getting ever more titillated reactions from the class, which I sensed were also becoming more anxious. I was definitely becoming more anxious, even fearful. I was also angry — furious, actually. I felt he was, if not exactly hijacking the class, distorting its focus. If he wants to be uncensored, I thought, then I get to be uncensored too, free to use his story as an example of failed writing about violence, comparing it instructively to work by Cormac McCarthy and Genet, among others. In a way those comparisons were quite respectful, as they indicated that I took him seriously which, actually, I did. There was something genuine in his writing — horrible, but genuine.

    Still, after the second workshop he came up to me and said, “I don’t understand your criticism.” I told him he could come to my office hours if he wanted to discuss it. He said, “You should’ve seen the first draft. In that version I kill everybody in the class including the teacher.” I said, “That’s very funny Don.” He laughed.

    I think that was when I went to the administration with copies of his story. The woman I spoke with recognized his name immediately. She said he was a strange guy: had been attending classes at the university for about ten years, changing his major with some frequency. Sometimes his grades were excellent, sometimes he just about flunked. He also changed his appearance radically; the last time she had seen him he was very thin, with shoulder-length hair, the opposite of how he looked at that moment. I explained my concerns; I showed her a few pages of his writing and repeated what he had said to me after class. I asked her if I could kick him out; I hadn’t decided that I wanted to do that, but I did want to know if it was an option. To my astonishment she informed me that no, it was not an option, not unless he “did something.” She told me that a similar situation had occurred a few years back, not in the English department but in History. A student had made a threatening remark to a teacher, was expelled from the class and went on to successfully sue the school. I don’t exactly remember who this administrator was in the hierarchy; now I wonder if I might have gotten a different response had I pursued the matter further.

    But I didn’t pursue it further. I gritted my teeth and hoped for the best, and well, at least something interesting happened. During our final thoughtful exploration of Don’s violent narrative, the woman in her fifties, probably the least popular person in class, had finally had enough. “I don’t know if I should say this,” she ventured, “because I don’t want to end up dead in a ditch somewhere”—tolerant laughter from the class—“but I am sick of this shit. This is like porn. This is like”—pounding the table with both fists—“FUCKING FUCKING FUCKING!” The kids rolled their eyes at the uncoolness; Don glared malevolently.

    And I, finally, said the most sensible, possibly the only sensible, thing I said during the entire episode: “Margery raises a valid point. Writing like this creates fear. That is its purpose.” In response, every single girl on one side of the room, girls who had been enthusiastically expressing their admiration for Don, turned to me with wide, childishly frightened eyes and mutely nodded their assent. It was astonishing, because just a moment earlier they had rolled their eyes as if what Margery had said was beneath them. Their feelings of titillation and fear were that connected and that labile. The semester was almost over, but somehow the admission of this more natural response defused the tension in the class at least somewhat; reality had been asserted. I felt chastened that it had taken another student (albeit an older and more mature one) to get us there.

    I left Texas shortly after the semester ended. Over the next twenty-five years or so, teaching at various universities, I had a few weird, even scary students, and a scattering of gruesome stories, including two about suicide. But I never encountered anything like the instability of that class in Texas, with its fascination for violence that almost amounted to longing, but with such terror underneath, it was almost as if the fascination was an attempt to neutralize the terror by becoming its friend. As time went on, I came to think of the experience as a relic of a particular time — louche, careless, and ridiculous. After tragedies such as the Virginia Tech massacre, the climate changed radically; I didn’t think a guy like Don would be tolerated for two minutes on the happiest campus in America.

    Luke, however, was another story. He was not kicked out; after only a few days in a hospital he returned to class with the full strength of the mental health apparatus behind him. I was encouraged by the apparatus to cut him as much slack as possible, which I was willing to do, and he seemed genuinely to appreciate the forbearance. I asked if he thought he could turn in the story that he had scheduled for workshop; it would be tight and no one could switch places with him. He said he would try his best. He also let me know that the piece he was working on described sexual situations and used words like “faggot.” He did not mention that it was a first-person murder narrative, but since the murdered character was a rich white guy who had sexually exploited the college kid who killed him, I didn’t expect anyone to be offended. And they weren’t. They showed real goodwill. It helped that the story was good and the killer likeable (a subjective concept with absurdly high currency in college workshops), with “relatable” self-esteem issues. My main criticism of it was its uniformity of tone and the lack of the physical world rendered descriptively.

    But that wasn’t so bad, given that few of them seemed able to describe anything. It is harder than it seems to accurately and evocatively “see” the world through a character’s eyes. It is even harder if your own eyes are so often fixed on a tiny screen that you barely register what is actually happening in front of you. I have seen people walk into traffic while scrolling on their phones. I have nearly walked off a sidewalk platform that suddenly came to an end because I was scrolling on my phone. I know, everyone knows, that traffic accidents have happened because of people screwing around on their phones.

    But there are more subtle effects. Fifteen years ago, even ten years ago, when I took a long walk, either in the city or in the natural world, it was a kind of mediation that happened without my trying. I became wholly absorbed in what was around me, in textures and shapes, in the human imprint of buildings, sidewalks, backyards, grasses, trees, fungus, worn roads, crushed leaves. It was a profoundly calming and rejuvenating reminder of the greater world and my own animal connection with it. When I go for walk now, it is different: even if I only look at my phone once or twice, the experience, while still soothing, is not as deep. My consciousness is kept from full absorption in the physical world by its neurological attunement to the electronic portal in my pocket — or back in my house, if I didn’t even bring the thing with me. My bodily connection to the environment is thus weakened. And I cannot believe I am the only one being affected in this way.

    I was surprised by the final suicide story. It was written by a seemingly temperate girl who had previously written subtle, quiet stories set in small towns; I wondered if — I hoped that — she had written this thing about a guy blowing his brains out in front of a girlfriend under the influence of her peers. But in a private conference she told me that she chose the subject because four people she had known in her small town had killed themselves or tried, and she was attempting to understand it. I asked her why she thought this had happened in her town. She replied that people now find it impossible to be satisfied with themselves, that no one thinks they are good enough, that girls in particular suffer profoundly over how their bodies look and cannot separate appearances from character. She named the usual suspects: social media, particularly Tik Tok and Instagram. We talked about how crippling this distorted mirroring can be, how ephemeral the sense of self can become when electronic images are more important than the actual human bodies around you. 

    Towards the end of the semester, Luke started missing classes; when he did show up, he looked and acted pretty out of it. He said he was so busy with other things that he completely forgot his final workshop date, and asked if he could turn something in after the semester ended. Annoyed by his attitude, I didn’t respond right away. The next day he sent me a late reply to the email that I had sent over a month earlier asking him why he thought he could understand serial murderers. He agreed that you could not know the precise reasons that individuals kill, but felt that the abstract reasons could be located in a nexus of power, domination, and control. He referred to a forensics expert who believes that murder can best be understood not by the killer’s words, but through forensic analysis of crime scenes, scenes that this expert compares to a kind of art. In fact, this expert, according to Luke, thinks that serial killers’ crimes “must be thought of as art.” Luke seemed enchanted by this idea and expounded on it at length, choosing as his one specific example “young men who rape old women,” women they often know. He went on to opine about what it meant when the hypothetical young men mutilated the hypothetical old women, before or after death, etc.

    There was more to the email which was, actually, polite and earnest in tone, that is when it wasn’t weird and desperate in tone. But the old lady rape/mutilation scenario was like an infuriating noise that obscured anything else. I wrote back (politely and earnestly) that I thought the forensic expert was wrong, that murder is in no way like art, and I dutifully expressed concern for his well-being — and then I reached out to the mental health apparatus. I had no idea what to expect, but I was surprised by what happened.

    The woman with whom I spoke — I believe she was an assistant dean — seemed very thoughtful and kind. She said she had been keeping tabs on Luke — she had lunch with him just a few days ago — and she thought he was doing very well. She asked if I thought there was a “safety issue” for me or anyone else. I told her that I didn’t think so, but that I had found his email disturbing. I described it to her; and I may have read from it, I don’t recall. She said it wasn’t really enough to act on. I understood — what kind of action would one take? — but I asked her if she would like me to send the email to her just so that she would have it. She said no, she preferred that I not send it. I asked why. She said, “Because if I see it, I’ll have to do something.” I asked her what she would have to do. She said she would have to report it and then Luke would be hauled before some committee or other, which in her opinion would just make the situation worse. I could actually see the sense in this. But I hung up wondering, where in hell is the safe space around here? I want a safe space!

    I also wondered why the only options were inaction or hauling the student before a committee. I wondered what would happen if he was instead required to sit down with the assistant dean and myself and answer certain questions. What exactly are you thinking? Why are you writing to your old lady professor about young men raping old ladies with whom they are acquainted? I didn’t suggest this for the same reason that I didn’t respond to that part of the email; I did not want to feed it. But I think a face-to-face sit-down that was not about a personal relationship between him and me but which involved university personnel — someone supportive — would have been different. It could have been exactly what I think students — not just students, but most people now — are missing: physical engagement requiring that you look the person to whom you are speaking in the eye.

    Of course, he could have gamed his way through it. He could have felt trapped and walked out. He could have gone back to his dorm and jerked off thinking about me and the dean raping each other. Such a meeting could have made the whole situation weirder. But given how weird it already was, I wish that I had at least made the suggestion.

    I emailed Luke to tell him that he could give me his final story late, approximately a week late, on the same date that I gave another student who needed a late date due to Covid. He wrote back saying that he didn’t have time to do the story at all, and that he didn’t care if he got a D-, since he was probably going to drop out anyway. I replied that the option was there if he changed his mind and wished him the best going forward. It was a perfunctory response, but it was also sincere: as exasperating and disturbing as he was, Luke was plainly suffering. I was fed up, certainly, but in spite of myself I also had empathy for him because, unlike Don, I felt that he was trying, in his own twisted way, to work with something essential; murder and despair are not bugs but essential human features.

     Fascination with murder and despair is also an essential human feature, and the young have been ever-famous for their raving misery. I spent much of my twenties feeling miserable; I thought of suicide fairly often. Two of my friends attempted it. The culture of that time — the ‘70s and early ‘80s — was a delirium of insistent belief in total happiness and an exuberant fixation on violence and stylized pain. I’m thinking of the ridiculous hipster cult of the serial killer, the ironic popularity of films such as The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, songs such as the Talking Heads’ “Psycho Killer” or the Pretenders’ “Tattooed Love Boys, the latter an ecstatic ode to gang rape. I’m thinking of the laugh riot racism of Archie Bunker, the comic nihilism of punk, and the transformative genius of Richard Pryor, who, in making comedy out of his own childhood abandonment, abuse, drug addiction, imprisonment, and racist consignment to a low-status social category, located the life-force behind the cruelty and anguish of America and repurposed the crap out of it. All of it was rude, and sometimes casually mean and self-hating on purpose; it was silly sometimes not on purpose; but it was finally healing. By allowing the ugliness in and acknowledging it as part of our humanity, that cultural moment created a kind of spaciousness, even balance. It was its own kind of corrective to a false story of virtue and niceness. This privileging of darkness, I’m pretty sure, informed my Texas students’ seemingly bizarre forbearance towards someone who actually frightened them. 

    But these days that breed of forbearance is looking like an indulgence that we cannot afford. These days, niceness is looking pretty damn good; these days, the darkness is just too overwhelming. Young children are being slaughtered in schools, and mass shootings of all description take place weekly for weeks at a stretch, while Congressional leaders treat gun ownership as sacred; black people — actually, white people too — are being murdered by the police; white nationalists are plotting a race war; lies and disinformation are everywhere; nuclear war in Europe suddenly looks possible; the West Coast is perpetually burning and Pakistan is catastrophically flooded, as the impending wave of hell nicknamed “climate change” rises over our heads. Yes, terrible things were happening in the 1980s, and terrible things have always been happening, but…not like this.

    That young people, including my students, are reacting to all of the above with fear, anguish, and rage is appropriate, even rational. (The reaction makes particular sense in a cohort that has been encouraged to believe that happiness is an expected norm.) That they are fixating on problems they can control and maybe solve (the pronouncement of offending words, gender madness, “shitty” men, “problematic” assigned reading material) is understandable. That they want the safety — or the illusion of safety — provided by the corrective apparatus is also understandable. Only a fool would not crave safety in the face of what is happening now. But while the corrective apparatus is providing a measure of control, it cannot really provide safety. Metaphorically, it is making sure that the crusts are cut off all the sandwiches and that no dishes are left in the sink while zombie hordes beat on the walls and stick their hands through the windows.

    I would like to end with a ringing conclusion of some kind, or at least a helpful suggestion. But I’m afraid that I can’t. The only thing I can say for sure is that the young deserve better. It has become standard to complain about how inept and spoiled the young are, but my students were in some ways pretty great. Their stories confronted not only suicide and violence but also dilemmas of artificial intelligence, gender animus, caring for a sick parent and sibling during the pandemic, the tenderness of asexual love, the awfulness of age, the timelessness of war — they were ambitious, humorous, and bright in the face of everything. But even if they weren’t, they would deserve better. Not only them, not only the other young people whom I met at the colleges where I taught, but also the working-class kids and the poor kids who spend hours alone in apartments that their single mothers have forbidden them to leave because their neighborhoods are dangerous, possibly sitting glued to the same Instagram accounts that make their more privileged counterparts feel so inadequate they want to die. All of them deserve better. I wish to God that we knew how to give it to them.

     

    A Passenger on the Philosophers’ Steamer

    I am standing on the quay in the Polish city of Szczecin. The north wind from the Baltic Sea brings a thick gray drizzle that envelops the buildings and the port cranes, creating a sense of stagnant timelessness. A tugboat on the Oder River, almost hidden by the curtain of rain and turned into a fluid silhouette, gives a loud, long blast of its horn and vanishes in the fog. But the horn still sounds, an echo out of the past. 

    One hundred years ago this past fall, on September 30, 1922, a ship docked here. Szczecin was called Stettin then, and it belonged to Germany. The ship had come from Petrograd, the former St. Petersburg and future Leningrad: in terms of names, it came from a city that no longer exists to another city that no longer exists. The Oberbürgermeister Haken carried a group of scholars, public and political figures, and intellectuals expelled by the Bolsheviks; among them were the philosophers Nikolai Berdayev and Semyon Frank, Sergei Trubetskoi and Boris Vysheslavtsev. In mid-November another ship, the Preussen, arrived with a second group of deportees; others were sent out through Black Sea ports or by railroad, totaling around two hundred and fifty people, including family members.

    Expulsion: the strange grace of forced salvation, a gesture of absurd magnanimity on the part of the ogre. Those who remained were executed, such as the philosopher Gustav Shpet. Or they died in the Gulag, like the philosopher Lev Karsavin, a passenger on the Preussen who settled in Lithuania, which was later seized by the Soviets. But then, in the year of the Treaty of Rapallo, the Bolsheviks needed international recognition, needed a bit of a good reputation, and this gave the deportees a chance to survive. 

    During the 1980s, in the period of glasnost, this expulsion in two boatloads of an eminent if unwanted intelligentsia was known as the Philosophers’ Steamer, a pejorative name, a symbol of the Soviet battle against free thought, of an enforced brain drain, and the destruction of culture and intellectual power. Today history repeats itself: Russians with undesired minds are once more being forced to leave their country, essentially using the same routes — through the Baltic states or through Turkey. The term Philosophers’ Steamer is current again, used by those leaving as if to stress the continuity of their flight with the earlier one, and by state media, mockingly, as if to say that the Philosophers’ Steamer was a real loss, even though the Bolsheviks were right, while today there is no one to feel sorry about losing.

    Well, there’s a bitter paradox in that irony. Russia’s war against Ukraine — an imperial and colonial war — has mercilessly exposed the fundamental flaw of Russian political culture. Russia has no intellectual tradition aimed at dismantling the imperial, chauvinist matrix of consciousness and its associated institutions. But the state, alas, easily adopts historical justifications for aggression, co-opting figures from seemingly opposing camps.

    One figure whose words are now widely quoted to buttress the claim that Ukraine belongs to the “Russian world,” descended on September 30, 1922, onto the quay of Stettin from the Oberbürgermeister Haken. He was thirty-nine. His name was Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin.

    Today he is Vladimir Putin’s favorite philosopher.

    He was my grandmother’s uncle.

    After a hundred years of exile, his remains rest in Russia, re-interred at Putin’s request in Moscow’s Donskoy Cemetery. I live in Berlin, where he lived in the 1920s and 1930s. He returned. I left. 

    He, who was once considered a dangerous criminal and a reactionary ideological foe by the Soviet state, is now posthumously recognized and honored. This comes from the people who grew up in the USSR, who were brought up to despise and hate the Whites — the imperialist defenders of Old Russia whom the communists despised. Their amazing omnivorousness — they now include even Ilyin in their pantheon — merely proves that today’s Russian regime opportunistically combines disparate elements of historical trajectories dating back a century ago: the totalitarian Red left and the authoritarian, and potentially fascist, White, related to Franco’s Spanish regime. How did that happen?

    I will try to answer the question using Ilyin as the key — or as the guide into my family history in its conjunction with the history of my country.

      In my Soviet childhood we often went cross-country skiing in winter, sometimes taking the train to the Ilyinskaya station, where in the midst of dachas on Kolkhoznaya Street stood a snow-covered church in the Russian Gothic style, the crosses knocked down from its dark cupolas. If someone had told me that this station had been named in honor of my distant relative, a colonel engineer named Nikolai Ilyin, who had built this railroad and had owned the nearby estate that was now a sanatorium, and that Ivan Ilyin (Nikolai’s nephew) had been married in this church in 1906, I would not have believed it. I would have been unable to assimilate something so enormous into my concept of our family history.

    For in fact there was no history. The past was dangerous territory that one could visit only accompanied by adults; the doses of permitted chronicles were measured out scrupulously and cautiously; I was a child, lacking in experience, and I thought that this was how it had to be.

    I did not question why the family narrative began in 1917, as if “before” was nonexistence, minus-time; my closest ancestors seemed to have been born in the year of the two revolutions. In the photos I was shown, for example, my great-grandfather Nikolai Lebedev appears already in uniform with a Red Army star on his cap. How had he lived before? Where had he served? I did not ask myself. I had mastered the skill of not asking. I learned that a part of the past had to remain opaque and that some people existed only nominally: all that was left of them was a name, perhaps a photo, but we should take no interest in their fate.

    Yet there was a place where the past came too close: the Vvedensky Cemetery in Moscow, locally known as the German cemetery, where my father’s family was buried. The old cemetery was intended for the non-Orthodox, with monuments speaking a dozen tongues, where death and the next life had diverse styles. The monuments were different, resembling sprouts of Gothic church spires, and the language of the symbols was different, too: Roman and Celtic crosses, olive branches, palm branches, and most importantly, angels. In the Orthodox tradition, angels are rarely depicted sculpturally; but here there were dozens — marble, bronze, a nesting site for angels, a sanctuary of otherworldliness.

    I always asked my parents why we Russians, we Lebedevs, had a family plot in the German cemetery. Who was memorialized by these worn limestone headstones? All of my paternal grandmother’s brothers had died missing in action in the war and her sisters had starved to death in the blockade of Leningrad. But there, in the cemetery, nineteenth-century German graves faced those of wounded Soviet officers who had died at the nearby military hospital, creating the illusion that the dead were still fighting the war underground. My parents replied that my great-grandfather was a military surgeon and that the hospital had given him the plot. That was only a partial truth. In the 1980s, my grandmother had written her memoirs by hand: a heavy book in a homemade cover. I read it only in the 1990s, and discovered that the nameless, ostensibly unmarked limestone monuments on our plot were the graves of our ancestors. Our German ancestors. The feeling that I was German — just a tiny bit, a minuscule fraction — was almost unbearable. 

    Then, for the first time in probably seventy years, the monuments were washed, removing the protective crust of dirt, moss, and lichen, and revealing the letters: Julius Schweikert von Stadion. Dr. Julius Schweikert von Stadion, a homeopath, came to Russia from Germany in 1832 as an apostle of alternative medicine. His apostolic mission failed and he ended his days as a naturopath, a physician at a Moscow residence for the widows of state officials. The building survived and we passed it amid the fluttering of red flags when my mother would take me to the May Day demonstrations.

    Dr. Schweikert was married to a Frenchwoman and left behind eight daughters. They became governesses and at least three of them married the sons of the families. The youngest, Sophia, my great-grandmother, became Orthodox and entered the noble Rtishchev family, provincial military men who found glory in the Napoleonic wars. Her older sister, Karolina, became Ekaterina Yulyevna Ilyina, a lady from a respected and wealthy family. Thus the genealogical tree that joined us to Ilyin grew out of the stone root of the old limestone monument. It was no accident that one of Ilyin’s pseudonyms was Julius Schweikert.

    “As sometimes happens with Russian Germans, he had a jealous love for the Russian element. Unrequited love,” the insightful memoirist and poet Yevgenia Gertsyk wrote about Ilyin.

    My grandmother was not a Party member, yet she worked her entire life at Politizdat, the Central Committee’s publishing house of political literature. She, whose relatives had been sent to the camps or killed by the Bolsheviks, had edited the complete works of Lenin. I still don’t know how she did it — a complete detachment from her feelings? Conformism? A readiness for martyrdom?

    She wrote memoirs of her life as an editor, or more accurately, as a censor. It was only when I became a journalist and an editor myself that I could fully appreciate her artistry in dropping a line of thought or using omissions that did not look like omissions. She recounted so many impossibly new things about her former life that it was hard to catch that the most important thing was often not said, or was hidden in the details. She wrote her text not knowing that the Soviet Union would soon collapse and the archives would be partially opened; she wrote it for publication in the USSR, desperately trying to maintain the elusive balance between permitted and unpermitted.

    Actually, I could only read her memoirs properly when electronic databases appeared with histories of people arrested and killed in the war. With their help I was able to decipher the omissions, and learn the fate of characters that she had hidden or had not known. I began working in the archives, reading investigations of the 1920s and 1930s that created a second layer for my grandmother’s memoir, an expanded commentary that turned into an independent text. One of the cases was that of Igor Ilyin, Ivan’s brother.

    Here is what my grandmother had written about Ivan Ilyin and his brothers:

    In the Ilyin family, Karolina’s sons had differing views. Ivan, an idealist philosopher, emigrated before the war of 1914 to Italy, settling somewhere near the Vatican. Alexander and Igor were average, apolitical, and honest working lawyers. Alexei was a Bolshevik. He died before the revolution in a clash with police. Consequently, when people came to Karolina from the GPU state police to question her about her son the émigré, or to make them move into smaller quarters, or to requisition something, she would show them some letter of protection given to her as Alexei’s mother. The visits usually ended in apologies, and Lina peacefully lived out her life in the family of her son Igor, his wife Nina, and his grandson Svyatoslav.

    Almost everything in that passage is either mistaken or misleading. Ivan, as we know, was expelled in 1922 on the Philosophers’ Steamer. Alexei did not die in a skirmish with the police, but after returning from exile in Siberia in 1913. Lina did not live out her life peacefully in Igor’s family.

    The real stories of these three brothers — Alexei, Ivan, and Igor — reflect the essence of the historic crossroads that Russia faced on the eve of the 1917 revolution.

      If not for the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917, Ivan Ilyin would probably have been a theoretical philosopher, a teacher specializing in Hegel. Roman Gul, the future émigré, journalist, and publisher, and a harsh critic of Ilyin, had been his student starting in 1914 in the law school of Moscow State University. “Tall, very thin, handsome in a Mephistophelian way (even though he was blond), I. A. was a brilliant lecturer and a brilliant scholar,” Gul wrote in his memoirs.

    Ilyin’s father had an estate in the village of Bolshiye Polyany in Ryazan Province, a wealthy homestead with a dairy farm. The local peasants who were questioned in 1937 about Igor remembered his brother Ivan as well: he taught in Moscow at the university. After the revolution the estate was confiscated and Ilyin’s mother and aunt were briefly arrested.

    According to Yevgenia Gertsyk, in his youth Ilyin paid tribute to leftist ideas and even attended the congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in Finland in 1905. (It was there that Lenin and Stalin first met.) Subsequently he withdrew from revolutionary ideas and studied Hegel. He was radicalized by the Civil War and the Red terror. He was arrested three times between 1917 and 1922 on suspicion of anti-Soviet activity. Once abroad, he grew close to the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), the organization of the defeated White Army, and became its de facto chief ideologue.

    The Whites had lost in part because they could not present a clear alternative to the Soviet project. Ilyin tried to replay the lost war, building an alternative in case there was a historical opportunity for revenge. In fact, in the 1920s and 1930s the confrontation between conditional “reds” and “whites” played out not only in Russia: in his programmatic article “On Russian Fascism” in 1927, Ilyin refers to the experience of Hungary, Germany, and Italy. Spain, of course, was to come later.

    It seems as if Ilyin had been hypnotized by the success of those various European “whites.” The Civil War left him with a visceral contempt for democracy, which had been unable to defend itself in Russia. (The Bolsheviks had easily routed the Provisional Government, Russia’s transitional parliament.) He acquired an exalted, mystical love for rightwing dictatorships as a practical and effective measure against communism. Ilyin regarded the tyrants from Mussolini to Hitler as a natural and necessary phenomenon: a kind of protective reflex of European civilization against communist barbarism.

    In Germany, Ilyin worked at the Russian Scholarly Institute in Berlin. In 1933, he welcomed the Nazi government and for a brief period headed the institute, until he was fired in 1934, because the Nazis were not impressed by his praise. With the composer Rachmaninoff’s help, he emigrated in 1938 to Switzerland, where he died in 1954.

    “I still have clippings of your pro-Hitler articles, where you tell Russians not to look at Hitlerism ‘with the eyes of Jews’ and sing the praises of the movement!” Roman Gul wrote to him in a postwar letter. Ilyin never reexamined or criticized his pro-fascist views publicly. This was in part owed to the political instability of the post-revolutionary Russian community abroad. Emigrés frequently became collaborators. Some secretly worked for the Soviet political police, furnishing information or helping to organize kidnappings and political murders (two chairmen of ROVS, General Kutepov and General Miller, were kidnapped and killed by Kremlin agents in Paris in 1930 and 1937). Others preferred the embraces of the Gestapo, out of ideological or practical considerations; the collaboration of some of the Whites with Nazi Germany during World War II is an especially shameful chapter in the history of the movement.

    With a German grandfather and French grandmother, Ilyin could have chosen a conditional European identity, but in the sixteen years that he lived in Germany he never met with his Schweikert relatives. He conspicuously cultivated his Russianness.

      Ivan Ilyin never mentioned his older brother, Alexei: not in articles, not in correspondence. He buried him in silence. It was probably because Alexei Alexandrovich Ilyin, a successful graduate of the legal and historical-philological departments of Moscow State University, was a Bolshevik. He had not been a newspaper-writing theorist or a brief fellow traveler like Ivan in his youth; he was a man of action, an agitator and a fighter.

    In 1925, when Ivan was living in exile in Berlin, his mother Ekaterina (Karolina) was petitioning for a pension in Moscow, on the grounds that she was the mother of the Soviet hero Alexei. She appended references to her petition from “Old Bolsheviks” who had joined the party before the first Russian revolution, before 1905, and who had known him personally under his party pseudonym Ermil Ivanovich.

    In 1905, on orders from the Moscow Committee of Bolsheviks, Alexei Ilyin organized a militant brigade, around sixty men, on the Moscow-Kazan railroad (this is the line that includes Ilyinskaya station and the Bykovo Estate that had belonged to the family then), which took part in an armed uprising in December. The brigade fought and killed police and gendarmes; Alexei was wounded on the night of December 2. He had to live illegally, hiding out, but with the assistance of lawyers he managed to help the escape of members of his brigade who had been arrested. He was himself arrested in 1907 and exiled to Siberia.

    Released in 1910, Alexei returned to his underground work, providing money and documents to people fleeing police surveillance (they could get passport booklets at his father’s estate in Bolshiye Polyany, in Ryazan), and died, probably of typhus, in 1913, when Ivan Ilyin returned from two years studying in European universities to begin teaching at Moscow State University. In 1925, Fedor Konurovsky, one of the members of the railroad military brigade who obtained fake documents from Ilyin, wrote: “I ask the commission to give Ekaterina Ilyina an appropriate personal pension as the mother of a true ideological revolutionary who bore all the hardships of the first revolution.”

    This is the classic plot of socialist realist writing: brother against brother, one for the old, one for the new. Ivan crossed Alexei out of his life but he could not have forgotten him, which made his crusade against Bolshevism something very personal: one recognizes that level of passion that is reserved for fighting estranged family, not strangers.

    The brigade members apparently felt obliged to their late patron who laid the foundation for their political biographies. Not many survived the 1920s and 1930s. The highest-ranking member, Petr Kameron, a fighter in 1905 and Alexei’s secretary in the 1910s when he returned to legal work, subsequently became chairman of revolutionary tribunals that executed the surrendered leaders of anti-Soviet rebels in Central Asia, a member of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, and chairman of the legal collegium on criminal cases of the Supreme Court (in 1938!) — a man who by virtue of the positions he held had blood up to his elbows, and visited Ekaterina Ilyina until her death in 1942.

    He visited and probably helped her; he certainly supported the petition for a pension in 1925. But his loyalty was strictly bounded and extended only to Alexei’s mother, not to his brothers.

      There was Ivan, there was Alexei, and there was Igor. 

    I obtained the case file on Igor Ilyin at the archives in Moscow when the covid pandemic began in Russia. The guard at the door put a thermometer gun to my forehead; the number 37 flashed in the frame. History is filled with black humor: Igor Ilyin was shot to death in 1937 in Butuvo, outside Moscow.

    “The equipment is acting up,” said the guard, and let me in.

    Opening the file, I was certain that I would find that Igor was arrested and executed for being Ivan’s brother, accused of kinship with an expelled enemy of the Soviet state. The reality was simpler and more horrifying. The NKVD did not bother making up a connection between the brothers, even though Igor honestly stated at his first interrogation that his brother had been expelled by the secret police in 1922. Igor was killed by “the apartment issue,” which had “ruined Muscovites,” as Bulgakov wrote in The Master and Margarita. A lawyer like his brothers, Igor found a loophole in Soviet legislation and managed to save the Ilyin apartment in Moscow from so-called “compaction,” that is, having the authorities move in strangers and turn it into a communal flat. He arranged for official recognition that there were three family units, not one, in the apartment: he and his wife, his mother-in-law, and his mother Ekaterina Yulyevna. Juridically, that is, they were all strangers and not a family, and therefore they required three norms of living space. The equation was almost perfect, but there was just one little room of five square meters left over, and to keep strangers from moving in Igor and his wife found a distant relative who needed housing.

    The relative found a boyfriend, and the two of them sued the Ilyins, demanding an entire full-fledged room. The court refused, but it also denied Igor’s countersuit to evict the lodgers. In 1937, the lodgers got their revenge, denouncing Igor for alleged anti-Soviet agitation. To prove that Igor hid his “class nature,” a witness stated, “Ilyin was two-faced. He was not short of money, at parties in his house he wore a tailcoat and patent leather slippers, while he went to work in torn shoes.” 

    Igor was arrested on September 20, 1937, and after several interrogations in which the investigator scrupulously detailed how many cows, seeders, and hired workers there were at the Bolshiye Polyany estate in order to establish Ilyin’s landowning background, he was shot on November 19.

    Stalin died in the spring of 1953, Ivan Ilyin died in Zollikon, Switzerland, on December 21, 1954, and in the summer of 1956, after Khruschev’s “thaw” began, Igor’s wife Nina Ilyin applied to the USSR Prosecutor’s Office for Igor’s rehabilitation. The KGB, established two years earlier, issued her a false certificate that Igor had perished from pneumonia on March 10, 1943 in a camp; such certificates were common practice, because despite the thaw, it was strictly forbidden to disclose the true cause of death — execution by firing squad, decreed by military field “troikas” according to a list. The KGB falsified death certificates on a mass scale, assigning arbitrary dates, usually belonging to the war period, so as to hide one death in the mass of others, and inventing “natural causes” of death — pneumonia, typhoid, heart attack.

    In Nina’s correspondence with the USSR Prosecutor’s Office and the KGB, she referred to Alexei’s revolutionary past as evidence of the family’s trustworthiness and, naturally, never mentioned the exiled Ivan. The KGB itself did establish this connection: it dug out the archive files on his arrests by the Cheka during the Civil War and the operational materials regarding the emigré ROVS, whose ideologist Ivan was. But it left this information without consequences.

    In the same correspondence, a striking detail emerges, an ominous metaphor for the entire era. Nina wrote that shortly after Igor’s arrest in 1937, an NKVD officer, one of those who arrested him, moved into his room, embezzling all his belongings. And, as she testified, in 1956 he was still living there: whenever the door to the room opened, she saw their belongings and furniture, appropriated by the murderer. Twenty years of living in the same apartment with the person who led your husband to his death, not being able to move out, and seeing the murderer sitting on the murdered man’s chairs, covering himself with his blanket — is there a stronger image of helplessness, of forced humiliation before evil, which was the school that the whole country went through in those years? It was the school of cohabitation with executioners. And today the heirs of those Chekists who destroyed Igor are praising and promoting his brother Ivan. 

      In the 1990s, when the culture of the Russian emigré world was undergoing a revival and previously banned books were being published in enormous quantities, Ivan Ilyin was overshadowed by the other passengers on the Philosophers’ Steamer, such as Berdayev, Trubetskoy, and Lossky. At the same time, the White Movement underwent a renaissance of its own with the publication of memoirs of military leaders, a fashion for “white” songs, and an idealization of the Whites as heroes to counterbalance the instant devaluation of the pantheon of Soviet heroes. And Ivan Ilyin appeared stage front in Russian history for a second time, with the ascendance of Vladimir Putin. The philosopher was forcibly “resurrected.”

    They say that Putin was chosen to be Yeltsin’s successor through an interesting bit of casting — that several candidates were considered. We can imagine that Ilyin was selected for state-sponsored rehabilitation in a similar way. We must bear in mind that the surveillance of Russian anti-Soviet emigrés, of the ROVS, was a specific field of professional activity inside the KGB. The secret police was a loyal reader of their works and kept track of them — the case file on Igor Ilyin, for example, shows that a manhunt was begun in 1950 to determine Ivan Ilyin`s location. The Chekists in Putin’s circle could choose easily among the subjects of their operational interests. 

    In 2005, on Putin’s orders, the remains of two Russian emigrés were reburied at the Donskoy cemetery in Moscow: Ivan Ilyin, whose grave had been in Switzerland, and General Anton Denikin, the commander-in-chief of the White Army, whose remains were in the United States. The selection of these figures, these silent cadavers, as the foundation of the new state ideology was highly symbolic. Denikin embodied the Whites’ main slogan, “Russia United and Inseparable,” which opposed the Bolshevik policies that accepted secession of former Russian Empire territories, such as Finland or Poland. The White slogan became the official name of Putin’s governing party, United Russia, in December 2003. 

    And Ilyin was selected for the role of ideologist and prophet. Putinism does not have a holy text, a main book: it is enormously eclectic and malleable, wherein lies its strength. But Putin’s regime needed a higher genealogy and a conservative political language with pretensions to being a “philosophy” and a “historical tradition.” Ilyin’s lofty chauvinism did the trick. Yet Ilyin did not set the course of Russian history; on the contrary, Russian history moved in the direction of his ideas. After an extreme swing to the left, the pendulum swung to the right.

    After 1991, whether its residents were aware of it or not, Russia faced the question of what it was, whether the Russian Federation would have real or merely nominal content. The answer came in 1994 with the First Chechen War, and the absolute rejection of the possibility of any declaration of independence by Chechnya from Russian control. The greatest fear of the 1990s was the fear that the country would come apart at the seams and devolve into an anarchy of national republics. Yeltsin exploited those fears to justify the war in Chechnya and the strengthening of the secret services.

    If we summarize Ilyin’s views on the post-Bolshevik future of Russia, and he was one of the few emigré minds who made such forecasts, the following picture emerges: there will be chaos, an imaginary triumph of “freedom” and “democracy,” which will be used by Russia’s enemies to try to dismember it, to play the separatist card. The only salvation will lie in a strong leader, a dictator surrounded by an entourage of supporters capable of “patriotic arbitrariness” and of curbing the centrifugal tendencies at the price of civil liberties. 

    No wonder that for Putin and his Chekist gang Ilyin’s writings looked like prophecy. After all, from the very beginning they created an image of Putin as the savior of Russia from the chaos of “democracy,” using the old Soviet myth of the security services as the knights of the revolution with a shield and a sword on the emblem, a formidable echelon of selfless guardians of the state. It was no coincidence that Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Federal Security Service, described the security services as the “new nobility,” while Viktor Cherkesov, a former KGB officer who used to harass dissidents and was now chief of the Federal Drug Control Service, wrote a sensational article in 2007 about the “Chekist hook” that snagged Russia as it was falling into the abyss, and presented the security services as a warrior caste inspired by Chekism.

    Putin and his cronies, in other words, have recognized themselves in Ilyin’s texts: in their own eyes, he had given them, the gray men from the secret services, people with a professional habit of anonymity and conspiracy, their desired historical respectability, and enhanced it with a touch of mysticism. Ilyin was their authority that justified their innate hostility to democracy through the narrative of the messianic inevitability of dictatorship. It — that is, Putinism — is not so much a detailed ideology as a mythological frame, a hallowed image that creates a sacralized identity.

      Yet how did people from the Soviet security services, for whom Ilyin in particular and White emigres in general were bitter enemies, accept these views and ideas?

    As a Soviet child I had a book called Reds and Whites. It was a collection of illustrated stories built on a deliberate and extreme dichotomy: the Reds were always heroes, the Whites were always villains and cowards. As a child I believed in this Manichean opposition completely. When I was a teenager, however, the picture was reversed; I can’t remember exactly when the transition happened; it was as if the inversion occurred all by itself. Now the Whites were noble knights and the Reds were lowly brigands. I think I breathed in the new version from the air of the age.

    There is a historical misunderstanding in the overarching opposition between Reds and Whites that was caused by the savage and irreconcilable Civil War. It may be said that the division into Reds and Whites was, in a sense, conventional. The Red Army included as many former tsarist officers as the White Army. This shared collaboration, this common element, proves that the Reds and the Whites — not as a matter of ideology but of historical fact — were not at all as distinct from each other as the myths insist. The old imperial elite found a place on both sides, for the simple reason that both sides were imperialists — only of different varieties.

    Still, there were significant doctrinal differences that bear upon events of the present day. White views on the national question were more conservative than those of the Reds, whereas the Soviets used the discourse of internationalism and opposed, at least rhetorically, the old imperial chauvinism. The Whites, with their idea of “one and indivisible Russia,” with their physiological metaphor for empire as (in the words of Ilyin) a “natural organism,” emphatically denied emancipation for the nationalities that made up the country. This is much closer to Vladimir Putin’s views, and to the practical needs of his regime: it was not for nothing that in a recent speech he reproached Lenin for “creating Ukraine,” that is, allowing it to appear on the map as a political entity, albeit within the Soviet system. 

    It is therefore not surprising that Putin, who for propaganda purposes has declared the “denazification” of Ukraine to be the goal of the war, at the same time quotes Ilyin, an apologist for fascist dictatorships, who occasionally wrote words of praise for Hitler. It is a kind of involuntary confession. It exposes the nature of the Putin regime, built on the cult of the leader and on the racist idea of the national superiority of Russians.

      In the village of Bolshiye Polyany, the ancestral home of the Ilyins, neither the farmstead nor the church remains. The farmstead was looted after a series of requisitions and finally destroyed; the church was closed, used as a warehouse, and demolished in the 1930s. The last priest, Father Nikolai Sokolov, was arrested in 1937 and shot in Butovo a month before Igor Ilyin. 

    Ruins and oblivion are always regrettable. Yet the history of the posthumous resuscitation of Ivan Ilyin’s texts and thoughts suggests that some crypts need to be opened carefully, or not at all. It is necessary to reexamine the lost heritage critically, with ethical and historical awareness — otherwise one can end up reviving something like a virus from the past against which we have lost all immunity.

    No One’s Gonna Love You More Than I Do

    The bars long since closed 

    when the shouting begins down the street

    Open the fucking door 

     

    and all my old selves leap to their feet

    sick with adrenaline

     

    rushing to the point of convergence 

    where things go bad.

     

    With repetitive force the voice assumes 

    a switched-on hydraulic quality 

     

    a monotony allowing other aspects to intrude 

    the spring night at its coolest just before dawn

     

    smell of sea fog and late-blooming lilac

    air like the air of a memoir

     

    and in the morning a neighbour comments

    you’d think there was a war on.

     

    There’s a war on. 

     

    Or is this just another Friday

    in an ongoing Easter of blame and remorse

     

    you in your dark house down the street

    creeping through the hallway with your phone 

     

    which lights up begins to ring 

     

    and your destiny on the threshold knocking.

    Indeed. Pounding.

    Antelope

    They appear out of nowhere as if they know where all the doors are 

    between our dimension and where they are called 

    by their true name, are not the last survivors 

    of their evolutionary niche. Familiarity does not diminish 

    their curiosity, and even the great plain aligned to the grid of monoculture 

    is not monotony, which is painful to them, 

    but a regularity that gives value to change, and WTF is that 

    walking on the road? How annoying 

    to be drawn into another pointless encounter with me, they huff, 

    brandish their hardware and run, 

    entering a sublimity of motion that is like the sublimity of night. 

    A Gothic spirit loves accumulation, magic, a big-block V8 

    in a Dodge Polara, they feel inside themselves the soul of an extra gear 

    that will lift them from the earth, from the prairie’s hall

    of mirrors, the fences whitetail leap 

    that they must scrabble under, tearing their cloaks on the barbs. 

    Only their old-timey machinery can digest the rough forbs. 

    The jackrabbit finds peace in his evening hollow, deer fold themselves 

    in elegant anxiety upon their grass couches, but the pronghorn’s eye 

    has been widened in some back-room occult transaction and he haunts

    the open country, a candle in the five-mile corridor of his tenfold vision, 

    sleeping minutes at a time under the shaking rings of Saturn.