Our Literature

    On the gloomy days, when the American catastrophes are too much to bear, I turn to my bookcases for solace and even something like friendship, and the shelves throw a welcoming arm over me. The bookcases are organized on the principle of no principle, and nowhere among them is there a section dedicated strictly to the traumas and treasures of life in our unhappy country. Still, scattered here and about are a number of squat volumes in sumptuous black dust jackets, all of the same height, devoted to flights of the American imagination — a sufficient number of those books, such that, if I ever gathered them together, a proper bookcase devoted to them alone would stand before me. These are volumes in the publishing series called the Library of America, which brings out the classics of American literature, Emerson and Mark Twain and little-known names like William Bartram, the ornithologist, and onward to Saul Bellow and beyond, perhaps too much beyond, in a uniform edition.

    One of those volumes plops into my hand. The cover is maybe a little too sumptuous. A glossy ribbon of red, white, and blue traverses the middle, as if it were a military sash on a colonel’s dress uniform. The publisher’s logo at the bottom of the spine is the Stars and Stripes, configured to suggest an open book. When I open the actual book, still more stars and more stripes blink upwards from the endpapers and the flyleaves. It is the Fourth of July. A tiny bugle says hello every time a page turns. Patriotism at the Library of America does not suffer from timidity. But I do like the feel of those books on my fingers, their heft, the cloth binding, the texture of the paper, and the buttery black dust jackets.

    It was Edmund Wilson who proposed the idea for those books, and his way of doing so figures in the lore of the series. He came up with the idea during World War II, which was perhaps not an ideal moment for founding a new literary institution. Nor was he in command of major finances, or any finances at all, though significant financing was going to be needed. Still, he talked up his idea, and he persisted in doing so into the 1950s. And only in the 1960s, at a vexing moment in his life, did signs of progress come his way. He was in trouble for non-payment of taxes. The IRS was threatening to jail him. And Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who was a White House assistant to President John F. Kennedy, put in a word on his behalf.

    Kennedy turned out to be an Edmund Wilson admirer. This was not an obvious thing to be, from a White House standpoint. Wilson had lately published a book about the Civil War in which he described Lincoln as a tyrant and the United States as a sea slug. And just then, in 1963, he published a pamphlet, The Cold War and the Income Tax, in which he explained that, given how abhorrent was America’s foreign policy, he was right not to have paid his income tax. But Kennedy was a lucid thinker. Apart from encouraging the tax authorities to show mercy, he decided to award Wilson a Medal of Freedom. The IRS objected. The president responded: “This is not an award for good conduct but for literary merit.” In one of the sections of The Cold War and the Income Tax, Wilson sketched his concept for a publishing series of the American classics. And Kennedy wrote a letter endorsing the idea.

    Wilson had competitors and enemies beyond the IRS, though. These included the academic literary scholars and their professional organization, the Modern Language Association, or MLA. The scholars and the MLA were promoting their own editions of American literary classics at the university presses. The MLA and the universities commanded a degree of political influence, and they stymied Wilson’s project at every turn, even if he did have a letter from the president. Wilson needed to enlist the support of major foundations, and the MLA made sure to get in his way. Finally he wrote up his frustrations in an essay called “The Fruits of the MLA,” which ran in two parts in the New York Review of Books. By then it was 1968, a year of insurrectionary riots, and Wilson, nothing loath, went about staging his own riot in the pages of the essay. He explained that some of the supreme classics of the American literary past had fallen out of print, which was a disgrace. He explained that still other classics had remained in print, but only in editions published by the university presses in conformity with the MLA’s very exacting scholarly principles.

    Wilson was endowed with a regal self-confidence, and he had come to feel that, if anyone could speak on behalf of America’s literature across the centuries, he was that person. And, on behalf of American literature, he had no patience for the MLA and its scholarly principles. He observed that, under the MLA’s supervision, teams of academic scholars had gotten hold of various writings by William Dean Howells, or Melville, or Mark Twain, and had pickled them in footnotes and pointless annotations, which rendered the books unreadable. The labor that had gone into amassing those scholarly annotations was, in Wilson’s word, a “boondoggle.” The book prices of the unreadable university editions, thanks to the boondoggle, rendered the books unaffordable, except to institutions.

    And then, having paused (as his readers may imagine) to pour himself another martini, he threw in a few remarks on the nature of academic life more generally in America. He noted a preposterous quality: “the absurdity of our oppressive PhD system of which we would have been well rid if, at the time of the First World War, when we were renaming our hamburgers Salisbury Steak and our sauerkraut Liberty Cabbage, we had decided to scrap it as a German atrocity.” He noted the consequences of this academic system for American literature: “The indiscriminate greed for this literary garbage on the part of the universities is a sign of the academic pedantry on which American Lit. has been stranded.”

    In other countries, he observed, publishers had figured out how to preserve and present their own national literatures in attractive formats. The model was the Bibliothèque da la Pléiade in France, which published a “library” or series of the leading French writers from across the centuries. The Pléiade volumes were leather-bound and handsomely designed, and, to judge from the displays in the French bookstores, they were a popular success, too. Perhaps if Wilson had been in less of a rush to show the United States at a disadvantage, he might have noted that, in spite of every achievement, the Pléiade had a lore of its own, some of which might bring us to reflect, by way of contrast, on America’s virtues. The Pléiade was not founded by one of the old-time French publishers, but, instead, by an immigrant to France who was Jacques Schiffrin, from Russia. Schiffrin got the project started in 1931 with a little help from André Gide, plus some investments from Peggy Guggenheim. Schiffrin was a crafty publisher, resourceful in his frugality. I know this because one day at the Strand second- hand bookstore in New York I bought an ancient copy of the original volume in his series, an edition of Baudelaire, only to discover that, when I went to read it, the decaying leather cover split apart and revealed a padding of old newspapers. This filled me with respect, once I had gotten over my indignation. Luxury leathers and gilt lettering (another feature of the series) were meant to be alluring. But the series was also meant to be accessible to a large public.

    And, to be sure, with the moderate prices that penny-pinching made possible, the Pléiade right away became too big for Schiffrin to handle on his own. With Gide’s help, he merged it into the much larger publishing house that was Gaston Gallimard’s. Only, a difficulty arose. In 1940, under German rule, the Aryan code went into effect, and, because Schiffrin was not only Russian but Jewish, Gallimard dismissed him from the house and kept the Bibliothèque de la Pléiade for himself. Schiffrin and his family just barely succeeded in escaping to Morocco, and then, once again with Gide’s help, to New York — a story that was told some years ago by Schiffrin’s son, the late André Schiffrin, an eminent American publisher, in his memoir A Political Education. But the German occupation came to an end, and Gaston Gallimard turned out to be content with how things had worked out. Jacques Schiffrin’s keenest desire was to return to France and resume his old responsibilities and prestige at the Gallimard house as the publisher of the Bibliothèqe de la Pléiade. But Gaston Gallimard was not interested in sharing what by then he regarded as his, and he went on publishing the series by himself.

    About the books themselves, though, Wilson was right. The Bibliothèque de la Pléiade was a beautiful series, all in all. A reader today may have to imagine some of the beauty, given that in our own era France’s version of the MLA has achieved an influence over the Pléiade, and various editions in the series have come to resemble the American university editions that Wilson so vigorously detested. Svelte volumes from the early years have swollen into fat little things, bulging with hundreds of pages of arcane scholarly annotations, printed in type fonts so tiny as to resemble dust motes. Endnote numbers creep across the pages like insects. And the book prices have swollen in tandem with the annotations. In Wilson’s time, however, the Pléiade volumes were designed to fit into a man’s coat pocket or a lady’s purse. They were books that a reader could carry to the locations where reading actually takes place, which is not typically the university library, but may be, instead, the garden bench, or the café table, or the subway, or, for people such as Wilson, who used to read while walking the streets, the busy sidewalk. And the texts were uncluttered with notes and footnotes. You could read those books without feeling that a miniature professor was hectoring you from the bottom of the page.

    So he proposed an American series on the model of the early Pléiade. It was a project to bring into print and keep in print first-rate editions of the principal and well-remembered American writers of long ago. And the project was to bring into print the not-so-well-remembered writers, too, if their works were of permanent value — the historical writings, for instance, of Francis Parkman, the author in the late nineteenth century of France and England in North America, about the European colonizers and the Indians. Parkman, in Wilson’s estimation, was one of the American masters of historical literature, whose works had disappeared almost entirely from the bookstores. By presenting his argument for this sort of thing in the New York Review, and by launching his insults at the universities and their indiscriminate greed for academic garbage, and by pointing out academic boondoggles, he succeeded finally in attracting sympathetic attention from people with institutional power.

    His co-conspirator in this enterprise was the publisher Jason Epstein, a generation younger than himself, who was a pioneer of paperback publishing in the United States, not to mention one of the founders of the New York Review. And Epstein began, at last, to make progress. He did this at the Ford Foundation, where President Kennedy’s National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, one of the colossally failed architects of the Vietnam War, had ended up in charge; and again at the National Endowment for the Humanities, during the period when Joseph Duffey (who died not long ago), was President Jimmy Carter’s appointee. It was a tale of bureaucratic machinations and big guns of the Democratic Party, as recounted a few years ago by David Skinner in the NEH magazine, Humanities. The progress was less than rapid.

    By the time the initial volumes made their way into the bookstores, it was 1982, and Wilson was ten years gone. And yet those first volumes turned out to be faithful to Wilson’s original concept in every way, except perhaps in their chunky size, which was not nearly as compact as the Pléiade editions. Also, it is hard to imagine how Wilson might have reacted to the Fourth of July bric-à-brac. But the basics were correct. The volumes were free of disfiguring footnotes and other scholarly intrusions. A small amount of useful information was tucked, instead, discreetly into the back pages, where it belongs. The initial set of books were by authors whose names would define the project for the general public: Whitman, Hawthorne, Melville, Harriet Beecher Stowe. One of the Hawthorne volumes was not up to standard. The editors chopped up Hawthorne’s short-story collections and, in a professorial sneak-attack, rearranged the stories in a pedantic order of their own. The other volumes were superb. And, in homage to Wilson, the initial set was followed right away by two volumes of Parkman’s history of colonial North America, even if Parkman’s volumes were never going to be a commercial success.

    The Library of America adhered to one more concept of Wilson’s, which was fundamental to him, though it was not something that he went on about in The Cold War and the Income Tax or in the New York Review of Books. This was still another inspiration that he drew from the French — in this instance from Hippolyte Taine, the literary critic, who was a great passion of Wilson’s. Taine, back in the 1860s, was the founder of modern literary theory — the founder, that is, of the idea that literature ought to have a theory, and science ought to be its basis. In Taine’s view, the moral sciences and the physical sciences were ultimately the same, and the science of literature ought to be comparable in some way to physiology or chemistry. He explained it in the introduction to his monumental History of English Literature: “No matter if the facts be physical or moral, they all have their causes; there is a cause for ambition, for courage, for truth, as there is for digestion, for muscular movement, for animal heat. Vice and virtue are products, like vitriol and sugar; and every complex phenomenon arises from other, more simple phenomena on which it hangs.”

    The simple phenomena that bore on the science of literature added up, in Taine’s formula, to race, place, and time. This meant, respectively, the influence of ethnic or national traits on literature; the influence of geographical location; and the influence of historical events. It is true that, in elaborating these ideas, Taine arrived sometimes at dubious judgments. The Aryan races, he figured, were beautifully poetic, metaphysically gifted, and scientifically innovative, whereas the Semitic races were faultily poetic, metaphysically stunted, non-scientific, and fanatical — which, then again, perhaps proves Taine’s thesis by showing that he, too, was a man of his race, place, and time.

    The belief that he had come up with something scientific filled him, in any case, with confident energy. Taine was superbly well-read in one language after another, vivid in his descriptions, skilled in his summaries. And the science itself, such as it was, allowed him to conjure a living quality in the history of literature. He pictured a world populated by writers across the generations, neighbors, and kinsmen of one another, engaged in the easy conversation of people who share a background and inhabit the same terrain, even if they do not inhabit the same century — writers who produce their individual works, and, at the same time, by entering into colloquy with one another across the ages, produce the cumulative thing that is a national literature.

    Taine saw a triumphal quality in all this. It was the triumph of individual temperament, one writer after another, set against the landscape of national traits and the past; and, then again, a triumph of the national temperament. And he saw a heroic quality in his own enterprise, as the scientific historian of literature. He believed that, by revealing the material factors that enter into literature, and by revealing the literary traits that result, he had uncovered the mechanisms that would permit writers and critics in the future to confer a conscious shape on the evolution of their own national literatures. We could become, in his phrase from an essay in 1866, “masters of our destiny.”

    Wilson adored Taine even as a child. His father kept an English translation of the History of English Literature on his shelves at home in New Jersey, and those volumes appear to have been young Wilson’s introduction to criticism and the history of literature. It was Taine whom Wilson read in the street, as a young man in New York. He wrote at length about Taine in his study of Marxism, To the Finland Station, which came out in 1940. But his principal effort to bring Taine to bear on questions of his own time was in a book that he published three years later, even if, on that next occasion, he did not invoke Taine overtly. This was The Shock of Recognition: The Development of Literature in the United States Recorded by the Men Who Made It — one of Wilson’s most brilliant books, though one of his least known, and long and egregiously out of print.

    The Shock of Recognition is a compendium of commentaries by leading American writers (plus one or two Europeans) in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on the work of other leading American writers, perhaps from their own epoch or from an earlier one. These are commentaries by writers who have felt a shock of recognition upon reading one another — commentaries that amount to an ardent and even intimate conversation between one writer and the next. Wilson drew his title from Melville’s essay, “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” which expresses how excited Melville was to discover the profundities of Hawthorne. But there is also a commentary by Henry James on Hawthorne, and by T.S. Eliot on Henry James and Hawthorne both, and so forth, with each entry presented by an omniscient Wilson, who, like Taine, appears to be at home across the entire reach of literature everywhere.

    The immediate purpose of the book was to make accessible a series of lively discussions, some of them not well-known. But the larger purpose was to demonstrate that an American literature does exist — a national literature in Taine’s sense, consisting of conversation across the generations among writers whose social backgrounds and language and dwelling places and shared historical experiences lend coherence to their discussion. The notion that an American literature exists was a nationalist conceit in the decades immediately before the Civil War. Sometimes it was a battle-cry for worldwide democratic revolution, no less, as in Melville’s essay on Hawthorne, or in Whitman’s poetry. But even in those years the idea of a national literature seemed to be more of a slogan or an aspiration than a description of reality.

    For wasn’t American literature mostly a stunted and provincial branch of the fertile literature that was England’s — even if a few blowhards were claiming otherwise? Wasn’t the soil of American civilization too thin to produce a genuine literature — even if now and then a lonely genius wandered out of the forest and published a book? Wasn’t America’s truest talent a gift for inventing industrial gadgets, and not for expanding the literary imagination? Those were Henry James’s beliefs. But Wilson wanted to demonstrate that American writers did recognize one another, and they did so from one generation to the next, and they did not merely look to England and Europe. The American writers understood their project to be in some respect cumulative. And their conversation was itself a literary achievement — an imaginative reflection on the American imagination over the course of time. Here, in sum, was a consciousness that was also a self-consciousness — “the developing self-consciousness of the American genius,” in Wilson’s phrase.

    He himself was a classic representative of the long American tradition, in its original and narrowly tribal version. Wilson was a Mather on his mother’s side, descended collaterally from the Puritan divines, which meant that he came from the same Calvinist background that, half a century before he was born, which was in 1895, had produced all but a few of the writers from those earlier times whom we still read today. It was natural for him to think of the literature in its long history as an extended conversation within a relatively cozy world of families and schoolmates and neighbors, which is how things did use to be in nineteenth-century New England — with an additional branch in a New York that descended from the Dutch, and another branch in the white South. About the African-American branch he was willfully ignorant, which I suppose is likewise the tradition, though in Wilson’s case the willfulness is hard to understand. He was a contributor to V. F. Calverton’s Modern Monthly in the 1930s and friendly with Calverton himself, and he had to go out of his way not to draw something for The Shock of Recognition from Calverton’s much-admired Modern Library compendium from 1929, An Anthology of American Negro Literature, a pioneering work.

    And yet he did understand that, even in his own intimate circles, the old American coziness was giving way to something more capacious. The most talented of his own closest literary companions when he was young — his Princeton schoolmate F. Scott Fitzgerald and their Vassar contemporary Edna St. Vincent Millay — were Irish Catholics, which, ethno-religiously speaking, represented a bit of a novelty in American literature. The novel development suggested still more novelties to come. And they came. These were developments that might have given pause to Hippolyte Taine. Then again, Taine, too, understood that populations change, and national cultures adapt and advance. The great forward step for English literature, in Taine’s interpretation, was achieved, after all, as a result of the Norman conquest of 1066, which allowed the French to civilize the Saxon barbarians. The non-WASP conquest of a previously WASP literature in the United States, then, the arrival not just of Irish Catholics but of everyone else as well, on top of the contributors to Calverton’s anthology, who had been here all along — this did not have to be a bad thing.

    But the old American tradition, the central trunk, did have to be rendered accessible to people who might not come by it in the simple way that Wilson did, amid the marvels of father’s bookshelves, or bestowed upon him by a beloved English teacher at prep school. Here was an obvious purpose of The Shock of Recognition. It was to show writers and readers that a self-aware American tradition did exist, and to display its nature, and to allow everybody to enter into it. Or the purpose, more grandly, was to show Americans what was American civilization, from the standpoint of the writers whom he took to be the central personalities. He had given up Marxism only recently, but he retained something of the deep idea that had animated him during his Marxist years, which was the ambition, Taine’s and Marx’s alike, to put knowledge to practical use and become “masters of our destiny,” which in this instance meant becoming conscious of our own culture and capable of adapting it as we like.

    Wilson came up with his proposal for an American Pléiade in the same period, and it should be obvious that in doing so he was extending what he had done in The Shock of Recognition. His compendium of American commentaries was 1,300 pages and came to an end in 1938. But the proposed new book series of American classics was going to be, in principle, endlessly elastic. In this respect, too, it was going to resemble the Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, whose own series has by now expanded to some eight hundred volumes, which is perhaps too many — a concession to the need for annual commercial successes of some kind, even if the Pléiade editors can reasonably explain that the French literary tradition is, in fact, enormous. (And the editors can explain that, because the French tradition has sometimes claimed to be a universal tradition, they have reason to publish writers from other languages, too, in French translation.) And so it has been with the Library of America, which has likewise expanded.

    There are some three hundred volumes in the Library of America by now, which is more than sufficient in some ways, and less than sufficient in other ways. Among those hundreds of books are boxed sets of science fiction and sports writing, not to mention a volume of commentaries on Peanuts, the Charlie Brown cartoon, which, to be sure, is imaginative. And snobbism is yesterday’s yesterday. And a good essay is a good essay. Still, an extra couple of volumes of Whitman are crying out to be included. There is an original sin to overcome in Whitman’s case, which was that, because he was such an outsider, nobody in his own time ever brought out the shelf-long Complete Works that were standard for the other great writers. But he is, after all, the national poet, and shouldn’t his complete poetry, and not just Leaves of Grass, be easily available, and his literary criticism, and his political essays? The Library of America has brought out two volumes of Wilson himself, as is appropriate. And yet another four or five Wilson volumes are likewise crying out for inclusion: his study of the American Indians, his labor reporting, his essays on Canadian literature, his study of Marxism, his novels, his poetry, and his book about the literature of the Civil War, not to mention his private journals, which are marvelous. The original Pléiade ambition was, after all, to publish full editions of the major writers, and not just a couple of representative works, which meant Gide’s journals and not just his novels and essays. But I do not mean to complain. The Library of America has just now brought out an unpublished novel of Richard Wright’s, The Man Who Lived Underground, thereby rescuing Wright, not for the first time, from the unappreciative and censorious publishers of his own era, which is precisely the mission: to preserve and protect the American literature.

    I wonder if something like the Library of America could ever be founded in an era like our own. Wilson’s proposal ran into obstacles that were daunting enough, such that it was forty years before his project came to anything. But at least in those years America enjoyed a degree of self-confidence, culturally speaking, and the Democratic Party was not averse to occasional feats of policy innovation. It should be remembered that, in the Kennedy and Johnson era, the New Frontier and the Great Society were not just programs for social reform at home and democracy promotion abroad, but were also, in a small degree, intended to shore up the national culture. Kennedy made a point of turning the White House into a center for the arts, and Johnson took the impresario instinct to another level by establishing the National Endowment for the Humanities and its sister, the National Endowment for the Arts, quite as if arts and letters were matters equal in dignity, if not in budget, to agriculture and transportation. The Library of America was one more of those new institutions, on a miniature scale. It was different only in that, after the NEH funding had gotten it launched, the winds of independent financing filled its modest sails, and onward it floated, propelled now and then by further gusts of NEH beneficence, and guided not at all by Washington, but, instead, by Wilson’s colleague Epstein, and his own colleagues and successors. Those were cultural achievements of the Democratic Party, directly or indirectly.

    Only, that was long ago. Today everybody understands that anyone who stood up to speak on behalf of the higher zones of the national imagination would get shouted down at once in the name of one or the other of populism’s contemporary demands, which are the leftwing demand for identity representation and the rightwing demand for a dismantling of higher zones in general. And the Democratic Party could hardly be expected to rise above those debates. I wonder even if anybody in the upper ranks of the party has given thought to these matters. If the Democrats did stop to reflect, however, they might observe that America’s political troubles right now appear to descend in some degree from a collapse in cultural understandings, which might suggest that, back in the day, John Kennedy and the Johnson administration were on to something with their cultural promotions, and some kind of policy to shore up the culture and its literature would fit rather well with policies meant to shore up the highways and the climate.

    But I never meant to go on about politics. How did I even get started? I began this reflection standing in front of my bookcases, fondling one book or another as they slip into my hands — here is Emerson: Selected Journals 1820-1842, and here is Emerson: Selected Journals 1841-1877 — precisely in the hope of leaving politics and its miseries behind. I wanted a vacation from the politicians. I wanted to read about the Over-Soul! But there are no vacations. The times are to blame, of course. Or maybe the volumes are to blame, with their Fourth of July covers and the spangled logos. Or the Biden administration is to blame, with its repeated and all-too-thrilling echoings of Democratic Party grandeurs of long ago.

    Where Have You Gone, Baby Face? 

    I watched too much Turner Classic Movies at an early age. It can be a burden: all my celebrity crushes have been dead for at least twenty years, and to this day I think that marcelled hair looks normal. But my obsession with films of the 1930s and 1940s can also instill another bias in a contemporary movie nut: I have no doubt that the depiction of women in Hollywood films has never been as good – that is, as rich, as varied, as focused, as human – as it was during the height of the studio system. The fortunes of women in real life may have gone up, but the fortunes of women in movies have gone down. 

    This is, admittedly, non-obvious: this has been a banner year for movies by, for, and about women. There are more female writers and directors working now than at any point in the past century (more on this later). Modern movie women can pursue careers instead of relationships; they are allowed to talk about racism or raise kids out of wedlock. So what’s missing? Hollywood, for one thing. Women’s pictures in the new ‘10s and ‘20s are mostly produced outside the major studios, and their audience is limited to the kinds of people with a high tolerance for indie movies. At best, this can produce sharp, sincere character studies which would have been impossible a hundred years ago; at worst, there is a self-conscious, artsy unfunness to the whole endeavor: entertainment is for children and comics fans, but we’re here to watch a miscarriage or a rape. A quick look at any top-ten grossing list of the past shows a market dominated by big-budget action movies and pre-existing intellectual property. Almost all of them have male leads, excepting the occasional action heroine or Disney princess. The blockbuster model is hardly only a woman’s issue –I have it from reliable sources that men also like interiority and nuance in their motion pictures – but the marginalization of female roles is one of its more noticeable side effects. 

    The present situation makes it easy to write off the scarcity of women on the big screen as a necessary consequence of commercial, profit-driven Hollywood-style cinema. But this is not so. Molly Haskell first described the problem in 1975, in her classic study From Reverence to Rape: “Women, in the early and middle ages of film, dominated. It is only recently that men have come to monopolize the popularity polls, the credits, and the romantic spotlight … back in the twenties and thirties, and to a lesser extent the forties, women were at the center.” Haskell was writing in response to the New Hollywood movement — a brief, brilliant blip in movie history when major studios let young European-inspired directors make movies about anything they wanted. Most often, they wanted to make movies about themselves, or their alter egos — at any rate, about men. I’m not knocking it. The artist-driven approach produced many great films, which also happened to be overwhelmingly male. Hollywood has changed since then, but the balance has not changed with it. 

    The ironic truth is that it was at the height of the studio system — the great American movie factory — when women ruled the screen. The really important thing to understand about the cinema landscape of the 1930s is how much bigger it was: major studios such as Paramount and MGM would start and finish a new movie every week. Before television and the internet and $15 tickets, people watched more movies. Not only that, but the movies they watched were more varied — and, frankly, much girlier. If modern Hollywood is selling a certain kind of escapism, rooted in the heroic fantasy that a single exceptional individual can save the world, depression-era studios specialized in aspirational elegance and glamour. The super-powered heroes and global stakes that are so universal in today’s blockbusters were unheard of in the 1930s. Instead, the most popular films of the decade include weepy female-led melodramas, musicals (whether the Astaire/ Rogers vehicles at RKO, the scrappy, down-to-earth stage door movies at Warner Brothers, or Lubitsch’s pseudo-European operettas at Paramount), romantic comedies, and literary adaptations from Little Women to The Wizard of Oz and Gone With The Wind. Even the most swashbuckling boys’ adventure films had major roles for their female co-stars – what would Errol Flynn have been without Olivia de Havilland? 

    Since the studios of the 1930s produced many times more movies than their modern equivalents, the range of problems they manage to depict is correspondingly broader. While navigating a stricter set of taboos than their modern counterparts, studio-era filmmakers evinced a much wider curiosity about women’s lives. A list of major dramas would touch on, among other subjects, mothers forced to relinquish their children to give them a better life (Stella Dallas, Lady For A Day, That Certain Woman), elderly couples separated by financial necessity (Make Way For Tomorrow), prostitutes with tuberculosis (Camille), womens’ prisons (Ladies They Talk About, Condemned Women, Ladies Of The Big House), religious chicanery (The Miracle Woman), violent gangster ex-boyfriends (Midnight Mary, The Purchase Price), and romances between upper-class men and working-class women, whether as Cinderella story (Alice Adams) or tragedy (Three Wise Girls, Forbidden). By placing women at their center, these movies were able to analyze an entire society — they were what the Indian cinema of the same era called “social films.” 

    These varied films share some common characteristics. More often than not, economic issues are front and center. This was the great depression: poverty was the background radiation of everyday life. Hard times produced a smart, scrappy, unsentimental breed of heroine. It is impossible to 235 imagine a bimbo in a ‘30s movie; the type simply does not exist. If a woman uses her sex appeal, it is always with intention and purpose. The overwhelming emphasis of these films is what their leading ladies want and what they will do to get it. Consider Gone With The Wind, which is really much more about the 1930s than the 1860s. Scarlett O’Hara is the quintessential ‘30s heroine when she makes a dress out of old curtains to seduce Rhett, and when she brutally claws her way back into a life of luxury, and most especially when she swears that she will never go hungry again. Of course she is completely awful, but she wants to survive, and Vivian Leigh’s performance keeps us magnetized for almost four hours through the sheer force of that desire. 

    Even the most sensitive and brilliant of the women’s pictures of our day can start to feel a bit anemic in comparison. Our heroines are more realistic, more enlightened, and even more profane than their ‘30s counterparts, but also weaker and less ambitious. We like movies to be authentic and personal — sometimes the word “raw” gets tossed around — and in our culture the easiest way to show authenticity is through vulnerability. Pain feels more real to us than grit or desire. As a result, there is a distinct prestige bias for female suffering. Just last year we have had The Assistant (sexual harassment), Promising Young Woman (rape), Never Rarely Sometimes Always (abortion), Pieces Of A Woman (stillbirth), and Beanpole (all of the above and then some). Interestingly, most of the critically acclaimed films that do not revolve around some formative sexual or obstetric trauma are period pieces. The closer these movies get to describing our real present-day experiences, the more likely they are to depict women whose bodily autonomy has been intimately violated. 

    The movies of the 1930s are not at all shy about female suffering, or even sexual violence; at least they were so before the infamous Motion Picture Production code was implemented in 1934. The difference is in how this suffering is depicted: in the old films the suffering is the start of a story rather than its subject. Studio-era filmmakers were less interested in the inner mechanics of trauma than in actions that their heroines took in response — victimization as an engine for agency. One of my favorite examples, Blondie Johnson, begins when the titular protagonist quits her job after being sexually harassed by her boss. After spending one night on the street, her ailing mother promptly dies, because this is 1933 and the concept of laying it on too thick had not yet been invented. Blondie — played by the remarkable and somewhat eponymous Joan Blondell — decides to get rich whatever it takes. She starts running confidence games, dates a gangster, and gradually moves up the ranks. Soon enough, she has bumped off the boss and taken over his lucrative bootlegging operation. In the end, she gets to have her cake and eat it too: as a sop to the censors, she is arrested and convicted, but the boyfriend survives, and they tearfully promise to build a new life together — on the level. The whole thing is great fun. Like Gone With The Wind, it is a clear empowerment fantasy: Blondie gets her own back against a system that failed to protect her, and she does it without relying on men. Blondell specialized in this type of no-nonsense working-class dame, and she does a brilliant job of channeling Blondie’s anger and cynicism as they gradually harden into steely self-sufficiency. We want to see her be ruthless, and we are happy for her when she no longer has to be. 

    Yet Blondie is still a good girl at heart. Things take a darker turn in the infamous Baby Face, also from 1933, starring Barbara Stanwyck. Our heroine, Lily Powers, is the daughter 237 of a slimy speakeasy owner in Pittsburgh. She is regularly groped by her father’s customers, and it is heavily implied that he is pimping her out to them, too. The movie really starts when Lily responds to an everyday instance of sexual harassment by pouring scalding hot coffee on the offender’s lap. What’s really remarkable is the casual way she does it — the same natural motion she would use to pour a drink, with just a hint of a sneer. “Oh, excuse me,” she drawls. “My hand shakes so when I’m around you.” Lily has only two friend in the world: a black waitress, Chico, and an elderly German cobbler. He tells her to read Nietzsche (really — the camera zooms in on the book), from whom she takes away a new credo: “all life, no matter how we idealize it, is nothing more or nor less than exploitation.” (Before the censorship board got to it, the rest of the cobbler’s advice read as follows: “That’s what I’m telling you. Exploit yourself. Go to some big city where you will find opportunities! Use men! Be strong! Defiant! Use men to get the things you want!”) 

    When her father dies in a gruesome explosion, Lily takes the lesson to heart. She heads to the big city, and soon enough is sleeping her way to the top of a major New York bank. There is a clever bit where the camera slowly and salaciously pans up the building as she rises from the office boy to the manager to the bank’s president. Stanwyck plays Lily with a combination of concentrated contempt and barely suppressed rage — at herself, at men, at the world. When an altercation between two of her lovers leads to a murder-suicide, she barely reacts. In the end, she settles down with the bank president’s successor, a smart, rich playboy who has her number and loves her anyway. As in Blondie Johnson, there is a last-minute and somewhat dutiful gesture at redemption: about thirty seconds before the credits roll, she is given the chance to trade in her million-dollar jewel collection for a chance to start a new life with him. We can believe they go on to live a happy life together, but I don’t think it matters either way. Lily Powers can save her husband or she can keep her loot. It is her choice. 

    Every time I watch Baby Face, I find myself thinking about how impossible it would be to make it today. It is not that Lily is a bad girl — we have those. It is how thoroughly she gets away with it. The film offers no judgement. It hides no guilt or embarrassment about its ambitious and amoral heroine. A more modern film might try and build up our sympathy with Lily by giving her a moment of softness, hesitation, or weakness — that de rigueur vulnerability. It might emphasize her trauma or the injustice of the society that enabled it. Baby Face does not bother. This is one of Stanwyck’s most closed-off performances, and it does nothing to weaken her electric and sympathetic bond with the viewer. That’s another thing about ‘30s movies: sympathy is not earned by weakness, but by strength. 

    The same principle is at play in Stella Dallas, a very different Stanwyck tour de force. Here, in 1937, she plays a poor mill-worker’s daughter, Stella Martin, who marries Stephen Dallas, a gentleman currently down on his luck. They have a daughter, Laurel, but gradually they drift apart as Stella’s vulgarity offends her husband’s more refined sensibilities. Stella is loud and garish and associates with race-track gamblers, but she does love her daughter, and she is horrified when her reputation gets in the way of a teenage Laurel making her own high-society match. In the end, she decides to protect Laurel by giving her up to be raised by Stephen and his new equally well-bred second wife. The final shot of the movie is of Stella standing alone in the rain, smiling wrenchingly as she looks through the window at Laurel’s wedding. It is a blatantly manipulative maternal tear-jerker, but it works. 239 Stella’s pain has made her strong. Stanwyck’s performance is so powerful precisely because it is so contained. Filmmakers of the 1930s (and 1940s and 1950s) understood that stoicism is more brutally effective at wringing tears out of an audience than any raw emotional breakdown or drawn-out screaming childbirth. We weep for Stella because she refuses to weep for herself. 

    The same principle — drawing audiences in through strength and self-sufficiency — is equally alive in ‘30s comedies. The sunnier counterparts to films such as Blondie Johnson and Baby Face are the glorious pre-code Warner Brothers musicals — movies such as 42nd Street, Footlight Parade, and Gold Diggers of 1933. They explore many of the same themes — exploitation, sex, capital, Joan Blondell’s legs — but with happy endings and tap dancing instead of gang violence. I can briefly summarize all of them: there is a stage musical production featuring a wide-eyed ingenue (Ruby Keeler) who pursues a romance with a juvenile man (Dick Powell) while surrounded by a rotating cast of wisecracking chorus girls (Joan Blondell, Una Merkel, Ginger Rogers, Aline McMahon). These were some of my favorite movies as a child. I was enthralled by the huge, trippy Busby Berkeley musical numbers; everyone was so snappy and smart and fast on their feet. I did not realize until much later that all of these women were fairly explicitly trading sex for money, although the title of Gold Diggers should really have been a tip-off. 

    The plot of that movie centers on four dancers thrown out of work when their show shuts down. They want the same 240 thing as Lily Powers wants: to marry rich, and as quickly as possible. But what she sets out to get with cruelty and grim determination, they pursue with ingenuity and charm. Since this is the softer side of depression-era cinema, they even get to fall in love. Again, there is no judgement here: only a shared understanding that one does what one must do to get by. If you want to understand what the movie is really about, I recommend pulling up the opening number on YouTube. It involves Ginger Rogers and a line of backup dancers in bikinis made out of coins singing about how we’re all so prosperous now that the depression is over. At the end of the song, the men from the bank show up to repossess the sets. In an early scene, Blondell’s character reminisces about her old Park Avenue penthouse while McMahon casually leans out the window to steal the neighbor’s milk. If they do manage to marry into a life of wealth and security, it is really no more than they deserve. The whole thing is adult fun, and not in the R-rated sense. Rather, it’s that these women are grown-ups: capable, self-possessed, resilient, and realistic, but not without a good sense of humor. 

    This kind of sexual license was impossible after 1934, when the Motion Picture Production Code introduced a strict set of standards for on-screen conduct — there was to be no profanity, miscegenation, glorification of crime, ridicule of the clergy. Licentious nudity was forbidden, as was the implication of cohabitation before marriage, and filmmakers were urged to be cautious about married couples sleeping in the same bed. The really remarkable thing, however, is that the people who came up with this list of rules were less afraid of sex than we are now. The lingering threat of sexual violence is more common than sex as a fulfilling, mutually pleasurable activity. Is there an on-screen couple today who are obviously enjoying themselves half as much as Nick and Nora Charles? After the code, all that sexual energy had to go somewhere, and so it was channeled into a new kind of comedy: the screwball. 

    The enormous success of Frank Capra’s It Happened One Night almost single-handedly launched Columbia Pictures into the ranks of the major studios in 1934 while setting the tone for every screwball comedy that followed. More than any other genre, I think, screwball exemplifies the fluid, lunatic equality of the cinema of the 1930s. The man and the woman in a screwball comedy (and if we can write a cultural phenomenon as significant as the Marx brothers off as an exception, there is always a man and a woman) live in their own private world. They start out embedded in some kind of a civilization — the upper classes, a house full of elderly encyclopedia writers, the mob, not that it really matters — whose rules and norms fall away as the couple is pushed together. Too much is happening to them too quickly for everyone else to keep up. 

    It Happened One Night opens with sheltered heiress Ellie Andrews (Claudette Colbert) jumping off her father’s yacht in Miami, swimming to shore, and catching a greyhound bus to New York City, where she falls in with the unemployed newspaper reporter Peter Warne (Clark Gable). High society and newspapers are two of the most popular screwball settings — both of them come with a rigid hierarchy and a specific, impenetrable constellation of tacit and explicit values that practically invites a benign sort of blasphemy. Those codes of conduct matter because we can leave them behind to watch Peter and Ellie, alone, in the middle of nowhere, gleefully turning all of them upside-down. 

    One of the funniest scenes in the movie comes when a gaggle of private detectives hired by Ellie’s father show up at a motel where the couple are staying under an assumed name. Peter and Ellie are having a very real fight when the cops burst in — but she instantly puts on an injured Southern housewife bit and he effortlessly plays along. This is the first time we see how intimately they understand each other, how comfortably they fall back into playing a game with the two of them against the world. This is how screwball works: all the anarchy and nonsense and plot contrivances are a scaffold for two people to develop a deep sympathetic attachment to one another. Think about the scene in Holiday with Katharine Hepburn and Cary Grant doing back-flips in the playroom of her family’s mansion while the grown-ups congregate downstairs, or the bit in Trouble in Paradise where Miriam Hopkins steals Herbert Marshall’s pocket-watch while he makes off with her garter, or when Ellie leaves her aviator fiancée at the altar to hit the road with Peter and spend their honeymoon in another cheap motel. In the process of falling in love, they recognize each other and begin to recognize themselves, without the impositions of family or class or sex. Screwball love is never simple or unspoken. At its best it is a perpetual give-and-take, a partnership, the continual process of making each other a better, freer person. 

    In sum: women on the screen in the 1930s project strength. They are independent and smart and stoic and, yes, very sexy. But is this so much better than what we have now — and what does “better” mean? Is it more realistic? More feminist? I could not say. Trauma does not reliably make people stronger. Weakness is a central part of being human. Everyone experiences it, and the stories we tell should reflect it. On the other hand, sometimes we all like to see ourselves in a position of strength, with irreducible inner resources, and utterly without self-pity. And comedy is an admirable response to hardship — a sign of mastery. I miss the scrappy depression-era way of looking at the world. It is not the only way to go through life, 243 but we could use a little more of it. 

    The question remains — what changed? There are a lot of things Hollywood studios took more seriously other than contemporary indie producers (starting and ending, of course, with profit). But female audiences were high on the list. Until the 1940s, when studios started conducting empirical research on audience composition, it was widely assumed that most people who went to the movies were women. Even then, the attitude took a long time to die. In Picture, Lillian Ross’s account in 1952 of the making of John Huston’s The Red Badge of Courage, she describes an early meeting with Dore Schary, the head of production at MGM: “There was resistance, great resistance, to making ‘The Red Badge of Courage.’ In terms of cost and in other terms. The picture has no women. This picture has no love story. This picture has no single incident … these are the elements that are considered important in determining success or failure at the box office.” Imagine an era when not having any women was the first and most obvious predictor of a box office flop! 

    The industry focus on female audiences is even starker in fan magazines such as Photoplay and Modern Screen. A quick glance at the advertisements makes it clear who their readers were — the most popular products are cosmetics, laundry soaps, and outfits worn by the stars — “faithful copies of these smartly styled and moderately priced garments on display in the stores of representative merchants whose firm names are conveniently listed on page 115.” These fan magazines helped to create another key element of classic Hollywood filmmaking: the star persona. Working closely with the studio’s own publicity departments, fan magazines gave stars a continuous identity that they carried with them from picture to picture. (Today we would call it their “brand.”) Greta Garbo was invariably alluring and otherworldly. Norma Shearer was poised and ladylike. Marlene Dietrich was sexy, exotic, and independent (though – as the magazine occasionally reminded its readers – she still loved nothing more than visiting her little daughter and husband back home in Germany). A spate of articles around Katherine Hepburn’s screen debut in 1932 crafted the narrative that would, with remarkable precision, define her career for the next six decades: a sophisticated thespian with patrician New England roots, but also something of a tomboy. One glowing review noted that she made her stage debut at age eight in a production of Beauty and the Beast – and she played the beast. 

    The magazines’ female readers were encouraged to view female stars as aspirational figures. They identified with the character that the star created for herself much more than with their role in any particular film. In one fascinating letter published in the January, 1934 issue of Photoplay, a Miss A. M. Johnson describes her own cinematic education as an awkward young girl: “Watching the incomparable Shearer, she learned to have poise and self-assurance. Watching the breathtaking beauty of Marlene, the ethereal loveliness of Garbo, the lady-like Harding and the sweet sincerity of Hayes, she kept on learning. She isn’t timid any longer, or lonely. She is popular now. She had, for the asking, the greatest teachers in the world.” One of the reasons ‘30s stars always projected strength is because audiences in that era did not go to the movies to see reflections of their own weakness. 

    The stars were supposed to be like them, but better: more glamorous, more poised, more capable. The most successful 245 of these actresses — Katherine Hepburn, Bette Davis, Barbara Stanwyck, Joan Crawford, Greta Garbo — had the power to shape the material they were given. Indeed, they shaped it simply by bringing their enormous individuality to bear. It is impossible to imagine any other human being making some of the acting choices that, say, Bette Davis does in Jezebel. The part is a rebellious Southern belle, but she plays it with a fragile, manic intensity, floridly and tragically, her eyes bugging out and her hands contorting into claws. (The rumor is that the role was her consolation prize from Warner’s for not getting cast as Scarlett O’Hara, and we should all take a moment to imagine what that movie would have been like). It is great and she is great and there is absolutely nobody like her — there has never been anybody like any of them. This is the genius of the star system. 

    Male stars did not attract nearly the same level of identification from their audience. As the film critic Dan Callahan has observed, “the limitation of so many of the screen men of the classic Hollywood period is their sense that men should not be acting at all.” There were plenty of fine actors in classic Hollywood, but with a very few exceptions — James Cagney, Cary Grant — none of them had the all-consuming personalities of their female counterparts. The stoicism of ‘30s women becomes a kind of repression in the men, most of whom struggled with the belief that projecting someone else’s emotions was just a little bit unmanly. All of that changed, of course, with Marlon Brando and Montgomery Clift and the Method. It created a new license for male vulnerability on screen — and it brought an end to the old kind of female star. 

    A lot of things happened at the same time in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1948, after a long legal battle, the studios’ 246 corporate owners were forced to sell off their theater chains, leaving their films without guaranteed buyers. Television was cutting into their market. Fewer movies were being made, and more of these were spectacles designed to compete with the small screen. The apparatus that had produced larger-than-life stars was collapsing, and audiences were gravitating towards a different kind of actor. For whatever reason, the women coming out of the Actor’s Studio never caught on with film audiences. Method actresses such as Kim Stanley and Geraldine Page had thriving stage careers but could not make the transition to the silver screen. Clift’s breakout performance in Red River and Brando’s in On The Waterfront are open, sensual, and sensitive — the kinds of parts that would have been reserved for women just a few years earlier. It is almost as if there was only so much emotion to go around: when the creative space available to men expanded, the room for women shrank. 

    Another popular explanation for Hollywood’s shift in focus during these years is a decline in the number of female creators, but I have never given this theory much weight. It is true that there was a cadre of influential female writers in Hollywood in the 1930s — women such as Anita Loos, Lillian Hellman, Frances Marion, Mary McCall Jr., and Ruth Gordon. Mary Pickford went from being a major star to a major producer, first of her own films and later as one of the founders of United Artists. But women were never more than about fifteen to twenty percent of screenwriters over the course of the decade (exact numbers are hard to find because writers were so often uncredited) — in fact, there were about as many as there are today. That is still an improvement on subsequent decades, but a significant drop from the 1920s, when almost half of all screenwriters were women. The most powerful women in ‘30s Hollywood were those who started their career in the silent era. It was the rare exceptions, such as Dorothy Parker 247 or Adela Rogers St. John, who broke into the business after it switched to sound (it helped that, like many sound-era screenwriters, they came from established literary careers). There was only one working female director — Dorothy Arzner — and female producers were always a small minority. 

    One of the great ironies of the studio era is that the rise of the talkies liberated women on screen while drastically limiting their creative role behind the scenes. On-screen women of the 1930s were more intelligent, more sophisticated, and generally more grown-up than they were in the 1920s, simply because they could speak. The greatest silent film actors – men as well as women – excelled in their ability to play broad types. There is only so much one can do with just a face, even when one has a face as infinitely expressive as Lillian Gish. But in the ‘20s it was common for studios to buy scenarios from freelancers. There were some highly paid staff scenarists (with Frances Marion leading the pack), but far fewer than sound-era studios would employ in their writers’ stables. Without dialogue, writing for the screen was less important and less prestigious, and thus, unsurprisingly, more female. The talkies brought a new crop of established writers to Los Angeles – journalists and playwrights, both largely male professions. 

    The surprising thing, then, is not that the women of ‘30s cinema were mostly written by men, but how little difference it seems to have made. I have never been able to tell whether a given movie from the 1930s was written by a man or a woman. They are equally likely to feature female protagonists and focus on women’s issues. Arzner is a fine director, but I have not been able to identify a uniquely female subjectivity in her work — because female subjectivity was so much the norm in the Hollywood of her day. 

    Loos, one of the most important and prolific screenwriters of any gender, said this about the movies in a late-in- life interview: “None of us took them the least bit seriously.” Hollywood in its earliest decades was full of people who treated their work with a mixture of perfectionism and contempt. They worked fourteen-hour days, spent years polishing scripts or invented new lenses just to get a particular effect, but they knew that the studios they worked for were glorified factories churning out a movie a week. Nobody involved in this system saw themselves as an artist –—and if they did, they saw themselves as slumming it. Instead, they were brilliant craftsmen. And the truth is that it doesn’t take lived experience or any kind of special or arcane knowledge to write formidable female characters, just close observation and dedicated craftsmanship. 

    Here is an unexpected hope: perhaps the rise of the streaming giants will restore some of that factory mentality. Netflix has fifty-one movies on its slate for this year. There are more people making more movies in mainstream Hollywood than at any point in the past eighty years. And that means more stories — about strength and weakness, about men and women, about a million other things. It might not be the old studio system come again, but surely it is no less capable of exploring all the aspects of human personality, of delivering to the screen the fullness of human life. 

    American Inquisitions 

    Fyodor Dostoevsky published the first installment of The Brothers Karamazov in February, 1879. The novel was the culmination of a decade of ideological strife, during which Dostoevsky had noted a steady slide toward populism. Socialism, the passion of Dostoevsky’s youth, was an enthusiasm still on the march. The author of The Brothers Karamazov was a devout Orthodox Christian and a conservative, a reactionary perhaps. He poured the expansive politics of his era into The Brothers Karamazov and especially into a phantasmagoric chapter — often read on its own — titled “The Grand Inquisitor.” For the past one hundred and forty years, this text has been mined for clues to modern politics. In the verdict of Lionel Trilling, “it can be said almost categorically that no other work of literature has made so strong an impression on the modern conscious- ness.” Modern consciousness was never more receptive to “The Grand Inquisitor” than in the 1930s and 1940s, when Dostoevsky was typically read as a prophet of totalitarianism. 

    Dostoevsky had foreseen this interpretation. In a letter written while he was completing The Brothers Karamazov, he worried about a regime that would provide “one’s daily bread, the Tower of Babel (i.e. the future reign of Socialism), and complete enslavement of freedom of conscience.” Enter the Grand Inquisitor. In the novel he directs the Inquisition in sixteenth-century Spain, having co-opted Christian mercy and replaced it with a cynical recipe for social control. According to Dostoevsky’s great biographer Joseph Frank, the Grand Inquisitor “has debased the authentic forms of miracles, mystery, and authority into magic, mystification, and tyranny.” His church enjoys absolute power. It traffics in mystification and magic. It caters cunningly to people’s spiritual needs and efficiently to their physical needs. For those who rebel against this domination masquerading as religion, there is the Inquisition. Thus did the Grand Inquisitor anticipate the techniques of the KGB, the Gestapo, and the political systems that those organs of oppression were meant to protect. 

    Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor is plausibly a proto-Bolshevik or a proto-fascist. Yet such readings can reduce this text to a kind of prophetic political journalism, to commentary avant la lettre on the cataclysmic 1930s. Read it again now, in the middle of our own tribulations. Detached from those long-ago debates, “The Grand Inquisitor” emerges as a timeless meditation on authoritarian attractions and on freedom’s vulnerabilities. As the Grand Inquisitor declares, “man prefers peace, and even death, to freedom of choice or the knowledge of good and evil… Nothing is more seductive for man than his freedom of conscience, but nothing is a greater cause of suffering.” The dilemma of politics in this text is that freedom is a dilemma. Freedom of conscience causes pain, which is precisely the emotional resource on which the Grand Inquisitor draws: freedom’s impositions are the secret of his power. The avowedly illiberal Dostoevsky was dramatizing a spiritual reality — freedom of conscience as a burden, a task, an impossible ideal — that is no less pervasive in free societies than in those regimes designated by the totalitarian label. 

    Perhaps “The Grand Inquisitor” is not just a discourse about them, the unfortunate totalitarians overseas. Perhaps it is also about us, citizens empowered by the Bill of Rights and basking in liberty. So considered, “The Grand Inquisitor” could be as illuminating about the United States, past and present, as it was supposed to be about Stalin’s Soviet Union or Hitler’s Germany. Without ever going to the extremes of sixteenth-century Spain, without an established church or a dictatorial government, the United States has never lacked for inquisitions. They have appeared, disappeared, and reappearedthroughout American history, exquisite barometers of the national mood and the objective correlatives of political and cultural power. They are as often creations of society as of government. They cast their strange, lurid light on the seductions and the suppressions that emanate from freedom of conscience. And they are once again abroad in the land. 

    The birthplace of the American inquisition is Salem, Massachusetts. In 1692, several members of this provincial New England community were put to death after a public investigation into witchcraft. Many outbreaks of alleged witchcraft had occurred in early modern Europe, and Salem was not at all unusual in the way it combined civil and theological authority, the supernatural and the legal, the magical and the scientific in order to save itself from witches. Nor were the guilty in the “Salem witch trial” quietly executed. They were given the role of exemplary perpetrators. The trial, the public exposure of their guilt, was the point. Only by seeing the forest into which the few had strayed could the many find their way to righteousness. 

    Historians disagree about the roots of what happened in Salem. It may have been material, a redistribution of property through the convenient discovery of witches. It may have been psychosexual, a letting go of forbidden energy under the pretense of witchcraft or amid a sprawling investigation into witchcraft. It may have been the anxiety of a religious elite convinced that the Massachusetts Bay Colony was not as homogeneous or as devout as it was supposed to be. The full inventory of motives for those tribunals may be lost to the vagaries and the hyperbole of the historical record. Whatever the actualities of the event, Salem’s legacy in American history is not institutional or legal or political. It is symbolic. 

    With the creation of the United States, memories of Salem in 1692 began to acquire a gothic frisson. Witchcraft became the stuff of Hawthorne stories and then Halloween kitsch. The Salem witch trials were a ready metaphor for obscurantism, for of theocrats, of those who believed in witches, the zealotry of those who wish to destroy a human being accused of witchcraft. It was this bequest of the seventeenth century that was rejected in the language of the American eighteenth century, in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Salem’s murk was left behind in the clean lines of Thomas Jefferson’s University of Virginia, proof positive of a new republican order. Universities would deliver what they were meant to deliver — enlightenment. The United States was born in the age of reason, though reason was often more a proposition than a reality in the new country. Reason had at least been put on a pedestal. 

    Instead of medieval inquisitions, then, the United States would concentrate on delivering justice. Few societies are as enamored of law as is the United States: the approach to justice through law speaks to the raison d’etre of the American republic. The nineteenth-century figure who best captured this infatuation was Abraham Lincoln, a lawyer by trade. Moved as so many other northerners were by the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850 and by the moral upheavals of the subsequent decade, Lincoln’s genius was to fight the Civil War with an eye to its legal outcome, which would be the guarantor of its moral outcome. His enduring achievements were the Emancipation Proclamation and the constitutional amendments that widened the scope of American citizenship. His literary-political style, like Jefferson’s, was precise, careful, analytical. His mysticism never clouded his mind. “With malice toward none, with charity for all” — such phrases banish the inquisitorial spirit. 

    But beware the romance of Lincoln’s oratory. In Lincoln’s time and after, there was often malice toward many and charity for few. Lincoln and Jefferson did not get the last word, and the inquisitorial spirit turned out to be a regular feature of American modernity. In the twentieth century it bubbled up from the extremes of the political spectrum. The Left went first. In the hothouse world of radical politics, the Dostoevskian dramas playing themselves out in the Soviet Union had an American resonance. It began with left-wing factionalism and culminated in the career of Joseph Stalin. (The Bolsheviks owed their name to factionalism, to their false claim to majority status and their mockery of their opponents as Mensheviks, the minority.) Stalin practiced the darkest arts of factionalism and, by logical extension, of inquisitions. Improvising rituals of investigation and confession, he had his enemies paraded before the Soviet public. Fewer than twenty people were put to death in Salem in 1692. Stalin had millions incarcerated and executed. The Massachusetts Bay Colony could not compete with the modern world in paranoia and dogmatic cruelty. 

    The American Communist Party slavishly followed Stalin and praised Stalinism. It justified the Moscow trials as it would the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. The American Communist Party also conducted a holy war against the Trotskyites, casting the demons out and subjecting those who wanted to stay on board to “party discipline.” The American Communist Party did not have the instruments of repression available to Stalin, who ruled over a police state that
    could conduct inquisitions of the sort portrayed in 1940 in Arthur Koestler’s epochal novel Darkness at Noon, a book that self-consciously retraces The Brothers Karamazov. Yet American communism endorsed the methods of the Soviet trials, which ensured that ideological and political enemies, having been publicly denounced, were airbrushed out of the historical photographs. 

    The reach of far-left sentiment — sometimes communist, sometimes not — was more cultural than political in the 1930s. It was an influence on educated people. The party and its fellow travelers were formidable enough to initiate a curious inquisition in the 1940s, just as an era of radical efflorescence was ending. In 1948, Whitaker Chambers, a former communist, accused Alger Hiss, a former State Department employee, of having spied for the Soviet Union. As if by magic, Chambers got put on trial. In the courtroom and in the press, he was accused of mendacity, of pathology, of homosexuality. A witness for the prosecution, he was not convicted, of course; but his reputation was irreparably damaged. An avid Dostoevsky reader, Chambers identified with Nikolai Rubashov, the persecuted protagonist of Koestler’s Darkness at Noon. At the same time, of course, Hiss was found guilty; he had been a spy, and Chambers, as would much later be shown definitively, had been telling the truth. For many of Hiss’s supporters, the trial itself had been a witch hunt. This tendency to see inquisitions in politically inconvenient investigations was an omen of political polarization to come. 

    The archetypal twentieth-century inquisition arose from the ashes of the Hiss case. One politician who profited from the case was Richard Nixon, Chambers’ friend and defender. Eisenhower chose him as his Vice President in 1952 in part because of Nixon’s barbed anti-communism. Another politician observing the Hiss case closely was Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, who possessed most of theGrand Inquisitor’s cynicism and only some of his cunning. McCarthy was less moved by the Cold War and by the facts of communism, American or otherwise, than by the political opportunities that he saw in anti-communism. Ideology as such was not really McCarthy’s forte — not to the degree that personal ambition was. He was skilled in the relent- less application of power, updating the practice of inquisition for the age of mass media. He wrapped the techniques of character assassination in the garb of legal and senatorial procedure. McCarthy was and remains the virtuoso inquisitor of American history. 

    McCarthy founded his harassment on fear and guilt and gullibility. The Cold War’s unclear borders and its reliance on espionage raised punishing questions of friend and foe. McCarthy presumed enmity and, having presumed it, he found enemies. Where there was no actual subversion, it was invented — by projecting the Cold War’s mood back onto the 1930s, when an affiliation with communism could mean so many things. McCarthy compounded the guilt of his victims by prodding them to “name names.” An inquisition inquires: it must ask or, better yet, interrogate. But interrogation can take place in different ways, in different spirits; not all questions that take the form of asking for the truth actually want the truth. Even when it inquires, an inquisition is not the same thing as an inquiry. A person publicly interrogated is made culpable by the sheer fact of having been interrogated. Though McCarthy’s fans enjoyed the television show that the Senator put before them, they also took his words at face value. McCarthy’s fictions left their mark on reality. 

    For McCarthy, generating fear was indispensable. It was not he who fired people. He was holed up in the Senate. He let the fear ripple out across the country, from the State Department to Hollywood. Guilt by association ran rampant. Treason 257 committed by communists, which did occur in the 1930s and 1940s, was not the only crime about which investigations were launched. Certain books were declared treasonous; some were removed from the libraries of American embassies. Works of art by those implicated in the Red Decade could be treasonous too, and for McCarthy and his supporters there was no way a person, once accused, could be exonerated. Naming names did not expiate anybody. To the contrary: it transformed public into private guilt, while guilt by association made fear ubiquitous, a virus for which there was no vaccine. People got fired mostly because their employers were afraid. As often happens, the institutions buckled. 

    The Salem witch trails and McCarthyism met in 1953 in Arthur Miller’s play, The Crucible. Miller’s parable challenged the modernity of McCarthyism. In the year of our Lord 1953, the salience of 1692 was supposed to be shocking. So too was the religiosity of the Puritan colony, which was not impossibly distant from Eisenhower’s America. The Puritans’ fanaticism foreshadowed McCarthyism. It was the all too familiar precedent, the resurrected template. The Crucible attributed a power-hungry, manipulative darkness to the divines of seventeenth-century Salem, whose purpose (in the play) was transparently McCarthy’s purpose — to deceive, to destroy, to terrify, to ruin, to control. Less grandly, Miller developed a political analogy in The Crucible. Like McCarthyism, Puritan justice was conservative in Miller’s eyes and as such it was dour, rigid, intolerant, and hierarchical. 

    Miller was himself a political progressive. McCarthy’s war on progressives allowed Miller to adorn the play’s hero, John Proctor, with the attributes of a liberal — as Miller understood these attributes. Porter is a handsome “farmer in his middle thirties,” one who “had a biting way with hypocrites… even-tempered, and not easily led.” Proctor’s Enlightenment courage, his Voltaire-inflected liberalism, inspires sympathy. A moderate churchgoer, he struggles with his having committed adultery. He cannot stop the trial from running its course. He is put to death, but he will not name names and he rises up at the play’s end and condemns the hypocrisy that is closing in on him. He asserts his freedom of conscience, which is his honor — “Because it is my name!” Proctor’s freedom is to not go along with injustice and, by not going along, to speak the truth. He robs an illiberal hypocrisy of its ultimate victory.

    Like John Proctor in The Crucible, Bill Clinton felt persecuted in his second term as president. Clinton was yet another reader of Arthur Koestler, and he, too, likened his interrogation at the hands of Kenneth Starr to scenes from Darkness at Noon. There were severe limitations to the analogy, of course. In its obsessive, self-righteous cadences, in its prurient interest in private matters, the Starr report certainly belongs to the literature of inquisitions, but it is hard to see the “trial of Bill Clinton” as a bona fide inquisition. Inquisitions are group phenomena. They are rituals of strength and weakness. They intentionally cross the lines of guilt and innocence, since doing so enhances their scope and spreads their message. Clinton, a sitting presi- dent, was guilty of a sexual liaison with an intern and of lying about it. He was too compromised and unique for his troubles to reach the level of an inquisition. He also stayed in office and did not fall very far from grace among his supporters. When Hillary Clinton ran for president in 2016, memories of the Clinton-Lewinsky affair resurfaced without becoming a major stumbling block for Democratic voters. 

    The contemporary cycle of American inquisitions began 259 after Clinton’s presidency. It was something new in the annals of inquisition, and not because people had changed. What had
    changed in our time was technology, and with it the public sphere. Social media mirrored a confluence of novelties. Opinions could be generated in new ways, and reputations and personal histories were publicly available in new ways. Whereas in the past a letter to the editor would have to be accepted for publication, making the press the key arbiter of the public domain, social media eliminated oversight. This gave opinions the speed of lightning, liberating disclosures and emotions that in the past were mostly confined to private conversation or to the proverbial grapevine. There was no time for introspection or a second look. The public sphere was accelerated and democratized as it had never been before. 

    The public sphere’s democratization had its bright side. The capacity of the powerful to suppress awkward or awful information about themselves diminished abruptly. Individ- uals and groups acquired access to a public sphere — mediated though it was by corporations — that could not be controlled. This assisted in the exposure of crimes sometimes in the form of information and testimony, sometimes through photographs and sometimes, as the technology got better, through video. It was not until the second decade of our century that we began to understand just how manipulable the public sphere had become. In the twenty-first century’s first decade, social media could be the hoped-for vehicle of democratic progress, holding the high and mighty to account. What obtained for the United States obtained even more dramatically outside of the United States. Authoritarianism had met its nemesis in social media. Was that not the lesson of Tahrir Square in 2011 and of the Maidan in 2014? 

    But democracy also met its nemesis in social media, and not only because authoritarian governments — in Russia, China, and elsewhere — had learned to use them for their own ends. The dark side of the public sphere’s democratization lay in its canonization of aggression. Expressing aggression was suddenly effortless and seemingly cost-free for the many who expressed it. Social-media aggression alternates between the random and the targeted, the light-hearted and the deadly, but it is anything but a trivial aspect of American political culture. In 2014, feminist critics of misogynist video games were not just argued against on social media. They were subjected to odious attacks made in the most brutal language, and to threats of violence that may or may not have been purely rhetorical. This aggression was a grotesque comedy for its advocates and a terrifying ordeal of intimidation for its victims — video-game posturing intended to silence voices and thus to dominate the public sphere. But ugly as it was, unprecedented as it was, the acts of aggression did not backfire. There was no mass revulsion against them. They went largely unchecked. 

    “Gamergate” prefigured the miserable election of 2016, during which several long-term trends converged. One was the collision between politics and social media, without which Trump could not have become president. He channeled the natural bellicosity of social media, its aura of unreality, its malicious humor, its absence of restraint, its invitations to violence. Another development was a metastasizing factionalism, for which Trump and his critics were at fault, a zero-sum attitude toward politics that promoted an abyss between the political parties, between Left and Right, between the signifiers of political friendship and the telltale attributes of a political foe. The election of 2016, its rough texture followed by its revolutionary outcome, ushered in a new inquisitorial 261 age. Enmities encourage inquisitions. 

    The record of recent inquisitions reveals an interesting asymmetry. Trump’s victory in 2016 gave him immense political power. He never accepted the separation of powers and constantly encroached on the independence of the judiciary. With some limits, he had the power of the state behind him. The Democratic Party did not disappear under Trump: it regained the House of Representatives in the mid-term elections and mounted two impeachment trials. “The resistance” found compensation for four years of exile from political power in the awesome cultural power linked in one way or another to progressive sentiment. Under Trump, the consequential inquisitions on the Right relied on state power, while the consequential inquisitions on the Left relied on cultural power. It has been an era rich in progressive inquisitions. 

    The story of Marie Yovanovich is a useful example. As Ambassador to Ukraine, she found herself in the middle of Trump administration schemes to find or to fabricate damaging material on Hunter Biden, Joe Biden’s son, who has some business connections to Ukraine. Ambassador Yovanovich did not comply. Phony accusations of her political bias circulated in the press. Social media piled on. The ambassador was recalled from Kyiv as a response to baseless accusations. The Trump administration never lifted a finger to clear her reputation for the obvious reason that it was the Trump administration that was besmirching her reputation. As inquisitions go, it could have been worse, and given the factionalism of American politics Ambassador Yovanovich’s persecution by Trump made her an overnight hero on the other side of the political spectrum. Had Trump won a second term, government-led inquisitions would have come fast and thick.

    The practice of twenty-first century inquisitions has found a congenial home on the Right. A perceived transgression and at times a real transgression is the starting point. Social media cacophonously cries out for justice. The pressure mounts and an institution is asked to take action — usually by firing someone. Suffice it to say that these procedures have little to do with a courtroom trial. They have no prior rules; they do not require anything remotely resembling due process; the accused is not necessarily given his or her chance to mount a defense. An example here is Will Wilkinson, a vice-president at the Niskanen Center who sent out a crude tweet in January 2021 and was fired after a burst of right-wing anger on social media and in the press. The anger entailed a misreading of Wilkinson’s tweet. His poor taste was misconstrued as an incitement to violence. The misreading is a predictable, almost a necessary ingredient of such frenzies. The perplexities of evidence are irrelevant to the inquisitorial mind. 

    The same inquisitorial technique is familiar on the Left as well. Its popularity owes something to the Left’s special agony in the Trump years, when a viciously coarse and anti-progressive man was in the White House while the majority of the country’s elite cultural institutions were becoming more overtly progressive. Those institutions found solace for the loss of political power in the exercise of social and cultural power. They took after those who deviated too egregiously from progressive etiquette. Whether the offense was real or perceived was often beside the point, as were in many cases the intentions of the offender. Motive is the concern of trials. Criminal law revolves around intent. Inquisitions, by contrast, presume motive and intent, and look only for confirmation and satisfaction. Again, due process, which used to be a pillar of the liberal worldview, was nowhere to be found. The effect 263 of these inquisitions has been a climate of fear, a growing conformity of speech and behavior, a resigned acceptance of a bullying authority. 

    The most extraordinary inquisition conducted by progressives in the Trump era was of Trump himself. Owing to the Trump campaign’s bizarre ties to the Russian government, and to Trump’s egregious comments about the excellence of Vladimir Putin, and of course to the fact that Trump was Trump and guilty by definition in the eyes of his enemies, he was found guilty of being a Russian asset. This indeed may been the case, but the evidence — even after the exhaustive Mueller investigation, after countless books on the topic, after round after round of first-rate investigative journalism — is still not there. In the inversion of a courtroom trial on which inquisitions rely, Trump was guilty from the outset. A thousand data points were gathered into a narrative repeated for months by journalists and experts on CNN, MSNBC, and other platforms. Social media added to the ministrations of this exuberant jury. Trump’s nods to Salem and to his being enmeshed in a latter-day witch hunt were not altogether wild. His baroque hypocrisy was that he was energetically engaged in witch hunts of his own. 

    For those convinced that Trump was a Russian spy, evidence could easily be subordinated to optics. Senator McCarthy had operated on a similar principle, exploiting a populist suspicion of the diplomats in striped pants, the fancy kind of people likely to join a treasonous conspiracy. Trump made matters worse by himself employing the inquisitor’s tactics — against government employees such as Ambassador Yovanovich and against whichever celebrity or athlete or journalist or politician (Republican or Democrat) annoyed him. Much of his campaign against Hillary Clinton ran on guilt by association: she was a Clinton, a globalist, a feminist, a liberal, and therefore not to be trusted with the presidency. Or, better yet, she was all of these things and should therefore be locked up. Eager to scorch the political earth, Trump could be seen as deserving an inquisition. Live by inquisition, die by inquisition. 

    While an inquisitorial spirit was proliferating on the Left and the Right, many of the people who fell within its sights were not household names. Beginning in earnest in 2016, progressive institutions proved receptive to inquisitions also of lesser-known and low-profile personnel. These institutions were sensitive to the verdict of social-media campaigns, less interested in individual cases and more alert to the perception of wrongdoing than to the complexities and obscurities of lived reality. They displayed little patience, critical thinking, fairness, and courage. It is typical of inquisitions that those who instigate them are at ease with the fear they unleash. Fear is their tool. The fear of a potential misstep that many now feel at progressive institutions preemptively internalizes the inquisitor’s tactics. 

    A striking case study is Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, a hundred miles or so from Salem. In 2018, a black student at Smith off on her own and eating lunch was approached by a janitor and a campus police officer. She was asked what she was doing, as reported in a detailed New York Times article. The student later went on Facebook to describe her upset. News articles projected the student’s side of the story — that she had been discriminated against — though the
    college looked into the incident and found out that the student was eating in an empty dorm. By approaching her, the unarmed officer and janitor had been following protocol. There was no evidence that they were motivated by prejudice. The incident 265 was most likely a misunderstanding on the student’s part. 

    Knowing what it knew, the college administration stayed silent when photographs, names, and email addresses of the Smith employees involved in the incident were made public. Accusations of guilt touched an employee not at work at the time. Death threats, whispering campaigns, and public humiliation followed, while the college did little to defend its employee, offering no proof of his guilt but implying it because the student had perceived malign intent in their actions. Their punishment, of course, was not execution. It was not getting fired outright, although one employee was eventually furloughed and had trouble finding another job because the accusations of racism were so well known in the Northampton community; her reputation has been destroyed. The punishment was the repetition of untruths by those in positions of authority and the requirement that the employees undergo anti-racism and intersectionality training. 

    The willful misreading and misinterpretation on display at Smith College bore the imprint of an inquisition. Beyond the fear shadowing the accused, beyond the social media moralizing and the stigmatization at will, this story of inquisition speaks to the enormous power of these public abuses. The handful of poorly paid employees who fell into the inquisition’s net were not a threat to the college or the community. They sought out no controversy. The power and suffering brought down on them was the power to control the narrative, which is that Smith College is a valiantly progressive institution awash in a sea of structural racism and doing its best to right the age-old wrongs of American society. The employees’ humiliation was necessary in the scheme of things. They had gotten in the way of a popular and righteous narrative, of a tempest of virtue. 

    Freedom of conscience is not protected by the Constitution. It is not equivalent to religious freedom or to freedom of speech. Religious freedom intersects with freedom of conscience in the phrase “conscientious objector,” someone who for religious reasons cannot fight in a war. This status accords civic space and moral prestige to conscience. It is generous in its assumption that people are not uniform, that their conscience might indicate something rare about them and something inviolable. A majority enlists. A small minority conscientiously objects. Freedom of speech is similar. It is by definition the freedom to lie and to offend and to criticize, the freedom to explore life in all its heterodox constructions. No established church in religion, no government restrictions on speech (with some qualifications) — more than anything these constitutional rights are protections. American citizens cannot be forced to attend any one church. They cannot be told by the government what a newspaper can publish or what a scholar can write. These are their rights. 

    Though it can be violated, freedom of conscience cannot be legally protected. It is a loose set of principles or ideas. One is the freedom to choose, which is impossible without the freedom to err. When choice becomes crime — murder, theft, rape — freedom of conscience is abrogated. Short of crime, though, freedom of conscience deserves a wide latitude. Even when choice tips over into crime, freedom of conscience is not erased forever. It is implicit in the criminal’s recovery and in the possibility of moral transformation: one might still recognize a crime, feel remorse for it, and try to change one’s ways. Freedom of conscience is also individual. The state does not set its terms. No church can guarantee it. To survive it must be respected as something that everyone seeks or finds to the same degree. Freedom of conscience enables moral lives that are autonomous, that allow people — making mistakes — to choose the good as they see it and the good that is not imposed, not homogeneous, not obvious, the good that is idiosyncratic and non-conforming, the good that is always a work in progress. 

    Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor focuses with ferocity on freedom of conscience. He relieves the people over whom he rules of their freedom, knowing that freedom of conscience carries with it ordeals of reflection and responsibility: choosing the good comes naturally to no one, and is at best a fleeting triumph over one’s internal limitations. Having freed his subjects of freedom, the Grand Inquisitor rewards them with moral uniformity: his church apportions dogmas, happily adjudicating all aspects of behavior and winning for itself immense power along the way. In this the Grand Inquisitor sees a version of happiness: obedience, authority, a narrative handed down from above, so that people can calmly go about their business. They are safe now. His inquisitions deliver them from the temptation of choice and from the onerous inner life in which conscience either flourishes or fails. By burning people alive, his inquisitions regulate conscience — not the consciences of the dehumanized victims but the consciences of the weak and fascinated onlookers. 

    If freedom of conscience cannot be legislated, how can it be defended? Its importance must first be acknowledged. Inquisitions translate people into cardboard enemies. They script them, they reduce them and diminish them and fill in all the blanks, meeting the psychological needs of their audience. Hence the never-ending political utility of inquisitions: they satisfy large numbers of people. They are populist theater. As long as our current factionalism reigns, we will be stuck with inquisitions. When you have raised the cost of expressing an unpopular opinion, when you lead individuals to censor themselves, when dissent (either for or against power) can result in the loss of one’s livelihood and social acceptance, then you have violated the freedom of conscience. Conversely, honoring another person’s freedom of conscience constrains the extra-legal machinery of ascribing guilt, of shunning. It argues for a light touch, for not going all in and for being especially vigilant about the points at which public shaming and the will to power converge. Freedom of conscience elevates the ideal of a merciful public sphere, an uphill battle in our unforgiving public sphere, addled as it is by the social- media furies and by incentivized sensationalism. Morte tua vita mia is the moral code of the internet. 

    The recent travails of Smith College illustrate the menace of a moral landscape without freedom of conscience. To the college administration, the employees accused of harassing a student were so unfree in conscience as to be almost without agency. Since they were regarded as unfree, as pillars of structural racism until proven otherwise, their actions and their intentions had no bearing on their destiny. Guilty or not in practice, they deserved their public shaming in theory. The college administration also felt justified in tolerating a public inquisition because it was certain of its own enlightened attitudes. The Grand Inquisitor would have approved. He is not, in his own view, a man who causes harm. “We shall triumph,” the Grand Inquisitor says in The Brothers Karamazov, “and shall be Caesars, and then we shall plan the universal happiness of man.” His hold on power is so firm because his policing of public morality leads to happiness. And what is a 269 bit of collateral damage in the vast enterprise of bettering humanity? 

    Precisely because freedom of conscience is not a right and cannot be a right, it is precarious. (“They have brought their burden to us and laid it humbly at our feet,” the Grand Inquisitor proudly declares.) No ACLU can be endowed in the name of this pre-political virtue. Its preservation — or its evisceration — will come from the culture, the climate of opinion, the spirit of laws, and from the education that art and philosophy confer. Repressive societies have amassed the richest literature of conscience. They make heroes and martyrs: while they exact a cruel price, and sometimes the ultimate price, from those who say no, they transform Václav Havel and Nelson Mandela and Sophie Scholl and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Liu Xiaobo into great historical figures, whose hands may have been tied but whose conscience was free. But less repressive societies, and even some open societies, too readily congratulate themselves in these matters. They may not make martyrs, but they sometimes forget the labyrinthine lessons of moral freedom, thus unlearning the balancing acts of a culture that can thwart inquisitions big and small, of a culture that refuses to speak the final word about the guilt or the misdeeds of other people, even of criminals. The scales of justice can easily be melted down and repurposed as the crucibles of endless recrimination. Let us fight inquisition with inquiry. Even if there will always be witch hunts, there will never be witches. 

    Staple Lady

    Next time her skull is sliced open,
    she must have a mind limber as rubber,
    bending to the pain. Under the bright lights
    of the icy theater she will melt, allowing the saw’s buzz
    to fade into the sound of the surgeon entering
    her interior, surveying the field of tumors for the bad one.

    When he finds it, there will be no escaping
    his blade. She will hear him hack through her anesthetic fog
    and scrape at her numb meninges wall, vanquishing
    the invader. Perhaps she is only dreaming,
    she thinks: when she awakens she will be
    at home, puzzled but refreshed

    from this deeply troubled sleep. But then
    she feels the bone door closed and stapled
    shut, cancelling her delusion. Later she is told
    that the enemy is gone but his colluders, claiming
    innocence, remain. A new vigil begins as she watches
    and waits for them to regroup, organize and grow.

    She confesses that she loves her staples. Furtively,
    she caresses them throughout the day. They are her secret
    cranial adornment. Under her hair, in all their metallic glamor,
    they are hers alone to enjoy. Daily, she attends to them holding
    closed her incision, tenderly washing and polishing
    them so they shine like a zipper, ready for the grab.

    Meanwhile, inside, the humors rise and fall like the tide, sway
    to the east with the wind, hold fast against
    the western torment brewing. Above, the wise sagittal
    sinus keeps things churning, as the heart pumps
    furiously below and the mind—her determined mind—keeps
    flexible but centered on the task of healing and staying healed.

    Gingerly, she peers through her two
    still functioning eyes, the skull’s port-hole access
    to the sea, and beyond, to the healing world
    for whom she will endure still more incursions, stay
    supple and ready, if only
    in the end she can stay a while.
    To the god who does not exist she prays—teach me to ride
    the storm safely, past the fatal depths, to the receding shore.

    For the Afterlife

    She wanted a crypt like the temple of Dendur,
    an enormous monolith unshakeable as their marriage.

    He favored the granite sarcophagus gaily
    decorated with Victorian swirls and oak leaf cornices.

    She wanted poplars tall and straight—leafy and shameless
    as Italian trees of summer, if sadly deciduous.

    He preferred cypresses, their constancy through the seasons:
    shrubs—yew or arbovite—modest, low to the ground.

    She fancied a stone table with seats for friends to come dine
    al fresco. He said a few high-back benches would do.

    She said as long as they’re comfortable, without Hallmark
    card prayers or one-size-fits-all labels like “Father” and “Mother.”

    When they settled on the white granite love seat carved
    from a single block, its elegantly supportive back to the forest,

    they were told it was impossible to order now
    that the factories making them in China and India were closed.

    Everything in the world was closed. Yet they strolled,
    faces masked, every day, in these grounds, secure

    in their solitude, among the decorated dead,
    the veterans from Gettysburg, the Somme, Normandy and
    Saigon

    and all the wars against measles, flu, whooping cough
    and plague,
    whole families wiped out by one contagion or another resting

    now in the rolling hills and burial mounds, under
    marble markers by now mostly effaced, amid medals
    and flags stabbed

    into the earth to celebrate their valor, here among the
    ancient oaks
    and stalwart pines, clustered in stately groves joined
    each to each by pebbled paths and avenues—daily they walked,
    stopped and even sat, feeling strangely welcome and
    terribly alive.

    Invalid Afternoons

    1.
    Precocious in her dotage, she teeters like a top unravelling,
    now spinning, now faltering, now lunging across
    living room carpets, over

    William Morris tendrils and Bokara medallions, past
    the leather sofa and beyond,
    arriving at the south window.

    She stoops over the hope chest with her watering can,
    drenching the amaryllis, dotting orchids and jade with ice,
    then pruning the cactus blossoms.

    One by one, she pulls off their delicate,
    erotic red heads, leaving
    the sheath for the next flower to occupy, and the next.

    She is not dying, she reminds herself, though today she feels
    a sort of emotional anemia come over her, a thinning
    inside, a rising-up of white corpuscles over red.

    There is shame, she thinks, in yielding
    to this voluptuous ennui, shame
    in failing to school the mind past boredom, past

    the exquisite temptation of absolute emptiness.
    Didn’t her mother tell her a commonplace—
    that she had no inner resources?

    To be complacently bored, she preached, is to be
    an ill-bred donkey:  Solo los burros se aburren,
    the refrain of her childhood. Her mother’s go-to line.

    She plays it now, over and over, and almost laughs
    to think somehow it has to do with her
    after a lifetime of ardor and infatuation.

    2.
    In her nostalgia she thinks of snow and snow days,
    of lazy afternoons with children demanding snow
    men and snow balls and snow angels

    and excursions to the park along the majestic snow-laden
    Avenue of Pines, the ancient trees hanging over
    the picture-perfect American families,

    the snow-packed branches
    now protecting, now threatening.
    Now gone.

    Today the March winds cut through a snowless city, a barren
    light over it all, exposing late-winter detritus, impending
    decline, the house silent, as she detects in her lungs

    a breeze, imagines a multitude of voyages, remembers
    landscapes, a lake—near frozen—a boat, a shoreline, the sound
    of waves breaking inside her chest, an impediment, a voice—

    something from deep inside the rim, something
    unreachable, the waters rolling towards her, rolling,
    her briny cough a harbinger

    of who knows what
    in her future, something illegible, distilled,
    a promise in the unfathomable sea of self, of selves.

    3.
    But life is good, she thinks today, as she hears
    the irrepressible cardinal, newly arrived,
    beseeching his mate, sees

    the neighbor’s calico alert, though the bird is out of reach—
    Stubbornly, he waits for some sudden splendor to fall
    into his lap, his tail twitching.

    The bird is immoderate
    in his casual exultances. She loves him
    immoderately, loves the world

    immoderately for all its violence and decadence. Even
    its boredom is lovable. She wants
    never to leave it. Never.

    4.
    Under the yews the tulips push through the loam. Life
    insisting its way back again. Ötzi, the frozen mummy found
    in the Alps, had thirty varieties of pollen in his stomach,
    some ibex meat and two chunks of wild goat.

    There was evidence of arthritis and over fifty wounds, all
    treated with Copper Age acupuncture, tattoo-style,
    from head to toe.
    When they chipped him out of the glacier he was smiling
    his Neolithic smile: what fleeting happiness
    before the avalanche felled and swallowed him?

    Nine Little Girls 

    Some years ago, deep into a confounding research assignment for which I had been combing through the website of the South Dakota legislature, I stumbled upon the recorded testimony of a woman describing in detail her own rape and torture, and the tortures of her sisters by the same hands. In her account the acts, which allegedly took place in the 1960s and 1970s, continued for several years and had begun when they were all children some fifty years earlier. The discovery of that testimony was a thing that happened to me, an event in my life, in the way realizing for the first time that my parents will grow old and die was an event in my life. The sound of her voice, the stories she told, gripped me, and attached me to a group of people I had never met, to a story that, before that evening, had nothing at all to do with me and my world. 

    We are surrounded, of course, by reports of atrocities of various kinds, and the mass of them often has the unfortunate effect of inuring us to many hells. But on that day I encountered a human voice and, despite our cultural preoccupation with trauma, which should have readied me to understand what I heard, I did not know how to think about what the woman’s voice was saying. In a confrontation not with data points, but with a personal account of extreme cruelty, I was without adequate resources. I recognized the problem of my human unpreparedness. 

    The horrors needed to be studied and reflected upon over time. There were implications that I needed to work out, and understandings that I needed to develop. Framings that had seemed sturdy and fundamental now felt flimsy. I experienced the testimony of those abused women as new knowledge, which ruptured trusted conceptions of justice and duty. It was not obvious to me that justice was possible here, or that this evil could be punished. My strongest sensation was of having been inducted into a darker acquaintance with the world.

    The story stayed with me. What follows is not an attempt at investigative journalism or historical scholarship. I wish only to share what I discovered, in order to give an account of how I tried to find a mental and social context for certain acts, and to offer some reflections about how to think about them. Much of the grisly information relayed here is in the public domain. It turns out that there is a lot that we do not know, and do not comprehend, about the public domain. 

    Geraldine Charbonneau believes that the scars from her abortion must have been there since just before her seventeenth birthday, though for most of the intervening decades she couldn’t remember the procedure that left them, or the rape that she says necessitated it. Like all eight of her sisters (Louise, Francine, Mary, Barbara, Joann, and three others who wish to remain anonymous), and like most victims of childhood sexual assault, she claims that she repressed memories of the abuse that she sustained while a child and a teenager. Louise, Geraldine’s older sister, alleges that she was in third grade when she became the first of her family to be abused by the priests and nuns at St. Paul’s Mission School (now called Marty Indian School), a Catholic school in Marty, South Dakota. The nine sisters were born and raised in Olga, North Dakota into a tribe of the Anishinaabe people known by the federal government as the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, to a strong-willed matriarch, the mother of seventeen children. They were among those Native toddlers whose parents had willingly sent them to Native boarding school in order to secure an education that could supply the skills necessary to thrive in this country. Others across the country were ordered from their homes by government officials, still others were allegedly forcibly taken from their families. 

    Both Charbonneau parents died without ever hearing their daughters’ stories. Like other children at similar boarding schools across the country, the nine sisters say they were warned not to tell anyone about the abuse they alleged took place there. When the nuns at St. Paul’s discovered that Geraldine was pregnant, they warned her that if she revealed her condition to her parents, all three of them would burn in eternal hell. In a clandestine operation in the school’s infirmary, Geraldine recalls, her fetus was aborted and forced into the incinerator in the basement. “They always kept a fire burning in the incinerator room,” she said. “ I know now that’s where they put the unborn child. They burned it.” 

    Since the inception of the Native American boarding school movement, the goal of these institutions has been the deracination of young Native Americans and their assimilation into American life. The schools were considered a potential solution for the “Indian Problem” beginning in the 1870s. They were conceived as a progressive alternative to the reservation policy, which had long been the favored policy in America. In 1869 the New York Times declared that “the only possible method [with which to keep Indians from hindering American growth] would seem to be to rigidly confine Indians to certain specific localities, until by their good conduct or progress in civilization they can be allowed perfect freedom.” Two and a half decades later, in an article entitled “Senator Dawes Talks to the Cambridge Indian Rights Association” the Times reported favorably about Dawes’ support for the reservation policy: “ [The Indian] is losing the last acre of his heritage. He can no longer retreat from the advance of civilization. We must either support him in idleness or else devise some way to make him a part of us and absorb him into our body politic. As we cannot exterminate him, we must make something of him.” 

    Colonel Richard Henry Pratt, the pioneer of the Native American boarding school movement, and the founder of Carlisle, the first off-reservation boarding school, delivered a speech in 1892 entitled “Kill the Indian, Save the Man.” In it he conceded that the only good Indian is a dead one, a nod to General Philip Sheridan’s infamous evaluation, but he urged the country to commit bloodless — that is to say, cultural — genocide. If granted entry into what he and most other whites of the period considered an indisputably superior way of life, Pratt assured his audience, the Indians would abandon their traditions willingly. This, he thought, was a far more humane and effective method than Jefferson’s reservation strategy, by which Natives were sequestered on patches of land “held apart from all association with the best of our civilization.” Pratt was proposing to erase them with kindness, or at least tolerance. 

    Many Natives agreed with him about the reservations, and about the hope of assimilation. There were Indian teachers and parents who supported Pratts’ schools, and who clung to the chimera of a “white man’s chance.” Pratt’s promise was made at the start of a great wave of immigration that would alter the American sense of belonging and identity. He conjured a future in which it was possible for a Native to become an American in a pre-multicultural context. It was, in essence, a melting-pot argument for America’s indigenous population. What is most unnerving about Pratt’s famous oration is its jumble of progressivism and racism. The speech champions the liberal truth that there is something essential and irreducible in all people that transcends their particularity. Pratt espoused a jarringly humanist argument. It was 283 also a universalist argument, rather like the French view of citizenship since the Enlightenment: erase your difference,
    lose your traditions, and you will be welcomed as members of the general society. 

    This mottledness in Pratt’s objectives, the mixture of good and evil, of benign and malign intentions, is characteristic of much of the Native American experience. It is a messy story, peopled with unlikely alliances and incongruous endings, and whereas the larger moral picture may be clear, and the historical verdict about American prejudice unequivocal, the story closer to the ground is clouded with complexities. There are plainly abhorrent actors whom some Natives defend. For decades after the rumored abuses that took place at Native American boarding schools had become semi-notorious within many Indian tribes, there were Native subcultures in which Carlisle was revered. 

    The first compulsory education clause affecting Native Americans appears in 1858 in a treaty between the United States and the Pawnees. Such clauses would appear in ten other treaties before the end of the treaty period in 1871. In 1891, federal legislation was passed which extended compulsory school attendance to all Indians regardless of tribe. In 1893, for a single year, it was legal for government officials to withhold “rations or the furnishings of subsistence either in money or in kind to the head of any Indian family” for failure to send Indian children between the ages of eight and twenty-one to school the previous year (this legislation and its revocation the following year can be found in chapter 7 of the US Code title 25). Nonetheless, there are cases of children being forcibly separated from their families well into the twentieth century. Consider the case of Dennis Seely, who was removed from his home and sent to the Tekakwitha Indian Mission in Sisseton, South Dakota in 1946 (further horrifying details of the Seely case, which have been made public, are of a piece with those of the nine sisters). In 1929 much of the authority to enforce Native school attendance was given to the states. The Meriam Report, commissioned by the Department of the Interior and published in 1928, focused on reservation and boarding school poverty. All 847 pages of the report, detailing a truly appalling episode in our nation’s history, are easily accessible online. Regarding the Native American boarding schools, it reads in part: 

    For several years the general policy of the Indian Service has been directed away from the boarding school for Indian children and toward public schools and Indian day schools…. It is, however, still the fact that the boarding school, either reservation or non-reservation, is the dominant characteristic of the school system maintained by the national government for its Indian wards. 

    The survey staff finds itself obliged to say frankly and unequivocally that the provisions for the care of the Indian children in boarding schools are grossly inadequate. 

    The outstanding deficiency is in the diet furnished the Indian children, many of whom are below normal health. The diet is deficient in quantity, quality, and variety……. 

    The boarding schools are frankly supported in part by the labor of the students. Those above the fourth grade ordinarily work for half a day and go to school for half a day…. The question may very properly be raised as to whether much of the work of Indian children in boarding schools would not be prohibited in many states by the child labor laws. 

    Just ten years after Carlisle’s founding, 10,500 of the roughly 36,000 Native student population went to Native boarding schools shaped by Pratt’s social-evolutionary philosophy. A web of these schools spread across the country over the course of the next century. 

    Allegations about the mistreatment of Native students at these establishments are as old as the schools themselves. Children were allegedly forced to eat lye soap for speaking their native tongue, whipped for running away, and beaten simply for holding one another’s hands. Some died from malnourishment. Disease due to overcrowding was rampant. Richard Monette, professor of law at UW-Madison, former president of the Native American Bar Association, and a graduate of a boarding school in North Dakota (and former chairman of the Turtle Mountain Tribe), put it this way: “Native America knows all too well the reality of the [Native] boarding schools, where recent generations learned the fine art of standing in line single-file for hours without moving a hair, as a lesson in discipline; where our best and brightest earned graduation certificates for homemaking and masonry; where the sharp rules of immaculate living were instilled through blistered hands and knees on the floor with scouring toothbrushes; where mouths were scrubbed with lye and chlorine solution for uttering Native words.” 

    Still, as always, the history is complicated. Not all student experiences at Native boarding schools are alike. Some former students recall their time at these schools fondly. For many it provided an education and an opportunity to develop inter-tribal Native identities, since schools often mixed students from different tribes. Michelle Dauphinais Echols, the Charbonneau sisters’ cousin and lawyer, is one such alumna. Like her cousins, she attended St. Paul’s. Even after spending the better part of the past decade pursuing justice on the nine sisters’ behalf, she describes the years she spent at the school happily. It was with her help, patience, and example that I was able to explore this episode. 

    What follows are the accounts that the nine sisters have given about their time at St. Paul’s in the 1960s and 1970s. These stories have been edited for brevity and clarity. 

    On the first Monday of every school year all of us would undergo the same initiation ritual: Straight off the bus we’d be organized into one long line and then stripped naked. Once we reached the front of the line, nuns would pour DDT powder, a poisonous insecticide, over our heads and bare bodies [for delousing]. We were told this was because we were dirty Indians and had to be debugged. If we tried to wash the powder off, we’d be forced back in line and the process would simply be repeated. Every single year, the first Friday evening at the end of that first week the entire school would assemble, and they would screen films of Jews in concentration camps lined up towards the gas chambers. The next morning all of us would be led into group showers where we would finally be permitted to wash off that powder. After washing each child would stand naked in front of the nuns waiting for us just outside the bathroom in order to inspect our bodies. They would  bend us over and touch us before finally permitting us to collect our clothes and redress. From that very first week, that fear of being put into the gas chamber was instilled and remained throughout our time at St. Paul’s. 

    There were all kinds of horrors awaiting us after that initial trial. Some of us suffered permanent frostbite, some still bear physical scars from the beatings administered by the nuns and priests. Some of us were beaten so badly we had to be hospitalized for up to ten days. Some of us were sodomized. Some have scars from births and abortions from being raped by our caretakers. Once, on an outing to a lake, one of the boys went into the water and started to drown and we were all screaming asking them to help him but the priests and nuns just ignored us and he died. No one took care of us. We had no mother or father figures. There were no toys. We made friends quickly. We had to — friendship was a form of protection. We always had our cliques. We had to have our cliques to look out for one another, or we would have been severely beaten on a daily basis. The staff hated us. They made us know they hated us in no uncertain terms. They gave us no affection. We wouldn’t have known what a hug was or how to have a bond with anybody if it hadn’t been for the summers back home with our mother. We were the lucky ones because we got to go home. There were students there who couldn’t afford the trip back, and they had to stay at that place the whole year round. 

    School was 700 miles away from our hometown. There was no way to connect with family. They made sure of that. Even our aunt and uncle, who lived on the grounds because they worked at the school, never got to see us. From the moment you got there it was total isolation at Marty. They enforced it by beatings, strappings, shaving heads, by saying “You’ll go to hell. Your parents will die and they’ll go to hell.” If one of us was at one table and we saw our sisters at another we didn’t dare say hello, just made eye contact. No talking at all. Sometimes when they fed us that mush we’d put it in our hands and go wash them at the sink, and that was the only time we’d be able to lean against a friend or touch their shoulders. If you were caught touching you got the worst beating of your life. 

    There was always the lurking of a priest or of this one man, the groundskeeper, who worked there and who also molested us. It was like they had different signals that they gave each other. Like for instance, the man who molested Louise would hold her to a chair by the front of her clothes and use his finger on her. And sometimes a few of his fingers. And then he would leave her there and we would see him making a motion with his hand to one of the priests and he would come over and do what he wanted with her. Was the hand motion a sign that she was ready for intercourse? We couldn’t be sure. But we remember definitely the secret looks they gave each other, and the snide remarks they’d make about young girls becoming women. Geraldine says her sexual abuse started when she was eight. Father George began to try and touch her and kiss her. Father George kissed her several times which made other children tease her and say that Father George was in love with her. Father Francis was in the room when Father George 289 kissed her. He laughed and accused Father George of saving Geraldine all for himself. 

    Father Francis was clever. He tricked Barbara into trusting him. The way he did it was, he knew that our aunt and uncle lived on the grounds and that we couldn’t go see them on our own, and we were so desperate for some connection with family. Father Francis would say ‘Come with me, I’ll take you to visit your uncle.’ And she missed our mom and dad so much so she’d go with him. And then after he’d gained her trust he would take her to the church basement and force her to fondle him and perform oral sex. Once there was a coffin in the church basement, maybe they were preparing the body for burial in there, and he lifted her up and showed her, there was a dead woman in it and he put her in that coffin next to the corpse and said if Barbara ever told anyone he’d lock her up in there. So we learned to keep quiet. 

    The groundskeeper who abused Louise had a big ring of keys with him all the time. When we were in the little girls dorm, so we must have been about fourth graders, we would say to each other “did you hear some keys? Some keys clinking in the night?” Because we used to hear them jingle. And on the nights that we heard them jingle, we’d see a priest in the dorm at night. We learned to pull the blankets up over our heads and hold our breath so he wouldn’t pick our bed to climb into. Once Louise went to the bathroom in the middle of the night and came back and found a man in her bed. This man with the keys was letting them in through the tunnels that run under the school, for the pipes, you know. The tunnels are still there now. They run underground connecting every building in the school — the rectory, the church, and the dorms. That’s how the priests got in. 

    The nuns were in on it, too. They let the priests do what they wanted, and they abused us too. They used to pull our blouses down, making believe that they thought we’d hidden something in our bras, but knowing full well we hadn’t. They just wanted to humiliate us. It was a team effort. We were handed around like used clothing, and nobody cared. Even the missionaries who worked at the school were in on it. There was no one to turn to and we knew it. We were told that we would be hurt if we told anybody, that they would kill our parents and our parents would go to hell. We certainly couldn’t turn to our parents so we buried it so deep inside that there was no way it would ever surface. 

    For many years none of the sisters spoke of their alleged abuse to each other or to anybody else. This is not uncommon. According to CHILDUSA, if child victims of sexual assault disclose at all, they do so during adulthood. The median age of disclosure is 48, the average age is 52. Of those who do disclose, only 6% to 15% contact authorities, while most others confide only in friends. That is why many state statutes of limitations for cases of childhood sexual assault, if they exist at all (some states have no SOL and permit plaintiffs to come forward at any time), provide timeframes for plaintiffs to bring their case after memories are likely to have resurfaced, rather than immediately after the incident occurred. 

    Geraldine Charbonneau was alarmed when asked by her gynecologists, who recognized the scarring, if she had gotten an abortion early in life. She had buried the memory of the procedure since it had happened. It was not until a family gathering in 2009 that one of the sisters, Louise, told the others that she had been abused at St. Paul’s and asked if they had been too. Barbara Kay Charbonneau recalled that “We all cried but nothing was said. It was so traumatic, so incomprehensible. But the memories came back one right after the other…. It was like Pandora’s Box was opened.” 

    The sisters had been approached in 2006 by other alumni who were members of a class action suit seeking recompense for abuses sustained by students at boarding schools such as St. Paul’s. Between 2003 and 2010, over a dozen alumni of South Dakota’s Catholic boarding schools filed civil lawsuits against the federal government, the Catholic Diocese of Sioux Falls, and various religious orders operating the schools. The following descriptions of abuse are from the Complaint for Zephier, et al. v United States of America (2003): 

    a. Plaintiff, Sherwyn Zephier, attended Boarding School at St. Paul’s at Marty, South Dakota, in the Yankton Reservation, where he was beaten and witnessed nuns regularly commit sexual assaults on boys; 

    b. Plaintiff, Adele Zephier, attended Boarding School at St. Paul’s at Marty where she was sexually abused by a priest, who would put his hands under her dress and fondle and penetrate her. She was also physically abused by the nuns, one of whom would pick her up by her hair, shake her, and lock her in a closet for hours. 

    c. Plaintiff, Roderica Rouse, also attended St. Paul’s at Marty Boarding School, and was physically beaten and sexually abused by a priest in the same manner as Adele Zephier. 

    d. Plaintiff, Lloyd B. One Star, attended the St. Francis Board School in South Dakota, on the Rosebud reservation. He was physically beaten and sexually abused from the age of 6 to age 10 by multiple priests and nuns, which included oral sex and sodomy. He was threatened physically by the priests if he told about the abuse. He was beaten and tortured continuously for a week, including head slappings and paddlings, for telling his father about the abuse. 

    e. Plaintiff, Edna Little Elk, attended the St. Francis Boarding School on the Rosebud reservation in the period 1921-24. She was locked in an attic for days because she did not speak English. She was beaten and stripped by both nuns and priests. She witnessed her cousin, Zona Iron Shell, beaten to death in front of her. She also witnessed other girls being sexually fondled by priests. 

    f. Plaintiff, Christine Medicine Horn, attended the St. Pauls Boarding School at Marty. Because she did not speak English, she was thrown down a three-story laundry chute. She was also stuffed in a trash can and locked in an incinerator for not speaking English. She was forced to strip to her underwear, when she was whipped with a leather strap. 

    g. Plaintiff, Lois L. Long, attended the Holy Rosary Boarding School in the Pine Ridge Reservation. Because she was left-handed, her educator accused her of Satanism and attempted to “cure” her by tying her left hand which caused permanent physical injuries. She was repeatedly stripped and beaten by nuns. During baths, the nuns would fondle her and attempt to “wash the devil out” of her. 

    After memories of their alleged abuse resurfaced, the sisters joined Bernie v Blue Cloud Abbey, a class action suit that was a consolidation of eighteen cases. In 2010, days before the case was scheduled to go to trial, the South Dakota Statute of Limitations (SOL) for childhood sexual assault (SDCL 26-10-25) was amended to bar claims against entity defendants after plaintiffs reach the age of 40. (Recall that the average of disclosure for cases of childhood sexual assault is 52 and the median age is 48.) 

    The amended SOL was drafted and introduced by Steven Smith, a lawyer for the Congregation of the Priests of the Sacred Heart, the religious order that operates St. Joseph’s Indian school. At the time the bill was drafted, Smith was the lawyer for the defendants in about a dozen pending cases of abuse alleged to have occurred at St. Joseph’s Indian School. The judge applied the new statute of limitations retroactively, and dismissed the case. About the amended SOL and the judge’s decision to retroactively apply it just days before the suit went to trial, Joelle Casteix, western regional director of Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, observed to WOMENSENEWS: “you bet the South Dakota legislation was designed to keep Native American lawsuits out of the courts. The Church has a hard time defending itself because it has the proof. It keeps a paper trail on sexual-abuse complaints.” And indeed during discovery for the case letters surfaced in which, for example, Abbot Thomas Hillebrand wrote to a victim and former student, in November 2008, “[Denis Quinkert] does know that he was going through a crisis in his vocation and a deep struggle with his own sexuality. And he is deeply sorry for the hurt that he caused you…. The favor that I want to ask is that you do not mention that incident outside of the sacrament of Confession. It causes a lot of damages to his character and sets off all sorts of alarms in the official Church.” 

    Every year since 2010, the Charbonneau sisters and their families return to South Dakota to lobby for a change in legislation that would allow them to bring their case to trial. In 2015 Michelle Dauphinais Echols drafted an amendment to the South Dakota SOL which would permit the sisters to reopen their claim and allow other survivors to bring forward their claims as well. The bill failed. After conversations with opponents of her original amendment, Dauphinais Echols drafted a new proposal which, if passed, would create a two-to- three year loophole in the 2010 Statute of Limitations, during which time plaintiffs would be permitted to bring their case to court. This bill failed as well. In 2018 Dauphinais Echols created the advocacy group 9littlegirls, dedicated to bringing awareness to child sexual abuse and to pursuing justice and healing. Every year she and her cousins, with bipartisan support from South Dakota representatives, present the bill to the legislature, and every year it is defeated. 

    II 

    A person raped can never be unraped. They will have those scars inside themselves until they die. The sisters’ pain is the silent, festering pain of overlooked people. It is not exquisite, glamorous, articulate, or redemptive. Nobody marches to denounce it. They suffer in obscurity, and the obscurity, the indifference of their surroundings to their story, compounds the suffering. They live with their understanding of all that was done to them and all that has not been done for them. 

    We have been taught that the knowledge of tragedy can transform societies. There are victims, such as Raphael Lemkin, coiner of the term “genocide,” who are able to salvage dignity from their personal tragedies by forcing others to be transformed by their experiences and the knowledge they managed to harvest from them. Lemkin, whose mother, father, and forty-seven other relatives were killed in Treblinka in 1943, dedicated most of his life to this effort. But there is nothing about victimhood that confers a capacity to do such work. The general truth is that tragic circumstances do not make ordinary people into extraordinary people. And people with the internal resources to bring tragedy eloquently and affectingly to our attention are rarer than tragedy itself. There were the slaves and there was Frederick Douglass. It is not the responsibility of a victim to know how to make use of her pain or give it lasting voice. Pain grants no wisdom, only the need for it. 

    No consolation will come to the nine sisters, but their stories should be known anyway. There are practical reasons for this, and I will list and explain them, but first I must say that the primary effect of their story is to explode our faith in happy endings. By telling their story or arguing for reform we can fulfill the duties of ethical beings and that is some comfort, but the sisters are themselves beyond the reach of solace. For them, the horror is irreversible. It is essential that we grasp this about all victims of atrocity — we must understand the aftermath in which they are condemned to live. 

    The South Dakota legislature will not give these sisters their day in court, and even if they did, the law still would have little capacity to enforce justice in their case. The scars will stay, they are indelible. The cultural genocide will not be undone, despite the astonishing power of Native cultures to sustain and to flourish. In 1975 St. Paul’s School, like many of these institutions, was transferred from the church to tribal control and became Marty Indian School. There is no one left even to punish. The alleged rapists and sadists are long dead: their mortality, and popular indifference, protected them. There should be monuments in the streets in South Dakota commemorating the horrors that were done there. High school students throughout this country should know the disgraceful history of these boarding schools. But if all this were to happen, by some social miracle, still justice would not be done. The wounded will remain the wounded. 

    And we do not have the luxury of saying that we tell these stories to stop evils like them from happening again. Our cultural obsession with utility, our impulse to respond always with practical steps, misleads us. This will happen again. Such horrors will be repeated. We know too much about human nature to believe only in human goodness, and in the efficacy of historical lessons. One of the essential characteristics of humankind is that it contains evil. There will always be evil people, and many of them will escape punishment, and there will always be an overwhelming majority of disinterested onlookers, a mass of unmoved movers, who will facilitate that evasion. 

    In this story the onlookers play a particularly disturbing part. After all, as people like to say, the story is complicated. Not all the students were brutalized. Many enjoyed their time at the Native boarding schools. Should the alleged tragedies of some overshadow the normalcy of others? Many Native survivors with the strength to seek justice are asked this question. Why soil the reputation of whole groups and whole institutions by making them known only for their crimes? Aren’t they much more than the darkness they harbor? These are questions that have been asked also about the rapes and abuses that were perpetrated against other students at different sorts of schools in America. The question is basically an invitation to lie or to look away, and in so doing to damage the victims and distort the history still further. In the protracted wrestling with these issues in many Catholic dioceses in America, the path of truth was eventually chosen. If children in Boston deserve truth and protection, so do children in South Dakota. Perhaps we feel awkward about intruding upon the privacy of another community, but all ethical criticism and action is a kind of intrusion. 

    Most victims will not be rescued, and their aftermath will stretch on, and those who could have saved them, or ameliorated their conditions, but did not, will not be absolved of complicity. Yet we must be careful not to tell these stories in order to absolve ourselves. The act of telling the story redeems no one — not us, not the victims. The tales may increase the ethical sensitivities of the hearers — or they may be treated only as stories, a passing disturbance of our minds with a beginning and an end, a structure which has the effect of abrogating shock. As an incentive to change, narrativity’s power may be exaggerated. These stories must be inducted into our national collective memory, alongside every other significant episode in our national history, the magnificent and the repugnant, for another reason: because America should know what America is. 

    There is a pop-therapeutic axiom that talking through pain or anxiety will diminish its power. Americans believe in the salvific power of speech. One long heart-to-heart and the world is already a better place. Let’s talk it out. That platitude is actually a sugary dilution of The Talking Cure, which has an interesting origin. It was first conceived by Bertha Pappenheim and inducted into our lexicon by Freud, who included hers as the first of six case studies in Studies on Hysteria. But it is worth noting that Pappenheim did not talk through her pain in the way that contemporary mental health advocates seem to think she did. She found, in consultation with her doctor, Josef Breuer, that her somatic disorders — headaches, partial paralyses, loss of sensation — would begin to weaken if she could recall aloud to him the repressed traumas and emotions related to the initial manifestations of each symptom. This process has little to do with let’s talk it out, with the theory that assumes that there is something inherently healing for a survivor about telling others their stories. Pappenheim wanted Breuer to fix the symptoms of a wound that itself could not be fixed. She wanted respite, not consolation or redemption. And respite was the most that the discursive therapeutic setting could offer her. 

    Talking it out is not always healing. It certainly has not been so for the Charbonneaus. Recalling their childhood, which they had for years done their best to forget, is excrucating for them. Silence is a natural reaction to the experience of horror, and a dignified one. Within the Native American community, the sisters are among many who have withdrawn into silence. Children of the survivors of the Native boarding schools were told by their parents not to go looking for clues about what happened in those places. Often this silence is an expression of shame, which many of these descendants say colored their childhoods, and was bequeathed to them. The shame makes the heavy memory heavier. 

    Some say it is fatal. The sisters who survive her believe that Louise Charbonneau, who died suddenly in 2020, just three weeks before she and her sisters planned to return to the South Dakota Legislature once again, could not bear to retell her story. They say that the looming burden, the annual pilgrimage back in time, hastened her death. During testimony for the proposed amendment, Geraldine told the legislators: “I feel the Creator took her home so she didn’t have to come here again, so she didn’t have to be raped all over again by your ‘no’ vote.” Is it ever a victim’s responsibility to relive her trauma? 

    In cases of atrocity, it is essential that the onlookers, and not just the victims, bear the burden of remembering. For over two centuries, since Carlisle’s founding, these stories have remained outside our national collective memory. It is a moral imperative that this willed amnesia be cured — not just among the tribes, and not just in South Dakota and North Dakota, and all the other states in which the boarding schools stood. These atrocities deserve to be incorporated into the shared past of the country, out of respect for the humanity that was desecrated and as an impediment to future desecrations. I say impediment advisedly. Collective memory, and even historical knowledge, certainly cannot preclude the recurrence of injustice. One of the saddest and most erroneous claims of the post-Holocaust sensitivity to atrocity is its confidence that the remembrance of past evil will prevent future evil. Survivors and victims bet a lot on the power of memory to dissuade people from violent action. But by now we ought to know better. “Never Again” did not prevent Bosnia, or Rwanda, or Syria. The destruction of the concentration camps built for Jews in Europe did not prevent the construction of the concentration camps built for Uighurs in Xinjiang today. 

    Evils must be remembered by people to whom they did not happen. We must remember other people’s histories. It is reasonable to wonder whether people can remember things that they have not experienced. Doesn’t that defy the nature of individual memory? But we do so all the time. We call this ubiquitous and mysterious phenomenon collective memory. Descendants of slaves never experienced slavery, and yet they are right to say that they remember it. The children of Holocaust survivors never experienced the Holocaust, and yet they are right to say that they remember it. It is possible to achieve great proximity to the experiences of other people. 

    In order to remember what did not happen to you, you have to immerse yourself so completely in the knowledge of the past that an inner intimacy with it is achieved and it takes on the sensation of personal acquaintance. The instrument of this intimacy, of this acquaintance, is the imagination — not the imagination of fantasy but the imagination of fact. Every year on Passover every Jew is enjoined to conceive of herself “as if she herself had left Egypt” two thousand years before her birth. That “as if” is the ancient rabbinical euphemism for the imagination. Even remembering episodes of one’s own group’s history is a creative exercise which requires an imaginative leap. The imagination is an ethical instrument. It has to be such: if the only evils one could conceive, abhor, and fight are those one has experienced oneself, then fortunate people would be useless against injustice. Which, for this reason, they often are. 

    The women of Olga, North Dakota are not like anyone I have ever known. Their personal histories are quite alien to me. We are children of different Americas, and I have no natural understanding, based on my own life history, of how these Ojibwe women lived and what they endured and how they interpreted it, though it may be easier for me to incorporate their stories into my collective memory because my own tradition supplied a training course in the importance of such strenuous empathy. (I have thought many times while researching the story of the Charbonneaus that the Jewish tradition’s emphasis on memory was essential preparation for this work.) But despite the differences between us, the distance in space and in background, the emphatic otherness, these women have haunted me, have been with me, since that night three years ago.

    In the space of an evening, I went from knowing almost nothing about these stories to becoming familiar with myriad specific details, and then to imagining minutes and hours that occurred decades ago in strange places where I have never been. By becoming aware of them, and by extension of all the men and women like the nine sisters whose lives were permanently mutilated by similar ordeals, these stories became in some sense also mine. I say this humbly. Again, I am not like them, and I have not suffered anything like what they have suffered. But it would be wrong to turn away from them for that reason, to invoke “alterity” and try to forget what I have learned. Difference should not be an excuse for indifference. If one does the work of study and imagination, the arduous and respectful work, then the gulf can be adequately traversed — certainly enough to impose moral and social and political responsibilities. Strangely, solemnly, in ways totally unlike the victims and their communities, I remember. They are a part of me. Now they are a part of you. 

    “The Wise, Too, Shed Tears”

    I

    How close to the world can one be? How far from the world should one be? Those questions represent two mentalities, two doctrines — the aspiration to nearness, the suspicion of nearness; engagement as a form of strength, engagement as a form of weakness; the hunger for reality, the horror of reality; the nobility of belonging, the nobility of alienation. We begin with the world and we end with it, and we spend our mortal interval ascertaining what to do about the relation, and how to get it right. There are some who draw close because they seek pleasure, or because they seek pain; there are some who fear pain, or fear pleasure, and pull away. Charity, and moral action, demands proximity, but proximity also narrows and deceives and corrupts — and immoral action requires it, too. Beauty enchants, and absorbs, and overwhelms, but it is not obvious that the dissolution of the self is its highest fulfillment, or that sublimity is our best level. And love — does anything imperil the heart more? Love, the commonplace miracle, is the cradle of anxiety; its fragility casts a shadow over the very happiness that it confers. The truly happy man, it would seem, is the man who lives only in the present and alone, which is to say, the man who is without a father or a mother, a son or a daughter, a lover or a spouse or a friend, which is to say, almost no man, really. A man with a memory is hardly alone. Even solitariness is a kind of social relation, which may be refined into solitude. The world comes with terms.

    One of the greatest satisfactions in the history of philosophy is the inconsistency, even the hypocrisy, of the Stoics. For as long as I have studied them, I have quarreled with them. Like the late Tolstoy, they get into your head. The Stoics were meticulous students of human breakability and raised it into a subject for philosophy. Nobody in the West ever pondered more rigorously the actualities of pain. The integrity of their ideal — tranquility of mind achieved by the stilling of strong feelings — is incontrovertible. Who lives too serenely? And incontrovertible, too, is their portrait of the assault of the world upon the soul, and of the soul’s consequent dispersal by stimulations and attachments. Experience is the enemy of composure; poise must be wrested from circumstance; we are taught by being troubled. When I encounter equanimity, then, I feel envy. And yet I have always believed that the price of Stoic equanimity may be too high. The virtue that it recommends is achieved by an ordeal of paring down and stripping away and pulling back that looks to me like a process of dehumanization. What is the self-sufficient self, if not the self that exaggerates its own resources? Where is the line between self-sufficiency and self-satisfaction? This is why the inconsistencies of the Stoics delight me, why I even gloat in their failures. And this is why the literature of Stoicism — and of Pyrrhonism and Epicureanism — is riddled, when read closely, with exceptions to the lofty rule of wise retirement.

    Stilpo was a philosopher in Megara in the late fourth and early third centuries B.C.E. and the teacher of Zeno, the Cypriot thinker who founded Stoicism. Seneca relates that “Stilpo’s homeland fell to invaders; his children were lost, his wife was lost, and he alone survived the destruction of his people. Yet he emerged happy; and when Demetrius, who was called Poliorcetes, or City-Sacker, asked him whether he lost anything, he replied: ‘All my goods are with me.’” Seneca extols him for thinking that “nothing is good which can be taken away.” He “conquered even his enemy’s conquest. ‘I have lost nothing’, he said. How amazing is this man, who escaped fire, sword, and devastation, not only without injury but even without loss!” Nothing is good that can be taken away: was this man a saint of indifference or a monster of indifference? There are other testimonies, other ancient exempla, equally stirring or shocking, in praise of imperturbability. The father of this tradition of virtuous passivity was Pyrrho, who began as a painter and founded the school known as Skepticism (which is not to be confused with skepticism). He outfitted indifference with an epistemology. In the company of his teacher Anaxarchus, he travelled to India with Alexander the Great, where no doubt he encountered Eastern varieties of philosophical quietism. It is said that Anaxarchus once fell into a ditch and Pyrrho walked right past him, without any offer of assistance, as evidence of his immunity to attachment. Diogenes Laertius relates that when Pyrrho was attacked by a dog and recoiled in fright, he apologized for his panic, pleading that “it was difficult entirely to strip away human nature,” which was otherwise his goal. According to Diogenes, Pyrrho’s principled obliviousness was perfect: “avoiding nothing, taking no precautions, facing everything as it came, whether wagons, cliffs, or dogs.” 

    The problem with Pyrrho’s extraordinary consistency is not only that it was fanatical, and like all fanaticism intellec-tually facile. It was also a little fraudulent: Diogenes further reports that “he was kept safe, as Antigonus of Carystus says, by the friends who accompanied him.” A detachment of attached people to protect his detachment. How could they stand him? Places, everybody! Pyrrho needs to be alone! A reputation for holiness is the best protection. The conclusion that must be drawn from Pyrrho’s amusing arrangement is that the values of apatheia, or freedom from strong feeling, and of ataraxia, or tranquillity of mind, the magnificent ideals of the ancient proponents of withdrawal and placidity, are not magnificent after all; or if they are magnificent, they are not practicable; or if they are practicable, they are premised on the worldly involvements of others, on a surrounding population of perturbables. The sight of equanimity should inspire not only envy, then, but also doubt. Seneca produced his elevating letters to Lucilius in the same years in which he stooped to the lowest court politics in Rome, with catastrophic results. Was he a hypocrite, or merely a human?

    There were thinkers who codified the inconsistencies of the wise man and conceptually extenuated his philosophically embarrassing needs. In his life of Zeno, Diogenes offers a brief analysis on the ways in which objects and qualities may be classified as indifferent. “Of indifferent things they say that some are preferred, others rejected. The preferred have value, whereas the rejected lack value.” The delicious notion of preferred indifferents is the backdoor through which the commitments of existence re-enter the Stoic life. “Of the preferred things, some are preferred for their own sake, others for the sake of something else, and still others both for their own sake and for the sake of something else.” It is hard not to smile at this casuistry of humaneness. There is something affecting about its intellectually tortured way of rehabilitating imperfection and vindicating the unlikelihood of a complete escape from the human muddle.

    The preferred indifferents include other people. Whereas Epictetus warns that the good supersedes all ties of kinship, and Cicero argues against Camus that parricide is justifiable because the son of a tyrant may “prefer the well-being of his fatherland over that of his father,” and Seneca cites approvingly the case of a good man who murdered his own sons, there is in Stoic writings a kind of creeping reconnection of the sage to others, a restoration of the human bonds that have just been deplored, a recognition of the intrinsic value of certain social relationships. Having been demoted as impediments to the development of the rational and virtuous individual — Philo of Alexandria, in one of his least Jewish moments, declares that a man who takes a wife and has children “has passed from freedom to slavery” — there is ample discussion of the merits of marriage, on the assumption that, in the words of scripture, it is not good for man to be alone. The proper qualities for a spouse are deliberated upon, and fertility is not primary among them. Arius Didymus, also of Alexandria, who was Augustus’ teacher, stated that the sage should marry and have children because “these things follow from the nature of a rational animal designed for community and mutual affection.” It would appear that we have left behind the war on worry. 

    So detachment is not all, and disruptions of serenity are admitted. The sociable Stoic: is he a contradiction, or one of culture’s great tributes to complexity? In the literature of friendship, certainly, the Stoics are among the founders. Friends are highly preferred indifferents; they are even instances of the good. Many eloquent passages could be cited. Seneca writes to Lucilius with passion about this passion, thereby doubling the sin. “The wise person loves his friends very deeply,” he says, explicitly joining wisdom to emotion. He calls the Stoic sage an “artist at friend-making” and proclaims “the grandeur of friendship.” He is offended by friendship that is based on expedience or utility. “What brings [the wise man] to friendship is not his own expediency but a natural instinct.” Seneca’s description of the motive for friendship is not only rational, it is almost romantic: “Why make a friend? To have someone I can die for, someone I can accompany into exile, someone whose life I can save, even by laying down my own.” The world has its hooks in this man. Not for him a callous walk past that ditch. And more: “One could even say that love is a friendship gone mad.” (One could also say that friendship is a love gone sane.) “Friendship is choice-worthy in itself,” Seneca explains, “and if friendship is choice-worthy in itself, then it is possible for one who is self-sufficient to pursue it.” A splendid result. In my tradition this sort of category-split-ting, of dialectical rigging, is known, not altogether favorably, as pilpul — but this is pilpul against the impoverishment of life, pagan pilpul, beautiful pilpul. One of the purposes of pilpul was anyway to make life more livable.

    The self-sufficient individual with needs and with bonds: this is not an anchorite dream, and it harbors no longing for the desert. Do such individuals exist? The truth is that the streets may be full of them, in differing degrees of inner strength and outer connection; not sages, exactly, but men and women surprised by events and beset by hardships and summoning the reason and the solidarity that is necessary to endure them, fighting off fear and struggling with dread, ordering feelings or choosing a dignified way not to order them, reckoning with the limitations of their wills, ruefully noticing transience, answering to some conception of the good life; not Stoics, exactly, but neither thoughtless nor helpless, and not without the capabilities of self-possession, and of understanding, and of courage. Here is Seneca’s characterization of the Stoic at home: “He is self-sufficient, and yet takes a wife; self-sufficient, and yet raises children; self-sufficient, and yet would not live at all if it meant living without other people.”  

    The ataraxic hearth? At this point the reasonableness of the picture becomes irksome, and the initial radicalism of the recommended discipline begins to seem implausible. Can the Stoic have it all? Is no significant renunciation necessary? If nothing is good that can be taken away, how can family and friendship be good? For they will be taken away from me as surely as I will be taken away from them. The original objection against the dependency of human affections, the warning against caring, is still valid: it is indubitably an invitation to pain. Good morning, heartache, sit down. Loss is the end of the story of every bond, and also the condition of its urgency. Eternal life, were it possible, would be no guarantee of eternal love, because eternity is the enemy of love. In our enthrallment to our vision of the good life, have we forgotten what we know about the lived life? There are not many things we can confidently foretell about the future, but it is safe to prophesy that it holds bitterness. It holds bitterness because it holds loss. Loves and friendships provide the specifications of our eventual bereavements.

    This is morbid, but every effort to prepare for mortality is morbid. For this reason, one of the central exertions of Stoic spirituality is the attempt to separate bitterness from loss — to preempt sorrow with reflection. “The wise person,” Seneca writes, “is not afflicted by the loss of children or of friends, because he endures their death in the same spirit as he awaits his own. He does not fear the one any more than he grieves over the other.”  For “all anxiety and worry is dishonorable.” Dishonorable! I scan those words and I grant the rationality in them. It may be that one day I will be able to regard the prospect of my own death with equanimity, not only so as to die freely, as the philosophers say, but also so as to find the words and the glances that will ease the sorrow of my mourners. But the death of my family and the death of my friends? I cannot do this. I will not do this. I will mourn. It is the failure to mourn that is dishonorable: a treason, a misrepresentation. The abrogation of grief by reason looks to me like the violation of a duty, and like an imperialism of reason. My tears will flow as a sort of somatic entailment, a physical proof, of my interrupted attachment. Perhaps I am soft, or insufficiently logical; or it may be that I hold a different view. 

    I was rudely thrown into these matters when, in the space of a week, two of my most preferred indifferents, two of my most cherished friends, died.

    II

    I met Adam Zagajewski in Paris three decades or so ago and it was love at first sight, or at least at first sound. Since that lucky day our conversation was constant, in every medium, until last spring, when he selfishly died. We were introduced by Tzvetan Todorov, a mutual friend, a sterling man with a soft, hopeful voice and curly silver hair, a radical who became a liberal, a Maoist who became a humanist, a rarity. Tzvetan and Adam and the American poet C.K., or Charlie, Williams were a circle of fellowship and cultivation in Paris, all of them expatriates, all of them serious but none of them earnest, offering ideas the way people used to offer cigarettes, sharing new work, merrily mocking cant, scouring the world for things to admire. They did me the honor of allowing me in, and Joseph Frank too, Dostoevsky’s sweet and bearish and masterly biographer: Charlie once joked that Joe and I were corresponding members of the little academy. 

    Adam was the first person I ever met who disliked Paris: except for Tzvetan and Charlie and a few others, almost all of them gone now, Adam was lonely there, and his poems were not read. It was in Paris that we began our history of walks — of the reveries of unsolitary walkers, in Paris and in Krakow and in Amsterdam and in Chicago and in New York. We wandered aimlessly, talking and laughing and reciting — “poems from poems, songs/ from songs, paintings from paintings,/ always this friendly/ impregnation…”  There was usually a museum on our itineraries. Once we had three whole hours together at the Rijksmuseum, which under each other’s influence became an afternoon of shared trances. I recall how we stood before Vermeer’s milkmaid, transfixed in a unitary focus upon the gentle pour of milk from her pitcher to her bowl, which is the heroic action of the picture, the spill leaving the red clay above in a delicate spout-shaped triangle and becoming a sure white line, a gentle vertical crux, as it falls into the red clay below. We agreed that this small passage was nothing less than a portrait of time. This most humble of scenes broached this least humble of subjects. We watched the liquid flow but not move, and we agreed that the painter had found a retort to Heraclitus’ river. Then we walked on, in a happy aesthetic daze, and trained ourselves on the stupendous facture in The Jewish Bride (now properly re-named Isaac and Rebecca), perhaps the greatest parcel of painted canvas in the world. In unison we were utterly bored by the notion that what Rembrandt had accomplished was an exciting anticipation of abstraction. For us the excitement lay in the fact that the glittering mess of pigments before our eyes was a representation. At Adam’s request, I recited a few verses of the story of Isaac and Rebecca in Hebrew, for the music of it, a story that is noteworthy because the furtive sex that it depicts is not forbidden; it is secret, but it is not illicit. The secret is that the lovers are husband and wife. A wholesome scandal, we chuckled, and strolled to the next gallery. (Years later Adam wrote to me: “The Rijksmuseum: I remember exactly those beautiful moments in front of the masterpieces. Very elitist.”) 

    The walks I treasured the most were in Krakow, because Adam lived there. I came once to give a lecture in memory of Czeslaw Milosz at the Jewish Cultural Center, which was run by a kind soul named Joachim Russek, a “righteous Gentile” if ever there was one. It was located in Kazimierz, the old Jewish district that is home to a large and venerable population of ghosts. One afternoon I was drawn by the window of an antiques shop on Josefa Street, which had been the main thoroughfare of the neighborhood, but I fled the shop immediately when I realized whose salons those elegant objects had once adorned. I was especially glad to have Adam’s company, because my trip was a disquieting one: a few days after my lecture I was to cross the border at Przemysl into Ukraine and visit my parents’ hometowns, in the region of Galicia that is soaked with my family’s blood. I needed a friend. 

    The subject of my lecture was Jewish messianism, which I had been studying for a long time and arriving at unconventional conclusions, and Adam was in attendance. After the lecture we set out across the city and he wanted to know more about a distinction that I had made between the messianic predicament of the Jews and the messianic predicament of the Christians. For the Jews, I said, the problem is that the redeemer does not arrive and the world stays the same; but for the Christians, the problem is that the redeemer did arrive and the world stays the same. They each have theological traditions of adjusting to the eschatological flaws in their respective situations. I suggested that I preferred what the Jews do not yet know to what the Christians already know. Who wants to wake up the morning after redemption? The coffee will still have to be made. The internet will be ablaze with the advent, but injustice will still abound and banality will still threaten everything. Adam wondered whether this was not similar to a dilemma that we had been discussing for years, which we called “after ecstasy.” It was a dilemma broached by mysticism and by eros and by music — by Mahler especially, for Adam. How can Mahler’s Ninth Symphony, that monument to the limitless-ness of yearning, end? How dare it end? And in what spirit does one breathe when it is over? Can memory adequately contain ecstasy? Or does the quest for ecstasy doom us to a grim alternative between frustration and repetition, with its deadening consequences, the way the search for love can come to ruin in chastity or promiscuity? By now we were in the rynek, the city’s grand square. The hour was late and it was deserted; the open market, where I had been dismayed, but not surprised, to discover tiny wooden figures of Jews with a beard and a penny attached to them, was gone, and the cafes were closed. “Do you want to visit the ermine tomorrow?” Adam cheerfully asked.

    I wanted to visit the ermine. In a small museum that houses the various collections of the aristocratic Czartoryski family, there hangs a strange and important picture by Leonardo called The Lady with the Ermine. The weasel-like creature held closely by the noble lady is an allegory for certain virtues, and the painting had many adventures during the world wars. But it was not the main event for the morning. There was something else that Adam wanted to show me, an object that for him was the secular equivalent of a religious relic. We walked over to the Collegium Maius, which is the museum of the Jagellonian University, where we visited a stuffy green room in the middle of which stood, in bright wood on a bright wooden floor, one of Chopin’s pianos. He used it on a concert tour of Scotland in 1847, and he inscribed his name inside it. If Adam had a god, it was Chopin. He always pronounced the name with reverence. He found the cosmos in Chopin’s pieces. He had highly developed views about the interpreters; I never squandered an opportunity to listen to any interpretation with him; I learned so much. Ekphrasis is the ancient literary technique of making poetry out of painting, by describing in verse a particular work of visual art. Adam was an ekphrastic poet — I especially adore his poem about Morandi — but the inspiring art was usually music. Ut musica poesis. When he died, at a wretched loss for how to grieve for him, I began to listen to Chopin, and Schubert, and Scarlatti, over and over again, with a ritual intensity, and Bach (“das Wolhtemperierte,” he exclaimed in an email, “it’s the whole world”), and Chopin again, and all the Edwin Fischer I could find, until I began to feel not only that I was listening for him, that I would be his ears the way we had together been each other’s eyes, but also that I was consoling the composers for his loss. The poor bereft geniuses, they will never be heard by him again.

    We left the holy piano for a leisurely walk in the Planty Gardens, one of the largest parks in Krakow, which traces the contours of the medieval walls of the old city. Here, too, I was haunted: I have a photograph of my parents in the Planty Gardens in 1945, immediately after their liberation. My father briskly wears a Polish officer’s uniform and my mother, an elegant woman even when shattered, appears in a smart dark coat with a hat tilted stylishly above her graciously smiling face. They had been in hell only months before. Now they were living under fictitious names, my father masquer-ading as a military man, because it was dangerous for Jews to become known to their Russian liberators; and when someone recognized my father on a reviewing stand and threatened to inform on him, they jumped a train and left the curse that was Poland. I told Adam the story, and our conversation turned to an early poem in which he compared Celan’s “Deathfugue” to Bach’s St. Matthew Passion, until finally we arrived at our next destination, which was Boguslawskiego Street. Milosz had lived and died in an apartment in number 6, and Adam had arranged for us to visit it. 

    He gave me a great gift. That huge man, that giant redwood of a man, that man of infinite and indestructible spirit, that writer before whom tyrants eventually fell, that poet who wrote imperishably about the burning of the Warsaw Ghetto from the other side of the ghetto wall —  he had been both our friend. Adam was his spiritual son. I earned Czeslaw’s friendship in 1981 with a piece in The New Republic, of blessed memory, in which I was harshly critical of certain American intellectuals who were advising the American government to do nothing about General Jaruzelski’s crackdown on Solidarity, and our friendship lasted until he was too weak to pick up a pen. His flat was as small as he was large. His slippers were still in place, and some of his books still stood next to his nondescript desk; and on a wall in the living room was a painting by his old friend Josef Czapski, who survived the Katyn massacre to become a profound painter, a profound writer, and by all accounts a saint. (The last gift I received from Adam, only a few months before he died, was a handsome monograph on Czapski’s art, to which he contributed one of the finest essays he ever wrote.) From the apartment we found our way to the Basilica of St. Michael the Archangel, specif-ically to its crypt, one of Poland’s pantheons, where Czeslaw is buried. Adam asked a stranger to take a photograph of us standing next to the heavy marble sarcophagus. On our faces is an unmistakable look of gratitude.

    “Now again in Krakow, trying to encourage my soul to emerge from its hiding place.” “The London Derek Walcott evening was very moving, but of course a soccer match would draw a hundred thousand more people.” “The other day I heard the first Violin Concerto by Shostakovitch by the Krakow Philharmonic. And then you remember how he waited for the NKVD by the elevator.” “I’m writing again (I attach a recent elegy for Charlie) and I keep my anger alive, the anger at our stupid nationalistic government. Instead of Lenin and Stalin we now have Mary, Jesus, and Pilsudski.” “I know that not everyone is keen on spiritual life. I noticed it some time ago and I can still barely believe it.” “My voice is gone and my higher mind too. Do you ever have weeks when your higher mind disappears? But what a joy when it returns.” And there were the inscriptions: “to my younger brother, able to combine wit and metaphysics (what’s better than that?)…”; “to my brother in the seeking business…” Every word I ever had from Adam, in his letters and in his books, no matter how sad or dour, was fortifying. As in his poems, so in his emails: he had an uncanny way of mingling the lyrical with the mordant, the magically dreamed with the keenly observed, the fanciful with the true, the elegiac with the risible. It was all done without raising his voice, even in his courageous anti-communist essays of the late 1960s and early 1970s. He spoke slowly, as if to leave time for his meaning to reach you before his irony. He loved mystery but he hated obscurity. His work carried the patrimony of European humanism into an allegedly post-humanist era. He was crazy about Billie Holiday. He was a great boon for the seeking business.

    III

    I met Larry McMurtry in 1989, at the public meeting of solidarity and protest that PEN tardily organized in New York in support of Salman Rushdie, who had recently gone into hiding to escape the fatwa against his novel and his life. I say tardily, because in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian outrage against freedom and literature many of the literary titans of the city were scared into silence, flattering themselves that sleeper agents were coming for them too, as if the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic had strong feelings about, say, Billy Bathgate. Rushdie’s publisher was also running for cover. But finally the event did take place, in an empty store-front not far from PEN’s offices at Broadway and Prince. The space filled quickly; people spilled out into the street. The cramped and rushed scene suited the emergency, which was real. The speakers included Sontag, who was president of PEN at the time, Mailer, Doctorow, Diana Trilling, Said, Talese (who bizarrely chose to honor the moment by reciting the Lord’s Prayer, which was sort of what had gotten us into this mess), McMurtry, and myself. When it was over, Larry came over to me and said: “You’re in Washington and I’m in Washington. Come to the bookshop next week.”

    The bookshop was Booked Up, one of four antiquarian bookstores that Larry owned around the country. He was not only a writer, he was also a “bookman”; he was narcotically addicted to books, high and low, old and new, he loved unpacking them and shelving them and pricing them and reading them and writing them, all in great numbers. His personal library in Archer City, Texas held more than thirty thousand volumes, and was a personal library, that is, the books on those floor-to-ceiling shelves were, in their genres and their subjects, expressions only of what most interested him. A library is not a bookstore. A true library excludes things, because nobody can care about everything. Nobody should care about everything. Larry had the entirety of the bibliographical map in his head, but he lived most fully in certain precincts of it. In Georgetown, Booked Up occupied both corners of Wisconsin and 31st Street. There were treasures there. The ones that moved me most were original copies of Mont-St. Michel and Chartres and The Education of Henry Adams, privately printed in the first years of the twentieth century by their increasingly incandescent author, in a large format bound in blue cloth, legendary books, and both of them signed by their author, the greatest writer who ever lived in the capital. The signatures themselves told the story of Adams’ last years: the first in a confident hand, the second in a hand that shook with the results of a stroke. I recall that each of them was priced in five figures, though I never believed that Larry, or his shrewd and charming partner Marcia Carter, would sell them.

    For me, they glowed in the dark. So did other volumes, some of which I was able to afford by the kindness of the house: the 1669 edition of Thomas Browne, complete with portrait and quincunx and urns, and the jewel-like first edition of The Black Riders and Other Lines by Stephen Crane, published in Boston in 1895, a book the size of your hand, its verses printed all in capital letters, its cover decadently illustrated by a black vine creeping across the cream-colored boards. Over the years Larry generously sent me books that reminded him of my obsessions, usually as they came out of the boxes which libraries and collectors had shipped to him. The most spectacular offering of all was Eliezer ben Yehuda’s vast dictionary, in eight huge volumes, of the “modern and ancient” Hebrew language, which he began to publish in 1910, complete with its “Great Introduction.” I was a little delirious when I saw the spines. This was the epic work of erudition and fanaticism that re-established — no, established, since no Jew ever spoke Hebrew before Ben Yehuda the way an entire Jewish society spoke Hebrew after Ben Yehuda — the language of the Jewish people. “I figure if you can’t use this, you’ll know someone who needs it,” Larry’s letter said. “Me in my role as the Last Bookman.” He went on to lament the decline of the trade in his time. “It’s come down to me, Peter Howard, and Bill Resse. When this generation wastes….”

    Anyway, we agreed to meet at Booked Up in Georgetown the following week. He was waiting for me at the bottom of the rickety metal staircase that ran up the side of the building to the second-floor entrance. He was holding a key. “This is for you”, he said and placed it in my hand. “You might need a place to write. I write on the second floor. Your desk is on the third.” He was like that. The place became my lair, especially when Larry was in town. He worked and slept in a tiny room just off Philosophy and Theology, with a small writing table and a monk’s bed. The clacking of his old typewriter downstairs rattled me, but not because of the noise. It was the reproving sound of his preternatural productivity. As I sat above him pondering the shape of an essay, or more often, losing myself in another book that I found on another shelf, the typed pages were piling high on his desk below — novel after novel, Some Can Whistle, tap tap tap, The Evening Star, tap tap tap,  The Streets of Laredo, tap tap tap, Duane’s Depressed, tap tap tap. He had so many stories in him. More, he relished the company of his characters. To paraphrase the screenplay for which he accepted an Oscar in jeans, he didn’t know how to quit them. Sometimes we unpacked boxes together — I remember a long night excavating all of Huntington Cairns’ library, a humanist’s candy store. Like anyone who appreciates the erotics of browsing, I was helpless there. One night I went up to the roof for some air, only to find a wooden structure that contained the contents of the Phoenix, a renowned and recently shuttered poetry bookshop in Greenwich Village. It was there that I discovered, in many copies, The Platonic Blow by W.H. Auden, published in 1965 (without the poet’s permission, I later learned) by The Fuck You Press, a work with which I was not familiar. A man’s education never ends. 

    When Larry was invited to a fancy dinner in Georgetown or at the White House, he would return to Booked Up to write a hilarious account of what he had seen and heard — and in the morning I would find those anthropological reports from the field faxed to my office at my magazine. (Those were the days of glossy paper and fading ink, and I did not have the sense to copy them.) He was the most perspicacious fly on the wall who ever lived. If Larry was taciturn, it was usually because he was taking notes. About people, he missed nothing, as his novels show. He had Balzac’s appetite for types and temperaments. In the years when he was president of PEN — a cultural comedy of the first order, though he was diligent in his duties and they brought him east more often — Larry regaled me, usually at a French restaurant up the street over his favorite Montrachet, with his impressions of the solemnities of Manhattan. (Some of this delightful material appears in Literary Life: A Second Memoir.) These were followed by the inanities of Hollywood. The business of Washington rarely figured in our conversations; politics interested him only as another spectacle of human idiosyncrasy. We also pondered the devastating emotional effects of a heart operation that he underwent a few years after we became friends. He never completely escaped its shadow. 

    Yet our many meals together were also something else, for me: a long course in the American West. Larry was supremely a man of his place. He was a scholar of it; his text was the land and its vicissitudes, its people and their scars, which he knew with as much authority as any scholar I have ever known has ever known anything. I admired Larry for his immersion: it is good not only to come from somewhere, but to know well from where one comes. In the tradition of writers who are universal but not cosmopolitan, Larry’s corner of the earth sufficed to fascinate him forever. This is evident in his books: they are full of detail but they are not made of research, as so many American novels are. (Richly imagined, those novels are usually called.) Gore Vidal once said, about his novel Lincoln, that he would read the historians in the evening and write the chapter in the morning. Not Larry; he came fully and naturally prepared. The history, the geography, the mythologies, the facts: he commanded them all. About his subjects he was sovereign. This freed him for imaginative play and social criticism. He once wrote a little book called Walter Benjamin at the Dairy Queen in which he pretty much sided with the Dairy Queen.  

    At one of our dinners we were talking about Native Americans, and he was introducing me to the tribes of the Southwest and telling me what to read for further instruc-tion, when he came to the tale of an American scout, I think it was Kit Carson, who had a famous fight with an Indian chief. According to legend, they met in the middle of a creek and fought mano a mano until the American hero vanquished his opponent in a fine spirit of manifest destiny. “Well, the truth isn’t that,” Larry said. “The truth is that Carson waited for the Indian to show up and shot him in the back.” Manifest destiny, indeed. And then Larry added: “Which is exactly what he should have done.” I was startled, of course. But I learned some things about my friend from his laconic and unsentimental remark. There was nothing triumphalist about his defense of Carson’s ambush. Larry was a man without prejudice, and his down-to-the-ground Americanism was utterly devoid of the ugliness that mars American identity in his parts of the country. He merely understood that the world, and the West, is harsh, and he liked that the American scout knew the score. Larry once showed me an old photograph of the women in his family in Archer County a few generations back – I think it is reproduced in one of his books — because he wanted me to see the toll that life on that unforgiving territory had taken on their faces and their bodies. He had little patience with unreality and much patience with reality. 

    Larry admired many people but he idealized nobody. He was the sworn foe of Liberty Valance-ism: he never printed the legend. Instead, in his writing and in his demeanor, he was a remorseless demythologizer. He often brought to mind a precious sentence from Hawthorne: “Let us thank God for having given us such ancestors; and let each successive genera-tion thank him, not less fervently, for being one step further from them in the march of ages.” His critical essays about Texas irritated many of his readers because he insisted that the beating heart of the state is to be found in its cities. In his “lecture” to me on Buffalo Bill and the transformation of the old West into entertainment, he concluded that “the old West” existed only for twenty years or so, but I heard no disenchantment in his voice. He was pre-disenchanted, which is what made The Last Picture Show a great film and Lonesome Dove a great book. 

    Archer City is a two-hour drive northwest from Dallas. It is a small town with a small population, the county seat, a place for roads to meet, with no feeling of a future. Jesse James hid out there. When I used to visit, it looked exactly as Peter Bogdanovich had filmed it. The movie house was a poetical ruin, as if it had been built to be best enjoyed in memory and most truly seen in a rearview mirror. The hospital that appears in the film became the Lonesome Dove Inn, where I enjoyed the blandishments of the Terms of Endearment suite. Larry had transformed four large buildings in the center of town into four large bookshops. Book Town, it came to be called. (Some years ago, as his health began to fail, he threw a big party and auctioned off three shops and three hundred thousand books.) The main store was down the street from the courthouse. The rarest holdings were there, and some literary memorabilia. From a comfortable chair in a corner in the front room Larry would greet visitors — bibliophiles and book dealers and locals looking for old books about Texas and writers from all over the country who heard that it was very cool. There was almost nothing to do at night in Archer City. At the American Legion hall I learned the Texas two-step and was regaled by the inebriated reminiscences of a toothless old oilman named Green. When Larry had guests, however, he provided for their nights: he kept the bookshops unlocked. So when sleep failed, as it often did, I would leave my bed for the deserted streets, where the only activity was the changing light at the crossroads, and ramble in the entirety of our literary civilization until dawn. Sleeplessness was never sweeter. My only responsibility was to turn the lights off. On my walk home my head swam with the rewards of serendipity, with the unexpected phrases and images and names and ideas that I encountered in the nocturnal sanctuary that my friend had created for people like us, but mainly I thought: I love this man, who keeps the lights on.  

    IV

    Seneca’s ninth letter to Lucilius treats the loss of a friend. It begins by clarifying that his hostility to emotionalism does not require the elimination of emotion. “Our position differs from theirs in that our wise person conquers all adversities, but still feels them; but theirs does not even feel them.” The sage is stringent, not grotesque. Yet even this concession to human frailty is limited: whereas the sage acknowledges feeling, because feelings are natural and the Stoic aspires to live in accordance with nature, Seneca advises Lucilius that his ideal should nonetheless be “the invulnerable mind.” This insistence upon invulnerability must have originated in an exceptional vulnerability. Only someone who feels deeply would be so alarmed by depth of feeling. 

    Yet the antidote to tender-heartedness cannot be hard-heartedness. Seneca compares the loss of a friend to the loss of a limb — it is an amputation. But the comparison is surprisingly unsympathetic: it is designed to minimize the injury, not to magnify it. “There are times when he is satisfied with just part of himself. He will be as happy with his body diminished as he was with it whole.” Surely there will be other times too, when he will be unsatisfied with his mutilation, but the philosopher continues in the same toughening spirit: “He is self-sufficient, not in that he wants to be without a friend, but that he is able to — by which I mean that he bears the loss with equanimity.” It is certainly the case that the maimed man has no choice: he will use his good eye or his remaining hand. (If you have ever seen a three-legged dog enjoying an afternoon in the park, you have seen this equanimity, and you have been touched by its unreflectiveness.) But do not approach the maimed man with solace, the Stoic counsels. It would be a philosophical error. In this account, the death of a friend is not an occasion for consolation, because reason will have obviated the need.

    The philosopher goes further, into the farther reaches of detachment where Stoicism becomes obnoxious. No consolation for the loss of a friend will be required, Seneca adds, because the sage turns out to have picked up a certain emotional efficiency. “In truth he will never be without a friend, for it rests with him how quickly he gets a replacement. Just as Phidias, if he should lose one of his statues, would immediately make another, so this artist at friend-making will substitute another in place of the one who is lost.” All he has to do is swipe right! In passages such as this one, the consolatory tradition of the Stoics, to which Seneca also contributed, begins to look a little phony. The death of a friend is quite obviously not the death of friendship. When my friend dies, I do not miss friendship, I miss my friend. All of Phidias’ statues may have been alike, but no two individuals are the same. And even Phidias might have noted that his reproductions were not perfect, and that there are no exact equivalences in human affairs. It should not take a sage to recognize that there are no “replacements.” The uniqueness of what has disappeared, its gorgeous specificity, is precisely the source of the pain. And the avoidance of the pain, the tranquility of mind that is the increasingly desperate master of these proceedings, has been accomplished by means of a shallow notion of human commensurability. 

    As James McMurtry, of Archer City and Austin, likes to sing, “I don’t want another drink, I only want that last one again.” There is the problem of sorrow. The general awareness of our mortality may be of limited value in summoning the courage to confront individual mortalities. Human finitude is universal, but Adam Zagajewski and Larry McMurtry were particular. No one like them will ever live again. Of course we do not expect our friends to live forever, but such “stoicism” is useless when the wounding day arrives, because we cared too much before to care less, or not at all, now. There is no profit in the attempt of the philosopher of indifference to defend the heart with definitions. One more text, then, this one from Epictetus, which I offer in praise of all the actually existing people whose specificities refute it: “In the case of everything attractive or useful, or that you are fond of, remember to say just what sort of thing it is, beginning with the least little things. If you are fond of a jug, say, ‘I am fond of a jug!’ For when it is broken you will not be upset. If you kiss your child or your wife, say that you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be upset.” It! But not even two jugs are identical, if they were made by human hands, and if you think they are identical then you have no eye for jugs. The collapse of such discernment should not be dignified as wisdom. The differences between people are what draw them to each other. If there is such a thing as species-love, it is not the highest love, or the most strenuous love, or the love that gets one through the night. 

    “Anyone who complains that a person has died is complaining that that person was human,” Seneca snaps. He takes mourners for fools. Their dejection is an intellectual misunderstanding. “Nothing is more foolish than seeking a reputation for sorrow and giving one’s approval to tears.” Are tears in need of approval? The disapproval of them seems so haughty, so cold. Whereas “the wise, too, shed tears,” this is only because “one can be tranquil and composed even in the midst of tears.” Seneca does not say how. But is there really nothing worse than a lapse of composure? Surely rationalists, or especially rationalists, may break down, and have their outlook tested by the tremendous unreason of experience. Were Mill’s tears bad for him, or for philosophy? Reason will not gain followers by attempting to recruit them where it does not belong. There will be time enough for argument when the tears dry. Like other thinkers in other traditions, Seneca warns against the excesses of grief, but his warning is hollow because he derides grief. He believes it is chiefly a social performance: “The show of grief demands more of us than grief itself requires. Without a spectator, grief comes to an end.” Yet the opposite is more often the case: it is when the others leave, when the spectators and the consolers are gone, that the quiet ravages of sorrow begin. 

    And then one learns, in desolation, not about the limits of sorrow but about the limits of solace. If consolation is difficult, it may be because consolation is impossible. When a person dies the world changes, once and for all, for those with whom, closely or distantly, he lived. The world is the people with whom one goes through the world. The emotional efficiency of the philosophical Stoics, which bears a resemblance to the emotional efficiency of the unphilosophical Americans, scants the finality of what has occurred. Religions seek the same evasion with their fantasies of resurrection, but resurrections and replacements are equally outlandish responses to the circumstance in which (as the Talmud says) something has been lost which shall not be found again. Too much grieving is hardly our problem. We can anyway count on the world for distractions from it. But respites may be the most we can hope for. There is nothing temporary about mourning; it is an essential view of an essential characteristic of human life. Since ephemerality is permanent, so is sorrow. We may set it aside, we may diversify it with lighter emotions that are warranted by lighter incidents, but it is never wrong. Sorrow befits the sage. Anyone who has ever loved may speak in praise of inconsolability.

    The Murder of Samuel Paty

    I

    It was Friday, October 16, 2020, the last day of school before the All Saints’ Day break at the Bois-d’Aulne middle school in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine on the outskirts of Paris. In front of the school, a man named Abdullakh Abouzeidovich Anzorov decapitated Samuel Paty, a professor of history, geography, and civics. The knife-wielding executioner was an eighteen-year-old Chechen born in Moscow who had been granted political refugee status with his family in France. In the minutes following the brutal act, the killer posted on his Twitter account a photo of the victim’s severed and bloodied head on the pavement, along with this prepared comment:

    In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Merciful. From Abdullah, the Servant of Allah, to Marcon (sic), the leader of the infidels, I executed one of your dogs from hell who dared to belittle Muhammad (Sal’am); calm those like him before you are severely punished.

    The teacher had already been the subject of an online harassment campaign that was begun on October 7 by Brahim Chnina, the father of a girl in one of his classes. The reason was that Samuel Paty had shown the students in his civics class a cartoon of the Prophet, depicted naked, that appeared in the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo. It was a pedagogical exercise designed to stimulate reflections on freedom of expression and blasphemy. Paty had been careful to excuse anyone likely to be offended by the picture on religious grounds from the classroom. The father, however, accused him of singling out Muslims and ejecting them. With such an interpretation, clearly designed to be prejudicial, he wanted to prove that they had been purposely discriminated against. It turned out later that his daughter had not even been in class that day. 

    Chnina senior, born in Oran, Algeria, drawing in-work welfare and child subsidy payments for his six daughters, had a following on the Islamist web as an organizer of pilgrim-ages to Mecca and charitable activities connected to mosques. His half-sister had joined ISIS in Syria in 2014 and at the time was still detained in the Al-Hol camp in northeastern Syria at Rojava, a territory controlled by Kurdish forces, from which he had tried to repatriate her. His several hundred social media friends included many well-known activists of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamo-leftist movements who lost no time sharing his message. In his first video on Facebook, posted on October 7, Chnina urged his Internet audience to mobilize — to ensure that, as he put it, “this scoundrel does not stay in public education.” He also advised them to protest if they became aware of similar cases. The video was rebroadcast on the website of the Pantin Mosque, located in a large banlieue in Paris, to its nearly 100,000 subscribers, on the orders of its president, M’hammed Henniche. It went viral as far as Algeria and the rest of the Maghreb.

    But this was just the beginning. Henniche, himself of Algerian origin, the son of a senior gendarmerie officer in Algeria and an erstwhile student at a suburban Parisian university, controlled the umbrella group for this mosque that had been founded in 2013. In 2001, in the Seine-Saint Denis department north of Paris, he had established the Islamic political lobby UAM 93 (Union of Muslim Associations, the numeral 93 being the postal code for Seine-Saint Denis), which claimed to be the first of its kind. Having claimed that the area’s population consisted mostly of his coreligionists, he hit on the idea of creating a political pressure group modeled on CRIF, the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France. He used it to “monetize” Muslim votes in elections by pressuring candidates to take positions favorable to various Islamic causes in return for the group’s support. It gave him control or influence over the issuance of building permits to mosques, the granting of subsidies to “cultural” or charitable associations endorsed by his group, the opening of Islamic charter schools, and more. The group even staged an annual UAM 93 iftar to break the fast of Ramadan, in imitation of the annual CRIF dinner. Local politicians rushed to it as if to some kind of halal popularity contest. UAM had an opportunistic attitude towards right and left, socialist, centrist, or communist ideologies. Patterned on the way Israel’s Orthodox Jewish religious parties horse-traded their votes in the Knesset in return for subsidies to their yeshivas, Henniche could boast of making or unmaking mayors, department councilors, or members of Parliament in the “most Muslim department in France.” 

    In October 2020, the Pantin Mosque occupied temporary quarters in a former sports hall that could accommodate up to 1,300 people. The cornerstone for a permanent building had been laid on Saturday, February 29, 2020, just prior to the municipal elections of March 15, in which the incumbent Socialist mayor Bertrand Kern was reelected during the first round. Close to Henniche, he had signed off on a long-term leasehold for the mosque as early as 2013, conditioned on its being open to all ethnic components of the local Muslim population. Hence the Friday imam, Ibrahim Doucouré, also known as Ibrahim Abou Talha, was of Malian origin, and had been educated in Dammaj, in northern Yemen, an area now occupied by Houthi rebels. This was where the principal local Salafist ideologue, Muqbil al Wadi’i, a lapsed Zaidi (local Shiite), had established his seminary, Dar al-Hadith, after he had joined the most virulent current of Wahhabism in neighboring Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. In Yemen, he preached an ultra-rig-orist doctrine with a new convert’s zeal, attracting many foreigners, including French-speaking converts. The rebel Houthi movement in fact was created in reaction to Muqbil’s brand of fanatical proselytism. In 2015, when the rebels took over the area and then the capital at Sanaa, they destroyed the seminary’s buildings and hunted down its students. Many of Muqbil’s French-speaking disciples today are refugees in Birmingham, the nerve center of the main Islamist power networks in the United Kingdom. It also spawned a group of activists who edit the “Islamologists of France” website, on which they regularly pillory French academics in this field when they take a critical approach to their subject. Thus, on October 9, 2020, two days after the Paty affair burst into the headlines, the site inveighed against two alleged academic “Islamophobes” as “ideologues of the new fascism” in the service of France’s department of education, which was described on the website as “a secular Gestapo.”

    Another one of UAM 93’s preoccupations was schools. On August 27, 2018, Hassen Farsadou, Henniche’s heir-apparent in the Islamist lobby, which was now very active in Pantin, had made headlines of his own with a post on his Facebook page. It was a cut-and-pasted message from Davut Pasha, an Alsatian convert to Islam in Erdogan’s Islamic AKP party in Turkey. Based since 2019 in the vicinity of Ankara, he acted as the chief drumbeater for Erdogan and his party’s networks in the French-speaking Islamosphere:

    In 2004, the secularists removed the hijab from the school = you left your children in them.

    Between 2004 and 2015, the secularists launched a vendetta against bandanas, long skirts, school outings = you continued to leave your children to them.

    In 2015, secularists put eight-year-olds in front of prosecutors and implemented the ABCD [of equality, as opposed to gender stereotypes] = you continued to let them have your children.

    In 2018, the books to teach them masturbation are ready = you will continue to leave your children with them.

    Are you waiting for the school outings in Gay Pride to get your act together?

    After his conversion, Davut Pasha, born David Bizet, had risen to become a high-ranking member of the European networks of Milli Görüş, or National Vision, a religious- political movement and the leading Turkish diaspora organization in Europe, and a key element of the Brotherist-Islamist network from which Erdogan issued. It is highly influential in Strasbourg’s Turkish Eyüp Sultan mosque. Davut Pasha, who ran unsuccessfully in the municipal elections in Mulhouse in 2014 and in the parliamentary elections in 2017, can lay claim to having invented the “Islamic revisionist history of France,” according to which the Muslim invasion of Provence from Andalusia, and the many subsequent raids between the eighth and tenth centuries, were the cornerstone of the modern French state, one allegedly hidden by Christian “falsification.” He even claimed to have excavated its supposed remains, especially at Narbonne, the seat of a short-lived emirate. A video posted on many platforms under the title When the Islamic State Was in France illustrated this revisionism as early as 2015, when ISIS was at its peak. It was an attempt at fitting the quest for re-Islamizing France into the longue durée of a grand historical saga. Davut Pasha defines himself as “caliphalist.” He regards Erdogan as the ideal contemporary incarnation of the Commander of the Faithful, exhorting him to invade Syria and Libya and thereby restore the Ottoman Empire within its erstwhile most extensive perimeter.

    Farsadou, who, with the support of his mentor, provided a somewhat muddled justification for the posting of Davut Pasha’s message, also presides over the Muslim association called Hope of French Youth based in the town of Aulnay-sous-Bois, also located in postal code 93. It sponsors a private charter school named after Philippe Grenier, a nineteenth-cen-tury physician who converted to Islam. In 1896, Grenier was elected the first Muslim member of the National Assembly, serving in that capacity until 1898. His career is ritually highlighted by the Islamist movement as prefiguring the inevitable conversion of the French, including the political elite, to Islam. The school opened its doors for the first time in premises rented from the municipality’s right-wing and center-right local majority, headed by Bruno Beschizza, a hardline former police union official. Farsadou and Henniche had campaigned for him in the municipal election in 2014, helping him to defeat the socialist incumbent Gérard Ségura. UAM 93 had sanctioned the latter for reneging on his town’s commitments to rent school premises to them.

    This mixing of departmental policy and Islamist lobbying came to a halt, at least temporarily, on October 19, 2020, when the prefect of Seine-Saint-Denis department, Georges-François Leclerc, decreed a six-month closure of the Pantin mosque. The decree implemented a request by the Minister of the Interior, in reaction to Henniche’s spreading Chnina’s post about Samuel Paty. The Salafist imam Abu Talha, who had enrolled some of his children in an underground Islamist school in Bobigny that was closed on October 8 by the police, announced a few weeks later that he was “stepping back from [his] “activities” while “rejecting the complaints articulated in the prefectural decree.” The decision was upheld three days later by the Administrative Court at a hearing attended by Leclerc. The Council of State gave its imprimatur for the decision. On November 25, 2020, Leclerc issued this statement: “The words of the leaders of the Great Pantin Mosque and the ideas or theories disseminated within it constitute a provocation linked to the risk of inciting acts of terrorism, violence, hatred or discrimination and are of a nature to justify closing the place of worship.”

    On the defensive in the face of an outcry, Henniche removed the Chnina video and deplored the teacher’s beheading. He pointed out to the press that he had not relayed a second video that had been posted the following day. The previous evening the student’s father had tried to stoke the Islamist mobilization and focus it on Samuel Paty by posting two statements in succession. They called for “contacting the CCIF” and doxing the “professor’s address and name to tell him STOP.” The CCIF, or the Collective Against Islamophobia in France, was founded in 2003. Its aim was to weld Muslims into a community solely defined by the discrimination to which its members would be subjected because of their religion — in a word, Islamophobia. This notion, characterized in CCIF propaganda campaigns as a “crime,” is strangely based on the Islamist understanding of anti-Semitism.  The Islamist movement considers anti-Semitism a strategy according to which Jews cleverly play the victim card to fend off any criticism of Israel and its policies. In one respect, though, the two cases differ: anti-Semitism advocates hatred of individuals, whereas “Islamophobia” — an English word that was manufactured in the wake of the Rushdie affair in the United Kingdom — works by stigmatizing and prohibiting any criticism of Islamic dogma — particularly its Brotherist, Salafist, and even jihadist interpretations. 

    The CCIF raised the victimization strategy to an art form in putting French society on the defensive whenever jihadist crimes or attacks were committed. A case in point was the attack in Nice on July 14, 2016, Bastille Day, when an Islamist terrorist killed eighty-six people by plowing into the celebrating crowd on the seaside Promenade des Anglais with a truck. The CCIF promptly mounted an intense campaign denouncing the “discrimination” suffered by Muslim women for wearing a burkini on the beaches of the Riviera within a stone’s throw of the killing committed a few weeks earlier. The aim clearly was to divert attention from the massacre. After the murder of Samuel Paty, CCIF similarly weaponized the publicity generated by the incident at the school: in order to arouse a victimization reflex in the Muslim community, it spun what happened in the classroom as an Islamophobic act.

    It was aided in this effort by the political context, which was dominated by news of several major trials incriminating jihadism that were about to begin. These trials promised to expose how the ideology related to, and had benefited from, a much larger movement. The court cases included those pertaining to the Charlie Hebdo massacres, the killings at the Jewish HyperCacher supermarket, and the murders of two police officers of West Indian and Maghrebian origin, all on January 7-9, 2015. Two other courts would have Algerian nationals in the dock. In one, a student named Sid Ahmed Ghlam would go on trial for the murder of a young woman and an abortive plan instigated by ISIS to attack churches in Villejuif in April 2015. In the other, a former journalist, Farid Ikken, was charged with the attempted murder with a hammer of a policeman outside Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris in 2017. In addition, the trial of the terrorist in the abortive attack on the Thalys Brussels-Paris train in August, 2015 was scheduled to begin on November 16: it would see the Moroccan jihadist Ayoub al-Khazzani prosecuted for planning to assassinate passengers with an AK-47. The orders for this operation had come from the main actor behind the November 2015 attacks, the Belgian-Moroccan ISIS operative Abdelhamid Abaaoud. It was against this background that the Ministry of the Interior moved to dissolve CCIF by November 19. The association preempted the ministry’s move by announcing on October 27 that it was disbanding and redeploying its activities abroad.

    On October 8, the senior Chnina, accompanied by the veteran Islamist agitator Abdelhakim Sefrioui, met with his daughter’s school principal to lodge a complaint against Samuel Paty for “spreading child pornography.” The libel would earn the latter a summons to the police station. This meeting between a school headmistress and a well-known activist recalls one that took place when the issue of wearing the hijab in a public school first erupted in September, 1989 at the Gabriel-Havez middle school in Creil, another small town on the outskirts of Paris. There, too, the school’s headmaster, Ernest Chénière, had been paid a visit by a delegation from the Union of Islamic Organizations of France, an association with Brotherist leanings, which advocated for the students in question and their parents. This campaign subsequently brought UOIF considerable fame in the French Islamist movement. 

    Sefrioui, a sixty-year-old born in Morocco, had staged multiple spectacular provocations starting in the 1980s. His goal, according to Tareq Oubrou, the imam of Bordeaux, also originally from the Alawite kingdom, was “fortifying the most fragile minds by systematically making Muslims victims of the Republic. These victimology theses managed to convince the most reckless who, as foreseeable, took action.” In particular, Sefrioui created the Sheikh Yassine collective, named after the founder of Hamas killed in 2004 by Israel. He campaigned for Dieudonné, the anti-Semitic comedian and pro-Iranian regime activist, in his presidential run in 2007, as well as for the conspiracy theorist Alain Soral, and he harassed Hassen Chalghoumi, the imam of Drancy — another city in 93 — for his closeness to Jewish institutions. He also had agitprop experience in protests relating to schools on his resume: he had led the revolt against the administration of Saint-Ouen High School when it tried to prohibit the wearing of jilbeb, a garment with which Salafi women must cover themselves (a case also cited by Davut Pasha and Farsadou).

    After the meeting on October 8 with the headmistress, Sefrioui taped an interview in the wooded environs of this suburban school, in which he claimed membership in the Council of Imams of France, an association founded in 1992. Its secretary-general, Dhaou Meskine, a preacher of Tunisian origin himself and close to the Brotherist movement, denied that Sefrioui was authorized to speak on the Council’s behalf. He cited “differences over methods” and indicated he had ceased all contact with him ages ago. Sefrioui further announced that he had insisted to the headmistress on the need for “the exclusion of this scoundrel,” meaning Samuel Paty. He threatened a mass protest outside the school to make his demand stick. He had already protested the humili-ation of “Muslim students,” which he described as a system-atic policy in place “for five years.” The involvement of this nationally known Islamic online agitator — with an “S” card on file, designating him as a serious threat to national security — escalated the incident to a higher level than the student’s father alone could have achieved. It is true that Chnina was active on the Islamist web, but he had a less extensive following. On October 12, Sefrioui raised the heat even more when he broadcast a video of himself in front of the school, in which Chnina’s daughter gave her version of events. Her story did not hold up under scrutiny: she displayed no first-hand knowledge of the events that she described.

    II

    The murder of Samuel Paty should be properly understood as an expression of what might be called atmospheric jihadism. Such terrorism dispenses with the murderer’s prior member-ship in an al-Qaeda-type pyramidal organization or with affiliation with a network-based structure such as ISIS. It is galvanized instead by the spread of mobilization messages on social media: they trigger the crime. Atmospheric jihadism crystallizes in the encounter of a demand for action spread online by “entrepreneurs of rage” — in Bernard Rougier’s phrase — and a terrorist offer in response to it. The connections no longer need to be formalized, notwithstanding that in Paty’s case the police investigation revealed telephone contacts between the student’s father and Abdullakh Anzorov. The parent posted the teacher’s contact information on his Facebook page and the assassin found it. Reporting in Le Monde showed that the young Chechen had been combing through social networks since September 25, searching for someone who merited punishment for disrespecting Islam.

    As it happened, on that date a certain Zaheer Hassan Mahmood, another refugee, this time from Pakistan, entered the picture. He came from a family sympathetic to a Pakistani radical Islamist organization back home, and was collecting public assistance after having falsely claimed to be an “unaccompanied minor” upon his arrival in France. He spoke no French and only broken English. He had been incensed by what he saw on the cover of Charlie Hebdo on the first day of the trial of the perpetrators of the massacre of the magazine’s staff. Below the headline “All that for this,” he saw, re-published, some of the offensive drawings that had set the attack in motion in 2015. Mahmood obtained a meat cleaver shaped like the cutlasses brandished in viral videos on social media by Urdu- language protesters in Karachi and Lahore who had marched to demand the beheading of the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists. Of low intellect and means, Mahmood neverthe-less had managed to go online and find the address where the attack on the weekly’s office had taken place (the editors had moved since then to a secret location). Having made his way to the building, he randomly singled out two people working in a film production company on the premises, neither with any connection to the case. He grievously injured them by blows to the head, without killing, much less decapitating, them. With no escape plan, stunned by his own act, he was easily and quickly apprehended. Subsequent investigation into his Parisian surroundings, where he lived in a crack house while awaiting an order expelling him from French territory, failed to uncover any accomplices or network affiliations.

    Abdullakh Abouzeidovich Anzorov, Paty’s killer, turned out to have more elaborate jihadist connections. The testimonies taken in his circle indicated that he had gravitated to a radical Salafist vision. He had openly proclaimed it on his Facebook page and Twitter account at least six months, if not a year, before the crime. He evinced a horror of all promiscuity with the other sex; he hated atheists, Christians, and “deviant” Muslims, such as Sufi mystics or Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman; he took an interest in international Islamist issues. He admired the Taliban and he worshipped Erdogan. The latter was swathed in a nimbus of neo-caliphate glory after recently ordering Istanbul’s Hagia Sophia to be converted into a mosque. Moreover, in the Chechen’s native Caucasus, Erdogan had also just sided with Azerbaijan in its war against Christian Armenia.

    Anzorov was also plugged into the French online Islamist milieu. On October 7, on the day that Chnina posted his first video, Anzorov voiced his support for Idriss Sihamedi, the founder and president of BarakaCity, an Islamist NGO in France, who had been indicted for cyberstalking and threatening the former Charlie journalist Zineb El Rhazoui. The NGO would be dissolved by the Council of Ministers on October 28. Its demise was affirmed by the Council of State on November 25, on the grounds that “the words of its president may be attributed to it and constitute discourses fomenting discrimination, hatred or violence sufficient to justify dissolu-tion.” Anzorov kept silent on the early developments of the Conflans affair, probably because he wanted to keep his murderous plot away from police surfing the web, and deleted his posts starting on October 11. Yet he and Chnina were said to have exchanged phone calls, their substance still shrouded in mystery. He also had online contacts with two jihadists in the Idlib zone in Syria. Between the moment he cut off Samuel Paty’s head and when the police shot him dead, he messaged one of them in Russian.

    He seems to have been spurred into action by Zaheer Mahmood’s attack. At first, he cyberstalked young people suspected of mocking the Prophet or Islam on social media. In all probability, this is when he stumbled on the accusations leveled against his future victim. He nurtured his own plan to “avenge the Prophet,” drawing on the means with which his specific cultural tradition had equipped him. In the monstrous execution of his crime, two actions were particularly telling: first, his bribing, with three hundred euros, of some of the middle school’s students to identify their teacher, so that he could be sure of his victim; second, the terrifyingly professional way in which he carried out the beheading, and, without missing a beat, messaging the Russian-speaking jihadist in Idlib. The first act links the murderer more to the criminal underworld than to standard jihadist practice; the second, to a rite of passage by Chechen teenagers for whom cutting off a sheep’s head opens the door to manhood (as opposed to slaughtering it the way Muslims generally do). It explains how someone like Anzorov could perform the counterintuitive motions inflicted in this particular kind of savagery. This skill cannot be acquired only by watching the many beheading videos that ISIS had been putting online since 2014. At most, these might have proved addictive, or may even have trivialized this killing method in the collective Islamist consciousness. (A Tunisian jihadist named Brahim Issaoui, who struck in Nice thirteen days later, failed in his attempt to behead his victims.)

    The Chechen population in France, estimated at nearly 50,000, arrived mainly as political refugees after the war of 1994-1996 and especially after the war of 1999-2009. Both of those bloody conflicts had pitted local separatists, whose ranks jihadists had gradually come to dominate, against Russian troops. Despite its relatively small size compared to other segments of the Muslim immigrant population, the French Chechen community made headlines. Some were frequently employed in “security” and known for extreme violence. Others controlled narcotics trafficking (and security for the properties of Russian oligarchs) on the French Riviera, one of their major stomping grounds. Some Chechen “protectors” took the drug business over by preying on the traditional Maghreb drug-trafficking channels, a phenomenon that gradually spread across France.

    In the week of June 16, 2020, for example, this takeover spiraled into four days of spectacular clashes in Dijon, the Burgundian metropolis. It began with a raid on Moroccans in the context of a conflict of honor. It brought together hundreds of Chechen thugs mobilized on social media from all over France and neighboring countries. In their muscle cars, they patrolled an entire working-class neighborhood, while the police kept its distance. The press was dumbfounded. The frenzy of violence came as a major shock to most of Dijon’s citizenry, who were exposed for the first time to these mores and habits of some of the people in their midst. The explosion happened just four months before the beheading of Samuel Paty in ConflansSainte-Honorine. Mediation between these two Sunni communities that totally shut out the French state authorities in charge of public order finally took place at the local “Fraternity” mosque. It was provided by its imam Mohammed Ateb, the regional representative of the Brotherist UOIF, in concert with his Chechen counterpart from Dole, a city in the nearby Jura department. The reconciliation was sealed against the backdrop of the Eid-el-Kebir holiday by the Chechens offering the Moroccans three sheep, transactional gifts immediately put to the sword in sacrifices of atonement.

    Abdullakh Anzorov, disqualified by a record of delinquency from working as a security guard like his father, was barely of age when he committed his crime. One of his countrymen, Khamzat Azimov, under “radicalization” watch since 2016, had previously carried out a jihadist knife attack in the Opera district in Paris on May 12, 2018. He killed a passerby, only to be shot dead by police. ISIS, which still had a spokesman then, claimed “credit” for his act, despite the absence of any affiliation. In any case, the Chechen jihad, less notorious than its Afghan parallel, has an equivalent claim to fame in Islamist hagiography: in the opening pages of Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, the manifesto that he published online around 1997, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s successor as the head of what was left of al-Qaeda in 2020, had put the Taliban and these fighters in the Caucasus on the same plane, arguing that both had established the first two “caliphates” on liberated territory, which would eventually extend to the entire planet.

    Before he was shot, Anzorov sent his last message to someone in a Chechen brigade stationed in Idlib under the protection of Turkish forces. The Chechens fighting in the Syrian jihad were notorious for their violence. In Russian folklore, Chechens are known for their fierce secular resistance to St. Petersburg’s troops. From that epoch came the dark legend of the “Chechen villain crawling on the riverbank, sharpening his knife,” as depicted in a poem by Lermontov that was turned into a famous lullaby. The bogeyman of the tchétchènskie golovorezy (Chechen head cutters) runs through the modern history of Russia ever since the Tsarist wars, as described by Tolstoy in his novella Hadji Murad (which also celebrates the chival-rous character of the eponymous hero). A steady drumbeat of beheadings of Moscow’s soldiers also marked Putin’s wars. These unspeakable images were posted in profusion on social media to terrorize the latest Russian adversary.

    After the assassination of the teacher at the school in Bois-d’Aulne, France was in shock. Even Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the leftist La France Insoumise (France Unbowed) and a fierce critic of Emmanuel Macron, asserted that there was a “Chechen problem.” It earned him accusations of stereo-typing from his political opponents — despite his having taken part in the “demonstration against Islamophobia” on November 10, 2019 in the heart of Paris, organized by the CCIF. Its ex-director, Marwan Muhammad, had galvanized the crowd at the event on the Avenue de la République with shouts of Allahu Akbar. Mélenchon perfectly exemplifies the problem for the French left: he must support both his MPs from Seine-Saint-Denis who need the Islamic votes mobilized by UAM 93 and an electoral base in which teachers such as their colleague in the Bois-d’Aulne middle school figure heavily. He must find a way to reconcile Islamism and leftism in his movement and in his opposition to Macron. 

    The murder of Samuel Paty buttressed the vision developed by the President of the French Republic in a speech two weeks earlier at Les Mureaux, a commune in the same department of Yvelines. In it, Macron advocated a legislative overhaul to better combat “Islamist separatism.” It was in in the nearby village of Magnanville, on June 13, 2016, that a policeman and his wife were stabbed to death in front of their young child at their home. The crime had been committed by Larossi Abballa, a jihadist of Moroccan origin. Recently released from prison, he was linked to and communicated online with Rachid Kassim, an ex-rapper and social educator born in Oran, Algeria, and formerly based in central France at Roanne, who at this time was running ISIS “external operations” from Raqqa, the erstwhile capital of the “caliphate” in Syria.

    Aside from the similarity between the two murders, even down to the murder weapon, the modus operandi had changed from June 2016 to October 2020. The first killing had been amplified by Larossi Abballa’s calling on his “Muslim brothers” to kill a French academic (more specifically, the author of this essay) and some journalists whose names he exposed to public condemnation on Facebook Live before he, too, was shot dead. With the assassination of Samuel Paty in Conflans, as I noted earlier, the network-based jihad that culminated in ISIS gave way to an atmospheric jihadism, for which it provided a model. To prepare a case against the perpetrators of the attacks of the previous era, which the public discovered only after they were carried out, required lengthy clandestine operations of the police. Such had been the case with the slaughters of January 2015 — whose trial was unfolding in the fall of 2020 and providing the backdrop for the crimes committed first by Zaheer Mahmood, then Abdullakh Anzorov, and then Brahim Issaoui. But today jihadist crimes are preceded by an explicit and public “cultural disavowal” engineered by “entrepreneurs of rage”: they are not prepared in secret, they have already been advocated on social media. This is how a teacher came to be singled out for Internet users as a scapegoat to rage against — and for one of them to assassinate. 

    This change means that the struggle of the secular French Republic must not be limited to after-the-fact criminal justice. It must instead fight an ethical battle against an ideology which rends the very fabric of French society by distinguishing between “believers” (mou’minin) and “nonbelievers” (kouffar), between “Salafist” (salafi) and “infidel” (mouchrik), “apostate” (mourtadd), “hypocrite” (mounafiq), and “deviant” (mounharif). These rigid categories are anathemas of exclusion: they propound a doctrinaire separatism that dehumanizes the designated enemy and forbids making a society with him until he submits to the faith or is put to death. This desire to secede from the surrounding citizenry was the founding impulse of Salafism. Nowadays, five decades after the upheaval of values from nationalism to Islamism, precipitated in the Muslim world by the October 1973 war, this agenda has been taken up by a spectrum of militants ranging from Brotherism to jihadism.

    Known in the West as the Yom Kippur War, since it was launched on that Jewish holiday to maximize the effect of surprise on the Israeli enemy, it was referred to in the Muslim World as the Ramadan War, since it coincided with the month of fasting; and in order for Muslim soldiers to be fed in combat, the ulema pronounced it a holy war — a jihad, which abrogates daytime fast. This theological elevation of the war reinforced the feeling that it was a Saudi and Islamic victory — as the army of the Jewish state had to end its counter-offensive on the order of Western powers who could not withstand the oil embargo decreed at the initiative of King Faysal of Saudi Arabia. From those days came the tilt toward a general Islamization of politics, leading to the use of concepts drawn from the Scriptures to decipher events or engage in action. For instance, what Macron called “separatism” matches what Islamists and jihadists call in Koranic parlance al-wala wal-ba-ra’a’, “alliance and rupture.” In the Salafized patois of the “conquered territories of Islamism,” to use the title of Bernard Rougier’s recent book, it is rendered as “allegiance and disavowal.” It is all about implementing an exclusive and total submission to dogma in its strictest and literal definition, as defined by the self-styled “orthodox.” It means “allying” only with those who share this ideology and breaking with the rest by “disavowing” them.

    The speech in which Emmanuel Macron spoke about “Islamist separatism” caused an uproar in France’s political Islamist movement and in the Muslim world. This happened despite the crime perpetrated in Conflans less than two weeks later, which corroborated Macron’s analysis. Macron’s opponents and detractors used the tactic of shifting the burden of proof back on the French president by accusing him of Islamophobia — of discrimination against all Muslims, while the “separatists” promoted themselves as their represen-tatives par excellence. This move was facilitated by a linguistic peculiarity: the term “Islamist” as such does not exist in the Arabic or Turkish languages, nor is it generally known there. It was originally coined in the 1980s by European scholars of contemporary Islam to describe “political Islam movements” that originated in the aforementioned shift in the wake of the Yom Kippur/Ramadan war in 1973. Its literal translation in Arabic, Islamawi, is understood only by a few intellectuals who manage to distance themselves from the prevalent religious dogma. And so it was that the expression used by Macron came to be falsely rendered as “Islamic terrorism” in the Muslim world, easily letting it be construed by those who had a political interest in such a misunderstanding as an aggression against all of the Prophet’s followers.

    In this charged context, the last week of October in 2020 saw the tensions and the commingling of French and international issues reach a climax. In the forefront was Erdogan’s Turkey. It set the tempo for the pan-Islamic campaign against Macron, to bolster its own president’s neo-caliphal stature after he had rededicated Hagia Sophia as a mosque. Noticeably absent were leaders of the Muslim world, even those participating in the Abraham Accords and opposed to the Brother-ist-Shiite axis. They might have been capable of swimming against the tide, but they held back out of fear of being tagged as Islamophobes.

    Thursday, October 29, 2020, marked the Feast of Mouloud, as the Prophet’s nativity is known in the Maghrebian dialects (al-mawlid an-nabawi, in classical Arabic). Its date is calculated by the Hegirian (lunar) calendar, and thus each year occurs ten days earlier than the previous year. As a symbolic date, it plays a key role in the spirituality of the Muslim masses in North Africa. They revere the figure of the Prophet in particular because it lets them feel charismatically and vibrantly close to him — unlike the scriptural Islam of the scholars (and that of the Salafists, now in digitized form). At 8:29 a.m. on that day, Brahim Issaoui, twenty-one years old, an illegal Tunisian immigrant who had just set foot on French soil after crossing the nearby Italian border, killed three people inside the Basilica of Notre-Dame de l’Assomption in Nice.

    This neo-Gothic building’s portal opens onto the city’s major thoroughfare, Avenue Jean-Médecin, now a pedestrian mall with a streetcar line. Its apses back onto a public garden 

    filled mainly with mothers garbed in jilbeb and their children tagging along. Beyond this garden lies Nice’s “Islamic quarter” of Notre-Dame, which ironically takes its name from the Basilica. Two blocks further, on the ground floor of 12 rue de Suisse, the first mosque opened in the heart of Nice has operated for the past twenty years. In January 2019, the city, which owns the building, issued a notice of non-renewal of the mosque’s lease to the imam of the Chechen community and the president of the management association. This place of worship, too cramped for the crowd of worshippers who spilled over into the street at prayers, was no stranger to contro-versy. In 2011, Nissa Rebella, the rightist group in Nice, whose leader regularly runs in the municipal elections on the National Front ticket, had plastered placards bearing the words “of the Stoning,” “of the Burqa,” and “of the Muslim Brotherhood” over existing street signs. In 2013, he sued the municipality for undercharging rent on the mosque’s lease. In 2020, the prayer hall closed, only to relocate nearby, according to a sign on the door. But the main Salafist stores selling Arabic and French books promoting “allegiance and disavowal,” as well as diverse “Islamic outfits,” and other attire, remain in the area. They equip the movement’s followers with the paraphernalia for flaunting their distinctive identity around the neighborhood. (Alpes-Maritimes, of which Nice is the capital, ranked second among French departments in the number of departures to the ISIS “caliphate” in Syria between 2014 and 2017.)

    The Basilica of Notre-Dame is located a few hundred meters from the main train station, where surveillance cameras captured Brahim Issaoui changing clothes before making his way to the scene of his crime. He was “de-silhouetting,” a common practice in the lead-up to a crime but usually not done in public view. He had slept the night before in a stairwell on a piece of cardboard, which he had shown his mother, at home in Tunisia in the Sfax suburbs, via cell phone video, also telling her that he had made a contact in Nice. Soon afterward he rampaged through the church, slitting the throat of a sixty-year old woman, then striking at the sacristan’s throat, before slashing a young Brazilian mother. All three died of their wounds. Intercepted by the municipal police, Issaoui was shot and wounded while chanting “Allahu Akbar” in a trance before being transported unconscious to the hospital.

    An Italian Red Cross certificate found on him indicated that Issaoui had landed at Lampedusa on September 20 on a boat in distress filled with North African migrants, who had to be rescued by an Italian ship. After a two-week Covid19 quaran-tine on board, an NGO’s boat took him to the mainland, depositing him in the port of Bari, in southeastern Italy. There, on October 9, he was put in a screening center with eight hundred other illegals. Under order to leave Italian territory, he was released from the center due to a lack of space. Here the trail goes cold. There is every reason to believe that, like most Tunisian illegals, he took the train to the border town of Vintimille, sneaked into France, made his way to Menton, and from there proceeded to Nice.

    Little is known of his personal history. He came from a poor family of eleven children, from a village on the outskirts of Kairouan, the Tunisian city that is an Islamic metropolis and the site of its most prestigious and ancient mosque. The family emigrated to an underprivileged suburb of Sfax, the economic capital on the country’s southern coast, where the local Diwan Radio podcast reported on the crime in Nice the day after it was committed. The signs that this is a rough and blighted neighborhood abound: young people in tracksuits emblazoned with counterfeit logos hanging out aimlessly amid unfinished construction projects; the killer’s parents, brothers, sisters, and friends expressing themselves in a thick working-class dialect with rudimentary vocabulary. From them it emerged that Brahim Issaoui, like everyone else, eked out a living in the gray economy, in his case by occasionally repairing mopeds. He later increased his income by smuggling fuel from neighboring Libya and offering it for sale in glass bottles at roadsides throughout the country’s south.

    His family and friends described him as a young man who conscientiously attended the mosque and also had a taste for hashish and alcohol, testifying to the kind of cultural and moral schizophrenia often found in such working-class environments. If his father approved of his leaving for France to escape the misery, his mother worried because he did not “know French.” Nice is in fact France’s “most Tunisian” city, with immigrants from that country constituting the majority among the population of Maghreb nationals. Apart from a claim on the day of the murder that was quickly dismissed as bogus, no jihadist network claimed “credit” for what Issaoui did. Whatever the complicities or the motivations for this act, the Nice attack is one more instance of atmospheric jihadism in Europe after the abandonment of militants by ISIS and its network. This was confirmed when the police announced in mid-November that they had found a photo of Abdullakh Anzorov on Brahim Issaoui’s phone.

    But what to make of this triple murder committed by an individual who had spent just a few hours in France? Clearly he could not have been exposed to any “Islamophobic discrim-ination” in France sufficient to set him off on a murder spree. It conjures up instead a worrisome link between the dynamics emerging from North Africa — poverty brought to a head by the Covid-19 pandemic and the collapse of the price of oil, the dereliction of the political order, clandestine emigration, the force of an Islamist ideology radicalized by the Salafist doctrine of “allegiance and disavowal” — and those now busily roiling the social and cultural cohesion of Europe.

    III

    On September 10, 2020, in Cairo, the Arab League condemned Turkey’s occupation of parts of western Libya, Syria, and North-ern Iraq, claiming that it evoked the dark hours of the Ottoman colonization of Arab lands prior to 1918. That solemn declaration somewhat tamped down the zeal of the Brotherist-Shiite axis in the Middle East that had been excited by the Turkish president’s bellicose policies. In this situation, Erdogan sought to break his isolation by taking his own turn as an “entrepreneur of rage.” He proceeded to stoke his anti-French campaign, with which he had initially inflamed part of the Muslim world 

    by coming out against Charlie Hebdo’s republication of the cartoons on September 3. He now followed up with broad-sides against Macron’s denunciation of “Islamist separatism” in his speech in Les Mureaux and in his tribute to Samuel Paty on October 21 in the courtyard of the Sorbonne, where the president declared that France would never repudiate the caricatures.

    Erdogan’s self-interested pivot, his renewed campaign against France, was aided by the collapse of Islamic studies in France, which had been reinforced by a cast of senior bureaucrats convinced that, to quote Olivier Roy’s aphorism, “knowing Arabic is of no use in understanding what is happening in the banlieues.” (To which I would add: or anywhere else.) France’s representatives were not up to the task of explaining to the Muslim world what Macron’s envisaged measures actually meant. They stymied the produc-tion of any translation of the presidential words into this “useless” language. None materialized until Macron bravely decided to express himself on Al Jazeera with a quality dubbing in Arabic. But by that time the allegations of Islamophobia had been revved up. Invoking universal principles, a phalanx of critics, ranging from Iran’s Supreme Leader to the Financial Times, had won over international opinion to the view the real problem in France is the hatred of Muslims.

    Yet this consensus of ignorance between the executive and a few asinine academics overshadowed the fundamental problem: as I have noted, the term “Islamist” — which in French connotes political Islam, and particularly the Muslim Brotherhood culturally permeated with a radicalized Salafism — has no functional equivalent in Arabic. The word that comes closest, Islamawi, proved to be useless in the crisis, since it is devoid of shades of meaning that would matter to Muslims. And the notion of “separatism” — for which Arabic actually does have meaningful equivalents, ranging from fitna (sedition, especially of a denominational nature, usually in the phrase fitna ta’ïfiyya) to bara’a (rupture with, or disavowal of, nonbelievers) on which Salafist ideology assiduously bases itself — requires a significant effort of explanation to make the link between the two lingusitic registers. This was why Macron’s criticism of “Islamist separatism” was widely portrayed as a questioning of Muslims generally (“Islamist” being rendered simply and inaccurately by Islami, or “Islamic”). This distortion was originated by political and propagandistic organizations and associations in France, such as the “humanitarians” of BarakaCity and the CCIF beating the drums of “French Islamophobia.”

    After Macron’s speech, and in the aftermath of the murder of Samuel Paty, the Anglo-Saxon press, always anxious about being on the wrong side of identity and inclusion, and always eager to denounce French-style secularism, were quick to chime in. They ignored the momentous fact that the French approach to religious freedom implied also freedom from religion — the emancipation of the individual from clerical domination, which is not a small problem, as honest members of devout religious communities will attest. Instead, in the name of certain Protestant or Jewish perspectives, they accused Macron and his predecessors of acting in the nefarious traditions of the anti-Huguenot dragonnades of Louis XIV or Pétain’s anti-Semitism. According to this view, the freedom to blaspheme, one of the fundamental accomplishments of the Enlightenment and a central feature of any open society, amounted only to the heartless and hegemonic injunction to “spit on the religion of the weak.” This stupidity is now professed by our Islamo-leftists, post-colonials, and intersectionals, who hold the high ground in the universities and interdict any critical approach to Islam — which, like Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism, and for that matter atheism, agnosticism, and freemasonry, is a faith in which one can distinguish denominations and persuasions, many different schools of theology and currents of practice, various forms and styles of piety, including the spirit of confrontation and intolerance as well as the spirit of integration and respect.

    The general ignorance of Arabic languages and cultures, of the diversity of idioms and traditions in Muslim lands and communities, has led to a colossal irony: some on the left have invented an image of Islam with a structure identical to the image propagated by the extreme right, only it is inverted. Where the latter demonize all Muslims and their religion as an ontologically negative religious entity, the former are content to turn such generalizations into a positivity as lenient as it is essentialist. They would be well advised to ponder what happened to their Turkish counterparts, who, at the start of this century, made a hero of Erdogan by crediting him with democratic virtues and cultural authenticity in facing down the “secular fascist” heirs of Ataturk. These partisans ended up rotting in his prisons, suppressed and tortured like Communist fellow travelers of yore — useful idiots whom the Stalinist regime thanked for their willful blindness by locking them up in the Gulag.

    The sensational trial of the murderers of January 7–9, 2015 should have started to heal the deep wounds that they inflicted on French society. It should have been a kind of Nuremberg tribunal for this ideology and its crimes. Unfortunately, it ended up being eclipsed first by the Covid-19 outbreak and the ensuing lockdown, and then by the campaign against “French Islamophobia.” The objective of that campaign was to prevent anybody from shining a light on the continuum between the radical Islamist “entrepreneurs of rage” and the jihadist assassins acting on their ideas. This strategy of diversion was similar to the one that the Collective Against Islamophobia in France successfully employed in the summer of 2016 to becloud the Bastille Day massacre in Nice, when they preferred instead to focus on the hostile “Islamophobic” reactions provoked by burkini-clad bathers on the beach above which the slaughter had taken place.

    All this tumult, all this violence, was provoked by the cartoons of the Prophet that Charlie Hebdo republished at the opening of the trial. And so it is important to add a further reflection. Criticism is not censorship: it is a social and intellectual duty. Once we recognize that there exists a right to blaspheme, nothing prevents us from making an ethical judgment about a drawing. The freedom to publish it, which must be fiercely defended, does not amount to an endorsement of its content. Nor does it prohibit us from criticizing it — no matter the solidarity expressed with the Charlie Hebdo staff that was decimated by the jihadist killers in 2015, and with the victims of those who followed them in 2020.

    A day after the cartoons that became an excuse for murder originally appeared in the September 19, 2012 issue of Charlie Hebdo, I went on French public radio. In a discus-sion with the journal’s lawyer, I expressed my revulsion at this mediocre sketch, and our exchange went downhill from there. Although the journal’s cover title “Muhammad: A Star Is Born” referred to the Prophet, I saw its cartoon less as blasphemy and more as an attack on human dignity in the form of a degrading depiction of believers of whatever kind, whose faith the atheist in me respects even if he cannot share it. Eight years and dozens of deaths later, I take back nothing from my view at the time. Jihadist terrorism and its breeding ground of Islamist separatism pose a serious and wrenchingly complicated problem for our societies that neither foolishness nor ignorance will contribute to solving. We have been called upon to be firm about many things.

    The Unsettled Dust

    SICILIANS AND GREEKS

    To celebrate the hundredth anniversary of the birth of the Sicilian writer Leonardo Sciascia, the Italian newspaper  La Repubblica is reissuing his books, one a week for twenty weeks. In theory, I have read most of them: when I first lived in Italy, I used to buy them at the newsstand in Rome’s Termini station just before boarding a train to Siena or Florence, back when trips that now take an hour and a half took a good four hours and the conductors would announce our arrival in person, out loud, their Tuscan accent pleasantly interrupting Sciascia’s Sicilian reveries. At that stage of my life, I had never been to Sicily. My Italian was little better than restaurant Italian. It didn’t matter: Sciascia’s ability to evoke an atmosphere and a psychology penetrated all the clouds of unknowing, so that the ugly hotel and corrupt politicians of Todo Modo and the Maltese forger of The Council of Egypt took up permanent lodging in my memories among other fantastic imagined people and places.

    Reading the books again, after years in Italy, is almost like reading them afresh. Most of all, perhaps, Sciascia’s present has become a historical past; for readers in their twenties today, the tangible realities of life in the 1960s and 1970s are no longer accessible experiences, not only the long-altered political and economic situations but also the tiny details of existence: telephones that took special grooved tokens, the smell of tobacco and sweat on a crowded bus, the formality, and the modesty, of everyday dress. And with a knowledge of Sicily, I can see now how Sciascia’s urge to tell a certain kind of story has emerged from the same sere, eroded volcanic landscape as the works of Luigi Pirandello and Andrea Camilleri, a terrain where implacable nature has contended in combat stupendous with deep-rooted culture: the region around Agrigento, once the great Greek city of Akragas, its splendid panorama now blighted by cheap, shoddy high-rises, yet still one of the most beautiful, mysterious places on earth. Now it is easier to catch the barrage of sly, oblique comments Sciascia makes as an author. They passed me by on first reading, and not only because my Italian was so raw; only older people have the restraint to express their insights with such world-weary economy. I missed Sciascia’s caustic wit back then not only because I grew up in another country, but also because I was young, or distracted by the fact of riding on a train: interrupted by the ticket collector, or by the luminous view out the window of twilight in the heart of Tuscany.

    The best books need to be read in a variety of ways, and reward reading more than once: both in a rush of adrenaline and slowly, closely; as a young person and as an older person; when times are hard and when times are hard again, perhaps under different conditions of hardship, perhaps hewing to the same old unchanging patterns. When my professors in graduate school decided to challenge me by giving me four months to study for my doctoral exams rather than the usual year, I had to read one Greek tragedy a day for a month and add in a second tragedy a couple of times a week. (I reserved the double-headers for Euripides’ crazy melodramas.) I split another month between all the comedies of Aristophanes and Thucydides’ history of the war between Athens and Sparta, reading so fast that I began to dream in ancient Greek, and the little words, called particles, that signal the nuances of an ancient Greek sentence took on the vividness of living language. I had been to Athens and Sparta when I read Thucydides in Rome for my exams, in a state of abject panic and manic illumination, not quite aware yet of the extent to which his history finds its real dramatic center in Sicily, in Syracuse, a place as lush as Agrigento is pitiless. One of Sciascia’s Agrigentine characters declares that people from the province of Syracuse are stupid, implying that life is too easy in that southeastern corner of Sicily. But fertility brings its own perils, as Syracuse has discovered time and again: perils like an Athenian fleet appearing on the horizon with plans to invade you before moving on to conquer Carthage, back in the days (415 BCE) when the Athenian fleet was the most powerful in the Mediterranean world. Two years after that glittering epiphany, however, Thucydides shows us the remnants of the Athenian army (the ships of the fleet have all been captured, sunk, or incinerated) as they beat a miserable retreat through the farmlands and gullies to the west of Syracuse. When the stragglers come to the river Assinaros, they are so exhausted and so thirsty that they swarm into the water to drink and there they are cut down en masse by the Syracusan cavalry, greedily gulping down the river’s water even when it turns red with their blood and muddy from the churning of horses’ hooves. Thucydides had long since suggested that the war between Athens and Sparta had become one great atrocity, but this scene is the most atrocious of them all. The survivors of the slaughter were thrown into the quarries of Syracuse, in the shadow of the theatre where Athenian tragedies played, then and now, and prisoners who could quote the latest play of Euripides were allegedly released. Almost exactly two hundred years later, a very smart Syracusan, Archimedes, would be struck down in his home by an invading Roman soldier after holding off the Roman fleet for two years with the world’s most ingenious array of catapults, another utter foolishness of war.

    One of the great joys of rereading any book at a later stage of life is the freedom to draw one’s own conclusions. It is easier to read freely when fortified by the twin bastions of age and familiarity, two immemorial guarantees of authority. (One of the professors who eventually sat on my Ph.D. committee complained that as a graduate student I wrote like someone looking back on a long life in the classics, but I was only twenty-three.) But the only way any of us reads at all is by starting from nothing, and sometimes the absence of preconceptions about what we read can be as liberating as long intimacy. Insight, after all, is unpredictable. Anwar el-Sadat discovered his mission as a statesman with the help of an article he read in a prison copy of Reader’s Digest (see Jehan Sadat, A Woman of Egypt, p. 86).

    Last semester, confronted with Thucydides for the first time, one of my students asked why the ancient Greeks were so violent. That same question has led to one of the most powerful recent retellings of a Greek tragedy: Yaël Farber’s Molora, which appeared in 20007, takes the Oresteia of Aeschylus, transposes its action from Bronze Age Greece to South Africa during the years of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and has a chorus of Xhosa women preempt the trilogy’s climactic act of vengeance, Orestes’ murder of his mother Clytemnestra (but not until Orestes has done a spectacular sword dance around a bonfire). The same motive lies behind Plato’s decision to expel the epic and dramatic poets from his ideal Republic, for by showing the gods and heroes as violent and base, these writers have set a bad example for the young. His discussion has often been condemned as censorship endorsed by a hidebound conservative, though it is hard to see what is conservative about an ideal state that abolishes the family and grants equal rights to women. It may be more useful to read these sections of the Republic as an account of Plato’s own struggles with deciding what and how to write. As a young man, he had composed tragedies, but the political turmoil that engulfed Athens at the end of the war with Sparta drove him to abandon traditional literature. Instead, he invented an entirely new kind of drama: the philosophical dialogue.

    As for the expulsion of the poets, I came over to Plato’s side after hearing a lecture some years ago by a distinguished classicist. He began by conjuring up the climactic scene on which the Iliad hinges: in what is in effect a journey through hell, King Priam of Troy has crept by night across the battle lines to beg the Greek hero Achilles to give up the body of his slain son, Hector, which Achilles has been dragging behind his chariot, an act that even the violent Greeks found repugnant. For a moment Achilles sees his own father mirrored in the elderly king, and agrees to release Hector—but warns Priam to withdraw quickly because he might change his mind at any moment. “This,” proclaimed the venerable scholar, “is what it means to be a man.” Women, it was easy to surmise, were incapable of rising to similar heights of manhood in his view, that is, to attain the twinge of empathy that shot through the shaggy breast of that capricious brute Achilles, and induced him, finally, to leave off mutilating the corpse he had been playing with for days. All I could think of in that instant was Plato imitating my undergraduate classics professor, Harry Carroll, who once shook his finger at a favorite student who had used the word “pissed” in his presence and repeated, “Out, out, out, out, out,” until the student had backed out the door of Harry’s office.

    Like Farber’s Molora, Plato’s Republic suggests that we might hold ourselves, not just men, to a higher standard of existence than Achilles’ temporary exchange of compassion for slaughter, and he does so by wielding the mighty weapon of humor. In the third book of the Republic, Socrates and Plato’s sardonic brother Adeimantus sling an impressive series of poetic quotations at each other, each one beautiful of form and pernicious in its implications for the basic character of gods and mortals. As the crescendo rises, we readers end up being swept along with the two of them into agreeing that Homer’s best — or, better, the atavistic “this is a man” reading of Homer’s best — is simply not a worthy model to live by. Socrates and Adeimantus are men who nurture other aspirations than snatching women, sacking cities, and skewering each other with spears (though they both did distinguished military service for Athens), and they prefer gods who behave in ways more evidently in harmony with the order of the universe than the capricious deities of Homer. Achilles may have sung “the glories of men” to the percussive rhythm of his lyre, but he was mean and slightly slow-witted, and so are the Homeric gods.

    Interestingly, the poetic citations that Socrates and Adeimantus throw at each other often differ from the texts we have now. Did Plato and his contemporaries read slightly different versions of Aeschylus and Homer than we do today, or did the philosopher enjoy catching, and immortalizing, his teacher and his big brother showing off their prodigious memories while slyly noting that memories are fallible? It is tempting to imagine Plato reveling in his elders’ senior moments and Freudian slips as he shares their glee at sending up that dreadful old Homeric model of “what it means to be a man.” All three of them knew perfectly well that the Iliad ends not with Achilles’s fleeting change of heart, but with a funeral: with the women cleaning up the mess the men have made, and weeping at all the useless carnage.

    Asking the ancient questions about who we are, and discovering new answers, are just some of the reasons that everyone, anyone, should be able to read the classic writers, Greek, Latin, Chinese, Babylonian, and read them again and again. For all its cruelties and its limits, neither Plato nor I would ever renounce the reading of Homer’s Iliad, a poem that emerged in its magnificent coherence around 750 BCE, as the relics of the collapsed Bronze Age pulled together to forge another culture of international resonance. As a human being, Achilles is a mass of brutal confusion, but Homer, by contrast, is a storyteller of masterful discipline and ingenuity: he restricts the subject matter of the Iliad to Achilles’ brief temper tantrum toward the end of the ten-year Trojan War, and yet manages to tuck the whole history of that conflict in between the lines. We can easily grow beyond Achilles as an exemplar of “what it is to be a man”; it is much more difficult to grow beyond Homer as an exemplar of what it is to be a poet.

    This freedom, this curiosity, this search for wisdom wherever it might be found, does not have to imply the moral or political endorsement of the societies that produced these works of literature — writers themselves are often the most trenchant critics of their own societies. Homer provided the model for Greek education in Plato’s childhood, and Plato, as an adult, overthrew that model, along with much of the rest of the Athenian social structure as he knew it. From the standpoint of justice, all societies have been to some degree culpable, there is evil everywhere, and all cultures have shown prejudice and ignorance and intolerance (including the cultures of the oppressed). Should we, then, study nothing and rely only on our wonderful selves? Both Homer and Plato may have known slavery first-hand: homeros in Greek means “hostage,” and Plato, in his thirties, was sold on the slave market by a treacherous Syracusan sea captain. His purchaser knew who he was and set him free immediately, but he never forgot the experience. It may be one of the reasons that neither he nor Homer could imagine a human society free from slavery or war.

    When Socrates and Adeimantus decide to expel the poets from their Republic, they do so from intimate knowledge, and they are fantasizing. But when the communications office of my university insisted in a recent mass email that education went beyond “dusty archives,” they were using an empty cliché, like “dead white males” to refer to immortal authors whose skin was mostly Mediterranean brown, and, in such cases as the Roman playwright Terence and St. Augustine, may have been considerably darker than that. There are few experiences more intoxicating than being in a place like the Vatican Library amid relics of millennia of human endeavor. The dust has not settled on those old tomes. They are as volatile and subversive now as ever — which is exactly why certain kinds of putative “educators” want to keep them out of your hands.

    We should be able to read, and reread, whatever helps us wind our way through the labyrinth of life. Thucydides helps me through humanity’s worst precisely because he endured the worst: plague, exile, war, the degeneration of democracy into tyranny. Plato, who saw these same terrible things in his own life, and many more, including treachery and slavery, provides unflagging hope that we can do better. And he hands the ultimate spiritual revelation of his intoxicating dialogue, the Symposium, to a woman, the priestess Diotima. Despite the fact that generations of self-absorbed men have continued to misread Plato in search of “what is it to be a man,” more careful reading will reveal a visionary of a far more lofty order.

    THE NAZGÛL

    I first read J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings as a thirteen-year-old. It was an unsettling tale for a teenager: unlike fairy-tale heroes, Frodo Baggins returns from his quest physically and psychically damaged, and the world he has struggled to save is no longer the same world at all. Tyranny has degraded its wild lands, erected monstrous buildings, and eroded the souls of every kind of living thing: birds, horses, spiders, trees, knights, kings, gossipy neighbors. For a young person, the end of the books presented a troubling anti-climax, but there was no way to stop reading before that puzzling end — the suspense was too unbearable.

    Thirteen-year-olds are unlikely to bother with literary analysis, but they are certainly susceptible to a well-structured plot. Tolkien’s epic tale begins in the exact antithesis to an epic setting: a placid village in the comfortably named Middle Earth, a fantasy version of the classic English countryside, green, prosperous, isolated from any forces more complex than the occasional tensions of village life and the round of the seasons, inhabited, as the English countryside always has been, by fantastic little people of human form but not quite human customs. In the 1930’s Tolkien invented his own set of little people for his three young sons: hobbits were child-sized individuals who walked about on large furry feet and lived in burrowlike houses, conservative in their ways and scrupulously tidy in their lace-curtained housekeeping. He enshrined them first in a charming book about a more adventurous member of the breed, the Hobbit, which appeared in 1937 and was immediately regarded as a classic. 

    The hobbits in the Lord of the Rings, the much longer narrative that he published in three volumes in 1955, became more complex as its target audience, the Tolkien boys, grew into adult readers. These hobbits are revealed as naïve isolationists in a much larger real world, and they ignore the forces beyond their borders at their own peril. Tolkien may have been writing in the mid-twentieth century, but, given the opportunity, his hobbits in their pastoral Shire would have voted eagerly for the equivalent of Brexit, with the same devastating results. As a South African who moved to England in childhood, Tolkien knew that the world was vast and that he was different from most of his neighbors.

    The hobbit stories address a child’s contradictory longings for stability and adventure, like the children in the Narnia series by Tolkien’s friend C.S. Lewis, who can climb through a wardrobe and become kings and queens on the other side. There is something eminently twentieth-century about the idea of launching an epic tale from the midst of middle-class comfort.  Most heroic sagas begin in the midst of hardship: Virgil’s Aeneid with a shipwreck, Homer’s Iliad with a battle-field, Dante’s Divine Comedy in a darkened forest. Both Tolkien and Lewis are clearly inspired by the Odyssey, an epic that is driven by a similar longing for home, and reveals, like the Lord of the Rings, that home will require a good scouring before it truly becomes home again. Yet after it has been well and truly scoured, home will still be forever different from what it  was, and the hero will leave again for yet another quest. The Odyssey provides its own trenchant critique of the Iliad’s version of “being a man.” Jean Cocteau’s twentieth-century Orpheus walks through a bourgeois bedroom mirror into  the netherworld.

    What I remember most about that adolescent reading  of the Lord of the Rings is a feeling of dread that quickly turned  into abject terror. Like that first dying rat in Camus’ The Plague, the initial seed of foreboding is planted by an apparition that, as the hobbits put it, seems “queer” rather than openly menacing. In chapter three of the Fellowship  of the Ring, the first volume in the series, Frodo Baggins and  his friends have taken to the road when they realize that they are being followed:

    Round the corner came a black horse, no hobbit-pony but a full-sized horse; and on it sat a large man, who seemed to crouch in the saddle, wrapped in a great  black cloak and hood, so that only his boots in the  high stirrups showed below; his face was shadowed  and invisible. When it reached the tree and was level with Frodo the horse stopped. The riding figure sat quite still with its head bowed, as if listening. From inside the hood came a noise as of someone sniffing to catch an elusive scent;  the head turned from side to side of the road. 

    The hidden face, the doglike sniffing, the odd posture, and the swaying motion already give the Black Rider an unearthly aura. Shrewdly, however, Tolkien fleshes out that intimation of wickedness without rushing the pace of his ample narrative. We assemble information about the Rider from brief glimpses, sometimes when he appears in person, sometimes, to great effect, when we only hear of him by rumor. We learn at second hand that he has been searching for “Baggins,” and that he has a foul temper: “He seemed mighty put out, when I told him Mr. Baggins had left his home for good. Hissed at me, he did. It gave me quite a shudder.” The Black Rider is almost animal at times, sniffing like a bloodhound, hissing like a snake. In his second appearance, he stoops down and crawls on all fours:

    The sound of hoofs stopped. As Frodo watched, he saw something dark pass across the lighter space between two trees, and then halt. It looked like the black shade of a horse led by a smaller black shadow. The black shadow stood close to the place where they had left the path, and it swayed from side to side. Frodo thought he heard the sound of snuffling. The shadow bent to the ground and began to crawl towards them. 

    At the sound of voices, the shadowy horseman retreats again, but by this time we know he will be back — as Chekhov warned, that one must never place a loaded rifle on stage if it isn’t going to go off. Tolkien places his loaded rifle early, and returns to his Black Rider, to increasingly terrifying effect, throughout the course of his epic tale. Soon that literary loaded rifle turns out to be a whole arsenal: that first, evil-tempered “he” is quickly revealed as a “they” when a Black Rider appears dramatically on an isolated crag, and lets forth an eerie scream — answered in kind by another scream. The dark horses start out as earthbound creatures, and then take to the skies. Bit by terrifying bit, the Black Riders shed their earthbound qualities of snake and bloodhound to resemble, more and more vividly, the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (Conquest, War, Famine and Plague) — but there are nine of them, who serve the Prince of Darkness (under the reptilian name Sauron) as loyally as the four horsemen in the Book of Revelation.

    In Tolkien’s world, the Black Riders are finally identified as “ringwraiths” or Nazgûl, once noble knights who have sold their souls for the sake of power and have existed ever after in a border zone between life and death.  They have bodies, but those bodies are utterly invisible; their lust for dominion has literally turned them into servile nobodies. When I was thirteen, the stealthy irruption of these frightening half-men into the apparent peace of the hobbits’ comfortable Shire scared me as much as the prospect of a California earthquake in my placid Corona del Mar, and no rereading of the Lord of the Rings has ever matched the sheer thrill of that primal terror. The Black Riders are one of Tolkien’s most enduring creations. Their power of suggestion has been so great that an ant, a crustacean, and a wasp all bear Nazgul as part of their scientific names, and at least one respectable American historian’s panoply of extracurricular talents includes a Nazgûl scream that she perfected in adolescence.

    I was not perfecting my Nazgûl scream; I was looking skyward for flying horses. When I first read the Lord of the Rings in Southern California in the mid-1960’s, my own skies were filled with amphibious helicopters, bound for Vietnam from the El Toro Marine Air Station, and undoubtedly my own imaginary picture of the Nazgûl was conceived in their image. When Frodo complains about having a Black Rider upset his peaceful travels within “my own Shire,” Gildor the elf retorts that the Shire is not his at all, and furthermore, “The wide world is all about you; you can fence yourselves in: but you cannot forever fence it out.” The Marine helicopters that chopped their way westward from El Toro reminded everyone in their path that the wide world reached deep into our sleepy beach town, and it was that same idea of connection with the outside world and the immanence of its tribulations that made the Nazgûl so scary for an adolescent. For most readers of the Lord of the Rings, the Black Riders lodge in the imagination in their final airborne form, screaming back and forth as their steeds flap leathery wings; it is hard to remember how slowly and cleverly Tolkien builds up this dread vision across hundreds of pages before he completes it.

    Thirty years after that first reading, I began to wonder whether the scream of the Nazgûl might really be the scream of the V-2 rockets that rained down on Britain in 1944-1945. Tolkien himself rejected any simple connections between his work and the Second World War. In his foreword to the second edition of the Lord of the Rings, he protested that his “prime motive was the desire of a tale-teller to try his hand at a really long story that would hold the attention of readers, amuse them, delight them, and at times maybe excite them or deeply move them.” But the screaming rockets of Wernher von Braun must have crossed his mind, for in the same foreword he describes his process of composition: “It was during 1944 that, leaving the loose ends and perplexities of war which it was my task to conduct, or at least to report, I forced myself to tackle the journey of Frodo to Mordor [that is, his hobbit hero’s confrontation with absolute evil, with all nine Nazgûl zipping about in full regalia, mounted on pterodactyls]. These chapters…were written and sent out as a serial to my son, Christopher, then in South Africa with the RAF.” Still, he also warns that “an author cannot of course remain wholly unaffected by his experience, but the ways in which a story-germ uses the soil of experience are extremely complex, and attempts to define the process are at best guesses from evidence that is inadequate and ambiguous.” Whatever sound the Nazgûl scream made inside Tolkien’s head, it was no less effective inside mine at the age of thirteen, piercing through the staccato whap of the rotors of Boeing CH-46 Sea Knights.

    I have reread the Lord of the Rings at least three times since that first immersion, and the Black Riders have never stirred up such vividly immediate fears as they did in my adolescent imagination. The fear they inspire now is a thoroughly adult fear, because the Nazgûl still move among us, creeping, snuffling, hissing, foul of temper and fouler of temperament. Today they tend to be dressed in suits rather than cloaks, with names like Mitch and Ted and Mike rather than Khamûl, with titles like The Senator from Kentucky and The Former Vice President rather than The Witch-King of Angmar, but their story is always the same, and sadly eternal:

    They were once men. Great kings of men. Then Sauron the deceiver gave to them nine rings of power. Blinded by their greed, they took them without question. One by one, they fell into darkness and now they’re slaves to His will. They are the Nazgûl, Ringwraiths. Neither living nor dead.

    And unfortunately, our Nazgûl, unlike Tolkien’s cloaked and crowned voids, show us the faces on which their iniquity has been written.

    THE PRANCING PONY

    One of the reasons that the first Star Wars film left my youthful self unimpressed was the obvious derivation of its bar on the edge of the galaxy from the bar in one of the most famous episodes of the original TV show Star Trek, “The Trouble with Tribbles.” The futuristic furniture, the customers from all corners of the galaxy exhibiting every variety of body type and speaking every kind of language, these had already been done to brilliant and humorous effect, and the fact that they were done for a tiny screen in cheap materials in black-and-white had made no difference to me: the idea was the thing. Star Wars, of course, meant to restyle the intergalactic bar for eyes accustomed to color, wide screens, and digital special effects; in the eyes of a moviemaker, these matters of superficial form defined an absolute distinction where my censorious young self saw an act of plagiarism. I was too young then to recognize that in any case the intergalactic bar was only a recent manifestation of an immemorial archetype, the inn at the border between one place and another, the diversorium, the caravanserai, the frontier saloon.  Douglas Adams’ Restaurant at the End of the Universe is no different in its way from the tavern on the River Mincio where Verdi’s Rigoletto meets the assassin Sparafucile to plot the death of the Duke of Mantua, who appears at the same inn in disguise to sing “La donna è mobile.” Inns have always catered to different social strata as well as different geographies, and there is often something disreputable about them because they exist where the usual limits that define society turn flexible.

    In both the Hobbit and the Lord of the Rings, that border saloon is a pub called the Prancing Pony, situated just over the human side of the border between the Shire of the hobbits and the world of men, in a village called Bree. The Prancing Pony caters to guests and animals who come in two different sizes: hobbit and human, pony and horse, and, on one memorable occasion, a hit squad of Nazgûl who end up stabbing pillows rather than Frodo and his friends. The Nazgûl, it seems, have not only surrendered their souls to greed, but also a good bit of their common sense. They are a singularly dimwitted lot — but then they had to be dimwits to sell off their principles in the first place. As Thucydides, Dante, and Machiavelli will happily remind us, people who choose to keep their souls and their principles also tend to keep their intelligence as well, albeit at the price of exile.

    Tolkien and C.S. Lewis and a group of literary friends who called themselves the Inklings used to meet at an Oxford pub called the Eagle and Child, at the edge of town on the road from Oxford to Woodstock. Just beyond this establishment (wags call it the “Bird and Baby”), a little farther up the road out of Oxford, is the Catholic church of St. Aloysius, where Tolkien was a parishioner. Built by the Jesuits in 1875 to serve the city’s Catholic community, St. Aloysius faces an explicitly anti-Catholic monument erected in 1843 to commemorate three bishops of the Church of England, all burned at the stake in Oxford during the reign of the Catholic queen Mary Tudor. Hugh Latimer and Nicholas Ridley died as heretics in 1555 in the city’s Corn Market. A third, heretic, Thomas Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury, watched their excruciating demise (Ridley took a long time to ignite) from a tower prison nearby and was burned himself the following year. As he mounted the scaffold, Latimer is said to have exhorted his friend, “Play the man, Master Ridley; we shall this day light such a candle, by God’s grace, in England, as I trust shall never be put out.” The Martyrs’ Monument on the road out of Oxford rose as a local protest against the Anglo-Catholic Oxford Movement that had begun to flourish in the 1840’s; in effect, it marked the border between town and country by affirming Oxford’s Protestant identity, secured when Elizabeth I succeeded “Bloody Mary” in 1558, and resisting any attempts to heal the centuries-old hostilities between Catholic and Anglican.

    But if the Martyrs’ Monument and the church of St. Aloysius represented an ancient Oxonian religious conflict, Somerville College, a little farther out than the Catholics on the road to Woodstock, presented an entirely new challenge to Oxford when it was founded in 1879: the college admitted women, for the first time in the eight hundred years since the university was founded.

    A few years ago, at a conference at this same Somerville College, a Danish friend and I went out to find some dinner. We walked the length of Somerville, passed St. Aloysius, passed the Martyrs Monument, and turned into the first pub we saw: none other than the Eagle and Child. We were thrilled to sit with our pints where the Inklings had once sat before us, there on the borderland between traditional Oxford and the wild unknown of Catholics, women, and countryside. He suddenly grinned and exclaimed, “We’re in the Prancing Pony!” And of course we were. Physically, the Prancing Pony of Bree is said to be have been modeled on the Bell Inn of Moreton-on-Marsh, where Tolkien was also a regular, and the town of Bree is itself a thin disguise for the village of Brill, which stands on the border between Oxford and Buckinghamshire, but there is no doubt that the Eagle and Child (at least up to its present remodeling, now in progress), is, or has been, a classic Restaurant at the End of the Universe, where minds meet and ideas fly free on wings of conversation.

    In ancient times, travelers arriving in Athens from the south passed by a verdant grove, dedicated to the hero Hekademos, before reaching the city walls. Eventually Plato took over responsibility for this property, and turned it into a school, his Academy, a Prancing Pony whose Inklings included, among many others, his nephew Speusippus; Dion, a Sicilian prince; two women students, Axiothea and Lastheneia, and a flashily-dressed, bejeweled beach boy from the north of Greece named Aristotle. No one could enter without knowing geometry, Plato’s idea of what it meant to be — not a man, but human.

    Putin’s Poisons

    Russia is a country of symbols. Major political shifts here are always accompanied by a change of outward trappings, as a graphic demonstration of a rupture with the old. In March 1917, as the Russian throne stood empty after the abdication of the last Czar, the crowned double-headed eagles — the symbols of the fallen empire — were being toppled all over the country: thrown down from the façades of government buildings, bridges, theaters, department stores, and spectacularly from the rostrum in the State Duma’s hemicycle in Petrograd. The new currency printed by the provisional government featured the eagle without the crowns or the scepter — a rare collector’s item as it only lasted a few months, until the eagle was eliminated altogether when the Bolsheviks seized power in a coup d’état later that year.

    Trying desperately to cling to power as the country — and the world — was changing around them, a new generation of Communist leaders attempted another coup d’état in August 1991. It seemed bound to succeed — after all, the leaders of the coup, who tried to stem a democratic tide provoked both by the half-hearted reforms of the 1980s and by the deteriorating woes of the socialist economy, held all the levers of power. The self-proclaimed “emergency committee” included the USSR’s vice president, prime minister, ministers of the interior and defense, and the chairman of the KGB — the top brass of the regime which had control of the party and state machinery, the propaganda apparatus, and all branches of the security forces, from the regular army to the secret police. And they had tanks, which they sent to occupy downtown Moscow.

    What they failed to account for was a changed Russian society: people who had tasted a sampling of freedom, however imperfect, were not prepared to give it up. The Muscovites who went into the streets — initially in the thousands, then in the hundreds of thousands — were not armed with anything except their dignity and a determination to defend their freedom. They came and stood in front of the tanks, and the tanks stopped and turned away. A mighty totalitarian system that had held the world in fear for decades went down in three days, defeated peacefully by its own citizens. I was a ten-year-old boy in Moscow — too young to join my father at the barricades by the White House (the seat of the Russian parliament that became the center of resistance to the coup) but certainly old enough to grasp the lesson of what was happening: that however strong a dictatorship, when enough people are willing to stand up to it they will succeed. The tanks will stop and turn away.

    The fall of the Soviet regime was followed, inevitably, by the overthrow of its symbols. On August 22, as the Russian republic’s president, Boris Yeltsin, who had led the opposition to the coup, addressed a huge victory rally from the White House balcony, thousands of Muscovites went over to Lubyanka Square, the site of the KGB’s headquarters, to tear down the monument to its founder, Felix Dzerzhinsky. The nineteen-foot bronze statue of the Soviet secret police chief hanging from a noose as a crane lifted it from its pedestal remains among the most enduring images of Russia’s democratic revolution. That same evening, a memorial plaque honoring Yuri Andropov was dismantled from the façade of the KGB building. Andropov was someone who had epitomized both the domestic repression and the external aggressive-ness of the Soviet system. As ambassador to Budapest, he was among those who oversaw the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. As longtime chairman of the KGB, he made a priority of targeting political dissent, setting up a special directorate to fight “anti-Soviet activities” at home and expanding the gruesome practice of punitive psychiatry in which dissidents were confined to torturous conditions of forced psychiatric “treatment.” A plaque honoring this man as a “distinguished statesman” was inconceivable in a democratic Russia.

    In December 1999, President Yeltsin was preparing to hand over power to a former KGB operative by the name of Vladimir Putin — a relatively obscure apparatchik who had recently been appointed prime minister and enjoyed a meteoric political rise on the back of mysterious apartment bombings blamed on Chechen terrorists and a brutal military campaign in Chechnya that culminated in his newly formed party’s victory in parliamentary elections. Much of the world media, pundits and foreign leaders everywhere, wondered who this Mr. Putin was and what they should expect from him, domestically and in the realm of foreign policy. For anyone willing to notice, however, the answer was already there. On December 20 — the anniversary of the founding of the Soviet secret police — Putin held a low-key ceremony on Lubyanka Square, attended by a few former colleagues and a handful of journalists, to unveil the restored memorial plaque to Andropov, the “distinguished statesman.” It was the same one that had been dismantled in August 1991, carefully preserved and waiting for its moment.

    In this country of symbols, Putin could not have chosen a more potent one to mark the start of a new political era. As if in confirmation of his intentions (if one were needed) he proceeded, in the first year of his presidency, to reinstate the Soviet-era national anthem once personally selected by Stalin. “A national anthem is a symbol,” Boris Strugatsky, a celebrated Russian science fiction novelist, wrote in 2000. “What can be symbolized by a return to the former Communist Party anthem except a return to the former times? This is frightening… It seems we are destined for a new spiral of suffering: a rejection of democracy, a return to totalitarianism and great-power games, an inevitable failure — and then another perestroika, democratization, freedom, but in the context of a total economic collapse and an impending energy crisis. I would very much like to be wrong.”

    Alas, he wasn’t. Symbols were followed by substance. On the fourth day after Putin’s inauguration as president in May 2000 — in keeping with the Russian saying that “those who will offend us won’t survive three days” — he dispatched armed operatives from the prosecutor-general’s service and the tax police to raid the offices of Media Most, Russia’s largest private media holding and the parent company of NTV, an influential television network. For years, NTV had been a staple in millions of Russian households, carrying critical news coverage, unfettered talk shows, and hard-hitting political satire — including the weekly program Kukly (Puppets) that did not shy away from deriding Russia’s most powerful politicians. Former deputy prime minister Boris Nemtsov once recalled how President Yeltsin, during one of their meetings in the Kremlin, remarked that he was tired of constant criticism on NTV and asked for the remote so he could turn off his television set.

    For Putin, turning off his own TV was not enough — he had to silence everyone else’s, too. NTV was destroyed within a year as its studios were seized in an early dawn raid on Holy Saturday in April, 2001. Within three years of Putin’s coming to power, by June 2003, all the other private television networks were silenced too, with the state regaining its Soviet-era monopoly on the most important source of public information. And though there was no single “moment” that could be said to mark Russia’s transition from its imperfect democracy of the 1990s to the perfect authoritarianism overseen by Putin today, the year 2003 was an important turning-point. After pulling the plug on Russia’s last private TV network in June, Putin went after a prominent rival in October — the oil tycoon and Russia’s richest man, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who had the tenacity to accuse the government of corruption and funded opposition parties and civil society groups. Khodorkovsky was arrested in a raid on his private jet by FSB operatives while on a trip to Siberia, brought back to Moscow, and displayed on television sitting in a courtroom cage.

    The goal was not only to silence Khodorkovsky but to send a message to the rest of Russia’s business community: stay out of politics or end up like him. The message was heeded. (Khodorkovsky would spend a decade in Putin’s prisons before being expelled to the West, Andropov-style, on the eve of the Sochi Olympics.) Finally, in December 2003, Russia held a parliamentary election that, for the first time since the end of Soviet rule, was assessed by international observers as “not fair,” with the effect of banishing genuine opposition voices from the Duma and turning it into a rubber stamp. “Parliament is not a place for discussion” — this imperishable observation by Boris Gryzlov, the speaker of the Duma and Putin’s party colleague, would be a fitting epitaph for future history books on Russia under Putin.

    Corruption has always been a feature of Russian life, but the removal of checks and balances and the institutionalization of authoritarian rule under Putin enabled kleptocracy on a scale never seen before. Putin’s personal friends — from his childhood, from his KGB days, and from his stint at the St. Petersburg mayor’s office in the 1990s — sprung from obscurity to join the ranks of Europe’s richest men, helped by lucrative no-bid government contracts and requisitioned private assets. Names like Arkady Rotenberg, Gennady Timchenko, and Igor Sechin have come to symbolize the crony capitalism of the Putin era. The much-maligned “oligarchs” of the 1990s paled in comparison. From time to time, glimpses from that world would come into public view, as with the contract to build a thirty-mile road for the Sochi Olympics that exceeded the cost of NASA’s Mars exploration program; a $2-billion offshore account belonging to a cellist friend of Putin’s, found among the Panama Papers; a $1.3 billion Italian-style palace reportedly constructed for Putin’s personal use on the Black Sea coast. For evident reasons, such stories never become subjects of tame parliamentary debates or state-controlled television programs.

    As the screws tightened and conventional channels of political activity and public communication were shut off, Russians — especially the younger urban middle classes — began taking to the streets to voice opposition to Putin’s rule. The protests snowballed in the winter of 2011–2012 as tens of thousands filled the streets of downtown Moscow to denounce a blatantly fraudulent parliamentary election, in which Putin’s party secured “victory” through large-scale ballot-stuffing. Among the leading voices at those rallies was Boris Nemtsov, who — unlike many of his former colleagues in the Yeltsin-era establishment — was not willing to be complicit in Russia’s turn to authoritarianism. “Putin, leave! You don’t know your own people,” he said, addressing a 100,000-strong crowd on Bolotnaya Square, across the river from the Kremlin, in December 2011. “You don’t even understand why we are here. We are here because we have a sense of dignity. We are here because we are not slaves.” Once the face of Russia’s hopes for democracy in the 1990s — a successful regional governor, deputy prime minister, and presumed heir to the presidency — Nemtsov emerged as the most prominent opponent of Putin’s corrupt and despotic rule, leading street protests, organizing local election victories for the opposition, successfully advocating for targeted Western sanctions on Putin’s cronies and oligarchs.

    He was too principled to be bought, too bold to be frightened, and too dangerous to be tolerated. On the evening of February 27, 2015, Nemtsov was gunned down, five bullets in the back, as he walked home across a bridge in front of the Kremlin. It was the most high-profile political assassination in the modern history of Russia. To this day, its organizers continue to be protected by the highest levels of the Russian government. An oversight report by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2020 has concluded that the reason for this continuing impunity is “not the capabilities of the Russian law enforcement, but political will.” After all, one cannot be expected to investigate oneself.

    The last public demonstration Nemtsov had led was against Putin’s war against Ukraine. In September 2014, tens of thousands marched down Moscow’s boulevards in protest at the Kremlin’s aggression against Russia’s close neighbor and traditional ally. Earlier that year, following a popular “revolution of dignity” that ousted a corrupt and authoritarian Ukrainian leader, Putin moved full-scale against that country, starting an unannounced but deadly war in eastern Ukraine under the guise of a phantom “separatist” conflict and formally annexing the Crimean Peninsula for Russia. This was the first time one European nation seized territory from another since the end of the Second World War. It was not the first time Putin crossed another country’s borders, though: in 2008 his forces had attacked the former Soviet republic of Georgia, occupying (but not formally annexing) some twenty percent of its territory.

    To Western leaders, the war on Ukraine came as a shock: one official statement after another derided Putin for “breaching international law,” “violating commitments,” and “passing a point of no-return.” The only cause for shock, though, should have been how long the leaders of Western democracies had not only tolerated but enabled Putin and his regime — by lending him much-needed international legitimacy and by allowing his cronies to use Western countries and financial institutions as havens for their looted wealth. The late Vladimir Bukovsky, a famed Soviet-era dissident, once remarked that for many Western politicians the ability to fry their morning bacon on Soviet gas trumped any concern for human rights.

    In this respect, not much has changed since the 1970s. In 2001, weeks after Putin’s government seized control of NTV, President George W. Bush famously stated that he had “looked the man in the eye… [and] was able to get a sense of his soul.” (An impossible feat, given Putin’s remarkably soulless eyes.) Later he praised Putin as “a new style of leader, a reformer… a man who is going to make a huge difference in making the world more peaceful by working closely with the United States.”

    Barack Obama continued this line of rapprochement, beginning his presidency with a “reset” in relations with Putin following the Georgia war; trying (unsuccessfully) to block Congressional passage of the Magnitsky Act that imposed targeted visa and financial sanctions on Kremlin officials involved in human rights abuses; and publicly praising Putin for his “extraordinary work… on behalf of the Russian people.” On March 5, 2012 — the day after Putin “won” an election characterized by what OSCE observers described as a lack of “real competition” and “abuse of government resources” — the Obama administration announced that “the United States congratulates the Russian people on the completion of the presidential elections, and looks forward to working with the president-elect.” I vividly recall that we in the Russian opposition received the news of this endorsement as we stood in Moscow’s Pushkin Square with thousands of people who came out to protest the sham vote. It was difficult to say whether the people on that square — and the millions around the country who shared their outlook — felt more mocked or insulted.

    Glaringly, the next American president, Donald Trump, professed his personal admiration and even reverence for Putin, invited him back into the Group of Eight (from which he had been expelled after the annexation of Crimea), and appeared to equate Russian intelligence officers accused of meddling in American elections with Americans who had helped craft the Magnitsky Act. In a pointed episode in 2017 — remember how much symbols matter for the Kremlin — the Trump administration, acting through a friendly senator, tried to block the effort to name a street in front of the Russian embassy in Washington D.C. after Boris Nemtsov. The administration’s attempt failed as the D.C. Council stepped in to legislate the street naming — the first commemoration of Nemtsov anywhere in the world — but the intention  was telling.

    In fairness, the policy of accommodation toward Putin (in a different historical era it would have been called “appeasement”) was not limited to the United States. With rare exceptions, European leaders did little better. I will never forget a lavish banquet honoring Putin during his state visit to the United Kingdom in June 2003 (which I was covering as a journalist), with champagne toasts and merry renditions of “For He’s a Jolly Good Fellow” — literally days after his government pulled the plug on Russia’s last independent television network. The banquet was held at the London Guildhall, not far from the spot where, three years later, Russian agents, likely acting on Putin’s personal orders, would poison Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer turned political émigré, with radioactive polonium: an attack against a NATO citizen on NATO soil.

    As history has repeatedly shown — and very clearly so in the case of Vladimir Putin — appeasement is not only morally wrong but also practically ineffective. By turning a blind eye to Putin’s domestic abuses in the hope of being able to “do business” with him in international affairs, Western leaders ignored a fundamental maxim of Russian history: foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy. Repression at home and aggression abroad follow each other. This interrelationship has been manifested throughout Russia’s history, but perhaps never as pointedly as in the past three decades. Democratic aspirations at home in the 1990s were duly translated into progressive international posturing, from President Yeltsin’s support for the independence of the Baltic States and Poland’s NATO membership to Russia’s own accession to the Council of Europe and the Group of Eight and its cooperation treaty with NATO that affirmed a “shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free.” With Putin’s authoritarian turn, Russian foreign policy was redirected to supporting dictators and rogue regimes all over the world, often through confrontation with democratic nations — including a direct military collision with U.S. forces in Syria in February 2018. Putin’s national security strategy has designated NATO actions as “a threat”; one of his state-of-the-nation addresses featured a computer animation of a ballistic missile attack on Florida; Russian military exercises have included simulated nuclear strikes on NATO countries and allies; and state propaganda chief Dmitri Kiselev has boasted on the air about Russia’s ability to “turn the U.S. into radioactive ash.” Alongside the actual wars against Ukraine and Georgia, Putin’s aggression has come in “hybrid” forms designed to undermine the security and sovereignty of others, from as near as the neighboring Belarus to as far as the Central African Republic.

    There is no reason to expect a regime that violates its own laws and tramples on its own citizens to respect international norms or the interests of other nations. History, as they say, knows no “if,” but one can only wonder what the world would look like today if Western leaders had taken a more principled stand against Putin’s attacks on democracy early on.

    The main purpose of historical analysis is not the study of the past — however fascinating it may be — but the preparation for the future. History has not been kind to Russia, but it has given it a number of openings for democratic change — and, no doubt, there will be another. To avoid repeating past mistakes, it is important to learn from them. The main reason for the failure of Russia’s transition to democracy in the 1990s lay in the inability — or the unwillingness — on the part of its new democratic leadership to fully break with the Soviet past. While Russia moved toward free elections, media pluralism, open borders, and a market economy, it never went through a process of public reckoning with the crimes of the former regime. There was nothing like the Stasi Records Agency in the former East Germany, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in post-apartheid South Africa, or the Office for the Documentation and the Investigation of the Crimes of Communism in the Czech Republic. Some of the Soviet archives were briefly opened — and quickly shut again.

    Russia’s Constitutional Court did rule in 1992 that “the governing structures of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had been the initiators of repression… directed at millions” — but no practical consequences followed. A lustration bill restricting former Communist and KGB officials from positions of power was introduced in the Russian parliament, but was never adopted. The old regime remained only half-condemned. “Be careful, it’s like dealing with a wounded beast,” Bukovsky warned members of Yeltsin’s government in the early 1990s. “If you don’t finish it off, it will attack you.” His warning came sadly true with Putin’s political rise just a few years later. The lesson for those who will shepherd Russia’s next transition to democracy is clear: symbols are not everything. It is not enough to shed the outward trappings of a dictatorship, not enough to change national anthems, topple monuments, and remove memorial plaques. The underlying problems must be identified and addressed — and only such a process of atonement and reform can guard against an authoritarian resurgence. The successful experience of many emerging democracies, from Chile to South Korea, testifies to this.

    But the West should learn its lessons, too. Although the main reasons for Russia’s botched democratic transition of the 1990s were undoubtedly domestic, the reformers could have been greatly helped by a promise of European and Euro-Atlantic integration — a promise that played such an important role in incentivizing successful post-communist transitions in other countries of Eastern and Central Europe. In February 1990, in his historic address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress, Václav Havel, the dissident playwright and new president of Czechoslovakia, framed that entire transition in terms of his country “returning to Europe.” For many former Warsaw Pact states, this return meant not only a symbolic affirmation of their status as “fully” European but also tangible practical benefits to their citizens in the form of open markets, free trade, and visa-free travel. In many cases, this prospect provided a crucial impetus for policymakers to stay the course in the face of acute economic and social challenges.

    No such prospect was given to Russia in the 1990s. Indeed, overtures from Moscow were often met with silence. On December 21, 1991, as NATO diplomats gathered at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels to meet with their counterparts from former Warsaw Pact countries, Russian Ambassador Nikolai Afanasyevsky read out a letter from President Yeltsin to NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner vowing to work toward “strengthening stability and cooperation on the European continent” and “raising a question of Russia’s membership in NATO … as a long-term political aim.” According to contemporary press accounts, “NATO officials, from Secretary-General Wörner on down, seemed too taken aback by the Russian letter to give any coherent response.” By the time Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev finally received assurances from the Clinton administration that the United States would be open to Russian membership in NATO in 1995, the democratic window in Russia itself was rapidly closing. As for potential accession to the European Union — which, under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty, was supposed to be open to “any European state,” Russia being the largest one — that prospect was not offered to Yeltsin’s government even as a distant possibility. Western reluctance to accept the nascent democratic Russia as one of its own would later be skillfully played by Putin’s propaganda to portray the community of democracies as inherently anti-Russian.

    Many of those mistakes came not from malice but from unpreparedness, both in Russia and in the West. For many Western policymakers in the late 1980s, the very prospect of democratic changes in Russia seemed to be in the realm of fantasy — whether because of confident predictions by Kremlin-watchers that the Soviet regime was secure and stable, or because of the misguided (and offensive) stereotype that Russians are somehow inherently unsuited for democracy — a stereotype that Ronald Reagan had described in his Westminster speech as “cultural condescension, or worse.” In fact, it is a matter of historical record that when Russians were able to choose their fate in a free election — be it the State Duma election in 1906, the Constituent Assembly vote in 1917, or the presidential election in 1991 — they chose democracy over dictatorship, and by a landslide. Democratic reformers in Yeltsin’s government were equally unprepared for the momentous task before them, making mistake after mistake and ignoring advice from those who knew better, including Bukovsky and the prominent pro-democracy lawmaker Galina Starovoitova, the author of the unsuccessful lustration bill. Honest mistakes were compounded by cynical schemes by those more interested in personal enrichment than in the success of Russia’s democratic experiment. That unprepared-ness of the early 1990s came with a high cost — primarily for Russia but also, eventually, for the West.

    It is imperative that we not repeat this error. If Russian history is any guide, big political shifts in our country come unexpectedly — including for their own participants. It is unlikely that the Czar’s interior minister, Vyacheslav von Plehve, a fervent advocate for a “small victorious war” with Japan in 1904, expected that war to result in Russia’s first revolution a year later. In a speech in Zürich in January 1917, the exiled Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin told a group of Swiss social democrats that “we of the older generation may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution,” but the revolution in Russia began six weeks later. In early August 1991, as I remember myself, no one predicted that the Soviet regime would not survive to the end of the month — and the Soviet Union itself to the end of the year.

    Today we hear familiar tunes, both from Kremlin propagandists and from their apologists in the West: that Putin’s regime is secure; that he is popular among Russians; that any alternative would be worse. As proof we are supposed to accept the results of bogus elections, with opponents disqualified from the ballot, and Putin’s public approval numbers in an unfree society where people are hesitant to share political opinions with strangers; and the false image of unanimity carefully crafted by state media. “There is no Russia without Putin,” as Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of the Duma, has said publicly — perhaps the biggest insult to my country I have ever heard.

    In truth — and despite the coercion and the pervasive propaganda — there are millions of Russians who have a different vision: one of a modern country that would respect its laws and play a constructive international role; that would be accountable to its own citizens and be respected rather than feared in the world. This Russia can already be seen — not in the dour halls of the rubberstamp legislature or in the staged shouting matches on state-run television, but in the hopes and the aspirations of Russia’s youth, the people who never witnessed any political reality except Putin’s but who are growing tired of a two-decade rule by one man whose circle increasingly resembles Leonid Brezhnev’s ageing Politburo. Even with the inevitable skewing of public opinion, surveys conducted by the independent Levada Center in the run-up to Putin’s sham plebiscite waiving presidential term limits in 2020 showed that the prospect of his continued rule split Russians fully in half, with most of those below the age of thirty in opposition. Perhaps more tellingly, a clear majority of Russians of all ages, 62 percent of them, wanted to age-limit Putin out of the presidency, while 59 percent said it was time for “decisive, large-scale” change in the country.

    The signs of this coming change are unmistakable. In local elections across the country — most spectacularly in Moscow in 2019 — pro-regime candidates have been losing to technical spoilers and political no-names even after real opponents had been disqualified from running. It should be difficult to lose elections when the opposition is not on the ballot, but such is the growing public fatigue with the system that Putin’s party is managing it — and this is likely to be repeated nation-wide in the parliamentary election in September. In a realization of the Putin’s regime’s greatest fear — its phobia after a series of “color revolutions” toppled authoritarian leaders in other post-Soviet states — Russians are increasingly willing to go to the streets to challenge the system — as hundreds of thousands did across the country, defying official threats and police violence, to protest the arrest of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in January.

    With his skillful social media outreach, his unique appeal to the young generation, and his organizational prowess, Navalny has emerged as Putin’s most dangerous challenger, attacking the regime not only over its repression, but also over its weakest spot: corruption. His investigative video detailing Putin’s lavish palace on the Black Sea has been viewed by a hundred million people, more than the combined audiences of Russia’s state television networks. The Kremlin has tried to silence Navalny in traditional ways: first, by an attempted poisoning, a method borrowed from the Soviet KGB and increasingly popular under Putin (it was tried — twice — against the author of this essay), then by arrest and imprisonment. The effect, it seems, has been the opposite, only strengthening Navalny’s public appeal and moral clout. As history shows, most dictatorships fall not under the power of their opponents but under the weight of their own mistakes. It seems Putin’s will not be an exception.

    Boris Nemtsov had long predicted that demands for change in Russian society would reach a critical point around the mid-2020s — and while no one can say exactly when or how this will happen, the more far-sighted are already preparing: organizing grassroots campaigns; building, despite the regime’s best efforts, a vibrant civil society on the ground; running in municipal elections to gain invaluable experience; learning to stand up for themselves in the face of police brutality during street demonstrations. Needless to say, any change in Russia can and should — and eventually will — come from Russians themselves. It is important, however, that Western democracies stay true to their values by refusing to accept or legitimize Putin’s attempts at further usurpations of power (including an extension of his rule, in violation of the term limit, in 2024); by stopping the import of corruption into their markets and financial institutions and finally targeting the Kremlin’s dark money abroad; by resisting calls for yet another “reset” or “détente” with an abusive and aggressive regime; and, above all, by engaging in dialogue with Russian society in anticipation of the task of integrating a post-Putin Russia into the community of law-abiding democracies — this time, for everyone’s sake, successfully. Just imagine the difference a democratic Russia would make for the world. Sooner or later, that day will come. With the right efforts and a shared commitment, it may come a little more quickly.

    Reckoning with National Failure: The Case of Covid

    Epidemics are not part of America’s collective memory. The colonial era’s smallpox and yellow fever epidemics, the three cholera epidemics of 1832, 1849, and 1866, the great flu pandemic of 1918 — none of these left a deep imprint on the national consciousness. None fit into a larger national story, at least none that Americans cared to tell. If the polio epidemic of the early twentieth century is remembered, it is mainly because it led to the polio vaccine and fits into a story about the triumph of medical science and American know-how. The AIDS epidemic is still a vivid memory in part because of its effect on the mobilization of the LBGT movement and an expanded vision of human rights. We Americans like our tragedies to have a happy ending. 

    A practical, inventive, yes-we-can people: that is the version of America many of us remember hearing about and believing in from childhood. Until recently, contagious disease has not troubled that understanding, and for good reason — experience has given us grounds for confidence. Advances in medicine have subdued the most lethal contagions. Disease hangs over all of us individually, but it has not threatened our collective life, much less our sense of ourselves.

    The Covid19 pandemic, however, will likely figure in our history in a way no previous national encounter with disease in the United States ever has. It is too big and disturbing a horror to be forgotten — not merely a medical story but also a social and cultural one: a story about a country unable to contain the forces of unreason within it. The American response to Covid19 has encapsulated an era when a nation that has always thought of itself as a success has had to confront the possibility that its luck has run out. At moments of crisis, from the Revolution to the Civil War and two world wars, the United States has not only benefited from its institutions and its wealth. It has also been exceptionally fortunate in political leadership. But it was America’s distinct misfortune in 2020 to confront a new and deadly virus at a time when a plague was already consuming its political life. Politics always matters for health and disease. Political decisions shape social structures and the allocation of resources, which in turn influence who gets sick and dies. Ordinarily, however, the chains of causality from politics to disease are long and complex. Not so this time. The impact of politics on the Covid19 pandemic was immediate and direct. 

    If Covid19 had struck in the decades before Donald Trump became president, it probably would not have mattered whether the administration in office was Republican or Democratic. The president would have turned to the nation’s leading experts in public health and medicine, relied on their counsel, and rallied the nation to cooperate in stopping the spread of the disease. Unlike AIDS in the 1980s, Covid19 did not inherently provoke culture-war divisions. A minimally rational president of either party would have seen the pandemic as an opportunity of the same kind that presidents have had in wartime to rise above partisanship and become the nation’s defender. 

    That is not to say the American response would have been ideal. It would have had to overcome the longstanding inequities of its healthcare system and its underinvestment in public health. And because Covid19 was a new threat, any administration might have made mistakes, especially at the beginning of the pandemic when critical scientific questions about the disease were clouded in uncertainty. But Trump did not simply make mistakes stemming from inadequate scientific knowledge or other factors beyond his control. He deliberately misled the public. He promoted bogus cures. He modeled antisocial behavior. He held rallies that put his own supporters and their communities at risk of infection, and he turned the White House itself into a superspreader venue. To suit his political interests, his aides muzzled scientists in the government and overruled the public health guidelines they developed. Above all, Trump so thoroughly politicized measures such as the adoption of masks and social distancing that he made the denial of scientific evidence and the defiance of scientific judgment into emblems of Republican identity. Sucked into Trump’s world of “alternative facts” or lacking the courage to speak up, other national leaders of his party either supported him or kept silent.

    Much of the historical significance of the Covid19 pandemic would be lost, however, if we reduced it to Trump and the Republicans who buckled under him. The failure in the national response to the pandemic is a larger story and a longer one. The forces of unreason in American politics have been building up on the right for some time. Talk radio, cable news, and social media have provided new channels for disseminating conspiracy stories and other falsehoods. Polarization has become a road to power. The “infodemic” that accompanied the pandemic reflected a prior pattern, a wider pattern — a pre-existing condition, you might say: the growing use of the internet and social media for disinformation and the desperate countervailing efforts to bring the technology under control to serve rational interests in wellbeing.

    The Covid19 virus came to our shores when we were already in the throes of a different sort of virality. Contemporary changes in information technology have affected the pandemic in many ways. Technology has divided Americans along class and racial lines. People who could do their jobs online have been generally safe, healthy, and even prosperous, while those who have to do their work in person have been exposed to higher odds of infection and unemployment. The disparities in who got sick and died partly followed from that objective difference in risk. Covid19 entered a politically polarized and economically divided America, and it intensified the divisions.

    As 2020 ended, the United States counted nearly 350,000 deaths from Covid19, putting it fourth among the world’s large, high-income countries in deaths from the disease per 100,000 population, surpassed only by Belgium, Great Britain, and Italy. (The toll in the United States may reach 600,000 deaths in 2021, according to projections in late January.) The East Asian societies that successfully controlled the pandemic offer a stark contrast. While the United States had 100.6 Covid19 deaths per 100,000 population in 2020, Japan had a rate of 3 per 100,000, South Korea 2 per 100,000, and Taiwan and Thailand under 1. If the United States had been able to keep its rate to South Korea’s 2 per 100,000 in 2020, we would have had only about 7,000 deaths instead of almost 350,000. In 2019 a survey of international experts in health security had rated America the best prepared nation in the world to deal with a pandemic. But those experts had overlooked a critical factor. They overlooked politics. The United States has been dealing with a pandemic in a time of political derangement.

    Everything about the Covid19 pandemic, including where it struck first, came to be seen through the prism of parti-san politics. The virus arrived early in 2020 in the blue states and had its most severe impact on Democratic constituencies, a pattern that influenced how Trump and other Republicans framed the crisis. The disease then spread into the red states and by the November election was taking its highest toll in those areas. But by then Republicans had so successfully excused Trump from responsibility and minimized the suffering from the pandemic that its rise in the red states appeared to have little or no impact on Trump’s support there.

    The early outbreaks of the virus in coastal cities had nothing to do with their Democratic politics. A contagious disease originating abroad and spreading through contact was bound to arrive first in metropolitan centers with international connections and spread most rapidly through densely populated urban areas. The demographic profile of the victims was also predictable, since those areas had large numbers of low-income racial minorities who suffered from high rates of diabetes, heart disease, and other conditions that made them especially vulnerable to the coronavirus. In the early months of 2020, no one had drugs or other means of treating the virus itself. As the numbers of patients surged during March and April, medical facilities in New York and elsewhere also lacked critical resources such as testing capacity and personal protective equipment. Instead of a coordinated national response, however, the Trump administration left the problem largely to state governments, forcing them to compete with one another as they sought out resources in short supply.

    What would have happened if Covid19 had struck the red states first? While it is impossible to know for sure, Trump might well have responded with more urgency and been less inclined to say — as he did to a rally last year — that the pandemic was the Democrats’ “new hoax.” The early geography of the pandemic allowed the president and other Republicans to suggest that the problems of the blue states were their own fault, the result of their own leadership, indeed, their whole governing ethos. The president made it clear that he did not regard the cases and the deaths in politically hostile regions as his responsibility: “If you take the blue states out, we’re at a level that I don’t think anybody in the world would be at. We’re really at a very low level.” This was false: by September, when he made those remarks, the rate of new cases in the red states was substantially higher than in the blue states — and it was about to go much higher still.

    The federal government’s failure to stem the pandemic began with the delayed development of a test for the virus and a disorganized response to travelers from China and Europe. On January 13, two days after Chinese scientists published the genome for the novel coronavirus, the World Health Organization issued a protocol for creating a diagnostic test. (The virus would later be named “severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2,” or SARS-CoV-2, the cause of the disease Covid19.) While several countries immediately deployed a test using those instructions, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta was unable to do so until February 28, a full forty-six days later. As the Washington Post subsequently reported, “The agency squandered weeks as it pursued a test design far more complicated than the WHO version and as its scientists wrestled with failures that regulators would later trace to a contaminated lab.” The Food and Drug Administration, which could have approved alternative tests, also failed to act expeditiously. Even after a workable test was approved, the government failed to ramp up testing at commercial and university laboratories, and testing shortages persisted for months. Although evidence began emerging in January that people who had no overt signs of illness could transmit the virus, CDC officials were slow to acknowledge that possibility and, with testing kits in short supply, did not recommend testing individuals who had been exposed but reported no symptoms.

    Although the testing failure originated within the CDC, the delay in correcting it and the persistent testing shortages reflected a failure of leadership at the highest levels of government. In 2018, Trump had shut down the Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense in the National Security Council, which is part of the White House. (President Biden has restored it.) When problems developed in global supply chains for N95 masks, chemical reagents for tests, and other resources, Trump turned instead to an ad hoc White House team of business consultants assembled by his son-in-law, which proved unequal to the task.

    The delay in both testing and recognition of asymptomatic transmission contributed to the failure to identify foreign travelers carrying the virus into the country in early 2020. From mid-January to the end of February, while other countries began identifying and isolating carriers of the virus, the United States did not have the requisite diagnostic technology. On January 31, the day after the WHO declared a global health emergency, Trump announced restrictions on travel by non-citizens from China. But during the next two months, an estimated 40,000 returning citizens and others who fell under various exceptions to the travel ban arrived from China, and were often subject to nothing more than cursory questioning before being sent on their way and told to quarantine voluntarily for two weeks. Although local public health authorities were supposed to check with them later, the follow-up was haphazard. In any case, the virus had already entered the country during January, when at least 13,000 travelers a day had been arriving on flights from China. Trump announced restrictions on European travel on March 11, but as later genomic tracing would show, travelers had already brought a European strain of the virus to New York at least a month earlier. Although the travel restrictions may have bought some time, they were too little and too late, and enforcement was too lax and disorganized, to prevent the virus from gaining a foothold.

    The United States could still have kept infection rates low if in the early spring it had adopted policies that reflected the evolving scientific understanding of the virus and its transmission. Those policies would have included the general promotion of masks and social distancing and the development of the three-part regime that other countries established for extensive testing, isolation of the infected, and systematic tracing of their contacts. Instead, the White House followed an erratic course from February to April before turning against a national public health effort and undermining a rational response to the pandemic.

    Trump was so concerned about the appearance of a growing pandemic that he sought to stifle public warnings from health officials that were aimed at persuading Americans of the need for change. Talking privately with the journalist Bob Woodward, Trump clearly recognized the seriousness of the disease: “This is deadly stuff. You just breathe the air and that’s how it’s passed. … It’s also more deadly than even your strenuous flus.” Publicly, however, he was saying there was nothing to worry about. On February 25, 2020 Trump said he thought the coronavirus was “a problem that’s going to go away.” So he was enraged when on that same day Dr. Nancy Messonnier, director of the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases at the CDC, issued a scientifically warranted warning that community spread of the virus was inevitable and Americans needed to consider drastic changes in their everyday lives, triggering a sharp fall in the stock market. CDC officials were thereafter directed to clear all public statements about Covid19 with the White House, and Messonnier was sidelined. The politicization of the pandemic was complete. Two days later Trump publicly speculated that, “like a miracle,” the virus might just disappear. 

    National politics kept interfering with national competence. Trump also undermined the adoption of masks when the CDC changed its recommendations on their use. At first, partly for fear of exacerbating shortages of N95 and surgical masks for medical use, both the WHO and CDC did not recommend that the public at large obtain masks. Basing their judgment on research on earlier diseases, scientists also disagreed during the early months of 2020 about whether ordinary cloth masks would be effective in preventing transmission of the coronavirus. Some were emphatically opposed. “Stop buying masks!” the Surgeon General Jerome Adams tweeted on February 19. “They are  not  effective in preventing general public from catching #Coronavirus.” This was an instance of a legitimate mistake made at a point when knowledge of the virus was just developing. 

    Yet a scientific consensus in favor of public use of cloth masks emerged as evidence began to demonstrate that masks did limit transmission, indeed that they were crucial for the general public because people who contracted the virus were most likely to infect others before they developed symptoms. But when the CDC on April 3 recommended that Americans wear “non-medical, cloth masks” in public places, the president said, “I don’t see it for myself.” Not only did he and other members of his administration ignore the guidance; the president mocked people who did wear masks.

    Trump turned decisively against a concerted national effort during the spring. On March 16, he agreed to adopt federal guidelines for “15 Days to Slow the Spread,” including recommendations for Americans to work from home whenever possible and to avoid discretionary travel and shopping trips, eating or drinking at bars and restaurants, and gathering in groups of ten or more people. Reluctantly, at the end of March he extended those guidelines for another fifteen days. By then a group of states, most of them led by Democratic governors, had issued more comprehensive stay-at-home orders. Research has shown that the measures adopted in March and April prevented millions of cases, “flattening the curve” and thereby, in the short term, preventing hospitals and other facilities from being overwhelmed, as they had earlier been in northern Italy and New York City.

    That delay was supposed to provide time to establish a testing-isolating-tracing regime and to identify targeted measures for limiting spread so as to allow communities in stages to resume normal activities. Targeted measures, such as closing bars, restaurants, and large indoor gatherings, would have had far less cost to the economy than across-the-board lockdowns. But it was not long before Trump became impatient with restrictions at any level. Some of his advisers told him that the pandemic was ebbing, just the rationale he was looking for to abandon all regulation. For a few days in mid-April, it seemed as though Trump was going to insist that the response to the pandemic be entirely under his own control. “When somebody is the president of the United States,” he said, “the authority is total and that’s the way it’s got to be.” Three days later, however, as part of what aides called a “state authority handoff,” the White House coronavirus task force issued reopening guidelines, and Trump told the governors, “You’re going to call your own shots.” But he didn’t mean that, either. Ignoring his own administration’s criteria for relaxing restrictions, he began tweeting denunciations of Democratic governors who failed to “liberate” their states.

    During the spring, the president was increasingly at odds with the scientific community and his own government’s public health officials. Shunting aside the experts, he took over the daily public briefings on the pandemic, using that platform to make boasts, give false reassurances, and pass along misinformation, most notoriously about an unproven and later discredited treatment (the infamous hydroxychloroquine) and the potential value of injecting disinfectant to kill the corona-virus. In May, after officials including Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, recommended greatly increased testing, Trump said that testing was “overrated”: “When you test, you find something is wrong with people. If we didn’t do any testing, we would have very few cases.” Repeatedly, White House aides intervened with the CDC to stop it from issuing public health guidelines that conflicted with Trump’s political message. The CDC’s chief of staff later told the New York Times, “Every time that the science clashed with the messaging, messaging won.”

    Trump’s messaging, designed to further his political interests among his base, fostered a narrative among his supporters that the coronavirus was overblown, and that the disease was not nearly as serious or extensive as the media were saying. But the numbers of cases and deaths kept rising through the summer and fall as the virus raged in rural areas and red states that were spared earlier. Some Republican governors finally did adopt regulations concerning masks and social distancing, but others, such as the governor of South Dakota, Kristi Noem, refused to impose any restrictions. In June, at a time when Covid19 cases were still low in South Dakota, Noem invited Americans who liked how well the state was handling the coronavirus to come there. From August 7 to August 16, tens of thousands of motorcyclists arrived, converging on the small town of Sturgis for an annual motorcycle rally and spending time at its bars, restaurants, and tattoo parlors, generally without masks. By November, South Dakota’s rate of cases and deaths was among the highest in the country. 

    Earlier in the year, when Trump and other Republicans blamed the blue states for high rates of Covid19, the leaders of those states were dealing with a crisis that had been thrust upon them by forces beyond their control. But the later surge of the virus in the red states occurred when more was known about limiting transmission, and Trump and Republican leaders such as Governor Noem refused to act on the basis of that knowledge. Indeed, they passed off failure as freedom. Their refusal to require masks and social distancing showed how dedicated they were to freedom and how indifferent to danger. And it worked: the voters of those states did not hold them responsible for being the superspreaders that they were. In the wake of the November election, an analysis showed that 93 percent of the counties in the nation with the highest numbers of new cases per capita voted for Trump.

    While Trump and the Republican leadership were the immediate source of America’s catastrophic failure in the pandemic, they did not act alone or in isolation. They had the active support of right-wing media, and they benefited from the unguarded channels for the dissemination of falsehood created over the preceding quarter-century. In the right-wing world, the coronavirus was not the big problem that it was being made out to be; on the contrary, the mainstream media and the “deep state” were in league with Democrats, deceiving the public about what was generally a mild illness, all in an effort to limit freedom and bring down the president. Hatred of government has long been the basis on which the dissimilar elements of the right — evangelicals, business interests, the anti-vaxxers and anti-taxers — have been able to unite. Now the same hatred was mobilized against public health measures.

    Conspiracy stories are falsehoods of a particular kind, involving claims of massive collaboration in deception. The idea that climate change is a hoax requires believing that scientists all over the world have conspired in making up evidence of rising temperatures, melting polar ice, and other signs of global warming. The idea that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump requires believing that election officials all over the United States conspired in tampering with the results and that the judges who rejected those claims, including many Republican appointees, were all in on the “steal.” And the idea that the Covid19 pandemic was overhyped requires believing that scientists, front-line health workers, and public health officials joined together in another gigantic conspiracy.

    The attraction of the political right to conspiracy thinking is hardly new. But until the past quarter century, the Republican Party and mainstream media were generally able to limit the reach of the conspiracy-obsessed far right. By Trump’s presidency, however, Republican leaders had mainstreamed the fringe. Figures who used to be consigned to the political wilderness had gained a dominant role in both the party and its principal channels of communication. 

    The effect of that shift on public health was already evident under Barack Obama. In 2009, when scientists warned that the fall would bring a particularly dangerous flu — the H1N1 strain — right-wing media figures opposed Obama’s efforts to persuade Americans to get vaccinated. Glenn Beck, who had a Fox News program at the time, said that “you don’t know if this [vaccine] is going to cause neurological damage like it did in the 1970s” and that he would do “the exact opposite” of what the government advised. Rush Limbaugh told his listeners, “I am not going to take it [the H1N1 vaccine], precisely because you are now telling me I must. . . . I don’t want to take your vaccine. I don’t get flu shots.” According to an October 2009 Pew survey, Democrats were 50 percent more likely than Republicans to say they planned to get vaccinated. Skepticism about the vaccine among Republicans, according to a study by the political scientist Matthew Baum, was concentrated among those who relied on cable news, the internet, and talk radio rather than network television news. Republicans were predisposed against any Obama policy, but the key factor, Baum argues, was the breakup of the earlier “informational commons” that existed when Americans from different viewpoints watched the same TV news programs. The change in communication may have had real-world consequences in 2009: red states had both lower flu vaccination rates and higher death rates from the flu that year than blue states did. 

    By 2020, there was even less of an information commons as a result of the decline of newspapers and network television and the growth of social media and partisan websites. Republicans and Democrats had separate sources of information and often wholly opposed understanding of basic facts. Unlike the much-denounced mainstream news organs, the right-wing media proudly refused to observe such conventions of journalism as checking facts and making corrections. The social media platforms contributed to the spread of misinformation. As studies of online communication have shown, people are more likely to share false information than accurate information. False information has the advantage of triggering more powerful emotions. In addition, the clustering of likeminded people in social networks tends to encourage more extreme views, a process known as “group polarization.” Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and other social media also set their ranking algorithms to maximize “user engagement,” which often meant directing people to extremist and unreliable sources. For example, even when users watched a scientifically reliable video about vaccines, YouTube’s “up next” recommendation algorithm pointed them to an anti-vaccination video.

    Until 2019, the social media platforms rejected any responsibility for the misinformation they were circulating about any subject, including health. Defending themselves as champions of free speech, they did not want to bear the costs of separating fact from falsehood and assuming the role that the press has long accepted. But in the midst of a resurgence of measles in mid-2019, Facebook and Twitter broke from their traditional policy and changed their ranking algorithms on vaccine information to favor authoritative medical sources. When people asked about vaccines, the platforms began directing them to the WHO and CDC, not to anti-vaccination groups with more followers.

    When the Covid19 pandemic began, the social media platforms confronted the same issue. Physicians reported cases of patients taking deadly remedies recommended online, such as bleach and highly concentrated alcohol, or refusing professional advice, citing posts they had seen on Facebook. In late February 2020, however, the platforms began extending to Covid19 the policies that they had already adopted on vaccination. Facebook reported that during March it displayed warnings on about forty million posts related to the pandemic and that by late April had “removed hundreds of thousands of pieces of misinformation that could lead to imminent physical harm,” such as claims that drinking bleach cures the virus. It was also directing people to reliable sources of information. But despite Facebook’s actions, the sober messages of public health authorities were poor competition for the masters of misinformation. During April 2020, the top ten health misinformation sites on Facebook had four times as many views as the CDC, WHO, and eight other prominent health-care institutions.

    The change in policy at Facebook and other social media platforms represented a major shift, but the companies were unable to stop the spread of misinformation. Repeatedly, claims that appeared first on the political fringe took off when groups or websites allied with the Republican Party shared or repeated them. Political legitimation was crucial to the spread of lies. For example, a video called “Plandemic,” posted by its maker on Facebook and other platforms on May 4, showcased a discredited researcher who claimed that masks could make wearers sick, vaccines for the coronavirus would be dangerous, and Anthony Fauci and Bill Gates were planning to gain money and power through the pandemic. After being promoted by a QAnon page and anti-vaccine activists, Plandemic took off when Trumpian “Reopen America” groups in different states began sharing it. Within a week it had been viewed more than eight million times. Eventually social media platforms began taking it down, but the damage had been done.

    Trump himself played a central role in the spread of misinformation. On July 27 he shared another video peddling misinformation, this one called “America’s Frontline Doctors,” helping it gain tens of millions of viewers for claims that masks did not work and hydroxychloroquine was a cure for Covid19. The video showcased several doctors of dubious reputation, including one doctor-pastor known for arguing that “demon sperm” in nighttime dreams cause disease in women. On September 1, during an interview with Laura Ingraham on Fox News, Trump cited a statistic supposedly showing that only 6 percent of reported Covid19 deaths were in fact due to the virus. That claim had gone from a Facebook post with stops along the way in a QAnon page and the right-wing website Gateway Pundit, eventually reaching a Trump campaign advisor, the president himself, and Fox’s audience. These were not exceptional cases. A study by researchers at Cornell University, which analyzed 38 million articles about the pandemic, pinpointed one key driver of the “infodemic”: the president, who was himself the source of 38 percent of what the researchers called the “misinformation conversation.”

    The role of Trump and other Republican leaders in spreading misinformation about the pandemic created what seemed, at the time, to be an impossible problem for the social media platforms and the news media. Although the platforms and the media could indicate the claims were false, they could not suppress them. Claims by a president and leaders of one of the two major parties are inherently newsworthy; the public has a right and a need to know what they are saying, even when what they say is untrue. After the November election, Facebook and Twitter did block Trump from communicating lies that the election had been stolen from him. But he was already on his way out; the companies were unwilling to de-platform him when he was still firmly in power and his lies about the virus aggravated the pandemic. If they had done so at that time, they might have saved many lives. But the largest burden of responsibility for what Trump said and did properly belongs with him and the party that put him in office and continued to support him.

    By any reasonable standard, the United States failed in its response to the pandemic in 2020. Its mortality rate exceeded that of most peer countries in the West, and it was astonishingly higher than East Asian societies such as South Korea and Japan. Changes in life expectancy offer a particularly telling measure of how great a loss Americans suffered, and who suffered the most. According to a preliminary medium estimate (which will probably turn out to be low), the pandemic brought about a decline of 1.13 years in life expectancy for Americans in 2020. Beneath that overall decline lay enormous disparities by race: a decline of .68 years for whites, 2.1 years for African Americans, and 3.05 years for Latinos. The bigger losses in life expectancy for African Americans and Latinos stemmed from greater susceptibility to Covid19 at younger ages in those groups as well as higher mortality rates from the disease. The deaths among whites were disproportionately among the aged, particularly residents of nursing homes. A toxic combination of ageism and racism lay behind the right-wing view that the pandemic was overblown, or that the disease should be allowed to spread until the country reached “herd immunity.”

    The damage from the pandemic goes beyond lives lost. Many survivors suffer from “long covid,” which may impair their physical and mental health for years to come. Other long-term consequences will result from the disparate impact on families of the pandemic recession and the shutdown of in-person education. Whole sectors of the economy have been devastated, including many small businesses that have closed for good. 

    How to explain the catastrophic performance of the United States? A number of commentators have pointed to American individualism. The East Asian statistics that I have cited, for example, draw the response that those societies are too different culturally for a comparison to be valid. Not only did they impose stricter regulations, but their citizens, acting in a more communitarian spirit, also complied. According to the cultural argument, Americans would never have accepted such rules because of a deep-seated individualism that rejects governmental regulation of personal behavior. Individualism used to be an explanation of American achievements; in the pandemic it became an excuse for American failure. 

    Fortunately, we have some empirical evidence on whether regulations requiring masks made a difference in the United States. During the summer of 2020, Kansas conducted what amounted to a test of the efficacy of mask mandates. As a red state that might be presumed to be hostile to government regulation of personal behavior, Kansas is an instructive case. In July, the governor issued an executive order that mandated the use of masks in public places, while allowing counties to opt out. In an analysis of trends before and after the order went into effect, the CDC and Kansas Department of Health found that Covid19 incidence fell 6 percent in counties with the mask mandate and rose by 100 percent in the counties that rejected it. These results, the CDC report noted, were consistent with “declines in COVID-19 cases observed in 15 states and the District of Columbia, which mandated masks, compared with states that did not have mask mandates.” 

    During the same period when Kansas enacted its partial mandate, Trump and his advisers debated whether the president should adopt a mask mandate for the country. According to the Washington Post, internal Trump campaign polling data in July showed that more than seventy percent of voters in states targeted by the campaign favored “mandatory masks at least indoors when in public, and even a majority of Republicans support this.” One of the pollster’s slides read, “Voters favor mask-wearing while keeping the economy open” and support Trump “issuing an executive order mandating the use of masks in public places.” As part of this internal discussion, according to a New York Times report, Jared Kushner argued that embracing masks was a “no brainer” because Trump could say they were a key to enjoying the freedom to go safely to sports arenas and restaurants. But Trump concluded that “I’m not doing a mask mandate” after the White House chief of staff Mark Meadows warned that the base would “revolt” and that the president might not have the necessary legal authority, a point that had not worried Trump when he adopted other policies, such as excluding non-citizens from the Census count used for reapportionment.

     Since a mask mandate by Trump might have had ample public support, including from Republican voters, it seems difficult to argue that America’s individualist culture was the determining factor in the failure to adopt a mandate. Individualism might explain resistance to mask mandates if it had only one possible interpretation, which political leaders are unable to change. But even most libertarians accept a limit on individual liberty when actions threaten direct harm to others, as does the failure to wear a mask during a pandemic. Individualism was not the culprit. Political leaders also have the ability to shape opinion; as president, Trump radically shifted Republican sentiment on some issues, such as trade. As Kushner suggested, Trump could have spun “freedom” in favor of a mask mandate on the grounds that it would enlarge Americans’ freedom to enter public places in safety. The party that bills itself as the “party of life” could easily have found a rationale for Americans to avoid killing their grandparents and their co-workers. Trump may have thought, like Meadows, that his base would not tolerate a shift on masks, and perhaps some of them would not have tolerated it. But he may just have misconstrued his own political self-interest. 

    Another cultural explanation for American behavior during the pandemic points to dominant notions of masculinity. According to this interpretation, the use of masks and other protections run up against the social pressures on men to display fearlessness and a willingness to take risks. Some evidence does support the idea that gender affected the use of masks. During August-September 2020, Gallup asked respondents, “Do you always wear a mask when you can’t maintain social distancing in indoor settings?” Among Democrats, 90 percent of men and 93 percent of women said they did. Among Republicans, 40 percent of men and 56 percent of women said they did. While gender mattered in the responses, political identity mattered more.

    To be sure, gender affects political identity — the gender gap in voting has reached unprecedented levels in recent years — and Trump made use of gender stereotypes in ridiculing masks, just as he drew on anti-government individualism to oppose regulations. But those cultural tendencies did not determine his choices. Even from the standpoint of his political self-interest, Trump could have chosen to pursue power a different way. By the summer of 2020 he may have dug himself in, but if he had acted differently in the early spring, public attitudes and social behavior regarding masks and other protections might have evolved differently despite the individualism and hyper-masculinity championed on the right.

    The role of culture in explaining America’s national failure is similar to that of race and social inequality. American culture did not determine the choices that Trump made, but it allowed him to believe those choices would work. The appeals to individualism and masculinity were resonant enough among Republican voters to be a plausible short-term political strategy, even if ultimately disastrous for the country. Similarly, the racial and other socioeconomic disparities in the pandemic allowed Republican leaders and the right-wing media to say the coronavirus was overblown. After all, they were not talking to the groups who were suffering the most. Republicans had a different frame of reference. Even as millions of Americans lost their livelihoods, Trump kept pointing to the stock market, which hit new highs in 2020. Just as Trump’s response to the pandemic might have been different if the virus had first hit the red states instead of the blue states, his response might have been different if the pandemic had primarily hit a white, affluent population and had a bigger impact on the stock market and corporate America. 

    I do not mean to say Trump drew his support only from a white and privileged base. White working-class voters continued to support him, and while he lost African Americans and Latinos, he did better among them in 2020 than in 2016. People do not necessarily make their voting decisions on the basis of accurate calculations of risk. The virus did not kill or make seriously ill the majority of people who caught it. Individuals might discount the risk of contracting Covid19 if most or all the people they knew who had tested positive had recovered. Moreover, if their understanding of the corona-virus came from right-wing media they might discount the risk entirely, whereas they might worry that Democrats would shut down the economy and put them out of work. During 2020 many people may also have just changed their baseline expectations of risk. The virus may have just become one of many uncertainties in life to be endured as normal, not a reason to change behavior.

    As great a disaster as the pandemic was, it became normalized in a remarkably short time. By the final months of 2020, the number of Americans dying of the virus every day was about what the country had lost on September 11, 2001. But the shock had worn off, and it had become almost unimaginable that the United States would make the necessary changes in society and behavior to control the pandemic. Complacency about the virus had set in. Early failures had narrowed the field of alternatives. The rate of community spread was so high that contact tracing and testing appeared to be futile. The only solution became a technological fix — a vaccine. 

    America’s national failure in the pandemic has ominous implications for other challenges that America faces. Asking people to wear masks was not asking much of them. That many Americans refused to adopt so simple a change is a discouraging sign for how they will respond to demands that require sacrifice, such as reforms that are needed to deal with global warming. Climate change has evoked the same denial and defiance from the right as the pandemic, the same disregard for science, the same attraction to conspiracy stories. And just as Republicans dismissed the virus as overblown even when cases and deaths were growing in the red states, so they seem determined to ignore the realities of climate change even when they strike close to home. Disasters, such as the fires on the West Coast and the hurricanes in the Gulf, may become normalized. Alternatives may become unimaginable. Lying and manipulation for narrow political and economic gain may be become so routine that they no longer cause shock or indignation.

    The United States has had great achievements, but it has also been lucky to have capable leaders when it needed them most. Until 2016, it succeeded in keeping demagogues like Trump away from the presidency. The same forces of unreason were always there, but they now control one of America’s two parties. Although Trump is no longer in office, the political derangement that brought him to power is not yet over. Nor can we count on the supposed genius of our institutions to control it; there is only a hard struggle ahead to save those institutions and to get them to work at least as well as they once did. The pandemic is a warning about looming dangers. It is a cautionary tale that Americans must not forget if we are to escape from the derangement that has already cost so many lives and that threatens everything that we hold dear.