Bière de Garde

    How good it is, to sip a beer
    outdoors, with winter drawing near,
    above the wreckage of a meal.

    How good, before the bill comes due,
    to watch a copper light gleam through
    an ale infused with chanterelle

    and trust yourself to only those
    sensations of the tongue and nose,
    what’s felt, and how it makes you feel.

    A sip held in the mouth evokes
    a golden bloom among the oaks
    and water drawn up from a well

    one afternoon spent near the source
    of happiness, atop a horse
    that now stands idle in its stall.

    These days you keep too much inside,
    but once you foraged far and wide
    through pastures north of Carbondale.

    How fine, that you have faintly caught
    a sour note of apricot
    so deep in the cloudy dregs of fall,

    the past in what has come to pass,
    and cradle in your palm a glass
    of once, a final swig of ale.

    Beulah Land

    Going home means anywhere
    but here, putting aside
    worn grays
    for the bright amber
    of a fall morning.
    No more counting days
    in the clack and steam of laundry.

    With the hush of brakes
    a Greyhound bus
    glides beneath the trees
    and past a shuttered smelter.
    Grisaille shadows.
    Chains of geese.
    A swath of sheepish sunlight

    on foothills south of Zion.
    As day dims
    the windows turn
    to mirrors,
    and the coach hums
    with quiet conversation,
    murmurs into cell phones.

    How might freedom feel
    after seven years away?
    Vibrations through
    the bootheel,
    with a cardboard box
    and bus fare
    to any place but here.

    Last Song

    after Guiraut Riquier

    It’s for the best that I stop singing.
    Songs should come from happiness,
    and lately I’ve felt less and less
    inspired, with my horizon shrinking.
    When I recall my darkest days
    and contemplate a world ablaze
    and dread extinctions of tomorrow,
    who could wonder at my sorrow?

    My fire dwindled long ago.
    I rake the ashes, fitting muse
    for crafting esoteric blues
    from scraps of what I feel and know:
    at dusk, a woodcock on the wing
    tumbles into early spring,
    and yet in verse such things express
    a feeling of belatedness.

    These days, authorities dismiss
    the subtle circuitries of rhyme
    as relics of another time
    or quaint devices that persist
    on shelves of kitsch and curios.
    Why not attempt a work in prose —
    a memoir to mythologize
    my progress through a world of lies?

    We live with gaps, hypocrisies,
    and flights of happiness brought low,
    estranged from what we feel and know.
    As every instrument agrees,
    we live in seasons out of sync,
    a February on the brink
    of never, snow extinguishing
    the first magnolia blossoming.

    This dread has tainted everything:
    each dawn I come to consciousness
    in panic, prickles of distress,
    and clench my teeth. Why would I sing?
    Towhees still propose a slow
    familiar tune, but no words follow;
    this ache of feeling finds no phrase,
    no means by which to mourn or praise.

    After Wyatt

    They slip away, those creatures who
    once caught my eye and ventured near,
    near enough to smell of snow
    as cold lingered in their fur
    and breath warmed my sleeping ear;
    who ate an apple from my hand
    and lounged in sunlight, unconstrained.

    Such old affections slip away,
    all but one, la douce dolor:
    she leaned above me as I lay
    stretched out on the kitchen floor,
    caught within her net of hair;
    then quickened by a passing mood,
    she softly asked, Does that feel good?

    She lingered in my consciousness
    when I awoke, a bit confused
    to find her gone, the place a mess,
    and emptiness come home to roost.
    I wonder if she’d be amused
    to see me settled down, and if
    she still pursues that wayward life.

    Mortifying

    Thirty-five minutes into the movie The Piano Teacher, there occurs an indelible scene. In a dim bathroom cluttered with drugstore label sprays, lotions, and other feeble concoctions designed to fend off decay, a middle-aged woman in a silk robe briskly zips open her pocketbook and removes a folded slip of paper, which she unfolds to reveal a razor blade. Armed with this instrument, she turns around, slips off her flip flops, opens her robe, and sits on the edge of her bathtub with her legs splayed. She moves resolutely but without authority, with a kind of robotic resolve, as if she were complying rather than presiding, mechanically obeying an inner necessity. The camera displays her in profile. A pink hand mirror rests on a ledge by the tub among bottles of various shapes and sizes. She snatches up the glass and holds it out between her knees with one hand, still gripping the blade in the other. Then Erika Kohut, the piano teacher, leans forward intently, carefully adjusts the mirror until she appears satisfied with her view, moves the knife towards her groin, and slices inside herself several times with strained and steady force. A curtain of flat auburn hair conceals all her face except her lips, which are puckered perhaps in pain, perhaps in concentration. She breathes heavily, apparently exerting great effort. Rivulets of crimson liquid spill out of her and into the porcelain basin. Then the mutilation is halted abruptly by banality. “Erika, dinner is ready!” her aging mother, with whom she lives in a cramped apartment, summons her from the other room. “Coming, Mother!” replies the dutiful daughter while snatching a thick menstrual pad from an open bag beside her and pressing it to the wounds between her legs.

    It has been reported that at the press screening for The Piano Teacher at the Cannes Film Festival in 2001, members of the audience guffawed at this scene. Their laughter in response to the self-mutilation just witnessed was as sickening as it was unwarranted — significantly more discomfiting than the blood in the bathtub. If the director, Michael Haneke, had intended the mortification to be funny — he does in fact have a profoundly twisted sense of humor — he should not have cast Isabelle Huppert as Erika. Huppert possesses a ferality which somehow does not mitigate her natural sophistication. And in the scene in the bathroom Huppert is feral in precisely the way that a woman’s hatred of her own womanhood is feral.

    Yes: a woman’s hatred of her own womanhood. It exists, it snarls in our bellies; and Huppert’s peerless performance is among its rare open expressions. She brilliantly communicates in the bathroom scene the gravity of her ferocious behavior. Owing to her marrow-deep conviction, conscious or not, of the significance of that drawn blood, the savagery that Erika Kohut perpetrates against herself is exhilarating. I do not mean to deny that it is also grotesque, revolting, and wrenching. And yet it is at the same time emphatically thrilling in the way that it is always thrilling when a person acts openly upon a perplexing, wounding, and unacknowledged truth. The blood is a shibboleth and the truth that it communicates extends beyond the inner torments of this piano teacher. Her action is symptomatic of the cruel reality that there is a long tradition — longer than most contemporary women know — of womanly self-mortification. Those streams of crimson encapsulate a common and time-honored and baffling compulsion: a woman’s compulsion to attack herself.

    What accounts for this propensity is a mystery, but the evidence for the compulsion is plentiful. Of course, most women, or more women, casually contract or stunt themselves rather than slice and starve themselves. But the slicing and the starving are hardly unheard of, and they are manifestations of the same proclivities, and are emphatically more common in women than men. Women are three to four times more likely to suffer from anorexia and bulimia and to cut than men are. Those numbers are strikingly reminiscent of another grizzly statistic: men are four times more likely to be murdered and to commit murder than women. It would seem that men brutalize one another and women brutalize themselves. (There are holes in such generalizations, of course.) In his learned and compassionate book Cutters, the psychotherapist Steven Levenkron describes these tendencies so well he seems to explain them:

    In the case of girls, they will absorb the blame for most behaviors directed against them. Whether it’s a natural component inherent to femininity, a sense of physical helplessness, or a combination of both, disorders of self-harm, for the most part, affect girls and women. These include cutting, anorexia, bulimia, and other self-harming behaviors. Males, for the most part, tend to externalize blame and emotional discomfort by acting out on others, from street fights to rapes and homicide… While we see crossovers in both genders, the patterns favor the classic models for aggression.

    In ordinary places such as locker rooms, sidewalks, and shopping centers, or in moments of intimate confidence, if you have been paying attention, you will have caught glimpses of forearms riddled with slashes of pale pink flesh, or dark red grooves, thick and deep. The character is familiar: the “fucked up” over-achiever; the type-A freak with a 5.00 GPA and a razor blade in her backpack; or a calorie counter pulled up on her iPhone.

    “Fucked up” is hardly a useful clinical description or a worthy literary appellation, but it is the term that, shamefully, often comes to mind. The reason is that generally we have not bothered to consider her charitably or deeply. We have squandered abundant opportunities to develop compassion for her. To outsiders she seems crazy, even selfish, depriving herself of the sustenance offered her, and forcing her friends and family to agonize over her poor choices. But strictly speaking she has not made choices, and her actions were not catalyzed by mere melodrama. Of all mental illnesses, eating disorders have the highest mortality rate. Between five and ten percent of people who suffer from anorexia die within ten years of developing the disease, and roughly twenty percent die within twenty years. Patients admitted to hospitals for anorexia or bulimia are told outright that they will likely come back, that escape from their own mental cells is practically impossible. Hope is extinguished in these personal purgatories. Yet the contemporary discussion about female self-harm is tinctured with a maddening unseriousness. In the popular imagination the bony, bleeding, scarred young girls are considered hysterical, even ridiculous. “Fucked up” is a terribly unimpressive thing to be.

    The general discussion of these disorders curdles with glibness bordering on contempt in the medical profession as well. When Levenkron first discovered that one of his patients had resorted to self-mutilation, he asked colleagues if they had encountered similar cases. His fellow psychotherapists would respond with chilling disinterest: “Oh yeah, another cutter. They’re pretty sick cookies.” This blasé attitude about cutting and other instances of analogous self-harm is baffling, given the carnage. Perhaps that is the reason so little is known about why women do this to themselves. The platitudinous explanations generally given are as satisfying as celery sticks. It is endlessly repeated that these girls are motivated by a need for control. But what, exactly, have they been deluded into believing that they can control through self-harm? Starvation saps a person of the energy to think clearly, so perhaps they are ceding control as much as gaining it.This so-called explanation is simply a description of a symptom the cause of which remains mysterious and unexamined.

    It is also said that their violent self-mortifications are owed to a pathological desire to be skinny. Perhaps that accounts for some of the violence, but it cannot account for all of it. Women have been starving themselves for far longer than thigh gaps and jutting collarbones have been in vogue. In her classic study Holy Feast and Holy Fast, the medievalist scholar Caroline Walker Bynum shows that since the medieval centuries food and fasting have been central to female spirituality:

    Although women were only about 18 percent of those canonized or revered as saints between 1000 and 17000, they were 30 percent of those in whose lives extreme austerities were a central aspect of holiness and over 50 percent of those in whose lives illness (often brought on by fasting and other penitential practices) was the major factor in reputation for sanctity… most males who were revered for fasting fit into one model of sanctity — the hermit saint (usually a layman) — and this was hardly the most popular male model, whereas fasting characterized female saints generally. Between late antiquity and the fifteenth century there are at least thirty cases of women who were reputed to eat nothing at all except the eucharist, but I have been able to find only one or possibly two male examples of such behavior before the well-publicized fifteenth-century case of the hermit Nicholas Flüe.

     

    The earliest known examples of food-avoidant female saints occur in the Low Countries in the late 1100s. Mary of Oignies was born in 1170, and was renowned for practicing extreme asceticism. She ate no meat, hardly any fish, and subsisted largely on vegetables and bits of bread so old and coarse that the morsels would draw blood while scraping the roof of her mouth. Her biographer, James of Vitry, asked her how it was possible that her fasts and her frantic sobs (she cried when meditating on Christ) did not cause crushing headaches. She answered: “These tears are my feast; they are my bread day and night; they… feed my mind rather than emptying and afflicting my head, they bring satiety to my soul.” Many female saints experienced communion with God as food itself, and during ritualistic intervals they could not stomach ordinary food. Upon receiving an unconsecrated host, Mary of Oignies vomited and then washed her mouth to obliterate the aftertaste. During the last year of her life, Margaret of Ypres (1216-1237) could swallow nothing but the eucharist. Juliana of Cornillon (c.1192-1258) practiced extreme fasting and as a teenager craved the eucharist and preferred prayer to food. When her caretakers endeavored to persuade her to eat, she insisted that “I want better and more beautiful food.”

    These women, and there were many more, are our spiritual ancestors. Of course, not every teenager who starves herself is straining for spiritual transcendence, but they aren’t merely maladjusted adolescents, either. Something significant and deep is at work. It is a mistake to consider these two types, the starving saint and the scarred woman, as essentially distinct. What they share is fundamental: womanhood.

    Erika Kohut, broken and brazen, cuts at her womanhood directly. She attacks the inheritance that coerces her to raise the blade. Women often torment their bodies, but it is rare for a woman to acknowledge through this peculiar violence that her womanliness itself inspires this brutality. Something about womanhood, some obscure quality or conditioning, predisposes her to conceive of herself as an enemy, or as a prison — something to be tamed, or wrestled into submission. In that gut-twisting scene Erika attempts female castration, as if trying to break free from a self-sabotaging parasite that lives in and off her. Her attempt is strikingly ineffectual. She does not exhibit relief the way cutters do when physical pain, delicious as dopamine, releases them from psychic torture. But Erika is attempting an impossible exorcism. She does not evidence relief because relief is not attainable. (Elsewhere in the film her continued difficulties as a woman are made crushingly clear.) There is no effective method for disentangling the strains of self that are harmless from those that she must expel. For there are — enmeshed, inextricable — two selves: the self attacking and the self attacked; the girl whose body has grown beyond girlhood and rebelled against her, and the woman. They are inseparable; a single life.

    Erika Kohut’s violence is freakish because of its extremity and its brutality. But there is a cornucopia of related behaviors to which we have become inured. Erika radically exemplifies something grotesquely ordinary. Women tend or are taught to contract themselves, to starve or mutilate their bodies or their minds. Shrinking is a woman’s business. Constant social and cultural training, implied and overt, prepares us to take up this self-undermining practice. It is painful to blunt ourselves, but it keeps us from operating at full strength, and that is a possibility we fear and cannot countenance. Women have been taught not to permit themselves to be intimidating. To paraphrase Colette, a female genius indulges in self-denial.

    Not all women carry razor blades in their pocketbooks, of course. But the extraordinary can teach us about the ordinary. It is useful to study the extreme cases, the freaks, the fanatics, the swollen iterations, to better understand the rest. In The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James considers only religious extremists in order to understand the religious temperament. His reasoning is compelling: inflamed essences and hyperbolic expressions are useful because in them the essential is exaggerated in a manner that makes it easier to detect and therefore to understand all the instances of a type: “we learn most about a thing when we view it under a microscope, as it were, in its most exaggerated form.” Erika’s attack is exaggerated, but her exaggeration makes manifest what is commonly the case. 

      But why is it commonly the case? What is it about the prospect of womanhood that inspires such fear and repulsion, a terror so great that a girl would choose to deprive her body of the energies that would catalyze and sustain menstruation, breast development, childbearing hips, and flowing hair? Where does the horror come from? Is it justified?

    In 1954, five years after The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir wrote a novel that was never published in her lifetime. It appeared only a few years ago and was translated into English by Sandra Smith in 2021. It is titled Inseparable, and in it Beauvoir tells the profoundly affecting story of a remarkable young girl, Andrée, through the eyes of her beloved friend Sylvie. As Andrée matures, her exceptionalism grows more apparent. This becomes increasingly unbearable for those around her, particularly her mother, an exacting Catholic woman who can tolerate erratic or conspicuous behavior in young girls, but not in young women. This story schools us in an age-old truth about the history of womanhood in society: it is a terrible thing for a woman to be special. Andrée deserves a prominent place in the annals of womanly mortification.

    ​Andrée Gallard and Sylvie Lepage meet in school in Paris when they are both nine years old — still young enough for Andrée’s gifts not to inspire envy or contempt. She is easy to admire, evidently precocious, irreverent but too young yet to be perceived as impudent or intimidating. There is a gripping, unsettling aura about her. She isn’t socialized the way the other girls in her class are, she “didn’t use the tone of voice she should have when talking to a teacher… [and] she walked with the confidence of an adult.” 

    Andrée introduces herself to Sylvie by explaining that she had started school a year late because two summers earlier she had been “burnt to a crisp” while roasting potatoes over a campfire. Her dress caught fire and the flesh on her thigh was burned straight through to the bone. Andrée tells this story with an air of impatience, bored at having repeated it so many times. Throughout the novel she demonstrates this same inhuman (or superhuman) disregard for physical pain — a warning that she is capable of seriously damaging her own body. She lacks the fear of physical suffering that paralyzes healthy, ordinary people. Madame Gallard relays another example of the same disregard when she tells “the story of Andrée’s martyrdom” to Sylvie’s mother:

    The cracked skin, enormous blisters, paraffin-coated dressings, Andrée’s delirium, her courage, how one of her little friends had kicked her while they were playing a game and had reopened her wounds — she’d made such an effort not to scream that she’d fainted.

     The extremity of this story inspires admiration and even awe in Sylvie, who feels suddenly as if nothing remotely interesting or important has ever happened to her.

    Sylvie had been a model student, top of her class in her first year. She maintains her perfect record, but she studies and reveres the contempt that Andrée harbors for the platitudinous and respectable ideas that the teachers at their conservative school spoon down the young girls’ throats. Throughout the long year spent lying flat on her back while her charred flesh bubbled and grew back, Andrée had read voraciously and developed opinions about fictional and historical figures and eras about which Sylvie knew very little. “Many of these opinions were subversive, but given her young age, the novices forgave her. ‘That child has personality,’ they said at school.” But how long before “personality” becomes “problematic”? How long until a forceful girl becomes a troublesome teenager, and then a dangerous woman?

    Sylvie’s love for her friend is pure, deep, and clean of jealousy or intimidation, as genuine friendship always is. She is aware that Andrée is exceptional, different in kind, that she possesses a power Sylvie cannot understand, and she revels in that knowledge.

    What gave her the greatest prestige in my eyes were certain unique characteristics whose meanings I never understood: when [Andrée] looked at a peach or an orchid, or if anyone simply said either word in front of her, Andrée would shudder and her arms would break out in goosebumps; those were the times when the heavenly gift she’d received — and which I marveled at so much — would manifest itself in the most disconcerting way: it was character. I secretly told myself that Andrée was one of those child prodigies whose lives would later be recounted in books.

    After summer vacation, when she and Andrée are separated for the first time since their meeting, Sylvie suddenly realizes that Andrée has inspired such intense love in her that she cannot bear to live without her. It is the most mature experience her young life has so far afforded.

    As the two girls grow, Sylvie’s love remains the only love which Andrée will ever receive that deepens rather than weakens as she becomes more formidable. Already by their second year together, the teachers have grown weary of Andrée’s wit and transgressiveness. She has by now recovered from the burns and is spirited and healthy. The stronger and more vivacious she becomes, the less likable she is. That first year she was manifestly weak, physically compromised, and this feebleness made it easier for others to conceive of her as needy rather than threatening. By now their concern has evaporated, and so has their patience. “They found her contradictory, ironic, prideful; they reproached her for making snide remarks. They never succeeded in catching her being downright insolent because Andrée carefully kept her distance, and that was perhaps what irritated them the most.” Generally, when young girls behave badly, their teachers depend on their mothers to rebuke them, to sound alarms about reputation and to instill within them the importance of appearances. But Madame Gallard indulges Andrée, and so there was little the teachers could do.

    ​Unlike Sylvie’s mother, Madame Gallard does not put much stock in the opinions of the schoolteachers. She does not hector Andrée about what the neighbors might think if they see her walking about the streets alone, or whether the other little girls call her odd or rude. At first it seems that Madame Gallard is much more permissive than the mothers Sylvie has come to know in Paris, but eventually Sylvie recognizes with foreboding that “her smile hid a trap,” and that Andrée’s evident freedom came at a price. Andrée is the second of seven children and is expected to care for her younger siblings and to participate in endless religious and familial duties, all enshrouded in piety. The social responsibilities that other girls her age must fulfill are in her case dwarfed by something of greater significance: God’s will and the sacrifices that it necessitates.

    Andrée willingly makes these sacrifices, which are fueled by the love that she feels for her family generally and her mother above all. That love is ferocious. The intensity of her filial passion is commensurate with the rest of her burning spirit, and greater than her mother can conceive or even deserve. For, tragically, Madame Gallard loves Andrée the way she believes a good Catholic mother ought to love one and all of her children, rather than in a way that is particular to Andrée and reflective of her difference, her impressive peculiarity. Andrée knows this, and it breaks her heart. She will be punished by a society that cannot tolerate exceptionalism in women — a punishment often exacted by other women.

    Madame Gallard knows that as Andrée gets older, her independence will shrink. She permits her freedoms early, when they are unimportant, and when they will not hinder her from submitting to tradition and loyalty. When Andrée reaches adulthood she will be expected to marry a man of her parents’ choosing, and renounce the individuality that she had been at liberty to cultivate. But Andrée understands none of this. In their second year of school, when her responsibilities to her family had only just begun to intensify, she tells Sylvie that she is “tired of being a child.” She imagines that the tightening fetters are features of childhood, and so she longs for adulthood. But she has it backwards: they will get tighter as she gets older, the more womanly she becomes, the farther she develops from prepubescent innocence. She is not afraid yet, but she will be.

      The parable of the strong young woman and her unjust destiny continues. Sylvie has an epiphany about the terms of Andree’s existence when she observes her in her father’s library in the country. There, amid the complete works of Joseph de Maistre, the writings of Louis Veuillot, and the photographs of Andrée’s bearded ancestors, Sylvie sees clearly for the first time that Andrée is shackled in place by the inherited past: “Amid all those austere gentlemen, Andrée seemed out of place, too young, too delicate, and, especially, too alive…. I had often envied Andrée’s independence; suddenly, she seemed a lot less free than I was. Behind her, she had this past; and around her, this large house, this enormous family: a prison whose exits were carefully guarded.” Andree’s vigorous soulfulness suddenly seems too weak to withstand the pressures of tradition and the expectations of family. Andrée never stood a chance.

    Achingly, Sylvie recognizes that Andrée is complicit in her own imprisonment. In Steven Levenkron’s book, he describes a precocious daughter who is dispossessed of her own childhood because her parents expect her to shoulder parental obligations at a young age. Such a child believes that if she fails to play the role set for her, she will forfeit her parents’ affection. The child internalizes the anger that should be healthily directed at the parent, for fear of squandering the dregs of love that have been allotted to her. This case describes Andrée well. She longs for a larger horizon and at the same time believes that her aspirations are treasonous and sinful. She plays both mother and child in the tribunals of her imagination, both rebelling and scolding herself for her rebellion.

        Sylvie goes on to study philosophy at the Sorbonne. There she befriends the brilliant Pascal Blondel, whom she introduces to Andrée, and the two immediately kindle to one another. He is the first believing Catholic who has succeeded in earning Andrée’s admiration and who does not encourage her to abandon her gifts in the name of religious zeal. Hungry for assurances that her powers are not essentially wicked, Andrée applies Pascal’s forgiving theology like balm to her inflamed and confused self-conception: “‘If He has granted us His gifts, it’s so that we will use them,’ [Pascal] often told her. These words filled Andrée with enthusiasm; you would have thought that an enormous weight had been lifted from her shoulders.’’

    Andrée had absorbed from her environment the conviction that the expression of her individuality was itself a sin. She, like Simone Weil, another brilliant woman who attended the Sorbonne at the same time Simone de Beauvoir did, believed that humility was the highest calling and a religious responsibility. “Humility is the refusal to exist outside God,” Weil wrote. “It is the queen of virtues. The self is only the shadow which sin and error cast by stopping the light of God, and I take this shadow for a being. Even if we could be like God it would be better to be like muck which obeys God.”(Dying in exile in a London hospital in the summer of 1943, Weil starved herself to death, though there is some debate about whether her refusal to eat was an expression of solidarity with occupied France or the result of illness.) This form of faith, which similarly torments Andrée, is not gendered. Pascal, too, believes that hubris is a sin. But though philosophical belief is universal, the personal interpretation of it and its absorption into an individual psyche is particular; and so Andree’s relationship with the problem of humility and hubris differs from Pascal’s. Unlike him, Andrée is predisposed to interpret her gifts themselves as hubristic, as deplorable indulgences of pride, and to hold herself accountable to God for every instance of their cultivation. It is difficult for her, as it is difficult for many women, to justify aspirations to excellence and distinction. Andrée reminds herself often that her mother never does anything for herself but dedicates all her time to others, and she believes that it is her duty to do the same. (This is reminiscent of the medieval women saints in Bynum’s study, for whom feeding and healing others comprise the essence of their religious devotion.) Andrée suspects that she is capable of greatness, and that consciousness itself is, in her mind, incriminating. She longs to live fully and to renounce absolutely — both with equal vehemence.

    These internal contradictions will tear Andrée to pieces, and she will respond to them the way women so often have responded to them. When Sylvie visits her in the summer, she notices immediately that Andrée has grown very thin. One of the young Gallard sisters murmurs to Sylvie that “Mama tells her off, but she doesn’t eat a thing.” Andrée’s duties have metastasized beyond bearable proportions, and they have succeeded in crushing her spirit. She confesses to Sylvie that she prays every night that she will die in her sleep. Andrée reports that Madame Gallard has discovered that she is in love with Pascal. Sylvie is not worried, insisting that Madame Gallard will find Pascal beyond reproach since he is a Catholic, but Andrée explains despairingly: “a love match is suspicious.”

    Meanwhile the social responsibilities that Andrée had more or less evaded have at last been demanded of her at full force. Andrée bakes pies, sets and clears tables, takes the twins on outings, and makes small talk at parties. Madame Gallard trains her daughters, the way women have always trained one another, to keep things running, to plug the interstices, to conduct the business that men neither notice nor think to perform, and to do it in a whisper. These standards are imposed upon women by other women for the sake of men. And the competence that results, the gentle and practical intelligence, the tasteful self-restraint, is wholly devoid of prestige. Andrée must cultivate it, but she will not be honored for it. This is training for a life darting from event to event, paying respects at funerals, organizing charity sales, birthing, calming, and marrying off children, setting guests at ease, and facilitating or performing cleanups — a life of manners and mores, a life of duties, not victories. There is no glory in this work, and it is all that is permitted of her. With each task, each tender directive, it is pounded into Andrée’s battered heart that if she loves her family truly and responsibly then she must renounce herself. It is a poisonous, merciless lesson.

    Andrée despises the mindless labor, she has contempt for her own station, but she loves her mother and so plays the role to perfection for as long as she can bear it. Finally, though, the moment of violent self-mortification arrives. One day towards the end of the summer, she is instructed to chop wood before taking her sisters on an outing — a task that she dreads. In the shed she deliberately cuts her foot with the ax, certain that the wound will deliver her from the asphyxiating chores. “I couldn’t stand it anymore,” she whispers to Sylvie.

    A few days into her convalescence, Madame Gallard reports that she will not oppose her relationship with Pascal as long as the two get engaged immediately. Pascal refuses, arguing that they are too young to speak of an engagement. Madame Gallard decrees that Andrée cannot remain in Paris and mandates a two-year-long exile to Oxford, far away from Sylvie’s influence and Pascal’s stimulations. Pascal concurs, and tells Andrée that her desire to be in the same city as him is an expression of corporeal weakness, that it is sinful. Andrée, ever susceptible to accusations of sin and shame, internalizes his castigation and repeats it to Sylvie like a dutiful marionette: “They’re right, and I know that very well. I know very well that yielding to the flesh is a sin: I must avoid the temptations of the flesh. We must be brave enough to face the facts.” Sylvie listens with swelling horror. She knows that Andrée cannot bear such a prolonged separation from the people she loves.

    A week or so before her scheduled eviction, Andrée visits Pascal’s house and asks to speak to his father. In a feverish fit she begs him to accept her, not to hate her, and asks again and again why he is against her. Pascal, who recognizes her voice from the other room, calls a taxi to take Andrée to the hospital. Madame Gallard forwards a telegram to Sylvie the next day explaining that Andrée has been delirious all night. Four days later she dies. The last thing she said to her mother was, “There’s a problem child in every family: and that’s me.” Andrée is buried in her family cemetery in the country, to decay for eternity alongside the bones of her triumphant ancestors. Sylvie attends the funeral, paying respects for the last time to the greatest love of her life. She notices bitterly that Andrée’s “grave was covered in white flowers. In some strange way, I understood that Andrée had died, suffocated by that whiteness. Before leaving to catch my train, I placed three red roses on top of those pristine flowers.”

    Inseparable is based on the true story of Simone de Beauvoir and her closest childhood friend, Elisabeth Lacoin. Elisabeth Lacoin, or Zaza, as Simone called her, died two weeks before her nineteenth birthday, after falling in love with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a fellow student to whom Simone had introduced her. According to Zaza’s doctors, she died of viral encephalitis, but the circumstances of her death were just as mysterious as those of Andrée’s in the novel. In the introduction to Inseparable, Beauvoir’s adopted daughter Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir confides that if one were to ask Simone what had caused Zaza’s death, she would have said that “Zaza died because she was extraordinary. She was assassinated; her death was a spiritual crime.” Simone recounts Zaza’s story in her autobiographical work Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, but Inseparable is the only book dedicated entirely to Zaza’s tragedy.

    It is difficult for a young girl to forgive herself for being extraordinary. It is difficult for an extraordinary woman to spare herself. The conflicting loyalties that strangle Zaza are familiar. They are structurally the same as the contradictory conceptions of proper femininity that revive like multi-headed hydras in every generation, preying on the special ones, the ambitious ones, the glittering ones, the odd ones, the high achievers who long for control over their own fate, for the authority to grant themselves permission, or the authority to snuff out the elements within them that rebel. Thwarted in their spirits, they overpower themselves; they are quick studies, trained through guilt to become self-saboteurs.

    Is it outrageous to draw parallels between Zaza’s short life and the lives of contemporary women? After all, since her burial in that dusty graveyard there have been several tsunamis’ worth of feminist victories. Haven’t we made progress? Or, as an exasperated interlocutor put it to me recently, “what more can feminists possibly want?” (This remark was made before a woman’s right to choose was imperiled.) Isn’t the fate of Andrée and Zaza a thing of the past? Is a woman who is afraid of womanhood merely a coward, or out of touch? Have the emaciated adolescents lining the high school hallways not gotten the memo? Shouldn’t they just see a doctor? Didn’t they hear about #MeToo, and wasn’t #MeToo the most recent in a long sequence of battle cries, each one a little more triumphant than the last? Why on earth are we still talking about this?

    ​These questions betray a fundamental misunderstanding. Feminism is a political movement. It operates primarily in a single realm of human life — the political realm. The nerve endings and muscles that it has developed are effectual or not, clumsy or not, exacting or not, within that realm. The movement ought to be judged according to the progress it has eked out through political means. But most of life takes place outside the realm of politics, and so there are many realms of life in which feminism has no teeth. Second-wave feminism insisted that “the personal is political,” and the Women’s Liberation Movement adopted that slogan because it wanted to persuade women to draw political conclusions from their own grim experiences. Yet that slogan, like all slogans, was intended more to be effective than to be truthful. History has proven it wrong. Since the 1960s political liberation has strengthened, but personal liberation remains illusory. The reason is simple: the emancipation of the soul from its inherited demons cannot be accomplished by Congress or the courts.

    The personal is not reducible to, or contingent upon, the political. Today (and for all time) this bifurcation hermetically seals off the realms in which a woman is encouraged to be an aggressive Girl Boss from the realms in which she is shamed (by herself as much as anyone else) for asserting her autonomy. In The Second Sex, Beauvoir lucidly described this confounding inevitability:

    The advantage man enjoys and which manifests itself from childhood onward is that his vocation as a human being in no way contradicts his destiny as a male… for a woman to accomplish her femininity, she is required to be object and prey; that is, she must renounce her claims as a sovereign subject. This is the conflict that singularly characterizes the situation of the emancipated woman. She refuses to confine herself to her role as a female because she does not want to mutilate herself; but it would also be a mutilation to repudiate her sex.

    Women who battle to smash the glass ceiling by day (and are feted for doing so) find themselves mysteriously compliant when confronted with a Tinder date’s odious demands and expectations. Suddenly these women cannot permit themselves to disappoint a stranger. (There was more dignity in complying physically with God’s demands, or in disappointing Him.) In these two realms, they are trying to fulfill contradictory roles: the role that feminism set for them, and the role that their womanhood imposes on them. Feminism is emphatically not the same thing as womanhood.

    And so it should not surprise us, it should not strike us as antiquated, that a daughter of the twenty-first century is just as likely as Elisabeth Lacoin to extinguish herself. Why hasn’t feminism taught her otherwise? Because that is not what feminism can do. Feminism can advocate for equal pay, but it cannot convince the women in the boardroom that they deserve to be there. The movement cannot teach a woman to like or admire or respect herself. It cannot eliminate from the consciousness of a young girl the stifling certainty that achieving proper womanhood will always mean developing a virtuosic capacity for self-denial, for self-abnegation, for self-mortification. Each new generation of girls is remorselessly inducted into this repressive sisterhood. Failing to equip ourselves, our daughters, and our sisters, with the capacity for emancipation, for inner emancipation, is not a feminist failing: it is a human one.

    The War Has Happened

    It is a dreary world, gentlemen.

    GOGOL

    The most consequential event of our time, I pray, will be the heroism of the Ukrainians. Here are men and women fighting and dying for liberal democracy. It was beginning to seem as if such a thing were no longer possible. Worse, no longer desirable. Here in the West, Jeshurun waxed fat and kicked. We have just been through years of contempt for liberal democracy, and the great disparagement is hardly over. We have been told that everything bad in our age is the fault of liberalism, or worse, neo-liberalism, whatever that is. It has been blamed for just about all the unhappiness in the world; and so the peddlers of a new happiness gloatingly call themselves post-liberal, on all sides of the rotted ideological spectrum. Sometimes one has to rub one’s eyes in disbelief at the intensity of the hatred for liberal democracy: do these fools really understand what they are saying? And then Vladimir Putin, with perfect candor about his lack of scruple and an inhuman absence of shame, attacked Ukraine. The question of his motivation is murky, like everything about this dead little man; there are those who attribute his war to strategic considerations and those who attribute it to mystical ones. Yet Putin’s objective could hardly be more plain: it is to stop the spread of liberal democracy, which in recent years has been exhilaratingly identified with the political evolution of Ukraine. Like his Soviet predecessors, Putin fears nothing more than sharing a border with freedom, which has a way of getting through barbed wire.

    One of the most striking features of the discussion about the war in Ukraine is how little the anti-liberal left and the anti-liberal right have contributed to it. The left does not support Russia, of course; but it does not support American support for Ukraine either, at least not with its customary relish. What the Ukrainians can expect from the progressives is an airlift of thoughts and prayers. I suspect that what really outrages them about Putin’s invasion, even more than its war crimes, is that it might beget an increase in the American defense budget; or worse, a revival of “the Washington foreign policy establishment” and “the Washington elite,” by which they mean anybody who holds a view contrary to theirs. This is populism as national security policy. In recent decades progressives have been more fascinated by Islam’s martyrs than by liberalism’s martyrs. They certainly do not look favorably upon the new activism of American foreign policy that has been engendered by the Ukrainian war. In their view, American foreign policy should be nothing more than a commemoration of the Iraq war unto the end of time. Our disgraceful retreat from Afghanistan was celebrated as precisely such a tribute to our post-Iraq wisdom. And now Putin comes along and spoils things. Just when we thought we were out, they pull us back in! (In fact, the conjunction of events was not a coincidence: our flight from Afghanistan made the moment auspicious for the Russian aggression.) In the curious logic of left-wing isolationism, the danger of Putin’s imperialism is that it may beget American imperialism, since all American interventions are by definition imperialistic. Putin has played into LBJ’s hands, if you see what I mean. And so here is Frantz Fanon, I mean Pankaj Mishra, warning that “Putin’s atrocities in Ukraine have now given” that aforesaid establishment “an opportunity to make America seem great again.” (No, not seem; be.) And here is Glenn Greenwald solemnly reporting Noam Chomsky’s remark that “fortunately” there is “one Western statesman of stature” agitating for a diplomatic solution to the war. That saving giant of diplomacy is Donald J. Trump. The spectacle of Chomsky’s degeneration is delightful.

    As for the post-liberal right, they are stuck with their admiration of Viktor Orban, who is stuck with his admiration of Vladimir Putin. They all deserve each other. In Poland, at least, even the post-liberals, including some of the prophets whom certain American reactionary intellectuals revere, have been clear about their opposition to the Russian war, but then Poland, for the obvious reason, has always been especially wakeful about Russia. Yet even as the horrors in Ukraine abound, the poisonous post-liberal vapors proliferate. A few months ago I came across a piece by Patrick Deneen, one of the most important thinkers that Hungary has produced, in which he discussed the thought of Augusto del Noce, a twentieth-century Italian Catholic philosopher who wrote probingly about modern atheism, which he interestingly called “natural irreligion.” Deneen said that “Del Noce saw further and better than most of his contemporaries that the great totalitarian threat of our age emanated not ultimately from the dictatorships of so-called communist regimes of the Soviet Union or China, but from the unfolding liberal logic of the West.” A bit of explication: Stalinist Russia and Maoist China were “so-called communist” because communism, in the teaching of the right-wing post-liberals, was at bottom liberalism. Really. Deneen posted that sentence about the totalitarian threat of the West while the Russian troops were massacring Mariupol. They were committing those atrocities, and many others, precisely in the name of the ethnonationalism and the anti-liberalism that these Western reactionaries have been urging upon us. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the writings of these Western ingrates, and for my sins I have read a lot of them, look to me like little more than a symptom of the decadence that they deplore.

    The West has found a teacher in Volodymyr Zelensky. He is stripping the banality from the truths that we hold to be self-evident; teaching us what we already know but have demoted to cliché and the inertness of civil religion; refreshing our sense of the beauty of our dispensation, all its current grotesqueries notwithstanding. He is a new kind of contemporary hero: the fighting liberal. He has the authority of his courage. When we assist him in his fight for liberal democracy, we are returning the favor. No such figure has emerged out of Europe since Havel, though it is doubtful that Havel could have presided over the management of a war. (How is it that both of these moral leaders came from the theater? Rousseau would have been baffled.)

    In 2014 I spent many hours in Maidan, the central square of Kyiv, or rather in its ruins. It was the charred scene of one of democracy’s finest battles. The place had been instantly turned into a memorial to the protestors who were murdered there. There were candles everywhere, in brightly colored holders that contradicted the bleakness of the scene. There were flowers, photographs, posters, crosses, and yellow-and-blue flags. The pavements were torn up, and tires were piled high in black towers that served as barricades. Fires caused by the government’s onslaught had blackened the surrounding buildings, which were also scarred by the bullets of police snipers. There were tents in which demonstrators from the “revolution of dignity” stubbornly lived, refusing to retreat from the scene. It was an honor to stand there. Even secular people have holy grounds. I might as well have been in the streets of Paris in 1871, or at Garibaldi’s spedizione. The impression was indelible; it melted me and steeled me. Before I went to Kyiv, I believed that I was headed for a city that aspired to be a Western city, and that I was going there to applaud its aspiration. When I arrived in Kyiv, I recognized my mistake. Kyiv already is a Western city. There is nothing aspirational about its openness, its pluralistic vitality, its reforming energy. To be sure, it was still in the middle of a struggle; the old order, authoritarian and corrupt and oligarchic, will not gently quit history’s stage. But the forces of freedom — in a place such as Maidan one learns to use those words without irony or sophistication — seemed to be winning. If they had lost, Putin would not have attacked.

    Were we prepared, intellectually and operationally, for Putin’s war in Ukraine? We must consider this question carefully, because we are not headed for a halcyon age. In our conflicted country, there has been only a single consensus in recent decades. It is that the United States should shrink its station in the world, that it must no longer loom so large, that it needs to “reduce its footprint” and “play the long game,” that it must adjust its ends to its means, that for itself it must come first (and then brook no seconds), that American leadership is more of a problem for the world than a solution. All the parties, each for their own reasons, concurs in these miniaturizing propositions, which became known as “responsible statecraft.” Occasionally they would just come right out and say it, as when the despicable J. D. Vance declared that “I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another.” Spoken like a true hillbilly. But there are many other foreign-policy hillbillies, alas, some of them denizens of the Acela corridor and even of Aspen, who harbor a similar indifference to the fate of countries and peoples beyond our borders. Those whose consciences do not permit them to openly express their callousness prefer to call themselves “realists.” Realists almost always advocate the same positions as isolationists, except that their op-ed pieces are longer.

    The ethical phoniness of realism found its perfect avatar in Barack Obama, who draped Elie Wiesel’s language over Henry Kissinger’s policies. The war in Ukraine is substantially the consequence of the moral and strategic timidity of Obama, who opened a strategic vacuum in the Middle East that Putin quickly proceeded to fill and thereby to inaugurate the contemporary (and until then, unlikely) resurgence of Russia. It is important to recognize that the strategic vacuum was made possible by a moral vacuum: if it had been the policy of the United States that, one way or another, with force or without, with allies or without, we would not stand idly by the genocide in Syria, we would have retained a regional position that might have kept Russia at bay. Obama’s apologists refer to his timidity as a respect for complexity. As someone who is in the complexity business myself, I can testify that sometimes we abuse the idea. Realists have a condescending way of believing that people who disagree with them are unaware of the facts, that only they, the wised-up members of the panel, know the score. They like to point out that a course of action is difficult and has costs, though usually it is a course of action of which they disapprove on other grounds. Every decisive historical action is difficult and has costs. Even us bloodthirsty interventionists know that. But justice — the word never appears in the discourse of realists, except in their “to be sure” sentences — requires that we not be daunted. We may fail and we may make mistakes, but at least we can live with ourselves; and more important than whether or not we can live with ourselves, since the suffering of others is not primarily about us, other people can live.

    In individuals, we regard the unwillingness to help, to come to the rescue, as a flaw of personal character. Is the same selfishness in collective action a flaw of national character? In individuals, we regard the secession from one’s surroundings, the withdrawal from effective participation in one’s world, as a personal disorder. Is the same truncated relationship to reality in the collective a national disorder? Is isolationism psychotic?

    Oh, for a little American hubris.

    We need to overcome our appetite for futurist indignation. During the years of ISIS, one could not escape the observation, offered always with astonishment, that here was an eighth-century caliphate in the twenty-first century. Amazing! Well, no. Everything that takes place in this moment is of this moment. We must see the entirety of the world in which we live. We chose to regard ISIS as an anachronism because it comforted us. Religious violence, we needed to believe, is not typical of our times, but a relic of earlier times, a florid exception to the Whiggish linearity in which we wallowed. We denied the intractability of history, the persistence with which certain features of human experience survived past the enormous changes that we were busily exalting. We were so dazzled by the discontinuities that we belittled the continuities. History offended our futurist excitement. Obama liked to play the man from the future. He pronounced that the important foreign policy challenges for which we must now prepare ourselves are Ebola and climate change. Meanwhile the world around him was becoming more and more Hobbesian, with aggressions and savageries to match the traditional ones. As he, and a great many other mandarins, enjoyed the globalist cool, the world was turning increasingly local and increasingly Westphalian, which is to say, it was becoming more familiar to those who bother about the past. In his first campaign Obama once said, in one of his many reassurances that the Russians were too weak for us to worry about them, that “you can’t be a twenty-first century power and act like a twentieth-century dictatorship.” But you can. In significant ways the twenty-first century still is the twentieth century. (In our domestic tribulations, too.) Stephen Kotkin was right when he recently argued, and showed, that “the Cold War never ended.”

    After Antonio Gutteres, the Secretary General of the United Nations, toured Bucha and its bodies, he remarked: “The war is an absurdity in the twenty-first century. The war is evil.” He was half-right. Bucha is now one of the capitals of modern barbarism, alongside Urumqi, Rakhine, Aleppo, Srebrenica, Nyarubuye, Lidice, Guernica, and the rest. But evil is not absurd, and to call it absurd is to evade its force. Absurdity is a category of logic and art. Evil is an inalienable feature of the history made by human beings. It has a logic of its own, which is why it creates its intellectuals and its mobs. If only falsehood were always absurd! The war in Ukraine is not absurd, because it is evil. One of the reasons that we were intellectually unprepared for the war in Ukraine is that we spent decades exalting newness and declaring old things obsolete. Here is another example. In 2010, the Obama administration released its defense budget, a “reform budget,” along with a new security document. Since many military appropriations were to be cut, people assumed that the cuts were driven by fiscal considerations. But the cuts were of a piece with a new conception of national security. They were driven by historical and strategic concepts. The document announced that land wars were a thing of the past, and that henceforth we could accomplish our military objectives mainly with Special Ops and drones. It was a fine document of the anti-Iraq-war ethos, and completely deluded. The new strategy was lauded for its moral superiority: fewer innocent civilians would be killed by such more precisely targeted operations. (Of course this inevitably led to the objection that the lower toll made the use of force more likely, so that limited strikes, too, lacked legitimacy, which by my lights leads directly to the brink of pacifism, or at least to a revival of the Kellogg-Briand nonsense, which anyway was already taking place.) But you cannot conquer territory, or hold territory, or expel an enemy from territory, from the air or like thieves in the night. And here is the war in Ukraine, mile after mile of it, town after town, to disprove all this advanced strategic illusion. We are sending heavy weaponry to the Ukrainians because there is no other way for them to expel the invader. History can be trite, which is how it readies us.

    It was stirring to watch the reception of the Ukrainian refugees in Poland and the other Eastern European states. When was the last time that we saw refugees warmly welcomed and no controversy attached to their plight? Then I remembered my Syrian friends and the travails of their community in its own flight. I imagined how they must have felt when they saw all those hugs and smiles in Przemysl and elsewhere. In Europe, you see, Ukrainians are not exactly the other. (That is what scares Putin.) There is nothing wrong with helping people who are like oneself, but it is not the most exacting test of one’s compassion.

    We wasted so much time in the long prelude to the Russian invasion. While Putin was amassing a vast force near the Ukrainian border, we argued with ourselves about the likelihood of war. Those who contended that war was coming, based on the incontrovertible evidence of Putin’s massive preparations for it, were regarded as the hawks, when in fact they were the realists. The doves, though these terms are coarse in these circumstances, insisted upon more diplomacy. They thought that pushing the elevator button again would make it come faster. Diplomacy became a kind of placebo for people who were not in the mood for another conflict that would in some way, hot or cold, involve us. American officials protested that a diplomatic solution was possible even as Putin’s tanks started rolling. One of my favorite errors of the Obama administration made its appearance in the Biden administration: the off-ramp. Remember, we have been here before. Putin’s current invasion is the third act of his protracted war on Ukraine: in 2014 he stole Crimea, and soon afterward he launched a separatist rebellion in Donetsk and Luzhansk, which in the aftermath of his recent failure to take Kyiv he is now attempting to complete with his own troops. During the Crimean crisis, which strictly speaking was not a crisis at all, since Putin stole it with impunity, Obama kept talking about the need to find Putin an off-ramp, a way out, as if the role of the United States was to be sagaciously helpful to Russia so that it could learn from its mistakes. (I was reminded of this misplaced magnanimity when a Democratic congresswoman recently said that the American task now is “to craft a win for Putin.”) But Putin was not looking for the off-ramp. He was, quite plainly, looking for the on-ramp. He found it and he took it. He has been taking the on-ramp in Ukraine for most of a decade. And anyone who knows that there is an on-ramp knows that there is an off-ramp. If they do not avail themselves of it, it is because they have a different itinerary in mind. Anyway, the option of turning around and going home is always there: other, equally proud states have done so, such as France and the United States. Putin is in Ukraine because he believes that Ukraine is his, Russia’s, its “near abroad,” or Novorussiya; and that therefore he need not restrain himself from destroying its democratic experiment. “We’ve sought to provide possible off-ramps to President Putin,” Secretary Blinken said in March. “He’s the only one who can decide whether or not to take them.” But then he added, immediately, and with an admirable alteration in tone: “So far, every time there’s been an opportunity to do just that, he’s pressed the accelerator and continued down this horrific road that he’s been pursuing.” Meanwhile the Ukrainians themselves have not bothered about the ramps. They have been courageously attacking the highways.

    Re Putin and religion: I was reading a Hebrew poem, published in 1940, about the “Winter War,” the Russian invasion of Finland in the previous year, which in some respects reminds one of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The poet referred to a strange incident that was reported by a newspaper in Stockholm. It appears that Finnish pilots flew sorties over Leningrad in which they dropped hundreds of little Bibles on the city, “because they believed it would have a decisive influence on the spirit of the Red Army.” Imagine! Putin, meanwhile, has a Patriarch in his pocket. “We have entered into a struggle that has not a physical, but a metaphysical significance,” Kirill has cravenly intoned. The religious heroes of the war in Ukraine are the Ukrainian clerics in the Orthodox Church who have turned against their Muscovitepontiff for being a slaughterer’s stooge.

    The United States responded slowly to Putin’s “special operation” because we were not mentally ready for it. We have caught up, certainly, but it always feels like catch-up. A great power — and we are one, whether we delight in it or not — cannot be always reactive. For a long time now, too much of American foreign policy has consisted in crisis management. In a world accelerated past the point of reflection, this was somewhat inevitable; but still resistance must be offered. The name of that resistance is strategy, or geo-strategy, or grand strategy. A few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union I was sitting with Walter Laqueur, a wise and erudite man, and one of the first analysts to write books about “Putinism” and the rise of the new Russian right, and he remarked that it had been a long time since he had heard the word “strategy” in Washington. “Geo-strategy,” he said, “has been replaced by geo-economics.” This was certainly true of the booming 1990s, but he was alarmed by more than the economicist interpretation of foreign affairs. His words have haunted me. The meaning of strategy is an infamously complicated subject, and the co-existence within it of empirical and moral elements, of facts and purposes, the integration within a single “intellectual architecture” of all the dimensions of warfare, is hard to pin down. What I mean by it here is only this: a prior understanding of what we want, and why. This understanding must be developed quite consciously as a historical plan, as a program for action and a standard for readiness. It should not be confused with the intellectual frameworks that we possess before events happen. It is, in fact, a challenge to those frameworks, which usually are little more than attitudes or moods or prejudices drawn from recent experience. A strategist is not indifferent to circumstances, but he is not a slave of circumstances either. He has a calling to shape and mold and alter a reprehensible or disadvantageous order, and an intense sensation of agency, and a certain pleasure in the exertion of intelligent will. He is comfortable with the proposition that power exists to be used. He recognizes the difference between flexibility and reactiveness; he is not rigid, but he is also not winging it. The problem, of course, is that a historical plan is a blueprint for time, but time does not stand still. There will be contingencies and emergencies that will allow no delay, if a response is to be effective, and they will require more than impulsiveness and improvisation.  If you tarry in response to a genocide, for example, you have not understood the nature of the challenge. Surprise is inevitable, but shock is unforgivable. Our preparedness starts in our imagination. (Obama was a peculiar case: he was good at strategizing, whatever the merits of his strategy, but bad at reacting.) Does the United States have a grand strategy? In the culture of endless repeal in which our politics now takes place, our partisan seesaws of doing and undoing, can the United States have a grand strategy? One of the primary conditions of strategy is constancy. But is anything that we do any longer durable? The problem is not, as George Kennan and Henry Kissinger liked to insist, democracy, or the impact of domestic opinion upon planning. It is, rather, the debasement of our democracy into what seems to be a permanent condition of unsettledness, our hot-headed unreliability about precedents, our infernal volatility. If we need to reduce the erratic nature of our public life, it is not least because the era is rapidly approaching in which we will find ourselves in great power rivalries of unclear but significant duration. Indeed, the era has already begun. Strategically speaking, the resurgence of Russia may be a sideshow to the ascendancy of China, but sideshows can last generations. The Soviet Union lasted seventy years — a blip in the arc of history, but not in the fate of many millions of people. I am not convinced that we are yet up to the task. The proof is in our platitudes. Until our withdrawal from Afghanistan, we spoke constantly of “the forever war.” Of course there was nothing interminable about it, as we eventually demonstrated. The important question was not its length but its wisdom. If a particular use of American force is morally and strategically justified, and there were ferociously different views about Afghanistan, then we must develop a new talent for patience and learn to think (as the economists say) secularly, or else we will condemn our actions to futility from the start. One of the lessons of our retreat from Afghanistan was that America can be waited out. (There is also the matter of costs, but the number of dead Ukrainians and Russians in only the first few months of combat should provide some context for the human costs that we suffered in Afghanistan, which was 2,401 dead in twenty years.) In any event, “the forever war” was swiftly replaced by a new platitude, which is that we must beware of getting into “a new cold war.” It is past time to put some intellectual pressure on this slogan. For a start, a cold war is preferable to a hot war. More importantly, our destiny is not entirely up to us: if Russia or China behave towards us (or our allies) in a hostile manner, then we are in a cold war with Russia or China. And so we already find ourselves in two cold wars. We can choose, of course, not to fight them, and hide between our oceans; but thankfully we have not made that choice, even if we are still profoundly uncomfortable with the accurate description of these global realities. Anyway, there is nothing to trouble our sleep about being the most powerful adversary of the most powerful tyrannies. Except that we must not sleep! The term “cold war” has become a term of imprecation, a dystopian word, because the Cold War, I mean the one that took place between 1946 and 1991, is erroneously remembered as an unprincipled contest between two deranged nuclear powers who went around the world committing crimes and abuses. It was nothing like that, though we did commit our share of crimes and abuses. It was an honorable struggle against totalitarianism that over many decades was conducted more or less firmly and more or less rationally and in stirring consonance with our principles; and every decent man and woman should tremble at the thought of what life everywhere would have been like if we had lost.

    Biden is ringingly correct when he says that the future will be characterized by a struggle between democrats and autocrats. But is this a worldview or a strategy? It all depends on what he does about it.

    In The Atlantic, where everything can be found, an American historian argues that World War II does not look the same when seen from an Asian standpoint. I do not doubt that this is so. In Asia, quite obviously, the anti-fascist powers were also imperialist powers. The implication of this colossal fact, according to the author of the article, is that we must retire our moral understanding of the war. It was not a war between good and evil. It was “a lethal collision of self-interested rivals.” The author even writes admiringly of a notorious Indian nationalist who escaped to Germany and raised an Indian force to fight alongside the Wehrmacht and later alongside Japan against British India. For him, “this wasn’t an invasion but a liberation.” Good for him. But why should the enlargement of our understanding about the Asian theater distort our understanding of the European theater? The Indian viewpoint about the war in South Asia does not refute the European viewpoint about the war in Europe, or the Jewish viewpoint, or the viewpoint of the resistance fighters across Europe who, even in societies rife with collaboration, were animated by the certainty that their enemy was evil. If the experience of Indians was different from the experience of Europeans and Americans, then the experience of Europeans and Americans was different from the experience of Indians. The rule of particularity and partiality applies to all, and the one cannot be used to discredit the other. (And Japan did not exactly fight the war with the impeccability of just war theory.) Yet the moral delegitimation of World War II, like the moral delegitimation of the Cold War, is attempted not only for the sake of a sounder historiography. It has also a policy purpose. The ultimate warrant for the principle of American interventionism, the decisive historical prooftext for the view that American power can be a force for good in the world, is World War II. Take it down and the withdrawalist program for American foreign policy is complete. Persuade people that even “the good war” was a bad war and they can serenely repair to their gardens, where most of them already are.

    What is the outcome that we seek in Ukraine? An end to the conflict is not a sufficient objective. The most urgent thing about a conflict is not always to end it as soon as you can. (I am not speaking about a nuclear conflict, but the anxiety about nuclear war was skillfully stimulated by Putin to disrupt Western enthusiasm for Ukraine, and in some quarters it worked like a charm.) A “sovereign, independent Ukraine,” as Blinken put it, looks to me like the proper goal, though it is finally the Ukrainians who will formulate the acceptable terms for the cessation of hostilities. If I were them, I would not rest until the removal of every Russian soldier from their soil. When Secretary of Defense Austin declared that “we want to see Russia weakened to the degree it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” I cheered. Putin started a vicious and unprovoked war against the civilians of a sovereign state that poses no threat to him except insofar as it seeks to join the community of liberal democratic nations, and thereby he showed himself to be a menace whose capacity for cruelty and recklessness we need no longer speculate about — an active and genuine enemy. In the years prior to his resort to his army, he was tireless in his intrigues and interventions in the democratic processes of the West, which we tolerated. His invasion of Ukraine has also exposed the startling mediocrity of the Russian military. And so Austin was right to suggest that a weak Russia is within our interest and within our grasp, and that we are not ourselves in search of the off-ramp. But Austin’s statement disturbed people who regard every expression of American toughness as a slippery slope to Baghdad. In the New Yorker, for example, a jittery reporter noted that “U.S. officials now frame America’s role in more ambitious terms that border on aggressive.” Aggressive! We have vowed not to send a single American soldier to Ukraine. Biden repeated this promise over and over long before the war began. (I wondered why, as a tactical matter, he would make such a promise to Putin. But he was not making it to Putin, he was making it to the progressive wing of his party.) What the Biden administration has splendidly done — with extraordinary quantities of heavy weaponry, and with intelligence, and with increasingly pitiless sanctions, and with its “ambitious” rhetoric — is display seriousness and steadfastness in its support of a just cause. Given the lameness of American foreign policy in the Obama and Trump years, this should be a reason for rejoicing. We are not only reacting, we are also acting. It is finally time for an adversary to be nervous about us.

    The professionals call the problem “escalation control.” I do not mean to make light of it. There are risks that we must beware. But surely escalation control cannot mean that we never respond with greater strength, especially in response to an escalation on the other side. There are escalations of degree and escalations of kind, a great many instruments with which to change the course of a conflict or determine its outcome. Not all of them are crazy, and not all of them lead directly to armageddon. We must be prudent, but we must not be played. Even Raymond Aron, the most powerful advocate of prudence in modern times, once remarked that “prudence does not always require either moderation or peace by compromise, or negotiations, or indifference to the internal regimes of enemy states or allies.” Aron’s variety of prudence, as he demonstrated in his long life of political philosophy and political engagement, was decidedly vertebrate. Too often in recent years American prudence decayed into American passivity. I miss the days when we were feared. They overlapped with the days when we were trusted.

    When bad actors anywhere in the world gather to plan an invasion or a repression or an expulsion or a genocide, does anyone at the table intervene with the question, “But wait — how will the Americans respond?” Does the prospect of American power any longer stay any villain’s hand?

    As a matter of historical record, America has “projected” its power abroad for many reasons, not all of them laudable; but the only state in the modern world that made dictators and murderers think twice, or go slow, or surrender, was the United States. (I exclude the Soviet Union in World War II, because it was a murderous dictatorship that helped to defeat a murderous dictatorship.) If there are to be obstacles or impediments, they will have to come from us.

    Closely related to the question of escalating is the question of being “provocative.” In the run-up to the war, while we were arguing among ourselves about its likelihood and Putin was gathering his forces, we should have been sending arms to the Ukrainians — sophisticated arms, lethal arms. The realists among us warned that this would provoke Putin. It turned out soon afterward that he required no provocation; he was pre-provoked. The Ukrainians knew this. In truth, any close student of Putin’s behavior could have known this. The same hesitation had been expressed in the persistent opposition about the expansion of NATO since the 1990s, which came down to the view that in the name of our national security we need to respect Putin’s “perceptions.” People used to say the same thing about the Soviet Union — that we needed to understand the subjective roots of its foreign adventures, since it was “expanding because it felt encircled.” In a famous sentence of the Long Telegram in 1946, George Kennan suggested that “at bottom of [the] Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is [the] traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” But who was intending then — who is intending now — to attack Russia? Surely there are limits to the therapeutic approach to states and statesmen. How mistaken do “perceptions” have to be before we cease to respect them in our planning? And if the “perceptions” are fantasies of aggression and domination and extermination, then conflict is more likely, and we must have less forbearance about them. NATO is a purely defensive alliance that was formed when the nations of Western Europe had good reason to organize for their own defense. They still do: it is not a trivial point that none of the countries that Putin has attacked were in NATO. Ukraine poses no military threat to Russia. Neither do Poland and the Baltic states. Meanwhile Putin, by military and cyber and other means, has been attacking countries large and small. Many people have lost their lives to Putin’s paranoia, which is a clinical term for “perception.” This same hesitation about active American measures in Ukraine was advocated during the debate about American military support for the besieged state in the 2010s. Those of us who argued for the dispatch of lethal weaponry to the Ukrainians were not dreaming that they would march triumphantly into Moscow. (We also had no idea that they would perform as brilliantly on the battlefield as they now have done.) We wished only to raise the costs on Putin’s aggressions and to prepare the ground for a political process. We were accused of irresponsibly poking the bear. But the bear poked us. The unfortunate consequence of such prevarications is that we are often tardy in our operational thinking.A story about escalation control: Two men have been condemned to death. They are lined up against the wall as the firing squad gets into position. Their hands are bound. Before they are blindfolded, the captain of the firing squad approaches them and asks if they have a last request. One of them asks for a cigarette. The other turns to him angrily and says, “Don’t make waves!”

    I was in Paris during the first week of the war. It was the most important week in European history since that delirious week in the autumn of 1989, when the Berlin Wall was brought down. It was, indeed, a kind of mirror image of that week — the antithesis of delirium, which is sobriety. The very air was sober. (In Montparnasse such a change registers rather sharply.) I could feel the European shudder. In conversations with friends and strangers, there was a sudden gravity, a somber acknowledgment that the holiday may be over. A struggle was at hand. In Robert Kagan’s terms, Venetians were talking like Martians. The salient emotion was not fear; it was anger, and then determination. The intensity of popular solidarity with Ukraine was palpable. Extraordinary things began to happen. Germany brought to a close the entirety of its post-war national security policy and raised its defense budget. I never believed that anything could morally offend the International Olympic Committee, but even it sought a way to punish Russia. Almost nobody looked back regretfully on the expansion of NATO. NATO acquired a new pride, as people to the east were now sacrificing their lives for their dream of belonging to it. It also acquired a new salience: in the first months of the war it was impossible to avoid the impression that Europe was leading America. This was in part the result of the loss of European confidence in America during the Obama and Trump years, but it was nonetheless wonderful. And even more wonderful was to watch us, the Americans, finally get up to speed. Eventually the Biden administration began to act with a magnificent decisiveness. The magnitude of our assistance to Ukraine, and its spirit, has been historic. (I wish that we had worked out a transfer of aircraft as well. Maybe we will.) As Stephen Kotkin concluded, “the West has rediscovered its manifold power.” At last! And American popular support for our government’s efforts has so far been running high in the polls. Who cares about the “performativity” of all the Ukrainian flags one sees in the windows and on the internet? “Performativity” is an important element of culture, and for now American culture is championing the good fight. But for how long? It is never safe to bet on American attention. Still, whereas no society can, or should, be maintained in a permanent condition of apocalyptic excitation, perhaps we will come out of this crisis with a more lasting tension about the enduring realities of the world.

    Whenever I visit Ukraine, I mourn, and not only for Ukrainians. My origins are there, and they are bloody. In the summer of 1941, in a forest near Boryslav, in western Ukraine, or Galicia, where my mother’s family lived and owned oil wells, a pogrom was committed by local Ukrainians against local Jews, and she, at the age of twenty-two, was among the Jews tasked with collecting the mutilated corpses and arranging for their proper burial. They included her uncle Elimelech. I drove by the forest and past “our” rusted derricks on my way to Schodnica, the small town where her large clan lived, and where, in a makeshift room dug out beneath a barn, she survived the last year or so of the war, under the protection of Poles who had worked for her father in the oil fields. After I satisfied myself that I had located the gentle slope on which her house once stood, and completed my inner convulsions, I went back to Lemberg, or Lviv, where I sought out the high school that she attended. (In Lemberg she saw Josephine Baker!) It took me two days to realize that I was using an outdated Hapsburg-era map, and that Zygmuntowska Street was now Gogolsa Street. The head of the school welcomed me warmly and took me to a room where some physical remains of my mother’s gymnasium — pennants, stationery, and so on — were framed and respectfully exhibited. At a nearby synagogue, once renowned for its murals, I prayed like a good son and then kicked around in the trash — the place was being renovated, I’m not sure for whom. In the trash I discovered a book. When I dusted it off, I was thunderstruck: it was Job — an edition of the Book of Job, two hundred and some pages, published not too far away in Zhitomir in 1872. Its end-pages were covered in Hebrew and Polish scribbles in a beautiful hand, and it came with the commentaries of Rashi and a certain late nineteenth-century rabbi named Shmuel Sternberg from the nearby town of Vinitsiya, who prefaced his commentary with a remarkable introductory essay in which he quarreled with modern non-Jewish Biblical critics as well as medieval Jewish Aristotelians, and displayed enormous literary sensitivity to the sacred text. The hounded volume also came with fire stains and water stains. I rescued it. It is now my Ukrainian Job.

    Years later, when I went to Kyiv, the same shadows accompanied me. Around the corner from my hotel was a huge equestrian statue of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, the seventeenth-century father of Ukrainian nationalism and one of the most reviled figures in Jewish history. His successful war against the Poles included some of the most hideous atrocities in the annals of anti-Semitic violence. This is from a Hebrew chronicle of 1648, about what befell Jews in the region of the Dnieper River: “Some of them were flayed and their bodies were thrown to the dogs. Some of them had their arms and legs cut off and they were thrown onto the roads, where wagons rode over them and horses trampled them. Some of them were buried alive. Children were slaughtered in the arms of their mothers, and many children were torn into pieces like fish. Pregnant women were cut open and watched their fetuses crushed. Other pregnant women were cut open and a live cat was placed in their bellies, which were then sewn back up, and their hands were cut off so that they couldn’t remove the cats from their bellies.” When I was growing up I knew Jews for whom “Khmielnitsky” was still a common curse word. And here was the hetman on a pedestal, in monumental bronze. To further upset my Jewish heart, I was told that the nineteenth-century building before which the statue stood, painted oddly in pink, was the courthouse in which Mendel Beilis was tried for ritual murder in 1913. Passing the statue and the courthouse, I walked down a steep cobbled street toward the old city, and along the way, directly across from the house where Bulgakov was born, I encountered a stall selling antiques from the Great War, including Nazi helmets and a slightly tattered waistcoat with a yellow star pinned to it. I could have had the yellow star for three hundred dollars. I was more inclined to spit.

    Yet I was there, along with some like-minded friends and comrades, to offer my support — I gave a few speeches and press conferences — to the noble struggle of the Ukrainians for liberal democracy. There was Khmielnitsky, but here was Maidan. There were moments when it was too much for my mind to hold. The plurality of loyalties can sometimes hurt. I knew all the arguments against the tyranny of collective memory, and against collective responsibility, and against historical inevitability; and the history of my own people vividly demonstrated the benevolent effects of liberal democracy and its Torah of rights. How can a Jew not support democracy? Yet how can a Jew surrender his skepticism about historical metamorphosis? I made a point of meeting many Ukrainian Jews, old and young, from all walks of Ukrainian life, and asking them for their assessment of their situation. Every one of them, including officials of the community who knew both the government and the democracy movement, responded with unalloyed confidence about the future. They knew the same history that I did, and they lived there. Who was I to contradict them? I had always believed in the possibility of progress, as every member of every minority must, or else they may fulfill their own fatalism. For Jews, there were always only two paths out of the persecuting world: democracy and Zionism. They are the two epic experiments in Jewish emancipation, the two great historical alternatives to the European bargain, which was autocracy punctuated by magnanimity and helplessness punctuated by happiness. I had yahrzeit for my father in Kiev, and I found myself reciting the kaddish with an unexpected élan. During this war, the embrace of the Ukrainian struggle by American Jews has been thrilling to behold (even the Israeli government, which never misses a chance to seem small, finally got it right); it represents, among other things, a poignant overcoming of memory by morality. The past always provides reasons for ethical relaxation, especially the past of once-oppressed groups, which is rich in occasions for anger; but they are wise who refuse to mistake the betterment of their conditions for a betrayal of their traditions.

    Hope, because it is premised on uncertainty, is perfectly compatible with vigilance; but there is a certain kind of vigilance, an expectation of the worst that crosses the line into morbidity, a prior weariness that is not so much an inference from reality as it is an interpretation of it, that destroys hope. The first requirement for political leadership, and for political participation, is an immunity to despair.

    This morning the Director of National Intelligence told Congress that “we assess President Putin is preparing for a prolonged conflict in Ukraine during which he still intends to achieve goals beyond the Donbas.” She added, “Putin most likely also judges that Russia has a greater ability and willingness to endure challenges than his adversaries.” About this he may not be wrong, at least as regards us. The Ukrainians can give us lessons in how not to relent. The important reckoning now must be with the history of our credulity, with the poverty of our geopolitical imagination, with our national lassitude about what lies out there. The war has happened. Those words, la guerre a eu lieu, gave the title to an essay that Merleau-Ponty published in Les Temps Modernes in October, 1945. Its subject, in the aftermath of the victory, was the mentality of the French on the eve of the conflict, which in his view left them ill-equipped for the perils of their time. “Events kept making it less and less probable that peace could be maintained,” he wrote. “How could we have waited so long to decide to go to war? The reason was that we were not guided by the facts. We had secretly resolved to know nothing of violence and unhappiness as elements of history because we were living in a country too happy and too weak to envisage them. Distrusting the facts had even become a duty for us. We had been taught that wars grow out of misunderstandings which can be cleared up and accidents which can be averted through patience and courage. We lived in a certain area of peace, experience, and freedom, formed by a combination of exceptional circumstances. We did not know that this was a soil to be defended but thought it the natural lot of men. From our youth we had been used to handling freedom and to living an individual life. How could we have learned to commit our freedom in order to preserve it?” There is pain in the philosopher’s words. He is not scoring political points. When he writes that “our standards were still those of peacetime,” he is a little elegiac, and he certainly is not mocking happiness and peace. But he is also insisting that a society has cognitive responsibilities. Nothing will determine its fate more than its ability to see clearly, and then not to flinch at what it sees if what it sees is really there. The first readiness is mental readiness.

    Gender: A Melee

    The king was pregnant.
    Ursula K. Le Guin, The Left Hand of Darkness

    It turns out the supply-side cheerleader George Gilder was more correct than not when he forecast, in the poignantly titled Sexual Suicide in 1973, that women playing at being men would spell the collapse of Western civilization and probably the social order itself. What he meant by sexual suicide was “the abolition of biological differences between men and women” — in his day, feminists demanding paychecks and forcing men to do housework, and thereby selfishly violating the pact they were supposed to be upholding with nature. Nature had endowed humankind with different sorts of bodies, from which different social roles followed: motherhood for some, breadwinning for others. Nature did not intend men to clean toilets! Or women to go to work, needless to say. It wasn’t just childbearing that society required from women; as the morally superior gender we were also meant to dragoon reluctant men into playing patres familias, according to Gilder, luring them into domestic cages like lion tamers at the circus, civilizing their beastly sex drives into socially productive ones. If we shirk the task, everything falls apart. Gay liberation was thus another sore spot in Gilder’s catalogue of contemporary woe, a world where women’s charms held no sway and male carnality thus ran amuck.

    How vulnerable the “primacy of the biological realm” would turn out to be, how tenuous its hold on the species if each of us had to pledge fealty to the gender binary to keep civilization afloat. How confident can nature’s defenders really be in the selling power of this story? After all, alarm bells aplenty have rung over the last half century yet have thus far failed to herd those renegade female factions back into their kitchens.

    And look around now! Gender is more of a clusterfuck than ever, and yes, civilization’s destruction indeed looms nearer: birthrates have dropped below replacement rates around the globe, down four percent in the United States in 2020 alone. Male breadwinner families are on the extinction watch list. And the damned liberationists still aren’t happy. Today’s gender vanguards — trans activists, the “genderqueer” — want to sever the link between biology and gender entirely, letting men become women and women men, surgically acquiring penises and cooches, rebranding important body parts with gender neutral language (“front hole” for vagina), not to mention poisoning innocent children with cross-sex hormones and puberty blockers. (Far more patriotic to mow them down with assault weapons, at least according to the child welfare experts of the GOP.) Some members of the younger generation want to abolish gender entirely, demanding the whole English language be revised to accommodate them and their impossible-to-remember pronoun preferences.

    Where gender distinctions blur, monsters seem to lurk, like those snarling creatures at the edge of the world on sixteenth-century maps warning sailors away from the abyss. I was thinking about the monster problem recently while reading an interesting history tracing the relation between the invention of endocrinology and the growing demand for gender reassignment treatments. Called Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender, from 1995, it opens with the author, Bernice L. Hausman, a mostly lucid writer, confessing in the book’s preface that she’d been pregnant while revising the manuscript, and was “perhaps one of few expectant mothers who worry they will give birth to a hermaphrodite.” I was therefore not surprised when the book takes an anxious anti-trans swerve in its epilogue, though prior chapters provide fascinating facts about the discovery of glandular therapies in the late nineteenth century. This includes the story of a researcher named Charles-Édouard Brown-Séquard, who in 1889 found, by injecting himself with canine (or possibly monkey) testicular tissue, that what would later be called testosterone had sexually rejuvenating effects in men. Thousands of men were soon arranging to have themselves likewise injected, though whatever rejuvenation followed was later thought to be a placebo effect — the testes don’t actually store testosterone, it turns out.

    If commentators as disparate as Gilder and Hausman are, in their different ways, a little panicky about the gender system collapsing, if both envision nature-defying creatures (feminists, hermaphrodites) snapping at them from the abyss, then we’re in the realm of what the fairy tale expert Marina Warner calls the monstrous imagination. Aroused by scenes of chaos and emergence, it mirrors our lack of understanding back to us in the form of menacing hybrids, typically depicted as scary inhabitants of dark underworlds. Among the chaotic emergent things no one much understands (especially these days) is gender, despite everyone supposedly having one. Yet what is it, where does it come from? Certainties abound, yet somehow they keep changing. With Western civilization itself a rickety boat navigating these tumultuous waters, perpetually about to sail over the edge into some posthuman future, no wonder the conversation gets a little shrill.

    Revolutions are threatening, and what Hausman calls the “new forms of being human” that emerged in the twentieth century were revolutionary, especially once “hormones” — so named in 1905 — were extracted (from glands) and then synthesized, leading eventually to new possibilities in gender reassignment procedures. Oddly — though maybe this is just the usual blinkers of an academic with nose pressed to her own research subject (in this case, transsexualism) — Hausman fails to mention that the ability to synthetize hormones also led to the development of birth control pills, first marketed in the United States in 1960, which prevent ovulation in women. It strikes me as weird that Hausman doesn’t see that far more widely implemented gender-altering technology as part of the same story, also ushering in new ways of “being human” for roughly a hundred million women worldwide. (Estrogen both figures in hormonal contraception and feminizes men who wish to change sex.) Maybe her pregnancy made her less attuned to this aspect of the narrative, but it’s hard to think of anything more consequential for natal females than the ability to effectively control fertility, which radically contested the existing gender regime, not to mention fundamentally transforming the experience of heterosexual sex. (See under: Sexual Revolution, The.)

    But how did the old regime manage to uphold itself in the first place when it disadvantaged so many? Conservatives will tell you that gender comes from nature and sits firmly on top of biological sex; these sexual differences are imagined to be binary. But this binary was always rather imaginary — the incidence of intersex babies was always higher than was generally acknowledged. Doctors made capricious medical decisions and interventions to assign those babies to one sex or the other, precisely because gender ideology dictated that binary gender had to be preserved. (Apparently intersexed babies are as common as red hair.)

    In other words, a certain bad faith seems to come with this territory, by which I mean a refusal to know what you know. Look at Gilder, famous for touting the very economic policies which crushed the single-paycheck family that Sexual Suicide was trying to corral America back into. The signature program of these guys (The Bell Curve author Charles Murray was another of the big guns) — suppressing wages and cutting taxes for the rich, shifting income shares from workers to capital — was a program so successful we’re still living with the consequences. Everyone’s seen the stats about upward redistribution of wealth in the last half century, and the gap keeps widening. As Gilder must know, it wasn’t feminism that catapulted women into the labor market in the 1970s, it was stagnant male wages, post-industrialism, and the expansion of the service sector; and then came the economic hits of Reaganomics. When labor was winning, as it had been before 1973 (a bad year, between an oil crisis and a recession), a middle-class household could survive on one income, not the two or more that are now the norm for vast swathes of the country, often sans benefits.

    But why not finger-point at feminists, those sexual gargoyles, chewing up men and spitting them out, though between the union busting and the job exports, capitalists were doing a lot more chewing and spitting than women ever managed, not that we wouldn’t have enjoyed it. Oh, and the declining birthrates? The majority of those recently surveyed in the United States cite childcare costs as the foremost reason not to procreate, along with climate change, another of free market capitalism’s great accomplishments. (France, the EU country with the highest birthrate, also funds eighty percent of childcare.) Obviously blaming women, homosexuals, and pornographers for macroeconomic shifts is a better yarn. Behind the monstering process lies an appetite for thrilling perversity, Marina Warner observes, for “lurid scenes of other people’s sins” — titillating even while they purport to condemn. (Speaking of titillation: along with feminists Gilder has a peculiar animus about sexologists, who come up frequently, though they can, admittedly, be creepy.)

    What if we were to put it as a question instead of an answer: why has the traditional gender order lost so many adherents these days? A less hysterical version of Gilder’s laments may be found in Francis Fukuyama’s account in The Great Disruption: in his telling, late capitalism no longer required gender differentiation for the technology and knowledge-based jobs that a post-industrial economy needed to fill. Women didn’t suddenly rise up and demand economic independence — Fukuyama goes so far as to call feminism an epiphenomenon of the information society, a symptom of social disruption and not its driver. The explosion of late twentieth-century liberation movements — the sexual revolution, second wave feminism, gay liberation — that freed individuals from the tethers of traditional norms and morals were likewise sparked by the transition to a post-industrial society.

    Capitalism smashes things while ushering into existence all sorts of new human freedoms. (Economic equality unfortunately not among them). If the male-female binary is losing its grip on the human psyche as a social organizing principle, and the premise that gender roles are rooted in nature has been crumbling for the last century, the causes are obviously multiple: an increasing focus on personal fulfillment, the decline of patriarchal authority that accompanied men’s declining economic fortunes and women’s economic independence, and resulting changes in the family structure. Or go back further: as Eli Zaretsky points out in Capitalism, The Family, and Personal Life, the gender order has been breaking down since Freud unwittingly hastened its demise by undoing the “knot that tied the sexual instincts to the difference between the sexes.”

    My point is that maybe feminism and transgenderism aren’t separate stories. Maybe the rising reports of gender dysphoria and plummeting birth rates aren’t separate stories either. There have always been people who did not fit easily into normative categories but were herded in by threat and force, and who are increasingly breaking loose. Because yes, the old structures are ever more enfeebled, unable to demand fealty. Conformity to their dictates is waning. For some that spells catastrophe, for others it’s a circus of possibility. Paul B. Preciado, author of Countersexual Manifesto and Testo Junkie, billed by Vice as a “punk trans philosopher,” says that “we’re transitioning from being a society which is organized by sexual difference.” We’re moving from a binary gender and sexuality regime “to a new and different regime that has yet to be named.” In other words: if endocrinology makes bodies malleable, and families instill (slightly) less repression this century than in previous ones, why not explore those possibilities instead of bemoaning the situation? Preciado suggests regarding gender disobedience as a model for social transformation. Why not start implementing “A Day Without Gender” in schools, hospitals, homes, museums and see what happens?

    Gilder obviously wasn’t wrong that paychecks and the sexual revolution gave women more access to what had traditionally been male prerogatives. (As to whether these were or are “freedoms” is a more complicated discussion.) But the question that Gilder and followers never get around to is this: if capitalism no longer requires gender differences (and soon will barely require workers at all, except for really shitty or “public-facing” jobs), why is it up to the rest of us to keep upholding these differences? What’s in it for us?

     

    That the snarling creatures at the edge of the gender abyss were once feminists now sounds quaint, since for today’s gender liberationists (trans activists, “enbys,” intersectionalists) the feminists are toothless and mainstream, also complicit in monstrous historical crimes. At least four books with “white feminism” in the title were published in 2021 alone; the term is not used with approbation. In the updated version of the story, white women are the ones responsible for electing Donald Trump — even those who voted or worked for Bernie — and will forever be saddled with the humiliating label “Karen” as payback.

    In another twist, weirdly it’s now feminists — well, a certain breed of feminist, mostly the dreaded white ones — wielding the “nature” card, demanding that the old binaries be kowtowed to, otherwise monsters will get us. In Gilder’s iconography of gender catastrophe, the monsters were women in pants; in the updated version they’re wearing skirts, but disaster still beckons. J.K Rowling has been mounting alarms about the monsters in skirts — that is, trans women (assigned male at birth but who identify and live as women), who are supposedly haunting women’s bathrooms and changing rooms, intent on sexually assaulting natal females. None of this has been great for her brand, but she seems undaunted. Among Rowling’s fears are that if gender self-identification laws go into effect in the United Kingdom, trans people will be allowed to change the gender on their birth certificates without going through the previous gauntlet of psychiatric diagnosis and permission, and then any man who says he identifies as a woman would be able to get a Gender Recognition Certificate and state sanctioned access to gender-segregated facilities.

    To inject a bit of reality into this anxious morass, the fact is that no one is stationed at the changing room entrances and public bathrooms checking birth or gender certificates now, so how would banning gender self-identification keep trans people out of non-state-run segregated spaces? There are, to be sure, no shortage of vigorous informal policing mechanisms not infrequently inflicted on trans people who don’t sufficiently pass muster (are “clocked” as the wrong sex) in civic spaces, gender-segregated and not. Among the pernicious things about Rowling’s statements is the likelihood of them empowering other women to make scenes when in proximity to anyone whose gender presentation is not to their standards, people who just needed somewhere to urinate when out for the day.

    In a statement articulating these anxieties, Rowling revealed that she was herself a survivor of domestic abuse and sexual assault, citing this history as a reason for opposing gender reforms. She regards herself as a vulnerable party in the emerging gender order. Yet she doesn’t appear to have been assaulted by a trans woman or a man masquerading as a woman. Then why shift responsibility for male violence against women onto trans people who, it is widely acknowledged, are disproportionately victims of violence and harassment themselves, especially when forced into facilities that don’t align with their chosen gender? Rowling did acknowledge that the majority of trans-identified people pose no threat to anyone, yet the gender self-recognition movement was still “offering cover to predators like few before it.”

    Are there really legions of roving trans women predators out there attacking other women, aside from “problematic” Brian De Palma homages to Hitchcock? (Dressed to Kill is the locus classicus — spoiler alert: the psychiatrist did it.) Like Rowling, the feminist philosopher Kathleen Stock seems to think so. Until recently a professor at University of Sussex, Stock voluntarily resigned her post in 2021 saying that she had been subject to bullying and harassment because of her views on transgender identity, and indeed, there had been a student campaign calling for her dismissal. Even her receipt of an OBE — Officer of the Order of the British Empire — was protested by over six hundred fellow philosophers, though a counter petition signed by two hundred philosophers supported her, or at least supported her academic freedom to say what she wanted about gender.

    Reading Stock’s essay, “Ignoring Differences Between Men and Women is the Wrong Way to Address Gender Dysphoria,” from 2019, it’s easy to see why she’s controversial. Things start out reasonably enough, with Stock delineating the difference between what she calls “sex eliminationists” — those who argue there’s no difference between biological women and trans women because biological sex isn’t a meaningful category — and “gender eliminationists,” who hold that distinctions between men and women aren’t meaningful, and we should treat all humans the same. From there things become, to my mind, exceedingly fuzzy. Stock argues that because “there will always be some social stereotypes about the sexes that remain programmed in our minds, if only because they correspond to statistically recurrent empirical truths about biological men and women,” then the most we can reasonably hope for, when it comes to damaging social stereotypes, is to be “gender critical” — “consciously critical of the particularly damaging social stereotypes we collectively uphold, aiming to replace them over time with better and more socially useful ones.”

    This slides rather fast from social stereotypes to empirical truths. I find myself wondering how Stock, a lesbian active in LGB organizations, can speak so confidently about the empirical realities of gender, while mysteriously oblivious about how recently so-called experts defined a reality in which homosexuality was a pathology — psychological in origin and thus, notoriously, “fixable.” Or one where women were unsuited to the professions. Nothing is less stable (or empirical) than social stereotypes about gender, as anyone who reads a work of history or anthropology knows. The traits associated with one or another gender bounce around and reverse over the centuries and between cultures: sometimes men are the more sentimental ones, elsewhere women; men are the lustier ones, no actually it’s women (amoral and multi-orgasmic); and so on.

    Where I have some sympathy for Rowling and Stock is that the political interests of sexual minorities (gay people), gender minorities (trans people), and feminists (Stock and Rowling are both speaking as feminists) do not always align. While you might be a trans lesbian-feminist, some trans-identified people are also quite attached to the kinds of binary gender distinctions that some feminists would like to abolish. Natal women and trans women have different health and reproductive issues. I don’t think natal women need to hold onto some proprietary definition of womanhood, but there are political reasons, in the current political climate and with abortion rights under threat, to acknowledge that biological womanhood disadvantages biological women in ways that will always defeat equality if not addressed. (Trans men, too, can get pregnant and require abortions.) In any case, no one has to be monstered. Nor does cisgender (not being trans) need to be a slur, or “cishet” a synonym for clueless, nor “older generation,” though no doubt these disagreements are generationally inflected. But even lumping “cis” women (a term I don’t love) into one pile overlooks a lot — for instance, pro- and anti-abortion cis women see their interests very differently. Race complicates things even more.

    Trans men and trans women are also not always allies. In fact, the age-old war between the sexes has lately been transposed to intra-trans disputes, with trans women calling out trans men for transmisogyny on Twitter. A trans man I know recently accused certain trans women in our circle of being “hard core bros until like a year ago” and moving through the world expecting the same privileges while moaning about being victims of institutional sexism. The intra-trans tensions broke into public in 2020 in the academic journal Transgender Studies Quarterly, when trans theorist Jack Halberstam reviewed trans theorist Andrea Long Chu’s book Females: A Concern (in a piece funnily titled “Nice Trannies”) and accused her of being the Allan Bloom of trans studies, while having “a deep antipathy” to trans men and butches. (Chu was recently appointed book critic at New York magazine.)

    Personally I’m more interested in political alliances than in gender- or identity-based ones. Clearly identity doesn’t in itself predict anyone’s political affiliations or savvy. A surprisingly high percentage of trans people surveyed — 36% — were Trump supporters in 2016, according to a peer-reviewed study a year later in the journal Politics, Groups, and Identities, to choose one of many available examples. Trying to make sense of this, the study’s authors explain that one of the unifying themes in Trump support was anti-feminism; a big way that the GOP has attracted adherents is by signaling that rejecting feminist positions is part of what it means to be a Republican.

    The trans versus feminist tensions are hardly new: open warfare was long ago declared between the brand of feminist some label TERFs (“trans exclusionary radical feminists”) and the trans community. (Stock and others regard TERF as a slur and insist on “gender critical” as the correct label.) This often unpleasant standoff commenced with a vicious little tract published in 1979 by the radical feminist Janice Raymond titled The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male, which argued that trans women are closet patriarchs who want to colonize women’s bodies by parading all the worst stereotypes about them. In the decades since, trans women were often excluded, in not particularly kind ways, from feminist spaces, because feminists such as Rowling declared themselves vulnerable parties, at risk of assault by trans women who came equipped with inborn male aggression despite presenting as women.

    Natal men may indeed perpetrate the majority of the violence in the world (though it’s been argued that female violence takes more hidden forms, for instance violence against children), but the majority of men are not violent. It’s men, in fact, not women, who are far more often the victims of violence. The week that everyone was talking about the Gabby Petito murder case (the missing travel blogger who turned out to have been killed by her fiancée) and the grim prevalence of missing women, the FBI annual murder statistics for the previous year were released, according to which roughly four times more men were murdered than women (14,146 men, 3,573 women, 35 gender unknown). Obviously women are subject to violence by men, frequently their husbands, boyfriends, and exes, but men are vulnerable to violence by men, too. (As are trans women, especially sex workers, assaulted by straight men who can’t own up to attractions that might make them, in their minds, “gay.”) Somehow we prefer telling stories about endangered cis women.

    Stock, along with Rowling, also seems bent on shunting blame for male violence onto trans women. Stock offers the case of a pre-operative trans woman named Karen White who sexually assaulted two female inmates while housed in a British woman’s prison. Described by her neighbors to The Guardian as “volatile and violent,” White was also a convicted pedophile on remand for grievous bodily harm, burglary, multiple rapes, and other sexual offenses. Does Stock think White is a typical trans woman? Is this even typical cisgender male behavior? Stock seems to think yes. Arguing against those who say that excluding trans women from women-only spaces is analogous to excluding lesbians from women-only spaces, Stock counters that there’s no “analogous pattern” of lesbian aggression comparable to patterns of male violence. In other words: trans women are men and must shoulder the blame for male violence. And one violent trans woman is a pattern.

    Is this intellectually honest? I don’t think so. As someone pithily tweeted about the sorts of fears circulated by Rowling and Stock, “The reason predatory men aren’t becoming trans to prey on women? It’s a lot easier to become a cop.” In other words, we panic selectively. Reports not infrequently surface about mothers doing violence to, sometimes even murdering, their children. To date there are no attempts to ban motherhood. We see those episodes as anomalies, though non-anomalous enough that there are laws and (generally understaffed) child protection agencies, and of course a thriving memoir sub-genre devoted to abusive mothers. But motherhood is also supposed to be the “natural” condition of things, thus maternal abuse, no matter how many cases a year surface, is always an exception. Whereas an isolated case of a violent trans women is a pattern.

    Let me press a little harder on the maternity analogy. Both Rowling and Stock worry that transness is contagious, and young girls will get the idea that changing genders is a good solution to the inherent problems of being female. But all our ideas about gender are contagious — that’s how culture works — including deep seated ideas such as “maternal instinct.” Except that it’s not an instinct, it’s a concept that arises at a particular point in history, circa the Industrial Revolution, just as the new industrial-era sexual division of labor was being negotiated, the one where men go to work and women stay home raising kids. (Before that everyone worked at home.) A new story arose to justify the new arrangements: that these roles were handed down by nature. As family historians tell us, it was only when children’s actual economic value declined, because they were no longer necessary additions to the household labor force, that they became the priceless little treasures we know them as today. The romance of the child didn’t get underway for the middle classes until the mid-nineteenth century (it was well into the twentieth that child labor laws went into effect). It also took a decline in infant-mortality rates for mothers to start regarding their offspring with much maternal affection. When infant deaths were high, maternal attachment ran low. It was only as families began getting smaller — birthrates declined steeply in the nineteenth century — that the emotional value of each child increased, which is where we find the origin of contemporary ideas about maternal instincts and fulfillments.

    All I’m saying is that what we’re calling a “biological” instinct is a historical artifact and a culturally specific development, not a fact of nature. An invented instinct can feel entirely real. I’m sure it can feel profound. As can the kinds of fears and vulnerabilities that Stock and Rowling are leveraging. But if we’re getting empirical, let’s acknowledge that childbirth has killed far more women than murderous trans women ever did, though I suppose the sentimental premise is that all those dead mothers died fulfilling their gender destiny, not defying it. The point is that a lot of behind-the-scenes conceptual labor goes into establishing the “naturalness” of gender, not to mention the vulnerability of gender critical feminists.

    As far as nature goes, the reverence for it is pretty selective. We’re happy to take cholesterol blockers, mood elevators, and erection enhancers as needed without worrying whether it’s what nature intended. The other day a pig kidney was transplanted into a human. Technological possibilities on the horizon include uterine transplants for sterile women, which raises the possibility of uterine transplants for trans women — maybe eventually for cisgender men too. Why not? Humans have always made it their business to conquer, alter, and repurpose nature — and then to invent monsters lurking at the crossroads.

    Not surprisingly, Rowling’s and Stock’s brand of panic-mongering soon became fodder for the fringe right in America. In July 2021, QAnon followers staged two weekends of violent protests in Los Angeles after a customer at a Koreatown spa (Instagram handle: “Cubana Angel”) filmed herself complaining vociferously to the manager about a trans woman supposedly using the jacuzzi in the woman’s area of the spa. “He’s a pervert,” shouts Cubana, “waving his penis and testicles around!” The sight was traumatizing for her. “His dick is out!” says Cubana’s friend, voice trembling. “His dick is swinging left and right!” She repeated the word “swinging” so many times it led me to wonder if these were rehearsed lines. “What about women’s rights?” shrieks Cubana, as the manager patiently tries to explain that California’s Civil Code prohibits businesses from discriminating against anyone on the basis of gender identity or expression. “We’re concerned about women’s safety,” yells Cubana. “We’re gonna take it worldwide!”

    Which is exactly what happened: the video went viral. Tucker Carlson aired a segment about it, the first of seven on Fox over a week. Antifa showed up to protest the QAnon protesters, evangelicals and the Proud Boys showed up, a reporter was clubbed, protestors threw smoke bombs at cops and pepper sprayed each other, riot cops fired projectiles and beanbag rounds into the crowd. Amidst all this, reports appeared in Slate, The Guardian, the L.A Times, and other liberal outlets suggesting that the report about a trans woman in the spa was likely a hoax, and according to a spa employee there had been no trans patrons with appointments that day.

    But the story turned out to be more complicated. According to the journalist Jason McGahan, who tried to untangle it five months later in Los Angeles Magazine, there actually was a (possibly) trans person in the spa that day. Police issued a warrant for 52-year-old Darren Merager for indecent exposure; Merager does have a penis and is a convicted sex offender. But is Merager actually trans? It’s unclear — he or she seems to have a female driver’s license, though until recently was identifying as male, according to acquaintances, and McGahan isn’t sure which pronouns he or she uses. Is Merager a predator? He/she has a criminal record for theft, but it appears that his/her previous sex crime arrests were for exhibitionism which, according to the psychoanalytic view, typically does entail wanting to be caught. (Robert Stoller calls these scenarios “scripts” in Observing the Erotic Imagination.) In this view, exhibitionism is a pathology of gender identity, not a sexual behavior. The motive is courting humiliation and punishment, not getting off sexually. It’s a (not very successful) remedy for gender dysphoria, not predation.

    Still, there it was, a penis in the woman’s pool. Did this put natal women at risk? It is the case that many (or most, or lots of) cis women have been socialized in ways that can make the sight of an exposed penis in non-private settings feel alarming. Perhaps that will someday change, though I don’t imagine such feelings are exactly voluntary — any more than gender dysphoria or compulsive exhibitionism is voluntary. But once again, to what extent is it possible to be intellectually honest about the distinction between an anomaly and a pattern? Perhaps it’s not, especially when there are competing interests and clashing vulnerabilities at stake. Especially when titillating monsters hover — and Merager made a wonderfully convenient one — feeding the “appetite for thrilling perversity.”

    Why is gender such a melee? Can’t it be a comedy instead of a tragedy, a playground and not a police state, with room for experiments and transformations? You don’t have to be some sort of pomo-structuralist to think that no one knows what gender is or where it comes from. Clearly all we have are stories about gender and sexual difference, which shift with the winds, the centuries, and political-economic contingencies. Why not see gender the way we do other human variables — personality for instance, capacious enough for thousands of permutations and infinite mutability?

    “Smash the family!” feminists used to declare. Look around: it’s smashed. As far as who done it, it’s not that big a mystery — could Gilder and cohort not see its demise up ahead when they tanked wages and trashed the safety nets? They were so caught up in their deregulatory zeal that they couldn’t imagine the S&L crisis, the housing bubble and evictions, Enron, and the opioid epidemic. No, the only thing they wanted to regulate was gender!

    Yes, capitalism breaks things while ushering in all sorts of great new personal liberties — expressive individuality, your very own idiosyncratic unconscious, unisex clothes. It brings whatever you want right to your door at all hours (if you’re among the lucky “haves”). Shopping for things, including identities, is the great modern consolation. Is having a gender identity — another recent development in the annals of modern selfhood — a trap or a freedom? Yes.

    To those who fear trans women in the ladies room: make sure to pee before you leave the house. Those immutable laws of nature you’re attempting to enforce today will be dust tomorrow, and soon enough so will you.

    Science and Politics: Three Principles, Three Fables

    Science is a creative endeavor that requires the free and open exchange of ideas to thrive. Society has benefited immensely from scientific progress, and in order for science to continue to better the lives of individuals and nations scientific work must be evaluated on the basis of scientific merit alone. Over the past decade, however, scientific departments and organizations have become increasingly politicized, to the point that the development of science is now being significantly impeded. This time the assault originated from the radical left, but conservatives have done their share of meddling in science and are likely to meddle again in the future. Keeping politics out of science is something that all people of good will, both Democrats and Republicans, should be able to agree on. Or so, once upon a time, one would have thought.

    How can we ensure political neutrality in science? I want to propose three critical principles for the protection of science from politics, and to illustrate them with three playful, slightly naughty fables about what has been happening when they are violated. The three principles are: (1) all scientists need to be able to say and argue whatever they want, even if it offends someone else; (2) universities and academic societies need to maintain strict neutrality on all social and political issues; and (3) hiring needs to be done on the basis of scientific merit alone. These principles have been lucidly outlined in three important documents at the University of Chicago, where I teach geophysical science: the Chicago Principles on Free Expression, which were issued by the university in 2014, and the Kalven Report “on the university’s role in social and political action,” from 1967, and the Shils Report on the “criteria for academic appointments,” from 1970. All these reports assume, as the Kalven Report puts it, that “the mission of the university is the discovery, improvement, and dissemination of knowledge.” This sounds prosaic, but the definition is important to emphasize because some people are now challenging it. They argue that faculty members should be activists who promote certain political positions and agendas, rather than pursue truth wherever it may lead. I should add that we are not perfect at the University of Chicago, and I sometimes fear that we honor these principles more in the breach than in the observance. And yet these principles are important goals for every scientific institution to at least aim for.

    I started my own journey in this fraught environment simply by self-censoring — for no less than five years. I stayed away from campus whenever possible and avoided departmental gatherings. At first I thought that the problem was a few bad apples in my department yelling at everyone who disagreed with them and accusing people of being various types of witches. I slowly learned that I was observing just a small part of a national movement in favor of censorship and the suppression of alternative viewpoints. It is absolutely essential that we resist this movement and encourage students and faculty to speak freely about whatever they want on campus: we all lose when people self-censor.

    Unfortunately, students and faculty are now self-censoring at alarming rates, in part as a result of the high-profile cancellations of academics who have been found guilty of wrongthink. The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) has documented 471 attempts to get professors fired or punished for their speech over the past six years, the vast majority of which resulted in an official sanction. In a recent report for the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology, Eric Kauffman estimates that 3 in 10,000 faculty members experience such an attack each year, which corresponds to about one every three years at a large university with a faculty of a thousand. Since these cancellations are so public and potentially harmful to the victim’s career, a small number can have an outsized impact on free expression. According to the same report, 70% of centrist and conservative faculty in American universities report a climate hostile to their beliefs and 91% of Trump-voting faculty say that a Trump voter would not express his or her views on campus or are unsure. Similarly, after a major academic freedom incident in the fall of 2021, MIT polled faculty at two faculty forums and found that approximately 80% are “worried given the current atmosphere in society that your voice or your colleagues’ voices are increasingly in jeopardy” and more than 50% “feel on an everyday basis that your voice, or the voices of your colleagues are constrained at MIT.” The problem extends to students, too: more than 80% of them self-censor on campus, according to a FIRE survey last year. To get a sense of the magnitude of the self-censorship problem at universities, contrast these numbers with the fact that, according to a recent paper in Social Science Research Network by James Gibson and Joseph Sutherland, only 13% of American respondents did not feel free to speak their mind in 1954, at the height of McCarthyism. The discovery and transmission of knowledge is severely hindered under these conditions.

    Another factor encouraging self-censorship among students and faculty is a growing administrative apparatus that often has goals other than the pursuit of truth. One mechanism is the imposition of language games, which can seem silly but have the effect of establishing an orthodox way of viewing the world, discouraging dissent, and stifling creativity. This pernicious practice can extend to faculty’s syllabi and even teaching. I was asked by an administrator not to use the term “blackbody radiation” in my class on global warming. Apparently “blackbody” — or more accurately, “black body” — is now exclusively a Critical Social Justice term. I refused. “Blackbody” is the scientific name for a hypothetical object that perfectly absorbs and emits electromagnetic radiation. “Blackbody radiation” is the correct physics term for what I was teaching, and there is no way that I will stop using it. Luckily for me, just standing up was all that was necessary in this case. But not everyone has the privilege of being a tenured professor at the University of Chicago.

    It was my wife who inspired me to start making my views known. Her reason was that she was born in Ukraine at the tail end of the Soviet Union. When I told her what was happening on campus, she had a question: “If you speak out, will you have trouble?” I said, “Why?” And she replied: “It sounds like what my mother told me about Soviet times, and people who spoke out had serious trouble then.” That was enough to convince me. Not in this country, not on my watch. My wife’s mother is a teacher. In the aftermath of communism, she brought home the old propaganda books from school about Lenin and his pals. For fond memories? To teach her children about the old ways? Not at all. She brought them home to burn them to stay warm in the winter. Lenin’s system failed so utterly that people had to burn the old propaganda just to stay warm. And no small part of this failure was due to the fact that they had allowed science to become politicized.

    Now for the first story. Consider a situation at the Awesome Institute of Technology, or AIT. It involves two main characters. The first character is Dr. Centrist, a professor at AIT. Dr. Centrist has devoted the past thirty years of his life to developing his biomedical skills and is now at the top of his field. He is working in cancer research and is close to finding a cure. No one questions his ability in the lab, or his scientific honesty, or his devotion to science and his students. Moreover, Dr. Centrist has advised people of both sexes, all races, all sexual orientations, all religions, and all nationalities, and treated them all with equal respect. Dr. Centrist is a political centrist, smack in the middle of mainstream American viewpoints. Some of his views are center left — for example, he supports broad access to education and healthcare as well as protecting the environment for everyone. But some are center right, and these will end up being considered “provocative” and “controversial” at AIT and cause him quite a bit of trouble.

    The second character in my story is Mr. Woke (he/they), an undergraduate. Mr. Woke entered AIT as a physics major, but physics just “wasn’t a good fit,” so he switched to anthropology, which leaves him/them much more time for other interests, such as Twitter.

    At some point it becomes publicly known that in his personal life Dr. Centrist “clings to his guns and Bible.” Upon hearing this, Mr. Woke looks up in shock from his/their Macbook Pro with all the appropriate political decal stickers, spits out a mouthful of his/their venti soy chai latte, and declares that this is highly “problematic.” According to Mr. Woke, supporting gun rights is a “dog whistle” or “coded language” for white supremacist vigilantism, and therefore minoritized people at AIT cannot feel safe and will be irreparably harmed if Dr. Centrist is allowed to continue his scientific research there. Moreover, Christianity is an exertion of power used by the cis-hetero-patriarchy to oppress gender and sexual minorities. The lgbtqia2s+ community at AIT will not tolerate this type of bigotry on campus, according to Mr. Woke, who has apparently appointed himself/themselves spokesfolx for the entire community.

    But it gets worse. In a conversation at lunch about a recent Supreme Court case, Dr. Centrist lets it slip that he is pro-life. Mr. Woke declares that this is a blatant “war-on-women” position that cannot be tolerated. AIT needs to be a safe space where no gender minority ever has to hear, and thereby be harmed by, a viewpoint with which she disagrees. Mr. Woke says inclusivity dictates that this sort of violent hate speech must be restricted, and he/they takes to Twitter to demand a “Speech Code” and a “Code of Conduct” to ensure that the “climate” at AIT is made safe and inclusive for everyone — by inhibiting and silencing anyone who disagrees with him/them, of course.

    I have saved the worst for last. Eventually it comes out that, horror of horrors, Dr. Centrist is a “deplorable” who actually voted for Donald Trump. Mr. Woke scrambles into action. He/they organizes a letter of denunciation of Dr. Centrist, demanding that he be fired in order to protect minoritized people on campus who have been threatened by Dr. Centrist’s violent and aggressive racist hate vote. Mr. Woke has plenty of “allies” who sign, and then he/they threatens everyone else with a similar denunciation if they refuse to sign, declaring: “Silence is violence, and if you don’t sign now you will be tarnished as a racist for the rest of your career. I will make sure of it!” Eventually most of the students at AIT sign.

    AIT President Craven is interrupted from a busy schedule of meetings on inclusive pronoun usage, equitable landscaping, and bathroom diversity to deal with the latest campus controversy. President Craven is presented with a real conundrum: should he defend the fundamental purpose of AIT, which is the unfettered pursuit of truth, and risk being called a scary name by Mr. Woke, or should he panic and do whatever it takes to make his anxiety go away quickly so that he can return to attending his important meetings and enjoying his outrageous salary in peace? For President Craven, the choice is easy. He fires Dr. Centrist and returns to his pronoun and landscaping meetings.

    An unfortunate result of his decision is that we never get the cure for cancer that Dr. Centrist was close to discovering — will another university or another laboratory hire such a disgraced individual? — but this was not high on President Craven’s list of priorities. Afterwards Mr. Woke insists that Dr. Centrist was not “canceled.” He was, rather, “held accountable” for his hateful, bigoted, and generally “problematic” views. Mr. Woke is fine with this result, because he/they believes that cancer is a social construct caused by systemic racism, and that Dr. Centrist’s racist scientific method is useless compared to the medicinal benefits of other ways of knowing. But what does the public, who funded Dr. Centrist’s research and pays for most of the tuition at AIT through federal grants, think about losing out on progress toward a cure for cancer because of someone’s disapproval of Dr. Centrist’s political views, which many people also hold?

    What would it have taken to avoid this disaster at AIT? As annoying as Mr. Woke is, I think the real villain is President Craven. In order to prevent the terrible outcome that we have just described, President Craven doesn’t exactly have to turn into Churchill, he just needs to turn into President Not-A-Complete-Dingleberry. He just needs a tiny bit of spine. All he has to do is say, “Sorry, Mr. Woke. That’s not how we do things around here. You are free to express your opinions and Dr. Centrist is free to express his opinions. You don’t get to silence people you disagree with at AIT.” This idea is described in the Chicago Principles as follows:

    It is not the proper role of the University to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive… Concerns about civility and mutual respect can never be used as a justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members of our community.

    It is important to get the Chicago Principles adopted on your own campus before a crisis occurs. Even President Craven might have been brave enough to stand up to Mr. Woke if he had an official policy to point to as an excuse. A standard part of the orientation for new students and faculty should be to explain the moral and intellectual foundations of these principles, and more generally of academic freedom: both why they are important and how they will be enforced. (There must be real penalties for violations.) This would help Mr. Woke understand that illiberal tactics will not work.

    I should emphasize that the right of everyone to speak on campus needs to be defended. Let me give an example. I have a colleague who has tiled images of Karl Marx on his website and a Soviet flag in his office. He is actively introducing his Marxist-Communist views into campus settings in a way that Dr. Centrist did not introduce his own. This is deeply offensive, of course, to anyone who has taken ten minutes to study the history of the twentieth century, let alone actually suffered under communism. But the fact that my colleague openly advocates for what I consider to be an indefensible political position has absolutely no bearing on his scientific and mathematical ability. No matter how extreme, immoral, and offensive his or anyone else’s political views may be, we need to defend his right to express them freely without letting them hinder his scientific career. Throughout history, many famous scientists have been highly eccentric and held weird and even repulsive social and political views. So what? Should we therefore renounce the fundamental and critical science that they produced?

    Now a story in the Swiss Alps. Professor Right and Professor Left are attending the Global Economic Forum. They have been appearing at the Forum for decades and they agree on almost nothing. Whenever an economic issue arises, Professor Right argues for less government and Professor Left argues for more government. But they listen to each other’s lectures seriously and they respond to each other’s arguments. Sometimes Professor Left gets excited and makes a hasty a comment about Professor Right’s lecture implying that she is stupid, but he never calls her evil. Even though Professor Right disagrees with Professor Left, she modifies her perspective when Professor Left shows data that contradicts a claim that she is making. In the end, after some back-and-forth, they tend to reach some sort of conclusion about the matter in question that both can agree is empirically justified. They do not like each other, but each understands that the other is necessary for the critical examination of his or her own views and can lead him or her to better economic research.

    Enter a graduate student. Let us call her Ms. Oppressed. Ms. Oppressed doesn’t think that Professor Right is merely wrong, she believes that she is morally corrupt. How else could someone argue for small government, when big government is clearly what is needed to fix the obvious systemic problems in our society that are oppressing women and marginalized people? Ms. Oppressed starts a Twitter campaign to force the Global Economic Forum to issue an official statement acknowledging that increasing the size of government is the only solution to all social and economic problems, as well as add a condition that in order to present a paper at the Forum, every participant must sign a pledge of agreement with this statement.

    Professor Left finds himself in a bit of a bind. On the one hand, Ms. Oppressed seems to agree with him on most policy issues, and he has never been terribly fond of Professor Right. On the other hand, banning speakers rather than contending with their arguments seems to go against the liberal tradition in which Professor Left usually locates himself. While he is considering this, Ms. Oppressed tells Professor Left that “silence is violence,” and that he had better get on board with the program or she will turn to Twitter. Professor Left decides that the best course of action is to declare “no enemies to the left” and go along with Ms. Oppressed. The statement and the pledge are instituted, Professor Right refuses to sign, and she is henceforth banned from the Global Economic Forum.

    Professor Left finds the next Forum meeting quite exhilarating. He can expound all his wildest ideas without the annoying Professor Right demanding evidence or logic. Yet he starts to get an uneasy feeling when he attends Ms. Oppressed’s lecture, which is titled, “Data: Research or Oppression?” In it, Ms. Oppressed argues that data and the ideal of disinterested methodological rigor should no longer be used in economic research because “this idea of intellectual debate and rigor as the pinnacle of intellectualism comes from a world in which white men dominated.” (These deathless words were actually uttered in October, 2021 by Phoebe Cohen, the chair of geosciences at Williams College.) In fact, at the end of her lecture, Ms. Oppressed attacks Professor Left because he refused to ban Professor Right for so many years. Silence is violence, after all, and by allowing that sort of hate think at the Global Economic Forum, Professor Left has actively participated in a horrible system of oppression.

    After the Forum, Ms. Oppressed organizes a letter to have Professor Left and anyone else over the age of thirty-five banned from all future Forums for past collaboration with evil right-wingers, which, in addition to being essential for social justice, will have the added benefit of opening up lots of career opportunities for Ms. Oppressed and her allies. It works, naturally, and Professor Left soon finds himself banned from the most important meeting in the field, suffering the same fate that was visited upon Professor Right only a year before. Meanwhile, at the next meeting of the Global Economic Forum, all the presentations have titles such as “Indigenous Ways of Managing Global Economies,” “Feminist Perspectives on Inflation,” and “Intersectional Debt Management.” No one dares to present data or make a rational argument, for fear of being labeled a white supremacist. Needless to say, the discussions of economics at the event quickly lose their previous influence upon business leaders and policymakers, whose job it is to make actual decisions in the actual world, but it becomes very popular with journalists at the prestigious journal of record, The New York Spaces, who write favorable pieces about the exciting new developments in a field that they used to treat with a mixture of confusion and disgust. It is not long before Ms. Oppressed is rewarded for speaking truth to power with a FitzArthur “Genius” Award.

    The key error here was that Professor Left compromised on the principle that universities and societies should never take positions on social and political issues. He did this because he tended to agree with the political positions that were proposed. Doing so makes universities and societies into political entities rather than scientific ones, and has the effect of restricting free expression by members of the university community who disagree with the official position. It is particularly important right now that professors on the left do not fall for this trap. Aside from the principled reason for this, there is a practical reason: they will never be revolutionary enough, and the revolution is sure to eat them next if they fail to stop it now. In the words of the Kalven Report,

    The instrument of dissent and criticism is the individual faculty member or the individual student. The university is the home and sponsor of critics; it is not itself the critic. To perform its mission in the society, a university must maintain an extraordinary environment of freedom of inquiry and maintain an independence from political fashions, passions, and pressures. A university, if it is to be true to its faith in intellectual inquiry, must embrace, be hospitable to, and encourage the widest diversity of views within its own community. It is a community, but only for the limited, albeit great, purposes of teaching and research. It is not a club, it is not a trade association, it is not a lobby.

    Since the university is a community only for these limited and distinctive purposes, it is a community which cannot take collective action on the issues of the day without endangering the conditions for its existence and effectiveness. There is no mechanism by which it can reach a collective position without inhibiting the full freedom of dissent on which it thrives. It cannot insist that all members favor a given view on social policy; if it takes collective action, therefore, it does so at the price of censuring any minority who do not agree with the view adopted. In brief, it is a community which cannot resort to majority vote to reach positions on public issues.

    The principle of political neutrality is extremely important for a university, though it is often neglected relative to the principle of free expression. But you cannot have the latter without the former. Free expression is not possible in practice at universities that release statements on social and political issues. Consider 2020 as an example of how this is not supposed to work: universities and societies across the country issued statements on social and political issues, and faculty members who disagreed with them publicly were attacked, silenced, and sometimes even fired. The attackers felt justified by the official statements.

    Finally, there is the situation developing in the job search at the physics department at Winthrop University. Winthrop has had an aggressive DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) program that has been in place for more than a decade, and it has already hired dozens of DEI deans and deanlets to implement and promote it. Yet Winthrop Physical Sciences Dean Shifty has recently received word from the President of the Henry Foundation that the Foundation is not happy with the numbers that Winthrop’s DEI program has produced. In particular, the Foundation is expressing concern with the slow progress at appointing an appropriate number of underrepresented faculty in the physical sciences.

    Given the Henry Foundation’s deep pockets and cultural influence, Dean Shifty can see her dreams of a nice presidency at a liberal arts college with a fat paycheck slipping away, and so takes immediate action. Although the advertisement for the physics faculty search explicitly says that there will be no discrimination on the basis of race or sex, Dean Shifty slyly informs the chair of the physics department and the members of the search committee that she will not consider a nomination for the faculty position if it is an Asian or white man. She does this orally and through an intermediary, because she knows that it is a violation of Titles VI and IX of the Civil Rights Act. The members of the faculty search committee are uncomfortable, but they feel that they have no choice but to comply. They do not actually know what is in the Civil Rights Act — they are physicists, not lawyers; but they assume that Dean Shifty would not do anything illegal.

    A fierce debate soon emerges on the hiring committee. It turns out that half of the committee thinks the department needs a woman and half of the committee thinks that the department needs an underrepresented minority. Instead of debating the scientific merit of the candidates, the committee spends its time debating which type of underrepresented person should be recruited. In the end they settle on hiring a woman, because there are more women than underrepresented minorities among the graduate students, and the students need more faculty members who “look like them.” They hire a woman and both Dean Shifty and the President of the Henry Foundation are thrilled. Of course the entirety of the faculty are vaguely aware of what happened, which leads to a strange and uncomfortable situation for the new member of the department. Meanwhile similar hiring shenanigans have been implemented at universities across the country, so the male Asian and white candidates find it extremely difficult to get faculty jobs and many end up leaving the field.

    Notice what happened when hiring criteria other than scientific merit were introduced: it immediately made the process political. Whether to hire a woman or an underrepresented minority is a political question, not a scientific question. In order to avoid the politicization of science, therefore, it is absolutely essential that all admission, hiring, promotion, and honors be awarded on the basis of scientific merit alone. Politics is automatically introduced when purely merit-based decisions are abandoned. Moreover, ideological purity tests called DEI statements are now often used as a gate-keeping mechanism to ensure political uniformity in faculty hiring, and this quite obviously violates the principle of political neutrality. Also, note that the purpose of the university and of science is being violated if criteria other than merit are used for hiring: in such cases we are no longer pursuing truth to the best of our ability. We have instead substituted some other goal.

    These matters were presciently discussed in the Shils Report:

    The conception of the proper tasks of the University determines the criteria which should govern the appointment, retention, and promotion of members of the academic staff. The criteria which are to be applied in the case of appointments to the University of Chicago should, therefore, be criteria which give preference above all to actual and prospective scholarly and scientific accomplishment of the highest order, actual and prospective teaching accomplishment of the highest order, and actual and prospective contribution to the intellectual quality of the University through critical stimulation of others within the University to produce work of the highest quality.

    Note that the last clause refers strictly to stimulating others “to produce work of the highest quality,” and should not be interpreted as a way to sneak other criteria into consideration. And later:

    There must be no consideration of sex, ethnic or national characteristics, or political or religious beliefs or affiliations, in any decision regarding appointment, promotion, or reappointment at any level of the academic staff.

    The objective of this rule is simple: fairness.

    The principles of academic freedom confer not only a right but also a duty. Some people think that the duty of academic freedom is to restrict your speech in certain cases, but this is incorrect. The duty of academic freedom is to use it. My obligation as a professor and a scientist is to say what I really think in public, while of course focusing my teaching on the particular subject I was hired to teach, not least because so many people in society cannot. That is the whole point of the professional protection known as tenure. Too often tenure is wasted on the timid. Anyway, they cannot cancel all of us.

    After Babel

    I

    How do you read?

    In posing this question, I have in mind the Surrealists’ question of 1919: “Why do you write?”

    But this time around the question is about reading.

    Weren’t the Surrealists also great readers?

    In André Breton’s Anthology of Black Humor, didn’t he turn his readings of Lautréamont, Roussel, Arthur Cravan, Leonora Carrington, and Alfred Jarry into full-fledged literary performances?

    And what are we to make of Borges, the late-arriving Surrealist, so enamored of the fantastic and of artifice, seeking out the algebra of dreams and the key to cities, and maintaining thirty years later that the only history that counts is not that of literature but that of reading. Books are immobile, he said, compact, closed in on themselves, identical. And the only things that change over time, and thus make history, are the ways we read them. And what are we to think of his concocted “true confessions” in which he asserts that writers must be judged on the basis of the readings they have inspired, the enthusiasm they have generated, and that he, Borges, is no prouder of the books he wrote than of those he read well?

    So, reading.

    The practices and purposes of reading.

    “How do you read?” asks another great reader, Italo Calvino. “Sitting, stretched out, head down, while eating, in a cafe, after getting up in the morning, before going to bed?”

    Are there places, times, life circumstances, or historical moments that seem more suited to the unpunished vice that Valery Larbaud believed reading to be?

    Is solitude required?

    Silence?

    Do you sometimes read out loud? If so, when?

    And haven’t we lent too much credence to Augustine’s story of his astonishment at discovering Ambrose reading silently in the garden of the bishop’s palace in Milan and declaring that this very place and time marked the passage from reading aloud to reading in a quiet, inward, concentrated, modern manner?

    In the universities of our youth, we learned about Latins, such as Propertius and Martial, who, before Ambrose, already read silently. And if the contemporaries of Augustus were so given to oral recitations at the home of Maecenas, protector of poets, doesn’t that mean that the usual practice was to read silently or in a low voice?

    Conversely, Flaubert was not reluctant to put his books to the test of the gueuloir. He would bellow his prose, scream it as loudly as he could, until he thought it was right. Zola, in his remembrances of the Rue Murillo, said that Flaubert even required his readers to declaim what they were reading. Hugo did the same.

    And the aging Louis Aragon who, in a bar on the Rue des Saints-Pères where he followed me one night, may have been speaking to the old man he was, to the former young man, to Antoine or Anthoine (his doppelgängers), to the person he called the performer, the narrator, or the third-party author, to Elsa, to his last readers, or in fact to me and to the young man I once was — in any event, there in the bar he is offering me a part in the film to be made from his novel Aurelien. He tries to persuade me by improvising, at 1:30 in the morning, amid the empty tables, a coruscant reading of several pages of the novel. How clearly I recall the stentorian delivery that he adopted to demonstrate that this was how he wanted to be read: in a very loud voice!

    And of the many writers who recently did me the honor of participating in my inquiry into their habits of reading in my journal La Règle du Jeu, how many are of the same mind? How many would follow the example of Virgil, who could declaim the Georgics for four days straight? In Rome, it was said that he had no talent more enviable than his tone, his eloquence, his touch. Two thousand years later, don’t authors write for ears as much as for eyes? And are we doing a text an injustice if we fail to recite it?

    Frame the question any way you will.

    There is an art of reading.

    It is probably not as high an art as writing.

    But among those who do it best, it is intimately tied to writing. And for fans of Borges, Aragon, or Virgil, it requires an aptitude no less rare.

    Can that art be taught?

    In principle, yes.

    And on this point we must stand steadfast against the populist demagogy of innocent and protocol-free reading.

    But if reading can be taught, how can we prevent the teachers of reading from becoming bogeymen like Monsieur Émile Faguet, the French professional critic, whom the Surrealists imagined slapping? He strove, in his mediocre art of reading, to reeducate the “pretty little reader” whose enthusiasm fades as fast as infatuation.

    How to shield this “pretty little reader,” who believes that a reading event is the same as an amorous one? “You don’t learn to be in love,” she says, “you fall in love! You don’t learn to read, you read!” And she is right.

    How to preserve the mixture of freedom and intelligence, of sensuality and culture, the bemused grace, the rapture that Roland Barthes called the pleasure of the text, which no initiation must be allowed to diminish?

    That is yet another question.

    And it is one of the puzzles that preoccupied the Surrealists as they worked, not only on automatic writing but also on automatic reading, with its free associations, its felicitous blunders, and its tendency, as they would say, to “slip on the roof of the winds.”

    An assortment of other questions.

    Do we read better or worse (whether silently or aloud) when we know in advance (or do not know) the name of the author? At what point should we act on our knowledge of a book’s existence? Is it in the storm of its publication, when the weight of the reviews and misunderstandings that pile up so quickly wedges itself between the book and you? Or later? Is the wise reader the one who waits for the book to cool down, to disappear from the booksellers’ shelves, and to move into the winter of the library?

    Am I, the reader, in a state of peace or war with the writer?

    Is the conversation with the book going to be a good one, or hand-to-hand combat?

    What do we do when reading becomes difficult? Do we stall or do we push on? Do we stop? Do we try to resolve the problem? Do we put the book down and pick it up again a little later? Or do we jump to the next one (as Jarry said to the neighbor whose child he almost killed while shooting in her yard, “Don’t worry, madam, we will make you a new one”)? Do we do as Montaigne did when he decided that, if the book “vexes,” one should simply pick another one and repeat the experiment?

    What is the right tempo for reading? Should we follow Heidegger, who pretended that his texts had to be read at the speed they were written, at the same cadence, the same clip? A lifetime to write, a lifetime to read? Or Sartre, who read like a pirate, without rule or scruple, at his own pace, very slowly then suddenly very fast, adapting the text to his inner rhythm, his speed, his thinking needs, his mood?

    What happens to a book when it is no longer read?

    Does the dearth of readers condemn it to nothingness?

    Do books lead their own lives in a parallel world devoid of living beings?

    Are there books that exist only because a handful of readers, sometimes just one, light them up with their love?

    Which comes first, the book or the reader? Am I the one who goes for the book, uncovers it, chooses it? Or does the book fix me in its sights, target me like a homing device, a guided missile, the finger of God or the Devil? Does it locate me, torpedo me?

    I have experience with such predestined books, those we refer to conventionally as having changed our life.

    I could name some books that dropped down on me like meteors: Le Vicomte de Bragelonne in childhood; Belle du Seigneur in adolescence; André Maurois’ biography of Disraeli; Malraux’s novels; Baudelaire; Artaud; so many others. I spent my life reading, so it is impossible to cite them all. The Gulag Archipelago in 1976; Levinas a little later; my encounter with Romain Gary; the discovery of Lord Byron; reconnecting with Sartre; the Talmud with its square letters; a nineteenth-century Lithuanian rabbi; Curzio Malaparte.

    Then there are those, parenthetically, that I avoided reading because I felt they were a threat, that they might shake me and I was not ready for it. Do I have to confess? The Kabbalah… Kierkegaard… Georges Bataille, whom I often cite but put off reading deeply for a very long time… Dostoevsky, yes, Dostoevsky…

    And as for “bad books”: Do I like some bad books? I have to admit that this may be the case. The failed attempts by the great writers. Or minor works by writers of the second rank who had a great life. Not to mention thrillers (detectives, spies, adventurers), of which I have always been a fan.

    II

    But there is another, related question: not how do you read, but why?

    For pleasure or out of necessity?

    To escape yourself or to find yourself?

    Do we read, as Don Quixote and Madame Bovary did, to flee a painful present? Is reading an experience similar to the lightning bolt that seduced the “pretty little reader?” The start of a trip that pulls us out of our orderly life? A flight toward an exalted elsewhere? An inner exile? A conversion? Is it one of those adventures that I praised in The Will to See, the first virtue of which is to make us strangers to ourselves, to estrange us?

    Or is it the other way around? Should we join Musil, Broch, and Kundera in believing that literature is a tool for knowing the world and, thus, our own soul? Do we read not to get out of ourselves, but to escape from melancholy, to feel what we feel more acutely, to live our lives in a better way, to become true subjects, to find each other and ourselves?

    Here I must acknowledge something I heard from Marthe Robert, another great reader, a specialist on Kafka, who at the time had just fought like a lioness to convince the jury of a prestigious French book award to select my first novel, Le Diable en tête. We were at the end of the evening, in the deserted dining room of a restaurant on the Quai des Grands-Augustins, where Grasset, my publisher, was celebrating the success of the book. And Robert confided to me, as if sharing a secret, in a slightly drunken voice and in pale makeup that made her look like the theosophist Madame Blavatsky: “Don’t tell anyone… because the times are crazy with all the talk of the death of the author and the subject… but this novel, it’s you… a hundred percent you… you’re the author… you’re the subject… what other virtue can a novel possess? It’s the return of the subject… it’s Artaud leaving Rodez, it’s Kafka guilty and absolved, it’s the bastard and the child reconciled… your Benjamin, it’s you!”

    A variant of the question: Is reading good for you? Does it bring reconciliation with the world and with oneself, liberation, freedom? Is it true that to open a book is to shut a prison? Is it the beautiful Enlightenment dream of a cure for packaged ideas, clichés, and religious or political obscurantism? Does it teach you to think for yourself? Or is it like any other vice which, when indulged to excess, becomes a poison? Consider Cervantes and his sorrowful knight, alienated in the “demon of analogy,” as Foucault would go on to describe him. Consider Huysmans’ Jean Des Esseintes, Don Quixote’s successor, suffocating under his hallucinations, haunted by sleepwalking apparitions, sickened by the miasmas exuding from the overly tidy volumes in his Latin library and from the cut flowers he has placed in all the urns in his house, which, in wilting, have released their venoms. Consider the Sartre of The Words, seeing in the love of books a virus with which Poulou, the prodigal child, was infected by his grandfather. Consider Montaigne worrying about an “excess” of reading that, as he ages, will be “harmful” to his health.

    Varying the question: “One of the greatest tragedies of my life is the death of Lucien de Rubempré.” Who said that? Was it Oscar Wilde, around the time he was also claiming that before Turner fogs did not hang over the Thames? Was it, before Wilde, Thomas de Quincey declaring that “direct knowledge of The Divine Comedy” is “the most inexhaustible happiness” that life can offer? Whether Wilde or Quincey, this stance changes everything. Because the latter, a discerning eater of opium, knew what he was talking about when it came to venoms, poisons, and other narcotics. And I cannot help observing that the Maoist leaders of my youth showed more or less the same conviction in their discouragement of too much Homer, Juvenal, Aristophanes, or Artaud’s Voyage to the Land of the Tarahumara. As did the radical leader Benny Lévy, who, despite having tempered his militancy, remained convinced that reading was a poison. And Byron deciding, in Missolonghi, to trade his library for a cargo of cannon, a shipment of Congreve rockets with inextinguishable fuses, and other arms for his Souliotes.

    And today?

    Today it’s hard to say.

    For my part, I swing between the two poles of this twin postulation.

    I recall that the Latins were already distinguishing between two types of reading, depending on whether one let oneself be guided by studium or otium, by study or recreation, by involved, engaged, practical intelligence or by disengaged, theoretical, and gratuitous reflection.

    Careful, though!

    I also recall that Cicero’s position on the subject was far from clear.

    He rejected the first route, which seemed to him reserved for slaves and freedmen — but the second route, reading as leisure, reading for no particular purpose, found no greater favor in his eyes.

    And this moralist so enamored of politics, this orator trying to be Caesar and Pompey and wanting to govern the republic, this philosopher and man of action, this rather successful prototype of what we might call today an intellectual in the city, gained clarity by separating the otium into two subcategories: the otiosum otium, literally sterile idleness (with which he wanted no more to do than with overly productive and contemptible studium) and otium coupled with utilitas (which was much better, as it equipped you to expose a conspiracy, destroy Catiline, and save the endangered republic!).

    Is that the compromise solution?

    And, for the writers and thinkers here and now who do not reject the possibility of changing the world, or at least of repairing it, does it achieve the right combination of words and things, talking and doing, reading and dreaming?

    For my part, it just about does.

    I do not read for professional reasons or because I am involved in this or that (studium).

    But neither (alas) do I read much for the pure pleasure of doing so (otiosum otium).

    Occasionally, of course, that happens.

    Last summer, for example, I yielded to the memory of long vacations and plunged into the ten volumes of an old-school French masterpiece, Romain Rolland’s Jean-Christophe.

    Another time, in a hotel library, I reconnected with the pleasures of my university days, when — thinking I knew all there was to know about The Human Comedy — I was amazed to discover this gem: The Secrets of the Princesse de Cadignan.

    And then there are those nights when, hoping to quiet my insomniac fever, I grab a novel long ago read and forgotten, and voilà, as with Proust remembering who he was in the “closed room invaded by the scent of iris,” a region of myself that I had walled up suddenly reopens, dilates, and releases a stream of sounds, smells, colors, and voices that works better than any effort of memory to bring back the me of the time. I see myself as I was at sixteen on each successive page of Gide’s The Counterfeiters. I reexperience, as if preserved in the pages of a Hemingway novel, the emotion of the love-crazed suitor of the young actress out of an Eric Rohmer film for whom I was waiting secretly in Granville and passing the time by reading. Better archived than in any film, photo, diary, or memory is my precise recollection, upon rereading Thackeray’s Vanity Fair recently, of the weather, the feeling of the air around me, the color of the garden and of the feathers of the ibis that strutted about regally and came now and then to taunt me one day in a hotel in Cuernavaca decades ago when I was filming Day and Night. And a short while later, it happened again with Ultramarine by Malcolm Lowry, of whom I knew nothing at the time apart from Under the Volcano…

    But most of the time everything moves too quickly.

    For I read while writing.

    Increasingly I read in order to write and to better understand the dramas, the specific situations, the challenges that punctuate my life and its political-philosophical work.

    And everything combusts in the foundry, the factory, the flares of those engagements and the texts that accompany them. I burn words, consume them. I annotate, dismember, crumble, and cannibalize books that I might otherwise love. The real flavor of reading I savor from afar with a touch of envy and nostalgia, in the manner of Italo Calvino’s “horrible worker” in If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler. Calvino’s character long ago stopped indulging in the innocent pleasure of reading. But before sitting down to work each morning, he watches through a telescope a young woman stretched out on a chaise longue reading a book that might be his. He sees her move her lips, lower the book, raise her eyes, resume reading, skip a page, dwell long on another, flip back, go to the end, come back, sigh, sometimes wipe away a tear — reading as he used to do.

    III

    But there is yet another question.

    It is the most pressing, and I don’t know any writer who doesn’t face it with some degree of anxiety.

    It is the question of what the internet, the giant that is Google, and the all

    powerful screens are doing to reading and its practices.

    A part of me believes that everything has changed, and that this mutation in the way we read is as decisive (but for the worse) as the transition from the scroll to the parchment codex; or from the standing stones of the prytaneum, on which was engraved the calendar of sacrifices in Solon’s time, to the first linden-wood tablets on which scribes wrote with sharpened reeds; or from hand-copied books to printed books; or from books in which, to save space, words and sentences were run together to those where the lines were separated by space and sentences by newly invented punctuation; or from reading out loud to reading silently, as with Ambrose and Augustine.

    Surfing, we call it now, or browsing.

    Plowing ahead at full steam.

    Displaying several books simultaneously on a shared screen.

    Or just one, but with access to the variations, glosses, corrections, notes, and guides that, in the pre-Internet world, appeared at the beginning or end of a volume.

    Or with the aid of various applications, a dictionary, an encyclopedia, cross-references to other books, a translation site, a quasi-library, and soon, within “metaverses,” an incorporated reading space.

    Or even those indices, lexicons, and other research engines that can scan text at the speed of digital light, count the occurrences of a word, capture the avatars of a concept and pass that concept through a sieve.

    Not to mention the flood of messages, alerts, flashes, beeps, intrusive notifications, security protocols, ads, cookies: they stream as I read; they sabotage my engagement with the author; they place between us that great impediment to reading that Proust called conversation but whose ultimate form has become the chatter of social networks.

    How is it possible not to conclude that these mechanisms so central to online life have engendered new ways of reading?

    Shouldn’t a book proceed at its own pace, take the time to operate within me, sharpen my desire, disappoint it, resume the attack, hollow out a space for itself and come to dwell within me?

    And doesn’t the very word “navigation” suggest that we remain on the surface, above the water? When today we occasionally go fishing for meaning, do we still subject ourselves to the effort of sounding the depths? Wasn’t this effort formerly an integral part of reading, just as it is with writing?

    Hasn’t our attention become distracted, constantly interrupted, tugged at, discouraged from dawdling, constantly uneasy, flitting, drifting in a permanent blue light that drives us crazy? Farewell concentration, reverie, contemplation!

    Think of the impeachment of reading that so frightened Proust. Ponder the “art of not reading” in the context of the mannered frivolity, envy, and spite that La Bruyère described as widespread. Remember the “reading with a bird’s eye view” for which Thomas de Quincey reproached Friedrich Schlegel and the German romantics. To all these bad practices, machines supply new and formidable weapons.

    I loved the little acts that went with reading: the open book, fallen from your hands, underlined, highlighted; shifting your seat because the light has changed; losing your place, finding it again, dog-earing the page in anticipation of resuming where you left off; the page marker; untrimmed pages; the paper cutter used to separate those pages; the velum torn out of impatience; proofs.

    I loved, in bookstores, book stalls, and friends’ attics, the chances of happening upon an out-of-print book.

    In public libraries, I loved the pleasure of requesting a book, waiting for it expectantly, of hearing the librarian say sorrowfully that someone else was reading it, that it had been moved to a warehouse outside Paris, or that it was out for restoration — in short, unavailable. Tomorrow, perhaps; you have to wait, take your turn, come back, hope for the best…

    And I loved the living past of libraries, with their narrow aisles, their stacks and shelves, their logical classifications, their inevitable random settling. How do you classify them, Georges Perec would ask about books that really matter? By author’s name, by genre, by country? By color, language, binding, collection? Is the date of publication or the date of acquisition more significant? Does a personal library have an end? Is there a moment when, like Captain Nemo disappearing in his Nautilus, you say to yourself, “OK, look, I have more books than I could read in a thousand years, so let’s act as if, from this day on, all publishing has ceased”? More important than an end, does your library have a beginning, a date of birth? And could you make out, in the stream of your rows of shelved books, those that came first, those with which the adventure began, the starters, the seeds and sprouts?

    For me, the answer is yes. I can spot my first books from among a thousand. Eyes closed, by feel, as blind as Borges wandering the long, shelved galleries of his Babel, I will find them because they are the secret, living pillars of my library. They are my mother’s books. Hidden among the multitude of books that I have since acquired in the course of my adventures in life, in writing, and in thought, there are the books that she had as a girl and that she presented to me as a gift when I was almost a man. I was fifteen. For a long time I would go to bed (late) and wake up (early) gazing at the shelves I had reserved for them. Over the years, they became diluted, separated, lost amid the rest of my books. But I can still pick them out of a thousand others because of their lovely yellowed paper, their stitching, their bindings with broken thread. And there on the flyleaf, in a hand elegant and firm, in pale ink or pencil, the first name of their beautiful first reader, the year she read them, and, occasionally, a word of commentary or criticism.

    I cherish those books. Their number has dwindled in proportion to the mass of others. In the room where I keep them, they give off a light invisible to all but myself. But how many are left who think this way? What will the careful archaeology of libraries be worth once the era of the great connection has taken hold for good? Won’t fidelity to a delicate stock of first books go the way of all the other rituals of the book age?

    And yet…

    I’m not sure things need to be as cut and dry as I’ve put them here.

    First of all, is this revolution really so radical?

    And have we really moved from the light of the old-fashioned book into the blinding shadow of text processing?

    If I’m getting this right, reading on screen means three things. A zip through books, a hop over letter and image alike, a spray of works consumed in fragments with neither care nor deference.

    But hasn’t that been a pervasive modern trend for a long time now? The disregard for books, reading like a monkey, lifting out bits and slapping them together, misappropriating their contents — weren’t those practices already customary among my beloved Surrealists, not to mention the Situationists? Didn’t Guy Debord’s reading logs, shown to me by his old friend, the collector Paul Destribats, classify the works that Debord was reading as either “redeployable” or not? Didn’t that clear the way for books to become debris?

    Electronic reading, which purports to be hyperconnected, loaded with meaning, and scholarly, is a stretching, a metastasizing, of the text, around which swirl constellations of metatexts that sometimes clarify it and sometimes cloud or obscure it. It is the door to the era of the “augmented book,” just as the transhumanists, when musing about grafting implants, electrodes, into our brains, refer to the “augmented man.” But wasn’t that (except for the technology) the principle behind the “rhizomatic” (non-discursive) reading — in layers and plateaus, with constant interruptions, all bifurcations and bypasses — that Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari were preaching well before the arrival of the Internet?

    Isn’t electronic reading also akin to the “symptomatic reading” that was theorized by my professor, Louis Althusser? Althusser’s conception consisted of finding the “undetected” part of the text, probing its “lacunae,” “making its empty spaces speak,” forcing out its “unsaid part.” In order to achieve this, didn’t we have to superimpose the text over another text that changed its context but was made to resonate within it?

    Can’t reading on a screen be seen as the generalization of an innovation of Jacques Derrida, who, in his writings in the second part of his life, proposed an art of page layout similar to what a philosopher version of Stéphane Mallarmé might have produced, inserting a commentary from The Phenomenology of Spirit here and bits of Jean Genet’s fiction there, and pushing to the point of dazing the reader the art of scattering, of setting up spiraling columns, of transplanting pieces of text, of separating words in space, of hybrid writing with no end point, of cross-eyed reading in which the gaze pauses indiscriminately at the right or left of the page? In so doing, couldn’t it be said that Derrida invented, when the Internet was still in diapers, the very notion of hypertext?

    And Roland Barthes: wasn’t he another precursor of this mode of reading when, in S/Z, he pioneered the practice of taking hold of a great text (Balzac’s Sarrasine) for the purpose of “sprinkling” it, making it “abound,” cutting it into “lexies” (invented semantic units), dismembering and eviscerating it; listening to the “palimpsests” (or, as Ferdinand de Saussure might put it, the “paragrams”) that made up its hidden matrix, and then, at the end of these serial “earthquakes,” reducing it to a pile of broken blocks that form a landscape bearing only a distant resemblance to that intended by the original author?

    And then there is the internet itself, which can be seen as an invitation to travel through a space that is limitless, endless, cosmic. It is the mad project of storing all of the knowledge published in every language of the world. Not all that different from the Babelian library of Borges, which was as vast as the universe, defying the imagination, whose nearly infinite number of rooms contained so many volumes that it was impossible, not only to view them all, but to embrace them in a single movement of thought. This unfathomable loop that is the Internet, this opening to the imaginary windows of the metaverse, can also be seen as the realization of the glittering utopia of the German mathematician and writer Kurd Lasswitz, who, in 1904, in a divine short story that Borges always said was the real source of inspiration for his “Library of Babel,” described a “universal library” capable of containing all books, all words spoken and unspoken, all conversations between people whether they have met each other or not, all laws enacted or to be enacted in the future, all peace treaties between nations that have waged war on each other or that have no reason to do so, all encyclopedias, all the train schedules for the next century, all certificates of birth and death down the ages, all the possible combinations of all the letters of all the alphabets of the world?

    But above all, is it really impossible for a scientist, an intellectual, or a writer to make virtuous use of these modern and postmodern protocols, this new relationship with books that the reign of the screens has brought about and that instills in me so much regret? Of course not.

    I open my laptop.

    I still write in longhand.

    I have never been able to break myself of that other unpunished vice, writing with pen on paper.

    But, like most people, I spend some time on my laptop verifying dates, checking references, documenting sources, or looking through a classic of which I have only a vague and reconstructed recollection.

    And so begins a screen experience that aims, targets, destroys and punctures some of my fondest reading habits. Yet the incurable optimist in me can’t help finding some merit in this. After all, isn’t it true that certain poisons (most in fact) can also be used as remedies? And wasn’t Achilles’ spear thought to have the power to heal the wounds that it had inflicted?

    Books come to me through the screen with a carefree air that I had not previously associated with them. They were noble, imposing, but also freighted with my earlier readings. Snowed in by the dust gathered on the shelves where I had left them. Domesticated by being arranged in the Perec-like order I had given them. Now here they are, galloping around. Here they flaunt their independence and escape from their little caskets. Here they catch fire, kiss, converse, agree and disagree, enrich each other, overlap, and, as Mallarmé says, light each other up through reciprocal reflections like a virtual swooping of fire across precious stones. The library regains its youth. It breathes deeply. It shakes itself off in a clatter of chains and thawed words.

    In every librarian there sleeps a Birotteau who, like Balzac’s character, is tempted to live inside his books as if on a frozen stage set. Or worse, an autodidact, the character in Sartre’s Nausea who has resolved to read every book there is in order from A to Z. The organized disorder of Google has many faults, but it has the virtue of shaking all this up, breaking the ice, awakening books. It is a pipe organ gone wild. A keyboard playing itself like a virtuoso. And like Mallarmé’s Le Livre — the ideal book in which, from multiple words, the poet formed composite terms unknown in the common language — it plays with words, combines them in infinite ways, and, to speak like another poet, makes of books a temple in which man passes through forests of symbols which watch him with suddenly foreign eyes.

    I, reader, am gripped by a nearly equal drunkenness.

    I am dispossessed, yes, of my page-to-page reading, sometimes dreamy, sometimes bored, and always consuming.

    I am cut off from the delicious shiver of worry I felt when the librarian at Sainte-Geneviève would disappear with my slip and leave me uncertain about whether she would ever return with the book I had requested.

    And I am deprived of the emotion that gripped me one day at the École Normale when, flipping through the cards neatly arranged in their long narrow drawers of polished wood and bearing the calligraphy of successive librarians at the school, I noticed, among many cards in the hand of the librarian Pierre Petitmengin, a very old one on which I detected the handwriting of Lucien Herr, his legendary predecessor, and a contemporary of Péguy, Jaurès, and Léon Blum…

    But, as if in compensation, there is another emotion and another type of joy. In place of the concentration of long ago, a strange and gripping sense of immersion. In place of my nostalgia for books, a new energy that carries me away in a whirlwind of images and pages. I jump from link to link. I rush from node to node. I, too, gallop from site to site, without aid of landmarks or a compass. The virtual library is like Pascal’s sphere, the center of which was everywhere and the circumference nowhere. Sometimes I read idiotic books in bad French and crater into a leaden ennui. Other times I come up with a rare pearl, tumble upon an old atlas or a brilliant PDF, get Aristotle and Thoreau to meet up, the umbrella and the sewing machine, the tinder and the spark, a monument and a document, the event, the unforeseen. An hour passes. Two. Day. Night. I don’t pause to reflect — or to sleep. It’s a form of hypnosis. It’s one of those rare moments in life where time stands still. I have the impression of being in a haunted castle, moving from door to door, knocking, waking ghosts and bringing them back to life. I work breathlessly. I write. I move forward.

    I have to say again, even if it is illusory, even if it seems blasphemous and irreverent, what a joy it is, for a devotee of texts and books, to be in contact with this underground library that is endless and, for the first time, entirely available. Before, when I scanned bibliographies at the end of books, I would suffer the same sort of dejection that Thomas de Quincey felt upon entering a library and realizing that he would not live long enough to read, or even to open, all the books waiting there. Here, too, I know that I won’t read everything. But the everything is there. And the books, the sources, and the scholarly articles have relinquished their formal nonavailability and no longer oblige me to consult them in some archive in a faraway university. Presence. Plethora. The miracle of sudden profusion. The milk and honey of the digital land. A horn of plenty and a joust with a God who no longer plays with dice but plays now with the flow rate of the river. A new garden of the Hesperides with its golden fruits where I no longer forbid myself from playing the triumphant Heracles. It is Goethe’s dream when he prophesied to Eckermann the advent of a world literature, or, better, a universal one that would succeed the era of national literatures and fulfill the plan of the Enlightenment. It is the world of Hegelian absolute knowledge, without origin or end; it is substance become subject, reason made world, the negation of the negation, History fully grasped. Yes, everything is there. Up to and including the works lost, destroyed, or burned, works that, according to the ancient sages, were supposed to live again only in the world of the future. I suspect, now, that if I searched diligently enough, if I clicked on the right links, I would find them! I am in this maze without a catalogue. I wander without a guide in a labyrinth of letters where everything and nothing is mystery. I get worked up, enthusiastic. I am a master of my books and of the universe, almost to the point of exulting, like Heidegger in his lecture “The Age of the World Picture,” that “the researcher no longer needs a library at home.”

    At this point, I have only one fear. The last, but not the least troubling. There is no library without a hell. No labyrinth without a minotaur. Might the minotaur, in this case, have flown at dusk?

    Taiwan: Chronicle of a Crisis Postponed

    I

    The South China Sea, fabled and contested, stretches from the Taiwan Strait south to the Java Sea and the Singapore Strait, where the Horsburgh lighthouse, an active relic of Asia’s violent encounter with Europe, now keeps watch over the world’s most crucial chokepoint. North of Singapore, the sea is bounded to the east by the island of Borneo, to the west by the Malay peninsula. As each of these land formations slopes away, the sea opens to a wide expanse. Wide, but frequently shallow, and dotted with cays, atolls, reefs, sand bars, and small island formations. For the vast commercial ships that transit this shipping lane, they must hew closely to well-charted but narrow routes where the sea lane is deep enough to accommodate their giant hulls.

    If you viewed the South China Sea simultaneously through satellite, radar, and sonar images, you would see a sea clogged with obstacles. There are the myriad islands and formations and shallows that constrain commercial passage. Across the remaining surface, every major shipping company in the world transits these waters, sailing mega-container ships, oil and natural gas tankers, grain ships and bulk carriers hauling copper, steel, and other industrial materials, and the “roll-on, roll-off” (or “ro-ro”) ships that move the world’s supply of cars and trucks from manufacturer to market. Several nations sail fishing fleets here, including two of the world’s largest, from China and Taiwan; according to the Ocean Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, fully half of the world’s fishing fleet spends some of the year trailing in these waters. Six countries have made sovereign claims here and are seeking to profit from the economic rights that follow (under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), namely China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia. In the shallow waters of the eastern and western reaches of the sea, dozens of nationally and internationally owned companies are part of their projects to drill into the huge estimated reserves of oil and gas captured beneath the sands. Along this sea floor lies the world’s largest concentration of undersea cables, which carry more than ninety percent of all the data that powers the contemporary technological world. This is the busiest shipping lane in the world, the jugular of the world economy.

    You would be blithely unaware of any of this, though, while sailing the main shipping lane, for that route runs far afield of most of these dangers. You can sometimes sail for hours without catching sight of another ship, even at the height of day. Perhaps you see the distant silhouette of a container vessel far ahead, or the outline of an oil tanker just at the horizon. Your radar shows you the position of these and other vessels too far away to be seen even with the binoculars that are still a standard part of sea-farers kit. On most modern vessels the Automated Information System (AIS) allows you, with a tap of the cursor, to glean the name, the speed, and the direction of these vessels, though you still need the binoculars because many small or mid-size Chinese fishing vessels do not carry AIS beacons or turn them off. But to the naked eye the sea is calm and can be all but empty.

    That is, until you approach the Taiwan Strait. Here the sea narrows sharply, and the seabed rises dramatically, reaching no more than three hundred feet at its deepest. Shipping is squeezed into a narrow channel. And around you the world’s most dangerous arms race comes into plain view.

    To the west lies China, to the east the island of Taiwan. For a long period, it was known as Formosa—after ilha formosa, or “beautiful island,” per a Portuguese account in 1542 — less fabled than the surrounding sea, but even more contested through contemporary history. Populated for the better part of six thousand years, it became a Dutch colony in the mid-1600s, then an independent kingdom. It was annexed to the Qing dynasty in 1683, then ceded to Japan in 1895, under the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the first Sino-Japan war. The short-lived Republic of China (which overthrew the Qing Dynasty in 1912) took over Taiwan in 1945, at the request of its World War II allies. When the Chinese civil war turned against them, in 1949, the Republic of China’s government, having already been forced to move from Nanjing, relocated from Chengdu to Taipai. Thus was modern Taiwan born. It has been subject to threat and claim from China ever since.

    It occupies a critical geography. It forms an essential part of what John Foster Dulles conceived of as “the first island chain” — an arc of islands from which the United States could project power in Asia by which to contain Soviet and Chinese military action in the Pacific. In our day, the greater focus is on Chinese naval expansion, for the arc collectively encloses the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea — what China calls its “Near Seas,” each of them bordering one of China’s major economic hubs. North of this arc is the Japanese main island, where an American naval base homeports the USS Ronald Reagan and its supporting destroyer squadron, and the Korean peninsula, where the United States maintains a large concentration of armed forces. The island chain formation itself runs from the Japanese island of Kyushu, where the United States operates the diplomatically named Fleet Activities Sasebo, a naval base home to the Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces and to several American ships, including amphibious assault vessels (like a small aircraft carrier) and America’s only forward-deployed expeditionary strike group. Southwest from Kyushu lies the Ryuku island arc, which encompasses Okinawa, home to not one but twenty-five American military installations, encompassing Marine and Air force capacities, along with smaller Army and Navy units. The lower arc of the Ryukus wraps around the Senkaku Island group (described by Taiwan as the Tiaoyutai Islands and by China as the Diaoyu Islands), where China and Japan came nearly to blows in 2012-2013. The southernmost of the Ryuku islands is a mere twenty nautical miles from Taiwan’s northeastern shore. Taiwan itself is the largest formation in the chain, spanning 245 miles from north to south, and pushing the waters of the East and South China Seas into a narrow strait, 97 nautical miles wide at its widest, separating Taiwan from the People’s Republic of China.

    Continuing down from Taiwan’s southern tip, the 160 nautical miles of the Luzon Strait that separates Taiwan from the northern reaches of the Philippine archipelago constitute the largest gap in the chain — and the deepest channel. Then comes the Philippine archipelago, once home to the massive American base at Subic Bay, our largest overseas naval installation throughout the Cold War, rashly given away during the naïve and heady days of the early post-Cold War order. Now the United States maintains only basing rights, and collaborates with the modest Philippine navy and larger Coast Guard. Further south, the sea is enclosed by the island of Palawan, then Borneo, before abutting Sumatra; there is no exit to the wider oceans here. For that, you have to sail further south past Singapore and out through the Lombok or Malacca Strait, into the Indian Ocean. Oddly, Singapore is never counted among the first island chain though it abuts Malacca, through which flows almost eighty percent of the oil that fuels China’s industry. American naval ships routinely dock at Singapore’s Changi Naval Base, and there the United States also maintains the carefully named Logistics Group Western Pacific — actually a sub-unit of the Seventh Fleet, and the direct naval descendant of the powerful Asiatic Station fleet that operated out of Hong Kong and patrolled China’s Yangtze river for nearly a century prior to World War II. (The Republic of Singapore Air Force, which maintains part of its fleet at bases in the United States, has also trained at launching its F-16 from both American and British aircraft carriers, adding to the potency of this ring of forces.)

    These waters are home to the largest concentration of naval forces in the world. In the Yellow Sea, a coalition of western navies patrol to enforce UN-mandated sanctions against North Korea, also keeping a careful eye on Chinese and Russian ships operating nearby. China has the bulk of its fleet deployed in these seas, along with its growing submarine fleet; in terms of combat ready surface ships, it now deploys more seacraft than the United States Navy (though many of them are smaller and less powerful than their American equivalents.) The US Navy has two hundred ships — including five aircraft carrier strike groups, and the majority of its submarines — allocated to the Indo-Pacific Command, some forward deployed in Japan, others in nearby Guam, and still others in Hawaii, San Diego, and in bases surrounding Seattle, but all transiting frequently through these waters. (Indo-Pacific Command also patrols the Persian Gulf, but many of the ships that deploy there from Hawaii or the West Coast transit through the South China Sea on their route to and fro, thus doing double duty.)

    Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Forces sails upwards of 150 surface combat ships and 19 submarines, concentrating this substantial firepower along the Ryuku arc. At the northern end of this arc, North Korean surface ships and submarines are a major feature — Pyongyang has the world’s largest naval fleet by sheer number of ships (though hardly that at all if measured in terms of fighting power.) Australia has a modest navy but an energetic one and frequently sails these waters, sometimes accompanying American exercises. The Russian Navy — either the second or third most powerful navy in the world, depending on how you measure — is a frequent visitor, and increasingly exercises with China’s PLA Navy (PLAN). India, too, has begun to mount more frequent sorties off China’s eastern coast, to Beijing’s great irritation. And these waters are heavily trafficked by submarines — as many as two hundred at any given time, according to the US Navy. Even Germany has sailed a frigate into these waters, in a rather tepid effort to show that it, too, matters in geopolitical Asia. More important, France maintains several thousand troops in the wider region, and regularly patrols its mid-size navy, including from its overseas possessions in French Polynesia (roughly the same distance from the Taiwan Strait as Hawaii). Britain has recently rejoined this new maritime version of the old imperial “Great Game,” after launching two new aircraft carriers sailing them and their supporting destroyer squadrons through the Luzon Strait.

    The Luzon Strait: if a great power war breaks out in Asia’s waters, this will be a decisive battle zone. As the Fulda Gap in Germany was to the Cold War, so the Luzon Strait will be to the world order unfolding now. It is the principal waterway through which the United States and allied navies flow their ships and submarines when seeking to reinforce their presence inside the South China Sea, or the Taiwan Strait itself. American submariners are familiar with it, at least from their studies, from frequent submarine hunting raids against Japan in World War II: Formosa and the Luzon islands were a key staging ground for the Imperial Japanese Navy’s campaign in southeast Asia. If a major power war breaks out, keeping the Luzon Strait open will be a critical objective for Western forces. It is also a key objective of China’s “counter-insurgency” doctrine — its focus on stopping the allies from reinforcing their position inside the “Near Seas.”

    It was not for nothing that the Royal Navy, which long dominated these waters (for purposes at once imperial, liberal, and brutal) chose this strait through which to sail the HMS Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales on their maiden voyages to Asia, in October 2021. Indeed, for the several weeks surrounding that voyage, it seemed that the Luzon and Taiwan flashpoints might be triggered sooner rather than later.

    II

    In truth, tensions had been mounting for years prior. In the early 2000s, China began its rapid expansion of its navy and missile force, and, in repudiation of a promise to the United States, began to militarize some of the land features that it had claimed in the South China Seas (illegally, according to a 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, ruling under Article VII of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.) Moreover, Xi Jinping began something of a drumbeat of statements that indicated that he viewed the incorporation of Taiwan into the sovereign fold of China as a personal and national priority. In November 2013, China’s Ministry of Defense announced that it had established an “air defense interdiction zone,” or ADIZ, over the East China Sea, north of Taiwan. The move generated a striking response from President Obama, who ordered two nuclear-capable B-52s flown through that airspace; but China’s naval build up on both ends of the Strait continued, as did sustained political and disinformation campaigns in Taiwan. President Trump then dialed up the American response, first by the symbolic (or in the Chinese rendering, provocative) act of taking a phone call from the Taiwanese leader during his transition to the presidency. More determined action followed, especially in the passage of the Taiwan Travel Act of 2018, which encouraged the United States government to elevate its engagement with Taiwan authorities, and a marked uptick in the rhetoric accompanying the transit of US Seventh Fleet destroyers and aircraft carriers through the Taiwan Strait. These sorties occurred both under the framework of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), by which the US Navy enforces the terms of open commerce and the Law of the Sea (somewhat ironically, as the United States is still a non-signatory to that Convention) — and as a show of deterrent strength. China continued and intensified its political and informational campaign in Taiwan, which, like Russia’s disinformation tactics in Europe, was designed to stoke resistance to pro-western or pro-independence candidates in Taiwan’s closely contested parliamentary and in Presidential elections. What’s more, in a major speech in 2019, Xi Jinping, rather than simply repeating the long-standing formula of emphasizing “peaceful reunification,” explicitly invoked the option of military force: “We make no promise to abandon the use of force, and retain the option of taking all necessary measures…” What’s more, he said that the Taiwan problem should not be passed down to future generations — the first Chinese leader to say this.

    And then things escalated further.

    Sometimes assessments matter as much as events. They certainly did on March 9, 2021, when Admiral Philip Davidson, the four-star in charge of the Indo-Pacific Command, gave testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during which he warned that China could move to try to take control of Taiwan: “…they’ve long said that they want to do that by 2050. I’m worried about them moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then. And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years.” Several China scholars reinforced Davidson’s argument, noting that a crucial factor in determining whether Xi Jinping ultimately decides to use force to compel Taiwan is whether he would be confident of victory, and highlighting with concern mounting evidence that the PLA leadership itself is confident of the results of a potential action. Whether or not the PLA’s confidence is warranted matters less for the onset of a crisis than the confidence itself.

    Other China and Taiwan specialists pushed back, criticizing Davidson for scaremongering, and underestimating both the political and military costs to China of using force. The critics argued — with some merit — that excess alarmism has the pernicious effect of undermining Taiwanese confidence, thus actually making it more likely that the Taiwanese leadership would ultimately cede political ground to Beijing. Then history intervened in the discussion, and events appeared to reinforce Davidson’s alarm.

    On June 15, the United States sent its Tokyo-based aircraft carrier, the USS Ronald Reagan, and the guided-missile destroyers USS Shiloh and USS Halsey, into the South China Sea, transiting the Luzon Strait. This was neither unprecedented nor unwarranted, but it was muscular. Then, on July 27, a British warship entered the South China Sea and docked in Singapore, to Beijing’s fury; the first of several British transits that year. The next day, the guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold made a foray through the Strait, the seventh of the year — a record pace. In previous iterations, the Chinese response to such transits has been primarily rhetorical. But now, China sent twenty-eight military aircraft into Taiwanese airspace, a sharp break from previous pattern.

    The debate among Washington’s deep bench of Taiwan experts continued. Several argued that the risk of war with China, specifically over Taiwan, was growing, and laid out strategies for response. Others continued to argue that Beijing preferred political strategies to military ones for dealing with Taiwan, and could not be confident of victory in a cross-Straits attack. Foreign Affairs published a collection of expert commentary on the “Strait of Emergency,” but the bulk of analysis suggested that the alarm about imminent invasion was exaggerated. And yet the tension in the Strait continued to mount.

    What we know now, though it was not leaked to the Financial Times until October, was that in late July China test-fired a long-range missile that entered space, circled the globe, and then released a hypersonic glide missile — a nuclear-capable one. According to a detailed report by International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the missile incorporated high-speed glide technology into what is known as a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System. This combination of technologies would allow China to place a missile into low-earth orbit, then fire a warhead into the atmosphere, and additionally to maneuver the warhead as it approaches its target. Leave aside the engineering: it is a missile system that would allow China to evade most of America’s existing missile defense systems; and it is a suite of technologies that the United States has not yet mastered.

    China also made a major “lawfare” move, announcing that it had passed a new maritime law that would come into effect on September 1. The law as passed would require a wide range of vessels to declare their presence to Chinese authorities upon entry into Chinese territorial waters. Now, every state has the right to require ships to provide a range of types of information as they enter territorial waters. The problem here is that China’s claim of territorial waters are vast, contested, and illegal (in the view of the UN tribunal.) So China was in effect claiming a right of information (and ultimately inspection) on shipping passing through what the rest of the world treats as international waters.

    The United States and its allies moved swiftly to clarify that they would in no way comply with the new Chinese regulations. In early September, the aircraft carrier strike group accompanying the USS Reagan entered the Taiwan Strait again, while a second aircraft carrier strike group led by the USS Carl Vinson conducted exercises nearby in the Western Pacific, and a guided-missile destroyer separately conducted “freedom of navigation operations” within the twelve-mile nautical zone surrounding the aptly named Mischief Reef (one of China’s claimed “territories” in the South China Sea and site of one of its largest military installations in the waters.) On September 17 the US Navy conducted its ninth passage of the Strait. In late September the USS Reagan strike group returned to the South China Sea, accompanied by Destroyer Squadron 15. On September 28 the British sent a warship, the HMS Richmond, into the Taiwan Strait, the first time in a decade that it had done so.

    And then things really began to heat up. In early October, British and Vietnamese warships conducted joint exercises, their first ever. A second UK carrier group conducted training operations in the nearby Philippine Sea. Then the British carrier group led by the HMS Queen Elizabeth transited the Luzon Strait and entered the South China Sea. It was joined by Dutch and Singaporean frigates, with whom it conducted joint exercises. On October 3, the USS Ronald Reagan, the USS Carl Vinson (and each of their supporting strike groups) joined the HMS Queen Elizabeth strike group and the Japanese helicopter carrier Ise and its strike group, as well as frigates from Canada and New Zealand. Together they conducted the largest multinational naval exercise since the end of the Cold War.

    China did not sit calmly by. On October 4, it began a series of air sorties into Taiwanese airspace, and over the course of three days flew at least 150 aircrafts through that area — by far and away the largest Chinese show of force in four decades. Beijing also issued a public and inflammatory warning to close American allies, notably Australia, that they would become “cannon fodder” if they chose to join Taiwan in defense against a Chinese incursion.

    At which point both the Taiwanese and American government ratcheted up the diplomatic pressure. Taipei’s leadership issued a stark warning that China would be able to successfully invade Taiwan by 2025. And Washington took the dramatic step of leaking to the press a reasonably well-kept secret: the United States already had special forces deployed in Taiwan, as part of a training operation. China had surely been aware of that, but the broad American public was not, and the decision to publicize the fact of the American military presence on the ground was designed to signal to China that we would treat those forces as a tripwire for a wider American response, should China choose to attack.

    The commentators noticed the changing weather. Writing in the Washington Post in the same week, Ishaan Tharoor captured the gloomier end of the spectrum of analysis, arguing that while some had reasoned that an invasion of Taiwan was both unneeded and too costly from Beijing’s perspective, the dynamic was shifting in the wrong direction. The deterioration of the US-China relationship, begun before Trump and accelerated by him, state-stoked nationalism, PLA confidence, and political-legacy dynamics all created incentives for Xi Jinping, Tharoor argued. What’s more, “the Chinese military’s capabilities are inexorably expanding and may have already reached a stage where America’s long-standing presence in the Asia-Pacific is an insufficient deterrent. Military planners in both countries treat a potential showdown over Taiwan as only a matter of time.”

    China has indeed been engaging in an intensive military build-up. It is now easily the number two defense spender in the world. It is rapidly expanding its nuclear stockpile, and it is building its navy at a fast pace. In the last fifteen years, the PLA Navy has gone from a fleet of 216 combat-capable ships to one with 348, many of them technologically sophisticated, including three aircraft carriers. (By contrast: in the last fifteen years, the US Navy went from 318 — down from a Reagan-era high of 590 — down to 275 combat ships, before ticking back up to around 290 recently.) Moreover, Chinese innovations in anti-ship missile technology are outpacing the United States. Anti-ship missiles have been a factor in war-planning since the Falklands War, when Argentina used a single air-fired Exocet missile to cripple a British destroyer (which later sank as it was being towed away). But China has greatly expanded the range of such missiles, and it has developed anti-ship missiles mounted both in land silos deep inside Chinese territory and on mobile units. Some of these have a range of up to 3000 miles, thus capable of targeting American ships at great distance — so-called “aircraft carrier killers.”

    It is true that these Chinese missiles have never been tested in combat conditions, and some forward installations of these missile batteries — especially those on reclaimed land formations in the South China Sea — could fairly readily be demolished by American airpower in a war scenario. Moreover, hitting an aircraft carrier at long range is harder than it sounds — the United States has substantial cyber counter measures, electronic warfare tools, and sophisticated missile defenses. But still — and this should really make us sit up and take notice — most military planners estimate that in a determined campaign China would ultimately succeed in using its large quiver of missiles to damage, cripple, or even sink American aircraft carriers and other surface ships. That is, unless the United States responded by launching large scale air, naval, and space-based attacks on those missile facilities, and on China’s “eyes and ears” — that is, what the Pentagon calls C4ISR, for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. That would involve not only multi-faceted cyber operations, but also — under a range of highly plausible circumstances — American airstrikes on facilities on the Chinese mainland. What might start as a limited naval engagement could quickly escalate to large-scale “system war” between the world’s two largest and most powerful militaries, both nuclear powers.

    A series of articles in The New York Times, the Financial Times, The Economist, and other leading newspapers all warned of a possible, even imminent war. David Ignatius argued that the tide was turning in Beijing’s favor, and Elbridge Colby, who oversaw Taiwan defense in Trump’s Pentagon, argued that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could come within two years. Oriana Skylar Mastro, a close observer of the PLA, warned that even moderate voices in Beijing were abandoning a prior focus on ‘peaceful reunification’: “I think the military option is the option now.” Taiwan’s President Tsai said publicly that the threat from China was increasing “every day.” (Later its Defense Ministry would clarify that it also believed that a naval invasion of Taiwan would be very difficult for China to pull off, in part because it lacked adequate transport ships — “ro-ro” ships used to transport heavy equipment like tanks and armored personnel carriers. Commentators thus took note when China shortly thereafter released to the press images of large conventional ferries being retro-fitted to carry a high volume of military materiel.)

    Yet no attack occurred. And amid the drumbeat and the escalating tensions, several of Washington’s most knowledgeable Taiwan experts argued that the crisis was not in fact imminent. Ryan Hass pointed out that, among other factors, the Beijing Olympics were scheduled for February 2022, and even though those games were overshadowed by Covid and a diplomatic boycott by the United States and a few other nations, it was highly unlikely that China would launch a military action prior to or during the games. The games would be closely followed by the 20th People’s Congress, a crucial event in the political calendar in Beijing, where Xi would have to secure a further five-year term (highly likely) and consolidate his control over the Central Committee and the Party as a whole (also likely, but not without its challenges.) Which brings the calendar to mid-2022; a mere two years away from Taiwanese elections in 2024, when, as Richard Bush has noted, Beijing would have another shot at using political, informational, and other lower-risk tactics to produce a political rather than military outcome to its favor in Taiwan.

    And while PLA generals might be growing in confidence, others noted that from Xi’s vantage point confidence is not certainty, and so long as political options remained viable, the risks to Xi of an uncertain military campaign were dissuasive. The flip side of the point that the Taiwan issue is of higher priority for Beijing than Washington (arguably) is this: Xi cannot afford to lose. If the United States mounts a defense of Taiwan and fails, it would be seriously damaging to America’s role in Asia and in the world, but it would not pose a threat to the stability of the American regime. Whereas if Xi Jinping, who has made “reunification” with Taiwan a major part of his legacy, mounts an attack on Taiwan and fails, it will be not only very costly, it also potentially threatens his continued tenure as party leader.

    In time, as the week-to-week tempo of escalation cooled, and the more sanguine specialists appeared to have called events more correctly. Notwithstanding the rhetoric, no Chinese military attack on Taiwan occurred, or from what we know now, was planned. (And for those who would say that the response forestalled the crisis: this misses the point that at no stage was there an actually observed Chinese military buildup, of the kind eminently visible in the case of Russian forces around Ukraine.) Still, even the most careful and all but the most sanguine Taiwan scholars acknowledge that while this crisis was not an emergency in the end, and that a crisis is far from guaranteed, it certainly remains possible. What’s more, the odds grow as Chinese confidence mounts, and as the military balance in Asia continues to tilt in their direction — as it will absent substantial American re-investment in its navy and missile technologies and a range of additional modernizations. The risks will grow absent effective strategy from both Taiwan and the United States. The calmer assessment should be a cause for focused preparations, not for relaxation.

    The months from June to November 2021 proved to be a kind of dry run, a real-world tabletop exercise to test the free world’s readiness to respond to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. And it exposed critical weaknesses: in Taiwan’s defense strategy; in America’s current military options; and in our allies’ and partners’ readiness to reinforce Taiwanese and American action, if need be. The rattling conclusion from the recent turbulence is this: if China does resort to military action in Taiwan, and the United States responds, there is no guarantee that we would win. We are not ready for a Taiwan emergency.

    The imbroglio in East Asia was not the only challenge confronting the United States or its close partners. Simultaneous with the mounting Taiwan tensions, Russia deployed several tens of thousands of troops to scheduled maneuvers on Ukraine’s northeastern border, then ominously didn’t bring them back. Moscow began a steady buildup of troops and equipment along the northeastern, southeastern, and maritime borders of Ukraine. Against American warnings of severe economic consequences for military action, Russia published a list of demands with which the United States and NATO would have to comply to forestall Russian military action — a set of demands that amounted to a rollback of NATO’s expansion and consolidation in Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War. With its forces surrounding Ukraine, Putin hoped to blackmail the West into reversing the terms of its victory in 1989-1991 and repealing Russia’s defeat.

    The two crises are different but they have essential similarities. Neither Taiwan nor Ukraine are American treaty allies, but they are both “alliance-adjacent”: in Taiwan’s case, by virtue of longstanding defense partnership arrangements with the United States, in Ukraine’s case, by NATO’s decision in 2008 to open a pathway for Ukrainian membership. Both immediately border a power that seeks a global rivalry with the United States, and which has putative claims on the territory in question. Both are democracies, though Taiwan’s is a fuller democracy than Ukraine’s. And both occupy geographies that crucially change the dynamics of “hard power projection” in their respective neighborhoods — a point frequently missed by American commentators who argue that America has no vital interests in either country. And so both raise delicate and significant questions about how far the United States is willing to go to defend a liberal or democratic concept of world order; about how much the United States is prepared to risk to retain primacy in the two major industrial, commercial, and technological regions outside the United States; and what strategy the United States is prepared to adopt to blunt the ambitions of two powers now seemingly bent, in some degree of coordination, on dulling American hegemony at least and supplanting it at most. Or will we in fact carry through on our present mood of withdrawalism and self-shrinkage, and proceed on the false but widespread notion that being a strong democratic power with global responsibilities is nothing other than hubris?

    One critical difference between the two contexts, so far, is the nature of American policy toward our respective endangered friends. From 2008 onwards, US/NATO policy on Ukraine has been a paradigmatic case of “talk loudly and carry a small stick.” A decision to open a pathway for Ukraine to NATO membership and then not actually bring them in, or deploy some Western troops on Ukrainian soil, was surely a worst-of-all-possible-worlds move. It put a huge Russian target on Kyiv while doing little or nothing to buttress Ukraine’s defenses. The modest American and European response (and the anemic global response) when Russia moved in 2014 to reverse its loses, by invading Eastern Ukraine and then annexing Crimea, made the situation worse. Even the relatively effective train-and-equip operation that followed, improving the defensive capability of the Ukrainian armed forces, did not bring — could not have brought — those forces to a level where they could single-handedly deter further Russian aggression. Russian energy sales to Europe not only continued, they increased; and the building of the NordStream 2 pipeline — which would still further increase European dependency on Russian gas exports — continued unabated. Far from satisfying Putin and forestalling a new crisis, all our half-hearted and strategically confused actions laid the groundwork for the deeper crisis of 2022.

    By contrast, at least so far, American policy on Taiwan hews more closely to a classical logic of restrained rhetoric and a muscular posture. To date, a refusal by successive American presidents (despite some pressure from within their parties) to move away from strategic ambiguity on the defense of Taiwan, and a continuing willingness to put sizeable American military assets at risk in the Taiwan Strait, has helped to keep the situation below the boiling point. Those arguing for increasingly bellicose rhetoric, just as the military balance is starting to tilt away from us, might want to pay careful attention to how effective that precise combination of tactics has been in Ukraine. They might wish to concentrate more on beefing up deterrence and resilience. The defense of Taiwan will not come from starker rhetoric or greater resolve alone.

    III

    Is the defense of Taiwan in America’s interest, or vital to the alliance system in Asia?

    America’s closest alliances date from the Second World War. They are the countries we fought with to defeat the Nazi regime and Imperial Japan — and in one of history’s unusual twists, Japan and Germany, too. Some newer alliances have far less depth, and fewer ties of history, or commerce, or population, or experience. Taiwan is a rare country that is not an ally now but once was, and with whom the United States has the depth of ties that parallel our old wartime alliances — of which, of course, the Republic of China was one. We have long acted in its defense. In 1954, in the face of escalating tensions in the Strait, when an invasion of Taiwan seemed possible, the Eisenhower administration got from Congress the Formosa Resolution, giving it prior authority to wage war with the PRC. In the wake of this crisis, the United States and Taiwan signed the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China, under which both sides agreed to provide aid and military support to the other if it came under attack — as in the NATO charter, an “Article 5” provision. Four years later, in another episode of high tension, President Eisenhower deployed the Seventh Fleet to the Strait.

    That alliance held until 1980, one year after the conclusion of normalization with China in 1979. But despite Kissinger’s and Nixon’s shift towards relations with the People’s Republic of China and the adoption of the “One China” policy (according to which the United States recognized Beijing as the sovereign government of China and acknowledges — but does not thereby support — its claim to sovereignty in Taiwan), Congress once again acted fulsomely to support Taiwan, through the passage of the Taiwan Trade Act — which went far beyond trade, including to cover the sale of military equipment to Taipei. Ronald Reagan also pulled back some of Nixon’s and Carter’s concessions to China over Taiwan, providing Taipei with “six assurances” that the further evolution of America-China relations would not hurt Taiwanese interests, or limit American military sales and trade with Taipei. The Taiwan Relations Act anchors the relationship, and under its provision the United States has maintained unofficial ties with the people of Taiwan; maintained the American Institute in Taiwan, which performs consular and other functions normally associated with an ambassy; and engaged in ever deeper trade, most recently in high technology. It was supplemented in 2018 by a new but non-binding Congressional act, the Taiwan Travel Act, which passed a highly divided Congress by — 414 to 0.

    Vitally, over the course of the ensuing decades, the United States has used substantial arms sales to Taiwan to help ensure that it can maintain a defense against China — since 2010, roughly $23 billion worth. Those sales have been wide ranging and have included frigates, advanced aircraft (most recently the F-16), surface to air missile systems, anti-tank missiles, transport aircraft, mobile radar, shipborne guided missiles, Patriot missiles, torpedoes, minesweepers, surveillance aircraft, and diesel submarines, along with an array of information and radar technologies. To date, though, America has not sold to Taiwan either of its two most advanced technologies: nuclear submarines and the Aegis radar system. The United States has also persistently (if not entirely consistently) sought to increase space for Taiwanese participation in international bodies such as the WHO, where China persistently and consistently blocks official Taiwanese membership.

    The relationship is now governed by a series of diplomatic formula — the Taiwan Relations, the U.S.-China Communiques (which still provide a diplomatic baseline for US-China diplomatic relations), and America’s Six Assurances to Taiwan. (All of which sound like they are ripped from the history of nineteenth-century British diplomacy in Asia.) These arcane but highly sensitive formulas have so far allowed for the United States to build and to maintain extensive ties with Taiwan without strictly speaking breaking the One China policy — and to continue to provide for its defense.

    American policy toward Taiwan has long been shaped by a doctrine of so-called “strategic ambiguity” — whereby the United States has not declared explicitly its intention to defend Taiwan in case of a Chinese attack, but merely retained its right to do so if it chooses. This formulation has come under pressure of late, both from scholars who have argued that it does too little to deter China from attack, and arguably from President Biden, who seemed to abandon the formula in a press conference where he stated that the United States would defend Taiwan in case of Chinese aggression — though his team quickly rolled that back and argued that Biden was merely expressing his presidential intention, not a change in American policy.

    It is important to recognize that throughout this period Taiwan has continuously deepened its democracy — holding repeated elections, freely and fairly; observing the peaceful transfer of power; sustaining a free press and a free opposition; and routinely scoring highly on the various rankings of democratic standards. President Biden effectively acknowledged this when he invited Taiwan to participate in his Summit for Democracy in November 2021. Does Taiwan’s status as a democracy effect the extent of American obligation or interests to defend it? Narrowly, no. But here, of course, we collide with one of the great debates in American foreign policy. In America’s grand strategy, its forward presence in Europe and Asia, tied to close allies in both theatres, has been the essential pillar of maintaining American primacy and an order that can deter great power war. In the American-led order from World War II onwards, alliances and democracy are Venn-diagramed concepts: there are several democracies that are not allies, and there are allies that are not democracies, but there is a heavy overlap, and our most robust allies are indeed democracies.

    Elsewhere I have argued against democracy promotion as a way to shape or to understand American foreign policy, in particular during an era when our own democracy is challenged. But the defense of democracy is a very different business. The defense of democracy within the United States is vital, and the defense of democracy abroad is also essential if the United States wants to retain an order wherein its interests and its political system are secured. If the United States is not willing to extend its power to defend established democracies, then the underlying purpose of much of American forward power and of the alliance system is called into doubt.

    Of course, the United States cannot credibly defend democracy everywhere over time, notwithstanding some of the grandiose claims of recent presidents. Would that we lived in a world, as we so briefly did, where American power was so untrammeled as to be able to act to defend any democracy it wished; would that we lived in a world, which we rarely have, where such power was matched by a keen awareness of history, and a solid grounding in the political and cultural realities of other regions, sufficient to allow us to devise wise policy towards that goal. Usually blind to history, and often ignorant of other cultures, American policymakers have repeatedly crafted poor policy to advance democracy (with notable and admirable exceptions), and in so doing they have cast a deep pall over the notion of the use of American hard power in service of democracy. But failures of democracy promotion, especially in the excesses and missteps of America’s long “war on terror,” do not abnegate the value of defending established democracies. We do, after all, have universal values, and we should not wish to be played for fools by the authoritarians of the world, many of whom are simply exploiting our confusion and our weakness.

    There is no danger — anti-interventionists all across America should sleep well — that we are about to become “the cops of the world.” Given the reality of the limits on American power, there must of course be choices as to where to defend democracy. It seems obvious, at least to me, that that choice should give preference to democracies with whom we have deep ties, with whom we trade substantially, and with whom we have shared or overlapping strategic interests, especially if they are allies. All of which but the last are features that characterize the situation with Taiwan.

    Taiwan is our eighth largest trading partner — only a fraction smaller than the United Kingdom (in American trade), and larger than France, Italy, the Netherlands, and India. Our trade ties with Taiwan are especially important in the area of technology, and specifically in Taiwan’s massive role in the manufacture of semiconductors — fully fifty percent of the world’s supply of which comes from Taiwanese suppliers. Even more important, Taiwanese manufacturers supply about ninety percent of the bespoke, advanced semiconductors that power the highest end of the technological sector, including most of our advanced military communications and sensor equipment. Would we go to war to defend our economic interests? We certainly have in the past. On its own, though, it is not an adequate reason; leaving aside for the moment any ethical considerations, the fact is that a crisis over Taiwan would also likely rupture our far larger trading relationship with China (now our third largest trading partner, recently down from first.) But the trade ties do add weight and depth to the long-standing political relations, its past as an ally, its present fact as a key defense and security partner.

    And then there is this: Taiwan is the literal — and littoral — front line in constraining Chinese hard power projection. If China were able to subjugate Taiwan, either politically or militarily, to the point where China’s navy could establish bases on its eastern shore, it would tilt the equation in the Pacific. China has launched a bid for extensive global naval power; a long-term but active ambition. It is an understandable ambition: China’s economy is vastly dependent on the flow of commercial, industrial, and energy goods in and out of its “Near Seas,” and sustained American naval dominance of those waters is understandably an uncomfortable reality for Beijing. A desire to advance its own naval capacity to protect its commercial interests at sea is natural, and on its own terms it is potentially uncomplicated for the United States. Indeed, for a brief period in the early 2000s, it seemed like China’s return to the seas for the first time in five hundred years could add to the net global capacity to protect globalization. But, to misuse a metaphor, that ship has long since sailed. In the Xi Jinping era, China has more fully revealed (and arguably more fully developed) its global ambitions, its desire for a blue water navy, and its intent to use this and other features of its growing power to confront and constrain American hegemony, and eventually displace it. As Rush Doshi in his book on China’s “long game” documents, this is an ambition both stated and revealed. Yet it is also an ambition constrained by multiple layers of geography and alliances. And those constraints start in the first island chain, of which Taiwan is an essential anchor.

    Does China’s bid for global naval capacity matter? Throughout the modern period, global naval power has been the handmaiden of hegemony. Portugal, the Ottomans, the Dutch, Spain, France: all once competed for global naval dominance. The British, securing it in the late 1600s, used it to create its empire and thereby to reshape the modern world, laying the foundation for modern globalization. (They did this with great brutality, with vast slaveholdings, and by becoming history’s largest drug cartel.) In the post-colonial world, the United States has been the world’s dominant naval power, and found a formula to support an international (now global) trade and financial regime without relying on a colonial infrastructure. Dominance of the high seas has allowed us to foster and to protect the liberal trading system on which so much American and global growth is now predicated (fully eighty-five percent of world trade by value moves by sea); and to protect the flow of oil (and increasingly) gas out of the Strait of Hormuz, on which so much American and global growth is still predicated (and will be for another decade or two); and to wield American power in defense of our interests in literally every corner of the globe; and to help us defeat the Soviet Union. Together with American financial, energy and technological power, our power on the seas has been an essential feature of American dominance. We give it up at great, great cost. Erosion of the first island chain would not collapse American naval dominance or guarantee China’s — they still have a long distance to travel to mount a genuinely global navy; but it would certainly be an important shift in the wrong direction.

    There is in the United States these days a burgeoning movement, both left and right, that would eschew American dominance or primacy, or at least argue that it is not worth the costs and the risks of maintaining it. This is not the place for a full critical engagement with that argument, but suffice it here to note two essential things. First, that what follows American primacy is not necessarily a period of peaceful multilateralism, as some of the advocates of this argument advance; far more likely is militarized crises in Europe and Asia as the two powers most wrong-footed by the American-led order, Russia and China, push back, and push back hard. As America relinquishes its salience around the world, the world grows more Hobbesian and more cruel and dangerous. And second, for all the ills recently associated with the forward projection of American power, it is easy to forget the roles that American power has played in deterring and defeating illiberal forces, in protecting the global commons, and in generating global public goods. All while the United States profits extensively from the role of the dollar as the world’s dominant currency — a different plank of power than our military dominance, but far from unconnected to it. It is hard to imagine any sphere of public life where increased Chinese influence in globalization and global order would not come at a meaningful cost to American interests, and those of close allies. We would cede this territory at great cost and great risk.

    The fact that Taiwan is the front line of constraining Chinese global ambition is an argument that cuts both ways: it also makes it much, much more costly to defend. To take a contrasting example: if Tanzania’s maturing democracy were threatened by Uganda, the systemic or ordering risks of not responding would be minor; Uganda poses no threat to any other region or to global systems. We could defend Tanzania at very low risk and very low costs. The case with Taiwan is exactly the opposite: the costs to the international order of failing to come to Taiwan’s defense are potentially substantial, precisely because it is China that is threatening, but by the same token the costs associated with Taiwan’s defense are very large indeed. This will be America’s dilemma. It is hard to construct a meaningful and viable concept of the American-led alliance system, the American-led order, or American values that does not incorporate a vital response to Taiwan; but any serious response in Taiwan must reflect the reality that it takes only one or two modest turns of the escalatory dial for us to be engaged in full blown war with China—and perhaps a wider conflagration.

    China’s reasons to prevent the independence of Taiwan, and/or to incorporate it fully into Chinese sovereignty, are the precise obverse of America’s interests. There are reasons of history and reasons of commerce, and there are reasons of legacy.  Certainly Xi Jinping has repeatedly stressed the importance of accomplishing this goal, although he has been careful to leave open the option of political outcomes and has set no firm timetable for it. There are issues of ideology, and arguably of the threat posed by the vibrancy of Taiwanese democracy among a nation of Han Chinese — though the virulence of that threat is easily exaggerated, given how tightly the Communist Party is able to control the media narrative and news consumption among its population. But above all there are reasons of strategy.

    The most sanguine observers argue that Xi can be satisfied simply by preventing Taiwanese independence. It is possible that that is true, and it certainly seems wise to maintain an American policy aimed at dissuading Taiwan from seeking independence; after all, a Taiwanese bid for independence would most certainly trigger a crisis. But it is hard to rest comfortably on that position. For a start, the underlying logic about China’s calculation of its own interests, of the possibility of Chinese forbearance, does not adequately explain its recent behavior in a parallel case: Hong Kong. The status quo ante in Hong Kong allowed China to maintain its deep commercial and financial interests in Hong Kong’s success, and to prevent any kind of serious move towards more democratic governance, and to control information about what was happening on the island (when the “umbrella protests” took hold, information about it was sparsely available to the population in mainland China). And yet, despite what seemed to most outside observers to be an eminently sustainable situation, Beijing chose to pass a deeply intrusive bill in 2019 designed to improve its ability to arrest Hong Kong citizens and move them to Macau or China. This triggered protests in Hong Kong, and rather than weather the protests as it had successfully done in the past, Beijing passed an even harsher “National Security Law” and moved to implement it through a combination of intense surveillance, intimidation, coercion, arrests, and an unexplainable coincidence of traffic accidents, balcony falls, and other deaths among leading activists. And this, despite the fact that in doing so, it paid two important prices: a measurable flight of citizens from Hong Kong to other major Asian cities, including from the vital financial industry, and an erosion of the “one country, two systems” posture which to date has been an important part of its political strategy for Taiwan. It chose the radical action anyway.

    Moreover, the sanguine view of Chinese self-restraint does not adequately contend with the strategic naval role that Taiwan plays in helping to enclose the Chinese PLAN from its wider “far seas” ambitions. China has few options here. Theoretically, it could escape the constrictions of the first island chain if it could convince the Philippines to provide it with basing rights on the Philippine Sea. But despite repeated efforts to woo the authoritarian President Duterte towards Beijing, China has made little or no progress, owing to stubborn resistance from the Philippine armed forces, who are still deeply enmeshed in the long-standing alliance and defense partnership with the United States. (And yes, there is an irony in China’s options being limited by virtue of a questionably democratic posture of the Philippine military.) Taiwan is China’s only credible option for improving its strategic position in the Pacific.

    Given this, and given uncertainty about Xi’s intentions, and given the very real possibility that the PLA’s assessment of American capacity and American intent could lead it to overestimate its confidence in victory, it seems wise to assume that, under a range of readily imaginable circumstances, China’s temptation to absorb Taiwan will outweigh its calculation of potential costs and risks. So Taiwan and the West have no real choice but to work seriously at deterring war, and at preparing for its possible eventuality.

    What would a Chinese effort to take Taiwan look like, and who would win?

    In the myriad writings on this, inside and outside the American government, a wide range of strategies are depicted. They start with those sometimes described as gray, namely the use of political and informational tactics, economic inducements, and perhaps private and quiet coercion, to change the political equation in Taiwan without the application of the direct use of military force. This, of course, is China’s least costly and least risky tactic. The use of informational warfare, smear campaigns, disinformation campaigns, and possibly more nefarious Russian-style tactics can be combined (more accurately, are being combined) with China’s naval buildup to create a perception in Taiwan of inevitability: an image of a PLAN with dominance of the bordering seas, doubt about American resolve and response, dissension among those who would pursue independence or deepen the alliance, and ultimately a Taipei capitulation to deeper Chinese political and even military participation in the island’s affairs. But Taiwan has been successful so far in rebuffing such tactics, and anyway such tactics do not always succeed — far from it. Russia tried these tactics in Ukraine, for example, and they failed to produce a political outcome favorable to Moscow — at which point Moscow escalated to military options. Beijing might do the same if it sees that political strategies are failing (and if it is confident that it will win.)

    By many accounts, what comes next is a Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan, designed to inflict substantial economic costs on the island, sufficient for them to sue for “peace” — that is, to capitulate. This would be relatively straightforward for China to implement. Even though Taiwan has American-made and French-made frigates in its fleet and a wide range of missiles and minesweeping capacities, there is almost no chance that the Republic of China Navy could stand up to the PLA Navy if China determined to enforce a blockade. That is, unless the United States weighed in, and mounted a counter-blockade offensive or deployed parts of the Seventh Fleet (perhaps together with Japan and Australia, perhaps others) to provide a corridor through which ships approaching the Taiwan Strait could sail under our protection. At that stage, China would have to decide whether it was willing to attack American ships, potentially provoking a wider war. Michael O’Hanlon recently undertook a careful table-top estimate of this scenario, and concluded this: the key factor in determining whether China or the United States emerges victorious in this scenario (leaving aside for a moment the deeper question of what it means to “win” in this context) would be the rate at which Chinese submarines could successfully target American and allied naval shipping, versus the commercial shipping that our navies would be trying to protect. His second and essential point is that experience and reasonable estimates of Chinese command and targeting capabilities provide a wide range of outcomes, in some of which the United States “wins,” in others of which China “wins” — thus both sides should be in doubt of easy victory here. I am slightly more pessimistic: the narrowness of the sea lane as you approach the Strait, and the swift rise of the seabed to too-shallow levels except in the narrow sea lane, suggest to me that it would be easier than sometimes assumed for China to make well-informed projections about the position of commercial ships and distinguish them from naval ships, meaning that its successful targeting of American ships would likely be at the high end of O’Hanlon’s estimate. But even so, this scenario still leaves an option to escalate in American hands.

    I am also less certain that a blockade is the low-risk option for China. Modern shipping is a complex business, and there is no such thing as a ship sailing goods only to Taiwanese ports. Ships going in and out of Taiwanese ports will be laden with goods destined for China itself as well, and potentially for several other countries. Those goods form parts of globally integrated supply chains from potentially dozens of countries; indeed, Taiwan is at the very heart of global supply chains. There are essential Taiwanese components in Chinese goods, as there are in German, American, Indian, and French goods, and so on. By squeezing the Taiwanese economy, China would also be hurting several other players, perhaps triggering a global economic slowdown. The imposition of a blockade in the Taiwan Strait would likely cause Lloyds of London and other maritime insurers to declare not just the Straits but the adjacent seas a “war risk” zone, creating endless complications for shipping firms in those waters. The disruption to sea-borne trade in the Western Pacific — and thus to the entire global economy — could be substantial. In short, in trying to squeeze Taiwan’s jugular, China risks severing one or two of its own arteries. It might still decide that the costs are worth it, but the costs would be real.

    What’s more, an easier blockade to mount successfully is the one that the United States could do in response: an oil blockade at the Strait of Malacca (through which China imports roughly eighty percent of its liquid fuels, which in turn constitute about fifty percent of its overall energy supply.) At this distance from Chinese mainland ports, the US Navy still has a clear, decisive advantage over the PLA. There are some complexities to an oil blockade here (like the substantial additional costs Japan would have to pay to re-route its oil imports), but they are more manageable than a wider commercial blockade in the Taiwan Strait.

    Which leaves more direct military operations. Oversimplifying, there could be two types. One would be a Chinese missile and air campaign to pummel Taiwanese defenses, and thereby to degrade their overall defenses, and to demonstrate Chinese power, and to expose American indecision (if we fail to show up in defense) or incapacity (if our defensive efforts do not substantially diminish the effect of the Chinese campaign). Taiwanese defenses against this kind of attack are not trivial: a combination of hardened bunkers on its eastern coast, anti-missile defense technology, and anti-air defenses would confront China with a number of obstacles. But not too many, alas: over a protracted campaign China would certainly overwhelm Taiwanese defense (including its cyber defenses, which at present are no match for China’s offensive capacity.) Again, unless the United States chose to respond. At which point the scenarios get very wide-ranging and very dangerous.

    Most complicated and dangerous for China, of course, is the second military course of action: an actual invasion of the island. History shows, however, that maritime assaults have proved among the hardest and most costly of military options. And in this case Taiwan has substantial mining, missile, and airpower options to make this hard for China — though China in turn has more of all of those instruments and could likely ultimately overwhelm Taiwan’s defenses in the Strait itself. But Taiwan also has both 160,000 troops and 1,600,000 reservists who would, in this scenario, presumably be well motivated to fight (though they are not particularly well trained.) That could make it extremely hard for China to get ashore without very high costs, and once ashore to subdue the population. At the very least China would have to prepare for the contingency of a long and costly counter-insurgency campaign. And again, all of this assumes that the United States does not join the fight.

    Yet every scenario in which the United States does join the fight comes with a crucial challenge. To increase our confidence of prevailing (in the narrow sense), we must do two very costly things: put large portions of the American fleet at risk, inside the range of Chinese missiles; and make substantial military moves against China’s missile batteries and its command and control apparatus, which likely means air or missile attacks on positions inside mainland China. We might well prevail, in the narrow sense of causing greater Chinese losses than we incur, and in causing China to abandon its military operation against Taiwan. But not before we were in every meaningful sense of the word at war with the PLA, and not before we were risking Chinese nuclear escalation. And if we are not willing to take those risks, we might well lose.

    And what if we lose? Would an American loss in any one of a series of Taiwan scenarios constitute a “Suez moment,” as Hal Brands and others have argued? Would the American-led order inevitably and inexorably decline? The short answer is: possibly, partially.

    In attempting to analyze this properly, we must first ignore the arguments made by many in Washington that the marred American withdrawal from Afghanistan profoundly eroded Western credibility. The evidence for this assertion is exceptionally slim. Anyone following the debate in Beijing, for example, heard the exact opposite: that the American withdrawal, a costly one at that, signaled the arrival of a much greater degree of seriousness in Washington about containing, even potentially confronting, China’s mounting power. It seemed as if our much-touted “pivot” to Asia, our promised shift of focus to a rising China, might finally be taking place. The fact that only weeks later, two of our closest allies, the United Kingdom and Australia, chose to substantially deepen their military partnership with us by means of a large nuclear submarine and technology deal shows the limited effect of the Afghan withdrawal. For Beijing our retreat from Afghanistan surely denoted a shift in the priorities of American power, though the extent of our willingness to exercise our power remains an open and vexing question.

    Beyond that, credibility — a much beloved concept in American statecraft — is actually quite complicated. While much of the academic literature on international relations is abstract and obscure, one place where it has made a valuable contribution to policy is in puncturing easy claims about credibility, especially the notion that failure to stand up in one domain necessarily erodes credibility in another domain. Think of it this way: would the Poles or the Ukrainians be happy that the United States chose to pour massive quantities of its hard power into the defense of Taiwan? In principle, maybe; but in practice they would be deeply nervous that that effort substantially diminished American capability or willingness to help them defend their eastern borders. Or the reverse: if the United States chose to respond to Russian aggression in Ukraine by mounting a large-scale hard power war in that theater, would Japan and Taiwan feel reassured? Or would they worry that the United States had thereby meaningfully diminished its real material capacity to deter China? In the real world of limited power and mounting challenges, allies are more likely to weigh American actions through the prism of jealous insecurity and worry less about the consistency of our policy.

    And yet what seems likely is that whereas a non-defense of Taiwan might not collapse or deeply erode the credibility of our alliance commitments in other theatres, it certainly would have such a damaging effect in Asia. Perhaps if the United States made crystal clear that a non-defense of Taiwan was driven by the fact that Taiwan is not a formal treaty ally, it might ease the sting for other allies in the region. But not by much: given how “alliance-adjacent” Taiwan has been, given how long standing a defense partner it has been, given the economic, democratic, and strategic stakes in Taiwan, it is far more likely that allies such as Korea and Japan, and close defense partners such as Singapore (and increasingly Vietnam), would see the decision in profoundly negative terms, and become far more worried about their own security. An already somewhat unsolid alliance with Korea could be shaken, perhaps irreparably. The alliance with Japan would likely continue, given how profoundly dependent Japan has long been on the American security guarantee, but the odds that Japan would move to develop its own nuclear deterrent would increase substantially and swiftly. Singapore, already divided between elites who see its interests lying in the American security relationship and those who see its commercial interests lying in China, might well feel forced to choose, and to choose China. China’s naval, strategic and political position in the Western Pacific would be substantially buttressed, and ours would be weakened. The stability of Asia would be thrown into sharp doubt. Every country in the region — and some beyond — would hedge against American uncertainty and adopt a more accommodating stance to China. China’s capacity to project power, military and political, into the wider global system would meaningfully increase, and ours would meaningfully diminish.

    We have deep interests in Taiwan’s continued autonomy. Even the most cursory glance at the strategic and commercial map of Asia suffices to dismiss the “we have no interests here” argument, even if democracy does not count (which it does.) But we cannot be certain of Taiwan’s victory, with our help, in limited engagements; and the prospects for our “victory” grow only when we escalate to the point of a wide-ranging war against the PLA, not just across the reaches of the Western Pacific but also involving attacks on China’s mainland. And this is to say nothing of the risk of nuclear escalation — which, as scholars such as Caitlin Talmadge have pointed out, is quite real. All of which combines to make a resoundingly clear point — that the only good version of a war in Taiwan is one that is never fought.

    For Xi Jinping and the Chinese leadership, it remains the case that a political and informational strategy to subdue Taiwan is likely preferable to a military option. But only so long as it works. And the success of any such strategy is surely in significant doubt. To move to a military option, however, Xi has to be convinced that the costs can be borne and that the war can be won. Indeed, he would need to be almost certain of victory. To continue to maintain an effective deterrence against war, then, it follows that the United States and its partners must increase the potential costs, and increase the uncertainty.

    Much of what needs doing is known — but it needs the doing. Taiwan some time ago adopted an asymmetric defense strategy vis-à-vis China’s greater power — that is, a focus on low-cost, resilient defensive capacities designed to deny China a swift, low-cost entry into Taiwanese territory (as opposed, say, to the procurement of ever more expensive frigates that are acutely vulnerable to Chinese missiles). This strategy has only grown in importance. But as the analysts of a bipartisan task force led by Bonnie Glaser, Richard Bush, and Michael Green (among the deans of Taiwan studies in the capital) point out, it has not been implemented in full. Far from it. Indeed, in the vigorous debates between Taiwan hawks and Taiwan doves, one clear point of consensus was the urgency for Taiwan to shift away from a defense focus that involved the purchase and maintenance of large, high-end military assets (which China could likely rapidly defeat in war) and move towards the real implementation of its asymmetric strategy. There is somewhat less of a consensus among China-defense scholars about what the United States needs to do to buttress our deterrent posture against China as a whole — whether by bulking up defenses in fixed positions, shifting to a more distributed defensive posture, investing more in technological counter-moves — but there is wide consensus that implementation of a new posture badly lags behind the recognition of the mounting China challenge. If our objectives are to protect Taiwan and to avoid war, then right now we are asleep at the wheel. Everyone also agrees that the United States should put substantial priority on getting Japan to move beyond the modest steps it has so far taken to possibly, kind of, quasi, semi prepare for coming to Taiwan’s defense in the case of an attack.

    For Taiwan itself, quite apart from asymmetric defense, there is more work to be done on the issue of political and economic resilience. Taiwan has begun to invest in a range of forms of resilience, but few observers’ question that they need to do more. On political and informational resilience: internationally, perhaps the most impressive example of a countries’ national resilience strategy is in Finland, which, faced with a range of forms of cyber, political, informational, and threatening pressures from Russia, has revitalized a strategy that engages its military, parliament, media, civil society, the business sector, and the government to share information about Russian tactics, prepare for attacks, and generally decrease the effectiveness of Russia’s efforts. Perhaps similar strategies could help buttress Taiwan against Chinese gray tactics. It should also look seriously at the option of building out a port on its eastern shore, perhaps in the estuary that is much easier to defend or resupply than any of its ports in the Taiwan Strait. On economic resilience, there are a number of preparatory steps that Taiwan can take to increase its options. That involves steps such as stockpiling reserves of war munitions, medical equipment and supplies, some essential food stocks, and essential fuels (including air fuel.)

    What is often missing from discussion of Taiwan’s defense options is a wider global strategy. The defense of Taiwan is principally its own responsibility, and secondarily that of the United States. But there are stakes here, too, for all of those allies and partners whose interests are impinged upon by instability in Asia, those who would not like to see China in a position increasingly to exert its power in world affairs; those who have stakes in the free flow of energy and commerce on the high seas; those with a deep interest in resisting a world in which authoritarian powers move by coercion to establish spheres of influence in which they could be entangled. Many of these countries will face similar dilemmas to ours — many of them (ironically including Japan) have vast trade and financial relationships with China that they will be reluctant to risk. But the United States must work to convince them that the risks are much greater if war breaks out than through deliberate deterrence. If you wish peace, prepare for war: the old Latin adage certainly applies in this new era of Chinese power.

    For the allies that are less likely to put military assets in play, there are still a number of steps that they can prepare themselves to take in the case of a Taiwan emergency. Just a partial list includes: votes in defense of the Republic of China in key international institutions; curtailment of visas for Chinese students and scientists, especially in key technology domains; targeted technology sanctions; targeted economic sanctions; targeted individual sanctions; energy sanctions; disinvestment from key sectors; blocking Chinese firms from acquiring nationally registered firms (or shares of firms) in the energy, technology and agricultural sectors; recognition of Taiwan; joint investment in supply chain diversification; joint investment in strategic minerals production. And crucially, this includes allies in Europe and other regions, not just in the Pacific. Making Taiwan a global — and not just a regional — problem will play to American strengths and exploit China’s continuing weaknesses. If we think about deterrence only in the seas on China’s eastern borders, we cede a massive geographical advantage to Beijing. At present China has far flung economic, energy and diplomatic interests, but its capacity to reinforce those by hard power projection lags far behind. This is China’s global dilemma, and we should do nothing to help them find a way out of it.

    We are not ready for a Taiwan emergency. Despite repeated alarms, 2021 did not see such an emergency, and there are reasons for calm about the short term. But over the medium term, the possibility of a Chinese military action in the Taiwan Strait or on the island cannot be ruled out. The United States and its Asian allies have major interests in preventing that outcome. We also have a major interest in avoiding war with China.

    All this being said, it seems unwise to me that the United States should move off of its declaratory policy of strategic ambiguity. Richard Hass and others have made the case for this shift, arguing that the current policy does not adequately deter China. If we were confident of victory in low-threshold crises and confident also of our ability to maintain “escalation dominance,” or to control the level of violence in the event of hostilities, perhaps this would be wise policy. But we are not. Speaking more loudly does not increase the size of our stick. We would be much wiser to increase the size — or at least the potency, the unpredictability, and the survivability — of our stick. And wiser, too, to communicate privately to China about the steps that we and other allies would be prepared to undertake in the case of a military move against Taiwan. At the same time, we can and should stipulate our continued conviction that, short of a military crisis, we oppose Taiwan’s independence, all the while retaining a freedom of tactical maneuver. We need to get this right: to keep our heads and stay calm, build our strength and rouse our allies, recognize our strategic responsibilities and be prepared to act with moral courage. Otherwise we are headed for costly abandonment or consequential failure.

    Expressionist Film

    We arrived at our goal in the dark,
    via the Avus. The green eye
    of the Radio Tower winking, as we
    saw the city sprawled below us.

    The broad streets radiated inwards
    reaching towards a center,
    monsters’ fingers, from the days
    of silent film, closing round a throat.

    The journey passed by ditches,
    new building sites, gaps between houses,
    where excavated earth lay in heaps
    glinting like slaughtered beasts on the hook.

    Under S-Bahn bridges they sat on their
    mattress thrones, wrapped in blankets,
    figures of the night from all the countries
    of Europe, the princes of alcohol.

    The jagged shadows emerging from
    courtyards met in front of posters
    for a retrospective of UFA-films
    called From Caligari to Hitler.

    translated by Karen Leeder  

    In the Cold Arms of Water

      I picked roses on the Wannsee
    and don’t know who to give them to.

    Jakob van Hoddi

    We left the city on muddy paths
    along the riverbank. Bare trees
    dogged us unseen like shadows
    in the icy water, the grey cross hatching.
    We brushed past blackthorn, breaking
    off alder branches with our shoulders.
    We tramped through unmined terrain.
    With us the dead, the fog of breath.
    Dangers almost all banished. That was new.

    It was those days that fall between the years.
    The fear was nameless now. But the forest
    stood in quarantine, an unpassable zone.
    Through tree trunks we glimpsed its sparkle:
    the Wannsee, late of madness, lake of silver.
    This is where the poet fell through the ice, this
    is where he was beyond all earthly help.
    A mask was caught in the bramble thorns.
    And night was enclosed in the cold arms of water.

    translated by Karen Leeder