I
It was Friday, October 16, 2020, the last day of school before the All Saints’ Day break at the Bois-d’Aulne middle school in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine on the outskirts of Paris. In front of the school, a man named Abdullakh Abouzeidovich Anzorov decapitated Samuel Paty, a professor of history, geography, and civics. The knife-wielding executioner was an eighteen-year-old Chechen born in Moscow who had been granted political refugee status with his family in France. In the minutes following the brutal act, the killer posted on his Twitter account a photo of the victim’s severed and bloodied head on the pavement, along with this prepared comment:
In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Merciful. From Abdullah, the Servant of Allah, to Marcon (sic), the leader of the infidels, I executed one of your dogs from hell who dared to belittle Muhammad (Sal’am); calm those like him before you are severely punished.
The teacher had already been the subject of an online harassment campaign that was begun on October 7 by Brahim Chnina, the father of a girl in one of his classes. The reason was that Samuel Paty had shown the students in his civics class a cartoon of the Prophet, depicted naked, that appeared in the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo. It was a pedagogical exercise designed to stimulate reflections on freedom of expression and blasphemy. Paty had been careful to excuse anyone likely to be offended by the picture on religious grounds from the classroom. The father, however, accused him of singling out Muslims and ejecting them. With such an interpretation, clearly designed to be prejudicial, he wanted to prove that they had been purposely discriminated against. It turned out later that his daughter had not even been in class that day.
Chnina senior, born in Oran, Algeria, drawing in-work welfare and child subsidy payments for his six daughters, had a following on the Islamist web as an organizer of pilgrim-ages to Mecca and charitable activities connected to mosques. His half-sister had joined ISIS in Syria in 2014 and at the time was still detained in the Al-Hol camp in northeastern Syria at Rojava, a territory controlled by Kurdish forces, from which he had tried to repatriate her. His several hundred social media friends included many well-known activists of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamo-leftist movements who lost no time sharing his message. In his first video on Facebook, posted on October 7, Chnina urged his Internet audience to mobilize — to ensure that, as he put it, “this scoundrel does not stay in public education.” He also advised them to protest if they became aware of similar cases. The video was rebroadcast on the website of the Pantin Mosque, located in a large banlieue in Paris, to its nearly 100,000 subscribers, on the orders of its president, M’hammed Henniche. It went viral as far as Algeria and the rest of the Maghreb.
But this was just the beginning. Henniche, himself of Algerian origin, the son of a senior gendarmerie officer in Algeria and an erstwhile student at a suburban Parisian university, controlled the umbrella group for this mosque that had been founded in 2013. In 2001, in the Seine-Saint Denis department north of Paris, he had established the Islamic political lobby UAM 93 (Union of Muslim Associations, the numeral 93 being the postal code for Seine-Saint Denis), which claimed to be the first of its kind. Having claimed that the area’s population consisted mostly of his coreligionists, he hit on the idea of creating a political pressure group modeled on CRIF, the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France. He used it to “monetize” Muslim votes in elections by pressuring candidates to take positions favorable to various Islamic causes in return for the group’s support. It gave him control or influence over the issuance of building permits to mosques, the granting of subsidies to “cultural” or charitable associations endorsed by his group, the opening of Islamic charter schools, and more. The group even staged an annual UAM 93 iftar to break the fast of Ramadan, in imitation of the annual CRIF dinner. Local politicians rushed to it as if to some kind of halal popularity contest. UAM had an opportunistic attitude towards right and left, socialist, centrist, or communist ideologies. Patterned on the way Israel’s Orthodox Jewish religious parties horse-traded their votes in the Knesset in return for subsidies to their yeshivas, Henniche could boast of making or unmaking mayors, department councilors, or members of Parliament in the “most Muslim department in France.”
In October 2020, the Pantin Mosque occupied temporary quarters in a former sports hall that could accommodate up to 1,300 people. The cornerstone for a permanent building had been laid on Saturday, February 29, 2020, just prior to the municipal elections of March 15, in which the incumbent Socialist mayor Bertrand Kern was reelected during the first round. Close to Henniche, he had signed off on a long-term leasehold for the mosque as early as 2013, conditioned on its being open to all ethnic components of the local Muslim population. Hence the Friday imam, Ibrahim Doucouré, also known as Ibrahim Abou Talha, was of Malian origin, and had been educated in Dammaj, in northern Yemen, an area now occupied by Houthi rebels. This was where the principal local Salafist ideologue, Muqbil al Wadi’i, a lapsed Zaidi (local Shiite), had established his seminary, Dar al-Hadith, after he had joined the most virulent current of Wahhabism in neighboring Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. In Yemen, he preached an ultra-rig-orist doctrine with a new convert’s zeal, attracting many foreigners, including French-speaking converts. The rebel Houthi movement in fact was created in reaction to Muqbil’s brand of fanatical proselytism. In 2015, when the rebels took over the area and then the capital at Sanaa, they destroyed the seminary’s buildings and hunted down its students. Many of Muqbil’s French-speaking disciples today are refugees in Birmingham, the nerve center of the main Islamist power networks in the United Kingdom. It also spawned a group of activists who edit the “Islamologists of France” website, on which they regularly pillory French academics in this field when they take a critical approach to their subject. Thus, on October 9, 2020, two days after the Paty affair burst into the headlines, the site inveighed against two alleged academic “Islamophobes” as “ideologues of the new fascism” in the service of France’s department of education, which was described on the website as “a secular Gestapo.”
Another one of UAM 93’s preoccupations was schools. On August 27, 2018, Hassen Farsadou, Henniche’s heir-apparent in the Islamist lobby, which was now very active in Pantin, had made headlines of his own with a post on his Facebook page. It was a cut-and-pasted message from Davut Pasha, an Alsatian convert to Islam in Erdogan’s Islamic AKP party in Turkey. Based since 2019 in the vicinity of Ankara, he acted as the chief drumbeater for Erdogan and his party’s networks in the French-speaking Islamosphere:
In 2004, the secularists removed the hijab from the school = you left your children in them.
Between 2004 and 2015, the secularists launched a vendetta against bandanas, long skirts, school outings = you continued to leave your children to them.
In 2015, secularists put eight-year-olds in front of prosecutors and implemented the ABCD [of equality, as opposed to gender stereotypes] = you continued to let them have your children.
In 2018, the books to teach them masturbation are ready = you will continue to leave your children with them.
Are you waiting for the school outings in Gay Pride to get your act together?
After his conversion, Davut Pasha, born David Bizet, had risen to become a high-ranking member of the European networks of Milli Görüş, or National Vision, a religious- political movement and the leading Turkish diaspora organization in Europe, and a key element of the Brotherist-Islamist network from which Erdogan issued. It is highly influential in Strasbourg’s Turkish Eyüp Sultan mosque. Davut Pasha, who ran unsuccessfully in the municipal elections in Mulhouse in 2014 and in the parliamentary elections in 2017, can lay claim to having invented the “Islamic revisionist history of France,” according to which the Muslim invasion of Provence from Andalusia, and the many subsequent raids between the eighth and tenth centuries, were the cornerstone of the modern French state, one allegedly hidden by Christian “falsification.” He even claimed to have excavated its supposed remains, especially at Narbonne, the seat of a short-lived emirate. A video posted on many platforms under the title When the Islamic State Was in France illustrated this revisionism as early as 2015, when ISIS was at its peak. It was an attempt at fitting the quest for re-Islamizing France into the longue durée of a grand historical saga. Davut Pasha defines himself as “caliphalist.” He regards Erdogan as the ideal contemporary incarnation of the Commander of the Faithful, exhorting him to invade Syria and Libya and thereby restore the Ottoman Empire within its erstwhile most extensive perimeter.
Farsadou, who, with the support of his mentor, provided a somewhat muddled justification for the posting of Davut Pasha’s message, also presides over the Muslim association called Hope of French Youth based in the town of Aulnay-sous-Bois, also located in postal code 93. It sponsors a private charter school named after Philippe Grenier, a nineteenth-cen-tury physician who converted to Islam. In 1896, Grenier was elected the first Muslim member of the National Assembly, serving in that capacity until 1898. His career is ritually highlighted by the Islamist movement as prefiguring the inevitable conversion of the French, including the political elite, to Islam. The school opened its doors for the first time in premises rented from the municipality’s right-wing and center-right local majority, headed by Bruno Beschizza, a hardline former police union official. Farsadou and Henniche had campaigned for him in the municipal election in 2014, helping him to defeat the socialist incumbent Gérard Ségura. UAM 93 had sanctioned the latter for reneging on his town’s commitments to rent school premises to them.
This mixing of departmental policy and Islamist lobbying came to a halt, at least temporarily, on October 19, 2020, when the prefect of Seine-Saint-Denis department, Georges-François Leclerc, decreed a six-month closure of the Pantin mosque. The decree implemented a request by the Minister of the Interior, in reaction to Henniche’s spreading Chnina’s post about Samuel Paty. The Salafist imam Abu Talha, who had enrolled some of his children in an underground Islamist school in Bobigny that was closed on October 8 by the police, announced a few weeks later that he was “stepping back from [his] “activities” while “rejecting the complaints articulated in the prefectural decree.” The decision was upheld three days later by the Administrative Court at a hearing attended by Leclerc. The Council of State gave its imprimatur for the decision. On November 25, 2020, Leclerc issued this statement: “The words of the leaders of the Great Pantin Mosque and the ideas or theories disseminated within it constitute a provocation linked to the risk of inciting acts of terrorism, violence, hatred or discrimination and are of a nature to justify closing the place of worship.”
On the defensive in the face of an outcry, Henniche removed the Chnina video and deplored the teacher’s beheading. He pointed out to the press that he had not relayed a second video that had been posted the following day. The previous evening the student’s father had tried to stoke the Islamist mobilization and focus it on Samuel Paty by posting two statements in succession. They called for “contacting the CCIF” and doxing the “professor’s address and name to tell him STOP.” The CCIF, or the Collective Against Islamophobia in France, was founded in 2003. Its aim was to weld Muslims into a community solely defined by the discrimination to which its members would be subjected because of their religion — in a word, Islamophobia. This notion, characterized in CCIF propaganda campaigns as a “crime,” is strangely based on the Islamist understanding of anti-Semitism. The Islamist movement considers anti-Semitism a strategy according to which Jews cleverly play the victim card to fend off any criticism of Israel and its policies. In one respect, though, the two cases differ: anti-Semitism advocates hatred of individuals, whereas “Islamophobia” — an English word that was manufactured in the wake of the Rushdie affair in the United Kingdom — works by stigmatizing and prohibiting any criticism of Islamic dogma — particularly its Brotherist, Salafist, and even jihadist interpretations.
The CCIF raised the victimization strategy to an art form in putting French society on the defensive whenever jihadist crimes or attacks were committed. A case in point was the attack in Nice on July 14, 2016, Bastille Day, when an Islamist terrorist killed eighty-six people by plowing into the celebrating crowd on the seaside Promenade des Anglais with a truck. The CCIF promptly mounted an intense campaign denouncing the “discrimination” suffered by Muslim women for wearing a burkini on the beaches of the Riviera within a stone’s throw of the killing committed a few weeks earlier. The aim clearly was to divert attention from the massacre. After the murder of Samuel Paty, CCIF similarly weaponized the publicity generated by the incident at the school: in order to arouse a victimization reflex in the Muslim community, it spun what happened in the classroom as an Islamophobic act.
It was aided in this effort by the political context, which was dominated by news of several major trials incriminating jihadism that were about to begin. These trials promised to expose how the ideology related to, and had benefited from, a much larger movement. The court cases included those pertaining to the Charlie Hebdo massacres, the killings at the Jewish HyperCacher supermarket, and the murders of two police officers of West Indian and Maghrebian origin, all on January 7-9, 2015. Two other courts would have Algerian nationals in the dock. In one, a student named Sid Ahmed Ghlam would go on trial for the murder of a young woman and an abortive plan instigated by ISIS to attack churches in Villejuif in April 2015. In the other, a former journalist, Farid Ikken, was charged with the attempted murder with a hammer of a policeman outside Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris in 2017. In addition, the trial of the terrorist in the abortive attack on the Thalys Brussels-Paris train in August, 2015 was scheduled to begin on November 16: it would see the Moroccan jihadist Ayoub al-Khazzani prosecuted for planning to assassinate passengers with an AK-47. The orders for this operation had come from the main actor behind the November 2015 attacks, the Belgian-Moroccan ISIS operative Abdelhamid Abaaoud. It was against this background that the Ministry of the Interior moved to dissolve CCIF by November 19. The association preempted the ministry’s move by announcing on October 27 that it was disbanding and redeploying its activities abroad.
On October 8, the senior Chnina, accompanied by the veteran Islamist agitator Abdelhakim Sefrioui, met with his daughter’s school principal to lodge a complaint against Samuel Paty for “spreading child pornography.” The libel would earn the latter a summons to the police station. This meeting between a school headmistress and a well-known activist recalls one that took place when the issue of wearing the hijab in a public school first erupted in September, 1989 at the Gabriel-Havez middle school in Creil, another small town on the outskirts of Paris. There, too, the school’s headmaster, Ernest Chénière, had been paid a visit by a delegation from the Union of Islamic Organizations of France, an association with Brotherist leanings, which advocated for the students in question and their parents. This campaign subsequently brought UOIF considerable fame in the French Islamist movement.
Sefrioui, a sixty-year-old born in Morocco, had staged multiple spectacular provocations starting in the 1980s. His goal, according to Tareq Oubrou, the imam of Bordeaux, also originally from the Alawite kingdom, was “fortifying the most fragile minds by systematically making Muslims victims of the Republic. These victimology theses managed to convince the most reckless who, as foreseeable, took action.” In particular, Sefrioui created the Sheikh Yassine collective, named after the founder of Hamas killed in 2004 by Israel. He campaigned for Dieudonné, the anti-Semitic comedian and pro-Iranian regime activist, in his presidential run in 2007, as well as for the conspiracy theorist Alain Soral, and he harassed Hassen Chalghoumi, the imam of Drancy — another city in 93 — for his closeness to Jewish institutions. He also had agitprop experience in protests relating to schools on his resume: he had led the revolt against the administration of Saint-Ouen High School when it tried to prohibit the wearing of jilbeb, a garment with which Salafi women must cover themselves (a case also cited by Davut Pasha and Farsadou).
After the meeting on October 8 with the headmistress, Sefrioui taped an interview in the wooded environs of this suburban school, in which he claimed membership in the Council of Imams of France, an association founded in 1992. Its secretary-general, Dhaou Meskine, a preacher of Tunisian origin himself and close to the Brotherist movement, denied that Sefrioui was authorized to speak on the Council’s behalf. He cited “differences over methods” and indicated he had ceased all contact with him ages ago. Sefrioui further announced that he had insisted to the headmistress on the need for “the exclusion of this scoundrel,” meaning Samuel Paty. He threatened a mass protest outside the school to make his demand stick. He had already protested the humili-ation of “Muslim students,” which he described as a system-atic policy in place “for five years.” The involvement of this nationally known Islamic online agitator — with an “S” card on file, designating him as a serious threat to national security — escalated the incident to a higher level than the student’s father alone could have achieved. It is true that Chnina was active on the Islamist web, but he had a less extensive following. On October 12, Sefrioui raised the heat even more when he broadcast a video of himself in front of the school, in which Chnina’s daughter gave her version of events. Her story did not hold up under scrutiny: she displayed no first-hand knowledge of the events that she described.
II
The murder of Samuel Paty should be properly understood as an expression of what might be called atmospheric jihadism. Such terrorism dispenses with the murderer’s prior member-ship in an al-Qaeda-type pyramidal organization or with affiliation with a network-based structure such as ISIS. It is galvanized instead by the spread of mobilization messages on social media: they trigger the crime. Atmospheric jihadism crystallizes in the encounter of a demand for action spread online by “entrepreneurs of rage” — in Bernard Rougier’s phrase — and a terrorist offer in response to it. The connections no longer need to be formalized, notwithstanding that in Paty’s case the police investigation revealed telephone contacts between the student’s father and Abdullakh Anzorov. The parent posted the teacher’s contact information on his Facebook page and the assassin found it. Reporting in Le Monde showed that the young Chechen had been combing through social networks since September 25, searching for someone who merited punishment for disrespecting Islam.
As it happened, on that date a certain Zaheer Hassan Mahmood, another refugee, this time from Pakistan, entered the picture. He came from a family sympathetic to a Pakistani radical Islamist organization back home, and was collecting public assistance after having falsely claimed to be an “unaccompanied minor” upon his arrival in France. He spoke no French and only broken English. He had been incensed by what he saw on the cover of Charlie Hebdo on the first day of the trial of the perpetrators of the massacre of the magazine’s staff. Below the headline “All that for this,” he saw, re-published, some of the offensive drawings that had set the attack in motion in 2015. Mahmood obtained a meat cleaver shaped like the cutlasses brandished in viral videos on social media by Urdu- language protesters in Karachi and Lahore who had marched to demand the beheading of the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists. Of low intellect and means, Mahmood neverthe-less had managed to go online and find the address where the attack on the weekly’s office had taken place (the editors had moved since then to a secret location). Having made his way to the building, he randomly singled out two people working in a film production company on the premises, neither with any connection to the case. He grievously injured them by blows to the head, without killing, much less decapitating, them. With no escape plan, stunned by his own act, he was easily and quickly apprehended. Subsequent investigation into his Parisian surroundings, where he lived in a crack house while awaiting an order expelling him from French territory, failed to uncover any accomplices or network affiliations.
Abdullakh Abouzeidovich Anzorov, Paty’s killer, turned out to have more elaborate jihadist connections. The testimonies taken in his circle indicated that he had gravitated to a radical Salafist vision. He had openly proclaimed it on his Facebook page and Twitter account at least six months, if not a year, before the crime. He evinced a horror of all promiscuity with the other sex; he hated atheists, Christians, and “deviant” Muslims, such as Sufi mystics or Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman; he took an interest in international Islamist issues. He admired the Taliban and he worshipped Erdogan. The latter was swathed in a nimbus of neo-caliphate glory after recently ordering Istanbul’s Hagia Sophia to be converted into a mosque. Moreover, in the Chechen’s native Caucasus, Erdogan had also just sided with Azerbaijan in its war against Christian Armenia.
Anzorov was also plugged into the French online Islamist milieu. On October 7, on the day that Chnina posted his first video, Anzorov voiced his support for Idriss Sihamedi, the founder and president of BarakaCity, an Islamist NGO in France, who had been indicted for cyberstalking and threatening the former Charlie journalist Zineb El Rhazoui. The NGO would be dissolved by the Council of Ministers on October 28. Its demise was affirmed by the Council of State on November 25, on the grounds that “the words of its president may be attributed to it and constitute discourses fomenting discrimination, hatred or violence sufficient to justify dissolu-tion.” Anzorov kept silent on the early developments of the Conflans affair, probably because he wanted to keep his murderous plot away from police surfing the web, and deleted his posts starting on October 11. Yet he and Chnina were said to have exchanged phone calls, their substance still shrouded in mystery. He also had online contacts with two jihadists in the Idlib zone in Syria. Between the moment he cut off Samuel Paty’s head and when the police shot him dead, he messaged one of them in Russian.
He seems to have been spurred into action by Zaheer Mahmood’s attack. At first, he cyberstalked young people suspected of mocking the Prophet or Islam on social media. In all probability, this is when he stumbled on the accusations leveled against his future victim. He nurtured his own plan to “avenge the Prophet,” drawing on the means with which his specific cultural tradition had equipped him. In the monstrous execution of his crime, two actions were particularly telling: first, his bribing, with three hundred euros, of some of the middle school’s students to identify their teacher, so that he could be sure of his victim; second, the terrifyingly professional way in which he carried out the beheading, and, without missing a beat, messaging the Russian-speaking jihadist in Idlib. The first act links the murderer more to the criminal underworld than to standard jihadist practice; the second, to a rite of passage by Chechen teenagers for whom cutting off a sheep’s head opens the door to manhood (as opposed to slaughtering it the way Muslims generally do). It explains how someone like Anzorov could perform the counterintuitive motions inflicted in this particular kind of savagery. This skill cannot be acquired only by watching the many beheading videos that ISIS had been putting online since 2014. At most, these might have proved addictive, or may even have trivialized this killing method in the collective Islamist consciousness. (A Tunisian jihadist named Brahim Issaoui, who struck in Nice thirteen days later, failed in his attempt to behead his victims.)
The Chechen population in France, estimated at nearly 50,000, arrived mainly as political refugees after the war of 1994-1996 and especially after the war of 1999-2009. Both of those bloody conflicts had pitted local separatists, whose ranks jihadists had gradually come to dominate, against Russian troops. Despite its relatively small size compared to other segments of the Muslim immigrant population, the French Chechen community made headlines. Some were frequently employed in “security” and known for extreme violence. Others controlled narcotics trafficking (and security for the properties of Russian oligarchs) on the French Riviera, one of their major stomping grounds. Some Chechen “protectors” took the drug business over by preying on the traditional Maghreb drug-trafficking channels, a phenomenon that gradually spread across France.
In the week of June 16, 2020, for example, this takeover spiraled into four days of spectacular clashes in Dijon, the Burgundian metropolis. It began with a raid on Moroccans in the context of a conflict of honor. It brought together hundreds of Chechen thugs mobilized on social media from all over France and neighboring countries. In their muscle cars, they patrolled an entire working-class neighborhood, while the police kept its distance. The press was dumbfounded. The frenzy of violence came as a major shock to most of Dijon’s citizenry, who were exposed for the first time to these mores and habits of some of the people in their midst. The explosion happened just four months before the beheading of Samuel Paty in ConflansSainte-Honorine. Mediation between these two Sunni communities that totally shut out the French state authorities in charge of public order finally took place at the local “Fraternity” mosque. It was provided by its imam Mohammed Ateb, the regional representative of the Brotherist UOIF, in concert with his Chechen counterpart from Dole, a city in the nearby Jura department. The reconciliation was sealed against the backdrop of the Eid-el-Kebir holiday by the Chechens offering the Moroccans three sheep, transactional gifts immediately put to the sword in sacrifices of atonement.
Abdullakh Anzorov, disqualified by a record of delinquency from working as a security guard like his father, was barely of age when he committed his crime. One of his countrymen, Khamzat Azimov, under “radicalization” watch since 2016, had previously carried out a jihadist knife attack in the Opera district in Paris on May 12, 2018. He killed a passerby, only to be shot dead by police. ISIS, which still had a spokesman then, claimed “credit” for his act, despite the absence of any affiliation. In any case, the Chechen jihad, less notorious than its Afghan parallel, has an equivalent claim to fame in Islamist hagiography: in the opening pages of Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, the manifesto that he published online around 1997, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s successor as the head of what was left of al-Qaeda in 2020, had put the Taliban and these fighters in the Caucasus on the same plane, arguing that both had established the first two “caliphates” on liberated territory, which would eventually extend to the entire planet.
Before he was shot, Anzorov sent his last message to someone in a Chechen brigade stationed in Idlib under the protection of Turkish forces. The Chechens fighting in the Syrian jihad were notorious for their violence. In Russian folklore, Chechens are known for their fierce secular resistance to St. Petersburg’s troops. From that epoch came the dark legend of the “Chechen villain crawling on the riverbank, sharpening his knife,” as depicted in a poem by Lermontov that was turned into a famous lullaby. The bogeyman of the tchétchènskie golovorezy (Chechen head cutters) runs through the modern history of Russia ever since the Tsarist wars, as described by Tolstoy in his novella Hadji Murad (which also celebrates the chival-rous character of the eponymous hero). A steady drumbeat of beheadings of Moscow’s soldiers also marked Putin’s wars. These unspeakable images were posted in profusion on social media to terrorize the latest Russian adversary.
After the assassination of the teacher at the school in Bois-d’Aulne, France was in shock. Even Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the leftist La France Insoumise (France Unbowed) and a fierce critic of Emmanuel Macron, asserted that there was a “Chechen problem.” It earned him accusations of stereo-typing from his political opponents — despite his having taken part in the “demonstration against Islamophobia” on November 10, 2019 in the heart of Paris, organized by the CCIF. Its ex-director, Marwan Muhammad, had galvanized the crowd at the event on the Avenue de la République with shouts of Allahu Akbar. Mélenchon perfectly exemplifies the problem for the French left: he must support both his MPs from Seine-Saint-Denis who need the Islamic votes mobilized by UAM 93 and an electoral base in which teachers such as their colleague in the Bois-d’Aulne middle school figure heavily. He must find a way to reconcile Islamism and leftism in his movement and in his opposition to Macron.
The murder of Samuel Paty buttressed the vision developed by the President of the French Republic in a speech two weeks earlier at Les Mureaux, a commune in the same department of Yvelines. In it, Macron advocated a legislative overhaul to better combat “Islamist separatism.” It was in in the nearby village of Magnanville, on June 13, 2016, that a policeman and his wife were stabbed to death in front of their young child at their home. The crime had been committed by Larossi Abballa, a jihadist of Moroccan origin. Recently released from prison, he was linked to and communicated online with Rachid Kassim, an ex-rapper and social educator born in Oran, Algeria, and formerly based in central France at Roanne, who at this time was running ISIS “external operations” from Raqqa, the erstwhile capital of the “caliphate” in Syria.
Aside from the similarity between the two murders, even down to the murder weapon, the modus operandi had changed from June 2016 to October 2020. The first killing had been amplified by Larossi Abballa’s calling on his “Muslim brothers” to kill a French academic (more specifically, the author of this essay) and some journalists whose names he exposed to public condemnation on Facebook Live before he, too, was shot dead. With the assassination of Samuel Paty in Conflans, as I noted earlier, the network-based jihad that culminated in ISIS gave way to an atmospheric jihadism, for which it provided a model. To prepare a case against the perpetrators of the attacks of the previous era, which the public discovered only after they were carried out, required lengthy clandestine operations of the police. Such had been the case with the slaughters of January 2015 — whose trial was unfolding in the fall of 2020 and providing the backdrop for the crimes committed first by Zaheer Mahmood, then Abdullakh Anzorov, and then Brahim Issaoui. But today jihadist crimes are preceded by an explicit and public “cultural disavowal” engineered by “entrepreneurs of rage”: they are not prepared in secret, they have already been advocated on social media. This is how a teacher came to be singled out for Internet users as a scapegoat to rage against — and for one of them to assassinate.
This change means that the struggle of the secular French Republic must not be limited to after-the-fact criminal justice. It must instead fight an ethical battle against an ideology which rends the very fabric of French society by distinguishing between “believers” (mou’minin) and “nonbelievers” (kouffar), between “Salafist” (salafi) and “infidel” (mouchrik), “apostate” (mourtadd), “hypocrite” (mounafiq), and “deviant” (mounharif). These rigid categories are anathemas of exclusion: they propound a doctrinaire separatism that dehumanizes the designated enemy and forbids making a society with him until he submits to the faith or is put to death. This desire to secede from the surrounding citizenry was the founding impulse of Salafism. Nowadays, five decades after the upheaval of values from nationalism to Islamism, precipitated in the Muslim world by the October 1973 war, this agenda has been taken up by a spectrum of militants ranging from Brotherism to jihadism.
Known in the West as the Yom Kippur War, since it was launched on that Jewish holiday to maximize the effect of surprise on the Israeli enemy, it was referred to in the Muslim World as the Ramadan War, since it coincided with the month of fasting; and in order for Muslim soldiers to be fed in combat, the ulema pronounced it a holy war — a jihad, which abrogates daytime fast. This theological elevation of the war reinforced the feeling that it was a Saudi and Islamic victory — as the army of the Jewish state had to end its counter-offensive on the order of Western powers who could not withstand the oil embargo decreed at the initiative of King Faysal of Saudi Arabia. From those days came the tilt toward a general Islamization of politics, leading to the use of concepts drawn from the Scriptures to decipher events or engage in action. For instance, what Macron called “separatism” matches what Islamists and jihadists call in Koranic parlance al-wala wal-ba-ra’a’, “alliance and rupture.” In the Salafized patois of the “conquered territories of Islamism,” to use the title of Bernard Rougier’s recent book, it is rendered as “allegiance and disavowal.” It is all about implementing an exclusive and total submission to dogma in its strictest and literal definition, as defined by the self-styled “orthodox.” It means “allying” only with those who share this ideology and breaking with the rest by “disavowing” them.
The speech in which Emmanuel Macron spoke about “Islamist separatism” caused an uproar in France’s political Islamist movement and in the Muslim world. This happened despite the crime perpetrated in Conflans less than two weeks later, which corroborated Macron’s analysis. Macron’s opponents and detractors used the tactic of shifting the burden of proof back on the French president by accusing him of Islamophobia — of discrimination against all Muslims, while the “separatists” promoted themselves as their represen-tatives par excellence. This move was facilitated by a linguistic peculiarity: the term “Islamist” as such does not exist in the Arabic or Turkish languages, nor is it generally known there. It was originally coined in the 1980s by European scholars of contemporary Islam to describe “political Islam movements” that originated in the aforementioned shift in the wake of the Yom Kippur/Ramadan war in 1973. Its literal translation in Arabic, Islamawi, is understood only by a few intellectuals who manage to distance themselves from the prevalent religious dogma. And so it was that the expression used by Macron came to be falsely rendered as “Islamic terrorism” in the Muslim world, easily letting it be construed by those who had a political interest in such a misunderstanding as an aggression against all of the Prophet’s followers.
In this charged context, the last week of October in 2020 saw the tensions and the commingling of French and international issues reach a climax. In the forefront was Erdogan’s Turkey. It set the tempo for the pan-Islamic campaign against Macron, to bolster its own president’s neo-caliphal stature after he had rededicated Hagia Sophia as a mosque. Noticeably absent were leaders of the Muslim world, even those participating in the Abraham Accords and opposed to the Brother-ist-Shiite axis. They might have been capable of swimming against the tide, but they held back out of fear of being tagged as Islamophobes.
Thursday, October 29, 2020, marked the Feast of Mouloud, as the Prophet’s nativity is known in the Maghrebian dialects (al-mawlid an-nabawi, in classical Arabic). Its date is calculated by the Hegirian (lunar) calendar, and thus each year occurs ten days earlier than the previous year. As a symbolic date, it plays a key role in the spirituality of the Muslim masses in North Africa. They revere the figure of the Prophet in particular because it lets them feel charismatically and vibrantly close to him — unlike the scriptural Islam of the scholars (and that of the Salafists, now in digitized form). At 8:29 a.m. on that day, Brahim Issaoui, twenty-one years old, an illegal Tunisian immigrant who had just set foot on French soil after crossing the nearby Italian border, killed three people inside the Basilica of Notre-Dame de l’Assomption in Nice.
This neo-Gothic building’s portal opens onto the city’s major thoroughfare, Avenue Jean-Médecin, now a pedestrian mall with a streetcar line. Its apses back onto a public garden
filled mainly with mothers garbed in jilbeb and their children tagging along. Beyond this garden lies Nice’s “Islamic quarter” of Notre-Dame, which ironically takes its name from the Basilica. Two blocks further, on the ground floor of 12 rue de Suisse, the first mosque opened in the heart of Nice has operated for the past twenty years. In January 2019, the city, which owns the building, issued a notice of non-renewal of the mosque’s lease to the imam of the Chechen community and the president of the management association. This place of worship, too cramped for the crowd of worshippers who spilled over into the street at prayers, was no stranger to contro-versy. In 2011, Nissa Rebella, the rightist group in Nice, whose leader regularly runs in the municipal elections on the National Front ticket, had plastered placards bearing the words “of the Stoning,” “of the Burqa,” and “of the Muslim Brotherhood” over existing street signs. In 2013, he sued the municipality for undercharging rent on the mosque’s lease. In 2020, the prayer hall closed, only to relocate nearby, according to a sign on the door. But the main Salafist stores selling Arabic and French books promoting “allegiance and disavowal,” as well as diverse “Islamic outfits,” and other attire, remain in the area. They equip the movement’s followers with the paraphernalia for flaunting their distinctive identity around the neighborhood. (Alpes-Maritimes, of which Nice is the capital, ranked second among French departments in the number of departures to the ISIS “caliphate” in Syria between 2014 and 2017.)
The Basilica of Notre-Dame is located a few hundred meters from the main train station, where surveillance cameras captured Brahim Issaoui changing clothes before making his way to the scene of his crime. He was “de-silhouetting,” a common practice in the lead-up to a crime but usually not done in public view. He had slept the night before in a stairwell on a piece of cardboard, which he had shown his mother, at home in Tunisia in the Sfax suburbs, via cell phone video, also telling her that he had made a contact in Nice. Soon afterward he rampaged through the church, slitting the throat of a sixty-year old woman, then striking at the sacristan’s throat, before slashing a young Brazilian mother. All three died of their wounds. Intercepted by the municipal police, Issaoui was shot and wounded while chanting “Allahu Akbar” in a trance before being transported unconscious to the hospital.
An Italian Red Cross certificate found on him indicated that Issaoui had landed at Lampedusa on September 20 on a boat in distress filled with North African migrants, who had to be rescued by an Italian ship. After a two-week Covid19 quaran-tine on board, an NGO’s boat took him to the mainland, depositing him in the port of Bari, in southeastern Italy. There, on October 9, he was put in a screening center with eight hundred other illegals. Under order to leave Italian territory, he was released from the center due to a lack of space. Here the trail goes cold. There is every reason to believe that, like most Tunisian illegals, he took the train to the border town of Vintimille, sneaked into France, made his way to Menton, and from there proceeded to Nice.
Little is known of his personal history. He came from a poor family of eleven children, from a village on the outskirts of Kairouan, the Tunisian city that is an Islamic metropolis and the site of its most prestigious and ancient mosque. The family emigrated to an underprivileged suburb of Sfax, the economic capital on the country’s southern coast, where the local Diwan Radio podcast reported on the crime in Nice the day after it was committed. The signs that this is a rough and blighted neighborhood abound: young people in tracksuits emblazoned with counterfeit logos hanging out aimlessly amid unfinished construction projects; the killer’s parents, brothers, sisters, and friends expressing themselves in a thick working-class dialect with rudimentary vocabulary. From them it emerged that Brahim Issaoui, like everyone else, eked out a living in the gray economy, in his case by occasionally repairing mopeds. He later increased his income by smuggling fuel from neighboring Libya and offering it for sale in glass bottles at roadsides throughout the country’s south.
His family and friends described him as a young man who conscientiously attended the mosque and also had a taste for hashish and alcohol, testifying to the kind of cultural and moral schizophrenia often found in such working-class environments. If his father approved of his leaving for France to escape the misery, his mother worried because he did not “know French.” Nice is in fact France’s “most Tunisian” city, with immigrants from that country constituting the majority among the population of Maghreb nationals. Apart from a claim on the day of the murder that was quickly dismissed as bogus, no jihadist network claimed “credit” for what Issaoui did. Whatever the complicities or the motivations for this act, the Nice attack is one more instance of atmospheric jihadism in Europe after the abandonment of militants by ISIS and its network. This was confirmed when the police announced in mid-November that they had found a photo of Abdullakh Anzorov on Brahim Issaoui’s phone.
But what to make of this triple murder committed by an individual who had spent just a few hours in France? Clearly he could not have been exposed to any “Islamophobic discrim-ination” in France sufficient to set him off on a murder spree. It conjures up instead a worrisome link between the dynamics emerging from North Africa — poverty brought to a head by the Covid-19 pandemic and the collapse of the price of oil, the dereliction of the political order, clandestine emigration, the force of an Islamist ideology radicalized by the Salafist doctrine of “allegiance and disavowal” — and those now busily roiling the social and cultural cohesion of Europe.
III
On September 10, 2020, in Cairo, the Arab League condemned Turkey’s occupation of parts of western Libya, Syria, and North-ern Iraq, claiming that it evoked the dark hours of the Ottoman colonization of Arab lands prior to 1918. That solemn declaration somewhat tamped down the zeal of the Brotherist-Shiite axis in the Middle East that had been excited by the Turkish president’s bellicose policies. In this situation, Erdogan sought to break his isolation by taking his own turn as an “entrepreneur of rage.” He proceeded to stoke his anti-French campaign, with which he had initially inflamed part of the Muslim world
by coming out against Charlie Hebdo’s republication of the cartoons on September 3. He now followed up with broad-sides against Macron’s denunciation of “Islamist separatism” in his speech in Les Mureaux and in his tribute to Samuel Paty on October 21 in the courtyard of the Sorbonne, where the president declared that France would never repudiate the caricatures.
Erdogan’s self-interested pivot, his renewed campaign against France, was aided by the collapse of Islamic studies in France, which had been reinforced by a cast of senior bureaucrats convinced that, to quote Olivier Roy’s aphorism, “knowing Arabic is of no use in understanding what is happening in the banlieues.” (To which I would add: or anywhere else.) France’s representatives were not up to the task of explaining to the Muslim world what Macron’s envisaged measures actually meant. They stymied the produc-tion of any translation of the presidential words into this “useless” language. None materialized until Macron bravely decided to express himself on Al Jazeera with a quality dubbing in Arabic. But by that time the allegations of Islamophobia had been revved up. Invoking universal principles, a phalanx of critics, ranging from Iran’s Supreme Leader to the Financial Times, had won over international opinion to the view the real problem in France is the hatred of Muslims.
Yet this consensus of ignorance between the executive and a few asinine academics overshadowed the fundamental problem: as I have noted, the term “Islamist” — which in French connotes political Islam, and particularly the Muslim Brotherhood culturally permeated with a radicalized Salafism — has no functional equivalent in Arabic. The word that comes closest, Islamawi, proved to be useless in the crisis, since it is devoid of shades of meaning that would matter to Muslims. And the notion of “separatism” — for which Arabic actually does have meaningful equivalents, ranging from fitna (sedition, especially of a denominational nature, usually in the phrase fitna ta’ïfiyya) to bara’a (rupture with, or disavowal of, nonbelievers) on which Salafist ideology assiduously bases itself — requires a significant effort of explanation to make the link between the two lingusitic registers. This was why Macron’s criticism of “Islamist separatism” was widely portrayed as a questioning of Muslims generally (“Islamist” being rendered simply and inaccurately by Islami, or “Islamic”). This distortion was originated by political and propagandistic organizations and associations in France, such as the “humanitarians” of BarakaCity and the CCIF beating the drums of “French Islamophobia.”
After Macron’s speech, and in the aftermath of the murder of Samuel Paty, the Anglo-Saxon press, always anxious about being on the wrong side of identity and inclusion, and always eager to denounce French-style secularism, were quick to chime in. They ignored the momentous fact that the French approach to religious freedom implied also freedom from religion — the emancipation of the individual from clerical domination, which is not a small problem, as honest members of devout religious communities will attest. Instead, in the name of certain Protestant or Jewish perspectives, they accused Macron and his predecessors of acting in the nefarious traditions of the anti-Huguenot dragonnades of Louis XIV or Pétain’s anti-Semitism. According to this view, the freedom to blaspheme, one of the fundamental accomplishments of the Enlightenment and a central feature of any open society, amounted only to the heartless and hegemonic injunction to “spit on the religion of the weak.” This stupidity is now professed by our Islamo-leftists, post-colonials, and intersectionals, who hold the high ground in the universities and interdict any critical approach to Islam — which, like Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism, and for that matter atheism, agnosticism, and freemasonry, is a faith in which one can distinguish denominations and persuasions, many different schools of theology and currents of practice, various forms and styles of piety, including the spirit of confrontation and intolerance as well as the spirit of integration and respect.
The general ignorance of Arabic languages and cultures, of the diversity of idioms and traditions in Muslim lands and communities, has led to a colossal irony: some on the left have invented an image of Islam with a structure identical to the image propagated by the extreme right, only it is inverted. Where the latter demonize all Muslims and their religion as an ontologically negative religious entity, the former are content to turn such generalizations into a positivity as lenient as it is essentialist. They would be well advised to ponder what happened to their Turkish counterparts, who, at the start of this century, made a hero of Erdogan by crediting him with democratic virtues and cultural authenticity in facing down the “secular fascist” heirs of Ataturk. These partisans ended up rotting in his prisons, suppressed and tortured like Communist fellow travelers of yore — useful idiots whom the Stalinist regime thanked for their willful blindness by locking them up in the Gulag.
The sensational trial of the murderers of January 7–9, 2015 should have started to heal the deep wounds that they inflicted on French society. It should have been a kind of Nuremberg tribunal for this ideology and its crimes. Unfortunately, it ended up being eclipsed first by the Covid-19 outbreak and the ensuing lockdown, and then by the campaign against “French Islamophobia.” The objective of that campaign was to prevent anybody from shining a light on the continuum between the radical Islamist “entrepreneurs of rage” and the jihadist assassins acting on their ideas. This strategy of diversion was similar to the one that the Collective Against Islamophobia in France successfully employed in the summer of 2016 to becloud the Bastille Day massacre in Nice, when they preferred instead to focus on the hostile “Islamophobic” reactions provoked by burkini-clad bathers on the beach above which the slaughter had taken place.
All this tumult, all this violence, was provoked by the cartoons of the Prophet that Charlie Hebdo republished at the opening of the trial. And so it is important to add a further reflection. Criticism is not censorship: it is a social and intellectual duty. Once we recognize that there exists a right to blaspheme, nothing prevents us from making an ethical judgment about a drawing. The freedom to publish it, which must be fiercely defended, does not amount to an endorsement of its content. Nor does it prohibit us from criticizing it — no matter the solidarity expressed with the Charlie Hebdo staff that was decimated by the jihadist killers in 2015, and with the victims of those who followed them in 2020.
A day after the cartoons that became an excuse for murder originally appeared in the September 19, 2012 issue of Charlie Hebdo, I went on French public radio. In a discus-sion with the journal’s lawyer, I expressed my revulsion at this mediocre sketch, and our exchange went downhill from there. Although the journal’s cover title “Muhammad: A Star Is Born” referred to the Prophet, I saw its cartoon less as blasphemy and more as an attack on human dignity in the form of a degrading depiction of believers of whatever kind, whose faith the atheist in me respects even if he cannot share it. Eight years and dozens of deaths later, I take back nothing from my view at the time. Jihadist terrorism and its breeding ground of Islamist separatism pose a serious and wrenchingly complicated problem for our societies that neither foolishness nor ignorance will contribute to solving. We have been called upon to be firm about many things.