Education and The Economic Menace

    In the halcyon days of the British welfare state, even the poor had the opportunity to go to university. Anyone who had been offered a “place” could apply to the local Education Authority for support — not to cover the fees (there were none), but to meet the expenses of living. But when I took the form to my parents for the necessary signature, they hesitated. Having left school at twelve and fourteen, respectively, they wondered why I wanted “more study.” With my background in mathematics, I was already qualified for “a good job,” one beyond anything they could have imagined for themselves. I might become an accountant, even an actuary.

    That sort of thinking is still too much with us. It dominates the decisions of powerful people who, unlike my parents, have had ample opportunity to appreciate its shortcomings. The assault on public goods, carried out on both sides of the Atlantic, has bequeathed to nations, in varying degrees, an economic conception of education. Politicians as different as Margaret Thatcher and Barack Obama have played variations on the same theme. We need programs to prepare the young to do their bit in maintaining financial health. Perhaps we are not yet at the stage where embryonic citizens are viewed as raw materials, to be hammered into shape, fitting the available slots in the powerful economic machine that the nation will send to do battle in the Global Demolition Derby, but that vision is on the horizon.

    From Plato on, most people who have reflected seriously on education and its aims have not adopted the economic conception. Their attitude towards it is the one adopted by Rick Blaine to the petty crook Signor Ugarte: they would despise it if they thought about it. To be sure, many of them are concerned only with the elite, with people who do not have to worry about earning a living. Yet even Adam Smith, very much occupied with eliminating waste in the classroom or lecture-hall — sweeping away “the cobweb science of ontology,” for example — worries about the intellectual and moral decline of the minimally educated worker, confined by the division of labor to a lifetime of repetitive tasks. W.E.B DuBois eloquently strips the common disdain for market-oriented education of its limitation to class: “The object of education is not to make men carpenters but to make carpenters men.”

    Today, in many affluent nations, the Economic Menace slouches towards the schools and colleges and universities. The funds for public education need to be cut. When school budgets are tight, administrators decide to cut back on “the frills.” The arts and the humanities are the prime targets. Classes in music and the visual arts disappear. Instruction in the “less important” languages, including the dead ones, is abandoned. In the remaining humanities classes, teachers are urged to concentrate on the basics. Less time for literature, more emphasis on functional literacy. Such attitudes are also echoed at higher levels of educational policy. Governments decide to slash the already meager budgets for the humanities and the arts. In the United States, scientists often bewail the reduction of funds to support research, but American humanists can only envy American scientists: although the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health may be pinched by policymakers apparently bereft of any sense of the value of basic research, the scorn directed at the National Endowment for the Humanities and the National Endowment for the Arts has been far more intense. Those agencies are permanently threatened by the barbarians within the gates. (It was almost miraculous to read that the Biden administration has proposed to increase these agencies’ funding.)

    Increasingly, education means training and training means vocational training. Although it is entirely reasonable to identify a capacity for self-maintenance as one of the goals of education, two others ought not to be discarded. Young people should learn how to be citizens and how to be individuals. They should be taught how to be a member of a community, a society, a state, and they should also find their own distinctive place, their own distinctive voice, their own way of contributing to the lives of others, their own projected path to fulfillment. Perhaps tens of thousands of years ago, the small bands of hunter-gatherers of the later Paleolithic reasonably socialized the young by concentrating on the skills required to survive in a precarious world. During recorded history, the vast majority of human beings have been treated as disposable material for rulers bent on maintaining the wealth and power of their domain. Occupations have been routinely assigned by caste or class or gender or race, and their occupants have been efficiently honed to suit the appointed role. Thanks to political and economic developments that are rightly celebrated, some twentieth century societies demonstrated the possibility of doing more than that. They showed, for a time, how all three major aims of education — creating people who are simultaneously workers, citizens, and individuals — were broadly achievable. Why, then, the extraordinary regression, the return to a world in which training substitutes for education? What justifies the penny-pinching and the celebration of economic efficiency above all else?

    Let us suspend, for a moment, the assumption that what young people need — that all they need — is preparation for “a good job.”

    In one of the greatest essays on liberty ever written, John Stuart Mill explains what he takes to be fundamental. “The only freedom deserving of the name,” he instructs, “is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.” Mill’s vision of fulfillment, of the worthwhile life, centers on autonomy. Each of us should choose the pattern of our existence, setting the goals we view as most important, and, if we have a tolerable amount of success in attaining them, we shall have lived well. But is that enough? Some projects for a life are harmless — they do not interfere with the plans made by others — but also trivial. A person who retreats into solitude, spending the days counting and recounting the blades of grass in a particular area, has not discovered a promising new “experiment of living.”

    Mill’s tendency to focus on an abstract individual, disconnected from society, interferes with a genuine insight. Autonomy, as he recognizes, is important. The life you live should be your own. Still, it is worth asking just what this means. As a banal matter of fact, human beings do not spring into the world equipped with preferences and ideals that can guide their selection of life plans. The horizon bounding their inclinations is set by the possibilities made available by their social milieux. Although they may seek to expand the boundaries, they will inevitably do so by beginning from the options they come initially to understand. Moreover, that understanding emerges from their socialization. More concretely, the direction of their inclinations is set by the education they receive.

    Where, in all this, does the liberal’s cherished autonomy fit? What is the intended contrast with the regimes that have dictated, for the vast majority of human beings, the patterns of their lives? A tempting answer is that the choices made by the developed individual should accord with “who she is.” Genuine education is a “leading out” of a self. It is a process in which the embryonic form is preserved and allowed to grow undistorted. True education, Nietzsche claims, is a kind of freeing: the seeds of the mature individual are permitted to grow, protected from the weeds, rubbish, and pests that would interfere with their development. There is surely something right about this picture. It points to a genuine danger in socialization, to the possibility of distortion, mutilation, regimentation, alienation. Yet it is hard to make sense of the threat. For the idea of a complete character already present in the infant is absurd.

    To solve the difficulty, I suggest, we should not insist on a match between the full-grown person and a pre-formed inherited self, but attend instead to the nature of the process out of which the individual emerges. Think of education in its most expansive form as a dialogue between the growing organism and the ambient society. The educational dialogue goes badly when society fails to listen, insisting on leading in a particular direction whatever signals the developing organism might send. By contrast, education goes properly when the representatives of society, the parents, the caregivers, the teachers, as well as the institutions within which they work, are attentive to the features of the individual, responding to the directions in which they point.

    Long before a child can be credited with a clear sense of self, sympathetic and sensitive observation of distinctive patterns of behavior allows the identification of activities that seem likely to prove interesting. Opportunities are offered, not on the basis of what society supposes appropriate for children of that age and sex, but rather because they seem attuned to the ways that individual child is developing. Nothing is forced. Educators listen closely to the particular voice, trying to follow its individual music, and to help it express its own song.

    Autonomy is thus a matter of degree. It is not a property accruing to individuals who are launched into some space outside of (or above) society. Rather, the extent of someone’s autonomy is the result of developmental processes in which society is profoundly implicated. The choices that we see as autonomous are made possible because our prior socialization has provided opportunities that attentive interlocutors have recognized as attuned to individual features, observed so far in a growing person’s behavior. Those interlocutors have drawn out embryonic traits and instilled capacities for reflective choice. Although they have shaped the self that chooses, they have nonetheless cultivated a degree of autonomy. And in doing so, they have made possible the selection of a life plan that will continue the individual’s dialogue with the ambient society.

    For each of us, in our time, plays both parts. As we have received from the fostering of others, so too we grow into beings capable of providing opportunities in our turn. How that is done depends on our particular choices, on the projects that we select and the activities and values that we mark out as central. Once we recognize the social embedding of our lives, however, it is easy to understand why the project of the solitary grass-counter appears pathological. For that imaginary recluse contributes nothing to the lives of others. A fulfilling life must surely meet an extra condition: its plan must involve a positive impact on other lives, the lives of sentient beings. At the close of his brief for humanistic religion, John Dewey makes the point with uncharacteristic eloquence:

    We who now live are parts of a humanity that extends into the remote past, a humanity that has interacted with nature. The things in civilization we most prize are not of ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is the responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it.

    Personal fulfillment has an other-directed, a collective, dimension. For this reason, it becomes easy to harmonize two of the three major aims of education. In fostering tendencies to engage with others and to contribute to their lives, we would also induce the capacities for good citizenship. Dewey’s famous linkage of democracy and education is neither arbitrary nor a penchant for teaching what he called (disdainfully) “the civics.” Democracy, he says, is a way of life, a condition in which citizens seek to understand, and to learn from, the perspectives and the life experiences of their fellows. At small scales, in deliberations within the family or in a local community, examples of the delicate dialogue are familiar, even if they are not as common as they might be. The educational challenge, common to promoting fulfillment and to forming citizens, is to find ways of improving this aspect of life — increasing the frequency with which mutual engagement occurs at small scales, and fashioning institutions for introducing it at larger ones.

    And at this point we can even reintroduce the third aim, the goal of preparing young people to sustain themselves. What jobs will remain when the labor market becomes fully global, and when production becomes ever more automated? The most plausible answer: those requiring human contact. We are likely to continue to need human firefighters and doctors, nurses, and gardeners — and especially people to care for the elderly and to teach the children. In a future world in which the stigma of “service employment” has been thoroughly scoured away, and in which these occupations receive the level of compensation that they deserve — wages and salaries that allow those who serve to lead full and fulfilling lives — the skills needed in the labor market will be those needed for attentive interactions with others. Instead of lamenting the closing of the pit or of the factory, we might view automation as an opportunity. Those who have learned from the delicate dialogue may become fluent participants in it, finding satisfaction in the work they do with and for one another.

    Today education should provide, more than anything else, the propensity to engage with one another. How might that be accomplished?

    It will certainly not be accomplished by restricting it to emphasize the skills required by the current vision of the labor market. Instead we should start by fostering the three major capacities required by the aims of education. Children must learn to understand themselves, to enter into the perspectives of others, and to recognize the range of opportunities from which they can select to find their own distinctive place. This requires a broad education — what used to be called a “liberal education.”

    If young people are to find their own distinctive pattern for a fulfilling life, education must enhance their self-understanding. To do so, they should gain some understanding of the diversity of human lives. A view of the different circumstances in which people live and the (often narrow) range of opportunities available to them promotes an awareness of where and how an individual might contribute to the lives of others. That form of awareness is promoted, from all sorts of angles, by a bundle of disciplines that Anglo-Saxons struggle to categorize. German does better, the Geisteswissenschaften comprise all those areas of research and teaching that bear on the human condition, from psychology at one end of the spectrum to the purest of the humanities at the other. Some degree of immersion in these disciplines, especially when they are taught in relation to one another, is essential for people to fashion their ideals of themselves, guiding them to find worthwhile ends to pursue, instructing them in how their own lives can bear positively on the lives of others.

    All too often the delicate dialogue between the growing individual and the ambient society goes awry. Social pressures can diminish autonomy by closing off attractive paths. Barriers can be constructed and obstacles introduced in two different ways. Societies can impose outright bans: women cannot have access to higher education — or even to any education at all; members of a particular caste (or ethnic group) may only pursue a limited number of occupations. Or, as is far more common in the contemporary world, they can couple de jure possibility to a de facto constraint: “Of course any African-American child can become a lawyer” — but, without jobs for the sole parent, without a place in which to live, and with access only to schools awash in drugs and crime, staffed by a rotating corps of disillusioned teachers, any real prospects for a legal career are suppressed from the start. Complacent political leaders preen themselves on the existence of “opportunities for all,” overlooking the myriad ways in which the obstacles to taking advantage of the alleged “opportunities” crush the hopes and aspirations of the young.

    Education may fail the ideal of autonomy by closing off potential lines of development and by failing to provide the support that it needs to grow in attractive directions. The latter failure is most evident in the material conditions of existence. Homeless people, or people mired in poverty or trapped in neighborhoods overrun by violence, need food, clean water, clean air, medical care, and safe shelter. Beyond these necessities, their children also require schools that they can attend without fear — schools that will offer them genuine chances of finding out where their talents lie and what kinds of life might prove fulfilling. In delivering those chances, the humanities and social sciences have an important role to play.

    Formal education is central to the cultivation of positive freedom, of freedom to rather than freedom from. Children should learn who they are and what kinds of people they might realistically become. Without resources to identify their distinctive talents and interests, or to understand what kinds of lives are available to them, their autonomy is diminished. The dialogue between the growing individual and society is unhealthy, not because the voices of authority issue decrees forbidding a large range of options, but because those voices are virtually silent when it comes to positive suggestions. They supply no conceptual nourishment on which the developing imagination can fasten.

    How, then, can the humanities supply what is lacking? By making vivid and illustrating the diverse possibilities for a human life. Literature, drama, film, and the visual arts can all stimulate the young imagination, revealing ways in which human beings might live, how they might prosper and how their lives might prove miserable and empty. History ranges across time to add detailed portraits of parts of the actual past. Geography and ethnography are comparably expansive across space. These humanist studies, at all levels, nourish a sense of possibilities, of horizons greater than the inherited ones.

    In the earliest years of schooling, children are rightly expected to acquire basic skills. They must learn how to read and write, to add, subtract, and so forth. These capacities will be called on as they explore the rich possibilities of human existence. Even at the start, however, they can be captivated by stories, by colorful tales of the past, by accounts of life in strange — and even exotic — places. Long before they are able to probe the details of forms of life, to appreciate nuances of success and failure, of virtue and moral error, they can thrill to simple pictures, entranced by great heroes and heroines, appalled by villains — and recognize that the patterns of their familiar life are not the only possibilities.

    Once reading skills have advanced sufficiently far, a more systematic evaluation of alternative modes of existence becomes possible. Geography and history classes can contain segments in which children learn the details of life in different contemporary places, at different times in the past of their own society, and in circumstances remote both in time and space. Some parts of their study should include arranging conditions enabling them to feel such alien forms of existence. By this, I do not intend the pallid exercises in which children bring to the classroom a motley of dishes allegedly representing those consumed by their forebears — and then sit down to a more-or-less palatable common meal. Rather, they should learn how to make the implements required to grow the crops, they should plant and tend them, and prepare the food — and, if all goes well, share in a convivial final feast. Along the way, they should be asked to solve, individually and collectively, the problems that would have arisen for the community whose way of life they are exploring. Work of this type also allows for practice in applying mathematical skills and coping with the kinds of situations that experimental scientists face daily.

    All this paves the way for deeper engagement with a small number of (diverse) forms of life during the last few years in secondary school. A possible strategy for organizing this is to require each student to choose a particular place and period, to spend a significant part of the school year (perhaps all of it?) researching how people lived there and then, culminating in a detailed historical and ethnographic report and a presentation to fellow students. At each step of the way, students would have opportunities to consult with knowledgeable mentors; it is important that many adults bring their varied perspectives to the classroom. They would be expected to read widely, and to treat some aspects of the alien culture in great detail.

    The three phases envisaged in such a program are intended to help students discover two things. Early training prepares them to enter deeply into lives very different from their own. As they choose to focus on groups of people, located at particular places and times, they discover respect and tolerance and interest across differences as well as what aspects of cultural life fascinate them most, and they are asked to understand the demands and constraints experienced by people very different from themselves. One goal is to bring them to recognize their own proclivities, thus helping them to chart a satisfying direction for their own lives and careers. Another is to widen their consciousness of human needs, their ability to see and feel from other perspectives.

    As they grow, they should discover how to read a particular style of history, not the kind that is focused on the large affairs of states, on rulers and conquests and sweeping social reforms. Rather, they should be asked to attend to the details of everyday life. Reading not only historical analyses but also primary documents, they may be expected to enter into the lives of others. Along the way, depending on their focal society, they may need to absorb, and apply some parts of, economics and sociology. To the extent that their education succeeds, the skills they acquire are likely to prove valuable throughout their lives, as their pursuit of their favored projects leads them to actions with consequences for distant strangers. They will be prepared not to view those whom they affect remotely as faceless masses, and (with luck) they will be inspired to inquire and to reflect before implementing their plans.

    Such an interdisciplinary program whose contributory domains are primarily geography and history, as well as those parts of anthropology flowing naturally from their explorations, might also draw on other areas of social science — economics, sociology, political science, and psychology. As they proceed with the individual studies of their later school years, this program should also be in dialogue with central areas of the humanities. None of the special inquiries would be complete without entering the culture of those whom they have chosen to study. The understanding of others’ perspectives requires engaging with the myths and stories, the poems and songs, the paintings and sculptures, through which a society’s personality is most deeply expressed.

    To attain that understanding, students must first be taught how to read, how to listen, and how to see. While the primary materials with which they engage are works of art, their ability to engage profitably with them will depend also on historians and critics, specialists in understanding and analyzing literature or painting or music. The later studies of the secondary school (as I have envisaged them) can only succeed if there are people trained in the humanities who can enable their pupils to find in works of art what those works have to offer. Historians of art and music, like literary critics, are mediators, “liaison officers,” revealing precious insights in works that would be misunderstood, or dismissed as incomprehensible, without their guidance. The art historian invites students to attend to the relation between two areas of a canvas. The architectural historian points to the curve of a cornice and its echo in the shape of windows. The musicologist plays a short figure on the piano, before accompanying a recording of an orchestral work with exaggerated gestures, inviting hearers to recognize the recurrence of that figure. The literary critic points out the overtones and ambiguities of particular words in a poem.

    In the beginning, none of us knows how to do these things for ourselves. We need instruction from people who have acquired the pertinent skills and who know how to convey them to others. Among the school staff there should be teachers who have so deep an understanding of particular genres as to make works of the pertinent types come alive for their students. Humanists, specifically historians and critics of literature, art, music, film, and drama, are needed at two levels. Researchers advance the interpretation of the nineteenth century novel, or of science fiction, or of conceptual art, or of Renaissance sculpture, or of film noir, or of the Romantic song cycle, or of Greek tragedy, or of television docudramas; their achievements are registered in their own teaching (typically at universities) and in their critical writings; and as they frame the work of interpreting their focal genres, they enable their students and their readers to see how to go on. Armed with the skills acquired by steeping themselves in the research level, these students and readers form a cadre at a second level, one that makes direct contact with pupils in secondary schools (and, perhaps, at earlier educational stages). Humanists at this second level are, and should be, less specialized. They ought to range more broadly, over the visual arts of a number of periods, for example, or through the grand sweep of poetry in their native language. The task for them is to instill in those they teach precursor capacities to those which their own education has given them. From the first stages of adolescence (if not before), their pupils should have the chance to learn to read and see and hear, not in the elementary ways of the very young but with attention to nuance and subtlety. The childhood passion inspired by Jo March may endure, but it is set within an understanding of the strengths and foibles of Elizabeth Bennett and Hester Prynne — perhaps even of Dorothea Brooke, Isabel Archer, and Mrs. Dalloway.

    Schools do not just need some second-level humanists. A significant number of people with diverse tastes and interests should move through the secondary school classroom. Not all of them need to be trained teachers. The principal teachers of literature, music, and art should not only offer their own wide repertory of genres, but also supplement and coordinate the visits of others who can introduce an even broader array of works of art. Using their own interpretive skills, they should seek ways of helping their students come alive to the features that excite the visitors who bring their distinctive enthusiasms. Advising pupils who are stirred to similar enthusiasms, they oversee their further development as interpreters, guiding them to suitable mentors and translating what those mentors convey into formulations apt for inculcating enhanced skills. Humanist teachers thus become liaison officers in two different senses: they mediate directly between some works of art and their students, and indirectly between those students and other potential liaison officers, whose fluency is inadequate to convey the messages they hope to offer.

    Data on the performance of American students in mathematics and science are far better known than the gloomy statistics about the reading of American adults. According to a study conducted in January and February of 2019, twenty-seven percent of American adults had not read any book (or even a part of any book) within the prior year. In the “league table” of adult readers, the United States ranked equal twenty-second (tied with Germany). Other figures show a decline in the amount of time spent per day in leisure reading, from the first decade of the twenty-first century to the second. How much of whatever reading occurs might contribute to self-understanding is anybody’s guess.

    Overall, then, it seems fair to conclude that American schools do not generate a swarm of avid readers, eager to garner the benefits that I have attributed to the engagement with literature; higher education appears to do somewhat better. Laments about the quenching of scientific curiosity are extremely common: why do so few Americans pursue post-graduate studies in the sciences? Yet surely educators ought to worry equally about the quashing of interest in literature. Why do so many abandon reading once their formal education is completed? There are obvious potential explanations. Many of those who graduate from secondary schools may always have found reading difficult. They may have struggled through the materials assigned to them, and felt relief when they no longer have to exercise basic skills they know to be incomplete and inadequate. Perhaps the “golden age of television” has inspired a turn to watching series (documentaries or dramas) offering occasions for reflection and promoting greater self-understanding; but no available data supports so hopeful a conclusion. For the past decade, the most popular television turns out to be sports events, a decline from previous decades that showed clear preferences for comedy and drama series, some of them surely rewarding to watch and providing food for thought. I have a hunch that the people who were gripped throughout all the seasons of The Wire and Homeland are also people who continue to read books.

    The goal of making Americans great readers again — and great observers and great listeners — is educationally urgent. Achieving it demands a serious campaign to help all children become fluent readers by the time of their adolescence. But it also requires more: literacy should be understood as a matter of degree. All of us, including the most adept readers, are imperfectly literate: there will always be some kinds of writing in our native language that we find difficult, even impenetrable. Formal education, through the secondary school, ought to provide each pupil with a profile in reading ability sufficient to make accessible — indeed, pleasurably accessible — a range of written texts capable of yielding the principal fruits of literacy. In particular, it should prepare them to read, with curiosity, interest, and joy, works able to prompt reflection and enhanced self-understanding. To achieve that goal (or some reasonable approximation to it), I suggest strengthening the connections between the two levels of humanists. Teachers of literature in secondary schools should have a passion for the genres they introduce to their pupils, combined with strong interpretive skills. They should be given the opportunities to refine those skills, and to extend them to other styles through periodic leaves that enable them to work with scholars engaged in humanistic research. Their schools should contain enough colleagues to form a community, regularly interacting with one another. The community would constantly be renewed by its contacts with research, in which the individual members can continue to develop and grow. Such a program has already been pioneered by some progressive schools.

    Parallel points apply to the visual arts and to music. Indeed, the status quo in these areas is almost certainly more dismal. Since education in the non-literary arts is so frequently curtailed, lopped off in times of budgetary shortage, visual and auditory literacy only attain more primitive levels. In these areas, the liaison officers are fewer, the time assigned to their mediatory work is minimal, and the range of material they are expected to introduce far too extensive. Like their colleagues in literature, they need to enhance their own capacities for sensitive seeing and listening, to recognize their fundamental task as one in which similar skills are germinated and developed in their students, and to find vital ways of conveying what is required. Teachers of art and music should have the chance to learn from scholars, critics, and historians of art and music, who engage in research and sometimes change the framework within which works of art are understood.

    Very few young people are fortunate enough (as I once was) to listen to a critic make an impassioned defense of the importance of literature. In my last undergraduate year in Cambridge, the university extended its support for the annual collegiate drama festival by recruiting eminent members of the faculty to give lunchtime talks on the plays to be performed. My own college dramatic society was rehearsing The Imaginary Invalid, and we invited the distinguished critic George Steiner to speak to us. His presentation was brilliant — and forthright. One claim he made has remained with me ever since: “Molière and Stendhal have taught us more about what it is to be human than all the psychologists there have ever been, combined.”

    Steiner’s dictum is an exaggeration — even if, in times when the humanities are suspect and the social sciences are viewed as poor relatives of their natural cousins, it is a necessary pushback against the evangelists of scientism. Psychology, pursued from a diversity of perspectives, has enlightened us about many aspects of human mental life and of human behavior, sometimes through understanding the lives of other animals, often by controlled observations of human behavior. Laboratory studies have enlarged the understanding of perception, memory, emotional responses, decision-making, perspective-sharing, and other significant mental processes. These achievements do not displace the contributions of playwrights and novelists, nor are they superseded by them. Learning can, and should, come from all directions. Understanding human life, of the individual and of the group, is best advanced through the interaction of disciplines. Marking off particular areas of inquiry as barren — “nothing there for me!” — is a foolish dogmatism, whether it serves as the proud credo of the scientistically devout or as the reprimand of a great literary critic.

    All young people deserve, however, to be instructed by teachers who are imbued with Steiner’s dictum, who recognize the importance of literature, music, and art for the growth of self-understanding, whose passion for a range of works is accompanied by mature interpretive skills, and who have techniques for instilling precursor capacities in their students. This, to be sure, is a lot to ask for. Yet it represents an important goal towards which education ought to strive.

    Literature, art, and music provide access to possibilities for developing individuals, enabling them to try on unrealized alternatives for size. As my passing remark about identification with Jo March indicates, this is relatively straightforward in the case of literature. The impulse to emulate a fictional character, to be as free and strong as Jo or as brave and resourceful as Jim Hawkins, is only the simplest form of literary impact. More complex novels and plays and poems inspire diagnostic reflections on one’s own conduct. They lead some readers of Bleak House to shudder as Dickens’ characters mouth unfeeling words echoing those readers’ own utterances. The more ambiguous figures delineated in “novels for adults” can provoke extended self-reflection: in the contrast between Dorothea Brooke’s impulsive warmth and generosity of spirit and the caution of her more conventional sister, an attentive reader may find material for exploring either the narrowness of his own altruistic sentiments or his own lack of prudence. Reading Ulysses, or the later parts of the Harry Potter series, can reorient our understanding of virtues and vices, change our conception of the heroic, and provoke new ways of working through the successes and failures of our lives.

    So far I have turned the gaze inward, considering how the conversations with ourselves, provoked by our well-instructed readings, seeings, and hearings, might redirect a purely personal and private search for fulfillment. But we must not ignore the changes wrought in the ways we look outward. Can refined capacities for reading and viewing and listening also broaden and deepen our sensitivities to the lives of others? Do they also sometimes lead us to recognize possibilities to make our own distinctive contributions to a larger human world?

    They can and they do. Education in the humanities not only makes us more self-aware, it also promotes our fulfillment through attuning us more closely to people whose welfare and whose aspirations we might affect. Even that formulation, however, is still held by the inward gaze. Surely we should not clamor for humanistic education on the grounds that, through its opening our eyes to possibilities for aiding others, we may become fulfilled! Those whom we help, aiding in their fulfillment, should not be thought of as means to our own fulfillment. Whatever private good our enhanced understanding of human existence may bring, this is a secondary matter. Rather, we should commend the well-schooled sensibilities for their power to make us better citizens and more highly developed moral agents. So we must turn from the first broad aim of education, the individualistic one, to a second cluster of reasons, which have to do with the preparation for citizenship and good conduct.

    Democracy depends on the ability of citizens to deliberate together, with a commitment to finding an outcome with which all potentially affected parties can live. Tocqueville was correct to see the New England town meeting as the core of America’s experiment with democratic government — and Dewey built on the insight when he declared democracy to be “more than a form of government,” seeing it as “primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.” But how do we cultivate mutual engagement, the capacity to listen carefully to others, to enter into their lives, committing ourselves to finding arrangements that all can accept?

    The answer is, from prolonged encounters with people representing a wide range of perspectives. Through living and working with those who are different, citizens come to understand alternative points of view. Perspectives once alien, dismissed as the products of ignorance and selfishness, appear in a softer light. They become comprehensible reactions to a difficult situation. Although disagreement, even strong disagreement, may survive the encounter, the once-despised perspectives acquire human faces. Joint deliberations may then begin in a different place and in a different spirit. Reaching behind the opposed attitudes, people who disagree may attend to the underlying predicaments, identifying factors responsible for the conflict and seeking responses to those factors that might combine to resolve it.

    This style of direct broadening can begin with joint planning in diverse groups, starting early in education, and gradually increasing the range of outlooks and the complexities of the situations. There is nothing “relativistic” about this, just as there is nothing “relativistic” about tolerance and compromise and patience. The expansion of one’s understanding is not a betrayal of one’s principles, unless of course they cannot withstand the challenge. Humanistic education is an ally in reinforcing capacities to listen and expanding habits of sympathetic understanding. Learning to interpret works of fiction (as well as to respond to visual art and to music) can induce skills for recognizing the standpoints and predicaments of others. Thus the way is prepared for deeper mutual engagement when citizens need to deliberate together.

    Of course, we cannot expect casual recommendations to read to work magic. There is no evidence as yet to support the thesis that people who read fiction become more empathetic than their non-reading peers; and there is a great deal of historical experience that weakens the correlation between culture and decency. Still, there are also historical cases that suggest the power of particular kinds of fiction to generate greater understanding of, and sympathy for, people whose perspectives previously seemed alien, incomprehensible, or abhorrent. On that basis, a carefully chosen set of readings, skillfully interpreted in the classroom, can provide students with the experience of entering the lives of others. Children who are initially inclined to condemn particular kinds of people or specific forms of behavior can be offered stories whose protagonists are relatively similar, and whose conditions of existence are explored in sympathetic detail. Their teacher can pose imaginative questions about how they might have behaved in the circumstances of the story or whether they would have sided with other characters who refused to listen or provide aid. The aim of class discussion will not be to impose a final verdict, but rather to lead each child to a fuller sense of the range of human motivation. Whatever the concluding judgment may be, children should come to see themselves as making it with a deeper engagement with the situation and with the thoughts and emotions of those whom they had been inclined to dismiss as beyond the pale. Exercises of this kind can be developed in many different ways. Testing will reveal how best to do for schoolchildren what Dickens and Stowe did for their nineteenth-century publics.

    Nor, quite evidently, are the humanistic disciplines on which I have so far concentrated the only areas relevant to preparing good citizens. History is an obvious source. So, too, are geography and anthropology. All these subjects can expand the sense of human possibilities, presenting the challenges people have faced at different times and in different places and recording their diverse efforts to meet them. Students can find ample material to perplex and to repel them — thus provoking questions about how people could have been led to accept such puzzling and apparently repugnant ways of life.

    Although historical education has a place for dates, for the glorious deeds of national heroes, and for the pageantry imaginatively constructed to celebrate a society’s past, these are not, in my view, central to its pedagogical importance. Particularly important for the development of citizenship and moral agency is study of the principal episodes of moral and social change — for good and for ill. Attention should be given to the construction of oppressive hierarchies, in the ancient world and in more recent times. Similarly, students should know how cruel practices were challenged and overthrown. Understanding the forms of slavery in Greece and Rome, in the Renaissance, and in the New World, is a clear and obvious example, profoundly relevant for future American citizens. Since the resonances of the institution of chattel slavery continue to sound in the society to whose future they will contribute, American children need to understand why slaves were originally brought to the American colonies, why the practice of keeping slaves persisted and how it was defended, how it came to be opposed, the character of the debate over abolitionism, how social conditions for former slaves and their descendants evolved, and how the legacy of slavery affects differential life prospects in the United States today. (Obviously there may be differences among historians about such matters. Nothing should be presented as gospel.) Charting that social history is more valuable for the formation of democratic character than depicting the campaigns and the battles of the American Civil War.

    Success in enlarging national history to cover all parts of the human world (however the local and global are balanced) must be based on geographical understanding. If, as suggested, history is far more than dates, geography is not simply maps. Naturally, just as a student’s chronology should be approximately accurate, so too her sense of the spatial relations among nations and societies ought to be roughly right. That sense is the basis for knowledge of the climatic and environmental conditions of people’s ways of life. In turn, appreciating the specific opportunities and challenges posed by living in a particular place underlies consideration of the ways in which local conventions and institutions have developed. Geography, as it figures in the education of citizens, must borrow first from the earth and environmental sciences, from demography, and ultimately extend its reach into economics and anthropology.

    All very well, you may say. How nice it would be if our society could afford to provide for all so enriching an education. But the world is a harsh and competitive place, and we must be “globally competitive,” and so young people must do their bit for the Post-Industrial Labor Army. It is hard to find fulfillment, or to be a good citizen, if you cannot support yourself.

    True enough. (And there is dignity in labor, as we used to say.) The economic menace looms over us, warning of dire consequences if we fail to heed its gloomy warnings. Why, though, should we concede its points about the Global Demolition Derby? Who decreed that our present economic arrangements, and habits of consumption, are the optimal ones, or the best we can do? Isn’t it worth asking if the drive to produce, produce, and produce can be resisted? If human lives can be richer and happier when enough is recognized as enough?

    Mill posed those questions, and he answered them. During a period when almost all of his fellow economists quaked at the thought of declining production, dreading the “Stationary State,” he saw such a state as allowing the development of happy and fulfilling forms of life. Repelled by the cutthroat competition already visible in the early stages of industrial capitalism, at the “struggling to get on,” at the neglect of important values in the pursuit of profit, he supposed that, once a nation had advanced far enough economically, the relentless treading on one another can cease. In recommending the “stationary state,” he warned against the danger of too much movement, of the cruel endless churning of the profit-making machinery. The stationary state, he claimed, “would be, on the whole, a very considerable improvement on our present condition.”

    To be sure, we are not stationary people, or a stationary society: we have been wildly accelerated by our economy and our technology. But that is hardly the last word. A society that provides economic security, and honors the educational requirements for it, need not be a society that tolerates grotesque levels of economic inequality. Moreover, the uncontrolled excesses of our contemporary acceleration can be resisted and rejected. Indeed, it is the technology itself that can make resistance plausible. In a world in which it has developed beyond Mill’s imagination, in which routine jobs can be automated, human labor can be directed toward fulfilling occupations, in which people work with and for one another. Prominent among them is the care and nurturing of the young. Education, broadly conceived, can become what Emerson thought it should be: the main enterprise of the world.

    The Selfless Self of Self

    On A Portrait of Two Beautiful Young People
    A Brother and Sister
    By Gerard Manley Hopkins

    O I admire and sorrow! The heart’s eye grieves
    Discovering you, dark tramplers, tyrant years.
    A juice rides rich through bluebells, in vine leaves,
    And beauty’s dearest veriest vein is tears.

    Happy the father, mother of these! Too fast:
    Not that, but thus far, all with frailty, blest
    In one fair fall; but, for time’s aftercast,
    Creatures all heft, hope, hazard, interest.

    And are they thus? The fine, the fingering beams
    Their young delightful hour do feature down
    That fleeted else like day-dissolvèd dreams
    Or ringlet-race on burling Barrow brown.

    She leans on him with such contentment fond
    As well with sister sits, would well the wife;
    His looks, the soul’s own letters, see beyond,
    Gaze on, and fall directly forth on life.

    But ah, bright forelock, cluster that you are
    Of favoured make and mind and health and youth,
    Where lies your landmark, seamark, or soul’s star?
    There’s none but truth can stead you. Christ is truth.

    There’s none but good can be good, both for you
    And what sways with you, maybe this sweet maid;
    None good, but God — a warning wavèd to
    One once that was found wanting when Good weighed.

    Man lives that list, that leaning in the will
    No wisdom can forecast by gauge or guess,
    The selfless self of self, most strange, most still,
    Fast furled and all foredrawn to No or Yes.

    Your feast of; that most in you earnest eye
    May but call on your banes to more carouse.
    Worst will the best. What worm was here, we cry,
    To have havoc-pocked so, see, the hung-heavenward boughs?

    Enough: corruption was the world’s first woe.
    What need I strain my heart beyond my ken?
    O but I bear my burning witness though
    Against the wild and wanton work of men.

    In the modern scholarly edition of the poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins, which appeared in 1990, the editor notes that in the preceding edition of 1948 a number of poems — eighty-two, in fact — were offered, after the preceding groups called “Early Poems” and “Poems,” as “Unfinished Poems, Fragments, Light Verse.” Those poems were sidelined, and so they were rarely anthologized, taught, or even read. Many of these apparently “lesser” pieces seemed to my young self — and still seem now — just as good as the poems honored in the front of the book. Although the new edition repaired this unfortunate editorial segregation by printing all the poems in chronological order, I still regret the relative obscurity of the “unfinished” poems. A late and ambitious one of them, called “On the Portrait of Two Beautiful Young People,” is worth pondering, not least to draw readers’ attention to its existence. It embodies the agony of Hopkins’ last years, in which he repeatedly staged a debate between his own theory of unbidden creativity and the religious theory of free will.

    At the age of twenty-two, Gerard Hopkins, an ardent young English poet and a recent graduate of Oxford (where he had shone as a brilliant student of the classics), prays that he may willingly advance beyond the legitimate pleasures of the senses in favor of the better joys of ascetic devotion. For the delight of the ear in song and speech, he will substitute contemplative silence and muteness in self-expression; instead of the distractions of worldly life, his eye will find “the uncreated light.” In gentle and unstrained “perfect” quatrains, each rhythmically serene line rhyming exactly with another, he enjoins the five natural senses to fix on spiritual pleasures. He begins the poem, which he calls “The Habit of Perfection,” with the ear and the eye:

    Elected Silence, sing to meAnd beat upon my whorlèd ear,
    Pipe me to pastures still and be
    The music that I care to hear.

    Shape nothing, lips; be lovely-dumb:
    It is the shut, the curfew sent
    From there where all surrenders come
    Which only makes you eloquent.

    Be shellèd eyes, with double dark
    And find the uncreated light:
    This ruck and reel which you remark
    Coils, keeps, and teases simple sight.

    He burned his own copies of his youthful poems (leaving some copies, however, with family and friends and letting others remain in drafts embedded in his diaries). Then, converted from his family’s Anglican Protestantism to Roman Catholicism, Gerard Hopkins became a Jesuit priest.

    He had supposed, before his ordination, that his ascetic desire to disregard sense-pleasure would ensure access to higher spiritual delights, and that he would willingly suspend his writing of poems in favor of consecrating all his time to his priestly duties. He did just that for seven years. Then, with the implied permission (or so he felt) of his Jesuit superior, who had said that someone should commemorate the five German Roman Catholic nuns, legally expelled from Germany for their religion, who had drowned when their ship, the Deutschland, was wrecked off the coast of Kent, Hopkins resumed writing poetry with a fiercely original long poem called”The Wreck of the Deutschland.” Hopkins’ return to the practice of verse continued until his premature death, of typhoid fever, when he was only forty-four.

    After his untroubled and open-hearted early election of silence, now writing as a priest, Hopkins became troubled by an increasingly anxious scrupulosity, suspecting that art must be blighted in its essence, infected by that original sin inherited by all human beings. If he, vowed to God’s service, chooses to write poetry, does he sin by that worldly choice? In an extraordinarily agile swerve, Hopkins rebukes, in the draft of a poem, the idea that composing a work of art — whether architectural or musical — is rightly characterized as an act of free will subject to moral judgment, arguing that the artist is driven to create by a compelling force subject to no external law, divine or secular. (The untitled draft, which we used to know by its first line “How all’s to one thing wrought!”, has had its stanzas rearranged, and the first line now reads “Who shaped these walls has shewn.” The rearrangement seems to me unconvincing.) It is impossible, he believes, to deduce the moral state of the artist or the composer from the work of art, since art is not created on a plane to which the moral law applies. The concept of obedience to a pre-existing moral or spiritual law and the concept of the freedom of the will are simply not relevant to the surprising and unpremeditated surge of inspiration which arises spontaneously, unbidden by the will.

    Drawing on his own experience, Hopkins claims that the artist is moved by a strange controlling power:

    Not free in this because
    His powers seemed free to play:

    He swept that scope he wa
    To sweep and must obey.

    Nor angel insight can
    Learn how the heart is hence:

    Since all the make of man
    Is law’s indifference

    Therefore this masterhood,
    This piece of perfect song,

    This fault-not-found-with good
    Is neither right nor wrong.

    Stung by the frequent condemnation of artworks (and, by implication, of artists) on moral grounds, Hopkins dismisses such judgments by giving to his unphilosophical reader — in absolutely plain, even childish, language — examples of three arts that cannot possibly be evaluated by moral standards: painting, melody, and the “architectural” constructions (such as a honeycomb) of animal instinct. These are “neither right nor wrong,”

    No more than red and blue,
    No more than Re and Mi,
    Or sweet the golden glue
    That’s built for by the bee.

    Clever as this is, it has not come to grips with the semantic content of the poet’s own poems: must they, because their medium is language, exist on the human plane of right and wrong, conforming themselves to a binary ethic of Yes or No? Or can his poems be left to exist solely on the aesthetic plane from which they originated, where the criterion of success is the approach to formal perfection? In judging art, must we abandon the aesthetic of the working artist, where inspiration drives what Keats called “the innumerable compositions and decompositions” intrinsic to the task of writing poetry? May the artist not conceive of his works as belonging among the pure “wild and wide” goods of Nature, all divinely created, all of innumerable shadings?

    For good grows wild and wide,
    Has shades, is nowhere none;

    Or must he instead value his poetry according to its (cruelly restricted) choice of a single presiding ethical “chieftain,” God or Satan?

    But right must seek a side
    And choose for chieftain one.

    Is the purpose of art to achieve a compelled artifact aspiring to perfection of form? Or is it rather to present a substantial moral argument? At this moment in his intellectual evolution, Hopkins offers an enigmatic two-part answer:

    What makes the man and what
    The man within that makes:
    Ask whom he serves or not
    Serves and what side he takes.

    The poet’s riddle asks first “What makes the man” (to which the answer is presumably a natural process, since the poet is not asking “Who makes the man”). Even more strangely, the riddle in its next two lines asks about the verse-product, about “what/ The man within that makes”. What is the context, the “that” which the man is “within”? By its neutral reference, “that” must once again stand for a natural process. In his four-line epigram Hopkins sums up the apparently impersonal natural force impelling the human creator, no less a creature of biological instinct than the bee. Only after asserting the idiosyncratic force that both makes and is made by the artist can the poet raise the question of the artist’s ultimate moral allegiance. When Hopkins stations against each other the natural, passionate, and independent urgency of creation and the strict moral urgency of intellectually ethical decision, the riddling relation between the two urgencies is an uneasy one.

    Seven years pass. It is 1886 and Hopkins is forty-two. Everything has changed in his circumstances: in 1884 he had been dispatched from England to Ireland to serve as Professor of Classics in the Catholic University in Dublin, newly re-founded by the Jesuits. Remembering, painfully, Jesus’ announcement, “I came not to send peace, but a sword” (Matthew 10:34), the poet finds himself isolated “at three removes,” not only from his native England but also from his Protestant family and his former company of English Jesuits. In a post-famine era when Ireland was implacably hostile to England, he was the only English Jesuit in all of Ireland. He realizes, desolately, that his university appointment in Dublin is likely to be permanent:

    To seem the stranger lies my lot, my life
    Among strangers. Father and mother dear,
    Brothers and sisters are in Christ not near,
    And he my peace/ my parting, sword and strife.
    ****
    I am in Ireland now; now I am at a third
    Remove.

    His depression is so intense that he refers to himself in the past tense, as though he had died: he is not a “beginner” but “a lonely began.”

    The religious, intellectual, scholarly, psychological, and physical trials that Hopkins had undergone in Ireland brought him, in 1886, the year of his poem on the portrait of two beautiful children, to a crisis of distress in which his commitment to accuracy obliged him to graph, in a meticulous and experimental style, his mind’s unbearable nervous oscillations among countless possible thoughts. His aesthetic drive is increasingly conditioned by a merciless self-scrutiny, the “helpless self-loathing” that he reveals in his later Dublin retreat notes. His familiar but ever-changing stand-off between the aesthetic and the moral now reappears in a tense poem that he names as if it were a commentary: “On the Portrait of Two Beautiful Young People.” When he sees, presumably in a wealthy family’s house, a watercolor portrait of two children, he is on his Christmas holiday. He has found it almost impossible to write poetry while teaching, but with his incessant anxiety somewhat reduced by distance from the university, he has the freedom to admire the art of the portraitist as well as the appealing beauty of the children. His title renders them merely as ungendered young “people,” but his subtitle (“a Brother and Sister”) represents them as pre-adolescent siblings, their innocence still undamaged.Although the poet’s initial response is an admiring one, ratifying the double beauty of both the children and the tender portrait, his anxiety soon awakens reflection on the children, their parents, and their probable future, and his mind leaps to an immediate moral sorrow inseparable from his initial aesthetic admiration. “O I admire” he says while attaching — without taking a breath — his second verb and its exclamation point, “and sorrow!” In that first line, he establishes the rapid — the instantaneous — fluctuations of response that the poem will mirror. His mixed emotions sometimes arrive in balanced opposition, but more often they emerge as restless questioning, philosophical perplexity, or psychological dread. Compared to the tranquility of “elected silence” in “The Habit of Perfection,” the turbulent stirrings besetting him before the portrait allow him only temporary moments of repose, each one rapidly disturbed into further disquiet. The tide of admiration that had in the past prompted “How all’s to one thing wrought!” ebbs, undermined by the looming sorrow prompted by the portrait.

    Hopkins’ increasing depression will bring him, by the end of the poem, to a desperate conclusion — that destiny may destroy these children. In that respect, the “beautiful” but static watercolor is mendacious. The artist has framed the children within a wreath of unspoiled flowers, fruit on tree-branches, and flourishing grapevines (generating the “bluebells” and “juice” of the first stanza), but does this unblemished context truthfully reflect the variable and endangered course of human fate that must be undergone by the children? Remembering the tree of the knowledge of good and evil from which Eve, tempted by the serpent, plucked the forbidden fruit, the poet arrives, in his penultimate stanza, at a dire image of the children’s likely future, crying out, as he approaches his conclusion, against the fall of man that brought disease and death into the world:

                 What worm was here, we cry,
    To have havoc-pocked so, see, the hung-heavenward
    boughs?

    As Hopkins mentioned in a letter, he adopted as his verse-form the sedate, if sorrowful, perfectly rhymed quatrains of Gray’s famous “Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard,” because he thought that he could “make something.” He, too, is writing an elegy grieving the children’s potential end, likely to be a blighted one. Six years earlier, responding to the tears of the child “Margaret” mourning the fall of leaves, he had expressed a horrible certainty with the words “born for”: “It is the blight man was born for, / It is Margaret you mourn for.” At least Gray could predict the certain future of his dead villagers: they will be recalled, if at all, in “the short and simple annals of the poor.” Their humble life, while it may exclude the prospect of political or literary fame, also keeps them from the hideous criminal acts of the powerful: they will not “wade through slaughter to a throne, / And shut the gates of mercy on mankind.” Hopkins, by contrast, can say nothing so reassuring about the children: his fear disrupts his lines, hurling them far from Gray’s even pace and calm punctuation. Both the poet’s quandary before the mendacious (and therefore sentimental) portrait — representing life falsely as a paradisal scene — and his vexing ignorance of the children’s moral future obliterate tranquility as soon as the poem opens.

    Hopkins’ emotional announcement — “O I admire and sorrow!” — had burst forth, forcibly breaking its single line in two by the word “sorrow” and the full stop at the exclamation point. The second stanza — Hopkins’ unsettling transcription of his almost simultaneous mental self-contradictions — presents, as its mimicry of agitated thought, an unstable and incoherent syntax and an over-supply of punctuation (nine commas, an exclamation point, a colon, a semi-colon, a period). We could paraphrase the stanza and iron out our first impressions of incoherence by following Hopkins’ line of reasoning: we could say that Hopkins first exclaims how happy the parents are in having such beautiful children, then feels that he spoke too quickly. No, he stammers, the parents cannot be said to be permanently happy (that particular luck cannot be ensured); but at least the parents are happy thus far, but we must recall (he reluctantly admits) the frailty of fortune; and after the present fleeting phase of childhood there will be an “aftercast” of time’s baleful dice — with what result? Following that gamble, the children’s fate and its effect on their parents can only be speculated upon. These young creatures are to their parents, thinks the poet in summary, a “heft” (a burden, from “heave”), a hope, a hazard (all alliterating with, and thereby reinforcing, the initial “Happy”). Yet in the final noun, they become merely an “interest.” This, the sole “neutral” noun of the series, detaches the spectator Hopkins from his initial emotional participation in the “happy” parents’ good fortune.

    If we consider, now, our first glimpse of this second stanza, we see Hopkins — hardly yet into his subject — becoming almost unintelligible as he daringly mimics on the page the confusing and reckless speed of his turbulent thought:

    Happy the father, mother of these! Too fast:
    Not that, but thus far, all with frailty, blest
    In one fair fall; but, for time’s aftercast,
    Creatures all heft, hope, hazard, interest.

    Hopkins will continue to represent the very melody of his mind’s oscillations in distress: these sometimes appear in balanced oppositions but more often become percussive in restless questioning, philosophical perplexity, or further dread. His music culminates in a broken syntax and ill-coupled words as he addresses one of the endangered and innocent siblings, the brother, approaching (the poet fears) that almost certain ruined end:

    Your feast of; that most in you earnest eye
    May but call on your banes to more carouse.
    Worst will the best. What worm was here, we cry,
    To have havoc-pocked so, see, the hung-heavenward
    boughs?

    As the poem reaches its deepest image, which had been lurking in the poem from the opening, the words careen from zenith to pit, from pit to zenith. First Hopkins announces the benign “feast,” reflecting the boy’s earnest and innocent eye, but the feast immediately generates (in forward linear time) the gluttonous “carouse” of agents of ruin. By contrast, the next two examples are grimly retrospective: the outcome (“worst”) is prophesied of its beautiful past counter-superlative “best,” and behind the disastrous “havoc-pocked” branches we glimpse the originally healthy “hung-heavenward” boughs. The passionate indignation behind such retrospective truth declares itself in this disequilibrium of time, as it goes forward and backward in depicting hope succeeded by despair. (Hopkins must have noticed, as a schoolboy, the originality of Shakespeare’s pre-positioned disasters in lines where time has already dealt a death-blow before we are allowed to see the charm of youth, and time is already digging the grave of a fair countenance: “Time doth transfix the flourish set on youth, / And delves the parallels in beauty’s brow.”)

    Against the buffets of threatening speculation, Hopkins allows occasional points of repose. The first is his initial admiring gaze on the tableau of the quiet and lovely portrait, where the artist has wreathed the beautiful siblings in a cluster of unspoiled flowers and grapevine, generating the bluebells, vine-leaves, and “juice” of the first stanza. But that initial pleasure is destroyed as soon as “sorrow” transfixes “admire,” “tyrant years” obliterate “youth,” and “tears” mar “beauty.” In the second instance in which anxiety is momentarily stilled, the poet creates in fantasy a serene future portrait where a conjectured young wife would replace the sister now by the boy’s side, while the boy himself, with the passage of time a husband, is poised (unlike his conditionally inserted bride) in a present-tense future, looking with steadfast confidence to his coming life:

    She leans on him with such contentment fond
    As well the sister sits, would well the wife;
    His looks, the soul’s own letters, see beyond,
    Gaze on, and fall directly forth on life.

    Yet even in the poised moment of that imagined marriage portrait, the poet’s intellectual skepticism speaks out, warning the promising boy that he must embark on a moral and spiritual search for a reliable principle of stability:

    But ah, bright forelock, cluster that you are
    Of favoured make and mind and health and youth,
    Where lies your landmark, seamark, or soul’s star?
    There’s none but truth can stead you. Christ is truth.

    In this direct address, echo-words create deliberate shadow-appearances of earlier poems. The first two echo-words, “mark,” and “star,” recall Shakespeare’s saying of love,

              It is an ever-fixèd mark
    That looks on tempests and is never shaken;
    It is the star to every wandering bark,

    Shakespeare’s ever-fixèd mark is (to Hopkins’ mind) a landmark, a lighthouse, and his star is the North Star by which sailors can navigate. The third echo-word here is “stead,” creating a shadow-appearance of Keats’s praise of the North Star in the sonnet “Bright star, would I were steadfast as thou art!” That line supplies, with its adjective “steadfast,” Hopkins’ “archaic” (OED) verb, “to stead” (to support, to help) for his desired outcome — that something will “stead” the boy in consistent uprightness as he advances in time.

    Having asked the question of where lies that which will “stead” the boy, Hopkins offers, in a startling turn, two different and independent answers: “There’s none but truth can stead you. Christ is truth.” Each of the two answers in the line occupies a free-standing sentence uttering a single thought; each exhibits an unequivocal closing period; and each exists on its own distinct plane. The planes do not intersect. The first sentence replicates the poet’s instant answer to his own question on the plane of moral philosophy: “There’s none but truth can stead you.” The second sentence, “Christ is truth,” astonishingly inserts itself into the very same line-unit as the first, even though it exists on an entirely different level, that of Christian scripture. The first sentence sets before the boy’s eyes a daily intellectual and moral value — truth — indispensable to Hopkins himself, as his letters fiercely show. Yet the second, a scriptural sentence, “Christ is truth,” echoes Jesus’ saying: “I am the way, the truth, and the life” (John 14: 6). Such a credal assertion is less universally applicable than the common recommendation of moral truth as a reliable bulwark of the virtuous life.

    To be true to himself, Hopkins has had to separate his two truths — one natural, one theological — and give to each its independence. Yet to present himself as he is, the poet has had to twin the two independent answers within a single line, as permanent absolute values equally held by him, inseparable. The poem balances precariously over the abyss between the two absolute standards, philosophical and theological. As he stands immobilized between the two distinct truths, Hopkins’ anxious mind, worrying for the young boy, hopes to bridge the abyss with a moral parable from a scriptural source: Jesus’ parable of the rich young man. There, invoking a value — “the Good”—that is apparently more flexible than “truth” and of a wider application, Hopkins creates another temporary point of mental repose, but blights it by recounting the Biblical parable’s unhappy conclusion.

    In the brief parable, a rich young man, addressing Jesus as “Good Master,” asks what he must do to be saved. After rebuking him for the flattering title (“There is none good but one, that is, God”), Jesus tells the young man to observe the commandments. When the young man, professing that he has obeyed the commandments from his youth, asks what he must further do to be saved, Jesus offers a direct two-part answer: “Go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor. . . and come and follow me.” The evangelist recounts the failed outcome: the young man “went away sorrowful, for he had great possessions” (Matthew 19:16-22). In Hopkins’ poem, the young man “was found wanting when Good weighed.” Knowing that the young people in the portrait are rich, Hopkins hopes to “stead” them by recalling to their minds Jesus’ warning that there is none good but God; he also reminds them that the young man was found wanting when he could not imagine depriving himself of riches. (A discarded stanza tells us that the poet forecasts a similar potential sin in the children, saying to them of the young man, “Rise he would not; fell/ Rather; he wore that millstone you wear, wealth.”)

    So far, the poet’s forensic move in recommending truth has been to direct the boy to three different sources of truth — philosophical, credal, and parabolic. Unsatisfied with all three, Hopkins takes refuge in another source entirely, one existing on a plane unknown to his initial three. In one of the moves that made readers of the first edition of Hopkins’ poems in 1918 find him excitingly “modern,” the poet’s mind leaps to a psychological plane, a trustworthy source to “stead” the boy’s future. This resource, very obliquely described, has already been hinted at in one stanza of “How all’s to one thing wrought!” Although the artist there, said Hopkins, “changed in choice,” he did so not freely but compelled by “his being’s bent”: that “bent” “was an instrument / Which overvaulted voice.” The voice must follow, in every moment of choice, the “being’s bent,” the innate inclination of the self-being of the artist. In this way, the poet of “On the Portrait” leaps, in the climax of his poem, to the plane of the unfathomable, surpassing the three earlier recommendations — moral, credal, and scriptural. All three, after all, are conventional and well known to Christian homiletics. But now — on the analogy of his lingering Anglican belief in predestination — that God has decided from all eternity who will be saved and who will be damned, Hopkins has conceived a psychological plane of predestined idiosyncratic selfhood.

    Somewhere inside the person, inside the very self, there is a pre-planted banner of the inaccessible source within the self. The banner remains in an inscrutable furled form which hides its emblem of the “the selfless self of self” — an abstraction unnamable as self or soul because it precedes both, resembling the Aristotelian “form” that determines a distinctive species-nature within inert earthly matter. For Hopkins, it was a matter of introspective fact that not only did each individual species differ from every other species, but every individual human being differed entirely from every other individual being, each bound, when engaged aesthetically, to express itself as itself. In the sonnet “As kingfishers catch fire,” Hopkins writes the poem of that conviction:

    Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
    Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
    Selves — goes its self; myself it speaks and spells,
    Crying What I do is me: for that I came.
    I say more: the just man justices.

    As he says in a notebook, he finds his self-being both distinctive and incommunicable: “My selfbeing, . . . that taste of myself, of I and me above and in all things . . . is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man.” At its deepest, his self-being was inaccessible even to the poet himself; otherwise he would have been able to find words to communicate it to others. Instead, he knows it only as the region from which the bolt of inspiration arrives, not at his summoning but as a gift. (Before Freud speculated on the incessant activity of the unconscious mind, insights were felt to be bestowed, not self-generated.)

    From the outset of “On the Portrait of Two Beautiful Young People,” the poet’s linguistic patterns have attempted to arrange themselves under the broad concepts of “authentic” and “inauthentic” (on the aesthetic plane) and “good” and “evil” (on the moral plane). The mounting mass of words of uncertainty in the poem, amid its repeated stops and starts of syntax and punctuation, undoes the overt emotional contrast of “Admiration” and “Sorrow” with which the poet had begun. In short, the aesthetic aim of “On the Portrait of Two Beautiful Young People” is to mimic, credibly, the poet’s unpredictable vicissitudes of response as he perceives, from the angle of experience, the precarious future of innocence — by no means an unknown theme in previous verse, but rarely found, as here, in a single extended panicked struggle. The mind here, as it thinks one thing, instantly thinks its opposite, or else it cannot find clear opposites, or it is sunk in prophetic conflict, or it is about to relinquish altogether any attempt at coherence. In earlier verse, experience, modeled on religious conviction, tended to judge firmly: think of Blake’s Auguries of Innocence, with their instant condemnations and approvals: “A robin redbreast in a cage / Puts all heaven in a rage”; “If the sun and moon should doubt, / They’d immediately go out.” Hopkins’s intellectual subtlety instantly raises not one judgment, but all possible ones, but his love of truth makes him abhor his own skepticism.

    As Hopkins suffers through his meditation on the portrait, he has seen the future of the children threatened by agents that could blight their branches of bright leaves and fruit. The worm — at once the serpent of the Fall of Man and Shakespeare’s canker-worm in the rose — devours the optimism of the poet’s initial hope, and deprives him, by the time his lyric ends, of all notes but tragedy and fury:

    Enough: corruption was the world’s first woe;
    What need I strain my thought beyond my ken?
    O but I bear my burning witness though
    Against the wild and wanton work of men.

    In the fair copy that Hopkins sent to his friend Robert Bridges, the poem “On the Portrait” ends there, but Hopkins showed that he hoped to add more by appending two lines of asterisks before he mails it off for Bridges’ scrutiny. Nowhere does he explain the function of “the selfless self of self,” and how it fits, or does not, with the triple recommendations of truth preceding it.

    “How all’s to one thing wrought!” had been spoken from the point of view of an audience admiring a successful creation in architecture or music. But now, gazing at the portrait to which he himself is audience, Hopkins is prompted to turn his gaze toward the absent painter’s own view: how does the artist himself explain the arrival of inspiration? Hopkins asserts, drawing on Wordsworth, that our inner aesthetic sense — physiological fellow to our other five — is as helpless not to feel joy in responding to perfection of form as the conventional senses are not to see or hear what presents itself to eye or ear. The aesthetic sense, he discovers, is indistinguishable in nature from the other impressionable senses, of which Wordsworth said, in “Expostulation and Reply,”

    The eye — it cannot choose but see,
    We cannot bid the ear be still;
    Our bodies feel, where’er they be,
    Against, or with our will.

    The aesthetic sense produces responses in us strictly comparable to those that we experience as our natural (and spontaneous) biological responses to seeing, hearing, and tasting. The senses are all natural goods, shaded and variegated, of infinite potential, divinely created, knowing no modification by the will:

    For good grows wild and wide,
    Has shades, is nowhere none.

    When Hopkins eventually permitted moral questioning to arise in “How all’s to one thing wrought!” he could not avoid the unequivocal question of salvation, of the “right” and the “wrong,” so different from the aesthetic judgment of “perfect” or “imperfect.”

    But right must choose a side
    And choose for chieftain one.

    What makes the man and what
    The man within that makes:
    Ask whom he serves or not
    Serves and what side he takes.

    As Jesus warned of ethical choice, “No man can serve two masters” (Matthew 6:24).

    This is Hopkins’ inventive argument: just as we cannot choose whether we see or hear or taste, so the aesthetic sense, equally of biological origin in the body, is exempt from serving one master or another. The crucial religious question, “Whom do you serve?” does not apply, Hopkins believes, to poetic inspiration, which arrives not as a decision but as an unexpected event that cannot be willed into being. What any masterpiece offers us is a sense of the mind that invented it, but the mind’s temporal potential is infinitely diverse, and the artist-as-bee, though creating honey from the flowers all about him, cannot exhaust the meadow’s nectar in a single retrieval. The mind, says the poet, is always awaiting the next perfection arriving unheralded from its indescribable “selfless self of self.” Of the artist’s flowers and honey he securely says,

    The brightest blooms lie there unblown
    His sweetest nectar hides behind.

    Masterpieces are not the weak records of a life that is no more, as the sentimental watercolor will be when the children are dead. On the contrary, Hopkins declares, masterpieces arrive at a quintessence of mind and medium stronger than architecture, sweeter than music, and of a permanence exceeding that of human life.

    The blessed potential of poetic invention had seemed ever-fresh at the time that Hopkins, released from the ascetic silence of “The Habit of Perfection,” exclaimed “How all’s to one thing wrought!” But by the time he composes “On the Portrait of Two Beautiful Young People,” he can no longer imagine the poem existing in an independent aesthetic space, aspiring to formal perfection; he has come to understand, through his own suffering, Wordsworth’s observations in “Tintern Abbey” that “a deep distress” had “humanized” his soul, that poetry must absorb and reflect not only nature but also “the still, sad music of humanity.” Hopkins’s “music of humanity” was only occasionally “still” and “sad”; rather, his physiological intensity — in which every feeling, from the exalted to the bitter, was heightened to acute nervous pitch — led him, in moral terms, to a witnessing aflame with pity and indignation. Although the masterpiece never cedes the aesthetic plane guaranteeing its existence into futurity, it is nonetheless now obliged, when it treats of human life, to take on the weight of moral judgment.

    During the Christmas holiday of Hopkins’ composing “On the Portrait,” he was completing the last revisions of a poem he had been working on for two years, called “Spelt from Sibyl’s Leaves.” In his youth, delighting in finding symbols in the world of his own mixed nature as priest and poet, he had written in praise of “pied beauty”: “Glory be to God for dappled things.” But now he was obliged, morally, to separate all the things of the world, both natural and human, into “two flocks, two folds — black, white; | right, wrong.” To the lover of the dappled world, this last judgment, arising when “earth her being has unbound, her dapple is at an end” is an agonizing reduction of the inextinguishable fertility of the creative mind. But what Hopkins has come to understand, in contemplating the scattered leaves of his sybilline book, is, at last, his “selfless self of self.” He had given it that name so as to connect it to the self while representing it as alien to the same self: it is “most strange,” and above all it is voiceless (“most still”). From it came his moments of inspiration (always already “foredrawn to No or Yes”), which seemed to arrive independently only to be quenched by a force outside himself. Inspiration was, he said in a sonnet dedicated to Robert Bridges and written only six weeks before his death, a delight that “breathes once and, quenchèd faster than it came, / leaves yet the mind a mother of immortal song.” Hopkins had thought of his inspiration as coming from God, a suitably unknowable source, but “Spelt from Sibyl’s Leaves” articulates his shocked understanding that inspiration came entirely from his own self, and that its cause was the constant struggle of opposing on the battlefield of the self, under the unfurled banner of the integral being. It was, he now knows, his own suffering that, over time, kindled the later inspiration that generated his “burning witness.” The “selfless self of self ” was (as we would say) the unconscious mind sequestering his suffering until it could find its necessary formal attributes and emerge as a shaping inspiration.

    Having understood that he was alone with himself in a material world of natural causes, the poet, in his apocalyptic sonnet of unrelieved darkness in which no God appears and heaven is populated only by the natural stars, describes his state as that of a man bound on a rack where he is both the torturer and the tortured. His thoughts, like upper and nether millstones, grind pitilessly, their product his wordless “groans,” poetry’s last expiring utterance, pain without words. He has necessarily become, now that his being has been unbound, the selfless self of self naked, stretching itself on an instrument of torture, a self unprotected, unhoused, beset by abrading contradictions, strung

                on a rack
    Where, selfwrung, selfstrung, sheathe- and shelterless, |
    thoughts against thoughts in groans grind.

    It is this pitiless and accurate self-portrait that has replaced the equivocal portrait of the beautiful children.

    The Last Night of the World

    Unfinished dares avoiding rules override Avernus.
    Were you wrong about everything to say anything?
    Plausible laws insufficient to our lives are blowback
    For the myth of liberty. Depeopled palace trumpets
    Silent where they were once wild for slaughter calls.
    Sons and daughters commandeer our mercy for grief
    Discerning: Who would harm a stranger harms me.
    Outstare the world’s visionary company parched so
    Thin on desire and conscience for things as things are
    And not as they appear, which appears contradictive
    To one who saw dynasties of patience vanish whole:
    The golden apple of discord is rotten at the core.
    Silence captures how our deep shadow work in sin
    Poises eternity for love to comfort us — or anyone.

    Animal Magnetism

    Phantom intelligence of the soul knows touch echoes
    Trace gestures prone to outcompose their originals —
    Springs and veils marvel at their sudden plainness,
    Nincompoops with tongs abandon the whole shebang.
    My stupefaction remains wholly blunt and untamed,
    That once familiar summer will ripen and destroy all
    Backward glances aimed at divining an elusive theme,
    Leaving room to fall in a series of parallel inclusions.
    A scholar of a hallucination taking altar in my brain
    Renews a languishing more terrible than perdition.
    The storm once more came on fast with annotations
    I meant to communicate but haven’t written yet —
    The dead hang out their songs to cure in the forest.
    The gates of heaven and hell are hard to tell apart.

    Interaction of Color

    Approached each day ready to return
    Knowing no knowledge in safety —
    Day eventually discovering day,
    Nothing is forever new tomorrow.
    All along songs that need to grow
    On us spring into action unlocking
    Stolen loves still too much to bear.
    An altar of air colors how hard this
    Is to say — your true love remains
    Marinated in a marble-box planter
    Filled to the rim with Pepto-Bismol.
    Composite horrors rendered endless,
    Barren minds are full of tendencies.
    May we all hang well with our wall art.

    An Atlas of Rare and Familiar Color

    Movements toward the unexceptional,
    Benediction of the voice’s mannering
    Vagrancy expires to tilt at beatific winds
    Tacking ships into a salty harbor of blood.
    Let us dispense with muttering receipts
    From Pentecostal fire in the chimney
    Where the jackdaw builds its nest of straw
    For weekend escapes to the empyreal stark.
    Ghosts zone out upon a philosopher stone —
    Vacuous processional full of restless spaces.
    Charter your tributes to the ritual mystery
    Melting fats in a meditation on incarnation.
    You wipe your mouth with a piece of fabric,
    Steel glitters mirroring messages using sun.

    Asteriskos

    In what world do you think I would say such a thing?
    We waded through possibilities to absurdity’s shore.
    In youth, I often ran through fearsome rows of corn.
    That is not metaphor. Primary trouble rests its case.
    People were after monuments: Less talk, more rock.
    A neighbor nearly knifed me open for others to see.
    Words are atoms beaten by myriad uses and abuses.
    Sweet inevitable, make yourself useful, sing without
    Purpose, and time things out in such a way that when
    You speak your mind over matter, with catastrophic
    Drawl, beautify the plural—its interstices so radiantly
    Untrue, a figurehead for all, rinsed of the workaday
    Symbols and the impermeable occlusions of power,
    Twice-told tales with pages of explanatory notes.

    The Bottom of Love

    In 1974 an infamous film, which happens to be one of the great cinematic meditations on love, was released. It is called The Night Porter, and it was intended to be nothing more or less than a study of the uncivilized drama of perverse, inexpungible passion. The film was denounced as sadomasochistic Nazi porn. Its plot was, to be sure, disturbing, and the viewer had to conquer a significant degree of discomfort and even outrage to consider charitably and lucidly the film’s primary theme, which perhaps explains its reception and subsequent reputation. The extreme mise en scène of the movie disrupted audiences’ relationship with its astonishing story, and allowed them to evade the excruciating questions that it broached. This was particularly true of American audiences, to whom the film was repeatedly mis-explained by American critics.

    The Night Porter tells the story of Max, a former Nazi official who worked in a concentration camp, and Lucia, a former inmate of that camp. Lucia was imprisoned because her father was a socialist, and in the camp she and Max developed a sexual relationship. We learn all this in flashbacks. The movie begins in Vienna about ten years after the war’s end. Max works as a night porter in a hotel, where one day Lucia and her husband, a celebrated American conductor, coincidentally arrive to stay. Max is now a member of a ghastly ring of former Nazis who endeavor to obliterate evidence of their past crimes by assiduously collecting and destroying incriminating documents and murdering witnesses who could testify against them; they hold mock trials for one another as test runs to see if sufficient evidence has been eliminated for the members to survive a real trial if one were to be held. In the lobby of the hotel Lucia and Max suddenly recognize each other, and in that electrifying moment the respective lives they have carefully built since the war’s end are over.

    Max does his best to hide Lucia from the Nazi ring — she was a witness to the camp’s atrocities — to keep them from murdering her. Lucia abandons her husband and moves into Max’s dank apartment. While he is at work one night, one of the Nazis comes to visit Lucia and tries to persuade her to testify against Max at his upcoming mock trial, which she refuses to do. Police come to the hotel asking questions about Lucia, whose family is looking for her, and Max eventually quits his job and moves into the apartment with her. They appear unable to be apart. His former comrades keep watch, attempting to kill the two lovers when either one is so much as seen from the window. Trapped inside, Max tells Lucia that she is free to call the police, who can secure her safe escape, have him arrested, and return her to her husband. She chooses to stay. The two remain barricaded inside until they run out of food. In the final scene of the film Max, dressed in his Nazi uniform, and Lucia, wearing a nightgown similar to the one he had smuggled into the camp for her, walk fatalistically outside onto a nearby bridge, where they are shot dead.

    It is a bizarre, tragic, and beautiful tale, and it cannot be adequately told without also describing the sweat and blood which give it life. These are made manifest primarily via the physical proximity of the lovers, and how that proximity, or its negation, works on them — the way they tremble, screech, beg, and collapse, the way their eyes glimmer or are held captive. Torrents of understanding and desire are exchanged in their tormented, silent stares. The film depicts the resurrection of a great damned love in the aftermath of atrocity.

    It is not bewildering that audiences just thirty years after the war recoiled from the film. The macabre brutality of The Night Porter must have been even rougher to endure in 1974 than it is now. The horrors of the Holocaust had not yet faded from living memory. There were people in those theaters who had memories of the sadistic universe in which Lucia and Max met. The movie takes place in a past peopled with demons of the sort that anyone alive today in the West never knew (though their contemporary counterparts thrive in Moscow, Damascus, and Beijing), and it was made and screened in a world in which those demons still lingered. Viewers who watch the movie today are twice removed: from the reality of The Night Porter, and from the context of the people who made it, and the viewers they expected to watch it.

    Yet The Night Porter was not the only film about the evils of World War Two that was released in the 1970s, and it is not remotely the most sexually explicit. The less said about the nauseating “Naziploitation” genre, such as Don Edmonds’ Ilsa, the She Wolf and Tinto Brass’ Salon Kitty, the better. But the confluence of debauchery and atrocity made it also into the mainstream, notably with Lina Wertmüller’s Seven Beauties, which was nominated for four Academy Awards. Bruno Bettelheim imperishably explained what was wrong with Wertmuller’s campy and cynical film in an essay called “Surviving”: “I believe that Seven Beauties is a somewhat uneasy, indirect, camouflaged — and therefore more dangerous, because more easily accepted and hence more effective — justification for accepting the world that produced concentration camps.”

    Still, the acidity of the reception that greeted The Night Porter was particularly pronounced and widespread. In the Chicago Sun-Times, Roger Ebert wrote that the film was “a despicable attempt to titillate us by exploiting memories of persecution and suffering.” In The New York Times, Vincent Canby called the film “a piece of junk.” Time Out said it was “an operatic celebration of sexual disgust.” In the longest of the reviews, which appeared in The New Yorker, Pauline Kael declared that “the film’s porno-profundity is humanly and aesthetically offensive. The offense is mitigated by incompetence, however: the picture is simply too crudely trumped up to be a serious insult.” The critics argued that the plot was poorly conceived; that the film was plagued by bad acting; and that it was pornographic and sadomasochistic. Those last two charges are of course particularly incriminating. Any film about the Holocaust that aspires to even a patina of integrity must not traffic in cheap thrills.

    In truth, the plot is skillfully crafted, and the movie is carried by two extraordinary actors, Dirk Bogarde and Charlotte Rampling, both of whom give wrenching and deeply humane performances. Moreover, it is not by any reasonable standard “hard-core-porno,” as Kael put it, or sadomasochistic. Not remotely. Pornography is famously difficult to define, and so it is rather tricky to demonstrate when so elastic a term does not apply. But it surely helps to note that there is only a single sex scene in the entire movie, and it is a scene in which both actors are, to the viewer’s eye, almost entirely clothed (Lucia’s dress rides up to the base of her back towards the end), and it lasts for a total of two minutes and eighteen seconds. 2:18 of tender sex in costume is not the stuff of porn.

    But there is another scene, the one with which the movie is most associated because it was emblazoned on movie posters and DVD covers, and it is the primary reason that lewd sex is mistaken as the true subject of The Night Porter. People who know nothing about the movie know about this scene. It is so much a part of popular culture that Madonna asked Rampling and Bogarde to reenact it in one of her music videos. (They, being decent human beings, refused.) In that scene, a flashback to the camp, Lucia, wearing only a pair of pants, suspenders, and a Nazi officer’s cap, has been forced to sing and to dance for salivating Nazi men. It is indeed a sickening spectacle, though hardly the worst possible representation of the sexual brutality that flourished in the camps. Of course the scene is morally offensive. It takes place in hell, as the film’s director, Lilliana Cavani, obviously understands. The scene was not presented to titillate audiences. Interpreting Lucia’s coerced performance as pornographic betrays a lack of decency, of sympathetic imagination, on the part of the viewer. It is not intended to arouse; it is intended to horrify. It is not pornographic in the same way that the rape scene in The Accused is not pornographic. It is, and is meant to be, revolting.

    As Cavani recalled, “they made it all about sex.” Of her trip to New York for the film’s opening, Rampling recounted that at dinner one night she told Cavani that she had to return to Europe, she could not complete the schedule of interviews: “They constantly bombard me with questions about sadomasochism. I don’t know how to answer them. Those topics have nothing to do with the movie.” She was correct. Sadomasochism, unlike pornography, is a term with a very specific meaning, and in no way does it apply to Cavani’s film. Of course, and it is almost too obvious to say so, the sexual relationship between a Nazi officer and an imprisoned woman is premised upon a power imbalance — upon the mother of all power imbalances — and for this reason it has been mistaken for a sadomasochistic relationship, which consists in a rigidly hierarchical bond between master and slave, strong and weak. But the power imbalance in a sadomasochistic relationship exists only in the context of that sex, the hierarchy is intrinsic and restricted to the relationship, and it is premised upon consent, which is the deep source of its emotional excitement. S&M is a common kind of sexual fetish, a well-known element of our erotic vernacular, whereas there is nothing remotely familiar about the darkness at the heart of The Night Porter. There is no conventional framework — and sadomasochism is indeed a convention — which the viewer can depend upon to explain Max and Lucia’s love. This radical unconventionality, this confusion of appearance and reality, this excruciating improbability, is what the movie is exploring. Sadomasochism, moreover, is not a catch-all for deviant sex — nor is the sex, and the love, in The Night Porter particularly deviant, unlike the circumstances in which it was conceived. It is merely deep and desperate.

    There was something else that horrified viewers about Max and Lucia, and about her in particular. It is no mystery what this something was: she, a concentration camp survivor, loved a Nazi. How can that be? Isn’t it disgusting even to imagine it? Is not Lucia contemptible, deserving of our harshest condemnation? Pauline Kael thought so, and she not only slandered the character, she also slandered the actress who played her, and at length.

    “The Night Porter” is said to be a runaway hit in Italy and France and to have made a big star of Charlotte Rampling, but surely one twinkle doesn’t make a star. At our first view of her sullen beauty, the sensual vibrations of her come-hither nastiness promise undreamt-of intensities, but absolutely nothing emerges. As an actress, she has no hidden resources; there’s no soul beneath that perverse Mona Lisa face. Maybe that’s why she was so effective in Georgy Girl, sawing away on her cello, and doing her nails while her baby lay on the bed squalling. Yes, she’s reminiscent of Garbo and Moreau but their sensuality is the sum total of their expressiveness; Rampling is wildly suggestive in a single shot and lifeless in a full performance. Bacall didn’t have much more than a look, but her look was a tease, a put on; is Rampling is an emblem of contamination, and though — both tense and languid — she looks as if she’d be a perfect sex symbol for a dragged-out world, her necrophilic allure could probably be sustained only if she were confined to fleeting bit parts. She looks all knowing and weary — exhausted from the weight of her own dirty thoughts — yet she becomes prosaic as soon as she starts to smash things exultantly or drag her chains around or perform sex acts. Nothing lives up to the foul promise.

    Nasty, dirty, foul, necrophilic, an emblem of contamination. After all that Lucia endured! Kael’s screed is animated by horror and disgust at Lucia’s love. She does not consider its depth and sincerity and helplessness. Audiences were suspicious of Lucia in a way that they could not be of Max. Max was a Nazi; he was supposed to be foul. But Lucia, who survived the war and found freedom and a fine bourgeois marriage, returns to him. How dare she? It seems almost as if critics felt that interpreting her devotion as genuine love — being moved by her behavior — conferred a kind of impurity. They seemed to believe that love, which our society considers a semi-mystical power beyond ordinary reproach, should not be permitted to operate in so discomfiting and disruptive a fashion. But who is doing the permitting, and under which conditions? The film insists that what we are watching is a love story, and it is right. It reminds viewers that there are such strange cases, that the integrity of a love does not correspond to its circumstances, that happiness is more precious when it serves as a balm for hopelessness and persistent misery, and that our own comfortable lives may poorly equip us to understand the desires and joys of people who have been mutilated by sustained brutality.

    In her New Yorker piece, Kael knowingly wrote that the “picture gives no sign of interest in what actually happened in the Nazi death camps. [The camp in the movie is not a death camp.] More likely, it came out of idle speculation: ‘Gee, I bet there were people sexually enslaved by the Nazis.’” In his review for The Village Voice, Andrew Sarris made a similar claim. But there are recorded cases of such an unimaginable bond. Consider the survivor Helena Citronova, who was interred at Auschwitz and slept there with an SS guard named Franz Wursch, with whom she professed to have fallen in love. In an interview after the war, Citronova remarked that “there were moments where I forgot that I was a Jew and that he was not a Jew and, honestly, in the end I loved him.” It is. disturbing testimony, but it would be outrageous to call her a foul contaminant. It would be disgraceful to judge her at all. Our normal world does not prepare us to comprehend the feelings and actions that took place in the universe of the concentration camps and its aftermath, or to denounce them. It is tempting for those who have never been as alienated from their own humanity, or as ravenous for intimacy and warmth, as Lucia and Helena must have been, to make such claims. But we cannot know what it was like. It is this suspension of judgment in the face of crippling terror that the movie asks of us. It is a rather strenuous test of its viewers’ capacity for empathy. Those are human beings on the screen.

    “What was the worst thing you saw in the war?” In a televised interview in 1986, Dirk Bogarde, who served as an intelligence officer in the British Army during World War II, replied to that question with the following story:

    I think it was the 13th of April — I’m not quite sure what the date was — in ’44 and we opened up the Belsen camp. It was the first concentration camp any of us had seen. We didn’t even know what they were. We’d heard vague rumors of what they were… The gates were opened and then I realized that I was looking at Dante’s Inferno… I still haven’t seen anything as dreadful. And never will. And a girl came up who spoke English because she recognized the badges, and her breasts were like sort of empty purses, she had no top on and a pair of man’s pajamas, you know prison pajamas, and no hair, but I knew she was a girl because of her breasts, which were empty. She was, I suppose, uh, I don’t know — twenty-four, twenty-five. And we talked and she was you know so excited and thrilled, and all around us there were mountains of dead people, I mean mountains of them. And they were slushy, they were slimy, so when you walked through them or walked — you tried to but it was like….[pause] Well, you just walked through it. There was a very nice British MP and he said, you know, don’t have anything more, come away, come away if you don’t mind because they’ve all got typhoid, they’re all sick and you’ll get it, and you shouldn’t be here swanning around. And the girl saw in the back of the jeep the portion of the daily ration wrapped in a piece of the Daily Mirror and she said could she have it? And he said, don’t give her food because they eat it immediately and they die within ten minutes. But she didn’t want the food, she wanted the piece of the Daily Mirror. She hadn’t seen newsprint for about eight years or five years or however long. So she folded it, you know it’s quite a big double sheet, about that size [he holds up his hands about two feet apart]. She folded it up into little pieces, talking the whole time, chattering away, in a funny broken accent, she was Estonian. And then she hid it, I can only say on her person. She folded it up. It was quite hard to do. And to hide it there. That’s all she wanted. She gave me a big kiss which was very moving, but the corporal was out of his mind and I was just dragged off. I never saw her again because she died. I mean I gather they all did. But I can’t really describe it very well. I don’t really want to. I went through some of the huts, and there were tiers and tiers of rotting people. But some of them were alive underneath the rot and were lifting their heads and trying [suppressing tears he holds up his middle and forefinger to make a “V”] trying to do the victory thing. And that was the worst. Sorry.

    It is impossible to believe that the man who told this story was not interested in what actually happened in the camps. Surely this experience informed how Bogarde approached the movie, how he justified it, and how he advised the director, Cavani, while assisting her in editing the script. (Later in his life Bogarde used to lecture about his experiences as a liberator of a camp.) Cavani also had intimate encounters with survivors. She began her career as a documentary filmmaker in the 1960s. One of her first films was Storia del III Reich, a history of the Third Reich that chronicled its rise. This film was the first documentary about the Nazi regime to be screened on Italian television. While working on another documentary, Women in the Resistance, which appeared in 1965, Cavani interviewed several Jewish women who had survived the camps. Two in particular left deep impressions on her. These conversations, Cavani explained, served as the catalysts for The Night Porter.

    One was a teacher in Cunea, who told me that her experiences had a massive effect on her. They took her there when she was eighteen years old. She survived. She said, “Every year I go to Dachau.” I asked her: “But you are a teacher, excuse me, why do you go to Dachau?”… She told me: “I feel the need to go back to those places, those spots where I left so many people behind and had such terrible experiences.” On the other hand, I interviewed a woman from Milan… She was taken to Auschwitz and survived. At first she didn’t want to talk about it. Then it became almost impossible to stop her from talking about it. She said, “I’m glad I can talk about this… Normally, people” — keep in mind, this took place in 1965 — “don’t want to hear about my experiences. They say to me, ‘Bury the hatched and move on. You shouldn’t bring up these things, we shouldn’t dwell on these things anymore. They were so terrible. Try to forget them.’ And I’d say to myself, ‘How can I forget about something like that, about any of these things?’”…I asked her, “what was the worst thing you remember from your experiences there?” She  answered, “I will never forgive the Germans for forcing me to see a side of myself I didn’t know existed.” So, by having survived, by having… how should I say, more guts than other women there — maybe by stealing a mess-tin, a pan to hide food in, so that she could survive by evidently only thinking about herself, and without thinking of the others, without any solidarity with them. The teacher from Cunea told me she had learned a lesson about solidarity. It’s that solidarity is a fundamental value — it is an instinct not to give into selfishness, not to save just yourself. She told me she had learned this from a group of French women who tried to help each other.

    There’s a dilemma as to what to do when confronted with this survival instinct. One never knows how one will behave in such situations. It’s easy to say, “I won’t ever kill anyone, I won’t ever do anything wrong” and then to be scandalized by others’ behavior… What I’m saying is that the victims’ stories can sometimes be controversial. They can be dark. It is because human nature is complex, sometimes far more complex than one would ever imagine.

    These elements — the irresistible compulsion to return to one’s own nightmare; the irreversibility of such a mental and verbal return; the chilling complexity of human nature; and the moral obligation to suspend judgment while considering how survivors made it out alive, and how they clung to their humanity inside — are the foundations of the film. These are the themes — not sex, not gender, not even power  — that Cavani was trying to explore in The Night Porter.

    The film was shaped profoundly by Bogarde, the man in the Allied uniform who participated in the liberation of hell. Cavani had sent him the script and for many years it collected dust in his attic, until one day he happened to watch one of her films and was enormously impressed. He contacted her immediately and told her he would do The Night Porter on condition that Charlotte Rampling be cast as his co-star. According to Rampling, Cavani and the rest of the team were not thrilled with this choice, but Bogarde was adamant and they ultimately acquiesced. Bogarde was one of the best-known movie stars in England at the time, and he used his stature to influence the production. Rampling remembered that “the film that Dirk wanted to do wasn’t necessarily the film that Liliana wanted to.”

    And what was the film that he wanted to do? “He wanted it to be a love story, which is what it in fact turned out to be.” Indeed, a love story that explores the themes that Cavani considered essential to a survivor’s battle with her past. In a letter on January 24, 1974, Bogarde wrote: “I don’t think one can really see the ‘NP’ thing unless you, or one rather, has been desperately, solidly, passionately in love. Or unless one has been loved. That is, ultimately, what it is about. At least Charlotte and Lilliane [sic] and I thought so…. We hacked and cut and clipped the ten other plots away from the original script and tried to get to the bottom of Love.”

    The opening credits of The Night Porter glide over a Viennese evening in 1957, more than a decade after the war ended, but the ghost of the cataclysm is still heavy. The present in The Night Porter crawls on all fours in the shadow of the war; it is not really a present so much as an aftermath. Evil has infected these streets and trees and buildings, it seems to hang in the air, and viewers become accustomed to its bitter presence. The movie consistently communicates this knowledge. There is no attempt to make light, or irony, or caricature, of the horror in the way that Seven Beauties did. The film’s somber understanding of the gravity of what happened a decade or so earlier is plain in every frame — it is, in a sense, its very plot. Every person in the story was alive and aware when the fires were still burning. Each character has either been smashed to pieces, did the smashing, or watched the bones break. All of them are children of horror. They are not healthily human in the way we viewers know humans to be. As we slink deeper into the ethos of The Night Porter, we begin to wonder whether the only incomprehensible inhabitants are the ones who move about pretending not to know that nothing can ever be normal, that everything is rotting.

    One way of describing the largest consequence of the Holocaust, aside from counting the dead, is to say that it forever expanded our sense of what is possible. If that actually happened, then what is beyond the realm of possibility? (Dictators and fascists and lunatics since the war have taken heart from the fact that these crimes were once committed.) In a world that has witnessed such evil, that is in some way now premised upon the grappling with it, does sanity demand that one fold oneself into the rhythms and etiquettes of a normal world and try to forget? Or is that the insane choice? The movie wrestles with this question. “Madness” flows like a river throughout the film. Lucia accuses a Nazi of insanity, to which he responds that she is the crazy one since she lives of her own volition with her former captor. (“That’s my affair,” she hisses back.) When Max tells a Nazi friend that he has found Lucia again, she advises him to kill her “before she can testify against you.” He shakes his head and says “Oh no… I love her.” To which she responds, “A madman!” And then again in the same conversation, after relaying the story of how he arranged to behead a prisoner who use to torment Lucia, and had the head brought to Lucia in a box as a gift, the Nazi woman says, “You were always insane, and you still are.” Max, shrugging, says “Sane, insane then — who’s to judge?” There could be no escape from such memory, no salvific return to an innocent ignorance.

    Survivors of cataclysm are always locked in a titanic struggle with their own memories. For the sake of a future, life must not be pulled backwards. But sometimes the impact of what was seen and done is too great and the past claims the present. In some cases this results in despair and morbidity and even suicide. The Night Porter depicts the case of an extreme surrender to the traumatic past, a surrender made in the name of love. Life is pulled backwards, and the tale of Max and Lucia takes place in the undertow.

    People, all people, bend themselves to their social settings — often it is our human duty to do so. We obey the rules and fit ourselves into our various social contexts. Usually the seduction of ordinary membership, of normalcy, is overwhelming. But not always. Sometimes, for good or for ill, luckily or unluckily, a person or an experience penetrates the carapaces and splits us open. Almost against our will we feel that we must return to him or to her, and to the place where we encounter our own viscera. We expect to find a rare form of self-knowledge there. This is what love and trauma have in common: they are the occasions for an encounter with our own guts.

    A small but complete universe blooms around two people who are passionately in love; they defect or are expelled from the commonplace world. Some trip in the wiring, a mistake in the machinations of our souls, allows for this violent discovery. Henry James, in Portrait of a Lady, described the trip in the wiring as being more interested in one person than any other (“What kept Ralph alive was simply the fact that he had not yet seen enough of the person in the world in whom he was most interested”), which is one useful definition of this phenomenon. Obsession is a kind of captivity. It exceeds physical bondage because it also conquers the mind. (Bettleheim, a survivor and a psychoanalyst, attested that one could not hope to survive the camps without maintaining mental autonomy, though of course that extraordinary feat did not ensure survival.) L’amour fou is not conducive to life as an ordinary citizen with multiple commitments and loyalties. There is a kind of love that is an act of secession, even if it does not involve the grotesque divergences from norms which the love in The Night Porter does, because there is always the possibility that the lover’s needs will conflict with society’s needs, and explode them. (This is why Freud’s study of instinct led him to elevate repression into a defining feature of civilization.) It might even be said that any love that fits seamlessly into social contexts is a love that betrays itself, though the standard for genuine and autonomous love, for love’s integrity, is of course not Max and Lucia.

    Unlike most mad loves, Max and Lucia’s was birthed in the inferno, and it was further damned since Max was an agent of evil. For him, in the grotesque reality of the camp, his love for Lucia was an escape into civility out of the savagery that he helped to perpetuate. His love for a dehumanized girl rehumanized him. The moral questions are excruciating. But the subject of this profoundly challenging film is not love’s morality but love’s brute strength. In the aftermath of the apocalypse, in post-war Vienna, the force of their love is of such a magnitude that it plays the process of liberation backwards, rips the lovers out of civilized society and puts them back in hell. In the morbid purity of their reunion, they have seceded from humanity. This love is too strange, too horrifying — it cannot survive in the ordinary world. In choosing each other they choose death.

    Whether Lucia loved Max while she was in the camp is one of the ugliest questions that the movie raises. It is an almost unbearable question to consider. The possibility is at once grotesque and gorgeous. If she did, if it was possible for an intimate human bond to transcend the merciless circumstances, it would be, among other things, a great human triumph. But how could she? And without definitive proof, which the film is careful to withhold, how can we attribute such affection to her? Throughout the whole film she never tells Max that she loves him, whereas he declares love for her three times. The closest she comes is when they are alone for the first time in her hotel room and she howls, “I want you!” The viewer knows that she loves him only through her actions — she chooses him, she leaves her husband and moves in with him, she cannot leave him. We must infer that she loves him. We must also surmise that her love is not devoid of jealousies and furies. She relishes the power that she, his former prisoner, his helpless “little girl,” has over him in Vienna. At one point she licks his hand and opens her mouth, inviting him to slide his fingers inside, and then she bites down so hard that he lifts her up with just his trapped hand while trying to wrestle his fingers free. Behind a closed door she smashes a glass perfume bottle, opens the door and tricks him into stepping on the shards so that the bottoms of his feet are cut. She visibly delights in his anxiety while he waits to see if she will leave him — who’s afraid now? His crippling love for her has given her power.

    The Night Porter inspects the guts of mad love, which are never pretty, no matter what the storybooks say. Rampling reported that it was Bogarde’s decision to make this movie a love story. Is it possible that he considered the Holocaust the proper background in which to engage this dangerous subject because it was the context in which he encountered his own innards? Some may decide that it was not his right to use the Holocaust as a setting for a philosophical exploration of extreme and remorseless love. This is certainly one of the liberties taken by the movie which makes viewers turn away. But why are some survivors’ stories worthy of consideration and not others? When Charlotte Rampling was in America for the movie’s opening, she was hounded by reporters and journalists who told her that “These things don’t happen. This story cannot be. This woman would not do that.” To which she responded, “But it’s based on fact. And women did do that, and they’ll carry on doing those sorts of things.” The Night Porter may be one of the most forceful restatements of the truism that love is strange.

    It is also, in another true truism, blind, by which I mean that love is democratic. It is impervious to societal cookie cutters, the social and political categories that we use to fit ourselves and each other tidily into our surroundings. One of the most urgent purposes of mainstream culture is to incorporate into itself elements that might otherwise subvert it, and thereby render them harmless by redefining them according to established norms. This process of disarming and coopting is one of society’s stealthy defense mechanisms. By expanding the range of socially legitimate sexual orientations, for example, various transgressive subcultures have been obliterated. This secures protection. It keeps the peace. We are healthier when we are not despised. But sometimes, when they are kindled, instinct and desire and obsession succeed in overwhelming us. Sometimes they defeat everything that we have been taught about the compulsory mastery of the passions. Faced with such tempests we must respect them, even those of us who cannot understand them, and who would never choose them. As if it is ever a choice.

    Extremity and perversity are ineradicable elements of human life. And they can grow anywhere, in the least likely settings. For this reason it is possible that, while we readily celebrate polyamorous and pan-sexual lovers of different shades and shapes, it could be that the lovers who indulge the wildest and most subversive passion do so in a cis hetero exterior behind a white picket fence in Bethesda or somewhere similarly exotic. Dark love does not prey on inhabitants of particular zip codes or members of specific ethnicities or instances of certain genders. (What was the zip code of Wuthering Heights?) It is, again, blind. People with the souls for it will find each other, or not. They will seem “anti-social,” which, essentially, they are. In its name they will do conventionally incomprehensible things. There is a code which mandates that we ignore these things, that we not discuss them and certainly not admire them. We are conditioned to avert our eyes, and thereby to renounce a full recognition of the mysteries of human existence. The Night Porter forces us to look and asks us to understand.

    Despair of Wings

    Why on earth doesn’t the poor man say the Soul and have done with it?

                                                                                       WILLIAM JAMES

    “By reality and perfection I understand the same thing.” I remember the moment fifty years ago when I read that outrageous and enviable sentence for the first time. The words infuriated me, because they seemed to defy so much of what we know about nature and history, and because they seemed to mock us for regarding the imperfections of the world, which include calamities of enormous magnitude, with the utmost seriousness. The shocking verbal simplicity of its fortune-cookie theodicy, the untroubled and undiversified syntax of its peace of mind, made it easy to imagine it being uttered in a comedy by a fool. But it was not the pronouncement of a fool, and so I confess that I felt also a certain jealousy of the philosopher whose ferocious critical energy did not rule out such a cosmically sanguine conclusion, such an unmitigated declaration of acceptance, such a thorough release from intellectual strain. Either he was wrong or I was flawed. (Or both, of course.) How could the mind think itself to such a state of contentment without compromising itself? Sentences such as this can tar reason’s already tarred reputation.

    The sentence appears, almost as a methodological throwaway, in the preparatory material, the introductory “definitions,” of the second part of Spinoza’s Ethics. The first part of the work, the strictly metaphysical part, laid the ground for it, so that no elaboration would be necessary. My study of Spinoza had been preceded, fortunately, by some immersion in medieval religious philosophy, and specifically medieval Jewish philosophy, out of which his own thought emerged, so that there were echoes and precedents that qualified my visceral sense of the sentence’s absurdity. There was a whiff of Anselm in Spinoza’s words, of his association, in the renowned proof for the existence of God, of the perfect with the real. Having demonstrated to his satisfaction, in the first part of his book, that God and nature are identical, Spinoza’s sentence follows rather uncontroversially: reality, which is God, and perfection, which is God, are the same thing. This triumphant conflation is re-stated almost immediately: no sooner has he completed his “definitions” and his “axioms” than Spinoza turns to the “propositions” of his second part. The first proposition is that “thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.” No breakthrough there; it was the conventional wisdom of medieval monotheism. The second proposition is that “extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.” That was Bento’s bombshell.

    There also loomed over the sentence, as over the rest of the work, the long, daring, and severe shadow of Maimonides, whose metaphysical faith in natural law and in the omniscience of its creator carried the mind to the very limit that Spinoza momentously transgressed. When, for example, in a startling passage in his own philosophical masterpiece, Maimonides mentions “the divine actions,” he immediately adds “I mean to say the natural actions” — an aside that makes Spinozists swoon, because it seems to suggest that their hero was fearlessly completing the logic of his precursor, who lacked the courage or the imagination to go the whole way. This is nonsense. Spinoza was not the fulfillment of his tradition; he was its destruction. Maimonides did not shrink back, in psychological or political timidity, from the pantheistic temptations of his own naturalism; he believed that they were false and unwarranted, rationally and in his religion. He went where his mind led him; and he regarded the faith in the divinity of creation as the most basic form of idolatry, because his mind — not his synagogue, his mind — established with rigorous conceptual analysis that the identification of the created with the creator cannot be true. These were some of my early thoughts upon encountering Spinoza’s sentence, some of my defenses against it, as I sat in my woolen yarmulke and jeans, a tender Maimonidean in the secular city, and experienced one of the seismic events in the history of Western thought.

    I had another misgiving about the sentence. Despite its quasi-mystical heat, it seemed so cold. It amoralized the cosmos; or more accurately, it chose to overlook those precincts of the cosmos in which human freedom tears holes in the finished and unruffled fabric of this allegedly immaculate reality. It was clear from the pages in which the sentence appeared that Spinoza was not regarding perfection from a moral standpoint; and indeed it is silly to regard the entirety of the universe from the standpoint of good and evil. In our world we are big, but our world is small. Still, Spinoza’s ontological equation begged an important question. What is the relationship between perfection and goodness? If perfection and reality are the same thing, are goodness and reality the same thing? Quite obviously they are not. In subsequent years, as I studied moral philosophy and the ethical writings of my tradition, the distinction between perfection and goodness became decisive for me. An extended but informal survey of the literature on Spinoza revealed that his sentence was not generally read as an observation on the goodness of what there is. But I note an interesting exception: in one of his greatest essays, Russell claims that Spinoza “uses the word ‘perfection’ when he means to speak of the good that is not merely human.” But what is the good that is not merely human? Russell’s reading remoralizes Spinoza’s cosmos, though he himself never believed that the universe has anything to do with the satisfaction of human desires or ideals. He argues that Spinoza’s sentence should be interpreted as an expression of “mysticism [that] maintains that all evil is illusory, and sometimes maintains the same view as regards good, but more often holds that all reality is good.” I think not. If we know too much to agree that reality is good, so too did Spinoza, and not only from his books. Perhaps reality is perfect and bad!

    Yet these recollections of my first encounter with Spinoza’s “definition,” of my thrill and my recoil, do not convey the significance of the event for me. I was granted not an idea but an experience. Something happened. Late on an autumn morning, when the sun seemed to gild everything, I took my book to Riverside Park. I had an assignment to complete for an “independent study” on Spinoza. I found a spot on the sloping grass, which turned white in patches as the wind exposed the blades to the glare of the sky. I started to read, though one does not exactly read the Ethics, or rather one reads it as one does wisdom literature, which interferes somewhat with the critical spirit that it requires, and that its author personifies for all time. Wisdom literature can have a lulling, even stupefying effect, and its polished concision — wisdom’s style — can be deceptive, as if a trove of serious reflection lies behind every epigram; and the question of whether there is wisdom in Spinoza is hardly a settled matter. So I proceeded slowly down the page, sentence by sentence, phrase by phrase, almost in the way I was taught to read Biblical verses, looking for plain meanings and not so plain meanings, establishing the structure, wondering about logical and linguistic connections, collating terms and concepts, scribbling vexations and associations in the margins, picking my way slowly through the “geometrical” presentation

    It happened that my text and I were bathed in sunlight. Before me stood an elm tree, its branches increasingly contorted as they rose higher into the local empyrean. The tree stood alone, and I have always been moved by solitary trees. Its leaves were approaching the end of their seasonal lives, and they were dying in splendor. They were disappearing into the throes of a joyful yellow, a parting gorgeousness, almost as if they were teaching the spectator how to die. Nature decays, but it is never decadent. Then I read “by reality and perfection I understand the same thing,” and I looked up at the tree. I had never before seen anything so clearly. I had a sensation of obstacles being removed, of impediments falling away. All drowsiness, all the conventions of vision, were gone. I was the site of a revolution in cognition. The form of the tree was fresh and precise, as if it had never been accurately viewed before; its shape was completely lucid, as if there were no air; its lines were fixed so strongly, so definitively, that they gave an illusion of necessity. The florid colors stayed steadfastly within the lines, except when they were blurred by a breeze, and even the obscurity of the blur was uncannily clear to me. The impression of the distinctness of the tree was overwhelming. There was nothing between it and me. What I saw was not that it was beautiful, but that it was actual. I was absolutely certain that I was a witness to actuality. It felt like a kind of election, a privileged way of living with matter. And the heightened presentness, the restored vividness — did it once exist and was lost? — extended to me, too: in all my life this was the most present and the most vivid that I had ever been. For once my powers had been up to the task of perception. I was as undispersed as the tree, as undeniable, as concentrated within existence.
    Was this mysticism? I do not think so, though clarity always has a transfiguring effect. (The tree was clarified the way an object is, I was clarified the way oil is.) The experience in the park was in fact the antithesis of mysticism, because nothing supernatural was disclosed. But the disclosure of the natural is itself an epiphanous event, with elevating consequences for the soul. The hiddenness of God pales beside the hiddenness of reality. For this reason the attainment of clarity is more than an optical achievement. It is an operation of all of one’s inwardness. The senses are only the front lines of experience, and they are easily diverted and defeated. They must have support from the rear, spiritual resources to back them up, to fortify and correct and intensify them.
    Somehow I had cleared myself for clarity. I like to think that Spinoza’s sentence was my preparation, that it shocked me into readiness, and so I was rewarded with an inkling of his “reality.” Certainly I did not come away with an inkling of his “perfection.” Except insofar as perfection means a thing’s suitability for itself, the revelation of the tree justified nothing. The same was true of Roquentin in his famous encounter with a tree, but he was trapped in his need for justification, and so he left the park nauseous and absurd. But the revelation of the tree left me neither happy nor unhappy. Better, it left me not caring about happiness, which in that setting would have been a solipsistic impertinence. The gift of the morning was that I had gotten out of my own way and transcended my limitations sufficiently to really see. The quotidian drudgery of subject and object had turned into a magnificent adventure. The subject was pierced by the object — not quite the arrows of love that pierce the Christian mystic’s heart, but penetration enough. Seeing is epical, and objectivity is a form of transcendence.

    This happened at the same time as the genocide in Bangladesh.

    There is no calm like the calm of Bruges at midnight. The stillness is so complete that it can be mistaken for peace. The canals are silvery ribbons of serenity; they do not flow, they abide. Spires throw shadows far across the abandoned streets, whose rough cobblestones look soft in the light of the streetlamps. The market square becomes the site of an agreeable emptiness, and the city hall in the Burg, from the fourteenth century, stands like a giant sentry guarding the public quiet. History, in this historic town, is all there is, as the present defers to the past, almost in a kind of lunar sorcery. I know of no other place where one can so completely acquire the medieval feeling. One strolls through the high Middle Ages and its stony beauty; the old buildings with their ornamental geometries speak of prosperity and piety; the ghosts form a guild, a community; one feels almost Christian. You would not know in this antique tranquility that here finance was born and massacres were perpetrated and insurrections were launched. Bruges is one of those places that broach the problem of the unmediated coexistence of refinement and brutality. The ground can hide anything. But in the absence, or the aftermath, of the disturbances, Bruges is a capital of things exquisitely wrought. In the morning you can buy fragments of sixteenth-century lace and learn the meaning of craft.

    Beware, my son, of precocity: some things may be known too soon, prematurely, before they can be properly received and cherished, and it is wise to leave some things for later, so that one never lives without the prospect of discoveries, and experience is not ruined by the archive of references and allusions that we have been taught to acquire in the name of sophistication. Ignorance is the innocent condition of discovery. I was ignorant of Jan van Eyck for many decades. Or rather, I was knowing about him. (Between ignorance and discovery there is the swindle of knowingness.) An esteemed art historian named Howard Macpherson Davis had instructed me in northern Renaissance painting at school, and I bent the knee at the mention of van Eyck’s name ever since. A genius! But his paintings were not yet wondrous for me; I had not yet pushed my eyes; I was winging it. There are certain artists about whom you have no right to speak before they have silenced you. Then I went to Bruges, and to the Groeninge Museum, where one afternoon I found myself before The Virgin and Child in the Presence of Saints Donatian and George and Canon Joris van der Paele. After the Ghent Altarpiece, it is the largest picture that van Eyck painted. He produced it between 1434 and 1436, on a commission by the wily and prosperous old man whom it depicts, as a gift to St. Donatian’s church in Bruges. (The tenth-century Romanesque church was also van Eyck’s burial place. It was destroyed in the violent aftermath of the French Revolution.) This is not a picture charged with feeling. Its charge is of a higher order, and as I pondered it something happened.

    The composition is frontal, almost as in a private devotional image, and it is symmetrically divided into thirds. In the center of a rather cramped church interior a delicate and somewhat diffident Virgin sits placidly on a marble throne, and on her lap sits a more energetic Child. They both look down to their left, where Joris van der Paele kneels before them. Behind him is his patron Saint George in his armor, who presents him to the holy family, oddly doffing his helmet. On the other side of the throne stands Saint Donatian, the patron saint of the church, carrying his attribute — a small wheel with lit candles, to commemorate his rescue as a boy by a holy man who saw him thrown into a river and outfitted a waterwheel with candles to find him. The face of van der Paele is one of the early treasures of pictorial humanism — though he is portrayed unsentimentally, he is the beating heart of the scene. Amid the crowded iconography his actuality is especially eloquent. I later learned that a great deal is known about him: born in Bruges in 1370, he was a secular canon who served for years, mainly as a scribe, in the papal curia, agilely negotiating the papal politics of his ecclesiastically turbulent era, growing rich from prebends and benefices, before retiring to Bruges, where he died in 1443. On his knees before the marble throne, in the holy presence, he holds his open prayerbook and his spectacles, which he has just removed. The plot of the picture is that his text has been made redundant. Why gaze at the description of a thing when you can gaze at the thing? The worldly old man could behold himself beholding the otherworldly. What money can buy!

    The composition is static but the painting is lavish. Its sensuousness is hard to describe; it is a delirium of surfaces. This sacred scene, this depiction of a man’s encounter with the divine, is a glittering anthology of the physical world: cloths, carpets, metals, jewels, stone, wood, glass, feathers, flowers, hair, fur, flesh, each in with its own texture and its own luminosity. On all these substances there occur dramas of light, as it is absorbed, or reflected, or repelled, or refracted. All this glorified stuff is not suggested, it is shown: Van Eyck stands athwart the tradition of Western painting that chose to give the brush increasing freedom over the details of an image and demonstrate painterly virtuosity by imprecision and insinuation — whose veristic images are formed in the eye at a distance out of a combination of unveristic elements. We enjoy the candor of the artifice. We admire that tradition because it seems to presage abstraction, which is how we like our art history. But there are no such teleological prefigurings, no such expressions of painterly self-consciousness, in van Eyck. Quite the contrary: he embarrasses us for our loss of interest in verisimilitude, our decision to regard it as an obsolete source of beauty. He insists on the precise rendering of infinitesimal detail, executed with such a degree of exactitude that one is left wondering helplessly and in awe about the techniques that made such radical representation possible. The verisimilitude is vertiginous. In this accomplishment he stands only with Durer and Ingres; and maybe only with Durer; and maybe alone. (When I came home from Bruges and sought to add some knowledge to my awe, I found this in Panofsky on “the Eyckian miracle”: “Jan van Eyck evolved a technique so ineffably minute that the number of details comprised by the total form approaches infinity…Jan van Eyck’s eye operates as a microscope and a telescope at the same time.” I was pleased to note that I had underlined the passage many years earlier.) When one stands before this picture and steps as close to it as the nearby guard will allow, so that one is struck not by large themes but by small phenomena, by the multiplicity of confident puny strokes on a single gemstone at the edge of a brocade, by the narrative of light and shadow on the tiny globe of a pearl, by the mottled sheen on a sleeve of armor and the dermatological drama on a sinking face, one finds oneself surrendering to a feeling that metaphysics forbids: the adoration of the real, the faith in the sufficiency of the empirical. This laudatio to the perceptible, created by a myriad of imperceptible human touches, has an unwitting secular effect. Here are the mother, the son, and the two saints, but it is the man, the mortal, who triumphs in a visual celebration of immanence.   

    The depiction of Canon van der Paele’s physiognomy is so lifelike — it is certainly one of the greatest portraits of old age — that spectators were able to infer from his features the particular variety of arthritis with which he was afflicted. This is van Eyck’s renowned “realism.” It is his immortality. In 1902 a famous exhibition of the Flemish “primitives” was held in Bruges, which had a huge impact upon the modern reception of northern Renaissance art — Huizinga visited it many times, though it never disabused him of his Italianate prejudices about northern realism. This is how one critic expressed his response to the van der Paele painting, which was given pride of place in the show: “the most realist picture that can be conceived, not, of course, through its choice of subject, but through its conception of art, which is the essential point. Courbet ‘who had never seen angels’ is no more rigorous a realist than Jan van Eyck who painted them.” In fact Courbet was a less rigorous realist, though not a less effective one. Realism comes in many versions and does not require a supernal Eyckian fastidiousness. In one of my visits to the picture — I kept going back — it did occur to me that this fanatical mimesis, which some have called “hyper-realism,” can also be a kind of trick, an illusionistic wizardry, a huge but hollow skill. Als ich can, was van Eyck’s motto: As best I can. I thought of certain later Dutch painters, of their brilliance with silk and velvet and satin, their amazing simulacra of tactility. But the comparison finally was not to their advantage: a mere tour de force would not invite the intensity of absorption that this picture provoked in me. The picture was not just marvelous. It held a secret. I continued to look.

    The more I looked, the more I saw, and what I saw was that this is not how we see. The optical fidelity in van Eyck’s picture was not the fidelity of the eye. Nobody perceives the world with such accuracy. Its details are often indiscernible; and the impediments are in both the eye and the environment. That is why we invent ways to correct for this natural imprecision. We enhance our vision and teach it discipline. Van Eyck’s realism could not have been a record of his optical experience. “Hyper-realism” is not an enhancement, it is a fiction. So what, then, accounted for the extraordinary charisma of the picture? I was studying the intricacies of the carpet and the patterns of the tiles when I recognized, with a shiver, what was before me: the picture of a dream. It was the dream of perfect sight. The painting reveals not what the world looks like, but what the world would look like if we could see the whole of the world. If we could see it all, it would all look like this, so let us imagine that we can see it all. Let us nullify the forces of distortion and pretend that doubt has died. In van Eyck, the imagination is not the student of the eye, the eye is the student of the imagination — not in the sense that he imagined angels and so could paint them “realistically,” but that he imagined the eye itself. Scholars have demonstrated van Eyck’s indebtedness to little known theories of late medieval optics, but fundamentally his realism is the transcription of a vision of vision. It is a fantasy of clarity, of senses without defects, of a life without obscurity and approximation. The artist was inviting the spectator into a visual utopia. When I thought of it this way, there was something a little oppressive, even a little demented, about his meticulousness, as there is about all perfection.

    So this apotheosis of the senses is not, in its essence, an encounter with the material world. Indeed, with the exception of the jowly old man, it is an encounter with the immaterial world. What is a realistic portrait of the Virgin and the Child if not a step beyond the real? As is often the case with the interpretation of religious art, we over-secularize, lingering over its forms because its symbols have lost their meaning for us. Van Eyck’s profane effects are so dazzling that I had to remind myself that I was standing before a religious picture. The master of the visible was the servant of the invisible; and his painting was a monument to the relationship between the visible and the invisible, to the old idea, detested by the iconoclasts, that matter is a road to spirit. I was reminded also of Augustine’s theory of the levels of vision, of the sight of the eye and the sight of the soul, which also contains images. The sanctity of the figures in the picture did not move me, since I am not a Christian, but the larger religious hypothesis of van Eyck’s panel — that the soul sees, that the soul is an eye — left me giddy. Is it just a metaphor? Maybe not. We have non-visual intuitions that are as strong and as enlightening as retinal reports. In every language I know seeing is a synonym for understanding. The perverse consequence of van Eyck’s punctilious naturalism was to shake me out of the confinements of the natural. Wherever I was, I was no longer completely stranded in the secular.

    I walked back to my hotel over a small stone bridge, and found myself reciting, in a whisper, almost liturgically, some of my favorite lines of poetry:

    The skin and shell of things
          Though fair
            are not
        Thy wish nor prayer
            but got
        By mere despair
            of wings.

    I committed those verses to memory many years ago because I feared that they would be my epitaph. But in Bruges I had wings.

    This happened at the same time as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

    In how many domains can a person live? Are we, I mean each of us, called to be one or many? Is our complicatedness a burden or a blessing? Is an existence in multiplicity a sign of dilettantism or prevarication, or is it singularity that bespeaks timidity? Does the plurality of our loyalties compromise the romance of loyalty? Must we pare our commitments and our pleasures down, or make rigid hierarchies of them, or deny them on pain of defection or expulsion? Does the wealth of human differences exist only among individuals, or also within individuals? Is any realm of life sovereign over the other realms of life? What subsumes what? How much guilt should complexity entail? And how much patience, and how much kindness?

    Abstract questions all, but not really. Our politics and our culture are riven by these questions. The crisis in which we are living, the injustices that pervade our society, have led not only to extreme positions but also to extreme mentalities. (They are not always the same.) These mentalities are shared across otherwise impermeable political boundaries: sometimes it seems as if all we have in common are our worst traits. The widespread psychology of single-mindedness can produce jarring similarities — for example, the apparently unshakeable consensus between American fascists and American progressives that the most salient attribute of identity is race. As is always the case with intellectual and emotional radicalization, we have agreed to be flattened and simplified in our conception of ourselves and others. We are only this and they are only that. Politics and culture are understood as consisting in iterations of a single thread, which runs through everything and explains it all. Eventually the leitmotif becomes the sole motif. Where there were once misunderstandings, there are now aggressions. In our pluralistic country we are all monists now; our culture wars are wars between our respective monisms. We are, in every one of our communities, militant simpletons, thrilling to the misguided notion that there is no higher calling for our members than representativeness. Somehow the prestige of diversity never translated into the prestige of complexity. Any challenge to the regimentation and the uniformity is regarded not as an act of analysis but as an act of defiance, and suspected of treason to the cause. The marketplace of ideas (an unattractive phrase, I know) is now the marketplace of deviations, for which punishments of various degrees of severity have been exacted. People have behaved unjustly in the name of social justice — not exactly a new development in the history of politics; but the tyranny of even a good cause must be fought. On the left now the important task, when confronted with facts or arguments that cannot smoothly be worked into the catechism, or with experiences that distract from the veneration of the one true thing, is not to go wobbly.

    I will give an example. Not long ago, there appeared a sign of struggle in The New Yorker. No, not that struggle, which is all there is in The New Yorker. (It recently ran a short film in tribute to the Weathermen.) What happened was that a writer for the magazine caught himself perpetrating an act of personal complexity, and he froze. He was excited by an encounter with art that he admired, and he was so enthusiastic about it, in an exemplary moment of critical self-awareness, he noticed, not a moment too soon, that he might be violating the rules and reversing the priorities. He was in danger of praising art without reference to politics. He, the magazine’s art critic, had come to the very brink of aestheticism, which could of course play into the hands of Mitch McConnell or worse. And so he had to offer an explanation, a confession of his struggle as a many-sided man, in the hope that his account of his brush with the pluralism of experience would not rattle the bon ton of his readers.

    In a review of a show at MoMA PS1 called “Greater New York,” which included hundreds of works by artists and collectives in the metropolitan area, Peter Schjeldahl discovered “unforced pleasure” in some of the objects that were displayed. He especially admired the work of Yuji Agematsu, who makes tiny sculptures out of the detritus of the city’s sidewalks — “the works convey a homing instinct for beauty in the humblest of materials,” the critic wrote. “There’s inarguably a political vibe about Agematsu’s activity, but it’s one that is subsumed by personal devotion.” I am persuaded by Schjeldahl: I did not see the show, but the photograph that accompanied the review, and a survey of Agematsu online, reveal a delicious sense of play and a joyful excavation of color out of drabness — his pieces look to me like miniature John Chamberlains. Schjeldahl also singled out for praise a film by a Swedish artist named Marie Karlberg, based on Doris Lessing’s disturbing novel The Good Terrorist, a study of damaged people engaged in revolutionary violence in England in the 1980s. “The work is a fable without a moral,” the critic said, “evincing Lessing’s uncanny comprehension of twisted humanity.” And then, all of a sudden, as if he could not permit himself any more aesthetic satisfaction without some sort of apology, he launched into a plaintive statement of self-defense, a record of his predicament:

    The political is more important than the artistic. Using art to advance causes isn’t bad; it simply surrenders independent initiative, always a fragile affair, to overbearing powers of worldly argument. There’s an ethical heft in the sacrifice, shaming mere aestheticism. I can’t defend my wish for autonomous experience in the face of concerns that acknowledge the real suffering of real people. But I find myself clinging to instances of creativity that eschew rhetoric.

    What a document! “The political is more important than the artistic”: is that really all there is to say? Politics, insofar as it secures the safety and well-being of people, is certainly a condition of artistic experience, because if there were no people there would be no art. (Writing in 1929 about the impact of the First World War upon his thinking, Russell recalled: “I think the War made me feel there would be not much point in the realm of essence if there were nobody left to think about it.”) But this is a trivial point, and there are many other reasons to want people to stay alive and dwell in peace. The primacy of politics is not at all self-evident, and a great deal of liberal and conservative philosophy has argued persuasively against it. Yet I do not wish to suggest that the opposite of Schjeldahl’s facile declaration is therefore true, and the artistic is more important than the political. Schjeldhal’s error is not that he chose the wrong winner, but that there is no contest. There is no winner and there is no choice. We do not have an obligation to choose between politics and art — indeed, we have an obligation not to choose. The insistence that there is a choice is only a sly way of politicizing art and, more generally, pleasure. The political puritans, with their righteous zero-sums, have gotten into Schjeldahl’s head. He is not alone.

    “Using art to advance causes isn’t bad.” Schjeldahl is correct, and the enlistment of art may not even involve a “surrender [of] independent initiative”: artists are citizens too, and the history of political art, though it is crowded with kitsch, is also replete with works, from Goya to Guernica, from Shelley to Mandelstam, that made no “sacrifice” of stylistic integrity. But what is “mere” about aestheticism, and why is it worthy of shame? Who does it threaten, and with what? The refinement of sensibility and the consecration to form that we call aestheticism is not incompatible with a moral life, not at all. If aesthetes sometimes defend themselves against moralists, it is because they wish to preserve their strenuous notion of art, not because they are sympathetic to evil. We cannot live significantly without goodness and beauty, but beauty does not have to be good and goodness does not have to be beautiful. In endorsing the “ethical heft” of politically engaged art, Schjeldahl seems to be admitting to a soft spot for his preferred propaganda. It is worth noting, therefore, that political art, even when it is fine art, is not much of a contribution to politics, which is about power and is never pretty. I remember the morning in Jerusalem, many decades ago, in the first days of Peace Now, when my friends in the movement summoned me to a caper that they promised would deliver a stinging blow against the settlers on the West Bank: the Israeli artist Yigal Tumarkin had sculpted a dovecote — get it? — and we were going to place it secretly at the site of a newly established settlement. If this is our response, I thought, the settlers might win.

    “I can’t defend my wish for autonomous experience in the face of concerns that acknowledge the real suffering of real people.” Here we get to the heart of the matter — to the politicization of inwardness, to the self-repression that mistakes itself for ethical strictness, to the preemption of life’s fullness by self-congratulatory guilt, to the imperialism of virtue. Of course he can defend autonomous experience! For a start, autonomous experience — that is to say, the refusal to permit one realm of experience to be reduced to another realm of it, so that life is not holistic but variegated, a plenitude of intensities that carry us far but not to the same destination — is real. We have a responsibility to acknowledge “the real suffering of real people,” but we have no responsibility to acknowledge nothing else. One of the fundamental facts about human life is the simultaneity of its dimensions. Whenever a mystic finds an unexpected God, or a lover finds unexpected bliss, or a musician finds unexpected structure, or an athlete finds unexpected strength — whenever somebody is transcending, somebody else is suffering. Are we then to renounce everything but ethics, or allow all our other abilities and longings to be translated (as many modern philosophers have proposed) into ethics? Surely it is not unethical to live for more than ethics.

    There is something comic about the implication that anything said and written that is not about the Syrians and the Uyghurs is a betrayal of the Syrians and the Uyghurs. The objective of conscience is not to level us. So the tribune of the people who is also an art critic can lighten up. No reasonable reader of his sentences in support of Yuji Agematsu will condemn him for not having written those sentences in support of George

    These strictures about the histrionics of virtue apply equally when the suffering in question is, or has been, endured by oneself or one’s own group. Last year the National Gallery of Art mounted a memorable show called Degas at the Opera. Nowhere, on any wall, was there a mention of Degas’s virulent anti-Semitism or his foul anti-Dreyfusard opinions. Some months ago the Washington National Opera returned to the stage with, among other things, wonderfully performed excerpts from Die Meistersinger von Nurnberg and Tannhauser. Nowhere in the accompanying materials was there a “contextualization” that Wagner was anti-Semitic and that Meistersinger is the opera most imbued with his racist hatred of the Jews. In the period in which these events, the exhibition and the concert, took place, there occurred a terrible revival of anti-Semitism in America and elsewhere. But neither at the museum nor at the opera house was I triggered, enraged, or broken-hearted. Degas’ views of Captain Dreyfus have no bearing on the tutus in his oils and pastels, and the musical merits of Wagner’s overture rises above the Judeophobic medievalist ethos of his opera, even for me, in the way that art often supersedes its origins. I did not feel let down by these institutions for not acknowledging the history of my pain, nor did I interpret the many ovations as expressions of sympathy for the persecutors of my people. I decided to practice the forgotten art of letting something pass. Magnanimously I absolved the gallerygoers and the concertgoers of all complicity in the darker sides of what they were enjoying, because it would have been absurd and unfair to do otherwise. Their experience of art was entitled to its self-sufficiency. How they applauded told me nothing about how they voted. Nor do I want to see the alarm about anti-Semitism become purely gestural, a pandering cliche, a talking point. Anyway my sense of who I am is firm enough not to require the morbid affirmations of strangers. I am not boasting, except about what is possible for all of us.

    “But I find myself clinging to instances of creativity that eschew rhetoric.” Bravo, Schjeldahl! He emerged intact from his introspective ordeal. In the end, after his little exercise in progressive casuistry, he escaped the clutches of totalizing politics. I was rooting for him, because his delight in artistic form is deep and not even the specter of Trumpism should stifle it. Autonomous experience is not only real, it is also rare, and happy is the man who has the capacity for it. The imperatives of art are too essential for the realization of the human definition to be given up for the imperatives of politics, and the reverse is also the case. Illuminations and mobilizations; mobilizations and illuminations. March and contemplate; march soulfully and contemplate soulfully. Tax the rich and reform (and support) the police and welcome the immigrants and protect Taiwan and save the Rohingya and break up Facebook and capture the carbon, and then seek, in art or music or philosophy or religion, or in a forest or a field, a light in which you can exceed yourself; and repeat. While the pursuit of justice is not an act of self-fulfillment, neither should it be an act of self-impoverishment.

    “Sometimes God, sometimes nothing,” wrote Kafka.
    “For once, then, something,” wrote Frost.
    Sometimes God, sometimes nothing, but for once, then, something.

    The Death Trap of Difference, or What the Uyghurs Understand

    In that tower built of skulls you will find my skull as well
    they cut my head off just to test the sharpness of a sword.
    When before the sword our beloved cause-and-effect relationship
    is ruined like a wild lover
    Do you know that I am with you 

    PERHAT TURSUN, “ELEGY” 

    June 1988 was an unforgettable month for the Uyghurs. A group of Uyghur students noticed an insulting slogan, presumably written by a Chinese person, on one of the walls of a public toilet in Xinjiang University: “We will turn your men into slaves and your women into whores!” This incident quickly triggered a mass protest of Uyghur students against the Xinjiang authorities, which just as quickly suppressed it. The protest was described by the Chinese government as an act of secession, a serious crime against the sovereignty of the Chinese state. The Uyghurs considered the inscription a gross insult, foreshadowing many insults and calamities to come. 

    Politically, for the Uyghurs, the incident heralded the end of the quasi-liberal atmosphere under the leadership of Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1980s, who tried, but ultimately failed, to implement the autonomous laws that were promised by the CCP to the Uyghurs, along with the Mongols, the Hui, the Zhuangzu, and the Tibetans, in the 1950s. With this humiliation and the others that they experienced daily, the Uyghurs were roughly awakened from the illusions of socialism’s promise of autonomy to face a merciless colonial reality that offered them a stark choice — notional autonomy or nothing at all. Since then, the scope of the notional autonomy for the Uyghurs has gradually dwindled, leaving room for more confusion, frustration, and resistance against Chinese rule, and then for much worse. 

    For some Uyghurs, the graffiti incident in June 1988 was experienced as a kind of historical déjà vu, a repetition of the experience of their ancestors who lived in what is now Mongolia, where Bilgë Qaghan, the fourth king of the second Turkic khaganate in the eighth century, issued a serious warning for the Turkic tribes about the Chinese. The warning was inscribed on stone monuments known as the Eternal Stones: “The Chinese made slaves of your noble sons, and slaves of your beautiful daughters.” This warning captured, and anticipated, the essence of the ongoing conflict between the Uyghurs and the Chinese, on and off, over a millennium — to be or not to be the slaves of the Chinese. 

    Almost thirty years after the incident at Xinjiang University, the Uyghurs have been visited by another horrific nightmare, another continuation of the one that they may never awaken from: they have been incarcerated in Chinese concentration camps, where their sons have been tortured and killed, their daughters have been raped and humiliated, and their children have been orphaned and abused. (The poet Perhat Tursun, whose lyrics are cited above, is a prisoner in one of those camps.) By an irony of fate, what Bilgë Qaghan feared most has finally happened to his descendants in its worst form possible. To a Uyghur, history feels as inescapable as those camps. 

    Is this the fate of the Uyghurs? Or is it a cruel mockery of history? How can the current Uyghur crisis best be understood? What is often missing in the discourse about this contemporary genocide is its cultural dimension. Without a proper grasp of culture, it is impossible to understand the origin, or the nature, of this conflict and this crime. After all, we have learned from earlier episodes of genocidal behavior that culture can lead to concentration camps. 

    The Uyghurs and the Chinese possess different cultures and mentalities, largely in contradiction with each other but still exhibiting certain commonalities, not because they share the same ancestral origins but because they are driven by the same human desires and life-forces to realize their aspirations and to cope with the pressures of their realities as human beings. Both cultures, first and foremost, owe their origin to the nurturing rivers in their historical terrain — for the Chinese, the Huanghe (Yellow) River and the Changjiang (Yangtze) River are vital for the formation of their culture, sustaining their survival, growth, connectedness, and prosperity, whereas for the Uyghurs, the Tarim River is their mother river and the source of their life. If Chinese culture originated historically between those two famous rivers, so did Uyghur culture originate in the Tarim Basin in East Turkestan, the heart of the Uyghur homeland, called Xinjiang by the Chinese. 

    Historically, the region of East Turkestan makes its first appearances in historical narratives beginning in the second millennium BC. The region was known to the ancient Chinese Kingdoms as Xiyu, or the Western Territories or Regions. At the heart of Xiyu lies the Tarim Basin, which was home to many races, peoples, and tribes — from Indo-European settlers to non-European ones. The extraordinary demographic mixture of the peoples in the area has been confirmed by modern genetic analysis, which has shown that the local inhabitants have a high proportion of DNA of European origin with the mixture of non-European ones. Owing to the geopolitical importance of its location, East Turkestan has caught the attention of many empires that sought control over it, including the Chinese, Turkish, Mongol, and Manchu (Qing) empires. Among them, the political interest of the Chinese dynasties to colonize it was especially strong, and it intensified after the annexation of the region by the Qing dynasty in the eighteenth century. 

    After the ancestors of the Uyghurs living in present-day Mongolia were defeated by Kyrgyz troops in the ninth century, they migrated en masse to the Tarim Basin, where they, along with other Uyghur and Turkic tribes in the area, contributed to the Uyghurization of the local Indo-European peoples, resulting in the creation of a local identity defined by oasis regions, consisting mainly of Islamic and Buddhist areas. The Uyghur tribes, which moved into the Kashgar region, established the Qarakhanid kingdom and embraced Islam in 940 in a peaceful manner, whereas other cities in the Koqu Uyghur Khaganate embraced Buddhism. Both Kashgar, the capital of the Qarakhanid kingdom, and Turpan, the capital of the Koqu Uyghur Khaganate, quickly became centers of learning for Islam and Buddhism, respectively. If there was any significant cultural exchange between the peoples in the Tarim Basin and mainland China, it was due to the spread and flourishing of Buddhism. Buddhism facilitated the nurturing exchanges of religious and other knowledge between Chang’an (now Xi’an) and Turpan, which were recorded in travel diaries and discovered in excavated documents. 

    East Turkestan was ruled by the Kara Khitays (alternatively known as “Black Khitan” or the Western Liao, which was a successor state to the Liao dynasty ruled by the Khitan Yelü clan) in the twelfth century, and was overwhelmed by the Mongols in the thirteenth century, who continued the Turkification process until the seventeenth century. The East Turkestan region was surrounded by the Manchus in the next century, who met with the relentless resistance of the Uyghurs as a response to several incidents of misrule and abuse that caused considerable anger and resentment. Later, in 1865, under the leadership of Yaqub Beg, the kingdom of Kashgaria (centered at Kashgar in East Turkestan) was established, and it lasted until 1877. In 1884, the Qing empire colonized East Turkestan and called it Xinjiang, which itself meant, literally, “colony.” In the twentieth century, Uyghurs staged several uprisings against the rule of Chinese warlords and established the East Turkestan Islamic Republic in Kashgar in 1933, and again, as the Second East Turkestan Republic, in Ghulja in 1944. This was a multi-ethnic republic that included other Turkic nationalities such as Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and more. This republic was finally defeated by the Chinese Communists, with the tacit support of Stalin, in 1949. 

    During this long historical process, which I have summarized here in broad strokes, Uyghur and Chinese cultures evolved to reflect the ideas, customs, beliefs, and social behaviors of their respective societies. These cultures began to display their differences. Again, I will describe them broadly. To an exaggerated degree, Chinese culture is time-oriented. It is a culture that has a deep respect for the past in the form of ancestry worship. It regards future progress as nothing but the useful application of the wisdom canonized by the sages in the past as timeless rules for everything. The future is merely the extended past. For such a historical consciousness, excellence is imitation. In extreme cases, it is the sign of a collective sense of self-worth and self-excellence, which currently takes the form of Chinese supremacy. In his book On China, Henry Kissinger appositely observed that “the Chinese never generated a myth of cosmic creation. Their universe was created by the Chinese themselves, whose values, even when declared of universal applicability, were conceived of as Chinese in origin.” The Chinese universe is exclusively Chinese in nature — self-centered and self-sufficient, exclusive to other cultures and ways of life. This sense of self-centeredness and self-sufficiency is not immune from the sin of collective narcissism, which was the theme of Lu Xun’s novel The True Story of Ah Q, a masterpiece of modern Chinese literature in which he traced the life of a narcissistic individual who “rationally” interprets his every loss and failure as a psychological triumph, as a “spiritual victory.”

     

    Uyghur culture, to an exaggerated degree, is space-oriented. Nowhere is this characteristic of Uyghur culture more evident than in its exposure to a variety of civilizational influences along the Silk Road, the great Eurasian crossroad connecting East (China) with West through the vast area of Central Asia where the Uyghurs lived. On the Silk Road, the Uyghurs were one of the most active peoples as traders, and as middlemen between different cultures, interests, and trades. The geographical position of East Turkestan served as a hub for the exchange not only of goods, but also of religions, ideas, and cultures. This position enabled the Uyghurs and the adjacent peoples to absorb and to interact with alien influences, so as to establish their own cultural ideas, practices, and identities. There exists, for example, a Uyghur version of Aesop’s fables, which is an essential part of Uyghur oral literature. Moreover, Uyghurs are perhaps the only people on earth who have worshipped almost all the major world religions throughout their history, including totemism, shamanism, Zoroastrianism, Manicheanism, Buddhism, the Nestorian Church, and Islam. As a consequence of these rich and diverse religious heritages, of this profound syncretism, Uyghur culture developed its unique mixture of variety, tolerance, and complexity. 

    As a syncretistic culture it may suffer from a lack of originality; it is especially good at absorbing and compressing the ideas and the arts of other cultures, by means of long dialectical processes of influence and adaptation, into a new arrangement. Of course no culture is pure, or perfectly insular, or completely self-sufficient. Every culture is the result of a constant interaction with, and acceptance of, the achievements of other cultures into itself in a nourishing way. What we see in Uyghur culture is a prodigious, and indeed radical, example of this great human integration. Uyghur medicine, for example, was historically influenced by the knowledge of Greek humoral medicine, Arab-Persian medicine, and Buddhist medicine. As such, it developed into folk medicine with Uyghur characteristics. Even though Uyghur culture is largely syncretistic, it is more than just the sum of its influences; it creates its own unique forms and practices, the combination of which is distinct to itself. 

    While Chinese culture is proud of its inward-looking, or better, backward-looking, greatness, and boasts of its immunity to external influences, Uyghur culture dwells upon its outward-looking, or in-between-looking, achievements, owing largely to its history as a crossroads. While the former seeks purity and originality, the latter seeks unity in diversity. It should never take us by surprise when Chinese culture pulls everything, all resistance, novelty, and otherness, back into the gravitational zones of the past, relentlessly and uncompromisingly, and tolerates no alterity. For Chinese speakers, for example, a foreign name must be pronounced not in its native way but in a Chinese way — it must be domesticated and Sinicized. Uyghur culture, on the other hand, thrives on alterity. It has learned over the mottled centuries to tolerate novelty and difference, aspiring to blend with other cultures graciously. 

    Strictly speaking, there is no direct and deep influence of Chinese culture upon Uyghur culture or vice versa, despite the historical fact that they both mutually benefited from short exchanges of ideas, customs, and music during the Tang dynasty. The differences between them are more striking than their similarities. The ideas of the eleventh-century Uyghur thinker Yusuf Khas Hajib remind us more of Plato and of Ferdowsi than of any thinkers in China, including Confucius and Mencius. In his magnum opus, Kutadgu Bilig, or Wisdom of Royal Glory: A Turko-Islamic Mirror for Princes, composed in 1069-1070, he exhibited the deep influence of Greco-Roman thought on his own thinking, the topics of which ranged from the virtues of kings and rulers in an imaginary utopia appropriated for a newly established religious context — Islam — to the multiple ways of being a good person in ordinary life. At the heart of this work lies the subject of goodness — how it should permeate society from top to bottom — and the good life. Unlike Chinese thinkers such as Sun Tzu, who advocated the use of deception — of evil — for victory at all costs, or Hsün-tzu, for whom human nature is inherently evil, Khas Hajib advocated for the use of goodness even in circumstances of destitution and hardship for greater social justice and harmony. He differs even from Confucius, whose ideas rest on the belief in the goodness of the human heart in immanent manifestations of kindness, loyalty, and harmony, for the purpose of a morally constructed world. For Khas Hajib, as for Plato, the notion of goodness is not immanent but transcendent, for which everything strives as an ultimate goal of human existence. This concept of goodness is one of the founding pillars of Uyghur thought. With the spread of Sufism in the East Turkestan region in the sixteenth century, the idea of the good was deeply irradiated by the idea of love — divine love — as an eternally binding force connecting man to man and man to God. This view was elevated to a new and sophisticated level in the poetry of Ali-shir Nava’i, one of the great poets of Central Asia. For him, human love is enriched with the vision of the divine love as the ultimate source of human existence, to which we all eventually return. 

    In the fifteenth century the great Silk Road was closed, and ocean transportation became considerably easier than overland transportation. This was a devastating blow to China and to Central Asia, the innermost, almost landlocked, part of Asia with no access to the seas. With the decline of the Silk Road, Uyghur culture became afflicted, to a certain extent, by a kind of depressive mood. Incurring cultural isolation, which was the antithesis of its historical experience, it lost many of its vital resources and inspirations. This isolation continued until the beginning of the twentieth century, when it was disrupted by the spread of the movement of cultural reform and secularization known as Jadidism in the Muslim territories of the Russian empire and in Central Asia and beyond. This movement created a new group of intellectuals and leaders who regarded themselves as modernizers and enlighteners. 

    The re-appropriation of the ethnonym “Uyghur” at a Soviet conference in Tashkent in 1921, and its subsequent widespread use, was a turning point in the social, cultural, and political awareness of Uyghurs. Uyghur intellectuals played a crucial role in bringing Uyghurs out of isolation into a wider world — a dazzling, frightening, and unavoidable change. Ever since, Uyghur intellectuals have consciously participated in nation-building activities with a focus on the urgent need to shape the collective self-consciousness of the Uyghurs as a prerequisite to the realization of a unified national identity. For this purpose, Uyghur intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s turned to a variety of ideologies — Islam, Pan-Turkism, and communism — to pursue their religious, cultural, and political aspirations. These various currents of modern Uyghur identity proved to be deeply irreconcilable, and they resulted in factional and ideological conflict during and after the Second East Turkestan Republic. 

    For the Chinese, the nineteenth century was full of miseries in the confrontation with a culture — Western culture — far more advanced than theirs. This encounter shattered their collective narcissism, forcing them to choose between modernization and humiliation. Like the Uyghurs, they were exposed to a variety of ideas and ideologies, ranging from Social Darwinism to communism, for the purpose of national revival. Moreover, they began to look toward the scientific achievements of the West as the crucial way to overcome their isolation, backwardness, and illusion — the great disgrace of being the “Sick Man of Asia.” Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of modern China, vowed to make it strong and respected again. He paved the foundations for a Chinese republic, which was inherited by the Kuomintang as a party, which governed most of China until it was defeated in the civil war by the Communists in 1949. 

    The political culture of China is unique, and indigenous to itself, in many ways. The most important aspects of Chinese political culture derive from an ancient Chinese conception of the political. It consists of a binary system: center and periphery. According to the time-honored traditions of Chinese political thought, there exists in the historical world a horizontal hierarchy, which specifies a Chinese state as the central kingdom vis-à-vis other areas, kingdoms, and peoples who make up the regions of the periphery. This statecraft promotes the center as the source of order, civility, advancement, and power, with the periphery standing for disorder, incivility, backwardness, and weakness. Moreover, this world-picture is the essential feature of the core system of the centralized bureaucracy, which manages power-sharing, the distribution of resources, the systems of tribute, and the mechanisms of alliances and enmities. In such a conception of politics, in such a political structure, the Western Regions were inevitably considered by the Chinese dynasties as chaotic, backward, and difficult to control. They were the badlands. 

    If politics was defined as an art of deception as by Sun Tzu, this deception required a clear knowledge of who are foes and who are friends. For him, this knowledge was the very prerequisite for winning a war: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.” Echoing his ancient master, Mao Zedong famously asked in his writings, solemnly but also anxiously, “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends?” Chinese propaganda has always used the phrases “enemy forces” and “hostile forces” and “foreign forces” to inflame Chinese nationalism, to express Chinese anger, or to play the victim. This construal of power is very much in the spirit of Carl Schmitt, the Weimar German political philosopher now revered by right-wing Chinese political theorists and lawyers, who once proclaimed that “all political actions and motives can be reduced [to the distinction] between friends and enemies” — a theory of politics that was influential in the Third Reich, where the recognition and eradication of the enemy was a political duty and a necessary part of the collective identity. 

    This knowledge was physically manifest in the greatest monument to Chinese political thought — the Great Wall, built over many centuries by many rulers and dynasties as a fortification against the northern and western barbarians. Its panoramic beauty notwithstanding, the length and the height of the Great Wall testify to how profoundly the Chinese feared those barbarians and how strongly they hated them. The complex combination of both fear and hatred was projected onto an everlasting wall of enmity — separating “us” from “them,” revealing the core of the Chinese political mentality. A wall fits well into the paradigm of center and periphery, in which the ancestors of the Uyghurs were regarded as enemies. This fear had already been reinforced by the ingenuity of the Chinese language, which uses, deliberately and strategically, certain derogatory characters to mark their enemies. The Huns, for example, whom the Uyghurs call their ancestors, were given the name “savage slaves” in Chinese, implicitly indicating that they must be destroyed. 

    Such a rigid and clearly delineated political world is, to a certain extent, foreign to Uyghurs, whose idea of difference was more religious than political. The Chinese were infidels, but they were rarely considered political enemies. The political slogans of the anti-Chinese resistance organized by religious leaders in East Turkestan in the nineteenth century were mainly focused on expelling the infidels from the land of Muslims. For the Uyghurs, who were not even identified as Uyghurs until the beginning of the twentieth century, perceived themselves only as Muslims, vaguely aligning themselves with the Ottoman Empire as a legitimate caliphate until its collapse. Uyghur identity was never fundamentally political. But the increased prominence of Islam in the political life of Uyghurs during the era of Sufism heralded the end of the more tolerant nature of the Uyghurs’ syncretistic culture. This tendency brought about the formation of a more monolithic identity of Uyghurs who perceived themselves in a binary opposition of Muslims and non-Muslims. 

    The political teachings of the Uyghur tradition were summarized in a scattered way and inscribed on the Eternal Stones in Mongolia by their kings, until they gained a more systematic medieval elaboration by Khas Hajib. On those Stones, the Chinese were perceived both as a dangerous and cunning foe and as a skillful and attractive friend. This contradiction foreshadowed the fatal crack in the political future of the Uyghurs — the impossibility of living together with their dangerous enemy without proper caution. It also revealed that for the Uyghurs the enemy was not as clearly, rigidly, and everlastingly defined as in Chinese political thought. The sense of political enmity was embodied by both peoples externally, in the Great Wall and the Eternal Stones; but if the Great Wall reenforced the cultural and political identity of the Chinese as sedentary city-dwellers with a static demarcation line, the Eternal Stones suited the lifestyle of a nomadic people such as the Uyghurs whose vitality rests on mobility. 

    Yet the Eternal Stones were left behind and forgotten after Uyghurs abandoned their kingdom, following their defeat by the Kyrgyz forces, to join other Uyghurs in the Tarim Basin. The Great Wall that kept the Chinese inside and the barbarians outside failed in its mission of exclusion as Mongols and Manchus, northern barbarians both, invaded China and established their dynasties. But the identification of the Uyghurs as enemies and outsiders never disappeared from the collective consciousness of China. The historical hatred of the savages was stored and became latent in their collective imagination, until it was stimulated by Sun Yat-sen when he mobilized the Chinese against the Manchu rulers in Honolulu in 1894 with the following oath: “Expel the northern barbarians, revive Zhonghua [China, in the cultural and literary sense], and establish a unified government.” 

    At the time of Manchu rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, some Chinese merchants, military personnel, and administrative staff settled in East Turkestan. The Uyghurs and the Chinese had first come to know each other after their tense interaction during the Tang dynasty, after which they developed negative perceptions of each other. Though the Uyghurs did not see the Chinese as a permanent political enemy, in the way that the Chinese viewed them, they did regard the Chinese as morally inferior. This perception was reciprocated by the Chinese, not about the morality of the Uyghurs but about their intelligence. The Uyghurs popularly view the Chinese as dirty, dishonest, stubborn, and stupid. These nasty caricatures are captured in the way Uyghurs call them “Khitay,” which is a derogatory and contemptuous term. These negative perceptions of the Chinese enabled the Uyghurs to maintain their sense of moral superiority while helping them to dilute the humiliation of being enslaved to them. It also gave them cultural strength as the source of their pride, self-confidence, and national identity, even though it sometimes made it too easy for them to slip into something dangerously self-delusional and self-serving.

    Without this inner strength, the Uyghurs would not have survived the century-long onslaught of the Chinese colonialists. They have paid a terrible price for refusing to become Chinese, which could have saved them from oppression and extermination — from the genocide that is now being mercilessly carried out by the Chinese regime of Xi Jinping. The psychological dynamics of the colonized and the colonizers are complicated: the inner strength, the pride, that makes Uyghur survival possible is sometimes interpreted by the Chinese as a provocation, a challenge to their own conception of themselves. For them, it is utterly unthinkable that a “backward” people such as the Uyghurs have refused to become a part of one of the great nations on earth, to join a country whose economic boom is now drawing awe and amazement from all corners of the world. 

    The Chinese do not perceive the Uyghurs positively either. They call them “Huizi” and “Chantou” or “Chanhui,” a derogatory word for being mentally disadvantaged or stupid. In 1845, in a letter to one of his relatives, Lin Zexu, Governor General and scholar-officer under the Emperor of Qing dynasty who was exiled to Xinjiang owing to his forceful opposition to the opium trade, described Uyghurs as “the most foolish, cowardly, and extremely pitiful.” Many other examples could be cited of the perennial Chinese belief that the Uyghurs are essentially outside the sphere of Chinese civilization because they are intrinsically unworthy of inclusion within it.

     After the Chinese Communists took power in 1949, they intended to establish social harmony in China in part by banning the negative names that different nationalities used against each other. Most Uyghurs started to call the Chinese not “Khitay” but “Chinese comrades” or “a big brother nationality.” (Orwell’s novel was published in the same year!) For a while the Chinese did the same to the Uyghurs, by calling them more courteously “Uyghur comrades” or “a minority brother.” In private discourse, however, in secret, the mutual contempt and hatred were never eradicated completely. In the 1980s, travel between East Turkestan and inland China improved significantly, with some Uyghurs moving inland to try their luck in the new Chinese economy. As the presence of Uyghurs in mainland China became more visible and active, it provoked curiosity at first, then mockery, and finally vilification. Chen Peisi, a famous Chinese comedian, called Uyghurs “kebab-sellers” in one of his popular comedies in 1986, which set a precedent for the stereotyping of Uyghurs in Chinese vernacular culture, breaking the political taboos set up by the CCP. This opened the floodgates of Chinese xenophobia: since then Uyghurs have been called pickpockets, drug dealers, savages, and, finally, terrorists. These negative stereotypes fueled the gradual marginalization of Uyghurs from the Chinese-dominant world and encouraged the Chinese perception of themselves as culturally superior to non-Chinese nationalities.

     

    The invasion of East Turkestan in 1949 was a momentous event in Chinese history, as it marked the first time that they felt confident enough to move beyond the Great Wall into the barbarian land — the land that their ancestors sought to occupy many times in vain. The Uyghurs, deprived of their nationality by the Chinese occupation, found themselves in a new political framework: they were to constitute an autonomous region, which promised them a significant degree of self-governance. But their dreams of self-determination, which were nourished by memories of the Second East Turkestan Republic, turned out to be a nightmare. In 1951, some Uyghur intellectuals and political figures who served in the government of the Second East Turkestan Republic wrote a letter to Zhou Enlai, the Premier of the Chinese government, to request the establishment of the Uyghuristan Autonomous Republic. In the letter, they rejected the ongoing Chinese plan for the establishment of an autonomous region for the Uyghurs, in which independence would be impossible. This letter did not please the Chinese Communist leaders, both in Beijing and Urumqi, resulting in the mass purge of these Uyghurs in the name of fighting local nationalism and revisionism. Since then, the dream of Uyghurs for political independence has been mercilessly quashed by the Chinese government, for whom it denotes secessionism. 

    Actually, the Chinese had already planned to colonize the Uyghurs and then to assimilate them. This plan had been a priority of Sun Yat-sen’s and was achieved by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. In 1924, Sun had already discussed the colonization of Mongolia and Xinjiang in his book The International Development of China, while advocating the urgent creation of a unified nation as a necessary step for China to prosper. In 1957, following in Sun’s footsteps, Premier Zhou Enlai described assimilation as “a progressive act if it means the natural merger of nations [i.e. ethnic groups] advancing towards prosperity. Assimilation as such has the significance of promoting progress.” This assimilationist program has been a government policy, carried out slowly but surely, since the beginning of the 1950s. 

    This assimilationist program has focused on the three key areas — the history, the language, and the religion of the Uyghurs, which together comprise the foundations of Uyghur identity. The Chinese authorities re-wrote the history of the Uyghurs, claiming that Xinjiang has been an integral part of China since antiquity, while forgetting that there was no state called China and that they themselves were colonized by non-Chinese rulers, such as Mongols and Manchus, until recently. This deceitful historical literature claimed that Xinjiang has always been ruled by Chinese and not by Uyghurs, who came to it only after the ninth century. This view aimed to separate the Uyghurs from their ancestral land — or more precisely, to make them wanderers, stateless on their own land. 

    The Uyghur language was targeted by the Chinese authorities because it is one of the most vital and living aspects of Uyghur culture. In the 1980s, the Uyghurs were gradually robbed of the linguistic rights spelled out in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, which allowed ethnic autonomous areas to decide on educational plans in those areas, including the language used in instruction and enrolment procedures. These rights were eroded because of the central and the regional government’s unwillingness to implement them, either fully or partially, in the early 1990s. In 1995, Wang Lequan, who was then Party Secretary of Xinjiang, discredited the languages of the minority nationalities, claiming that these languages have exceedingly small capacities to express the key concepts of modern science and technology, which makes education in those concepts impossible. By the beginning of the 2000s, the Chinese government implemented a bilingual education policy which was in fact a monolingual policy, a Chinese-centric language policy, leading to the complete exclusion of the Uyghur language from all levels of education in 2017. 

    Since 1949, the Uyghurs have faced one of the deepest dilemmas of their colonial life: how to reconcile their Islamic identity with an atheistic and anti-religious party, the CCP. At first the Uyghurs were allowed by the CCP to practice their Islamic faith on the condition that it not be harmful to the rule of the CCP. Yet the communists’ tolerance of Islam was less about the mercy of the CCP and more about the utility of religion as an ideological tool, so that local religious figures would help the regime govern the Uyghurs more effectively. The Uyghurs were given no option other than reconciling an atheistic belief in socialism with their theistic faith in Islam. Of course, they cannot be reconciled. This strange era of tense but peaceful contradiction proved to be short-lived.


    Despite this pressure, the Uyghurs’ faith in Islam has played a great role in maintaining their own identity in a fiercely secular Chinese culture. It has created a dichotomy of “us and them” — “us” as Uyghur Muslims whose lifestyle is shaped by Islamic principles and rules, and “them” whose lifestyle is non-Islamic and non-Uyghur. The strict demarcation between halal and non-halal created a demarcation between the world of the Uyghurs and the world of the Han Chinese. They interact with each other only at work, and on other occasions in a superficial way. This religious demarcation prevented the Uyghurs from being blended with the Chinese and created a social barrier from which they could maintain their difference. It also placed huge internal restrictions on the Uyghurs about inter-ethnic marriages with the Chinese. Generally speaking, marriage to a Chinese is as unthinkable for a devout Uyghur as it is for an atheist Uyghur and even a Christian Uyghur, out of a deep fear of being assimilated into Chinese culture. All that the Uyghurs demanded was the right to be apart, the right to be themselves.

    In the 1990s, the Uyghurs struggled to maintain their culture against the constantly intensifying assimilationist 25 policies of the Chinese authorities. In this resistance, Uyghurs gradually made Islam the core part of their identity, as a spiritual shield in the face of cultural marginalization, social violence, and systematic injustices. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the United States and the aftermath of the American-led war on terror, China has indiscriminately branded any type of Uyghur dissent as terrorism. This has dangerously blurred the line between legitimate grievances consistent with the Chinese Constitution and violence, between normal religious practices and terrorism. It has systematically violated the rights of the Uyghurs to free expression, forcing them into silence about the violations of their rights. 

    During this time, Chinese nationalism came gradually to the forefront of Chinese government and politics, mirroring the growing self-assertiveness that seemed warranted by China’s spectacularly successful economic reforms. This resurgence of Chinese nationalism was guided and manipulated by the Chinese regime. The re-appearance in textbooks and in public discourse of the notion of national humiliation, which is always perceived to be caused by foreign invasion and interference, gave a new life to the old feelings of self-pity and victimhood, which frequently accompany nationalist exhilaration. Chinese nationalism gained unprecedented popularity among the Chinese middle class, and like many nationalisms it frequently took the forms of anger, contempt, and hatred. 

    And so, China intensified its crackdown on Uyghurs and Uyghur nationalism in the name of nationalism and anti-separatism. The Uyghurs became a convenient screen upon which Chinese nationalists could project their fantasy of invincible power and their ultimate aim to create a unitary Chinese nation-state. Uyghurs, along with Tibetans, were an obstacle to this program of coercive integration, as they resisted being absorbed into the Chinese state at the cost of losing their culture. For Chinese nationalist intellectuals, inside and outside of government, being a unitary nation-state is the only guarantee of China’s future. In pursuit of this imperialistic aim, China has been ruthlessly determined to eliminate Uyghur resistance. 

    On July 5, 2009, the relationship between the Uyghurs and the Chinese went from bad to worse, when Uyghurs took to the streets of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, to honor the Uyghur workers who had been beaten to death by Chinese workers in Shaoguan, Guangdong a few days earlier, and to demand changes. Their demands fell on deaf ears. The peaceful demonstration turned quickly into uncontrollable mayhem. The century-long clash of cultures finally became violent, beneath the veneer of the communist propaganda about ethnic harmony and national unity. The physical, political, and psychological damage to the already fragile relationship between the Uyghurs and the Chinese was irreparable. A foul image of the Uyghurs was rapidly and widely disseminated by a variety of state propaganda channels. It became just a matter of time before the CCP decided to wipe out this enemy — the enemy of the people, the party, and the state. 

    Responding to the Urumqi riots in 2009, Chinese authorities introduced many hostile measures to curb expressions of Uyghur identity in the name of The Three Evils, defined by the Chinese government as “terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.” China took another critical step further to intensify their racist policies, so as to subdue the wild and 27 stubborn Uyghurs once and for all: it played the Uyghur terrorism card successfully. Since 2014, thousands of Uyghurs had escaped mysteriously from China through southeast Asian countries, with some assistance from Turkey, and they ended up in Syria. The presence of Uyghurs in Syria provided the excuse for China to label Uyghurs indiscriminately as actual and potential terrorists, and to call Islam “an ideological virus.” (That latter inuendo has not provoked any alarm or indignation in the Muslim world, including Turkey.) This provided the alibi for the creation of a network of concentration camps deceptively described by the regime as re-education centers. The crackdown on Uyghur identity on all fronts was carried out within the context of waging a “Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Extremism” in Xinjiang in 2014. But the level of repression increased dramatically after Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo was transferred from the Tibet Autonomous Region to assume the leadership of Xinjiang in late 2016. In Tibet he had been notorious for suppressing the human rights of the Tibetans. 

    In 2017, the genocide of the Uyghurs began.

     

    The Uyghur genocide, which aims to put an end to the Uyghur question once and for all, includes the incarceration of millions of Uyghurs in the camps, systematic campaigns of brainwashing and humiliation through torture, the forced sterilization and rape of Uyghur women both inside and outside the camps, industrialized organ harvesting, the “orphanization” of hundreds of thousands of Uyghur children forcibly separated from their parents and assimilated into Chinese culture, the systematic prevention and reduction of Uyghur population growth, as well as others means for the eradication of Uyghur identity. All these practices satisfy the definition of genocide as formulated in the UN Genocide Convention. In a recent article called “Beijing Plans a Slow Genocide in Xinjiang” in Foreign Policy, Erin Rosenberg and Adrian Zenz, the latter a well known expert on the Uyghur issue, summarized the crisis: “The newly published research provides states and the international community with compelling evidence that a genocide is slowly being carried out. Of particular concern is China’s perception of concentrated Uyghur populations as a national security threat. Other signs of genocidal intent under the U.N. framework are also clearly present. However, even those states that may not share this conclusion cannot deny that, at a minimum, there is a serious risk of genocide occurring. We argue states are therefore obligated to act urgently on that knowledge.” 

    On June 7, 2021, in testimony in Britain at the Uyghur Tribunal, which was convened with a nine-member panel to probe whether China’s alleged crimes against the Uyghurs amount to genocide, Wang Leizhan, a former police officer in China who is currently applying for asylum in Germany, stated that 

    as part of the national policy of seeing Uyghurs as automatically enemies/terrorists, as part of my police training, I was taught to see Uyghurs as “the enemy.” If a Chinese police officer decided to arrest Uyghurs, we were told to invent reasons and to make the arrest appear as legal and plausible as possible. This is why torture and electrocutions were also routinely administered to Uyghurs. 

    The categorization of all Uyghurs as a collective enemy of China has long been an element of the Chinese strategy to justify the Uyghur genocide. To borrow a phrase from Carl Schmitt, the collectivization of enmity is the essence of Chinese politics on the Uyghur issue.

    In the implementation of the Uyghur genocide, the role of the CCP is essential, and in the CCP it is the leader, Xi Jinping, who is paramount. The Communist Party of China is a party that has maintained its legitimacy and its power by mercilessly suppressing any opposition to its rule. The method of this genocide, like its intent, is shocking and inhuman. Leaked Chinese documents have revealed clear governmental instructions for the camp administrators to “show absolutely no mercy” and “allow no escape.” The reports of Uyghur and Kazak camp survivors — who were released from the ordeal of the camps to Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Egypt, and Turkey, where they held dual citizenship as a Chinese citizen, on condition of their absolute silence over their horrific experience in the camps — paint a grim and harrowing picture. The CCP has been systematically and cold-bloodedly eliminating, that is, killing, camp inmates. 

    How could such a culture, Chinese culture, which has been admired for its Confucian values advocating for the common good, allow such evil? There are many possible answers to this question. One of them is that, in a group as in an individual, morality may conflict with psychology, and when such a conflict occurs morality may yield to psychology. The centuries-old insecurities of the Chinese have led them to develop certain mechanisms of survival. These mechanisms are masked by the high ideals of Confucianism, which allow their presentation in a safe and satisfactory way. Fear and hatred are some of these survival mechanisms, as manifested in the great negative vision of the Great Wall — as perfect a symbol of a collective psyche as any people ever devised. These traditional instincts of fear and hatred have served as the inner psychological and cultural force behind this genocide. Even though they live within the borders of the Chinese state, the Uyghurs are still the enemy beyond the Wall, the abiding trans-historical enemy that changes form over time but remains always the same. 

    This fear and this hatred are not dead after a millennium, for their object is still very much alive and has refused to be defeated — to be enslaved by the Chinese. And this has created an evil circle: the more resistant and resilient the enemy has been, the stronger the fear and the hatred has grown. In the current genocide we are witnessing the extension of the Chinese fear of the Uyghurs who during the Tang dynasty “threatened” them from without to the Uyghurs within the Chinese state who now “threaten” them from within. Until this enemy is eradicated, no Chinese can feel safe. Liao Zhaoyu, dean of the Institute of Frontier History and Geography at Xinjiang’s Tarim University, has declared that “the imbalance of the ethnic minority and Han population composition in southern Xinjiang has reached an unbelievably serious degree.” He contends that southern Xinjiang must “change the population structure and distribution [to] end the dominance of the Uyghur ethnic group.” That is why Rosenberg and Zenz argue that “the perception of Uyghurs as a human threat to China’s national security suggests birth prevention targets could increase over time, increasing the threat to the continued existence of the group as a whole.” 

    All this is madness. How could a nuclear-armed military power and an economic superpower be afraid of a people who have nothing but their bare lives left to be destroyed? Why would a mighty and sophisticated state such as China wage a war of destruction against one of the weakest peoples on earth, save that the Uyghurs are hated by them viscerally and beyond all reason? No genocide happens without hatred, and animalistic hatred especially. The annihilation of another human person must be preceded by his de-humanization, which numbs all the perpetrators’ moral sensibilities, blinding them to the meanings and the consequences of their action. Hatred fuels this dehumanization and fear sanctions it. 

    Recent Chinese propaganda has shown singing and dancing Uyghurs in East Turkestan, a colorful folksy mask to hide the horror of what is being done to them. These official videos and photographs ratify the old Chinese stereotype of the Uyghurs, the eugenicist belief that they are simpletons and idiots who know only how to sing and dance, whose primitive minds must be re-engineered. The government propaganda even suggests that the Uyghurs do not feel humiliated by their treatment: after all, they do not have the intellectual capacity to understand what is happening to them. What they seek is only sensual pleasure. Their apparent smile is the proof that they are happy with the conduct of their Chinese masters. They deserve inhumane treatment because they are not quite human. 

    The modern world has seen genocide before, and it is seeing genocide again. This genocide is enabled by cutting-edge technologies, global economic power, aggressive diplomatic influence, and domestic political support. And, of course, by the passivity and the indifference of the bystanders beyond China’s borders. In committing this vast crime, China is scorning the conscience of humanity, if such a thing still exists. And so, the question that was asked before must now be asked again. What is the world going to do about it? 

    Slavery’s Wages

    I was in grade school when the television show Roots, based on Alex Haley’s famous book, first aired. It was a big deal, at least among adults, and my parents insisted that my sister and I watch it. We dutifully sat down in the front the walnut-veneered TV cabinet as my father adjusted the rabbit ear antennas to get a good signal. For an eight-year-old, Roots was disorienting, often boring, and occasionally very disturbing. The images of LeVar Burton’s Kunta Kinte enduring the brutal Middle Passage and of the slavers throwing the sick Africans overboard are still with me today. Sitting in an air-conditioned living room in a California track house, I didn’t quite grasp what it had to do with me. This all happened a long time ago, I thought. It seemed like another one of the period costume dramas that my mother watched on PBS, but with many more examples of vicious behavior, a lot more black people, and much better production values. I identified with the black slaves as the protagonists of the story, but I felt little connection with any of the people depicted. The landscapes, accents, clothing, and architecture were all unfamiliar. Most of the white people were inexplicably cruel and heartless. The black people were as unlike me and my family as the slaves in Spartacus (and I kept waiting for what I naively assumed would be the inevitable slave uprising that would provide the story with its cathartic ending).

    When I went to school, where I was one of three or four other black students, some of the kids started calling me Kunta Kinte. I was annoyed but brushed it off, until I was cornered by a group of older white kids. Kunta Kinte! Kunta Kinte! Go back to Africa where you belong! I ran away, cursing the bullies — and silently cursing Alex Haley for writing that damn book. When I told my father, he offered the advice that was typical of his generation: “They’ll never leave you alone if they think you’re scared of them.” He had taken me and my sister to karate lessons, seemingly in preparation for just such a problem. The next day, when the same kids cornered me, I picked the smallest of them and tried to do as much damage as I could. I still got the worst of it, of course, but the one unlucky kid I targeted left the scene with his face bloodied and his wrist sprained. In the principal’s office I said that I didn’t start the fight, and I promised to stay away from the other boys. But if they hassled me again, I added, I would make sure that at least one of them left bloody every single time and I didn’t care what happened to me in the process. They stopped calling me Kunta Kinte and started whispering behind my back. It would have to do. 

    Those grade school bullies showed me exactly what I had in common with the characters in Roots. A straight and unbroken line connected me to my despised and exploited ancestors who had made the brutal Middle Passage from Africa. Or at least that’s how it felt at the time. 

    Before Roots, the archetypical slavery story was probably Up from Slavery by Booker T. Washington. Indeed, Roots was a late-twentieth-century century answer to Up from Slavery: more radical in its politics, more ambitious in its scope, more scholarly in its historical research, more dramatic and novelistic in style. For me, and I expect for many other Americans of a certain age, Roots is still the archetypical representation of slavery. Although there have been many others since, Haley’s account established the genre. Ever since, all decent slavery narratives have shared some common elements. Most obviously, a respectable slavery narrative must unflinchingly depict the horrors and cruelties of slavery: the unspeakably hellish passage across the ocean, the dehumanizing slave auctions, the grueling, thankless, and unremunerated toil, the capricious rule of the master, the separation of mothers from their children, the whippings, the rapes, the lynchings. It must also establish the experience of slavery as the foundation of the black experience. A slavery narrative cannot simply be the story of an individual; it must carry the symbolic weight of slavery for black people as a group. Either overtly or indirectly, it must depict slavery as a sort of pedigree, a shared ancestral experience that joins black people to each other. 

    Quentin Tarrantino’s film Django Unchained is not a respectable slavery narrative, but it is instructive because it successfully treats the slavery narrative as a stylized genre. It is a cross between a slavery narrative and a spaghetti Western. The film operates, as many Tarrantino films do, by quoting familiar elements of a well-established genre and slyly but convincingly tweaking or inverting them. Django Unchained, in what has become a signature Tarrantino flourish, offers a cathartic alternative to the classic archetype, wherein the downtrodden gets even with the oppressor in a highly stylized orgy of righteous violent retribution. It does for the slavery narrative what Inglorious Bastards (wherein a team of Jewish-American military officers outwit and fight Nazi soldiers in occupied France) does for the Holocaust narrative and what Kill Bill (in which a woman gets bloody revenge on a host of sexually predatory and exploitative men, the worst of whom had killed her bridegroom and her unborn child on her wedding day) does for the story of the sexually victimized woman. Django suffers all the classic injuries of enslavement: grueling toil, routine humiliation, regular beatings. His wife is raped by a sadistic plantation owner. Instead of staging an unsuccessful rebellion or making an unsatisfying escape as would be historically plausible, Django becomes an expert gunslinger and returns to slaughter every white person on the plantation before he rescues his wife and burns the plantation house to the ground, while the stereotypical “House Negro” looks on in horror. 

    Django Unchained makes sense as a film only because the slavery narrative is so familiar. We already know the story and how it has to end, which makes the unexpected, impossible denouement both shocking and exhilarating, as if cinema offers the chance to alter the past and redeem history itself. (Tarantino played the same benevolent counterfactual trick on the Manson killings in Once Upon a Time…in Hollywood.) The film left many black viewers uneasy, I suspect because it disrupted the line of subjugation and suffering that joins the history of slavery to the present day. Django seems to escape not only slavery but history itself. Like a spaghetti Western hero, he rides off into the sunset and into a depthless present: we do not ask whether his descendants will suffer as sharecroppers or live in segregated impoverished neighborhoods, endure Jim Crow policies, be incarcerated for petty offenses, or be killed by racist police. Django puts it all behind him. We cannot. 

    Not only can we not put slavery behind us; it has become the lens through which many people of all races see the black experience in America. Consider a few examples: 

    • As Americans reckon with the horrors of police violence and mass incarceration, many people have insisted that the racial inequities of the criminal justice system have their roots in slavery. Mass incarceration is “the new Jim Crow,” which was, of course, a continuation of the
    racial economy of slavery in a new form. Extending the analogy, some argue that modern policing writ large is an outgrowth of patrols organized to track down runaway slaves. 

    • A black person who attempts to get ahead by distancing herself from other black people or ingratiating herself to whites is known as a “House Negro” — a reference to the distinctions between slaves on the plantation. 

    • A common criticism of romantic or intimate relationships between blacks and whites — especially those involving black women and white men — is that they mirror, and in some way recapitulate, the rape of black slaves by white masters. 

    • A recent controversy in high tech involves the use of the terms “master” and “slave” to describe the relationship between circuits and elements of programming. Some contend that this terminology is racially insensitive because it callously evokes the traumas of slavery. 

    This return to slavery grounds our conversations about race and racism in a discrete history. Virtually all educated people have rejected the myth of biological race, but without it race is an infamously slippery concept; it defies definition even as it defines a social hierarchy. Slavery, by contrast, provides a concrete historical referent: a black person is a person who could have been enslaved. The return to slavery also pays homage to our ancestors, connecting black people to a legacy of oppression and survival and spiritual resistance. Most black people cannot trace our lineage back to a specific place — instead, we find it in slavery and the struggle for freedom. The memory of slavery substitutes for the memory of an ancestral homeland, of the “old country” that other groups in America define as their origins — a connection that the historical practice of slavery ruthlessly cut off. Slavery, then, both explains our present circumstances and joins black people to today to black people in the past. If our suffering today is a legacy of and a reflection of slavery, then our suffering is continuous with and analogous to the suffering of slaves. 

    Like an ancestral homeland that one has never visited, however, or an ancient ethnic tradition that has been modified and idealized as it passes from one generation to the next, the legacy of slavery is not completely straightforward or identical to the historical practice. Slavery’s contemporary significance is both practical and symbolic; it is real but it is obscure, the lingering consequences of laws, customs and events, and the poetic and emotional force of past trauma. 

    The distinctive evil of slavery lay not only in the practice itself but also in the racism that justified it and eventually outlived it. The ideology of race has kept this country in the shadow of slavery, dooming us to reproduce racial injustice in new mutations: sharecropping, Jim Crow, the chain gang, the isolation of the ghetto, the confinement of the prison. In this way, racial ideology compounded the initial theft of labor, denying opportunities for gainful employment and remunerative investment to the descendants of slaves long after Emancipation. Employment discrimination kept most blacks in low wage jobs and blocked the advancement of even those who managed to pursue a skilled trade or profession. Housing segregation and discrimination ensured that black neighborhoods would be plagued by blight, crime, environmental hazards, and unstable property values. 

    The modern idea of race is a byproduct of modern chattel slavery. Chattel slavery differed from slavery in the ancient world, where the status was often temporary and typically was justified as a consequence of conquest. The conflict between the ideals of Enlightenment liberalism and the realities of the slave economy inspired a new and more pernicious justification of human bondage: a natural hierarchy of races. There were older ideas of race, but they were quite different. Europeans had an idea of distinctive human races before the slave trade, but it was vague and politically contingent. In Society Must be Defended, a book based on a series of lectures given at the College de France, Michel Foucault noted that the idea of race appears in early modern Europe, where it refers to geo-political conflict between groups distinguished by language, culture, and geographical origin (Normans, Angles and Saxons in England; Franks and Gauls in France.) In these instances, race organizes a historical account of political community, power, and legitimacy. The idea of the “race war” describes the conquest of one group by another, and is used as a counter-narrative to a story of unity under a legitimate sovereign. Race is a sort of rallying cry whereby one faction contests the legitimacy of political dynasty. The Norman monarch had the right to rule the Normans but not the Saxons, who must reclaim their proud independence as a distinct race and throw off the tyranny of alien dominion. This idea of race shares some features with modern racism, but it lacks the crucial notion of inherited hierarchical status. 

    The notion of race that appears in Shakespeare’s Othello is more familiar but still not quite the same as ours. The Moor of Venice is an outsider, marked by his skin color, which has already taken on some of the now-familiar symbolism assigned to it by atavistic white supremacy. Desdemona’s father Brabantio, objecting to the marriage, complains, “For if such actions have passage free, bond-slaves and pagans shall our statesmen be.” The Duke, in approving the marriage, suggests that Othello’s race does not signify low status — or at least that his other qualities make up for it: “if virtue no delighted beauty lack, your son in law is far more fair than black.” And, most infamously, Iago, in an effort to provoke Brabantio, taunts, “Even now, very now, an old black ram is tupping your white ewe.” 

    Yet Othello’s race is a subject of ambivalence in the play. There is no iron law against miscegenation, as there was in most of the American south until 1967. Othello is regularly described as honorable and noble. Those who would disparage his relationship with Desdemona accuse him of drugging or casting a spell on her — not of raping her, as they certainly would have in the United States for much of its history. Othello is obliquely compared to a “bond-slave” but also a “pagan,” suggesting that the slur refers as much to his exoticism and acculturation as to his status or color. Shakespeare’s Venetians use Othello’s color as a metaphor for status; Brabantio’s objections to his union with Desdemona reflect concerns about a loss or degradation of status, and — most tellingly — the Duke’s answer to those objections consists of an assurance that Othello’s color is not in fact a sign of his status. 

    All this is not yet the race and racism that came to dominate and to corrupt the United States. Slavery took these more fluid and contingent ideas of race and hardened them into an immutable biological condition that was used to justify intergenerational subjugation. This idea of race survived the demise of slavery itself and came to take on a life of its own. What we might call modern racism first developed as propaganda for slavery. 

    But modern racism is not a fixed ideology: it is an opportunistic discourse, changing to suit the times. Just as the race of Foucault’s “race war” was not the same race as that of Shakespeare’s Othello which in turn was not the same race as Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings, today’s race is not identical to that of the eighteenth-century plantation. Racism changed as slavery matured into its most uncompromising form. As the tension between American democratic ideals and slavery became more and more conspicuous, racial ideology became more extreme and more shrill: in a sense, it was not racism that inspired and intensified slavery but slavery that inspired and intensified racism. Tragically, racist propaganda has flourished and spread well beyond its original function and has inspired new types of evil. We do not passively inherit the prejudices of our ancestors; each generation makes its own prejudices, building on but also modifying that of the past. Likewise, new racial injustices metastasize from old bad habits, while new institutions and practices offer new opportunities for selfish ambition, bigotry, exploitation, and callousness. 

    The history of racism’s mutations begs an important and delicate question. What can slavery explain about contemporary black life and what can it not explain? It cannot be the case that it explains nothing, but it also cannot be the case that it explains everything. Is collective memory enough to account for present experience? Did the same racism that tied black people to humid plantations south of the Mason-Dixon Line also provoke grade-school bullies to taunt and pummel me in the arid heat of California’s Big Valley over a century later? 

    It is worth noting that those kids didn’t think to hassle me until Roots was aired on network television. They were, of course, racists, but it took the publicity surrounding Roots to trigger their racism. Their aggression was not the smug assertion of dominance that one encounters from people secure in their position or convinced of their superiority — I would encounter this too, but only later and much more frequently at the elite universities that I attended and in the elite law firms and government offices in which I worked. This was different: it was a shrill and defensive aggression provoked by the shifting cultural landscape that allowed a radical retelling of the American story from the black perspective to air on prime-time television. Roots sullied the innocent, sunny version of the American story and replaced it with a grim and unvarnished account that placed slavery at its center. For black people, this story was familiar and seeing it in popular national media was a long overdue vindication. But for many whites, it must have felt like an accusation and the prelude to a loss in status. 

    The defensive reaction to Roots was a racism of ressentiment, a distinctive form of late twentieth-century racism. Of course, it finds it origins in the racism of slavery, but it is also an outgrowth of its own historical moment. It is a reinvented racism, a sour remake of a bitter American standard. Racism has been reinvented many times over its strange history. It became more strident and uncompromising as slavery came under more forceful attack in the nineteenth century. It acquired new justifications, such as the allegedly inherent rapaciousness and laziness of blacks after Emancipation. It adapted to the mass urbanization of blacks during the long Great Migration from the rural Jim Crow south to the cities of the north. It morphed again during the upheavals of the civil rights struggle, when black liberation was linked to the menace of communist sedition and countercultural radicalism. During my youth it took the form of the stereotypes of the urban thug, the welfare queen, and the affirmative action hire who gamed naïve liberals to snatch unearned advantages. 

    Each of these racism reboots is based on the original atavistic racism developed to justify slavery. But they are not the same. These reinterpretations now justify other practices and attitudes; they are spread by new political coalitions for new purposes. As racism mutates, it serves new purposes and acquires new themes, attenuating its connection to slavery. How much does today’s racism owe to slavery and how much to the years that came after slavery? Do we learn more about our current racial injustices by looking to the plantation economy of the eighteenth century or to the urban markets of the twentieth century? 

    It would be remiss to discuss the legacy of slavery and fail to mention the New York Times’ renowned and controversial 1619 Project. A common theme of many of the 1619 Project essays is that slavery was — and its legacy remains — central to almost every institution, custom, and practice in America. The racism born of slavery is, according to the project’s lead essayist Nikole Hannah-Jones, part of the “the very DNA of this country.” The 1619 Project asks, provocatively, what might be illuminated if we thought of slavery rather than liberty as America’s foundation. It is certainly useful to re-center racial justice in the American story, and thereby correct a certain Whiggish interpretation of the American racial narrative. 

    The 1619 Project reminds us that slavery was also a long-lived practice of central importance to national economies. It is well known that slavery was indispensable to the agricultural industries of the American South, the Caribbean, and Latin America. But it is less often acknowledged that slavery defined transatlantic trade for centuries. Slavery was an indispensable leg in the infamous triangular trades of the Age of Discovery: slaves brought from Africa to the Caribbean and North America, where they worked to harvest sugar and rum, which was brought to Europe and later the North American colonies and traded for manufactured goods, which were traded in Africa for slaves. It was a perpetual circuit. Without slavery, trans-Atlantic trade would have been much smaller and much less profitable. Slavery sustained empires and bankrolled entire cities in Europe. Monticello and Richmond in Virginia were built on the backs of African slaves; so were Liverpool and Manchester in England. Slavery was more than an evil practice with discrete injuries; it was an integral part of the modern world for centuries. 

    Now add to this the racial prejudice, the discrimination and exclusion that slavery left in its wake. Like a major technological innovation or scientific breakthrough, the economy of slavery inspired a mythology. An epic of Progress celebrated machine-age breakthroughs. A parable of racial hierarchy justified slavery. This mythology is one of slavery’s most durable legacies, and surely its most toxic. As a consequence, the design of cities, the location of housing, the administration of criminal justice — all have been shaped, distorted, and corrupted by slavery. In these respects, the 1619 Project helped to correct a distorted and incomplete popular understanding of history by emphasizing the significance of slavery during this formative period in America’s history. 

    A group of prominent professional historians fairly criticized the 1619 Project for ignoring or downplaying the opposition to slavery during the nation’s founding. They argued that the tone and emphasis of the articles “suggest a displacement of historical understanding by ideology.” They pointed to exaggerations and errors of fact and interpretation — most notably, that the revolution was fought by 45 slaveowners so as to keep their slaves. But to many readers this seemed beside the point: the 1619 Project insists upon confronting the centrality of slavery to American wealth and influence and to ask whether the influence of slavery might be more profound than the influence of noble ideals too often honored in the breach, such as liberty and equality. Those are fair questions, whatever the answers. 

    Slavery’s influence has been so widespread, so lasting, and so profound that it seems reasonable for black people to attribute almost any disadvantage or misfortune to it. Fewer black people would be poor and more of them would be rich, if generations of wages had not been stolen from our ancestors; had our parents and grandparents not been denied equal employment opportunities and equal access to housing investments in desirable neighborhoods. We would have longer, happier, and healthier lives if we were free of the constant stigma of racial bigotry, the steady diet of insults, snubs and condescension, the episodic but still regular explosion of violent repression from racist thugs, mobs and police abusing the color of law. 

    Yet the causality is very imprecise and can be easily abused. The very pervasiveness of slavery’s influence is also why it is hard to identify its discrete consequences with precision. A cause of everything is also a cause of nothing in particular. Death affects every aspect of human psychology, every institution, custom, and ambition, which is precisely why no one tries to account historically for its influence. It is real and ubiquitous, but too tangled and diffuse to constitute a historical cause. For black people in America, the legacy of slavery is in this way like the anticipation of death: an unavoidable and looming monolith so overwhelming that it cannot be reckoned with even as it demands to be acknowledged. Perhaps that is why we are better at addressing slavery figuratively and narratively rather than analytically. In book and films, we can describe slavery’s gruesome horrors and relentless indignities, but we cannot account for them in the sense of tracing their consequences or measuring their costs. A monocausal emphasis on slavery would simplify history, and lead us to believe in phantom continuities, and falsely reduce the present to the past, and deny the many things that really have changed in America. 

    Given the impossibility of causal analysis, we resort to metaphor; and sometimes that leads to intellectual sloppiness as well. A biological metaphor in particular, the metaphor
    of DNA, evoking an image of a body politic with an inescapable genetic legacy. Thus Matthew Desmond argues in his essay for the 1619 Project that “American slavery is necessarily imprinted on the DNA of American capitalism.” Desmond notes, for example, that depreciating mortgages and double-entry bookkeeping were developed to organize the slave economy. He clearly means to discredit modern capitalism by revealing its debt to the slave economy. But this alone does not discredit the institutions and practices by association, any more than it would discredit the field of mathematics if we were to discover that it was first developed to aid an avaricious dictator in calculating the tribute due from his vanquished subjects. Given its importance to global trade and the easy circulation of wealth and resources in a rapidly developing nation, it was inevitable that some of the practices that developed to support slavery might later be put to better uses. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a modern institution or practice that was not influenced by slavery at least indirectly, either benefiting from the wealth it created or influenced by the pernicious ideas it propagated. But do we understand these things adequately if we dwell only, or mainly, on their link to slavery? 

    To discredit various practices, we would have to believe that they still effectively carry on the ugly work of slavery today in a different guise. Certainly, one could make the case that some parts of the wage economy resemble slavery — indeed someone did, hence the old idea of “wage slavery.” But it is important to insist that the institution of slavery was much more than very hard work in very hard conditions. It was a social system. Anyway, Desmond does not really argue for this; instead he lets the metaphor of DNA imply that these practices somehow carry the genetic code of slavery into today’s financial system, such that slavery explains the exploitations of modern capitalism in the same way the chronic depression of a parent might explain the crankiness of a child. This is more likely to convince capitalism’s critics than its admirers. And even the fiercest anti-capitalist might insist that today’s economy has its own distinctively contemporary evils. To say that slavery explains starvation wages and sweatshop working conditions today is post hoc ergo prompter hoc speculation. It is plausible that some of the habits of callousness formed during slavery have contributed to the particularly harsh character of American capitalism; but callousness is older even than slavery. It is much more likely that both slavery and sweatshops are independently explained by the universal phenomenon of human avarice. 

    The DNA metaphor suggests a mysterious and inscrutable causality. When my mother notices that I like cashews and says it must be because my father liked nuts before dinner, or when someone points out that heart disease runs in the family, they mean to say that there is no need to parse the relationship any further — that we have hit upon the one true explanation. It doesn’t really matter whether I like cashews because such a preference is in the DNA that I inherited from my father, or because I remember sharing them with him as a kid, or because the bar at the Duke’s Hotel in London, which he never visited but which I love for other reasons, serves them with their excellent martinis. On the other hand, it does matter if the supposedly genetically encoded trait is something I would like to change. The biological metaphor, the notion of inherited social or cultural imprinting, is a pessimistic, even fatalistic idea. If heart disease is in my DNA, I am in trouble no matter what I do: my ancestry is my destiny. If, on the other hand, it runs in the family because of lifestyle choices such as smoking cigarettes and a high-fat diet, it is up to me, my sister, and my cousins whether it continues to run in the family for another generation. We have agency, and therefore change, a different fate, is possible. 

    For slavery to define black racial identity, there must be some way it is transmitted inter-generationally to those born long after the institution itself was abolished. The idea that slavery is in the nation’s DNA echoes the idea that race is in the individual’s DNA. We have replaced the discredited idea of inherited race passed from generation to generation encoded in biological DNA with a different type of genetic inheritance: the experience of slavery, passed down from generation to generation. Not the memory; the experience. 

    The centrality of slavery in today’s racial consciousness is explained as much by its distinctiveness to the black American experience as by its causal significance. Capitalism, caste, punitiveness, and technocracy affect everyone and create a multi-racial group of victims; but the legacy of slavery makes the experience of black suffering unique. What happened to black people in America happened to no other Americans. About this there can be no doubt. But while it may be true that slavery accounts for the uniqueness of black subordination, it does not account for all or even most of the history of black subordination. There are too many intervening historical contingencies for that to be the case. Slavery, one might argue, is a cause of racially segregated urban poverty, but so is the pattern of industrialization and deindustrialization, American metropolitan development, and the construction of the interstate highway system. A slavery-centered narrative conflates the psychological meaning of an especially salient instance of oppression with the causal significance of those events for contemporary inequality. But we will not eliminate inequality unless we are empirical about its causes. 

    Moreover, since racism has mutated to serve new nefarious purposes over its long and strange career, practices may be racially unjust but largely discontinuous with the legacy of slavery. For example, today it is almost a commonplace that modern policing practices evolved from the tactics of patrols that sought to capture and return escaped slaves — a clear and unbroken line from slave patrols to today’s racial disparities in aggressive policing. This serves as an unequivocal indictment of both the motivations for policing and its effects. (It also, perhaps unintentionally, suggests an optimistic prognosis for reform: we can change or abolish policing at little social cost because its primary function is unambiguously abhorrent.) To say that a twenty-first century police officer who shoots an unarmed black person is perpetuating the legacy of slavery implies a continuous and consistent social practice: policing and incarceration is simply the plantation in a new guise. 

    This is bad history. Racism certainly played a role in the development of modern policing, but policing was largely a reaction to urbanization and industrialization. It took a similar form on the European continent at a time when slavery was either unlawful or quite rare, and in American cities in the north as well as the south. In America, as in Europe, the modern project of pervasive and systematic crime prevention was largely a reaction to the norms and habits of a rural peasant class entering industrialized urban environments in large numbers. Police were one of many organizations designed to socialize people used to village and rural life into the rhythms of the factory, the habits of the city, and the norms of bourgeois society. The American historian Hendrik Hartog describes this pattern in his classic essay “Pigs and Positivism,” where he details the efforts to prohibit pig farming in New York City; and the French historian Eugen Weber describes it in Peasants into Frenchmen, which recounts the largely, if often inadvertently, successful efforts to impose a Parisian French dialect, a Parisian French history, and a Parisian French national identity on the provinces. 

    Black Americans fleeing the degradations and the exploitations of the Jim Crow system were the last of such a peasant class to enter American cities. The famous Great Migration of the early twentieth century in fact continued until the early 1970s. Peasant migrants to cities in the nineteenth century met with harsh conditions and vicious policing, but also with economic opportunity. They acculturated to bourgeois norms, to greater and lesser degrees, and eventually they began to blend into a less differentiated mass culture. This development, with its rough edges shaved away, was the basis for the sanitizing myth of the American melting pot. This was Weber’s story of how peasants became Frenchmen. It is also, to a large extent, the historian Noel Ignatiev’s American story of How the Irish Became White. It is tale of widespread ethnic prejudice, compulsory assimilation at its most objectionable, and a great deal of violence. It is, perhaps most of all, a story of the culturally homogenizing effects of liberal capitalism. In Weber’s account, for example, the harshest discipline could not convince the residents of villages in Languedoc or Provencal to abandon local dialects, customs, and identity for a generic French national culture as defined by the elites of Paris. What did convince them was economic opportunity, and the well-known liberties and seductions of the big city. 

    The black American urban migrants met with all of the hardships suffered by every other farming laborer who entered the city, plus the distinctive ones of racial animus. Worse, they did not come into a welcoming job market. Blacks were shunted into the most menial jobs. By the 1960s they entered a slowing urban economy where industrial jobs were leaving cities for suburban industrial parks. Unemployment was rising everywhere, but it was worse in cities where industry had fled, and it was chronic among black men, who faced discrimination as well as a weak labor market. Joblessness was as pressing an issue as civil rights — the famous March on Washington in 1963 was for Jobs and Freedom. 

    Some of the large number of jobless people of all races did what some jobless people everywhere have always done: they turned to crime, both serious and petty. In the late 1960s and 1970s, American cities faced one of the most significant crime waves in history. In an understandable zeal to condemn the criminal justice crackdown that followed, some ignore or even deny this. But people of all races at the time agreed that crime was a serious menace and many people of all races eventually supported aggressive policing as a response. An aggressive jobs creation policy on the order of the New Deal, combined with a generous and expanded social safety net as a backstop would have been both wiser and more humane. Federal officials saw this clearly at the time: Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society was the response. But that initiative withered under budgetary pressures and competing priorities, most notably the war in Vietnam. Intensified law enforcement, by contrast, was cheap — at least in the short run. Moreover, it was a local solution. Crime was a national problem, but every big city mayor had to deal with it, and in the absence of a federal response they used the tools that were available. Law enforcement is under local administration; social welfare is not. So, the nation as whole, city by city, police department by police department, district attorney by district attorney, got tough on crime. 

    Of course, the response was warped and intensified by racism. But rich and powerful political interests opposed social welfare programs and the redistribution they would require out of self-interest, while many others opposed them in principle as inconsistent with the work ethic. In any case, today’s punitive and violent law enforcement was not simply the continuation of racist practices such as Jim Crow or slavery. It was created and shaped by factors that have little or nothing to do with race or slavery, such as the structure of American government and the changing industrial economy. 

    Slavery is the defining trauma of black identity. It occupies the place that the Holocaust does for modern Jews; and that rape does for a certain type of radical feminist. If slavery seems like the archetype of all race relations, it is because the modern idea of race itself is a legacy of slavery. The black race as a race was born into slavery. To understand the black experience, then, we must begin with slavery. But must we end with it? Must we also return to it repeatedly, evoke it constantly, advance it as an explanation for all of the evils and the injustices that now fall under the capacious banner of “racial injustice”? Must we always keep our eyes focused on it? What will we fail to see if we do? 

    The horrors of slavery were real and objective facts. But the community defined by slavery, like all communities defined by maps, flags, anthems, museums, political institutions, and military might, is imagined. This does not mean it is insignificant or fantastical, only that it cannot be experienced directly as such — it must be imaginatively reconstructed from the fragments of smaller encounters, symbols, and stories, across significant differences and circumstances, across centuries. And imagination can be an unreliable narrator. An account of contemporary racial inequality relentlessly focused on slavery is incomplete and distorted. In such an account, which is really a mythology, slavery becomes a transhistorical force that reaches out, unmediated, too easily seeming to explain social patterns that have complex and multiple causes. If the legacy of slavery defines racial oppression today, what room is left for the more universal evils of exploitative capitalism, social caste-like hierarchy, punitive moralism, and the banal technocratic viciousness of modern civilization as explored by Hannah Arendt and the philosophers of the Frankfurt School in contexts far removed from the evils of slavery but steeped in other unspeakable evils? 

    What slavery is to black people today, moreover, is not always the same as what it was to the slaves. Consider the reaction to Annette Gordon-Reed’s fine book, The Hemingses of Monticello, which documents the intimate relationship between Thomas Jefferson and his slave and paramour Sally Hemings. The book unsurprisingly upset conventional Jefferson historians, who with few exceptions jealously guarded a tradition of hagiography reserved for the “founding fathers.” Not only was Jefferson’s relationship with Sally Hemings illegitimate and exploitative, it also violated taboos on interracial intimacy that, while anachronistic, doubtless still informed the sensibilities of some of the historians in question. 

    What is perhaps more surprising is that some black readers also objected to Gordon-Reed’s subtle analysis of the Jefferson-Hemings relationship. Some were incredulous at the implication (unavoidable given the historical record) that Sally Hemings had genuine affection for Jefferson and lived what was in many ways a privileged life, not only in comparison to other black slaves but also in comparison to most white people of her era. When Jefferson traveled to France with Hemings and her brother, the two could have sued for their freedom and refused to return to America with him. Apparently she considered doing so, but returned with him after getting Jefferson’s assurance that their children and her brother would be freed upon his death.

     

    This paints a more complicated picture of slavery than its current symbolic position allows. Perhaps life as a destitute black woman in a patriarchal foreign country was worse than slavery, or the equal of it. Gordon-Reed reminds the reader that no women were truly free in Jefferson’s and Hemings’ era. Moreover, slavery itself was not a monolith: it was worse for some slaves than for others, and it got worse for all slaves over time as the absolutism of racial status hardened into place in the decades after Sally Hemings’ death. Gordon-Reed notes that the Hemingses enjoyed a favored status in the Jefferson household — they were exempt from manual labor, they 55 dressed in sumptuous aristocratic attire, and they ate as well as Jefferson himself. Chattel slavery was a unique moral abomination. But for some, the alternatives, in a society stratified by a rigid class hierarchy and defined by patriarchy, were no better. 

    Today such observations may seem like an apology for slavery, minimizing or denying its cruelties and horrors. But we cannot understand slavery’s historical legacy without taking into account not only how it was singular and unique, but also how it was continuous with many other contemporaneous injustices in American society. Slavery was, among other things, a monumental theft of human labor. But there were other customs and practices that also effectively stole human labor: for instance, many feminists credibly insist that marriage and the patriarchal limitations on the liberty of unmarried women constituted a theft of women’s labor, not to mention of their other property, which accrued to the husband after marriage. Such were the circumstances that Sally Hemings would have faced had she left Jefferson to stay in Paris. These other injustices have also cast long shadows and have also warped our society. 

    The symbolic weight of slavery for the black race can blind us to injustices that do not involve the racial legacy of slavery, even when they mirror it in important respects. To give one striking example: from the perspective of political economy, today’s undocumented workers are the most obvious descendants of the slaves — they have quite literally taken the place of slaves, doing the same type of work in domestic service and in an agricultural economy that remains organized to require a powerless and exploitable workforce. Yet they are not, for the most part, black, and this disrupts the familiar link between anti-black racism and slavery. As a consequence, most discussions of the legacy of slavery fail to mention them.

    There is a risk in overstating or oversimplifying the importance of slavery to both the American experiment and to the African American experience — not only in overlooking or trivializing the real virtues that contributed to the national character, but also in ignoring a host of other evils and morally ambiguous features that account for this large, vibrant, chaotic society. A genuine confrontation with our history entails not only condemning evil but also embracing virtue, and grappling with moral ambiguity, complexity, and contradiction. I am a black American who believes that my true legacy is rich, nuanced, and layered — as is the legacy of any great people. It cannot be reduced to a simple linear story of oppression and resistance, the fundamentals of which were determined before the discovery of electricity. I reject the idea that nothing of fundamental significance has changed in race relations in four hundred years — that we are really just fighting the same fight against slavery in new forms, like some nightmare of eternal recurrence. 

    Slavery looms out of our past and it haunts our present in myriad indirect forms. And we can reinvent slavery in new forms if we choose to do so. Yet the legacy of slavery does not get passed down through the generations like detached earlobes. If we are cruel and exploitative today, it is because we are cruel and exploitative — not because someone in 1619 was. Thankfully, we can also reinvent liberty and equality in our time; and to the extent we do so, that will be to our credit — not that of the Founding Fathers or even Fredrick Douglass or Fannie Lou Hamer, much as their examples might inspire us. Slavery is our history, but it is not our roots. 

    The Winds

    I went to the demonstration against the closure of the Cines Ideal at the Plaza de Jacinto Benavente, and no sooner had it begun than I inopportunely broke wind; it’s been happening more and more these days. But no one around me noticed. I regretted going there, because the crowd was negligible and those who did show up were mainly human rubble like myself. No young person in Madrid cares that the last cinemas in the city are vanishing. They have never set foot in them. Since childhood they’ve been used to watching the films devised — if you can use the word film to describe those images that the present generation find amusing — for the screens of their computers, tablets, and mobile phones.

    Osorio, in his optimist mode, says that since the cinemas are gone, I will have to get used to seeing films on the small screen. But I won’t get used to them; in this, too, I will remain faithful to my tendencies of old. I have lived too long to care if they call me a fossil, a Luddite, or, as Osorio says to tease me, a “conservative irredentist.” I am all that, and will continue to be so as long as my body holds out (which I doubt will be much longer). I break wind again; but no one has noticed it this time either, to judge by the indifference on people’s faces. 

    Osorio must be the last friend I have. We talk on the phone every day, to be sure that we are still alive. “Good morning. What’s up? You still standing?” “Apparently. At least it looks that way.” “Shall we meet for a coffee later?” “Yup.” I don’t remember when we first met; certainly not when we were young. The hazy swamp of my memory tells me that it was twenty or thirty years ago. I know I was a journalist in my youth; Osorio says he taught philosophy in secondary school, but I’m not at all certain that he was a teacher, and even less of philosophy, since he knows little of the profession or the subject. He has never read Pascal, for example, whom I like a lot. Maybe he has forgotten how he made his living, and his memory is as shot as mine. Maybe he is trying to dupe me and himself by inventing a past. And he is well within his rights to do so. We have agreed to call each other every morning to see if one of us has departed this world in his sleep, and to notify the competent authorities to incinerate us, so that we may disappear completely. 

    “The last of the cinemas may be closed, but they’ve opened a new bookstore,” Osorio says to lift my spirits once the sorry farewell ceremony for the Ideal has ended. “There are now four in Madrid. I don’t guess you’ll complain. Four bookstores! More than in Paris and London, I assure you. It’s an outright luxury.” 

    Another tall tale, the product of Osorio’s pathological optimism. What he calls a “bookstore” is actually a simulacrum, a firefly that lights up at night and dies out almost simultaneously. This so-called bookstore — I dropped by there yesterday or the day before — was the property of an old codger from Malasaña who put his library on sale before retiring to the next world: a motley collection of ragged volumes pawed at, leafed through, and put back on their dusty shelves by the handful of shoppers present when Osorio and I went in to take a look around. I bought a slim tract by Azorín, a compilation of articles on Argentine literature, mainly Martín Fierro. I had never heard of it, and it cost me just a few cents. Naturally, in the shop, amid the old codger’s books, I broke wind again, and there was nothing I could do to cover it up. No one cared, except for Osorio, of course, who smiled one of his devilish smiles and briefly flared the wings of his nose in disgust. 

    I didn’t find any of those old-fashioned novels I like nowadays. Since the practice arose of ordering up novels custom-written by computer, I gave up reading any of the ones produced — it would be absurd to say “written” — in our time. When the system was invented, it seemed like another of those diversions that appear in such profusion from day to day, one destined to fade away like any other passing fad. Who can take seriously a novel generated by a computer in accordance with the client’s instructions? “I want a story that takes place in the nineteenth century, with duels, tragic loves, lots of sex, a dwarf, a King Charles spaniel, and a pedophile priest.” The same way you order a hamburger or a hot dog with mustard and extra ketchup. But the fad caught on, then it stuck, and now people — the few people who read at all — read nothing but novels that they order from metal or plastic skeletons. You can’t say there is even such a thing as a novelist anymore; or better said, all of us are novelists now. But that’s not true either. The only novelist on the planet still alive and kicking is the computer. Which is why readers wedded to tradition, to the real novel, the novel of Cervantes, Tolstoy, Woolf, and Faulkner, are left reading dead writers with our backs stiffly turned to the living. 

    This so-called bookstore in Malasaña will last as long as it takes to sell the relics piled on its shelves, unless the state succeeds first in its campaign to expropriate printed paper of all kinds, which it plans to incinerate in order to be rid of those allegedly harmful bacteria that the militants of that godforsaken Paper-Free Society! campaign have been yammering about in slogans and on placards for some time now. I think it’s all bunk, regardless of how many scientists — among them more than one Nobel winner — assert that they have proven repeatedly in laboratory tests that the combination of paper and printer’s ink is as harmful as paper and tobacco were back when cigarettes were killing generations of smokers with cancer of the lungs and throat. My sense is this is just the latest craze, something for the idle masses to get up in arms about. My worry is that they will win, and like Singapore, the first paper-free city in the world, Spain and all of Europe will turn their books, libraries, and private and public archives into ash. 

    “What do you care if it all burns up?” Osorio asks, ever defensive of what he assumes is our era’s political vanguard. “All those books, magazines, and newspapers are digitalized, and you can consult them comfortably, in antiseptic conditions, onscreen at your house.” But I don’t have a “house,” just a tiny room with a bathroom, and anyway my computer is no bigger than an old book. So his argument doesn’t hold for me. For that matter, I don’t think even he believes what he is saying. He does it to get under my skin. If he didn’t, we would get bored. 

    Osorio says he feels not the least nostalgia for those faraway years when people like myself went to the library to read. But I do. I liked the tranquil atmosphere, a bit like a convent, of the Biblioteca Nacional on the Paseo de Recoletos, the religious silence of its reading rooms, the secret complicity among those of us there, with our folders, reading by the bluish glow of the lamps. When the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid closed its doors there was a protest, and I swear I saw people shed tears. In Madrid, it was a peaceful farewell. Not so in Paris, where a violent demonstration took place on the day they shuttered the Bibliothèque Nationale. There were violent protests, a fire, and I believe some dead and wounded. 

    It is true that they have digitalized the former holdings of that immense building on Recoletos, and that they are now accessible onscreen. But for people like myself, people from another era, life without bookstores, without libraries, without cinemas, is a life without a soul. If this is progress, they can stick it where the sun don’t shine. “You’re a pterodactyl, a dinosaur, an antediluvian,” Osorio tells me. He may be right. 

    Far as I know, Osorio never had a family. He must have had parents, but he doesn’t remember them, and he doesn’t recall whether he had brothers or sisters, and he will tell you with certainty that he has never been married. I do have some recollections of my parents, whom I don’t think I ever really got along with. I do not know if I had siblings; if I did, they have been erased from my memories. But Carmencita, my wife of many years, I remember well. I never talk to Osorio about her, though. Every night since I was stupid enough to leave her, I think about her, and I am tortured by regrets. I think I have only done one wrong thing in my life: leaving Carmencita for a woman who wasn’t worth it. She never forgave me, we never managed to be friends again, and to top it off Carmencita married Roberto Sanabria, my best friend at the time. It is the only episode from the distant past to which my memory still clings, and it torments me even today. At night, before I go to sleep, I think of Carmencita and ask her to forgive me. She doesn’t know this, of course, unless there is another life after this one and the dead amuse themselves by spying on the living. I never saw her again, and only many years later did I get word of the accident that ended her life. I no longer remember the name of the woman I left Carmencita for; it will probably come back to me, but if it doesn’t, I don’t care. I never loved her. Ours was a fierce and fleeting affair, one of those rash incidents that turn your life upside down. After doing what I did, my world exploded, and I was never happy again. 

    It’s not true that I’m a pterodactyl. At least not in most senses of the word. I can recognize that in many ways the world of today is better than the one of my youth. There is less poverty than before, and that matters. According to the statistics, eighty percent of humanity is now middle class. A great achievement, and I hope it is really true. That leaves a fifth or a sixth of the planet poor and miserable, which means that we are still far from eradicating the problem. Defeating cancer and AIDS seemed impossible, but the scientists did it. Even I survived a cancer of the blood. We never thought it would be common for people to live a hundred years, and yet a good number of us bipeds are still standing to show that this isn’t out of reach. More than a few centenarians retain their lucidity and are able to enjoy life and even sex. Not me, but many people more or less my age still enjoy making love, or so I hear. As for freedom, I believe today — tomorrow I may change my mind — that it has disappeared entirely from our lives. This is a permanent source of arguments between Osorio and myself. He believes — or says he believes — that we are freer than ever, and is scandalized when I tell him that ours is a world of happy, obsequious slaves. But sometimes, when he is in a bad mood, he admits that I am right. 

    I was thinking about all this — Osorio, the vanished movie theaters, the young people with their laptops — when I felt something strange in my head, something that coursed through my entire body, like a chill. A strange sensation. Discreetly, I patted myself all over, and noticed nothing strange on my head or body. What was it then? For the first time, with growing anxiety, I understood: I didn’t know how to get home. I had forgotten my address. I had often thought that I should write it down on a piece of paper and carry it everywhere I went, but I never did. Now something worse was happening: I had forgotten which streets to take to reach my house, or rather to my room with its bathroom. I looked around frantically: all the people who had attended the protest at the closing of the Ideal had left. Osorio was one of the first to go, saying he had to drop off papers at some ministry or other.

    And so I was alone on that corner of the Plaza Benavente, even as people, cars, buses, and trucks surrounded me. I had no idea what direction to take. I had been breaking wind a long time, as I always do when I get nervous. Dissimulating, as though the few passersby might notice my indisposition, I walked to the corner and looked closely at the sign hanging high up on the wall: Plaza Jacinto Benavente. It meant nothing to me, though I knew that if I rummaged through my memory it would reveal itself bit by bit, gradually growing brighter like a spotlight. 

    Pretending that all was well, I walked around the square, scrutinizing the names of the streets. I felt a slight tremor when I read the street sign that said Plaza del Ángel, which I was certain was familiar and meant something to me, even if I didn’t know what. At last, having come full circle, I sat on a bench, trying to calm my nerves. I was frightened. Nothing like this had ever happened to me before. And at this accursed hour my friend had left me there, forgotten and alone. My friend — what was his name — ah, yes, Osorio. Sometimes I even forget my own name — like a jerk I broke wind as I tried to recall it. What must it smell like around me? I lost my sense of smell some time ago. I had better walk, maybe that will stir up my memories. Yes, they’ll come back to me when the scene changes and my serenity returns. 

    I chose a street called Carretas that ran downhill. I had the feeling, almost the certainty, that my home was not far away. It hadn’t taken me long to walk to the protest that morning. A half an hour, or maybe less, it could have been just fifteen or twenty minutes. No time at all. I walked slowly to keep from tripping and falling. As I did, I remembered things and people, and my address would undoubtedly return to me soon. One by one, the streets that separate me from the little room full of books and papers will appear, and the little bathroom where I piss and shit and shower and comb my few remaining hairs every day before going out for a coffee and a conversation with Osorio. 

    But I recognized nothing and nobody, certainly not the streets whose names I paused to read on every corner. Another expulsion, this time long and noisy. Why did I have so much gas? Because I was anxious. It always happens. When I remembered my address, I would relax. Finally I reached a public square, the Puerta del Sol. I had the feeling that this place must be important, with its crowds, its plaques, a clock, flags, police, and Metro tunnels. But I recognized nothing. And why bother asking questions of passersby? What would I ask? I didn’t have any identification. Seeing me so confused they would most likely call the police, who would haul me off to the station and stick me in a cell while they figured out who I was and where I lived. And I was certain that I wouldn’t make it through the experience alive. Again, a shiver shook me from head to toe. I thought I’d better stop and rest a while, and continue walking later, but slowly, taking my time, waiting for the movement to rouse my memories, until I at last remembered what street I lived on. When I got there, I would have to climb a long staircase for several stories. That much, at least, I still knew. 

    There were no benches in the Puerta del Sol, so I sat down on the edge of a fountain, along with a group of young people of both sexes. Now and then a few drops of water struck our heads and shoulders. I felt a bit weary, but my mind was active, struggling to remember my address. I looked around again. Had I come this way? Probably, but I didn’t remember. Was this the first time I had a memory lapse so severe? I thought so, but I wasn’t sure even of that.

    I watched the girls and boys I was sharing the fountain with get up, hold their nose, and glare at me. “I’ve broken wind,” I thought. And I hadn’t even realized it. How long ago had I lost my sense of smell? Years ago. I got up, too. My back ached, and I took a slow turn around the Puerta del Sol. I had the vague impression that I had been there that morning, when fewer people were around, but I couldn’t imagine which street I ought to take to return home. And many streets branch off from the Puerta del Sol, leading into every part of Madrid. The sun was high in the sky. It must have been early afternoon. 

    It is true that all the holdings in the building on Recoletos are now digitized, within reach of any screen. But for me, a man from another era, life without libraries is a living death. Just then — walking slowly, I had made it around the Puerta del Sol — I was certain that the Calle del Arenal, which lay before me, would take me home. My heart was pounding in my chest. Yes, I could turn there and I would make it back to my room. 

    Incidentally, I’m not an antediluvian, not entirely. I can recognize that in many ways the world of today is better than the one of my youth. There is less poverty than before, and that matters. According to the statistics, eighty percent of humanity is now middle class. A great achievement, and I hope it’s really true. That leaves a fifth or a sixth of the planet poor and miserable, which means we are far from eradicating the problem. Today there are African countries — South Africa is one of them — that rival those of the first world in terms of modernization and development, and that is remarkable. Defeating cancer and AIDS seemed impossible, but the scientists did it. And myeloma, as it’s called, which made me lose almost fifty pounds and still flares up now and again, because myeloma is a strange disease, no one knows what causes it or how long it will last, and it rarely kills its patients, but it never goes away entirely. (Still, for two years now I have been free of blood cancer.) We never imagined it would be common for people to live so long, and yet here we are, hundred-year-old bipeds, showing it was no mere fantasy. Let alone that men and women could last this long with their lucidity intact — but not, hélas, their memory — and enjoy their lives. (The last time I made love without chemical assistance was ten years ago or so, I believe.) 

    But despite all this progress, we haven’t gotten rid of war or nuclear accidents, and this means that however far the world advances, it may disappear at any time. The slaughter of Israelis by Palestinians and vice-versa continues, a daily testament to our self-destructive vocation. It’s curious that Jews, persecuted throughout their history, have turned cruel, at least with regard to the ill-fated Palestinians. The nuclear accident in Lahore — which might have been a terrorist plot, the true cause was never established — brought about more than a million deaths in a matter of minutes. And yet an international treaty to deactivate our nuclear arsenals is still a fantasy. No one can ignore the likelihood of war between China and India, which seems to creep closer every day. Pessimists say that if one does happen, the nuclear cataclysm will blow the world to pieces. Osorio, of course, isn’t one of them. “If it occurs, believe me, only Asia will disappear. The scientists and the military have studied it. All of us this over here will survive, don’t worry. And once the disaster’s over, perhaps common sense will prevail, and peace will reign over whatever’s left of the earth. The world will be a museum, like the kind you love so much.” At times my friend Osorio utters this kind of idiocy, just to irritate me. And he inevitably succeeds. 

    I had reached the end of the Calle del Arenal and was now in the Plaza de Isabel II, in front of the Teatro Real, which was advertising a run of five operas by Verdi. I felt weary and on edge and had broken wind at length and I suppose malodorously the entire time. My legs were shaking. I sat on one of those small benches scattered across the Plaza de Isabel II, in the heart of the old Madrid of the Austrias, to see if my memories would return and I would find my home, which should be nearby. I missed it. 

    Osorio must be the last friend I have. I don’t remember  when we met; certainly not when we were young. The hazy swamp that is my memory seems to say twenty or thirty  years ago. I know I was a journalist in my youth; Osorio says he taught philosophy in secondary school, but I’m not at all certain he was a teacher, and even less of philosophy, since he knows little of the profession or the subject. He has never read Pascal, for example, whom I studied a great deal at one time and who nearly convinced me to return to the Catholicism in which I grew up. Maybe Osorio has forgotten what he was in life, and his memory is as shot as mine; maybe he is trying to dupe me and himself by inventing a past. And he is well within his rights to do so. We have agreed to call each other every morning to see if one of us has departed this world in his sleep and to notify the competent authorities to incinerate us, so we may disappear completely. I think I’ve thought this, and said this, already. 

    I went through my pockets again, as I did many times that morning, believing I would finally find my cellphone so I could call Osorio and ask him my address. But I had gone out to the ill-starred protest against the closure of the Cines Ideal in such a rush, I had forgotten it. Damn it. 

    Far as I know, Osorio never had a family. He must have had parents, but he doesn’t remember them, he doesn’t recall whether he had brothers or sisters, and he will tell you with certainty that he has never been married. I do have some recollections of my parents, whom I don’t think I ever really got along with. I do not know if I had siblings; if I did, they have been erased from my memories. But Carmencita, my wife of many years, I remember well. I never talk to Osorio about her, though. Every night since I was stupid enough to leave her, I think about her, and am tormented by regrets. I think I have only done one wrong thing in my life: leaving Carmencita for a woman who wasn’t worth it. She never forgave me, we never managed to be friends again, and to top it off, Carmencita married Roberto Sanabria, a good friend from the neighborhood. It is the only episode from the distant past to which my memory still clings, and it torments me even today. I fell in love with my dick, not my heart. A dick that’s no good for anything anymore except peeing. When I think of my dick, the word that occurs to me is the Peruvian one, pichula, but why, if no one here in Spain uses it? Force of habit, I suppose. It still pains me that I left Carmencita. I never saw her again, and only much later did I learn that she had been run over by a car and killed. I have never managed to remember the name of the woman I left her for. It has vanished from my mind, same as my address, which was gone just when I needed it most. It would probably come back to me when it no longer mattered. A long fart escaped me, but so softly I hardly noticed. How long had I been sitting in the Plaza de Isabel II? A long time, an hour maybe, maybe two. My legs were heavy, and I thought a walk would do me good. I was still lost, utterly lost, but I felt more relaxed now. It had to be past midday, and although I couldn’t be sure, I doubted that I had eaten breakfast or lunch or even drunk a glass of water that whole day. I asked a passerby what time it was and he said, “Around three.” 

    Three in the afternoon! Would I ever find my house? Or would I have to go to the police and ask for their help? I’d have to show them my papers — which I obviously didn’t have on me — and the whole thing would be a mess and a horrible waste of time. I had reached a large square past which lay a building which I immediately identified as the Royal Palace. Was this the Plaza de Oriente? Yes. I remembered this place, and in the old days I think I even passed by here when I used to stroll or even jog along the Paseo del Pintor Rosales, which was just past here, in that direction. If I kept going, I would see to my left the Parque del Oeste, which was full of foreign prostitutes, Dominicans and Haitians especially, at night. Not far from where I stood, I saw a fountain where people were filling their bottles or taking sips of the cool water. I got in line and drank long and deep, and it felt good. When I was done I broke wind quickly, discreetly, and it bothered no one. 

    As I walked along the Paseo del Pintor Rosales, I thought what a good thing it was that the museums still hadn’t disappeared. Weren’t we headed in that direction? Aren’t the paintings and sculptures in them already digitized? That is why so few people visit them, in all likelihood. Even the Prado, which always used to be full, especially in summer. Many people, like Osorio, prefer to look at the paintings on their screens. As if it were the same, seeing a Goya, a Velázquez, a Rembrandt, in person as on a computer! What is extraordinary is that there are critics and professors who maintain this idiocy, claiming that the digital image is not only more comfortable for spectators, but also more exact than the original. According to them, an artwork viewed on screen can be examined minutely and in its totality for an extended period of time in a way that just looking at it does not allow. Many people swallow this flimflam and as a result the museums are neglected. I need to go back to the Prado one of these days, I haven’t been for a good while. Thinning crowds mean tighter budgets, and they open for fewer hours a day, fewer days a week, and fewer weeks a year. Eventually the absence of a public will force them to close. And soon enough some scientist will discover that the blend of oil and linen is dreadful for people’s health, and we will have to burn all the paintings for the sake of public safety. I hope I’m no longer here when the tragedy occurs. 

    My god, I’m a pessimist these days! I had reached the Parque de Debod, I vaguely recognized the Egyptian temple there, and since I was tired and there was nowhere to sit, I plopped down in the grass. I felt my heart beating in my chest, and wondered if I was having a heart attack. But I calmed down a few minutes later: false alarm. 

    Still, I didn’t get up yet. I felt good there. There weren’t many people in the park. A few tourists snapping photos of the Egyptian monument. Someone had told me that during the Civil War, the Montaña Barracks were here. When Franco rose up, the soldiers from these barracks rose up too, but the people of Madrid came out in full force, pried the doors open, and massacred the soldiers inside. What times those were! Now nothing moves anymore in Spain, and there won’t be another civil war. Just as well. What they call Francoism now is something different: without caudillos or radical partisans, without firing squads or torture, all very scientific, based on physics and mathematics, and, above all, on the absolute dominion of screens and images over reason and ideas. 

    I laid back in the grass and I felt serene. Maybe I would take a nap, and when I slept I would remember my address. 

    I thought about the serious museums, not the galleries, which were no longer, at least in aesthetic terms, what they once were. Now they were little circuses, less interesting than the big ones — the only institutions, I might add, that have progressed in this era and have turned into proper artistic spectacles. I had recognized as much some time ago, but I kept my opinions to myself. I would never tell Osorio, because it would make him jump for joy, and shout: “You’ve sold out to the modern age!” But I haven’t sold out, and I haven’t made any concessions. I am simply confirming an objective fact. While everything that was artistic in the past — painting, sculpture, literature, high music, the humanities — has deteriorated to such an extreme as to either disappear or change permanently for the worse, the circus, which used to be entertainment for children or older adults who yearned for their lost childhood, and which no one would ever have called art half a century earlier, has been reborn with a rigor, elegance, audacity, and perfection that suffuses many of its routines with the grandeur of artworks from long ago. Technological developments have helped make the circus an artistic spectacle of the highest order. Young people, who once wanted to be architects, then directors, then singers, then chefs or soccer stars, now dream of being ringmasters, acrobats, clowns, trapeze artists, or magicians. How the times change. 

    Did I fall asleep? If not, I was close. I felt good. There was a pleasant breeze. I did sense that the bugs might be biting me, especially the ants. My stomach had calmed down. I no longer had that uncomfortable gassy feeling that brought me so much shame. 

    A few weeks ago — or months? — after a long time of waiting, I got a ticket to see the celebrated Adonis Mantra. A prodigy, that magician from Silesia: he could make members of the public vanish before the spectators’ eyes, or levitate them, or fly to the ceiling of the auditorium, and then a second later the lights would dim, and when they came back up, he would be tied with rope in the bottom of a trunk. Those tricks were pure genius, absolutely incredible.

    The same is true of cartoons. And surely for the same reason: technological advances. It’s funny, as a boy, unlike my classmates, I didn’t care for the circus. Especially the animals, which frightened me. When my parents took me I would go along, but I wasn’t dying to go the way my friends were. And I cared even less for cartoons. When we argued about what we should go see, I was always against watching anything with Donald Duck, Mickey Mouse, or Popeye and Olive Oil. They bored me. And yet now they are the only films on television I can stand to watch. The effects they achieve are incredible. The figures emerge from the screen, stare at you straight in the eyes, sit on your knees, hide under the sofa. Or so it seems. It must be true what they say, that old age is a second childhood. Now an old man, I had turned back to the circus and to animation, the only fields in which I am prepared to admit that the culture — is it culture? — of today had surpassed that of yesterday. 

    Still, it’s sad that in a period that could never give birth to Cervantes, to Michelangelo, to Beethoven, the only thing comparable to those giants in originality and beauty are the funambulists from the circus and the puppets of the cartoons. It’s unfair of me to think of it this way, because in truth those are the only two things now that bring me the same sensation of absolute satisfaction that I felt as a young man reading War and Peace or seeing Primavera in the Uffizi or the Giaconda in the Louvre. 

    I felt good, and I went on sleeping on the grass of the Parque de Debod. I don’t remember my address and I don’t care. What they call art galleries now strike me as failed circuses in the vast majority of instances. Or theaters playing out a ridiculous farce. The last one I visited, a few months — or years? — ago, the Marlborough in Madrid, was putting on an exhibition of insignificant pieces by the famous Emil Boshinsky entitled Art for Fantasy and Imagination. I can’t say at present why this con man is so famous. His monstrous creations were projected on large screens. They had flashy titles like Tiburtius, Bringer of Storms or The Hood of the Monk Romualdo. They consisted of fireworks, like the figures in a kaleidoscope, those tubes of cardboard filled with shifting colored glass that were meant to amuse children back when I was small. 

    No one knows what a kaleidoscope is anymore. Children don’t play with them; they can work a computer as soon as they are born. The other day I was arguing with Osorio, who swore to me that he had never seen a tube of colored glass that changed its appearance as it moved. I thought they were entertaining, a pretty thing, and I seem to remember spending hours with them, turning my right wrist to make the images dance. I think I did that, but maybe it’s a false memory. 

    The trick with Emil Boshinsky’s exhibitions is that his paintings do not exist: the titles do, but the works themselves are digital. Still, you can buy them at the Marlborough, which furnishes its clients with a certificate of authenticity. That seemed like a silly joke to me, and I cared for it even less when the gallerist offered me a socio-political explanation to justify the charade. She assured me that this invention of Boshinsky’s had resolved the ancient problem of private property and those who were opposed to it. Property had always been considered a form of theft, an injustice committed by the rich against the poor. “Immaterial” artworks, however, have owners, and therefore respect the principle of private property, but everyone can enjoy the artworks on the net without stealing them. She assured me they had already sold several “immaterial paintings” for a very modest fee — just twenty to twenty-five thousand euros — and that the gallery considered them a success. I told her — I don’t know how I remembered — that a Peruvian poet and painter, Jorge Eduardo Eielson, had invented “imaginary sculptures” eighty (or many more) years ago. He installed them in such storied settings as the Tower of Pisa, the Arc de Triomphe, and the Statue of Liberty; he even sent one to the moon on a NASA spaceship. Without ever making a cent from it. I thought that the gallerist would be amused to learn that Boshinsky had a predecessor, but she looked at me incredulously and slightly dismayed. Twice I broke wind as I spoke to her, but I covered it up, with some measure of success, by hunching over, as though I needed to scratch my leg. 

    When I woke I was shivering, and the natural light had dimmed. I had the horrible feeling that as I slept I had not only passed gas, but had lost control of my bowels and soiled myself. My goddamn stomach! This wasn’t the first time it had occurred. It happened once before when I was in the cinema watching a film by John Ford, a director I admire a great deal. I would have to do now what I had done then: carefully clean myself and wash my shit-stained briefs and pants with bleach. How revolting. And that was if I ever found my home. 

    There was just a bit of light left. I was shaking, and the bugs, especially the ants, had eaten me alive while I was sleeping. I didn’t remember my building number or the name of my street, but I wasn’t as scared as before. I felt resigned to my fate. I struggled to get up and asked a passerby the time. It was five-ten in the afternoon. I still had time to remember my address. If I didn’t — but I felt optimistic, I had a hunch that it was close, this neighborhood looked familiar to me — I would go to the police to avoid spending the night out in the open. Perhaps I would be jailed and never get back out. But at least with the police, while they tried to figure out who I was, I would have a roof over my head. What would I do if it started to rain? I set out slowly down the Paseo del Pintor Rosales. 

    A few months — or maybe weeks? — ago, Osorio dragged me to a new gallery, “cutting edge,” he told me, in Lavapiés. The title of the exhibition was Sculptures for the Sense of Smell. There were twenty-odd mannequins vomiting, urinating, defecating, or suppurating liquids — let’s be frank: mucus — from their ears and nostrils, and to appreciate fully the significance of the works on display the visitor had to smell the containers where these figures deposited their discharge. As soon as I entered, I felt such disgust that I myself wanted to vomit in one of those slop buckets. And of course I emitted a series of farts. It always happens when I get out of sorts. But Osorio assured me that after a moment of initial difficulties, the nose would cease to be repelled and would begin to grasp the deeper sense of the exhibition. And, he added, “its metaphysical significance.” The poor fool thought that I was intimidated. “I never imagined metaphysics would smell like farts,” I responded. “I’ve got enough of my own.” At the end of the series, the artist himself, a hairy young man with the eyes of a madman, who seemed never to have bathed and who called himself Gregor Samsa, gratified the heroic visitor with a translated text from Baudelaire about the artistic value of odors. 

    I barely go to the theater or the opera now, though I liked them a great deal before. Or rather, it’s for that reason that I don’t go. Because they too have become a joke, a pretext for putting things on screens, like everything in this electronic digital world that we’ve wound up in thanks to progress. 

    Just imagine, this was celebrated as a grand invention — I remember it well, forty years ago, or twenty, or ten — this thing they call a guided multimedia spectacle. It seemed like an advance, being able to hear the opera while you received information on a screen about the work, the composer, the librettist, the conductor, and the historical context of the piece, especially as you could comment on the performance with fellow spectators or others far from the action onstage. Bravo, bravissimo. Except that attention is unitary, and we have only one brain, and this kind of simultaneous operation ends with the spectator concentrating on the little glimmers on the portable screen and completely distracted from the opera which, in principle, he has come to hear and to watch. The entire theater is packed with a multitude that, instead of listening to or savoring the music, is totally absorbed in its screens, informing itself about a work that it neither sees nor hears except in snippets, commenting — or rather, blabbing — with other nitwits like themselves, magnetized by the glowing pixels. A guided multimedia spectacle. It is impossible to enjoy a concert or an opera or even a light comedy surrounded by people who can do nothing but tap or caress the tablets before their eyes and gawk incessantly at the poor spectator who went to the theater with the idiotic plan of watching and listening to the things happening onstage. The only serious spectator of today is the image that the biped produces of himself on his portable appliance, that incinerator of all that is genuine and authentic, all that has gone basically extinct in this world reigned over by the glimmer of the prosthetic and the artificial. 

    Was this not the Teatro Real? Was I not once more before the Palacio de Oriente? Yes, of course. Here was the Royal Palace, where the ambassadors presented their credentials to the kings. How had I gotten here? I thought I had been walking in the opposite direction. At some point I had turned around and retraced my steps from that morning. Yes, this was the Teatro Real. I was tired, and depressed again. I felt something strange on my face, touched my eyes, and found that they were full of tears. I managed to stop myself from screaming and sobbing. Would I never get home? I was fatigued, my body was quivering, I wanted to lie down. How nice it would be, to cover up and sleep knowing I would wake to natural light a few hours later, and I would be in my house, or rather my room, with its tiny bathroom. How nice. It terrifies me to think of spending an entire night on a bench, dying from the cold. If I had to spend the entire night outside, I would certainly die like a dog. I was tired and looked for a bench to sit down on and pass the time. 

    When I sat down on a corner of the Plaza de Oriente, half turned away from the Royal Palace, I felt more relaxed. I touched my eyes, and discovered that I had stopped crying. I looked at the sky, and it was clear and radiant. A few stars were visible. 

    Sometimes, without realizing it, I imagine that what is happening around me has contaminated me as well, and I don’t really know how to distinguish between culture and its stand-ins in this mad world we now live in. I say this because of my argument the other day with Osorio at the home of the Arismendis, the millionaires. The dinner impressed me greatly, not because of the food, which was nothing out of this world, but because of the holograms. They were truly the stuff of fairytales. We were two of a half-dozen guests who were surprised and amazed from the beginning of the night to its end. I had already seen holograms at fairs, exhibitions, and museums, but those three-dimensional figures had never before astonished me. That night, they did. I didn’t know that hologram technology had evolved to such a point that it could produce the kind of wonders we saw at the Arismendis. 

    I was stunned as soon as the butler opened the door to help me remove my coat and scarf and I saw his holographic double, a butler with his same face and attire, repeating his gestures, his smile, and his bow. And that was just the beginning. All night we were surrounded by ghosts, duplicates of waiters or waitresses, serving the table, passing trays of canapés and drinks, absolutely identical to their real counterparts. We were delirious: all of us had the sensation of entering an oneiric world, of living in a surrealist poem, witnessing what you might call the quotidian marvelous, a world in which it was hard to distinguish the edge of reality, the real people from their doubles, flesh and blood from puppets wrought by technological illusions. For the grand finale, when we were at the entrance saying our goodbyes, duplicates of our hosts, fictional Arismendis, appeared to say goodnight and wish us well. 

    My argument with Osorio began when I told him about the impressions that the holographic spectacle had made on me. He interrupted me with a kind of ironic scorn, as if he had caught me masturbating or doing something else untoward. “Tell me, then, was what we saw not art?” No, I told him, it wasn’t. It was simply a remarkable technological feat. He replied: “Well, that’s what art has always been, a technological feat. That’s what art in our day consists of.” We argued for hours, and I refused to accept his theory that the true artists of our time are electronic engineers, programmers, specialists in art and image, and network professionals. I never told him that he was right, but there was a depressing truth in Osorio’s point: we live in a world where what we used to call art, literature, and culture is no longer the work of the imagination and the skill of individual creators, but the product of laboratories, workshops, and factories. Of the fucking machines, in other words. (Am I a Luddite? I might well be.) 

    I felt myself getting drowsy again. If I fell asleep, the sky would be full of stars when I woke. A whole day looking for my home, my room, certain that it was around here, but not being able to find it. Now, at this moment, I didn’t care. I knew my underwear was full of shit, it happened when I dozed off by the Avenida del Pintor Rosales, but I didn’t really care. I huddled up and realized I felt good and decided to sleep a bit more. 

    Is it possible that culture no longer serves a function in our lives? That its former justifications — sharpening the sensibility and the imagination, bringing to life the pleasure of beauty, developing a person’s critical spirit — no longer matter for human beings today, when science and technology can do everything better? That must be why there are no more philosophy departments in any of the universities of the cultured countries on the planet. I did an internet search the other day and found that the only surviving philosophy departments are those of the University of Cochabamba in Bolivia and in the School of Humanities in the Marquesas Islands. But the latter shares the department with Theology and the Culinary Studies programs. What a mix! I imagine getting a doctorate in Philosophy, Theology, and Gastronomy, and I die laughing. 

    But yes, if ideas as such, ideas divorced from immediate practical ends, had disappeared, then every form of dissidence and opposition would consequently have evaporated from our societies as well. Fortunately, it isn’t so, though I do fear we are headed in that direction, toward a society of automata. My hope lies in the movement of the “imbalanced,” which is spreading across Spain and the rest of the world. I say this despite my ambivalence toward the “imbalanced.” At times they awaken my sympathy, because they dislike the world as it is, and their way of life reveals their clear desire to change it.  They have a disinterested attitude of purity and spirituality, all the things that seem to have been wiped out in our societies, which are frantically oriented toward work, productivity, making money, and piling up entertainment appliances. 

    But I am far from an advocate for their creeds and their obsessions, and their fanatical contempt for things such as sex and meat, without which my youth and mature years would have lacked for certain pleasures that sometimes I recall with so much emotion that my eyes cloud with tears. (I’ve turned into something of a crybaby in my dotage.) I’m not saying that lovemaking or dining on a succulent churrasco are the same thing, I’m not that stupid. I do believe that making love was something marvelous, especially when I was younger. I remembered Carmencita. Wasn’t it luscious, stripping down and twining in bed for hours and making love around the corner from the news bureau where I worked? Seeing a woman’s naked body for the first time, making love to her with the delicacy of a poet writing a poem, reveling, drunk on desire and happiness, feeling time abolished in the immortality of that instant that carnal ecstasy gives rise to: what a wonder! I am certain that sex no longer represents all it did in those faraway years when I slowly overcame the taboos and the sanctimonies surrounding physical love and finally engaged in the act itself, like a person setting foot in paradise. But I must say, in those days, putting away a good filet, a ribeye, or kidneys soaked in wine, was a delight a common man could indulge in with a clear conscience, free from those moral and political problems that arise today, when everyone jokes about it awkwardly, and follows the dictates of their nutritionists and dishes increasingly resemble medicines or some kind of vitamin supplement. How repulsive it is to eat and drink nowadays. And this is coming from someone who hardly ever eats to excess and rarely drinks a drop of those pharmaceutical liquids that now go by the name of wine. 

    I fell asleep and dreamed serenely, in perfect peace with myself. The fear, the cold, were gone. I felt fine that way. 

    They say that the movement of the “imbalanced” started in Japan half a century ago. It has slowly spread across the world naturally, the way rivers open new tributaries, not through propaganda and proselytism; and with its rank individualism, the last thing its adepts would do is become apostles and messengers of its philosophy of life. They aren’t a new religion or anything of the kind. What are they, then? Something like a fraternity of passivists or iconoclasts, within or beyond their countries’ borders, one that attracts the young above all. I use the term “fraternity” because “ideology” would be an anachronism. Nobody knows anymore what it is, or what it was. There are no more ideologies worthy of the name. Everything in life has become practical, politics included. Maybe the movement of the “imbalanced” is a reaction to the universal materialist pragmatism that has imposed itself as the one possible way of life — a singular protest against a world of people who seem to be in agreement with almost everything and cannot see around their blinders — our blinders, why should I exclude myself? 

    The “imbalanced” have no doctrines or apostles, so far as I know. They teach by example. And this example has spread and gathered force. They are everywhere now, though the screens that have sprouted up on every street corner to give us the news don’t talk about them much. Their way of life has touched a nerve for the younger generation today. They are passive, they don’t have reunions or set up camps, they avoid the media and crowds, and for that reason they go largely unnoticed. But they are there, all around us. Thousands, tens of thousands, perhaps millions of them. All of them young. I suppose that as the years pass and they get older, they will retire. Or maybe still younger ones will kill them. I laugh in my sleep at the notion. Absurd. The “imbalanced” are pacifists. I don’t think they kill even flies. 

    What do they want? How would they like to change the world? I talked once with a group of them here in Madrid. They were sunning themselves on the grass beside the Egyptian Temple of Debod, looking up at a clear sky, the Parque de Oeste all around them. 

    At first they looked at me mistrustfully, but without hostility. When I told them I just wanted to know a bit more about what they were doing, what their beliefs were, what they wanted for society, they were unnerved. After an exchange of glances, they agreed. One of them asked me if I was with the police. And they all laughed, because I looked like a beggar. We talked for about an hour, lying there in the grass, me like a great-grandfather or great-great-grandfather surrounded by great-grandchildren or great-great-grandchildren. There were a few foreigners who could barely manage a couple of words in Spanish, with occasional phrases in English, Italian, or French. 

    I was confused by their contradictions and ambiguities. Reflecting later on the “imbalanced,” I concluded that they acted more from instinct than conviction. What drives them is not ideas — which are shunned in today’s world — but impulses, intentions, actions. Manifestly, they all agree on one thing: our system doesn’t leave people with enough time to waste. They are passionate defenders of leisure. Wasting time as they do there, lying on the grass, seems to them a great privilege, because it is something rare in these times. Doing nothing, lying there and dreaming, soaking in the warm sun, singing or telling jokes. “This is life,” one of them affirmed, “not spending the whole day from morning to night clicking around on your computer surrounded by walls and boredom.” A redheaded girl added persuasively, “Not everything can be work, we need to value other things.” The rest of them nodded. 

    When I asked them how they ate, how they made a living, they were surprised, as though none of that mattered. They worked the odd occasional job and shared everything they had. Some had managed to get a pension from the state. They divided up their income and expenses. Everything was for everyone. Anyway, they didn’t eat much. 

    When I asked them why they seemed so infatuated with lotions, ointments, and cosmetics, I noticed that they were uncomfortable, as if I had tread on intimate terrain. After a long pause one of them murmured, “Our body is sacred, and we have to take care of it.” For them, the sacred is found in perfumeries and pharmacies. They asked me if I had put on anything for the sun and when I said no, I never use sunscreen, they were scandalized. They confessed that whatever money they made with their precarious employment and the checks they get simply for being alive went toward buying pills, lotions, tonics, anything to impede the deterioration of the skin, the eyes, the teeth. For aesthetic reasons, but above all for their health. Though there are many bad things in our time, they said, there is one that is a cause for celebration, and it is all that science has invented to protect us against physical decline: disinfectants, reconstituting creams, balsams, hydrotherapy, thermal baths, massages, a whole arsenal of drugs and natural products which, used judiciously, keep human beings healthy, handsome, and in full possession of their faculties down to their final day. 

    One of the boys, of a slender ascetic build, told me that the most important thing was always to keep the stomach clean, and that curing constipation was the greatest glory of contemporary science. (But all this costs money, and they are idlers and don’t have it, so what do they do?) Possession of a stomach that worked as precisely as a Swiss watch kept people from succumbing to neurosis, which was the main cause of the suicides recorded every day all across Europe. Another argued that more important still was the discovery of a gel that maintains the memory fresh and alert. Others refuted both of them, asserting that more remarkable still was a pill that relieves the libido and allows men and women to avoid the sexual worries that beset them in the old days. 

    I used this opportunity to ask them why the “imbalanced” were opposed to sex and why so many of them practiced abstinence. I noticed some of the group blushing and looking away. Finally, the redheaded girl spoke up: “We believe in cleanliness in body and spirit.” “As do I,” I said, “but that can’t mean a person never makes love. Sex is healthy as well as pleasurable.” They looked at me as if I were what I am — a caveman. “Isn’t it enough that we have to defecate every day?” a belligerent young man, almost a boy, intervened. It was the first time he had spoken a word. “Now we’re supposed to expel our semen every day, too?”

     

    I didn’t understand what he meant, but it seems that his companions did, because all of them smiled upon hearing him, as though he had routed me completely. When I was a boy, I told him, that was exactly what the priests told us: that sex was dirty, ugly, sinful, something a person could easily dispense with. None of these people practiced any sort of religion. There was just one girl who admitted that, without adhering to any specific faith, she couldn’t be an atheist either, because she believed in “a first principle for all things.” She defended asceticism with reference not to religious faith, but to lay morality and, strangely enough, to hygiene. 

    This was the most flagrant example I had seen of the contempt for sex among the young at a time when we have achieved something that just half a century ago seemed impossible: the unrestricted freedom to have sex in any and all ways, with anyone and anywhere. Perhaps this much-celebrated freedom is the cause of their disdain. Sex used to excite people when it was surrounded by prohibitions and taboos; now that they are gone, it has lost its magic, and the young people find it repulsive. Who could have imagined? 

    When I whispered that if everyone followed their example and chose chastity, humanity would disappear, one of them replied: “Science will take care of that, they’ll make people in laboratories.” But the group delighted more still in another’s contribution: “And who cares if we disappear? The plants and the animals certainly won’t mind.” 

    I asked them why they were called “imbalanced,” and they didn’t know. One of them mused: “Maybe the people who saw us as a danger to society gave us that name. They later realized we were no such thing, but the name stuck. We don’t care, or at least I don’t.” One of the girls said, “Those words, we, us, we have defanged them.” Her neighbor agreed: “That word used to be an insult, now we’ve turned it into a compliment.” 

    They love cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, they disdain sex, and they are dyed-in-the-wool vegetarians. The only part of the conversation that excited them was when I said that the prohibition against meat-eating struck me as absurd, as a violation of liberty and human rights, specifically the right to pleasure. The worst thing is the way the state, the government, supports their prejudices in this regard. I said I thought it monstrous that people found violating the ban were fined or sent off to jail. They lost their composure at this point, raising their voices and waving their hands as they criticized me. What would have happened if I had told them I was appalled by the ban on bullfighting? They might have lynched me then and there. I chose to say goodbye before they started in with the insults. I remembered when youth rebellion was inspired by creating paradise on earth, inaugurating an egalitarian society, banishing inequality, free love, feminism, abortion, dying with dignity (we called it euthanasia). Now what adolescent nonconformists want is for the whole world to survive on fruits and vegetables. If this isn’t decadence, I don’t know what is. 

    The curious thing is that the hatred for meat on the part of the “imbalanced” has less to do with their love for animals than with a supposed medical certainty that made the rounds when they outlawed bullfighting: that meat is harmful, gives rise to illness, “pollutes” the human body, makes men and women “ugly” and “violent.” Ridiculous rumors spread at that time —for example, that when the bulls ran into the ring, aficionados sometimes lynched people. (I am repeating this exactly as I heard it.) These young people’s ideas of cleanliness are sick, neurotic, and their obsession has given rise to an entire category of sanitary fantasies. 

    The “imbalanced” would not be rebels if they did not put some distance between themselves and that perverse pro-animal sentiment that has overtaken the entire globe. I liked animals a great deal in my youth, and even as an adult I had a dog to whom I used to read poems by Cernuda and García Lorca. But things being as they are, I have developed a sort of phobia about the animal world. I wouldn’t be surprised if it did away with us, the humans. Without telling anyone — certainly not Osorio — I have started to take a kinder view of those anti-animal commandoes cropping up here and there committing terrorist acts against dogs, cats, rats, skunks, flies, and other so-called domestic animals. The other day a court in Madrid condemned a ten-year-old boy to a year in a reformatory because the police found him shooting stones at swallows with a slingshot. Now I don’t think you should shoot rocks at swallows, and I didn’t do it in the days before a slingshot was considered a “deadly weapon,” but sending this boy to a correctional facility strikes me as the height of sectarian stupidity, and it was grotesque when the judge declared that swallows were, as the bureaucratic jargon has it, “living, warm-blooded beings whose right to life must be respected.” 

    What did away with much of my sympathy for animals was when the veterinarians said that in our times rats were no longer vectors of disease, that scientists had managed to eradicate the germs and microbes that they formerly carried, and that they would thenceforth be considered domestic animals, as many animal rights organizations had pleaded. I had nightmares then and I still do; I detest those horrible rodents. My hair stands on end when I realize that they live in so many houses now, fed and cuddled by their owners, who stuff food into their mouths and probably let them into bed so that they don’t get cold on winter nights. Fortunately, they haven’t managed to extirpate the killer instinct of cats toward rodents, and the cats continue to eviscerate them every time they come within reach. Long live cats! I stopped taking walks in Retiro in the early morning because of the rats, and it was something I used to love to do. They have taken over that beautiful park; they are everywhere, climbing the trees, swimming in the pond, crawling over pedestrians’ feet, and wagging their grey tails so that people will throw them food. If you want to get rid of them, you have to scare them away softly, otherwise you will draw the attention of the guards or you will get slapped with a fine for being inconsiderate to your “warm-blooded” neighbors. What does warm blood matter? 

    That is why I believe that I was one of the few people not frightened when the foxes invaded Madrid. In fact, I was happy to see packs of them taking over the parks, the arbors, and the trails of Madrid. For as long as those silvery immigrants were here, the rats disappeared from the city streets: they hid or the foxes ate them. Osorio was terrified and went along with others to the Puerta del Sol to protest the campaigns of all those NGOs which ran slogans such as “Welcome to Madrid, our fox brothers,” “Madrid, homeland of the foxes,” and so on, which aimed to retain the canine invaders and to condition the city to become their permanent home. I wasn’t at all bothered by the foxes’ presence in the capital. The one inconvenience, I recognize, is the scent of their piss: it is pungent, and it permeated the dry Madrid air. Mixed with my own odors, it was disgusting. Fox urine stinks, and in those weeks you would see people in the street heaving and vomiting, put off by the foul scent that permeated everything. After a while the foxes left as mysteriously as they had arrived. And the damned rats slowly returned. 

    Osorio says the city loves those little beasts. Another milestone for contemporary culture, which is on the verge of bursting the limits of credulity. The other day he swore to me that in several cities there are foundations and institutions seeking to legalize marriage between human beings and animals. Maybe he was pulling my leg, because he didn’t give me tangible proof of the existence of those institutions. But if they do not yet exist, they will soon. It would be amusing to attend the first wedding of a man and a dog or a woman and an ape. Even more if, instead of just going to the courthouse, they do it in a church to the bars of Mendelssohn’s wedding march. 

    When I told him about my experience with the “imbalanced,” Osorio joked that one of these days a commando of vegetarian fanatics would set fire to the clandestine restaurant where, once a month, he and I drop in to treat ourselves to a nice oxtail or a rare filet. Thanks to the prohibition, we carnivores seem to take much more joy than before in a meaty feast. This is one way in which human nature has not changed: risks, taboos, interdictions around anything make it infinitely more desirable and attractive. A friend of mine, a secret smoker, told me the same thing some time ago, that he and his friends enjoy themselves much more in clandestine smoking dens, in the knowledge that a cigarette butt could land them in jail, than when they used to smoke wherever they wished with no risk at all. 

    Osorio defends the “imbalanced,” and I think he does so from his heart rather than out of dedication to his favorite sport, which is to contradict me. According to him, the old ideals of social justice and egalitarian societies simply don’t do it for the new generations, because they aspired to things that already form a part of contemporary life. And whatever falls outside that, whatever remains wedded to chimerical and impossible ideals, repels them rather than excites them, since they are schooled in “realism,” the fundamental bias of present-day culture. They are pragmatists, and they refuse to waste time and energy on things that they will never achieve, especially as they remember the consequences of the search for perfect societies in the past: civil wars, bloody revolutions, and injustices worse than those being fought against. According to Osorio, it is sensible, even wise, of these young people of today to substitute for the longing for a perfect world something more human: a world in which young people have regular bowel movements and no longer suffer the torment of acne. I praised his joke, but a few seconds later I felt forlorn when I realized that he wasn’t joking. 

    When I told Osorio that it struck me as a strange paradox that young people had begun to scorn sex — to act as the priests tried to convince us to act when we were young (even if many priests where doing it this, that, and the other way) — at the very time when religions were withering like the peau de chagrin, Osorio corrected me: “What’s withering is the churches, not religion.” I had to admit that he was right. 

    We had arrived at a question on which Osorio and I tended to agree: are we free, or mere automata? Orwell hadn’t known that problem, writing in the most rabid moment of Stalinism, which he combatted in such splendid books as Animal Farm and 1984 as a man of the left and a defender of a democratic left, if such a thing ever existed. He was a socialist and at the same time not one, for in the guise of his democratic socialism he defended capitalist democracy, knowing very well that without free private business it is impossible for liberty to survive, and that if the state controls employment and the production of goods, sooner or later communism will triumph in its tried and true forms, and with it totalitarianism and poverty. That is why the Soviet Union disappeared and the People’s Republic of China turned into a dictatorship of crony capitalists. What exists in China is a private company of millionaires who swallow all the lies of the regime. Yet the regime is a caricature of capitalism and the lack of freedom will strangle it sooner or later. 

    What kind of regime are we living in now? It’s impossible to say, but what is certain is that we are surrounded by systematic mendacity. The economy functions thanks to private enterprise and the free market economy. But are we free? Neither I nor Osorio thinks so, though at times he changes his mind. My own belief hasn’t wavered since the newspapers disappeared. True, on almost every corner there is a screen that presents news all day, and apparently the businesses represented there favor a diversity of ideologies and systems. But do they, really? We both have the impression that they do not, and that beneath the apparent differences the screens project a single supposed truth — that is, a heavily guarded lie; that all of them in essence defend a system in which government and business perpetuate a lie in common, as in China so long ago, making a show of superficial discrepancies to conceal their basic commitment to this system that keeps the world hoodwinked and more or less happy, since there are jobs, pensions, medicines, and education for all and even something called freedom, however much it is just a smokescreen invented by technology to keep the masses entertained. Men and women have turned vulgar and malleable as culture has died or turned into a mere diversion. We are slaves, more or less content with our fate. Orwell could never imagine that this would be the end product of the “free socialism” that he promoted, which was, in a word, impossible. Now we have lost our freedom without realizing it, and the worst thing is, we are happy and we think that we are free. What imbeciles we are! 

    Isn’t it strange that in these conditions sex has lost all interest, when its great enemy, the Catholic Church, the entity that worked hardest to eradicate it from our lives, at least in theory, is losing worshippers, congregants, and priests, becoming in some countries the equivalent of an organization of stamp collectors? I have often argued with Osorio about why the great churches are going under in our day, and with them the terrorist fanatics who used to try to destroy them with bombs and assassinations. What holds for Catholicism holds likewise for Judaism, Protestantism, the Orthodox Church, and even Oriental religions such as Islam and Buddhism: the ranks of the faithful are thinning, attendance is collapsing, and many think that they are on the verge of extinction. After exercising such influence over history, leaving their mark on it in burning letters, the churches are gradually disappearing without anyone attacking them, in a climate devoid of hostility, and despite government subsidies. Nietzsche’s observation from so long ago is coming true: God is dead and no one cares, because men and women have learned to live without God. God was a product of culture, and since culture is now entertainment we don’t even recognize that the old deities have been replaced by football tables, images on screens, circuses, cartoons, and advertisements, which increasingly seem like something other than what they are. 

    I suspect that the Catholic Church signed its own death warrant when it began to modernize, when the erstwhile bastion of machismo, conservatism, intolerance, and dogmatism relaxed, buckled, made concessions to progressive priests and the laity. The move backfired. It seemed impossible, but there it was: the Church began to ordain women as priests and nominate them as bishops, allowed priests to marry the way Protestant pastors do, and the Pope himself oversaw a gay wedding in Saint Peter’s Basilica. My poor mother, may she rest in peace, let out a bloodcurdling cry and fainted when she heard the news and saw it on her tablet, then slipped from her wheelchair to the floor. Poor old thing. “Those were steps forward that the time required,” Osorio says. “If they hadn’t done it, the Church would have begun to wither like a rose left out too long in the sun.” But didn’t that happen anyway? 

    He and I disagree about this too, of course. People liked the Church because it wasn’t like life, like society — it represented the very opposite of existence in that century. In the church you felt as if you were in another world, a territory far from everyday routine. It was a pretty illusion, made of rituals, chants, incense, Latin phrases that seemed wise to the faithful who didn’t understand them, celestial allusions to perfect lives, heroic, marked by purity, by innocence, by inner peace. Now the church has ceased to be such a refuge: it is an extension of everyday life, where everything is more or less permitted, where there are no taboos or dogmas. The church has lost its mystery and ceased to be interesting, like those political parties no one believes in, or college fraternities or football clubs. 

    When the Vatican determined that Limbo doesn’t exist, things started to take a bad turn. The abolition of Hell calmed many faithful sinners, but it disappointed others, those who had dreamed of their enemies, their oppressors, burning eternally in Beelzebub’s flames. With no flames and no Beelzebub, the beyond lost its attraction for much of the flock. Now they say the Vatican is about to declare that Heaven exists only in the symbolic and metaphorical sense, not in tangible, material terms. Poor Christian martyrs! They were broken on the rack, devoured by wild beasts, and burned alive defending the principles and truths of the Christian faith, and now it turns that out neither Hell nor Limbo nor even Heaven exists. What’s the Church good for, who is it good for, under such conditions? 

    Now I should clarify a point that Osorio makes often, and rightly to my mind. The decline of the great churches has not put an end to religiosity. It has just become vulgarized and bastardized to the point of embarrassment. Now that no one believes in priests, people place their faith in witches, sorcerers, shamans, divines, palm-readers, holy men, hypnotists, that whole rabble of liars and tricksters who for a few pennies will make their gullible clientele believe that another world exists and that they are privy to it, that the future is written and they can decipher it in coffee grounds, coca leaves, cards, or crystal balls. What serious religions did elegantly, beautifully, with intellectual complexity, is now the monopoly of rogues, two-bit scammers, and illiterates. Just when science and technology have reached their peak we have returned to paganism, to primitive bewitchment. This is where the culture of our time has left us. And this twit Osorio calls it progress. 

    Just then I woke up. It was the depth of night, and the sky was a sea of stars. I was sitting on the stone bench in the Plaza de Oriente, and in front of me to the right I could see the Teatro Real and the back of the palace, and beside them a little street of restaurants and the service door to the theater, where the crew entered and exited, along with the cast and the musicians when they were rehearsing. I knew perfectly that if I walked down that street I would find, on the corner to the right, the Plaza de Isabel II, and that the street I lived on branches off of it. Calle de la Flora, it was called. Of course! My building, with my room and bathroom located in the attic, was number 1. 

    I was neither excited nor sad. I remembered now that my dwelling lay on this short street called, naturally, I repeat it again, Calle de la Flora. You could walk right past it. My house was on the corner where it runs into Calle Hileras, just by the Plaza de San Martín, which opens in turn onto the broader Plaza de las Descalzas. There stands one of the oldest convents in Madrid, full of paintings, which opens to the public only on Sundays. There is always a long line of people waiting to enter. 

    My memory had come back to me. I remembered that, if I stood up and put those last few streets behind me, I could enter my home after an entire day spent looking for it. But that didn’t excite me, or even especially please me. I knew it would be like that. I had been frightened, I had thought I might die on the street like a stray dog, but now I was relaxed. I kept sitting there. What time was it? There weren’t many people around. In the Plaza de Isabel II, I would probably run into a couple of drunks. I still didn’t stand up. 

    “Was today a waste?” I asked myself. No, it wasn’t. I had felt death closer than ever as I walked around this square sensing that my home was somewhere nearby. Now my memory was back. After I slept and recovered, I would call Osorio and tell him the story. I had felt death close, but it had not been a waste of time. I knew now that I would never again leave my house — or rather, my room — without taking along a piece of paper with my name and address and instructions to notify Osorio if I fell down dead, and I would write down his phone number and address there too. 

    I struggled to breath. I wasn’t cold, hungry, or thirsty. I didn’t feel happy and I didn’t feel sad. It had been an adventure. A new adventure. A lesson, too. I could lose my memory and spend an entire day looking for home without finding it. From now on I would take precautions, I would always keep that document on me with my name and address and Osorio’s number. I learned this. So I had gotten something out of it. 

    I stood up with difficulty. Now I felt a little cold. Nothing serious. I knew I could walk, but slowly, stretching out my legs, right, left, feeling a little cramping, right, left, confident that my memory was back and I knew perfectly well where I lived. I would get there, climb the five floors slowly, unagitated, would wash my pants with soap and bleach, and would go to bed calmly, in the awareness that I had survived a new experience that had brought me a little bit closer to death. I told myself this without sorrow or rage, but with a newfound tranquility: I had discovered that I could lose my memory and fail to find my way home and not know who I am and lose an entire day trying to remember. Now I did know who I am and where my room and bathroom are. I walked, but unhurriedly, like a man out to stretch his legs who has decided that it’s time to return home. “My home,” I said with affection. And I felt tears streaming down my face. (I repeat: with the years, I’ve become a crybaby.) 

    I know that alley by the back door to the Teatro Real very well. Most of the restaurants there had already closed, but one was still open, and there were two couples sitting at the outside tables paying their check. When I passed by them, slowly, I said goodnight. They responded with a silent movement of the head. 

    I was afraid I would fall, which is why I walked slowly. When I reached the corner I turned right, and less than a minute later I was in the Plaza de Isabel II, which was still brightly lit. I breathed calmly. The usual spectacle was there: a row of taxis, the drivers standing in groups to smoke and converse; a very young couple making out on a bench; two shuttered newspaper stands; and at the intersection of the Calle Arenal, which led to the Puerta del Sol, a solitary dog trying to bite its own tail. To the left of it was the street that led to my home — to my little room with its bathroom. Again I told myself that I would take the stairs slowly, not tire myself, even if I had to sit down on each of the landings. Calle de la Flora, it was called. How could I have forgotten? I walked up it sluggishly, very sure of myself, musing over what an idiot I had been, looking around all day for my address. There it was, at the end of the street. My confidence was back. I had reflected on many things. I had been very afraid. 

    And I was afraid again, when I reached the corner of Calle de la Flora and Hileras, beside the tiny Plaza de San Martín, which opens onto the Plaza de las Descalzas, where I realized, feeling around in my pockets, that I didn’t have the key to open the large front door to number 1, where I live. I felt again the lash of terror that had harrowed me all day. Would I spend the rest of the night sitting here on the ground, hoping that someone who lived in the building would show up? But I got lucky. After just ten or fifteen minutes of waiting, a gentleman with a cane appeared who looked more or less familiar. He stopped by the door, removed his key, and opened it. 

    I approached him and said, “At last you’re here. I forgot my key. Would you let me in?” The gentleman — somewhat older — looked at me with distrust. “I live here,” I assured him. “In one of the apartments on the top floor. I’ve been walking all day. I’m very tired. I beg you, please let me in.” The gentleman nodded, opened the door for me, and stepped back so I could enter first. When I was standing in the long vestibule with its flagstones, I thanked him again, effusively. The gentleman turned left, taking the door opposite the one that led to the office with the gas, electric, and water meters. He was very kind. He opened the door to the elevator with another key and asked me if I would take it up with him. I agreed. Those of us on the top floor don’t have access to the elevator. That was a surprise. The man lived on the third floor, and from there I would only need to climb two flights of stairs to reach my room. 

    I took them very slowly, stopping for a moment on each step, inwardly cheerful, but trying to still my heart, which was pounding from the effort. I felt it racing in my chest, and I had the fleeting thought that I might die here from a heart attack before I could reach my room and my bathroom. 

    I took the last few stairs in slow motion. Whenever I placed a foot on the next one, I could hardly believe the effort required. Once I reached the attic, I breathed easier. If I had a heart attack here, I didn’t care. The people, the neighbors here, know me, they could tell the police, even Osorio, who has visited me here a few times. I took a deep breath, and when I reached the door to my room I saw the key still dangling from the door. That is to say, the keychain with the key to the front door and to my apartment. I was in a hurry that morning and had forgotten them, and there they were, where I left them. For an instant I felt happiness as the key turned in the latch, and at last, at last, I was in my room. 

    It is a tiny space full of books and papers. But very clean and orderly. I sweep and tidy up every morning before I go out for my coffee and chat with Osorio. I always make the bed and wash the sheets once a week; not the blanket, which gets washed every fifteen days. I clean the bathroom, the shower, the sink, and the toilet, every day after showering and carefully lathering myself up — especially my backside, which is always dirty because of my constant expulsions of gas. Tonight, after breaking so much wind during the day, it must be filthier than usual. 

    No sooner than I turned on the light than I looked around with satisfaction at my clean, ordered room. Then, rather agitated, I shuffled to the bathroom, where I took off my shoes and pants. It was a long operation, as I was exhausted and my heart was about to burst from my chest. 

    When I realized that I had soiled my underwear, I turned desolate. I had felt the farts, of course, but the shit surprised me. It had squeezed past my underwear and streaked my legs. I had become a man made of shit from the waist down. I was disgusted with myself. But instead of standing there like a dimwit, feeling sorry for myself on account of this minor catastrophe, I emptied all the shit into the toilet and flushed. It worked, and once the shit was gone and the toilet was pristine once again I opened the faucet and waited for the water in the shower to warm up before carefully scrubbing my legs and behind until I had made sure, ten times over, that both were impeccable. Then I washed my underwear with soap and bleach in the shower until it, too, was clean, and I hung it on the curtain rod with a couple of clothespins to dry. I toweled myself off gently, feeling ready to fall asleep and yawning constantly. 

    I went back into my room, but I didn’t bother putting on the pajamas that I keep folded under my pillow in bed. I was exhausted, but at least I had showered and washed off all that  repulsive shit that had clung to my legs for hours and hours without my knowing it. 

    I dried my hair hastily, running the towel back and forth over and over, remembering how ages ago my grandfather used to tell me that you lose your mind if you go to sleep with wet hair. When he said this the old man would bring a finger to his temple and laugh, imitating Napoleon, who apparently lost his mind in Santa Elena. That’s one of the few things I remember from my childhood, which is largely erased, apart from the memory of the happiness that I experienced until I discovered the horrible way women get pregnant and give birth to children. I was fine so long as I thought you ordered them from Paris and the stork delivered them. I don’t think I was ever happy once I found out the truth. 

    At last, I got into bed, wrapped myself in my blanket, curled up, and turned out the light. 

    Almost immediately afterward, the tachycardia set in. But it wasn’t my heart that frightened me, it was the sweat. It wasn’t hot, it was cool or even cold — it was the end of autumn, the nicest time in Madrid — and yet I was soaked with sweat. I ran my hands over my face, then a handkerchief, then the sheet, but it was pointless, because more droplets emerged from my pores and my face and neck were soaked again, along with my chest, back, and thighs. What was this? I thought I should call Osorio, but it was late and my friend usually went to bed early. What would I say to him? That I was sweating and my heart was racing? He would laugh at me. “I forgot the address to my building and I spent the whole damned day looking for it, I just got home a second ago. I washed out my shitty underwear and showered and got in bed, and now I’ve got tachycardia and I’m soaked in sweat.” Osorio would crack up and joke back: “You woke me up for this bullshit?” 

    Instead of calling him I balled up, tried to forget the sweating, brought my knees all the way to my chin, and waited for sleep to overtake me. But the pounding in my chest got worse. I had to keep my mouth open to breathe. I thought, frightened, in the darkness of my room, “Am I going to die?” Many times I had imagined that it might happen, especially recently, whenever something felt off. But I always got through it, usually after falling asleep. Now my heart was thumping like a kettledrum and I was gasping, slack-jawed, as if I couldn’t get enough air. My chest, my shoulder, and my right arm began to hurt. Should I call Osorio? Would I wake him up? I imagined hearing his mocking laugh: “Are you dying, brother?” And so I didn’t. 

    Now my left arm and shoulder hurt too, and I was sweating from head to toe. Everything ached, even my neck and back, my muscles, veins, tendons, and bones. I was sinking into something that was not sleep but unconsciousness. Was I fainting? My body began to shiver all over. And I swooned as though sinking into a whirlpool. Perhaps it was for the best. Death surprising me while I slept was a good way to go. Osorio would call me in the morning, according to our agreement, and when I didn’t pick up he would realize that I died in my sleep and would tell the ambulance to come. The paramedics would declare me dead and would take my body to my columbarium in Madrid. I would be immediately incinerated — or almost immediately, after the inevitable paperwork. The worms would already be pullulating in my body, but the fire would destroy them. 

    My chest ached. This was not a false alarm. This was the end. I wasn’t scared, only aching. I felt myself sinking into something viscous and confused, not sleep but the dawn, the anteroom of death. I was not consoled to imagine that in a few minutes — a few seconds? — I would know whether God existed, whether the soul would survive the disappearance of that bodily energy that kept my heart pounding and the blood flowing through my veins, or whether in the future there would be only silence and oblivion, a slow decomposition of the organism, until the tongues of fire extinguished the filthy, damp flesh that had already begun to rot when they burned it.