The New Statue

                                     Morning Song

    Love set you going like a fat gold watch.

    The midwife slapped your footsoles, and your bald cry

    Took its place among the elements.

     

    Our voices echo, magnifying your arrival. New statue.

    In a drafty museum, your nakedness

    Shadows our safety. We stand round blankly as walls.

     

    I’m no more your mother

    Than the cloud that distills a mirror to reflect its own slow

    Effacement at the wind’s hand.

     

    All night your moth-breath

    Flickers among the flat pink roses. I wake to listen.

    A far sea moves in my ear.

     

    One cry, and I stumble from bed, cow-heavy and floral

    In my Victorian nightgown.

    Your mouth opens clean as a cat’s. The window square

     

    Whitens and swallows its dull stars. And now you try

    Your handful of notes;

    The clear vowels rise like balloons.                                                       

    Sylvia Plath

    19 February 1961

             When my son was born, I was shocked to realize that among all the poems I knew, hardly any were about a baby or about becoming a mother. For a long time I had been accustomed to find, on almost any occasion of substance, a line of verse rising unbidden to consciousness, unerringly telling me what I was feeling. But the joyous line that had risen spontaneously and immediately at childbirth —”For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given” — was followed by no others, and an unaccustomed silence lay heavy on my mind with the absence of any resonance between my life and a poem commenting on it.

             One of the poems that I did know (remembered from childhood because my mother had quoted it) opened with a putative dialogue between a mother and her newborn baby:

     

    Where did you come from, baby dear?

    Out of the everywhere into the here.

     

    I eventually read the poem (by George MacDonald, the Victorian novelist), and while I recognized the wit in the graphic decline of the enormous invisible “everywhere” into the diminished visible “here,” as a whole the fantasy was too sentimental for me:

    Feet, whence did you come, you darling things?

    From the same box as the cherubs’ wings.

     

    I flinched at that as I did at Mother’s Day cards.

             When, as an adult, I read Blake’s Songs of Experience, I at last found (in “Infant Sorrow”) a newborn baby speaking credibly of its own birth-agony. Outraged by its forced eruption from warm amniotic comfort into an unfamiliar and chilling world, and rebelling against both its restrictive swaddling clothes and its father’s constraining arms, the helpless baby screams cries unintelligible to the horrified parents, who wonder what demonic force is obscured behind the cloud of their struggling infant’s flesh. The exhausted baby, in its first intellectual moment, thinks it best to retreat into a silent sulk:

    My mother groaned! my father wept.

    Into the dangerous world I leapt:

    Helpless, naked, piping loud;

    Like a fiend hid in a cloud.

     

    Struggling in my father’s hands:

    Striving against my swaddling bands:

    Bound and weary I thought best

    To sulk upon my mother’s breast.

    A poet — imagining the words a terrified newborn might shriek if it had languageexposes the pieties of the usual “baby poem.” A fierce empathy with the baby’s sufferings at birth prompted Blake’s glimpse here into the disillusioned state he called “Experience,” while his earlier “Infant Joy” (from the Songs of Innocence) screened out the real baby, entering instead into the new mother’s projection (onto her actually silent baby) of her own self-absorbed joy. The mother’s fantasy that her infant (the Latin infans means “unable to speak”) begins life by complaining of its lack of a name prompts, with exquisite reciprocity, her own mirroring response: “What shall I call thee?” The baby declares that its name is “Joy,” and the mother, completing the circuit of dialogue, utters a blessing: “Sweet joy befall thee!” As the dialogue opens, the baby speaks first :

    I have no name

    I am but two days old.—

    What shall I call thee?

    I happy am

    Joy is my name,—

    Sweet joy befall thee!

    The whole second stanza belongs to the mother, as she ecstatically reinforces (with “pretty” and “sweet”) the exclusive symbiotic delight of shared harmonic naming-and-echoing. The baby smiles while the joyful mother sings, and her repetition of the sixth line is no longer a wish but a concurrent fact, confirmed by the song, the smile, and the closing period:

    Pretty joy!

    Sweet joy but two days old,

    Sweet joy I call thee;

    Thou dost smile, 

    I sing the while

    Sweet joy befall thee.

    The ecstatic narcissism of this (imagined) dialogue is surreally critiqued by Blake in “Infant Sorrow.” The “experienced” mother — disabused of her naive girlish image of a loving dialogue with her child — is groaning in her birth-pains, the father is weeping in alarm, and the baby is furious.

    These were to me real poems, confronting both the “innocent” virginal fantasy of purely joyful motherhood and the dark trauma of experience — both equally human, both requiring acknowledgment, both known to any sheltered girl who has become a mother. 

                           

              And so, when I first saw Sylvia Plath’s “Morning Song,” her narrative of how a clueless young wife gradually becomes able to love her infant, I felt astonished relief. A modern poet had at last told the story of her gradual initiation into motherhood. As “Morning Song” opens, a couple stand awkwardly around their newborn baby, conceived in love but now an unfamiliar stranger to its parents. Petrified by anxiety into immobile “statues,” the couple fear what they may have done in admitting a “new statue” into their uneasy “museum.” The house is now merely the curator of its own past, a museum of former selves, unable to conceive of a future with this unfathomable inhabitant. The naked creature intrudes into the scene by making an unfamiliar animal sound, while the parents, in joint unease, echo and magnify, with their adult voices, the infant’s inarticulate cry. 

             Plath’s wonderfully unexpected third stanza expresses, in its peculiarly slow and evolving syntax, the mother’s gradual perception-by-negatives of her new state: “I’m no more your mother than. …” The husband and the collective “we” vanish permanently from the scene, leaving the wife, a single “I,” to clarify her relation to the child she addresses. Unable as yet to conceive of that relation in human terms, she resorts instead, in the pivot of the poem, to the vague climatic terms of cloud and wind. She progresses haltingly to acknowledge that in giving birth she has signed the warrant for her own eventual death, her literal “effacement.” The sentence (which at first almost defeats understanding) offers each halting realization slowly, each segment suppressing the realms of animal and vegetable to become purely mineral, each segment answering an unpredictable question that itself stems from the words just uttered and issues in an unpredictable answer generating yet another question:

    “I’m no more your mother than”—

      than what? 

    “than the cloud that”—

    that does what? 

    “distils”—

    distils what? 

    “a mirror to”—

    to do what? 

    “to reflect”—

    what? 

    “its own slow”—

    slow what? 

    “effacement at”—

    at what? 

    “at the wind’s”—

    the wind’s what? 

    “hand.”

    As the new mother stumbles along the corridors of this intellectual labyrinth, every expected “natural” foresight in pregnancy of what motherhood has to offer (love, curiosity, nursing, “baby-talk”) is subtracted; the self-effacement becomes increasingly inorganic, un-mammalian. The syntax of this tercet, so peculiar and arresting, displays Plath’s talent for saying something — “I don’t know where this experience is leading me” — without making the statement explicit. It mimics, in its pacing, the experience itself. A comparable thought-process precedes each of Plath’s powerful words in this late phase: “What is it in this phenomenon that makes me call it ‘drafty’? What makes it a ‘museum’?”   

    The second half of “Morning Song” takes place some weeks later. The baby has been put to bed, and the maternal ritual of the first sleep-deprived months has begun. The new mother, awakened in the middle of the night by the child’s demanding cry (so aggressively different from its soft breathing in sleep), hastens to transfer the baby and its noise into another room. There, while she nurses the child in solitude, the day slowly dawns at the windowpane. Plath, by her title inserting the time of day into the poem, is transforming a known genre. The traditional “morning song” — an aubade, from the French aube, dawn — shows two lovers in bed, regretting the arrival of the sun (as in Donne’s “The Sun Rising”). The baby’s open-mouthed hunger-cry modulates over time, as it nurses, into musical cooings of satisfaction, repeated like the notes of a melody. In her startled recognition that the small foreign animal in her arms is now emitting not merely sounds but syllables (vowels and consonants linked into the first phonemes, “ma-ma”), the elated young mother comes to feel that in its possession of even rudimentary language, her baby is another human being like herself. Her spirits rise with the baby’s rising notes, and the atmosphere becomes one of festivity, with imaginary birthday balloons.

    And that is the plot, a relatively bare one (sketched almost a year after Plath’s baby was born), of the speaker’s gradual transformation from wife into mother. As the poem opens, the wife (with her husband in attendance) is in her bed at home as the baby is born; she feels for the first time the clash between her former idealizing simile of conception and pregnancy (that love had set in motion a “fat gold watch” inaugurating a golden time) — and the jarrings of childbirth, the midwife’s slap and a naked cry. The cry is shockingly perceived as repellently “bald,” unadorned, featureless, intimidating. The speaker and her husband fuse to a single “we” at the birth-moment against the baby “you.” But in the second half of the poem, the wife leaves the marital bed for the nursing of the child; she becomes (and remains) a single “I,” and the husband does not reappear. The marital duo has ceded (at least temporarily) to the maternal one.

    Plath was a terribly hard-working poet from her teen years on (as evidenced by her technically fully articulated, if still mostly formulaic, juvenilia). Very early, she had formulated a fully conventional idea of a happy life: she would be a gifted and sexual wife to an exceptional and universally admired husband, and would give birth to many babies (always imagined as babies rather than as children). After her marriage, as soon as she was attempting pregnancy, she raced to find independent imaginative forms for that envisaged life, many of them invented to express in both themes and styles a new, rich, and relatively untreated poetic enterprise: motherhood. 

    A full year before she had her first child, Plath wrote a single-stanza nine-line (for nine-month) poem entitled “Metaphors,” comparing (too archly) the pregnant body to a playful set of equivalents. Each of the nine lines of “Metaphors” has nine syllables, presenting ill-assorted and jesting definitions of the swelling body and its ultimate direction. The pregnant first-person speaker is “an elephant, a ponderous house,” and, ridiculously, “A melon strolling on two tendrils.” The last metaphors initiate pregnancy’s dangerous momentum: “I’ve eaten a bag of green apples, / Boarded the train there’s no getting off.” Too self-conscious and effortful in its casting around for whimsical metaphors, the poem nonetheless is anticipating more work ahead to illuminate motherhood. Less than two months before her child was born, Plath rewrote “Metaphors” into “You’re,” doubling its size into two stanzas of nine nine-syllabled lines addressed to her fetus (but with the same disorienting overplus of description). One moment the fetus is “gilled like a fish,” at another it becomes “my little loaf,” at yet another, it reverts to “our traveled prawn,” before ultimately becoming “A clean slate.” “Metaphors” and “You’re,” with their incoherence of imagery and artificiality of tone, cannot become interesting poems. A better poem, “Mushrooms,” written halfway through pregnancy, did not attempt an individuated embryo, gilled or baked or traveled: instead, it imagines an undifferentiated chorus of half-formed fetuses masquerading metaphorically as speaking mushrooms. They push up irresistibly through loam to air, uttering in tercets (often an “incomplete” form by comparison to couplets or quatrains), their compact two-beat threats of eventual victory:

    Overnight, very

    Whitely, discreetly,

    Very quietly,

     

    Our toes, our noses

    Take hold on the loam,

    Acquire the air.

    Like fetuses, they require no external feeding: “We // Diet on water, / On crumbs of shadow.” Although they are initially “meek,” they become “nudgers and shovers / In spite of ourselves,” propelled by genetic force:

    We shall by morning

    Inherit the earth. 

    Our foot’s in the door.

    “Mushrooms” convinces on its own terms, not presuming on the “human” personality or individuality of the fetus, but aware that it is unstoppable in its arrival.

             It will not be surprising to any reader of Plath that her youthful imagination, long before it was alerted to pregnancy, had specialized in disastrous outcomes (see her doomsday poems in the Juvenilia). Now, with a focus not global but personal, the dooms become biological. The anxiety felt during pregnancy by any mother is displaced, in “Stillborn,” onto the writing of poems, as Plath, a few months into motherhood, finds yet another seam opening in possible biological sources of poetry. But the elegy for the stillborn embodies none of the grief a mother would feel when her expected child does not survive. When unsuccessful poems become fetuses in formaldehyde, Plath’s brittleness offers a derisive grotesquerie:

    These poems do not live: it’s a sad diagnosis.

      . . .

    O I cannot understand what happened to them!

    They are proper in shape and number and every part

    They sit so nicely in the pickling fluid!

             Plath never ceased to explore motherhood, in many poems evoking maternal joy even in tragic contexts. Before I return to that joy, it must be conceded that tragedy had the ultimate victory, and so I glance ahead here to her final visual tableau of maternity, “Edge.” It opens with a posthumous tomb-sculpture of a mother and two children, but its second tableau softens to recount the slow hemorrhaging of still-living garden flowers. It is austere in its conviction of the conceptual finality of death, but surprisingly lavish in its gradual farewell to the young bodies of the children. As always in her best poems, Plath’s investigation of a topic has both intellectual weight and emotional resonance. In “Edge,” the objective, intellectually accurate, immobility of marble “motherhood” co-exists with the lamenting heart’s mimicry of the gradual dissolution of the body. The chill of the sepulchral group (conveyed in the third person: “The woman is dead”) coexists with the weeping sounds of mourning: “odours bleed / From the sweet, deep throats of the night flower.” In a bold move, Plath diminishes her multiple dying flowers to a single one, but the single flower, remembering its past companions, bleeds from multiple throats. Motherhood both is (in sculpture) and is not (in life) eternal. 

             As “Edge” closes, the spectator looks upward and says, of the indifferent moon, that in the long view of history, “She is used to this sort of thing.” Of course she is; history is one long bloodbath. But Plath being Plath, fact and intellect, compelling as they are, are not allotted the last word of the grave-garden. As the spectator looks up from earth, the moon, humanized, becomes visible as a skeletal hood of bone. But Plath insists on making the moon audible as well, and creates a cold flat music for her witch-cloak: “Her blacks crackle and drag.” Plath could not envisage her own death except by making the tomb-sculpture include her children; unless she had her two children with her, she would not be the person she is, but some past self long relinquished. Motherhood is preserved, even after death. “Edge” is an irreproachable poem, but because it memorializes her deathbed self, it belongs thematically with Plath’s meditations on death rather than with her poems on living motherhood.

    So I turn back here to my central topic — how motherhood allowed Plath to invent a poetics of motherhood — situations, elements, analogies, feelings — and to write sane and joyous poems about and to her children. Although she was never a religious believer, her interest in imaginative emblems of motherhood inevitably led her into the territory of the Christian Nativity myth. The birth of Christ to Mary offered Plath temptations to sharp modern contrasts, of which the most amusing is Plath’s playful lyric in which the Magi come to the wrong address. Yeats’ magisterial poem “The Magi” might have daunted any successor from appropriating that title, but Plath was bold enough to call her poem, too, “The Magi.” Yeats’ solemn portrayal of “unsatisfied” Magi compelled to return from Calvary to “The uncontrollable mystery on the bestial floor” is comically repudiated in Plath’s re-imagining of the encounter of a baby girl with such would-be male sponsors.

             The scholarly Magi, guided by a moving star, journeyed to greet the Second Person — the Son — of the Holy Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Plath’s irony and humorous skepticism mock the idea of wise old men as the best company for a newborn baby. Instead of the biblical gold, frankincense, and myrrh, modern male sponsors in our rational era would bring as gifts to the cradle the Platonic Triad of abstractions: “The Good,” “The True,” and “The Beautiful.” Such philosophical sponsors are a two-dimensional sort of “papery godfolk” who have followed the wrong star to the wrong crib. Because they are looking for a rationalist God, a “lamp-headed Plato,” Plath waves them away airily: “What girl ever flourished in such company?” She does not suggest what “company” her baby girl might thrive in. She certainly would need better patrons than the “disquieting Muses” of Plath’s own christening, or the star-followers of the Christian story, or the rationalist world’s bearers of the Platonic triad. No invented modern benefactors can fill the gaping absence, and Plath’s closing flippancy, though memorable, cannot conceal the lack of suitable protective elders for the modern female baby. 

             It took a miscarriage and almost a full year of living with her first child to enable Plath to write “Morning Song” for her second. It has many virtues: it does not fall into the sterile unlived jokes of “Metaphors” nor into the uneasy repetitions in “You’re”; it doesn’t impose the Gothic gloom of bottled babies in “Stillborn”; it restrains itself from repeating either reverent biblical mythology or the frustration of Yeats’ Magi. Its discipline continues the purity of “Mushrooms,” in which, by pluralizing her fetus and reducing it in category from mammal to vegetable, Plath could create an apprehension of threatening organic growth without imposing on her invisible fetus a humanity not yet perceivable. “Morning Song” has the inevitability of birth-momentum — what will happen next once a child is born but lets the child remain ungendered and unnamed, only a step — one could say — from its fetus-existence.

             “Morning Song” hints immediately at biological momentum: the “new statue” utters a “bald cry” — unlovely, unsettling, and insistent, and the first sign of the mother’s response to her child is unnervingly intellectual, non-human, as abstract as wind and cloud. That relation, not yet humanized, has its own ongoing momentum, as distillation effects effacement. Surely this is the most detached portrait of motherhood in literature. Without the strangeness of its first three stanzas, “Morning Song” could not have gained the measured steps into love by which it progresses, never putting a foot wrong in its steady pace.

             Just as ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny in “You’re” (in which the fetus has gills as it goes about becoming human), so motherhood in “Morning Song” begins its metaphors for the baby in the strange realm of a remote insect-species as the child produces its “moth-breath.” (Alliteration at the end of a word rather than the beginning —moth/breath” — although almost invisible, is one sound-connection that often gives Plath’s poetry an unusual texture.) At the next level of being, the new statue has now advanced in species from insect to animal, uttering an urgent cry from a mouth like a cat’s; the cry produces a companion animal, a “cow-heavy” lactating mother. The mother’s swift removal of the child and herself into another room takes a further step — the grounding of the “I” of the mother in a physiological function, nursing that is impossible to the male. The collective “we” of the couple never returns after the double establishment of the female “I” — first in the abstract terms of “I’m no more your mother” and secondly in the down-to-earth self-description by the young woman: “One cry, and I stumble from bed, cow-heavy.” The inalterable momentum of the cosmos (the cloud, the effacing wind) creates the rising dawn that “swallows” the night stars, past selves, as they dull after the irrevocable change of motherhood. The penultimate moment of the poem — in which the child, choosing its “notes,” becomes a human creature of intentional melody — arrives prefaced by the traditional “Et iam” remembered from the Latin poets, the “And now” that lifts an ongoing temporal curve into the present. Plath may be remembering Keats’ closing of his autumn ode: 

                                                 And now

    The redbreast whistles from a garden-croft,

    And gathering swallows twitter in the skies.

    The completeness implied in the conventional end-point — “And now” — wraps mother and baby and reader in the ecstatic moment in which the baby becomes human, the mother perceives the first sign of communication, and the reader feels the lift of the mother’s imagined balloons.

             It was the impeccable constancy of pace that moved me when I first read “Morning Song”: everything now on its way, the sequence of phases confident, the ending happy — not triumphant like the victory of those mushroom-invaders, but mutual, intelligible, reassuring. Later, as I saw further into the poem, its shadows troubled me: the permanent vanishing of the husband; the disappearance of the marital “we” in favor of the maternal “I”; the severe apprehension of personal effacement by the very decision to give birth; the permanence of universal natural “elements” of inorganic and organic existence (cloud, wind, birth, cry, nourishment, mind, death) within the swift transience of a single life from birth to the sepulcher; the conceptual incompatibility of abstractions (cloud, mirror, wind) and individuals (mother and infant).       

    My first emotional and structural responses to “Morning Song” did not yet admit me into Plath’s subtlety of sound, her claim on our subliminal response to the phonetic transfusion of the poem even as we gather the plot, the architecture, the pacing, and climax (or climaxes) as we traverse it. I hadn’t at first seen that the “moth-breath” was so styled because it reproduced part of the word “mother,” or that “mirror” echoed “mother” in rhythm and length as well as in sound. “Midwife,” “mother,” and “mirror,” all trochees (with stressed / unstressed rhythms), fit together as a birth-trinity; the cosmic wind’s invisible “hand” condenses itself into the audible “handful” of notes. Even the changes of agent in the closing lines make a container for the reader’s sense of closing events. We look in different directions — north, south, east, west — as the human gives way to the non-human: the organic dyad of mother and baby disappears into the inorganic dyad of window and dawn; the organic living body of the child produces the inorganic “notes” and “vowels.” Only a very flexible mind can hold in a single instant a whitening window swallowing stars, a baby’s proffering of melodic notes, and a mother’s vision of phonemic sound-balloons defined by their vowels. The “thickness” of such coalescences gives weight and solidity to Plath’s conclusion, bestows on the “new statue” an earned animation, and prompts in the new mother an awakening of love.

             Plath’s meditations on motherhood continue to deepen, enabling the reach and success of “Parliament Hill Fields,” a poem written when Plath suffered a miscarriage less than a year after her daughter Frieda’s birth. For the poem, Plath invents a yes-no structure replicating the existence/nonexistence of the fetus as it bleeds out, and replicating the movement of thought as well, as it returns repeatedly to a trauma. She interrupts her verse-narrative in this way with sad but stoic addresses to the never-to-be-known fetus:

    Your absence is inconspicuous;

    Nobody can tell what I lack. 

    . . . 

    I suppose it’s pointless to think of you at all.

    Already your doll grip lets go.

    . . . .

    Your cry fades like the cry of a gnat.

    I lose sight of you on your blind journey.

     

    The day empties its images

     Like a cup or a room.

    The day discards its hopes as the womb discards its burden. For consolation, Plath reminds herself that she has a living daughter at home, and summons up, as she walks, the glow-in-the-dark picture on the nursery wall. One by one, in her imagination, the objects in the picture begin to reveal their colors, but as Plath tries to install haloed angel-presences, each image collapses into transparent falsity; each “Blue shrub behind the glass / / Exhales an indigo nimbus, / A sort of cellophane balloon.” She returns home apprehensively: “The old dregs, the old difficulties take me to wife.” 

             It was only a week after that depressed requiem for a miscarriage that Plath turned to the past and wrote “Morning Song” for comfort, but its closing joy took on weight, I believe, through her continuing sorrow over the lost pregnancy. The instability of her mood is such that two days after writing “Morning Song” (February 19), Plath’s mind, meditating on motherhood, raises two unnerving specters: she composes “Barren Woman” (February 21) reflecting her fear of infertility, and its parallel “Heavy Women” (February 26) about disillusion after childbirth. The pregnant women “Smiling to themselves” and “beautifully smug” await birth in an ominous landscape where “the axle of winter / Grinds round, bearing down with the straw, / The star, the wise gray men.” “Bearing down,” the women will experience grinding tragedy as an inevitable consequence of giving birth. 

             Plath had thought that her life would offer, as sources of joy, the rich aesthetic stimuli of conception, pregnancy, and motherhood, and after her miscarriage her imagination clung to those stimuli even as suicide (presided over by a funereal yew-tree and a moon “with the O-gape of complete despair”) rises into competition with them.

     

              Although it is true that Plath’s suicidal depression and the violent poems that it produced won her fame, the tragic evidence of her mental illness has so dominated anthologies that her efforts to record and express joy tend to recede out of sight. Except for “Morning Song,” the selections from Plath’s poetry in The Norton Anthology of Poetry introduce readers solely to the grim Plath, each poem bearing its portrait of ruin: 

    “I crawl like an ant in mourning” (“The Colossus”);

    “The tulips should be behind bars, like dangerous animals” (“Tulips”); 

    “I have suffered the atrocity of sunsets” (“Elm”); 

    “If I’ve killed one man, I’ve killed two–” (“Daddy”); 

    “The dew that flies / Suicidal,” (“Ariel”);

    “I rise with my red hair / And I eat men like air” (“Lady Lazarus”).

    But as Plath, with her acute ear, completed and disciplined experience into form, the work of analysis permitted her an impersonal joy in creation that inspires even in her tragic poems an inescapable vitality. Even when Plath cannot maintain her joy in motherhood, even when a menacing darkness encroaches upon the child, the initial hope and joy appear and reappear in Plath’s lines.

    “Nick and the Candlestick” begins in a sunless underground cave, lit by a single candle. We see Plath transform the hellish cave into a place beautiful enough to house her beloved new child, Nicholas. The vowel-sound of the word “love,” touch by touch, (“Love, love,” “hung,” “rugs,” “of”) decorates the space of the poem, while alliterations (“roses,” “rugs,” “[Victo-]riana”) link the images: 

    Love, love,

    I have hung our cave with roses,

    With soft rugs–

     

    The last of Victoriana.

    Excoriating “the mercuric / Atoms that cripple,” Plath confirms to her son the cosmic new era produced by his birth:

    You are the one

    Solid the spaces lean on, envious.

    You are the baby in the barn.

    Still, the secularized parallel with the birth of Christ weakens, rather than strengthens, the poem. To demonstrate the inspiration that Plath found when she turned her gaze to motherhood (as well as her anticipatory guilt as she planned her death), there is no better illustration than “Child,” where even her hyperboles turn tranquil:

    Your clear eye is the one absolutely beautiful thing.

    I want to fill it with color and ducks,

    The zoo of the new

     

    Whose names you meditate–

    April snowdrop, Indian pipe,

    Little

     

    Stalk without wrinkle,

    Pool in which images

    Should be grand and classical

     

    Not this troublous

    Wringing of hands, this dark

    Ceiling without a star.

    Plath could include the joy of “Child” at the same time as she was foretelling her death in “Edge.” The longer she lived, the more inextricable the alternate truths became.

             There were, and are, many difficulties in inventing poems transmitting the labile emotions surrounding the birth of children. As Plath’s efforts suggest, it is hardest of all to attach poems to pregnancy when it is uneventful: while the cells are merely multiplying, no intellectual cause wakes the imagination. When Plath treats only the physiological events, the poems (“Metaphors,” for example) are unfruitful; as soon as there is an emotional event (a miscarriage, say) the poems reach fullness and credibility. Since so much of the biology of fertility is routine, biology alone cannot provide subjects for poems. Lived responses to motherhood — because there is so little access to them in the poetry of the past, and because biology itself seemed fatally governed by that indifferent moon of the impersonal universe — have not been easy to galvanize into poetry. But Plath had courage: even when life seemed meaningless, she actively sought out new genres of childbirth and motherhood (a miscarriage poem, a Thalidomide poem, a posthumous poem).

             What medicine had to offer Plath — electroshock, inefficient medications, “talk-therapy” — was too little. (A few years after Plath’s death, Robert Lowell began treatment with lithium, which, for all its drawbacks, enabled him to live.) Plath, who studied with Lowell, admitted her debt to his autobiographical Life Studies, but their styles distinguished them — his, ever more forcefully adjectival and “plotted,” hers, more surreal and fanciful and excited (she had a weakness for exclamation marks, which she vigorously deleted in revision). “To add to the stock of available reality” — R.P. Blackmur’s definition of the purpose of art — requires the day-by-day courage to devise an individual style, which issues from a strongly individual sensibility inseparable from a desire to play with language. (Pound defined poetry as “the dance of the intellect among words”). In Plath’s Unabridged Journals, published in 2000, thirty-seven years after her death, we follow, with pity and confusion, the incessant nightmares and tormenting emotions of an incurable patient hurled hither and yon by episodes of insanity. But from those chaotic journal pages, Plath somehow, by a perfectionism of instinct and intellect, drew her painstaking and commanding map of madness — madness disciplined, made strikingly euphonious, rhythmic, plotted, and controlled. 

    In the Journals during periods of illness, she is baffled, hysterical, malicious, vengeful, paranoid, frightened, self-loathing, and lonely beyond belief; and on the other hand, at her less anguished moments she is boastful, idealistic, hard-working, vain, self-congratulatory, self-sacrificing, resolute, and — in her best and sanest moods —  tender, kind, and loving. She had an eye that noticed the smallest details of life, and her poems of motherhood are full of them: who else would say of motherhood (as she does in “Thalidomide”): “All night I carpenter //A space for the thing I am given, /A love // Of two wet eyes and a screech.” In her poems of motherhood, her highly-colored lines strive constantly for truth, irony, comedy, and wit before they are bleached out by death.

    The paucity of convincing poems about motherhood remains evident. Few people are educated to the level needed to write original verse. (Most of the great English lyrics came from writers who knew several languages, usually including Latin, were beset by imagination, had a keen sense of poetic genres, were delighted by etymology, had read hundreds of fine poems and knew many of those by heart, and possessed an instinctive ear for cadence. The autodidacts — Clare and Blake in England, Whitman and Dickinson in America — taught themselves by reading intensely, not least the Bible and Shakespeare, and often by loving another art, see Whitman on “the trained soprano” and Dickinson on “The fascinating chill that music leaves.”) Few women writers become mothers; and too few mothers have the time, energy, money, and talent to write works of genius. Successful women writers have been, for the most part, single, protected, and rich. Too late for the eras of patronage and too early for reliable birth control, many talented women gave up creative hopes. 

    Plath did have a patron — a wealthy woman novelist named Olive Higgins Prouty — and she grew up in a house full of books, the child of two teachers. But the familial heritage of depression proved a lethal one. Plath’s father Otto refused for four years to be examined or treated for an illness that he insisted was lung cancer but that was actually treatable diabetes; Sylvia, by her own account, felt that she died when her father did, and first attempted suicide (almost successfully) at nineteen, then gassed herself at thirty-one; and her son Nicholas — “the baby in the barn” — after years of depression, hanged himself at forty-seven. The darkness finally defeated, too early, the gifts even of this first adequate and observant poet of motherhood. 

     

    The Metaphysician-in-Chief

    On February 22, 1990, Vaclav Havel spoke to a joint session of the United States Congress as the newly elected president of a free Czechoslovakia. Just a few months earlier, he had been detained (the last in a long line of arrests) by the StB, his country’s infamous secret police; he said he didn’t know whether he would be going to jail “for two days or two years.” But a mere three weeks later, as the satellites of the Soviet Union began to topple, overwhelming demonstrations throughout the country forced the Communist Party to agree to the first genuine elections since the Soviet-backed coup in 1948. Nearly two months to the day of his last arrest, Havel emerged as the only viable candidate for the presidency, and was rhapsodically elected on December 29, 1989, with a level of consensus unseen since Washington.

    As a playwright, a philosopher, an essayist, and one of the eminent adversaries of his country’s regime, Havel initially regarded his election as “an absurd joke.” (Philip Roth privately described it as Josef K. making it to the Castle.) And Havel was not the only one: Michael Žantovský (known for his translations of James Baldwin, Norman Mailer, and Joseph Heller) was elected to the Senate; Eda Kriseová (a journalist and short story writer) became one of Havel’s key advisors; and Jaroslav Kořán (who helped introduce the works of Henry Miller and Charles Bukowski into the Czech language) was elected the mayor of Prague. Never before or since had so many literary intellectuals found themselves in the house of power. Indeed, at the time of Havel’s address in 1990, the reality of Czech politics seemed to be almost the stuff of satire, befitting the sense of irony that had proved such an effective weapon against totalitarianism for nearly half a century.

    This showed itself in the language that Havel used in his speech to Congress, in which he spoke in terms that were utterly foreign to American politics and its everlasting anti-intellectualism. He stood before the assembled politicians and declared that “consciousness precedes being” — a line that weirdly received enthusiastic applause. It was classic Havel: the Goethe of government, the Metaphysician-in-Chief, addressing not just the state of the nation, but the state of the soul. I am reminded of the title character in Saul Bellow’s Humboldt’s Gift, who riffs on the candidacy of Adlai Stevenson (an image of Aristotle’s “great-souled man”), hoping that he will bring about an administration in which poets will be consulted for foreign policy and cabinet members will cite Joyce in their deliberations.

    Havel was frequently referred to as a “Philosopher King,” though almost never with the acknowledgement that this is, in fact, a smirking term, an oxymoron that denotes one of the oldest problems in Western thought: the inherent conflict between truth and power. Plato concocted a utopian and essentially satirical (which is not to say unserious) exercise to try to deal with this problem. The conclusion of this exercise was that philosophers were ultimately unfit for power, because the pursuit of truth — which is all too easily corrupted — is imperiled by politics, with its deceptions and duplicities. The joke that closes The Republic is that we should sooner expect kings to become philosophers than philosophers to become kings. And this “joke” was precisely the moral and philosophical challenge that confronted Havel the moment he went from being a dissident whose mantra was that one should always strive to “live in truth” to being the first democratically elected president of his country in over four decades. 

    Before 1989, Havel had lived his life in opposition, in what Hegel called “the labor of the negative.” But when this labor suddenly finds itself in the positive — becoming constructive rather than deconstructive — what is the dissident to do? Havel’s trajectory broaches the most fundamental questions about morality and power. Is morality enough for governance? Is compromise, which is the heart of democratic politics, an ethical defeat? How much realism can the moral man stomach? Do high ends require equally high means? Were Vaclav Havel’s ideas, which he forged as a rebel, compatible with the responsibilities of power? Did they prepare him adequately to rule?

    In many ways, Havel’s ascension was a real-life dramatization of a tension that had always existed in his thought: the uneasy relationship between an acute sense of irony (what Czesław Miłosz called “the glory of slaves”) and an often impossible moral seriousness. Generally, this is a tension that afflicts the oppressed: the acknowledgement of irony is one of the key resources of the disempowered, whereas the empowered, while fully outfitted with irony, are routinely disabled from acknowledging it. (Irony is incompatible with the solemnity, not to mention the majesty, of office.) Acutely conscious of this, Havel spent much of his early years as president attempting to qualify his new position. In Summer Meditations, written in 1991 on the eve of his reelection, he insisted that a person of his experience is not only suited to politics but destined for it, as long as they maintain good instincts and good taste: “The sine qua non of a politician is not the ability to lie; he need only be sensitive and know when, what, to whom, and how to say what he has to say.” But this must be contrasted with what Havel had written only a few years earlier, in 1985, as a dispossessed citizen in “The Anatomy of Reticence”:

    A dissident runs the risk of becoming ridiculous only when he transgresses the limits of his natural existence and enters into the hypothetical realm of real power… Here he accepts the perspective of real power without having any genuine power… he leaves the world of service to truth and attempts to smuggle his truth into the world of service to power without being able or even willing to serve it himself.

    Plato could not have said it better. And yet this reluctance to seek power turns out to be one of the better measures of a person’s fitness for it — as ambition itself is suspect, and a capacity for self-doubt is surely preferable to none at all. (In more recent decades, of course, and certainly in America, ambition has lost the odium that was attached to it, and perhaps for the better.) The question that Havel’s purist position raises, ultimately, is whether the intellectual’s role in society is necessarily an adversarial one, whether the intellectual can acquire power and exercise it without betraying his vocation or the truth. 

    From his biography we know that Havel had never demonstrated any visible ambition for power, and that he was acutely aware of its toxic effects on the psyche. He was also, by all accounts, undestined for leadership, being not especially gifted with charisma, oratorical power, or bureaucratic savvy. Nor is there much evidence to suggest that he was ever motivated by a sense of vanity — that he wished to be seen as a martyr, or as a symbol of his country’s triumph over totalitarianism. Havel could have easily remained in an adversarial role for the rest of his life, scribbling implacably and leaving plays and essays for posterity. But like so many of his contemporaries, he was conscripted into a political life. This is a boomerang of totalitarianism’s own making: in seeking to abolish private life, it makes an apolitical life impossible. 

    Vaclav Havel was born in Prague in 1936, which means that he was two years old at the time of the Munich Agreement and the Nazi annexation of the Sudetenland; and six when Reinhard Heydrich was assassinated in the streets of Prague by a secret Czechoslovak paratroop unit; and twelve at the time of the communist coup (“Victorious February”), which saw his family’s property confiscated and transferred to the state. The Havels were a landed family, known for their real estate and their presence in the film industry, and provided a prominent image of prosperity in a new era of national independence: a cultured and conscious noblesse, modeled by Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, the founding father of the First Czechoslovak Republic, which lasted from 1918 to 1938, and one of the central influences on Havel’s political philosophy. Masaryk, himself a Philosopher President, studied phenomenology with Husserl and taught at Charles University in Prague before becoming a member of the Austro-Hungarian parliament in Vienna. Masaryk was an Enlightenment humanist, devoted to the principles of liberal democracy and the right to self-determination. As a politician, Havel frequently located himself in this tradition and the republican values that he believed ran deep in the national psyche.

    Branded a “bourgeois element” by the communist authorities, Havel’s class background disabled him from attending any academic gymnasium or studying the humanities. He almost certainly received a good education at home, but he was by all accounts an autodidact. After dropping out of a technical university in his early twenties, he began working at the Theatre on Balustrade, one of the few creative avenues open to him in the early 1960s, when the political culture in Czechoslovakia began to thaw. In 1963, his first (and still his finest) play, The Garden Party, was performed. The play is a satire on the insanities — and the inanities — of communist bureaucracy, and the absurdities of language in which its characters find themselves trapped (unknowingly) in cyclical deliberations, which allow them to speak only in party-line platitudes. 

    Crucially, The Garden Party exploits the intrinsic connection between linguistic manipulation and political manipulation, mocking the socialist langue de bois and showing how the “ritualization of language” leads to the ritualization of thought. Like much of Havel’s work, it dramatizes the menace of banality, and reminds us that one of the many tyrannies of totalitarianism is the tyranny of cliché. We also see — in this regard Havel is the heir to Kafka and Hašek — the existential dread that comes from being trapped within a system, which can only be undermined by replicating the features of that system, thus reinforcing (and making oneself complicit in) one’s own alienation, something that Havel would attempt to break out of in his own life, in what he described as a search for an “absolute and universal system of coordinates.”

    Czech politics in the 1960s turned out to be strangely literary. The same year in which The Garden Party premiered, the Czechoslovak Writers Union organized a symposium to discuss Kafka’s work for the first time since it had been banned as “decadent anti-realism” during the Stalinist period. The symposium is now widely cited as the opening shot of the Prague Spring. Since it was met with no retaliation, the Writers Union convened again every year, and in 1967 it decided to air its grievances with the regime, an event that assisted in the ascension to power of Alexander Dubček, whose democratic reforms set out to create “socialism with a human face.” (Before too long Soviet troops put an end to that fantasy.) Havel was not in the forefront of the Prague Spring. His activities in 1968 were mostly rearguard, and he was already displaying a non-partisan, anti-ideological approach, in contrast to his contemporaries, who were largely on the side of reform communism. He nonetheless penned an eloquent essay titled “On the Theme of Opposition,” in which he argued for creating a second political party instead of hoping for transformation within the communist bureaucracy. 

    Havel’s real entry into political life came in the 1970s, the era odiously known as “normalization.” In 1977, he and several other Czech intellectuals in the Committee to Defend the Unjustly Prosecuted, known as VONS, momentously published “Charter 77.” Written in response to the trial of the (truly) underground psychedelic rock band, The Plastic People of the Universe, it was less a declaration than a reminder of human rights, which the Czechoslovak Communist Party had agreed to uphold at the Helsinki Accords in 1975. The Charter pointed out that any in Czechoslovakia existence of human rights, or a “freedom from fear,” was “purely illusory.” The extent to which these rights existed was “regrettably, on paper alone,” and the regular harassment of citizens––not for openly opposing party ideology––but merely holding opinions that differed from it, constituted “a virtual apartheid.” Havel would be imprisoned for nearly four years for his role in helping to draft the Charter, which would circulate as samizdat until the revolution, by then accumulating thousands of signatures. 

    Another of the Charter’s signatories was the philosopher Jan Patočka, who had studied with Husserl and Heidegger and had written extensively on Plato, Aristotle, and Masaryk. Patočka’s existential phenomenology, which heavily influenced Havel, was based on the very Hegelian notion that history is the process of overcoming alienation, and that “authenticity” comes from engaging in “truth-revealing” activities, which liberate the mind from the technological and political currents of the “everyday” world. Importantly, the phenomenological standpoint intuited a connection between the utilitarian and the totalitarian, in regarding an unspeculative, mechanized life as essentially tyrannous, and its emphasis on personal responsibility constituted a direct threat to state ideology, as it did to the whole “system” of anonymous, depersonalized power.

    Patočka, who was nearly seventy, was subjected to many lengthy police interrogations for his role in the Charter. These sessions were so stressful that he was eventually admitted to the hospital for chest pains, where he died within a week, in March 1977, of a cerebral hemorrhage. But not before firing off two extraordinary essays. One of these was “The Obligation to Resist Injustice,” which appealed to “a higher authority, binding on individuals in virtue of their conscience…” and “something that in its very essence is not technological, something that is not merely instrumental: we need a morality that is not merely tactical and situational but absolute.” “Absolute” is a very strong word. One notices, even at a glance, how this way of thinking is visibly imprinted on Havel’s philosophy. Some of these ideas would be modified — the notion of “authenticity” would be relabeled as “living in truth” — but the language that Havel used, even in his address to Congress years later, is traceable to Patočka’s thought.

    Despite having been a vocal defendant of Charter 77, Patočka’s philosophical approach was essentially Platonic, in that truth, or Truth, was something to be pursued hermetically, outside of the norms of the political order — a necessity, in this case, of living under an oppressive regime. This was the lesson that Plato learned from the execution of Socrates, which made it clear that philosophy could not be practiced in the polis. Where Havel broke from Patočka (and Plato) was in his belief that Truth could be, and must be, discovered socially. He would develop these ideas in his long and imperishable essay “The Power of the Powerless,” written in 1978, between the publication of the Charter and his imprisonment the following year. The essay diagnoses the state of one’s consciousness under what Havel preemptively termed the “post-totalitarian” age — the last days of a walking-dead ideology, in which the system is held together not by the integrity of its ideas but by a hollow devotion to procedure, and — crucially — by a mass falsification of opinion.

    In Havel’s account, life in a post-totalitarian society was characterized by an elaborate fiction, in which people became complicit in their own oppression by their willingness to “live within the lie.” Havel uses the example of an ordinary shopkeeper who places a sign in his window that says “Workers of the world, unite!,” not because he believes it but because he knows that he is expected to do it: it is a signal of his auto-obedience. He also knows that his neighbor, who might inform on him lest she be suspected, does not believe it either; nor does the policeman who questions him, nor the bureaucrat who penalizes him by reducing his pay. They are all simply protecting themselves. Thus, everyone becomes an instrument of obedience, a link in a chain of mendacity and self-oppression, knowingly contributing to a “world of appearances trying to pass for reality.” Any refusal to prop up this world, therefore, is an act of “living in truth.” Such a refusal might consist in writing a novel, putting on a play, or simply changing the punctuation on the shopkeeper’s sign: “Workers of the world, unite?” What qualifies for being a “dissident” (a word Havel always used in scare quotes) is nothing more than recognizing and pointing out the fraudulence of the world of appearances. 

    Under such conditions, civil disobedience becomes a somewhat quixotic affair, with the dissident solipsistically battling forces he is powerless to stop and knowing that he will likely be punished for it. Jiří Němec, a Catholic philosopher and fellow member of VONS, once remarked that Havel had “always written as though censorship did not exist.” This “as though” is an essential test of one’s character, and something that no regime can hope to claim or conquer. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, another great exemplar of this politically unreachable personal autonomy, insisted that it is a way of preserving a sense of “innocence.” Havel, like Solzhenitsyn, was not just talking the talk: if the Charter was an act of “living in truth,” based on a moral obligation to resist injustice, then it was an act that he knew would likely result in his imprisonment.

    But at what point does such an act become a display of one’s purity? This criticism came from Milan Kundera, who accused Havel of moral exhibitionism (a charge that Havel’s detractors would level against him all his life) for the role that he and Němec had played in drafting a petition for the release of political prisoners after the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968 — a petition that Kundera refused to sign. “Such action” Kundera argued coldly, “has only a twofold aim: (1) to unmask the world in all its irreparable amorality, and (2) to display its author in all his pure morality.” Kundera would eventually dramatize this in The Unbearable Lightness of Being, in a scene where a newspaper editor ambushes Tomas with a petition for the amnesty of political prisoners, which Tomas considers “possibly noble but certainly, and totally, useless.” The more worldly Kundera, who had already emigrated to France by the time Charter 77 was published, would in time be proven wrong. As a symbol of solidarity, the Charter’s significance was undeniable. Still, it resulted in Havel’s removal from public life for many years — years that might have been more productive had he managed to avoid imprisonment.

    When Havel was released from prison in 1984, he wrote “Politics and Conscience,” a continuation of his argument against “automatism” and mechanized life. He claimed that the values on which all societies are based are self-evident to us — values that are in our world before we recognize them, or even speak of them, and that these values are tangible in phenomena such as aesthetic revulsion. Havel uses an example from his childhood, walking to school every day under the smog of a polluting factory, which “soiled the heavens.” The existence of the factory is not just harmful to the environment, or to human health, he wrote  — it is metaphysically offensive, it violates our “pre-speculative” sense that there is a “hidden source of all the rules, customs, commandments, prohibitions and norms that hold within it.”

    Havel’s critique of the spiritually empty machinery of everyday life went both ways, recognizing that post-totalitarian automatism had an analogue in the West, in the hideously lit spaces of shopping malls and TV screens. He argued that modern consumer societies and techno-capitalist democracies were ultimately unfit as an alternative to communism, because they too released the citizen from a sense of “personal responsibility” and were based on “man-made absolute[s], devoid of mystery, free of the whims of subjectivity.” This was not long after Solzhenitsyn’s infamous lecture at Harvard in 1978, an acerbic sermon in which he denounced the West for making man the measure of all things and domesticating the human soul in favor of the “cult” of individualism. This bi-directional criticism, this “third way,” was not uncommon among dissidents, nor were the appeals to a deeper humanism. Havel was not at all cynical, nor did he stoop to an embittered and reactionary chauvinism, like Solzhenitsyn. Still, his warnings about the culture of nihilism that characterizes “Western totalitarianism” — strong words, coming from him — against which we must rekindle a sense of “higher responsibility” because “man has abolished the absolute horizon of his relations” — these chastisements cut eerily close, and carried clerical overtones.

    Havel’s vision of the polis was essentially Aristotelian: a state grows out of human relations just as a seed grows into a tree. Modern civilization, however far it appears to stray from the natural world, is nonetheless founded on a “pre-objective” conscience about our relationship to one another. (Throughout his work, Havel variously referred to this as “anti-political” politics, “non-political” politics, and “genuine politics.”) The basis of a society is to serve Truth; it should be predicated on the pursuit of a meaningful life, with humans as ends in themselves. Like Patočka, Havel frequently argued that we are bound to “something higher,” though that exact something  — Nature? God? Conscience? — is left rather vaporous.

    This was the intellectual and “spiritual” (a word that Havel used a lot) opportunity presented by the collapse of communism, which looked like the moment when an “existential revolution” was finally ready to launch, the moment when capital-H History had breached a new epoch, amid George H.W. Bush’s declarations of a “new world order” and Francis Fukuyama’s celebrated reflections on “the end of history” (a triumphalism that now seems impossibly quaint, or worse). But 1989 turned out not to be the end of history, of course. It turned out to be the resumption of history, after many decades of interruption by History and its vast social experiments that ended in failure and disgrace. Havel rightly understood that this resumption could not be smooth — that the end of communism signaled not just an ideological failure, but an existential one, which would leave deep wounds in the next century if its consequences were not properly identified and treated. Totalitarianism had attempted to denature — or re-nature — human beings, and succeeded only in deforming them. Since the system infiltrated every aspect of existence, attempting to abolish not only private life but also the privacy of the mind, it followed that whatever came in its wake would require some renovation of our sensibilities.

    Havel recognized that communism’s sudden evacuation from the world left a vacuum in people’s hearts, making them vulnerable to surrogate ideologies such as nationalism and religious fanaticism, as well as political extremism and the “primitive cult” of consumerism. In addition to political revolution, a metaphysical revolution was also needed, precisely because totalitarianism sought to eliminate metaphysical life. How this revolution would be achieved he left characteristically vague. Havel claimed that a new “self-understanding” was needed, that “we must discover a new relationship to our neighbors, and to the universe and its metaphysical order, which is the source of the moral order.” This existential revolution was not limited to post-communist polities. With globalism in view, Havel argued that one of the great challenges of the twenty-first century would be to overcome a “purely national perception of the world.” The only way to transcend this would be to cultivate a “worldwide, pluralistic metaculture” based on a recognition of our common humanity.

    But from which body would this new metaculture emerge and be upheld? The UN? A new North Atlantic Treaty Organization? A Metaphysical Council? Institutions — especially rules-based ones — which arise mainly out of the need to restrain truancy are ill-equipped for such a task. After all, it is not the role of the state to be a smithy of the soul. Its spiritual responsibility is, at most, to create the conditions of freedom in which this work can take place. Jefferson understood this, which is why the Declaration of Independence does not offer happiness, but only a door open for its pursuit. The conditions for this pursuit — human rights and civil liberties — are only the beginning, and securing them is not a guarantee against the nastier aspects of human nature. The question, which Havel addressed only indirectly (it is the question that lies at the heart of the Republic), is whether fit people are needed to build good institutions or fit institutions can build good people.

    Havel was especially perceptive about what Karl Popper called “holistic social engineering” — the willingness to use human beings in an experimental manner, something that Marxist utopian materialism tried for the better part of a century to hammer out. And here it is worth remembering that the Bolshevik coup, which set this experiment in motion, was brought about by an ascension of intellectuals to power — Lenin and Trotsky were both brilliant intellectuals — who made philosophy the business of the state, believing that it was the job of an educated vanguard to organize life for the rest of society. More still, these men justified their actions by their belief, their certainty, that they were doing good.  The corruption of the good is often the worst corruption of all. (Corruptio optimi pessima, though the application of that adage to Lenin and his comrades flatters them.) Conscious of this, Havel was careful not to suggest that an “existential revolution” would be the business of institutions conforming to ideologies and the ideologists who propound them. Where Havel broke with the tradition of social engineering from Plato to Lenin was in his profoundly anti-ideological approach. The revolution would be bottom-up and intellectually libertarian, rather than the top-down approach of state-sanctioned philosophy. It was less a call for a “new man” than an appeal to auto-enlightenment.

    This drew a poignant criticism from Joseph Brodsky, who knew a thing or two about prison and life in a totalitarian state. He agreed that communism had been a human failure as much as a political failure, but he pointed out that this was less an aberration than another example of humanity’s repeated mishandling of the attempt to establish justice. The “metaphysical order” on which new institutions are to be built should thus begin with self-examination and the recognition of our tendency to bungle justice. (A look at how revolutions devour their own and the ways in which the oppressed come to resemble their oppressors is evidence enough.) Among other things, this means that calls for a “perfect society” or a “new man” are to be distrusted on principle, as they are so often the intellectual roots of horrendous social experiments.

    Like Jefferson, Havel seemed to believe that institutions could accomplish only so much, and that most of the important work involved building spiritually fit people before we could expect true justice. He was inclined to see our institutions as potential manifestations of our essential goodness — but here we must remind ourselves, against Havel, that the true legacy of the Enlightenment, a time of accelerated transformation in human consciousness, was that the new constitutions, which allowed people the freedom to pursue Truth, were based on the recognition not of our essential goodness but of our propensity for error. We cannot assume that people will become more virtuous; we must assume the opposite. (“If men were angels, no government would be necessary.”) A state of civility, however we achieve it, should be a constant reminder of how easy it has been for us at times to abandon it. If this is optimism, it is not quite idealism. And what Havel’s picture of the world was lacking was a certain degree of moral realism, which is not the same as cynicism even if it can degenerate into it.

    Havel’s sense of morality must have derived partly from having lived most of his life under a brutal regime. In such circumstances, it is tempting to perceive oneself as good and true simply by being in opposition to power. The recognition of oneself as virtuous is in many ways a luxury of the oppressed (who do not have many luxuries), one that those in power cannot always afford or justify. Thus, Havel’s famous civility — his great strength of character — became his main political weakness. Though he found himself a revolutionary, Havel did not have the rigid, unreflective mind that revolutionaries often need to repress empathy and irony. This is the “old disease” described by Rubashov in Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon — the tendency to “think through the minds of others.” For better or worse, Havel was usually too willing to think through the minds of others, of his opponents and his enemies, and he always seemed ready to give them the benefit of the doubt. This was a reflection, certainly, of his own self-doubt. But it left him ill-equipped for some of the harder responsibilities of politics and governance. 

    The challenge, at home and abroad, was how to build new institutions that could overcome the legacies of totalitarianism, both within the mind and in everyday life. Temperamentally a dissident, Havel was not well prepared to build these institutions, and his idealistic notions of Truth could not find a place in the new circumstances of reform power. He lacked the practical knowledge to construct institutions that would restrain the greed, corruption, and opportunism that followed the collapse of communism in his own country (and elsewhere), in which many former apparatchiks simply changed the color of their ties and went into business for themselves, accumulating pelf in an engorged era of mafia capitalism. One of those characters was Andrej Babiš, a former StB stooge and the country’s second-wealthiest man, who served as the scandal-plagued prime minister of the Czech Republic from 2017 to 2021.

    Havel was also unable to restrain the rise of nationalism in his own backyard, when the Slovaks separated from the Czechs on New Year’s Day, 1993. The country literally fell apart. He had supported the continuation of the union, but he did not oppose the decision to separate, recognizing the Slovaks’ right to self-determination, which had been an important part of Czechoslovakia’s independence from the Austrian empire. He argued incessantly for a new global identity, but he could not dissuade the Slovaks from the cult of their own particularism and from secession from the pluralistic federation to which they had belonged since 1918. Havel was one of many impotent leaders who had to watch as the world failed to respond to genocides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, for which he and many others urged international action to no avail. (Eventually the Americans and NATO took belated action in Bosnia, though not owing to Havel-like strictures of conscience.) His noble calls for an existential revolution and a worldwide metaculture came to seem absurd, and blind to the realities of an increasingly Hobbesian and particularistic world. 

    It should be noted in fairness that the Czech president is a different kind of executive, not ensconced in immense power like the president of the United States, but rather draped in symbolic cloth. A largely ceremonial figure, with the power to sign and occasionally to veto laws, Havel’s duties were different from those of other politicians. It was his job, in a certain sense, to raise questions of selfhood, nationhood, conscience, goodness, civility, destiny, determination, the nature of Truth, and the nature of power itself. Still, his philosophy, which he developed as a dissident, showed itself to be inadequate once he came to occupy a position of power. It also revealed the irony of “the power of the powerless,” because it demonstrated that the powerful, too, are often powerless — to acknowledge and to act on the truth.

    Havel taught that we must trust our conscience. Who will deny it? Yet how does this teaching account for others who do not trust their conscience, or who do not even know what conscience is? How are we to relate politically to people who display no conscience on matters such as Rwanda, or who are content with having power guided only by interests or prejudices? Can you persuade them to have more of a conscience? Do you encourage more self-examination? Surely they will be deaf to such exhortations. (Consider the question of China and human rights.) When Havel became a politician, he experienced the very thing that he had loathed, which is that the calculus of impersonal bureaucratic power domesticates the conscience and restricts its deployment to convenience and expedience. The repeated failure of Western leaders to react to pressing threats and emergencies — the annexation of the Sudetenland, say, a miscarriage of justice that Czechs love to remind the world of — is proof enough of this discouraging understanding of the actual career of conscience in power.

    Now, more than eighty years later, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we have had to watch yet again as another aggressive, expansionist regime threatens the sovereignty of one of its neighbors and the stability of Europe as a whole, and once more suffer the shame of having done so little to prevent it. Havel supported NATO expansion in Central and Eastern Europe, which would suggest that he had no illusions about Russia. But this lack of illusion was set in a larger intellectual framework that was rife with illusion. Very few people anticipated that a crabbed and revanchist Russia could once again come under the rule of one man, rebuild a “pact” in its sphere of influence, and strike out against the West. But now that all this has transpired, the view that conscience can suffice as a guiding force in world affairs without the robust assistance of power, and that a “rules-based international order” can act as a deterrent for those who clearly have no conscience, is unrealistic to the point of naïveté. Perhaps naïveté is the occupational hazard of conscience. In any event, the campaign for an increased role for conscience is certainly necessary; but it is dangerous to believe that it is sufficient.

    Havel’s “letters” to the Czech presidents Aleksander Dubček (in 1969) and Gustav Husák (in 1975) have the voice of a kind of court philosopher, one trying to enlighten his despots in the unwisdom of torturing their subjects. (This was a compromise that intellectuals made for centuries.) But when the intellectual then finds himself in power, does it become his job to turn over the task of enlightenment to society? The question we might ask ourselves is, how much should we ask of our elected officials? Do we want them to be gurus, spiritual guides, telling us in their televised addresses that we need to rekindle our relationship to a metaphysical order? Are we willing to tolerate this kind of talk from tax collectors? Or do we expect them only to perform the tasks of government effectively, and to leave questions of the soul to us, whatever our philosophical qualifications?

    Many of the questions that Havel posed in the wake of communism’s collapse anticipated what we now recognize as the great challenges of our century: the move from a bi-polar to a multi-polar world of international relations; the tension between national identity and global identity, particularly in the confrontation with global problems such as environmental degradation; the recrudescence of tribalism, nationalism, fascism, xenophobia, incivility, and a well-heeled techno-utopianism that threatens to make automatons of us all. Addressing these challenges is surely a duty shared by both writers and elected officials. They are both agents in the discourse, but in their own ways. No one (I hope) would dispute that intellectuals have a leadership role in society, and that their responsibilities bend toward an enlightened citizenry. (The definition of this enlightenment can be debated, but there are cruel and violent worldviews that it obviously excludes.) Yet the greatest contribution that intellectuals have made to their societies has generally been made outside the halls of power, and sometimes in opposition to power. When Vaclav Havel went from dissident to president, he tried to make history and found himself at its mercy. His story has an element of late tragedy. We are all, it is true, at history’s mercy, including the non-intellectuals who occupy the presidencies and the palaces. But if justice is possible, it will require qualities of will and determination, and a comfort with power, that are not the strengths of saints.

    Glass of Milk

    Was a swell commandment: drink up, sleep.  She’d

    relinquished the vampy black and absconded to her toddler

    color (muddy sunset) as we, one from each grief stage,

    commissioned to flock her, petal’d her pale strapless, 

    pressed the appliqué along her spine with dancer’s glue,

    all funds sunk into that silk, hence the wan hors d’oeuvres,

    sheepish flasks, White Album on a loop.

    Eventual brood snug in her ova, she straightened, candle-

    brave before that noonday deadline.  Startled nipples

    got plastered.  A dose of almonds

    so no swooning during forevers.  Preview

    of losing it, Skyping with her guru

    to parse the voice of God thunderstruck into the nib of 

    a midcentury housewife.  Waking rapturous, un-entombed,

    to commune with birdsong and him in the mystical

    five am.  An Oona holding hydrangeas, she was.  Soon 

    to vanish into a strobing, off-kilter rainstorm,  

    the frothy whitecaps of a harbor’s embrace and resistance.  

    There stands her hometown man.  A future of borax-

    bleached nappies, the Paxil.  She turned us a keen look

    sailing down satin.  Absolute abandonment, can’t come with,

    the fox’s grin plunging unabashed into snow drift.

    Ouroboros

    Frigid in vibrating daylight, with no distinction

    between indoors and out.  Ailene on the gurney

    asked her children, Am I dying? and received

    a coward’s answer.  How she eyed the ward, panicked,

    more alive than ever.  Once a lounging

     

    teenager, biting the brush end of her braid,

    the lattice more alive than ever with carnations.  

    Braised rabbit hunted that morning, not sleeping, no

    indeed, beneath silver.  Relieved of instinct.    

    Retold in a tempo to correct the grievous echo.

    Albino Deer

    Stunning as noon sun or psychosis aftermath, vase

    flung into the garden, but surely the porcelain

    was speaking and the mother, she couldn’t let it go on

    terrorizing the household, could she?  

    White noise, attention span frail as a ghost crab 

    clattering into surf, washed backwards into the mist 

    of Ansel’s photographs, synth to soften a century,   

    gallows clouds fusing with Osipova’s jetés in the Bolshoi.  

    From the green edge stepped innocence, sobs   

    of snow from the orchestra warm-up (first post-

    disaster performance) hushed by the soloing oboist,  

    slow whole notes, quarter notes hoof-black, O solemn

    comet, you bride, you confusion, you phantom.

    A Wounded Loyalty

    You shall not hate your brother in your heart,
    you shall surely reprove your fellow and not bear guilt because of him.

    Leviticus 19:17

    “This last winter was another lost in fog. As usual he did nothing.” In this way A.B. Yehoshua introduces readers to the anonymous, plodding, intellectually undistinguished Israeli protagonist of his story “Facing the Forests,” which appeared in 1968. The character betrays clumsiness even with his own perceptions, which often strike him as blurry, out of focus. A haze encircles him. At first he seems merely lazy, but slowly, slowly, at the glacial pace of a narrative that unfolds in a universe staggering beneath its own drowsiness, the reader realizes that this man is bound by an incapacitating awareness that something terrible has gone wrong. He has been sewn into an inheritance, bequeathed to him at birth, which he is powerless to set right. This awareness thickens and befuddles him, affecting him more than it seems to affect anyone else in the story. The other characters are utterly immune to whatever dark reality shackles him in place. 

    Solitude, his friends decree, will cure him. They propose a plan: he must become a forest ranger — ads in the newspaper assure them that such a position exists. All alone for months on end surveilling the trees in case of fire, this isolation will invigorate him, they insist, and shake loose the clutches of inertia. They do not know what the reader freshly suspects: that inertia is the mechanism by which he ignores an unbearable truth. It is his cure, and there is no cure for it.

    Since protestation requires energy, which his crushing passivity saps, he finds himself some days later at the Forestry Service where “in a sort of dangerous drowsiness” he cannot stop himself from expressing his disbelief that there are any forests at all in a country as arid as Israel. The manager of the department, visibly insulted, assigns our gloomy hero to one of the larger forests. He will not be alone there; there is also an Arab laborer, about whom “they feel certain he has no prejudices.” Before his departure, a friend suggests that he make use of his leisurely job as a scout to finally distinguish himself academically. Why not sink his teeth into a subject — the Crusades, for example? Together they pack a suitcase full of history books.

    A truck from the Forestry Service carries him from Jerusalem — “fading like a dream” — into a forest populated with pines so alien to that topography he is surprised they could take root in the rocky soil. The dream that he leaves behind is a world in which everyone but himself goes about ignoring a past which they are powerless to alter, though it hangs heavily over their present and their future. In this land, the Holy Land, more perhaps than any other track of earth, the living live alongside ghosts, and the ghosts preside.

    At long last he alights at a small house, a two-story lookout post, in which an Arab man and his daughter also live. The man is mute — his tongue was cut out long ago. (“Did we cut it out or did they?” our hero wonders.) The Fire Scout’s solitude remains virtually undisturbed until, soon after his arrival, his timid father comes to visit. In this confrontation between father and son, Yehoshua forces the generations to face one another. The story presumably occurs in the year it was published, which means that the Fire Scout was ten years old when his country was established. His father’s generation oversaw that creation, and so this father bequeathed to this son not only a great victory but also a painful past. In the Fire Scout’s case, this father is the one responsible — though no single individual bears the blame for the ruthlessness of history.

    Father and son sit in silence, broken occasionally by the old man’s awkward mutterings as he tries to strike up discussion. Why, he asks, doesn’t his son treat the Jewish dimension of the Crusades? The mass Jewish suicides in the Rhineland, for example, rather than the Muslim blood spilled by Christian hands in the Holy Land? This is the only time in Yehoshua’s tale that the two histories which are the ultimate subject of the story, winding around one another like twisted arteries, are overtly juxtaposed: the Muslim presence on the land from which the Jews were evicted a thousand years before the First Crusade, and the Jewish longing for return, punctuated and deepened by slaughters in exile. But the Fire Scout does not know this history, and he cannot answer his father. The son smiles and the two slip back into silence. Their silence is symptomatic of an overwhelming historical ignorance, which is often the condition of citizens who live in the grip of history. This ignorance, and the complacence that it fosters, is the ultimate villain of the story. A day or so before the father leaves, he mumbles warnings about the Arab who might any day set fire to the forest. Why not? he asks. His son offers no answer. 

    The Fire Scout returns to his books, but after a week heaving himself from line to line, he finds that he has read only three pages. Discouraged and distracted, he ventures out into the forest for the first time since his arrival. On the stones at his feet, he notices brass plaques glittering in the dappled sunlight. The plaques have names stamped on them: “Louis Schwartz of Chicago” and “the King of Burundi and his People.” These are the names of donors who have contributed to the national project of afforestation, to plant trees in a land so lacking in them. He stoops and reads plaque after plaque, repeating the names to himself, and is suddenly overcome by a great sadness. 

    Hikers begin to flow into the forest for the summer. From afar they look to him rather like Crusaders. At night they set small, harmless fires. At first he worries that a stray spark will set the forest ablaze, but after some time he discovers in himself a vague longing to see the trees go up in flames. A group of hikers seeks out the Fire Scout to ask a question: Where exactly is the Arab village marked on the map? It should be here, right in the forest where they are standing. Has he seen it? He assures them that there is no such village. The map must be mistaken. But that night he cannot sleep. The names on the plaques resurface in his memory, taunting him. He climbs out of bed, plods downstairs, and brusquely wakes the Arab on the floor below. When he tries to pronounce the name of the missing village, the mute Arab is overcome with astonishment and excitement. He jumps out of bed and points excitedly outside the window. The Fire Scout smiles and retreats back upstairs. So there was an Arab village there, long ago, or not so long ago, before the war for independence in 1948.

    A brief historical excursus: Since the first Aliyah (or wave of Jewish immigration to the land of Israel) beginning in 1882, Jews had journeyed across Europe and Russia to their ancient homeland, the promised land, which was then under Ottoman control. Most of the land that these beleaguered, penurious Jews could afford to buy were plots of mosquito-infested swampland owned by absentee Arab landowners who were glad to sell. The pioneers’ momentous task was to make that land habitable. It was grueling, maddening work. Some went back to Europe, many died from malaria, others committed suicide. The few that survived managed to drain and convert the swamps into farmland. It was not long before these extraordinary pioneers had established a sufficiently large and thriving society and accumulated enough property — legally, according to the Ottoman legal code which the British, who governed the land after 1922, largely adopted — that the British proposed a partition plan: in 1936, as a solution to the growing conflict between the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine, the British suggested that the Jews would maintain control of all those regions which were already under Jewish control and the Palestinian Arabs (as they were newly called) would get the rest. The Jewish leadership accepted this proposal; the Palestinian and Arab leadership rejected it. A similar plan was proposed by the British, accepted by the Zionist leadership, and rejected by the Arab and Palestinian leadership again in 1947. On the night of November 29, 1947, when the United Nations voted to adopt the partition plan and authorized the establishment of a Jewish state and a Palestinian state, Jews danced in the streets. Eight of them were murdered by Palestinians. The British withdrew on May 15, 1948, the State of Israel was declared, and the War of Independence (as the Jews call it) immediately ensued, between the Jews of the new, internationally ratified state and the attacking armies of Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, and Egypt. Israel won an unlikely victory, and territories within the Mandate of Palestine that had been controlled by Arabs before the war came under Israeli control. For Palestinians, the war became known as al Naqba, the Destruction, in which many Palestinians were expelled by Israeli forces and many fled. The Palestinians were rebuffed or forced into refugee camps by all of the Arab countries into which they fled. Those who remained within the borders of the newly founded Jewish state became its citizens, guaranteed fundamental rights by its Declaration of Independence which the Jewish rulers of the state sometimes honored in the breach. 

    In the decades after 1948, wealthy Zionists from other countries, and many thousands of Jewish families and schoolchildren, donated trees to create forests like the one that the protagonist in Yehoshua’s story oversees. These trees grew over evidence of the forest’s former life. Nature often obfuscates the past, though frequently it requires the cooperation of politics and people. Landscapes bear the fingerprints of human history. They are historical documents. The Fire Scout begins to perceive this, to notice the revisions in the arboreal palimpsest over which he keeps watch, though Yehoshua does not communicate this realization outright. He gestures towards it. His Israeli readers know what it means; they understand the implicit condemnation. As Yehoshua — a patriarch of Israeli literature, who died in Tel Aviv last June — said in a speech to Israeli college students a few years ago, “We cannot behave as if the war did not happen. We cannot behave as if the Naqba did not happen. Yes, it was a just war. But even in a just war, terrible things are done.” His story is a critique of the cognitive consequences of victory. Reading it now, one wonders whether the Israelis have ever adequately faced the forests. 

    Back in the forest, the procession of hikers gives way to a procession of ceremonies. Donors teem in, the old manager from the Forestry Service returns each day to give speeches and cut ribbons while photographers flash their cameras. New plaques are fastened to rocks, and new trees take root. The Fire Scout confronts his old acquaintance, the manager, who says triumphantly, “You see? There are forests after all!” Before leaving, the manager asks what the Fire Scout’s opinion is of the Arab worker at the station, whom a department official suspects of harboring a stock of kerosene. The manager thinks there is no need to worry: the Arab seems a placid fellow. “He’s a local isn’t he?” the manager asks. “A local?” “Because our forest is growing over, well, over a ruined village… a small village… But that is a thing of the past.” Is it?

    The Fire Scout’s mistress comes to visit him, and insists that he return with her. He refuses, and when she leaves she takes all connection to his former life with her. All hope for return to an untroubled, uncomplicated existence, to a past in which he was ignorant of the forest and all it hides, is extinguished. On the way back to his cabin on a cold evening, he meets the mute Arab. Gripped by a strong desire to warm his hands, the Fire Scout strikes match after match, each of which are blown out by “damp, traitorous air.” The Arab stares with wild eyes as the scout walks over to the hideout where the kerosene is hidden, and pours a flask of clear liquid onto the ground. He throws down a lit match and flames shoot up. The two men stand, bodies pressed close to the bonfire, which slowly dies. The Arab watches in despair as the scout stamps out the lingering sparks. “It was only a lesson,” the Fire Scout thinks to himself. 

    The Fire Scout’s alienation has thickened after being forced to reckon with the forest’s tainted past. He wants his guilt to be exorcized — specifically, he wants the accursed place burned to the ground — but he cannot bring himself to set the fire. He wants the Arab to do it for him. The mute man tries to communicate with the Fire Scout. He gesticulates wildly and thrashes the stump of his tongue inside his mouth so that his whole head shakes. He wants to tell the Fire Scout about his wives who were murdered right here on this land, but the Fire Scout smiles and pretends not to comprehend. “Did there used to be a village here? He sees nothing but trees.”

    Finally, at midnight on the eve of the Fire Scout’s last day on the job, the Arab sets fire to the forest. The scout watches happily at first as the flames lick at his small two-story house. Eventually the Scout grabs the Arab’s daughter and carries her for miles, until the pines thin out and give way to parched, struggling shoots. The Arab appears from out of the wreckage, takes his daughter, and vanishes. The police arrive and after a few hours of uncomfortable interrogation the Fire Scout implicates the Arab, as the police had hoped and expected he would. The conclusion is nauseating.

    Like the rest of us, Yehoshua’s protagonist finds himself in a national community with many of whose inhabitants he would never willingly form a moral community. (There are no morally homogenous communities, no perfectly evil or perfectly good societies.) Disquiet, malaise, suspicion, alienation, a vague but increasingly vivid awareness that he is building on something that is, at least in part, unstable or unjust — all this rises within him. There develops a peculiar heartsickness. It is the special agony of incomplete alienation, the torment of a wounded loyalty.

    There are many ways to respond to the immorality of one’s own people. The most common response is no response at all, a numb complacency. Of course one can also righteously defect and relinquish one’s membership in the group. This is usually the response of fools who insist on an impossible purity in human affairs. Do its immoral actions morally vitiate an entire polity? Is the United States nothing but slavery and racism? Is Ukraine nothing but its corruption? Is Israel nothing but occupation? (It may be necessary, alas, to remind the present-day reader that Israel’s very existence is also an expression of right and justice.) The task is to honor what deserves to be honored and to renounce what deserves to be renounced. Too many Zionists find this too difficult to attempt. They have trouble making such distinctions, as if loyalty is incompatible with honesty. They protest that since Israel is constantly under attack (and its enemies, they argue, never are), only traitorous Zionists would publicly accuse Israel. Such an orientation conditions — insists upon — dishonesty.

    What is instead required is heartsickness. Not of the passive sort, to be sure; but heartsickness that provokes debate and dissent and political action. Heartsickness is a healthy expression of patriotism, and it is also an expression of loyalty. A Jewish prooftext, if one is required: the exacting duality of heartsickness is broached by the verse in the Torah from which the rabbis deduce that we are commanded to hold our people to account and that we not hate them: “You shall not hate your brother in your heart, you shall surely reprove your fellow and not bear guilt because of him.” Such heartsickness is a regular feature of responsible commitment to any state, including the Jewish one. 

    The Fire Scout’s heartsickness is commendable, but his befuddlement and confusion are failings. His heartsickness, like everything else about him, is passive. He cannot bring himself to read the history with which he must reckon. But the realities of power demand, among other things, introspection and unflagging alertness. Moral membership must overpower inertia, platitude, and bleary-eyed habituation. The vague sense that we have inherited guilt must precipitate education and then action, as opposed to brutish outrage or lazy complacence.

    Yehoshua’s extraordinary story, which was a sensation when it was originally published, is a useful lens through which to interpret the evolution of Israeli politics. In 1968, when the story appeared, the mute and powerless Arab seemed to Yehoshua representative of the Arab Israeli experience. Much has since changed. The Arabs of Israel still suffer considerable discrimination, but, for now, they have a strong political voice. Mansour Abbas, the heroic member of Knesset who in 2021 secured his party’s place as the first Arab party to sit in a governing coalition in Israel, is a repudiation of Yehoshua’s wounded, tongueless Arab whose only recourse was to burn the forest down. Abbas joined Naftali Bennet and Yair Lapid to form the coalition that finally ousted Benjamin Netanyahu from power, but Bennet and Lapid would never have been able to invite Abbas into their coalition if Netanyahu had not legitimized Abbas by trying to secure his partnership first. Netanyahu’s cynical courtship of the leader of the community that he had previously slandered had a sanguine consequence: it made Abbas halal for Israeli politics. This is what Israeli politics are like: there are myriad rules and biases which dictate what will be construed as too Arab-friendly. Even actors who are impartial to the Arab question (and a growing majority would rather ignore the question altogether than address it in any way) must obey these etiquettes or suffer political obscurity. 

    Abbas has gentle eyes and a sweet, soft voice. He is often described as a teddy-bear, which is surprising, because he has spent his political career nimbly and courageously walking a hair-thin tightrope in order to accrue and maintain the legitimacy necessary to advocate for his constituents in a political order in which Arab Israelis have enjoyed, before him, practically no influential representation. According to the 2020 national census, there are 1,956,000 Arab residents in Israel, out of a total population of 9,291,000; they comprise twenty percent of the Israeli population. Most of them live in all-Arab villages in the north and the middle of the country, though about ten percent of Arab Israelis live in integrated villages and cities alongside Jews. Thirty-six percent of Arab Israelis suffer from poverty, which is double the national average. In the last six years, crime waves have ravaged Arab cities in Israel, and criminal gangs have come to dominate the community. Abbas, who often acts as peacemaker in the bloody disputes between gangs, has pledged that he will serve as an effective advocate to address these and a complicated web of related maladies. His efforts have yielded results: he has secured billions of dollars’ worth of support for Arab communities.

    Abbas has sacrificed much in order to demonstrate that it is possible to improve conditions for Arab Israelis while still respecting the Jewish majority: “I’m trying to show Jews and Arabs a new way to live together in which each side will realize itself as a collective and as individuals. It is [my party’s] role always to emphasize the rights of the minority, but the majority has rights too, and we have to preserve them as well.” For his trouble, he has become reviled both by the Israeli right and by segments of the Arab Israeli population who consider him a quisling and a sell-out. This is because Arab Israelis, who increasingly call themselves Palestinian Israelis to signal solidarity with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, know very well that Abbas has had to steer clear of the Palestinian issue entirely. He does not mention the occupation, or the national aspirations of the Palestinian people, because if he did the Jewish majority in Knesset would not do business with him. Out of fear for his own safety, he has had to stop praying at Al-Aqsa in Jerusalem. Abbas is confident, however, that a significant majority of Arab Israelis are heartened by the progress that he has made in the government over the course of the past year. 

    In his lack of revolutionary sentiments Abbas is a revolutionary figure, rather like what Salam Fayyad once was in Ramallah. In an environment inflamed on all sides by ideology and bigotry, he is a practical man. In his person and in his program, he demonstrates that it is possible for an Arab Israeli to assume a position of leadership in Israel. Indeed, his objective should be the objective of every Zionist and every Israeli: to transform his constituency’s conception of citizenship in Israel. He has said with pride that “it has been my great pleasure to gain support among the Arab sector. In most public opinion polls, no less than 60 percent support what we are doing. Even among people who have not voted for UAL [United Arab List] and voted for the other [Arab] party, the Joint List, almost 45 percent of their voters support what we are doing. Many are waiting and seeing what we can do, what we can accomplish. Of course, this depends on the other side, on the Zionist parties, and whether they will give us the opportunity to succeed. If we succeed, then I have no doubt that more than 85 percent of the public in Israel will support us.” He is right: whatever progress he is permitted to make will be determined by the fate of the Israeli right in Israeli politics, and a particularly ferocious segment of the Israeli right is committed to his failure.

    In 1968, the same year that A. B. Yehoshua published “Facing the Forests,” a man named Meir Kahane founded the Jewish Defense League in Brooklyn. It began as a Jewish vigilante group patrolling high-crime neighborhoods in which Jews lived and were endangered, and then it got into the struggle on behalf of Soviet Jewry, distinguishing itself from more influential groups in that cause with its use of violence; but eventually it became perhaps the most influential, and certainly the most extreme, of the extremist groups in the Israeli right. Kahane emigrated to Israel in 1971, just three years before the official launch of Gush Emunim, the Bloc of the Faithful, the movement dedicated to the (illegal) Jewish settlement in the territories that they call Judea and Samaria; its purposes were strategic — to foreclose any possibility of territorial concessions in any negotiation about the disposition of the territories — and spiritual — to fulfill a religious vision of Zionism with the Bible as its justification. (The settlement saga also began in the year that “Facing the Forests” appeared, when a group of militant religious Zionists posing as Swiss tourists checked in to the Park Hotel in Hebron for Passover in March, 1968 and then refused to leave.)

    In Israel Kahane started promoting what he called T.N.T. — or teror neged terror, terror against terror — which in practice meant countering Arab violence with Jewish violence. (A decade later his anti-Palestinian bloodthirst would be fulfilled by a terrorist network of settlers that became known as Mahteret or “the underground.”) He preached the rankest hatred of Arabs and promulgated a worldview that was the mirror-image of the worldview that nearly destroyed the entirety of European Jewry. He lamented, for example, “the growing number of Jewish girls who date and sleep with and marry Arabs. Who easily bed the foreign laborers and foreign soldiers. The incredible pollution of the Jewish seed.” His blatant, disgraceful racism also matched inch for inch the ugliest expressions of Arab anti-Semitism. It is darkly ironic that, for Kahane’s twisted followers, Arab anti-Semitism implicitly legitimated Kahanism. The logic is as simple as it is barbaric: fight hate with hate, ugliness with ugliness, dehumanization with dehumanization.

    Forty years ago Kahane developed a strain of Jewish anti-Arab racism which was so morally vile that his party — Kach, or Thus!, with a fist for its logo — was eventually banned from the Knesset, in 1985, under the Racism Law, which banned parties guilty of inciting racism. In 1990 Kahane was assassinated in Manhattan by an Islamist Arab gunman who had ties to the terrorist network that would perpetrate the first bombing of the World Trade Center three years later. But his movement, his party, did not die with him. For a while its standard-bearer was a madman named Baruch Marzel, Kahane’s right-hand man, who personally assaulted a Palestinian, an Israeli police officer, and a left-wing Israeli activist, but serially failed to make it into the Knesset. The legacy of Kahanism is now represented in Israeli politics, and prominently, by the foul Itamar Ben Gvir, who was a member of Kahane’s Kach party just as his father was before him. 

    Ben Gvir has given wild speeches at commemorations of Kahane, celebrating his ideology of hatred. For several years he has participated in and led “the flag march,” an annual provocation in which xenophobic Jewish extremists carry Israeli flags through the Muslim Quarter of the old city of Jerusalem, reminiscent of the march that Kahane led along that same route the day after his party was elected to the Knesset. Both marches were and are intended to elicit violence. Ben Gvir appears regularly with members of Lehava, a far-right Jewish terror group which, among other things, targets Arab-Jewish couples and community projects. Ben-Gvir calls himself an anti-assimilationist, which is his euphemism for a racist obsession with biological purity. Polls have predicted that his party, Otzma Yehudit, may achieve a significant number of seats in the Knesset after the next election in November. It is not speculation to suggest that Netanyahu will invite him into the governing coalition if it means securing the premiership: Netanyahu flirted with inviting Otzma Yehudit into the government in 2021. Ben Gvir detests Mansour Abbas, of course; he refers to him as a supporter of terrorism, and in a tweet he complained that “after they raised prices and taxes to enrich the terrorist supporter Mansour Abbas, even the prices on bread have risen by tens of percent and Yair Lapid does not care. A disconnected group that does not care if children go to bed hungry. With God’s help in the next election we will correct the injustices of the part of ‘healing and change.’ We deserve better.”

    This despicable individual became an avatar of the extremist underbelly of the Israeli right in 1995, a few weeks before Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, when Ben Gvir wrenched the Cadillac logo off of Rabin’s car and boasted to the television cameras that “if we can get to his car, we will get to Rabin too.” In the intervening years he became a lawyer, and, like Kahane before him, offers legal services to Jewish terrorists. Ben Gvir told a disciple, a woman named Roni who became a member of his gang when she was fourteen years old, that whereas Kahane was defanged because he broke Israeli law, he, Ben Gvir, will cunningly stay within the boundaries of the law while promulgating his doctrine: “They placed Kahane outside of the law. But I will play by their laws. They will not manage to place me outside of the law.” And he has succeeded. 

    The Israeli channel MAKO conducted an interview with Roni about her time under Ben Gvir’s influence, and it is among the only windows into his netherworld. Roni recalled that one weekend, when she was fourteen years old, Ben-Gvir invited her and others to his house outside of Hebron (where, incidentally, a monument to Kahane stands in the nearby settlement of Qiryat Arba), and advised the children to go into the Arab casbah, approach an Arab man, and quietly mutter the words “Mohammed is a pig.” His plan was to ignite a conflagration. Her interviewer asked, “What went through your mind when you whispered that?” Roni replied: “I would provoke him to start a commotion and then I could say that he started it, not me.” She also described another instance when she and a group of Ben Gvirists were together on Shabbat and saw an Arab boy walking alone. They ganged up on him and then ran together into the closest Arab house and trashed it while the family watched. “When you’re in such a group,” she explained, “you feel like you are in a Jewish supremacy, you feel like you are better than them and… you end up doing things that are not so far from what was done to the Jews.” The interviewer asked, “Because you did some things that were not so different from a pogrom?” Roni answered: “Correct.” Eventually Roni dropped out of school and went to live on a hillside with other teenagers who would organize attacks on nearby Arab villages and on Israeli army bases.

    Ben Gvir has said that he would never represent rapists or those guilty of indecent acts, but he is willing to represent Israeli terrorists such as the ones who used arson to kill the Dawabsheh family in their house in the village of Dum in the West Bank in 2015. “That was an entirely different matter,” he explained. “It was not murder for the sake of murder. It was ideologically motivated.” At a wedding of right-wing settlers later that same year, videos circulated of the guests stabbing a photograph of Ali Dawabsheh, the baby who had been killed in the fire. Ben Gvir was at the wedding; he said that it took him a little while to realize that the baby in the photo was Ali Dawabsheh, and that when he realized it was, he was surprised and ashamed. Apparently he thought the guests were stabbing photos of a different baby.

     

    Itamar Ben Gvir and his contemptible comrades are useful to extremists on both sides. For those who hate Israel, their ascendance confirms everything that they already believe. For those who hate Arabs, their ascendance whets an appetite for intolerance and cruelty and even blood. Kahane’s ideological grandchildren are fittingly responsible for the new mainstreaming of a repulsive Jewish racism. Otzma Yehudit is a minority party, but it is not the smallest minority party in Israel, and it is large enough to figure in Israel’s endless and byzantine parliamentary politics. The harsh truth is that the party’s extremism has been steadily normalized, and this has had the effect of shifting the entire spectrum rightward. 

    Otzma Yehudit’s undemocratic tendencies are mirrored by more moderate right-wing colleagues in the Knesset who recently passed a law criminalizing the flying of Palestinian flags in publicly funded places, such as universities. The bill was introduced by Eli Cohen, a member of the center-right Likud Party, in response to a particularly large demonstration commemorating the Naqba at Ben Gurion University. At the debate preceding the vote on the bill, he shouted at those in opposition to “go to Gaza or Jordan.” He also snarled at the Arab members of parliament that “Naqba Day is your day of jealousy against Israel… your eyes pop out when you see how we turned the state of Israel into a powerful country.” Israel Katz, another member of Likud, declared: “I warned the Arab students who are flying Palestine flags at universities: Remember ‘48. Remember our war of independence and your Naqba. Don’t stretch the rope too thin.… If you don’t calm down, we’ll teach you a lesson that won’t be forgotten.” 

    It is true that a number of the people participating in the protests commemorating the Naqba are agitating for the destruction of the Jewish state. They fly the Palestinian flag, in many cases, because they want the state of Israel to be destroyed and for Palestine to include all the territory “from the river to the sea.” Zionists, on any point of the political spectrum, must oppose those aspirations, on moral and historical grounds; allegations of illegitimacy and fantasies of elimination are not criticisms, they are threats. But these same self-respecting Zionists must also allow the demonstrations to take place, because they live in what they love to call “the only democracy in the Middle East,” and democracies must tolerate non-violent protest no matter how unpleasant.

    On March 10 of this year, members of Knesset also renewed the Citizenship Law, which bans Palestinians who marry Israelis from obtaining permanent residency in Israel. Whereas the country generally grants residency to most non-citizens who are married to Israelis under a policy called Family Unification, this law was designed to exempt Palestinians married to Israelis from reaping that benefit. About 12,700 such Palestinians live in Israel. Many are not permitted to drive or to open bank accounts. If their marriage ends — through death or divorce — the Palestinian partner may be separated from their children and deported to the West Bank. In early 2022, Ayelet Shaked, the Interior Minister, gave instructions to continue enforcing the law even though it had not yet been renewed. Ben Gvirism is only a few steps away from the spirit of this effort.

    It is important to note — to insist — that the Palestinian question and the Arab Israeli question are distinct. The former concerns an occupied population in need of a political settlement, the latter concerns citizens of the state. Those who insist that the Palestinian problem will be solved as soon as Israel halts the occupation ignore the role that the Palestinians themselves play in the perpetuation of violence. Israelis are right to be mindful of the history of Palestinian behavior in the West Bank and Gaza. Though Israel cannot survive as both a democratic and Jewish state unless the occupation ends, the occupation cannot be unilaterally dismantled, at least not responsibly. When Israel tried to do so in the past in part of Gaza, Palestinian extremists responded with violence because they did not want a two-state solution, they wanted a one state solution, which is to say, they wanted the elimination of the Jewish state. This conflict will not be resolved by people who refuse to acknowledge the dangers to Israel.

    Still, as the Citizenship Law makes plain, the Arab Israeli issue and the Palestinian issue often overlap. Arab citizens of Israel are rightly reminded often that in their country they enjoy rights which would be denied them in any Arab country — but they are not in an Arab country, and it is abundantly clear to them, and to honest observers of Israeli society, that they enjoy fewer of the fruits of life in a democracy than their Jewish cohabitants do. It is morally wrong and politically imprudent to strip a minority, especially a large minority, of their rights. These existential disparities only increase resentment — and Palestinian nationalism — among Arab Israelis, many of whom are related to Palestinians who live nearby in the West Bank.

    The controversial Nation-State Law of 2018 was another awful reminder that Israel serves it Jewish citizens before its Arab citizens. The law was designed to protect the Jewish character of Israel (as if it is under threat by anything except the prospect of the annexation of the territories), and it states that “the right to exercise national self-determination” in Israel is “unique to the Jewish people.” It also stripped Arabic of its status as one of the national languages, and demoted it to a language with “special status.” This was a slap in the face of Arab Israelis. The symbolism was clear: Arab citizens are second-class citizens. The legislation underscored the already manifest reality that Arab citizens of Israel are considered by a majority of the Israeli government to be a subaltern group and a threat to the country. It also repudiates the remarkably inclusive and egalitarian spirit of Israel’s Declaration of Independence, which somehow found a way to combine a universal guarantee of rights with a powerful statement of Jewish self-determination.

    These are just some of the laws that overtly affect Arab Israelis. But then there are the unspoken rules that dictate their quality of life. The crime waves in Arab communities that Mansour Abbas has dedicated enormous effort to quelling should be dealt with by the government, but so little of the national budget (and national interest) is dedicated to the maintenance of Arab cities and villages. The spending package that Netanyahu passed for Arab communities (shockingly, the biggest to date) was largely wasted because the infrastructure was not prepared for the proper allocation of funds. It is incredibly difficult for Arab Israelis to get permits to build homes legally. Many sit on waiting lists for years. Owing to this, most of the buildings in Arab cities and villages in Israel are illegal, which means, among other things, that their homes cannot be hooked up to the electricity grids in the country. Black market electricity circuits are set up in these places, and they explode regularly. In addition, the demolition of illegally built Arab buildings accelerated during the pandemic and left almost a thousand Arabs homeless. If the Bennett-Lapid government had been permitted to last longer than one year, perhaps Abbas would have been able to attend to these and other conditions. But that is a senseless hypothetical: there is a reason the government was forced to collapse. There were just too many opponents of decency.

    And all of this leaves aside the other forest: the question of peace with Palestinians. About this the majority of Israelis, like Yehoshua’s forest ranger, would rather not think at all. Mansour Abbas was able to achieve as much as he did in a coalition with Naftali Bennet because the two agreed to leave the issue alone. Abbas has made it clear that he considers it his responsibility to do what he can for his constituents, and that he can only ameliorate conditions for them if he steers clear of the Palestinian conundrum. But I find myself returning to the following questions. There is a politically significant abundance of right-wing Zionists who insist that the only solution to the Palestinian question is the annexation of all territories into a single Jewish state and who remind the Arab Israelis at every opportunity that they will never be treated as equal citizens of a Jewish state. As the ancient rabbis used to say when they were incredulous, do their ears hear what their mouths have just said? What do these Jewish patriots think will happen if a one-state solution is declared? Do they imagine that the Arab citizens of their newly established utopia will go merrily into that good democracy, or is democracy not a part of their plan? Do they believe that 3.2 million Palestinians can be smoothly and justly absorbed? Have they forgotten that a permanent demographic majority of Jews in the state is the very essence of Zionism’s revolutionary promise of security for the Jewish people?

    The right-wing integrationists, in other words, are the ones who need to believe in Arab and Israeli comity from the river to the sea. (They deny this, of course, because for them integration has nothing to do with emancipation and everything to do with domination.) Their single state will be a multi-ethnic state. One would think, therefore, that if they want their single multi-ethnic state to function and to sustain itself, these Zionists’ top priority should be the amelioration of the quality of life for Arab Israelis. Why aren’t they protesting Ben Gvir? Why aren’t they protesting the Nation State Law? Why are they regularly insulting the people with whom they propose to share a polity, and already do share a polity?

    Why, indeed, aren’t they voting for Mansour Abbas? As it happens, some Jewish Israelis are. Polls indicate that in the next election Jewish votes will account for fully half a seat of Mansour Abbas’ party. The handful of Jews who vote for Mansour Abbas represent an enlightened minority. They are taking the future seriously. But most Israelis, like the characters in Yehoshua’s story who live in Jerusalem and have never been to the forest, prefer to ignore the problem. Their willful ignorance is one of the villains of our story. Since 1968, Israelis have developed more elaborate methods for ignoring the problem than simply planting trees over it. Highways are designed, for example, in such a way that Israelis never have to look at the long wall that they have constructed between the Israeli and Palestinian populations. (As a security measure, the wall is a success and a necessity. But it has the added “benefit” of shielding Israeli citizens from ever having to face the realities of life on the other side of it.) Except for Haaretz and some smaller publications, the reporting on most of these issues is highly selective. There exists an infrastructure for ignorance and indifference. 

    As should be obvious by now, the kind of Zionists who do not care about the fate of the Palestinians are also the kind who do not care about Arab Israelis. For this and many other reasons, a one-state solution is no solution at all. But is there really any point, at this late date in the history of this conflict, in pretending that neither Israel nor the Palestinians have committed crimes and abuses? Is there really any point in pretending that these crimes and abuses vitiate the right of each people to part of the land? These two peoples are not going anywhere. They have nowhere to go. They both deserve safety and dignity. Their fates are forever intertwined.

    Heartsickness is not the same as heartbrokenness. Heartsickness is a finer kind of pain. The unalloyed emotions are more common: usually one is either enraptured or envenomed. But heartsickness is nothing so unitary. Through it one is both steadfast and wounded. It is the only politically responsible kind of loyalty, because it makes room for criticism, even withering criticism, within loyalty, within ahavat yisrael, or love of the Jewish people. Zionists, like the decent citizens of all actual states, must learn to be cognitive contortionists, condemning Israel for what it does wrong, praising it for what it does right, and defending it when it is wrongly accused. One must be careful not to commit the Fire Scout’s mistake: one must not allow the admixture of diffidence and ignorance to congeal into hatred and incite one to burn the whole thing down. The existence of Israel, and its security, is completely justified. But the duties of a Zionist do not stop at support. One must also not permit a marrow-deep loyalty to compel one to defend the indefensible, or to silence criticism for fear of abetting ideological enemies. 

    This is difficult work, especially regarding a conflict upon which so many people opine but which so few understand. The conflict itself must be disentangled from the discourse about it, that one which rages on social media and college campuses every time influencers are reminded about that tempestuous plot of Earth to which they have not given a thought since the last related virality. The ferocity of that discourse is sustained by an obnoxious disdain for the full history. Virtually all involved developed their view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the political and cultural environment that they inhabit, without bothering to learn about the mind-boggling intricacies that characterize it. Everyone’s position is a priori

    On the left, the loudest and most common criticism of Israel begins and ends with the assumption that Israel is an illegitimate state, that it is a colonialist enterprise, that the Jews materialized in the Levant after the Holocaust as devastated interlopers and that that tragedy blinded the international community long enough to grant that traumatized mass statehood. Jewish history and Middle Eastern history are ignored. Millions of people blithely pass judgment about the existential legitimacy of a country about which they know only what they have gleaned from headlines and infographics. For this reason, they often criticize it for the wrong thing and with the wrong intensity. (I leave aside the considerable segment of Israel’s critics, here and abroad, that is animated by anti-Semitism.) Why bother learning about a country that shouldn’t exist in the first place? And the loudest and most visible responses from the Zionist right are often also fueled by selective ignorance. They know enough to defend Israel when it is wrongly accused, but not enough to criticize it for its transgressions; or they do not wish to know the latter, because their Zionist pride is too coarse to practice such self-scrutiny. Why bother criticizing a country that everyone else is already lambasting?

    Consider the terrible killing of Shireen Abu Akleh on May 11 during an Israeli military raid on the city of Jenin in the West Bank. The raid was precipitated by Arab terrorist attacks that resulted in the death of nineteen civilians within Israel in the preceding weeks. Is nineteen a negligible number? During the raid, the renowned Al Jazeera reporter was shot in the head. Though the circumstances of her death remained murky for months, Al Jazeera insisted immediately, with perfect certainty, before any investigation was even possible, that she had been “assassinated in cold blood” by the Israeli army. There was no evidence that this was true, or that it was false; but news outlets across the globe repeated the “analysis.” Most consumers of mainstream media therefore continue to believe that Israel ordered the assassination of a journalist.

    For months the Palestinian Authority held onto the bullet that had killed Abu Akleh, preventing a third-party investigation. Meanwhile CNN published a “report” thirteen days after the tragedy which stated that “new evidence suggests Shireen Abu Akleh was killed in a targeted attack by Israeli forces.” But the report itself contained no new evidence. Thirteen days is not enough time to conduct a responsible inquiry. The New York Times released a report on June 3 in which two experts analyzed the sound of the gunfire from a video recorded close to the site when Abu Akleh was shot. One expert deduced that it was likely fired by Israeli forces from “at least 181 yards… and up to 211 yards away;” the other deduced that it was fired “from a distance of 170 to 196 yards.” That means it was fired from about one tenth of a mile away — and Israeli soldiers were about that distance from Abu Akleh at the time. When the bullet was finally handed over to American investigators, the Department of State reported that, though the bullet was severely damaged, it is likely that it was fired by an Israeli soldier. The United States Security Coordinator “found no reason to believe that this was intentional, but rather the result of tragic circumstances.” But the a priori crowd — the priorists, we might call them — hardly noticed. In their minds the verdict was obvious, and was delivered on the day Abu Akleh was shot. (According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, the number of journalists killed while covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1992 (25) is significantly smaller than the number killed covering Afghanistan (65), Russia (82), Syria (141) and Iraq (248) during the same period. Moreover, mainstream media outlets do not accuse American soldiers of “assassinating” journalists when they are killed in battle, but of killing them — a distinction with a good deal of difference.)

    Then another terrible thing happened. At the funeral procession held on May 13 in East Jerusalem, Israeli riot police officers attacked the mourners carrying Abu Akleh’s coffin. In the videos of the event, a dozen or so armed and helmeted officers can be seen beating the unarmed mourners with batons. The coffin was barely saved from smashing to the ground. The Israeli police later said that they had attacked the pallbearers because the coffin had been carried rather than driven in a hearse, as had been agreed beforehand. The defiling of the funeral, the conduct of Israeli policemen at the event, was a disgrace. But most consumers of mainstream media had stopped paying attention to the Abu Akleh affair before the time of the funeral two days later, and so did not blame Israel for attacking the mourning procession. If the subject comes up, they blame Israel for deliberately assassinating a journalist, which is precisely what Israel did not do. In this way Israel is both wrongly accused and yet not held to account. And so it goes with many events related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

    And there are blinding and corrupting ways of defending Israel. Zionists repeat catechismic assurances of Israel’s perfect innocence, which is priorism of the other kind. While Itamar Ben Gvir defends Israeli terrorists, many Zionists reflexively point out that there are more Palestinian terrorists, which is true but a way of changing the subject. While Ben Gvir’s political strength grows, many of Israel’s defenders protest — truthfully — that the Palestinian government rewards the families of Palestinian terrorists, and that Palestinians give their children candy in the streets when a terrorist murders a Jew. That, too, is a way of changing the subject. While Israeli Arabs are targeted directly and blatantly by Kahanists, many Zionists point out — truthfully — that the quality of life for Arab Israelis is better than the quality of life they enjoy in any Arab country. Again, a different subject.

    Let us stop changing the subject. Is it really so difficult to condemn racist and violent Palestinians and racist and violent Israelis? What kind of a democracy justifies itself by comparing itself to non-democracies? These comparisons are sophistical and pathetic. Enslaved to a merely tribal loyalty, such Zionists are derelict in their duties and may preside over the corruption of their own country. After all, Ben Gvir and his supporters, and the radical Israeli right more generally, do not represent the majority, even if the undercurrent of racist hatred in the country is metastasizing beyond tolerable proportions. They depend for their political success on the passivity of the tribal loyalists, of the forest scouts, who are content to put no pressure on their own patriotism and never admit that Israel has moral failings. 

    It is not the duty of a citizen, or an ally, or a supporter of any cause, to lie, to evade and digress, to refuse knowledge, to suffice with slogans, to ignore or excuse the ugliest permutations of their own community. Right-wing Zionist extremism is growing in Israel. I am not a bad Jew or a bad Zionist for saying so, and you are not a good Jew and a good Zionist for changing the subject. Too many Zionists who live far from Yehoshua’s forest teach their children to fear the truth, as if Zionism or Israeli identity cannot withstand it. But fear of the truth is a dereliction of civic duty. The forests must be faced.

    The Future of Nature

                                                  Being implies obligation.

                                                                         Hans Jonas

    The most incomprehensible moral idiocy of our time is indifference to the fate of the planet. I say this humbly, because I have not really said it until just now: I am late to the truth. Not that I ever denied it, of course; deferring to science on matters about which only science has authority is a quintessential act of reason and even of love, if love includes the desire to protect and protract the life of who and what is loved. The problem with environmental concern has been precisely that its grounds are so obvious — it has become a part of the standard equipment of an enlightened individual, an ambient truth dulled by its own ambience. It has produced, since the nineteenth century, a beautiful literature, whose beauty seems almost a promise of its futility: to read Muir or Leopold or Carson is to be enchanted when one should be agitated. What does “nature writing” have to do with nature policy? In politics, certainly, the cause of the environment, when it is not outrightly rejected by liars and profiteers, occasions more lip service than any other cause. The apocalypse has become a platitude, as it often does. For many years the temporal distance of the doom blunted the fear of it; time, in a rare role for it, seemed like our friend. And so, like many people, I prevaricated, I cared, but not the most. The truth is never enough to set you free.

    Yet now, at least in my case, the fear must be dusted off, and the shock of environmental awareness must be refreshed. Time is a false friend. It helps that the weather is increasingly the breaking news above the fold. (Remember the fold?) Suddenly one must add to the expertise of the scientists the evidence of one’s senses. No, every scalding day of summer does not prove that the world is burning up, but it is invidious — it is unempirical — to pretend that nothing is happening, that it has not begun, that the question of climate change is still purely futural. Have we ever lived so meteorologically? Even in regions of the world where human evil seems unsurpassable, the cruelties of the environment are catching up quickly; but then those cruelties, too, are the consequences of human evil — or more precisely, of human action, even of laudable human action, which, if it continues unmodified into this early era of climate disaster, will indeed become a variety of human evil. About some things, the age of unanticipated consequences is over. We know what the planetary effects of some of our actions will be.

    What, really, is the other side of this question? Clearly nobody is for environmental holocaust. But there are political leaders and political parties that, in their anti-regulatory zealotry and their cultural hostility to ecological concerns, may as well be for it. It is indeed the case that scientists may sometimes be wrong; but the fallibility of science is one of its glories, because scientists are the first to acknowledge it, and it comes with a principled impatience for its own correction. The repudiation of science that is now one of the defining characteristics of the American right must not be allowed to hide behind the provisional and experimental nature of scientific research. Being wrong is not as egregious as being stupid. And environmentalists, for their part, must learn to accept that dogmatism is not more attractive when it serves the proper side. The sanctimony of the party of the earth is sometimes hard to take. The worst scenario is not the only scenario. There are many legitimate debates to be had within the community of alarm.

    Many years ago I became interested in a debate about environmental regulation between the advocates of the “precautionary principle” and the advocates of cost-benefit analysis. The latter contend that the best way to evaluate environmental damage is in economic terms, as if all of it is quantifiable; and that precipitous action against a particular risk often produces other risks, so that we will only aggravate the problem that we set out to solve; and that a policy of preemption, of general foreboding, would have an excessively inhibiting effect on innovation and growth. The former, the precautionists, who are arguing for extra dollops of prudence, prefer philosophical arguments and humane attitudes that come without the apparatus of social science; they insist that the stakes are too high to think in merely economic ways, which in any event are no guarantee of accuracy or success, and that erring in the direction of caution, which is to say, of economically contested policies, is morally and practically justified. Precaution has been more popular in Europe than in America, as in this typical declaration of a United Nations Economic Conference for Europe in 1990: “In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the Precautionary Principle. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.”

    It is hard for me to believe that if sensible precautionary measures, which is to say, regulations unpopular in some of the business community, had been adopted in this country (and some were) years ago, the iPhone and the app would not have been invented. Nor should greed be permitted to disguise itself as a high-minded anxiety about sustainable growth. In truth, our predicament is Pascalian, and it calls for a wager: if a strict regime of regulation makes a decisive difference in saving us, then we (and all life) will have won everything, and if it does not, then we will have lost nothing, except some profits. Better safe than incinerated. My summary of this important debate, which is pertinent to many areas of human affairs, will strike economists as tendentious, and they will be right: in a conflict between economics and ethics, I stop caring about the money. When I listen to the anti-regulatory protestations of many Republicans, what I hear is not much more than expressions of corporate avarice, which are hard to dignify in the face of the dangers under discussion. (I feel the same way about our economic policy toward China: on the one side, concentration camps; on the other side, the terrifying prospect that American executives may not be able to afford summer homes.)

    In a time when the early ravages of global warming can be witnessed and not merely modeled, I cannot comprehend, except in terms of base human motives, the resistance to ambitious historical action. Capitalism has become hysterical. The biggest whiners in our society are its richest members. Every attempted intervention in American capitalism’s own idea of what is best for itself is regarded by its titans as the slippery slope to the Komsomol and the Gulag. Of course the controversial environmental interventions are animated by values that are not at all anti-capitalist, but they do not concede the primacy of economic values. After all, the question of the place of business in a society is not a question for businesspeople to answer, and not only because they are the interested parties. It is a question of philosophy and politics, about which high net-worth individuals have no special competence. Compare the earthly gains of heavy regulation to the earthly costs of light regulation or no regulation at all, and the hit that American capitalists must take for the good of the earth will seem stupendously slight. (We can always give them medals.) Anyway, isn’t existence good for business? And aren’t there obscene sums of money — if that is the only language we wish to understand — to be made in new forms of energy and more responsible forms of consumption? And why should the American people be stirred by the cause of carried interest? The capitalists of our day are giving capitalism a bad name, which is unfortunate for many reasons, not least because the alternatives to the capitalist order have not exactly distinguished themselves with their sensitivity to the skies. They emit a lot of smoke.

    There are few more difficult assignments for the human mind than the calibration of fear. Reason and unreason run smack into each other on this ground. Scholars have developed an enormously sophisticated body of work about risks, probabilities, and the “heuristics” that are required for the accurate analysis of them. All this is a boon to technocracy, and people who are in the grip of fear — about the environment, about public health, about the economy — should spare a few kind words for the technocrats. They exist because of the diabolical complexity of the perils we face, and their efforts are a tribute to the astonishing expansion of knowledge in our time. We suffer from conditions that we, I mean the ordinary people in the street, cannot sufficiently understand, and so we are hugely indebted to those who devote their lives to doing so. In its coldness, technocracy is a kind of compassion. It is certainly a part of the answer to fear. But it is not the entirety of the answer, because existential fear needs to be addressed by more than governmental policy. The problem of fear, in the individual and in the mass, is a political and cultural and even spiritual problem — a circumstance in which public reason must be supplemented by private reason, and self-mastery must accompany collective action. Those are glib formulations, I know — Stoicism, yet again; but I am afraid. One must find a way not to be rattled by every news cycle, by every report of every flood and every drought and every riven glacier.

    The important thing is that the fears of others must not be belittled. We saw the results of such disrespect in the election of 2016. But neither should the fears of others command perfect deference. Nobody’s fear can have the last word about us all. Fear cannot be overcome without making discriminations among its varieties. There are instances in which the threat precedes the fear and instances in which the fear precedes, or invents, the threat. There are fears that have a basis in reality, the so-called rational fears, which cannot be reduced to psychology or psychopathology. And there are fears that are expressions of subjective realities searching for objective realities with which to justify themselves, and usually finding them. Those latter fears are the ones that hurt people, sometimes many millions of them. The challenge for politics in a populist era is how to address false fears. Of course they will not be constructively addressed unless we are willing to recognize fears that are true, not least in people with whom we disagree. But that is not easily accomplished: the most crushing blow of the pandemic, aside from the number of deaths, was the discovery that not even the plain factuality of the virus sufficed to unite the country, to join us all in a single, empirically warranted fear. If this damaged sense of reality persists into our confrontation with the future of nature, we truly will be the authors of our own destruction.

    The singular urgency of the threat to the environment poses also another intellectual difficulty: how to reconcile it with all our other commitments. It is partly for the sake of those other commitments that the campaign to reverse our current course of environmental abuse is conducted. This endangered planet teems with good and beautiful activities (and with bad and ugly activities, of course), and beneath the injured ozone layer there are struggles for justice that do not deserve to be trumped. But there are those who believe that the environmental danger is the danger of dangers, that it trumps everything. Emotionally speaking, the fanaticism on this question can seem commensurate with the fear. Anybody who is not a little panicked is a little crazy. In some instances the fanaticism has issued in violence, in “eco-terrorism,” in an environmental suspension of the ethical, though it would be wrong to tar the whole movement with these crimes; and there have also been explosions of “eco-fascism,” in which right-wing shooters have invoked environmentalism as a motive for their racist massacres. (They are the intersectionalists of the right.)

    The problem with environmental fanaticism is not that the cause is wrong but that the feeling is wrong. Fanaticism always represents an erroneous analysis of human existence. It erases every commitment except one, and thereby refuses to recognize the unalterably multifarious nature of being human — the multiplicity of the spheres that we inhabit, which is the most fundamental fact about us, more fundamental even than our animal nature because it is our distinction among the animals. We are the species whose diversity is not only external but also internal. We famously search for meaning, and even before we find it, if we find it, we find meanings. There are so many of them because we have so many possibilities and capabilities. Philosophers sometimes call us “self-interpreting beings,” and with that capacity for self-interpretation, with our powers of mind and imagination, we surmount our biology, even to the grotesque point of attempting to surmount our mortality. This defining trait of variousness extends also to the assessment of threats: there is never just one. Obviously we should prioritize the threats we face, but almost never down to one. One way of characterizing the abundance of human life — a dark way — is that there are so many things to be threatened, so many things to protect.

    “How immensely the world is simplified,” Walter Benjamin observed, “when it is examined for its worthiness for destruction.” Fanaticism is not the only instrument of simplification in our time. There is a new instrument, a theoretical and ideological innovation, and it has been extended to the discussion of the environment. It is the social and political monism known as intersectionality. It was designed to make the many one. (Monism is the brainstorm of people who are fatigued by their own plurality.) It is a cheap answer to the problem known as the incommensurability of values, which recognizes that there are differences and contradictions, their terms irreducible and irrefutable, that will not be reconciled. Intersectionality knows no such tensions, except with oppressors. It is a theory of the commensurability, the even weighting, of all injustices, though there are victims of prejudice and violence to whom the intersectionalists do not extend their otherwise categorical concern. How ironic it is, that an idea that was originated by celebrants of diversity should be so flattening. Here, for example, is the beginning of a recent book, a rich document of contemporary progressivism, called The Intersectional Environmentalist:

    We can’t save the planet without uplifting the voices of its people, especially those most often unheard. We should care about the protection of people as much as we care about the protection of our planet. Unfortunately, as with other animals, some humans are endangered and facing a multitude of social and environmental injustices that impact their ability not only to survive but also to thrive in liberation and joy. Why, then, are conservation efforts not extended to the protection of endangered humans and their human rights? This is a question I’ve struggled with as a Black environmentalist for years, because in my environmental practice, caring for the earth means caring for its people.

    When I studied environmental science as an undergrad at a predominantly white institution, social issues were perpetually separated from environmentalism, and sustainability, conservation. As a Black student in STEM, I had to search beyond the classroom to learn about the contributions of people of color to sustainability. The lack of representation of Black, Brown, Indigenous, Asian, low income, LGBTQ+, disabled, and other marginalized voices has led to an ineffective mainstream environmentalism that doesn’t truly stand for the liberation of all peoples and the planet. Social injustice and environmental injustice are fueled by the same flame….

    And then the author, a well-known activist named Leah Thomas, continues even more personally:

    Patience begins to run out and internal fires begin to burn when you’re silencing parts of yourself. Did the environmental leaders I followed understand the gravity of risk associated with Black citizens across the world who faced violence for public demonstrations? Did they understand the fear that I faced at every protest I’ve attended since watching non-violent protesters in Ferguson be beaten, maced, and terrorized and Black reporters harassed and jailed?

    The disconnect was isolating. I watched predominantly white environmental protestors chain themselves to buildings, illegally deface property, trespass, and flaunt their arrests on camera during their protests and I started to wonder: how? When non-violent protesters or innocent Black, Indigenous, Latinx, and Asian citizens are met with injustice for smaller infractions, such as existing, I had to ask: how privileged must one be to so boldly participate in theatrical protests?

    Never mind the downpour of cliches. There is an idea here, and a very popular one with a long past unknown to the author. The idea is that every unfairness is like every other unfairness; and luck runs together, too. There is only the party of misfortune and the party of fortune. In such an account, the similarities between social justice and environmental justice outweigh the differences, or there are no differences at all. Warming temperatures are “oppression,” like all other oppression. A disconnect, indeed. Or rather, a disastrous connect. I say disastrous, because the conflation of these problems, of these injustices, will have the consequence of making their respective solutions harder to attain, all the joys of solidarity notwithstanding.

    One must begin a critical analysis of this progressive mentality by noting immediately that there is indeed a linkage between the injustices that enjoys an incontrovertible basis in reality. There is no question but that the poor suffer environmental afflictions as they suffer all other afflictions: more severely than the rest of us. Is there a more punished land on earth than Bangladesh? They have no need for war; they have water. Moreover, the conjunction of poverty with race and ethnicity validates the claim that in heterogeneous societies such as ours the effects of environmental degradation fall disproportionately upon people of color. (This is not to say that as a rule pollution is racially motivated, though in a case such as Flint, Michigan, and I do not doubt that there are others, the relevance of race is difficult to deny.) Thomas cites a paper by researchers at USC called “The Climate Gap: Inequalities in How Climate Change Hurts Americans and How to Close the Gap,” in a journal called Race, Poverty & the Environment in 2009, which concluded that “African Americans on average emit nearly twenty percent less greenhouse gases than non-Hispanic whites per capita. Though less responsible for climate change, African Americans are significantly more vulnerable to its effects than non-Hispanic whites.” The distortions of inequality penetrate everywhere. In Flint, inequality was in the water supply.

    There are two reasons, however, for dissociating the injustices even when they are experienced by the same people. The first is that, like all “systemic” approaches, the intersectional or conflationary approach increases the difficulty of identifying actual causality and attributing actual responsibility. Isolation may be emotionally crushing, as Thomas attests, but it can be intellectually clarifying. To argue that the hole in the ozone layer was made by racism is to play into the hands of the hole-punchers. Such an account distracts attention from the actual etiology of the crisis, which is the necessary preliminary to measures for change. In the reckoning with how technology and economic development came to disfigure the atmosphere, political and cultural analysis must take a back seat to more proximate causes. In an emergency, one must be concrete. When a scientist or an engineer makes a significant breakthrough in the struggle for the planet, it may turn out that the providential individual in the lab coat or the hard hat is also a bigot, but that must be left for another day. His or her scientific integrity will be all that counts; we possess, or we lack, many integrities, and everyone’s record is mottled. And so I could not care less that medical discoveries have been made by anti-Semites. I do not mean to say that science washes away all sins; but the application of science to particular political and social objectives, its historical alliances with good or with evil, is another matter — another blessing or another curse. Moreover, if we were to postpone the healing of our environment for the healing of our society, if the regulation of air and water must await the eradication of prejudice, then we will all die. The rhetoric of activism is not the language of research and reform. Everybody always complains about the weather but nobody ever does anything about it, said the Catskills comedian, and he was onto something.

    The second reason for insisting upon a disjunction between the explanations, for making a distinction between the social climate and the physical climate, is that it honors the scale of the environmental crisis — the natural scale and the ethical scale. I know how I would respond if one of my brethren asked whether carbon is bad for the Jews: I would be embarrassed by the solipsism and amused by the provinciality. The same holds for all other groups. Sometimes only a thin line separates the special pleadings of identities from the special pleadings of interest groups. The analysis of a planetary crisis in terms of identity misunderstands the reach of the crisis, unless of course the identity that is championed is the human one. Now there is an intersection — the one between every living being on the planet! An intersection, and an opportunity for the most comprehensive solidarity in history. Indeed, the planetary character of this crisis arrives as a correction to the plague of particularisms that is injuring so many contemporary societies. There is no greater commonality than the sky. (“When skies are blue,” says the holy fool in the Ian Dury song, “we all feel the benefit.”)

    Is it selfish to evaluate the danger only, or mainly, in terms of one’s own? Environmental catastrophe is a great equalizer, and it is equality that we seek, though not only of the morbid sort. It is wonderful that we are all in this together. Surely we can devise ways to fulfill our specific identities without squandering the occasion for a genuinely universal affirmation. A great philosopher once wrote that “humanity” is a name not only for a species but also for a quality — that is, we may interpret our biological being in a way that raises us above it, and above the self. The entirety of the human world now finds itself joined in a single desperate situation, even if it is experienced at different intensities. And so does the non-human world, thanks to us.

    For this reason, the environmental crisis should complicate the centripetal tendencies of our society, the post-liberal shibboleths that now abound. The prestige of universalism has long been in tatters, for various sorry intellectual and political reasons, but in recent years we have seen the same scorn applied to the category of the global. It is true that globalism served for decades as an alibi for economic rapacity, and that the globalized economy issued in obscene disparities in wealth and security, though it did raise standards of living for untold millions as well. For these reasons — and for uglier ones, including a frightened international recoil from the strenuous expectations of modernity, such as liberty, democracy, egalitarianism, and toleration — there is occurring a great revival of localism. I am told that even corporations, recently schooled in the fragilities of far-flung supply chains, are now “coming home.” The spirit of all this localism is exclusionary and unadventurous. We have become habituated to the tiny idea that all that we must become is what we already are. We regard influences as assaults, as appropriations, as betrayals; we are always policing the cultural and psychological perimeters. Increasingly the only nationalism that we can envision is ethnonationalism. We mistake tradition for a sacralized sclerosis. Within the confinements of our specificities, we exhaust ourselves in strident differentiations from all others. We are authenticity gangsters. When it comes to a generous sense of the other, there is little to choose between the Magyarism of the post-liberal right and the indigenism of the post-liberal left.

    As we contract ourselves, however, the environmental crisis requires that we expand ourselves. Not in our customary way, by clinging against all sense to a program of reckless development or endless growth: the earth has had quite enough of our expansionist talents. We are headed into an era of restraint or ruin. No, this time we must expand ourselves imaginatively, by recognizing that similarities are sometimes more significant than differences, and that the local and the global coincide. Culture is replete with examples of this coincidence. When we enjoy foreign music, it is because the local and the global coincide. Is rhythm particular or universal? When we celebrate the beauty of a building whose design is based on native traditions unlike our own, we erase the tiresome distinction between here and elsewhere. There are cases in politics and policy in which the same erasure must be performed. When we oppose nuclear war and nuclear proliferation, are we dreading only for the fate of one, or some, of our communities? When it comes to the environment, every person is a microcosm of our macrocosmic — of our cosmic — vulnerability. This time we represent not only ourselves but also each other. (And owing to our accountability for their predicament, we represent non-human beings and other organic entities as well.) The forces that are now indifferent to the fate of the planet, who are damaging the air and the water, who refuse to accept the science because they are economically dependent on, or prosper from, fossil fuels — they are the ones who represent only themselves. 

    “You shall not take a wife nor shall you have sons and daughters in this place. For thus said the Lord concerning the sons and concerning the daughters born in this place and concerning their mothers who bore them and concerning the fathers who begat them in this land: Deaths by illness shall they die. They shall not be lamented and shall not be buried. Dung on the face of the soil they shall become, and by the sword and by famine they shall come to an end, and their carcasses shall be food for the fowl of the heaven and the beasts of the earth.” The sixteenth chapter of Jeremiah records this Divine admonition to the tormented prophet. The promise of catastrophe compels a drastic renunciation: Jeremiah is forbidden to have a family, to wed and to have children. The prohibition flies in the face of God’s first instruction to humankind, which was to be fruitful and multiply, and also in the face of the moral priority of the family that was established in the Biblical pre-history of Judaism. It also defies the ancient Jewish belief, stated in the Psalms and elsewhere, in the eternal perdurability of the Jewish people. It is a shocking punishment. But it is not delivered as a punishment: the ferocity of God’s description of the coming horrors makes the command to the prophet seem almost merciful. Jeremiah will be lucky: he will have less to lose, his childlessness will spare him the savage experience of parental bereavement. It would be wrong to bring children into such a world, says the deity who has authorized the inexorable atrocity. 

    “Is it still OK to have a child?” Not long ago Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez asked the question on social media. This is more radical than anything in the Green New Deal. But the question is not hers alone. Environmental alarm has shaken many people’s confidence in the future to the point of their speculating about a willing abdication of it. A parent who reads the macabre timeline to 2° C and its aftermath is immediately put in mind of the age of his own child. (I speak from unpleasant experience.) In a brilliant essay in the London Review of Books two years ago, Meehan Crist reported that “I have​ spent more time than I’d like to admit scrolling through posts by people who have made the decision not to have children because of the climate crisis. These posts radiate varying degrees of fear, despair, political commitment, solidarity, anxiety, and a care for and delight in already existing children.” One such post read: “I always imagined myself having children. However I have felt incredibly hopeless for our future for many years because of the interaction [sic] of governments on climate change … I love kids and feel deeply saddened by this, but I would not willingly want to bring a child into a world I see will be plagued by disaster, ruin, famine & wars… total destruction.” Another post read: “The science is clear. We are about to witness the destruction of everything we love because of the climate crisis. I feel incapable of welcoming an innocent human being into this world knowing the facts.” Crist’s essay was cited by Jia Tolentino in a heartfelt but somewhat incoherent piece in favor of abortion in the New Yorker, where she noted: “I gave birth in the middle of a pandemic that previewed a future of cross-species viral transmission exacerbated by global warming, and during a summer when ten million acres on the West Coast burned. I knew that my child would not only live in this degrading world but contribute to that degradation.”

    Along with the ecological skepticism about reproduction, the outraged response to Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization has contributed to a certain progressive disenchantment with pregnancy. “It was violent even as I loved it,” Tolentino remarks. She describes “the paralyzing back spasms, the ragged desperation of sleeplessness, [and later] the thundering doom that pervaded every cell in my body when I weaned my child.” And she concludes: “Abortion is often talked about as a grave act that requires justification, but bringing a new life into the world felt, to me, like the decision that more clearly risked being a moral mistake.” By all the authority vested in me by fatherhood, I cannot follow her. I do not live in a surfeit of enchantment, and “a new life,” if it landed in a basket at my doorstep like in the old movies, would justify adjustments to my urbanity. Or at least it could not be summarily dismissed as a “moral mistake.” My mother once told me that, when I was three years old, I rushed home from school one afternoon to tell her exciting news: I had just learned that because I was a boy I would never have to endure labor pains. It was good to be me! Later the gender boundary — the womb that I lack — prompted me to empathy and respect: women have physical and biological experiences that men can only imagine, if they can, and their singularity in this regard must be honored. But the fact that I cannot speak about the birth process from the inside does not disqualify me from speaking about it altogether. (Women have hardly been inhibited by their personal unfamiliarity with the subjectivity of manhood from telling men how to live; women’s knowingness about men is one of the salient themes of our culture.) So the bad reputation of pregnancy troubles me, and not only because I have a gamete to give. Soon afterward, in The New York Times, Amanda Hess, one of the paper’s gender commissars, developed the alienation further. “Pregnancy” she complained, “has the power to render any body ridiculous. And yet, as I trudge down the street, my increasingly preposterous dimensions inspire such affirmational outbursts from strangers that I feel at the center of an immense gendered conspiracy, where the self-evident absurdity of my physical situation is instead pitched as the cheerful apotheosis of my life as a woman.” And this: “Though I am of course aware of the biological process through which babies are made, it still feels so supernatural that if you told me that people get pregnant by gobbling up live infants, I might believe it.” I am quite sure that there is nothing that I, or perhaps any man, could have said to relieve her distress. But I swear I never saw a pregnant woman who looked absurd to me.

             There are two ways in which human fertility is considered bad for the planet. The first is that the decaying world will be bad for the child. The second is that the child will be bad for the decaying world. The latter worry is as old as Malthus, and eventually issued in the doctrines of population control and family planning. Those doctrines insist that every decision to have a child, a personal decision if ever there was one, must include a sense of planetariness; and that on the same cosmopolitan grounds measures must be introduced to lower the numbers of involuntary pregnancies and unwanted children. Or, to put it differently, love and desire must find a place for reason, so that values can have an influence on passions. All this, of course, is premised on a consciousness of limits, which is easier said than done for limited beings with dreams of limitlessness. The population of the world is now close to eight billion. The fastest doubling of the world population occurred between 1950 and 1987, from two and a half billion to five billion. The peak population growth in a single year — 2.1% — happened in 1962, and the rate of growth has somewhat slowed. By the end of this century the planet is projected to hold more than eleven billion people. The case for population control is completely persuasive, and the distaste for large families among secular people in the West is morally admirable if emotionally unattractive. (It is worth noting that there may be groups who demand an exemption from demographic austerity as a consequence of historical injustice. Consider the prodigious fertility rates of haredi Jews. Of all the Jewries that were decimated in the Holocaust, the haredim were among the most decimated. Their rate of reproduction is owed, if you will pardon the expression, to a replacement theory, but they are not replacing the living, they are replacing the dead. Genocide, after all, is also a method of population control. There are tens of millions of Jews missing from the world today. When I was growing up, I often heard Jews assent to the idea of population control on condition that we do not go first. My inner universalist and my inner particularist began a battle that has not yet ended.)

             The world will not be redeemed, of course, by a loss of enthusiasm for babies in progressive neighborhoods of the West. But that is hardly the only objection to such a policy. The decision not to have children so as not to increase the burden on the world’s resources is based on a probability, not on a certainty; and the precise probabilities for particular calamities differ, including among scholars. There is, again, a plethora of scenarios. I cannot pretend to be impartial about the outcome of this debate, or to follow only my intellect. There is an outcome that I wish, and it looks like a child. And so I intend to think my way out of the Jeremiah paradigm, and refuse to allow (in Crist’s splendid words) “the toxic logic of the carbon footprint to shape our sense of what [is] possible.” This is not only for sentimental reasons; there are also philosophical reasons to eschew fatalism. There is a lower limit of human renunciation beneath which life is no longer recognizably human. Human parenthood serves more than a merely evolutionary end; it is a laboratory of our beliefs, of our understanding of the aims of human existence. Thoughtful parenthood is lived philosophy. And history has shown again and again that survival need not require a surrender of our deepest purposes. There are many ways to propagate the species and the communities that comprise it, but childlessness is not one of them: it is another technique of extinction. Why would we mortify ourselves for the sake of nature if we did not hold that our humanity, our supra-natural meaningfulness, is worth preserving? The good news about climate change, as well as the bad news, is that it is a dynamic situation, and a great deal will depend on how we intervene against it. We have not yet really begun the fight.

    The question of the environment is the question of technology. It was technology that enabled us to despoil the environment and it is technology that may enable us to repair it.

    I met Hans Jonas before I knew who he was. When I was seventeen, and a little restless at the end of my high school years, I received permission from its intellectually encouraging principal to attend a few night courses in philosophy at the New School for Social Research. One of the courses was on pre-Socratic philosophy — the remarkable rabbi who was the head of my school had agreed to my study of chochmah yevanit, or Greek wisdom, which was precisely what the ancient rabbis had forbidden me to study! I still remember the strange magic of reading Anaxagaros and Parmenides on the D train from Flatbush to Greenwich Village. The instructor was a certain Professor Jonas. I did not know that he was the author of probably the greatest book ever written about Gnosticism, or that he was one of Heidegger’s most distinguished students (the faculty of the New School in 1969 was rich with students of Husserl and Heidegger) and then one of Heidegger’s most withering critics, or that he had been a confirmed Zionist who lived in the yishuv in Palestine for sixteen years, or that he had served as a soldier both in the Jewish Brigade of the British army in the Second World War and in the Haganah, or that he was the world’s preeminent philosopher of the environment. Some of his earliest elaborations of his philosophy of biology, his “philosophy of life,” were made in 1944 and 1945 in “didactic letters” to his wife during his military service in southern Italy. The man was, in a word, a hero. I had never before heard such a pure philosophical voice. Many years later we came to know each other and I was able to express my admiration. By that time I had read his environmental-philosophical writings — first The Phenomenon of Life, according to which “the organic even in its lowest forms prefigures mind and mind even in its highest reaches remains part of the organic,” and which appeared in English in 1966, and then The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for a Technological Age, his masterpiece, which appeared in English in 1984. When its German original appeared in Germany five years earlier, it was a sensation, intellectually and politically. He died in New York in 1993.

    In his posthumously published memoirs, Jonas attributed the enormous influence of his book “to the general recognition, which even then relatively attentive observers could less and less ignore, that something could go wrong with the human race, that it was even on the verge of putting its own existence in jeopardy through ever-increasing technical interventions in nature.” The critique of technology was one of the distinctive contributions of German thought in the twentieth century: from Heidegger to the Frankfurt School, in their different idioms, technology was denounced as a way of denaturing the human, of compressing the individual into a life of pure instrumentality, of alienating us from what we most profoundly are. “There are times,” Jonas wrote, “when the [technological] drive needs moral encouragement, when hope and daring rather than fear and caution should lead. Ours is not one of them.” And Jonas went further. In his writings technology is not an impersonal force that acts upon us. He was exercised not only by what technology is doing to us, but also, and even more, by what we are doing with technology. And so he was moved by the plight of nature, technology’s great target, because his “philosophical biology” persuaded him of the unimaginability of human meaning without the nexus with the natural world. In technology Jonas saw, above all, human agency. His critique of technology led him directly to ethics, because human agency implied human responsibility. There was nothing anti-modern about him. He did not bemoan our powers; he demanded that they be responsibly used.

    The primacy of ethics in Jonas is not to be confused with the primacy of ethics in Buber and Levinas. The ethical relationship that Jonas enjoins is larger and deeper: it is not a relationship between individuals and it is not occasioned by an encounter with an “other.” For Jonas, “being is obligation” — not social being or communal being, but being itself. Heidegger’s renegade student was still in the business of ontology, except that it served for him as a basis for duty rather than rapture. In Jonas’ account of the human, to be alive is to be responsible for life. One takes away from his work an indelible sense of stewardship. He is a philosopher of our obligations to the world. (His teaching is a little reminiscent of Aldo Leopold’s “land ethic” and “ecological conscience.”) Our species-task is to do everything we can to avoid what he nicely calls “the apocalypse of the ‘too much.’” And this requires a new ecological focus. “We know the thing at stake only when we know that it is at stake,” Jonas wrote. “Because this is the way we are made: the perception of the malum is infinitely easier to us than the perception of the bonum.”

    But is that really so? The widespread spectacle of environmental complacence would suggest otherwise. The malum is everywhere and it is still unimpeded. Perhaps our ability to sustain a commitment to historical change died with the death of our attention. There is also a vexing political dimension to the environmental challenge. Aside from the satisfaction of doing the right thing, is it realistic to rely for the salvation of the planet upon the consciences of individuals? Will there ever be enough of them, in our country and in others, to form a social basis for decisive ecological action? Did David Buckel, the man who set himself on fire in Prospect Park in Brooklyn some years ago because “my early death by fossil fuels reflects what we are doing to ourselves” — did his suicide change a thing? The biologist Garrett Hardin, in a famous lecture on “the tragedy of the commons” in 1968, warned, against the grain of his conscience-stricken time, about trusting in appeals to conscience: they would produce mainly anxiety and “feelings of guilt in non-cooperators.” Moreover, decisive ecological action will involve infringements on personal freedom — not for the first time in our constitutional order, to be sure, but these infringements may be ascetic and rough. Hardin called them “mutual coercion mutually agreed upon.” But we are not living in the heyday of mutual agreement, and there are powerful interests at work to prevent any such consensus, even though Congress has passed the Inflation Reduction Act as I write. Nor are we living in a society with any special skill for mortifying itself even in the name of a high ideal.

    Recall the conundrum of population control. Hardin cites a resolution in the United Nations in 1967 that reads: “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the family as the natural and fundamental unit of society. It follows that any choices and decisions with regard to the size of the family must irrevocably rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else.” From the standpoint of the failing environment, however, this is untenable. The family’s autonomous power to determine its own size cannot be completely sacrosanct. But what political power will revoke it, or modify it? Will the government deliver the blow? That will depend on its composition — on us. We live in a democracy: arriving at a social basis for policy is how we govern ourselves. We believe, as a matter of principle, in persuasion and deliberation, one by one by one. But there will never be a majority of citizens who will agree to allow the government into the bedroom, China-style; and their objections will not be mischievous. That is why the logic of environmental reform has led certain thinkers into heretical precincts of thought. “Coercion is a dirty word to most liberals now,” Hardin remarked, “but it need not forever be so.”  It comes as a bit of a shock to read Jonas, who was a lifelong foe of totalitarianism and whose mother was murdered in Auschwitz, suggest that “in the coming severity of a politics of responsible abnegation, democracy (in which the interests of the day necessarily hold the stage) is at least temporarily unsuited, and our present comparative weighing is, reluctantly, between different forms of ‘tyranny.’” Socialism — by which he meant a directed economy — “has an advantage here.” Many readers were upset by these pages in The Imperative of Responsibility. They are weak pages. Which socialist or communist regime has ever improved the environment?

    Jonas was aware that his “reluctant” conclusion about politics, his uncharacteristic soft spot for dirigisme, was owed to his importation into political philosophy of a criterion — will it protect life? — that is not native to it. The environmentalist imperative was given sway over everything else, including liberty. And yet Jonas’ perplexity must be faced. The question of whether the many processes of democracy can work effectively enough and efficiently enough to retard and reverse our present trajectory is a discomfiting question, because it may not have an edifying answer. The scale of the crisis and the speed of the crisis mean that solutions will have to be the work of concentrated political power. Bold legislation and stringent regulation, the ordinary work of elected bodies and federal agencies, need formidable political cover. Does the cause of the planet warrant a unitary executive of its own?

    Once nature mastered us. Then we mastered nature. Now we must master our mastery.  Hardin was wrong when he assured his listeners that “the tragedy of the commons” was a “no technical solution problem.” In the end, so that there will be no end, we may be dependent on technology to save us from the ravages of technology. This is certainly more likely than a massive intellectual and political mobilization across the globe and its various regimes to enact with alacrity a broad and concerted series of unilateral and multilateral measures to reverse all aspects of the planet’s decline. We may be wiser to turn to Prometheus to make amends for the excesses of Prometheanism. Our powers can take back what our powers wrought. Science and technology can vindicate themselves as never before. The prospects for humility, then, are mixed: a crisis that was supposed to convince us of the limits of our power may require more gargantuan exercises of it. The instrumental mind may yet save us for the elevated life beyond instrumentality. With some luck, we may preserve both the earth and the republic.