On December 21, 1908, several hundred men and women gathered at the Bösendorfer-Saal in Vienna, settled into their seats, and bore unexpected witness to one of the great revolutions in musical history. Heading the program that night was a new work for string quartet and soprano by a controversial young composer named Arnold Schoenberg, already known in Viennese music circles for his challenging style: tense, drawn-out Wagnerian harmonies, allowed only the briefest and rarest moments of respite. And indeed, as the first three movements of his piece unfolded — Schoenberg straight away twisting the four lines of the quartet, cat’s-cradle-like, into one splayed chord after another — the crowd could be heard growing increasingly restless. But none of this was, strictly speaking, out of the ordinary. Yet.
Then came the fourth, and final, movement. Suddenly, and seemingly without preparation, Schoenberg abandoned any sense of a home key, or resolution, at all — and unleashed on the unsuspecting audience eleven minutes of total, unforgiving dissonance. There had been near-precedents: flashes of atonality in Debussy, Scriabin, and Strauss. But Schoenberg’s radicalism was of a different order. Unlike Debussy, he did not employ dissonance as a streaky, painterly effect. Unlike Strauss, his atonality did not just bubble up momentarily from otherwise conventional harmonic tensions, as though somebody had simply turned up the heat too high and accidentally caused simmering chords to spill over, for a second, into outright dissonance. No, Schoenberg used atonality, really for the first time in history, directly: as an all-encompassing, self-contained — and consciously abrasive — musical language of its own.
The audience was, predictably, stunned. Schoenberg would later reminisce, perhaps a little romantically, that the crowd began to “riot.” The morning after the concert, one local paper ran the headline “Scandal in the Bösendorfer-Saal!” In another, the music critic called Schoenberg “tone-deaf.” The Neues Wiener Tagblatt published their review in their “Crime” section. Some close to Schoenberg speculated that the fourth movement was simply a crazed musical response to an ongoing crisis in the composer’s personal life. The previous summer, while writing the quartet, Schoenberg had discovered that his wife, Mathilde, was having an affair with their friend and neighbor, the painter Richard Gerstl. Richard and Mathilde eloped shortly after — but in October,
following an intervention from Schoenberg’s pupil Anton Webern, Mathilde agreed to return home. A few weeks later, Gerstl set fire to most of his paintings, stripped naked, and hanged himself in front of the mirror that he used for self-portraits. He was twenty-five years old. Schoenberg, contemplating his own suicide, drafted a will in which he wrote: “I deny facts. All of them, without exception. They have no value to me, for I elude them before they can pull me down. I deny the fact that my wife betrayed me. She did not betray me, for my imagination had already pictured everything that she has done.” In the end, he did not follow Gerstl’s example. The String Quartet No.2, which premiered forty-seven days after the painter’s death, was dedicated “to my wife.”
Others dismissed Schoenberg’s experiments as an adolescent attempt to trash the past, in keeping with the radical mood of the decade. But the composer, an austere and academic man, and living an otherwise bourgeois lifestyle, always insisted that his use of atonality was a rational decision. It was simply a matter of taking the inevitable next step in the evolution of Western music. The conventions of tonality, he would argue a few years later in his theoretical treatise Harmonielehre, had been worn out over the course of the nineteenth century — and melody and rhythm now needed to be decanted into a fresher idiom to ensure their survival.
Whatever the ultimate explanation, what emerged from that night was a narrative that has stuck ever since: that tonality had come to its irreversible end, and that, for serious composers, there was now “no going back.” Thanks in part to the painter Wassily Kandinsky — who, after hearing the quartet in 1911, made his own “break” with pictorial tradition, going fully abstract — and especially to the philosopher Theodor Adorno, who saw in Schoenberg’s work the only truthful musical expression of the horrors of twentieth-century life, a connection was made, too, between atonality and the so-called “crisis of modernity.” The death of traditional harmony, the death of representational art, the death of syntax, the death of God: all the deaths, it was assumed, were intrinsically linked.
It proved to be an intoxicating thesis. In the “high art” musical world, tonality became quickly associated with pastiche and compositional cowardice. And yet atonality, for all Schoenberg’s predictions that it would one day come to sound to us as natural as Mozart or Bach, failed to mature into a lasting idiom of its own. The result has been a profound sense of frustration: a musical culture stuck between a forbidden past and an increasingly irrelevant future. As the composer György Ligeti wrote in 1993: “[One] cannot simply go back to tonality, it’s not the way. We must find a way of neither going back nor continuing the avant-garde. I am in a prison: one wall is the avant-garde, the other wall is the past, and I want to escape.” And all of this has fed into the favored grand narrative of our times: that we are culturally stuck, still unable to get our spinning wheels back out of the modernist ditch. Consider the cultural historian Jacques Barzun’s book From Dawn to Decadence, which appeared in 2000, in which he partitions the last five centuries into two basic chunks: the years 1500 to 1900, during which the West blossomed, and the hundred or so years since, in which we have witnessed a “tailing off.” Our society has become restless, Barzun writes, “for it sees no clear lines of advance.” He continues: “The loss it faces is that of Possibility. The forms of art as of life seem exhausted, the stages of development have been run through.”
As a story, this narrative undoubtedly has a certain allure. If, as seems to me true, we have still not fully recovered our philosophical balance since the blows landed on us by Nietzsche all those years ago, then it would follow, naturally, that other areas of our culture — music among them — would exhibit surface signs of that same spiritual concussion. And indeed, the evidence seems to tally. Can it really be a coincidence that, in the space of a couple of decades at the beginning of the twentieth century, tonal music, representational art, narrative fiction — indeed our very faith in language, in beauty, in truth — all seemed to collapse at once?
A coincidence, no. But neither were these crises, as many people still seem to believe, inevitable and irreversible, as though penciled into the almighty calendar of the universe for a set date and time — a point after which humanity was obliged, by some mysterious force, to abandon its cultural past and start all over again. Put like that, such an idea obviously sounds absurd. But the notion that “history” makes specific demands of us — that, like a stern parent or a jealous god, it will “judge us” harshly if we ignore them — runs much deeper in our cultural subconscious than we perhaps realize. Anyone who wants to understand Schoenberg should first ponder why we, ourselves, still, right now, cannot fully shake the unnerving sense that he might have been right — that modernity really did spell the end of an artistic era, and that it would be wrong, a spiritual failing even, to “go back.”

Rewind for a second, and replay the last few centuries on fast-forward. As a car runs on petrol, humans run on myth — on some kind of a story that gives their lives order and purpose. In the last few decades of the eighteenth century, conscious of the ongoing decline of traditional religion, humans began drilling into every other bit of their inherited conceptual landscape — science, philosophy, art — in search of some new dependable source of meaning. And they found a vast, and surprisingly potent, reservoir of spiritual fuel in, of all things, history. Give it its proper name: historicism. In the most basic telling, historicism is simply the belief that, like the laws of physics, there exist laws that dictate how history, too, will unfold. For nineteenth-century Europe, the task of discovering these historical laws, and then shaping our lives according to them — finding the inevitable stages that art is “meant” to pass through, for instance, and then doing one’s best to bring them about — proved a remarkably rich and rewarding project. Under the influence, in particular, of Hegel — who argued, brilliantly if a little oddly to our ears today, that every single aspect of history could be understood as part of the universe’s great teleological plan to become fully self-aware — historicist ideas spread rapidly into pretty much every aspect of intellectual culture.
True, the days of industrial-scale drilling for meaning — with Hegelian geysers spurting up all across Europe — are behind us. But historicism still bubbles up. Look at our language. We talk endlessly about “making history”; accuse each other of being on history’s “wrong” side (or boast that we are on its “right” one); argue that our beliefs are “ahead of ” — or “behind” — its curve. We view everything, natural or human, developmentally. The tyranny of history owes as much to Darwin as to Hegel (and then of course to Marx). History, and the particular histories which it contains, is confidently headed toward a goal, a telos. We repeat, almost ritually, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s dictum that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”
None of this is quite the same thing as a belief in full-on determinism. What really sets historicism apart — what made it, and continues to make it, so alluring — was, as the Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski once put it, that it turned history into something “real: not just something that once was, but a living being.” History became, that is, an anthropomorphic figure. It wants to unfold in certain ways, and we feel a profound obligation to make sure that it does so. We gain a monumental, even quasi-religious, sense of purpose — but a monumental burden, too. How often do we hear, for instance, the complaint that “even in 2023” some people still hold certain views — not because these beliefs contravene permanent moral laws, but because they happen to have popped up at the wrong time, like a magician’s assistant, struggling with a faulty trapdoor, emerging through the floor several moments too late? In 1936, Friedrich Meinecke called historicism “one of the greatest intellectual revolutions that has ever taken place in Western thought.” The contemporary historian Thomas Albert Howard calls it the defining ideology of our age — a “post-theological worldview coeval with modernity.” So entrenched is it in our way of thinking in fact, that we barely notice it. As Paul de Man once put it: “Whether we know it, or like it, or not, most of us are Hegelians…. Few thinkers have so many disciples who never read a word of their master’s writings.”
Certainly Schoenberg was animated by a profound sense of historical duty as he put the finishing touches to his quartet in that summer of 1908. And he was, himself, just one link in an already much older chain. Casting his gaze back over the nineteenth century, he would have seen generations of musicians, themselves influenced by emerging historicist ideas, increasingly troubled by — as they saw it — the coming end of traditional harmony. He would have seen the growing popularity of the Hegelian notion that the teleological endpoint of all art is complete abstraction. He would have seen impassioned claims about some great irreversible rupture from the past — and the birth of a uniquely modern age towards which artists had a new spiritual responsibility. All he — Schoenberg — really needed to do was to write down the notes.

In 1847, at the age of thirty-five, and at the height of his fame, Franz Liszt, the composer and virtuoso pianist, suddenly, abruptly, quit touring. For almost a decade before, the Hungarian master had been the nearest thing the nineteenth century had to a pop star. Women fainted at his concerts. They fought over his used handkerchiefs. Some brought phials into which to pour his old coffee dregs. One admirer even had a cigar stump that Liszt had discarded encased in a diamond-encrusted locket. It helped, of course, that Liszt had clenched-fist cheekbones, flowing hair, and a jaw that you could use to teach children about right-angles. It helped doubly that he was generally considered — as he still is, by many today — to be the greatest pianist ever to have lived.
All the more strange, then, that Liszt should not only withdraw from performing, but settle, of all places, in Weimar — a small, sleepy town in central Germany, which George Eliot, on a trip there only a few years later, would describe as a “dull, lifeless village.” But Liszt had plans. Ostensibly there to take on a small (but handsomely paid) conducting role with the local orchestra, he was afforded enough time — finally — to think intently, and intensely, about a growing preoccupation of his: the future of music. That Liszt should be interested in the future was, of course, nothing unusual. The previous century had been marked not only by rapid social and technological change, but by a heightened sense, too, that such change was now predictable. Indeed, for many people, the apparent successes of democracy, capitalism, and the sciences — as well as emerging “social sciences” like economics — yielded confidence that the future was, really for the first time, something fully controllable. Now hurtling along at a thrilling speed, nineteenth-century Europeans began to reorientate themselves, switching from rear-facing to forward-facing seats.
Naturally, this led to an increased dynamism in the arts. But Liszt, as his lover Princess Sayn-Wittgenstein would later write, “hurled his lance much further into the future” than most. Already, behind the scenes, and rather in conflict with his reputation as a showy and shallow crowd-pleaser, Liszt had been working on some of the most harmonically experimental music ever produced. If you had broken into his study in, say, 1842, you would have probably found, on his desk, a pile of radical sketches for piano, each only a bar or two long, testing out wild, chromatic flourishes and cascading stacks of clashing chords. None of these early snippets was ever performed in public. But as steps in the evolution of Liszt’s compositional psyche — and in the development, therefore, of nineteenth-century music more widely — there is a good case to be made that they count among the most consequential bits of music ever written. The key to understanding why, though, is in the strange title that Liszt gave to each one: Prélude Omnitonique.
A decade earlier, in 1832, a twenty-one-year-old Liszt had attended a series of lectures given by the Belgian musicologist François-Joseph Fétis. Fétis had been working on an elaborate theory about the predetermined teleological evolution, and therefore the inevitable destiny, of music — based, at that point, on a relatively new idea: “tonality.” Even today, tonality is a slippery concept: Patrick McCreless, a professor of music theory at Yale, claimed recently not to have the first clue what the word really meant. To paint the matter in primary colors, tonality simply refers to the set of implicit harmonic rules, seemingly intuitive to us all, by which almost all music, in the West at least, has abided for the last five hundred years. Why do certain combinations of notes sound pleasant and others intolerable? Why do some chords sound awkward and restless, while others seem perfectly happy where they are? We might never fully know the answer, but — in just the same way we call that mysterious force by which physical objects are drawn to each other “gravity” — we can at least give the phenomenon a name: tonality.
All of this was already tacitly understood. But like his good friend Alexandre-Étienne Choron — who had first coined the term “tonality” in 1810 — Fétis wanted to step back and analyze the concept as a whole, from all sides. He had noticed — who hadn’t? — that the history of music was a story of ever-growing harmonic complexity, from the single-line simplicity of medieval plainchant to the constant key-hopping and deliberate dissonances of Beethoven. And, spotting a link with the voguish Hegelianism of his time, he posited that this was not, as many had previously assumed, because we were discovering ever-more intricate connections between the natural mathematical laws underpinning music, but because human consciousness itself was evolving, and demanding of music, as it were, ever-greater levels of harmonic excitement. Tonality, in other words, was not something coded into the laws of nature, but a kind of mental ability — which, like every other aspect of human thought, was developing teleologically over time.
Contemporary composers, ostensibly still writing in one particular home key, were now regularly borrowing notes and chords from others, yielding, at least for adventurous listeners, the exhilarating sense of being constantly upended. But Fétis predicted this process would soon reach its inevitable “endpoint”: music of the future, shaped by our increasingly “insatiable desire for modulation,” would flit so frequently between theoretically unrelated harmonies that the effect would be like being in all possible keys at once. Fétis — and here he split from traditional Hegelian optimism — found the idea profoundly troubling: this coming ordre omnitonique would, he argued, spell the ultimate end of all musical meaning. After all, when a painter mixes together all possible colors at once, she ends up with only a dull, lifeless black.
The young Liszt, though, was transfixed. He struck up a correspondence with Fétis, and began — not entirely to the theorist’s liking — attempting to put some of his harmonic predictions into practice. What, Liszt wanted to find out, would full omnitonality sound like? How would it work? Of the Prélude Omnitonique sketches that survive from those early trial runs, perhaps the most tantalizing consists of a quick waterfall of notes from the high end of the piano to the low, riffling, seemingly quite deliberately, through every single one of the twelve possible notes of the chromatic scale before repeating any a second time — an uncanny premonition of Schoenberg’s twelve-note tone-rows, employed seventy years later to obliterate all sense of tonal hierarchy.
It would be several decades before Liszt himself incorporated anything nearly as radical into his published compositions. But he arrived at Weimar with a deep desire to decode the secrets of music’s future. Over the next few decades, along with a small group of fellow musicians, among them Richard Wagner and Peter Cornelius, known collectively as the New German School, Liszt would transform Weimar into a hub of musical progressivism — or, in the words of the composer Humphrey Searle, “the Mecca of the avant-garde movement.” The informal catchphrase of the group was, fittingly, la musique de l’avenir, “the music of the future.”
It helped hugely that Liszt had the support, and admiration, of perhaps the most influential musicologist of the time, Franz Brendel — the longstanding editor of the journal Neue Zeitschrift für Musik. Brendel was as Hegelian as Hegelians come, convinced that the history of music was a tale of ongoing, step-by-step, teleological emancipation. Renaissance music had freed itself from the church and become fully secular. Secular music had freed itself from words and become fully instrumental. Instrumental music was now loosening itself from its obligation to audiences, and becoming, in true Hegelian spirit, concerned only with its own internal laws — in short, those of tonality. Brendel outlined all of this in his monumental history of music published in 1852, which functioned as a kind of Hegelian heart, pumping historicism out into every last capillary of European musical culture. As the great music historian Richard Taruskin put it: “Ever since the appearance of Brendel’s History, historicism has been a force not only in the historiography of music but in its actual history as well…. Ever since the middle of the nineteenth century, in other words, the idea that one is morally bound to serve the impersonal aims of history has been one of the most powerful motivating forces, and one of the most exigent criteria of value, in the history of music.”
Discussions about the fate of tonality in particular began poking up everywhere like flower shoots in spring. Brendel, to celebrate the fiftieth issue of the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik in 1859, ran a contest in which music theorists were asked to predict the future of harmony on the basis of currently discoverable laws. Liszt began penning a theoretical treatise, Sketches Humphrey for a Harmony of the Future, which has unfortunately been lost. Elsewhere, in a letter, admittedly a little tongue-in-cheek, he wrote about not only embracing omnitonality, but also going a step further and splitting the distance between all consecutive notes on the piano in two, thus creating a scale of twenty-four quarter-tones. (The avant-garde composer Ferruccio Busoni would later, in the twentieth century, do exactly this.) Liszt concluded with an ironic quip: “Behold the abyss of progress into which the abominable Musicians of the Future are hurling us!”
Perhaps because Liszt was still keeping his most radical compositional ideas under wraps, the focal point of the discussions turned to his friend Wagner, whose strained harmonies were seen as leading, as the French composer Louis Pagnerre put it, to “the almost complete annihilation of tonality.” The composer Karl Mayrberger summed things up in a rather more measured tone:
The harmonic language of the present day is on a footing essentially different from that of the past. Richard Wagner has pointed the musical world along the path that it must henceforth travel. The sixteenth century knew only the realm of the diatonic. In the eighteenth century, the diatonic and the chromatic existed side by side, equal in status…. But with Richard Wagner an altogether new era begins: major and minor intermingle, and the realm of the diatonic gives way to that of the chromatic and the enharmonic.
Still, in the last five years of his life, Liszt would again move ahead of Wagner in the race for the musical future, publishing several works that harked back to his early omnitonal experiments. In quick succession came Nuages gris, in 1881, and La lugubre gondola, in 1882 — both dark, proto-impressionistic works, later celebrated by Debussy and Stravinsky alike, in which Liszt, rather than telling a story, paints something more like a static mood, with slow-motion splashes of notes up and down the piano. Then came the aptly titled Bagatelle sans tonalite, in 1885, a playful dance-like piece in which the pianist’s hands scuttle across the keys like drugged-up spiders. There are melodic fragments, but they sound more like childlike parodies of tunes — and none settles for long enough to establish any sense of a home key.
Liszt knew that these pieces were radical, and warned his younger piano students against performing them. But one day, he believed, they would be understood. He wrote to Princess Sayn-Wittgenstein: “The time will yet come when my works are appreciated. True, it will be late for me because then I shall no longer be with you.” In both senses, he was right. Liszt died in 1886, at the age of seventy-four. But as the composer Béla Bartók put it, several decades later,
Liszt’s works had a more fertilizing influence on the following generations than Wagner’s. Let no one be misled by the host of Wagner’s imitators. Wagner solved his whole problem, and every detail of it, so perfectly that only a servile imitation of him was possible for his successors.… Liszt, on the other hand, touched upon so many new possibilities in his works, without being able to exhaust them utterly that he provided an incomparably greater stimulus.
In 1867, Philip Gilbert Hamerton, an English printmaker and critic living in France, noticed something strange going on in Parisian art circles. Painters, he wrote, were “beginning to express contempt for all art which in any way depends on the interest of the subject.” Increasingly, they seemed concerned only with abstract shape and form:
Painting, like journalism, should in their view offer nothing but its own merchandise. And the especial merchandise of painting they hold to be the visible melodies and harmonies — a kind of visible music — meaning as much and narrating as much as the music which is heard in the ears and nothing whatever more… when they paint a woman they do not take the slightest interest in her personally, she is merely, for them, a certain beautiful and fortunate arrangement of forms, an impersonal harmony and melody, melody in harmony, seen instead of being heard. It may seem impossible to many readers that men should ever arrive at such a state of mind as this and come to live in the innermost sanctuary of artistic abstraction, seeing the outer world merely as a vision of shapes; but there is no exaggeration in the preceding sentences, they are simply true, and true of men now living.
Hamerton turned out to be extraordinarily prescient. Over the next few decades, artists would become increasingly obsessed with the purely formal or aesthetic aspects of painting — flattening their images as though with a steak press, carving the world into two-dimensional shapes with hard outlines, and eventually eliminating any sense of a depicted subject at all. And they would indeed look to music as their model. Titles like “Nocturnes” and “Symphonies” became commonplace. Cézanne talked about color “modulating.” Matisse explained that “colors are forces, as in music.” Henri Rovel claimed, simply, that “the laws of harmony in painting and in music are the same.” And it wasn’t just painters. Poets, too, seemed less and less interested in subject matter, and more and more preoccupied with the abstract sounds of speech. Verlaine urged “de la musique avant toute chose,” “music above all else.” One critic, lamenting the state of late nineteenth-century poetry, remarked: “It is music and picture, and nothing more.”
Where was this strange mass movement coming from? Cue a bang, a puff of smoke, and Hegel emerging from a time machine with a self-satisfied expression on his face. All of this, he would say, surveying the world a half-century or so after his death, was exactly as predicted.
Well, sort of. Hegel had always contended that art was a manifestation of the universe’s ongoing journey towards complete self-awareness. For painting, that meant moving away from illusionistically, as if through a window, “representing” external subjects in space — a vase of flowers, a muddy battlefield, a ballroom dance — and instead reflecting on, and drawing greater attention to, itself: the flatness of the canvas, the texture of the paint, the repetition of certain shapes, the unconventional selection of colors. Poetry, too, would become increasingly about poetry, and music increasingly about music. Indeed, Hegel believed, pure and non-programmatic music already represented a kind of ideal: “Music has the maximum possibility of freeing itself from any actual text as well as from the expression of any specific subject-matter, with a view to finding satisfaction solely in a self-enclosed series of the conjunctions, changes, oppositions, and modulations falling within the purely musical sphere of sounds.”
No wonder the other arts would look to music as a model of formal purity. Eventually, in Hegel’s account, the arts would go one collective step further, inviting reflection not just on the unique qualities of each medium, but on the philosophical nature of art itself. The abstract, that is, would give way to the conceptual, and merge with theory once and for all. It was a chillingly prophetic narrative, at least in the hands of a twentieth-century critic such as Clement Greenberg, who adapted it, retrospectively, to explain the journey from representation, via “flatness” and abstraction, to fully conceptual art. In truth, Hegel himself never spelled out in concrete terms what artworks of the future would look like, and it is hard to know whether Degas, Delaunay, and Duchamp are what he had in mind. His more rudimentary claim — that art would become increasingly interested in its own formal properties — can be just as well explained by the emergence of photography, which forced painters to reflect about what advantages the canvas offered over the darkroom.
It certainly helped Hegel’s reputation that his ideas were adopted by several generations of art theorists — such that, by the end of the nineteenth century, a genuine feedback loop had formed: artists went increasingly “abstract,” largely for non-theoretical reasons; theorists then interpreted this abstraction in Hegelian terms; and artists duly adopted the new rationale, with the bonus sense of historical significance it gave them. In 1873, for example, the highly influential aesthete and art critic (and Hegelian) Walter Pater observed that “all art constantly aspires towards the condition of music.” The German art historian Wilhelm Worringer, a few decades later, would popularize the idea of the “urge to abstraction.” Artists lapped it up. But the idea that music represents a model of aesthetic purity was, in fact, nothing new. Michelangelo, for instance, had written, in a critique of Flemish painters:
They paint stuffs and masonry, the green grass of the fields, the shadow of trees, and rivers and bridges, which they call landscapes… And all this, though it pleases some persons, is done without reason or art, without symmetry or proportion, without skillful selection or boldness, and, finally, without substance or vigor… for good painting is nothing but a copy of the perfections of God and a recollection of his painting; it is a music and a melody which only intellect can understand, and that with great difficulty.
All Hegel really did was add a twist of teleology — the mildly more exciting plot line of a journey from realism towards abstraction — thus giving an age-old idea a second lease on life. It is a measure of his influence that Liszt, Wagner, and Brendel’s great nemesis, the Austrian critic and philosopher of art Eduard Hanslick, spent years attacking the New German School’s progressive Hegelianism on equally Hegelian, but slightly more conservative, grounds. Hanslick was a purist. Music, he believed, ought to be entirely non-representational, concerned only with the aural architecture of the notes themselves. He despised Wagner’s attempts to combine music with other art forms — to create the fabled, all-encompassing Gesamtkunstwerk or “total artwork” — and Liszt’s use of extended program notes.
The gap between Hanslick and the New German School only appeared great because they were staring at each other from opposite points on the same Hegelian spiral. After all, it was the progressive Brendel who had already waxed in quasi-mythological terms about the emancipation of “pure” music from words and religion — he just happened to recognize in Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk the prospect of another synthesis, the creation of a new art form that might itself be further purified down the line. The conservative Hanslick, meanwhile, held that pure, non-programmatic music was already the perfect aesthetic endpoint. Ironically, it was Hanslick’s pivotal book, On the Musically Beautiful, in 1854, that ended up becoming a kind of Bible for formalism in the arts. The abstract painter František Kupka cited it fifty years later as one of his great influences.
But what if there were a way for pure music itself to become even more “abstract” than it already was? What if tonality, say, were the musical equivalent of a “subject” — an external point of reference, a catalog of well-known storylines that had been passed down from generation to generation, ultimately distracting listeners from the pure sounds, gestures, and rhythms that really constituted music? Certainly Debussy seemed to be arguing this when he wrote:
I am more and more convinced that music, by its very nature, is something that cannot be cast into a traditional and fixed form. It is made up of colors and rhythms. The rest is a lot of humbug invented by frigid imbeciles riding on the backs of the Masters — who, for the most part, wrote almost nothing but period music.
Schoenberg echoed this a couple of decades later, in a letter to Kandinsky: “One must express oneself! Express oneself directly! Not one’s taste, or one’s upbringing, or one’s intelligence, knowledge or skill.” And of course, as the twentieth century wore on, the notion developed that composers should even abandon sound itself — music, in the hands of John Cage, dissolved into pure spirit.

“Of great painting or great music there can no longer be, for Western people, any question.” So wrote the German polymath Oswald Spengler, in his magnum opus The Decline of the West, in 1918. Spengler was not a cheery fellow and neither was his thought. His father, a dissatisfied civil servant, had discouraged the young Spengler from pursuing his literary interests as a child, leading to a lifelong sense of his being misunderstood. He would suffer, in adulthood, from severe insomnia and debilitating migraines — extreme enough to give him regular bouts of memory loss. He was a recluse, and never married. And yet his profound pessimism about the fate of Western art was not — at least not entirely — projected gloominess.
Spengler’s great thesis was that all cultures were, in his word, “organisms” — and that the religion, art, philosophy, and science of each one had more in common “physiognomically” than, say, the paintings or poetry of two unrelated societies or ages. Indeed, Spengler contended that no such thing as “painting,” “music,” or even “maths,” really existed — certainly not as a single “entity” that you could compare across different eras or places. The criteria for producing and judging “art” (or anything else) were restricted to each particular cultural epoch:
One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be — though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain — because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message will have gone. Every thought, faith and science dies as soon as the spirits in whose worlds their “eternal truths” were true and necessary are extinguished.
Spengler believed that our own culture was in rapid decline and could no longer produce anything of artistic merit. But this was not because, by some permanent and universal set of aesthetic standards, we were not up to it anymore, but because the very standards themselves, as part of the dying organism, no longer had the authority to “dictate” whether art was good or bad. If someone were to create a work of art that, in a previous era, would have been considered aesthetically great, Spengler argued it would now be meaningless. “What is practiced as art today — be it music after Wagner or painting after Cézanne, Leibl and Menzel — is impotence and falsehood,” he wrote.
One of Spengler’s biggest — and looking back, most surprising — followers, Ludwig Wittgenstein, echoed this in a personal note, in 1948:
If it is true, as I believe, that Mahler’s music is worthless, then the question is what I think he should have done with his talent. For quite obviously it took a set of very rare talents to produce this bad music. Should he, say, have written his symphonies and burnt them?
Wittgenstein denounced Mahler for trying to speak, stylistically, to a bygone era. And yet the alternative, he conceded, was little better: contemporary music that attempted to reflect authentically the present moment was condemned only to articulate the “absurd” and “stupid” axioms of its time. A familiar refrain emerges: artists must be true to their times, but modernity, as an epoch markedly different from everything that came before, seems to offer us no meaningful way of doing so.
If Spengler’s ideas were to do one of those spit-in-a-tube genealogy tests, the results would show a big flush of ancestry coming from Germany of the late eighteenth century. Hegel, as we know, saw artworks as momentary snapshots of the evolving spirit of the universe, and thus believed that artists were answerable not to timeless truths but to the specific demands of each age (or the Zeitgeist). But like many of his peers, Hegel also worried that the unique conditions of his own time — namely, rapid disenchantment — were making art increasingly impotent. It “is certainly the case,” he wrote, “that art no longer affords that satisfaction of spiritual needs which earlier ages and nations sought in it, and found in it alone.” His intellectual sparring partner, Friedrich Schlegel, lamented in 1800 that “modern poetry’s inferiority to classical poetry can be summed up in the words: we have no mythology….” The same year, the philosopher Friedrich Schelling wrote mournfully about a lost golden age of art “before the occurrence of a breach that now seems beyond repair.”
There was one crucial difference, though. What stopped Hegel and his contemporaries from lapsing into full-on Spenglerian nihilism was the sense, still widespread at that time, of fundamental teleological optimism — the implicit belief that these crises (even the “death of God,” which Hegel had announced in 1802, almost a century before Nietzsche) were sent our way for some greater purpose. Hegel was especially taken with the Biblical image of The Fall — “the eternal Mythus of Man; in fact, the very transition by which he becomes man” — which he believed to be a kind of historical stencil, appearing again and again, each time carrying us one stage closer to full self-awareness. This basic template — crisis followed by a return at some “higher point” on the upward helix of historical progress — became so common in late-eighteenth-century literature that it gained a nickname: the “Romantic Spiral.”
But over the course of the nineteenth century, such teleological optimism steadily disappeared. Thanks in part to Schopenhauer’s melancholy philosophy, and especially to the rise of Darwinism and subsequent fears of “degeneration,” the Romantic Spiral was knotted into a closed loop, and any excess string that might have led to a happier ending was snipped off. History, as Spengler later put it, was no longer seen as a story of linear progress — a “tapeworm industriously adding on to itself one epoch after another” — but as a series of self-contained epochs, each following the same fixed lifecycle: birth, growth, decline, and death.
Hope having evaporated, there remained in the dregs, though, two key elements of “cultural modernity.” First, the sense that we now found ourselves irreversibly on the other side of a terrifying historical threshold. “The complete negation in the state, church, art, and life, that occurred at the end of the last century,” the historian Jacob Burckhardt wrote midway through the century, “has unleashed… such an enormous measure of objective consciousness that a restoration of the old level of immaturity is quite unthinkable.” And second, the residual conviction among artists that this “modern” epoch presented them with an entirely new set of spiritual demands. (In Rimbaud’s words, “il faut être absolument moderne.”)
Schoenberg, like Spengler and Wittgenstein, inherited this psychological burden, and felt it deeply. Unlike them, however, he despised defeatism. In 1923, he wrote an article castigating Spengler for his pessimism and lack of ambition. What Spengler failed to see, he argued, was that a truly brilliant figure, a real genius, might yet still rescue the West — like a superhero flinging his arm over the cliff edge at the last-minute to grab the falling heroine — and single-handedly return it, once more, to artistic greatness.
When intellectual revolutions happen, it is rarely because everyone has sat down, considered a manifesto line by line, agreed that it improves upon the currently accepted account of reality, and then employed it consciously in their day-to-day lives. On the contrary, ideas — big ones, at least — are like islands of chalk in a river, little bits crumbling off all the time, swept along in the cloudy water, until, at various kinks down the way, piles of sediment build up anew. For nineteenth-century historicism, a great bend in the stream appeared around 1910, and the ideas of the previous hundred or so years began slopping up, wave after wave, on the bank. Schoenberg scooped up the broken-off notion of a predetermined destiny for tonality; of art’s yearning to abandon all representation; of a new, terrifying — but also, for the truly heroic, liberating — historical epoch; and created his own strange amalgam of them all.
In his subsequent attempts to ghostwrite modernity’s memoirs, Schoenberg had collaborators, each retelling the same myth with slightly different inflections. His friend and artistic soulmate Kandinsky emphasized, for his part, Hegelian ideas about abstraction, music, and purity:
And so at different points along the road are the different arts, saying what they are best able to say and in the language which is peculiarly their own. Despite, or perhaps thanks to, the differences between them, there has never been a time when the arts approached each other more nearly than they do today, in this later stage of spiritual development.
In each manifestation is the seed of a striving towards the abstract, the non-material. Consciously or unconsciously they are obeying Socrates’ command — Know Thyself….
And the natural result of this striving is that the various arts are drawing together. They are finding in music the best teacher. With few exceptions music has been for some centuries the art which has devoted itself not to the reproduction of natural phenomenon but rather to the expression of the artist’s soul, in musical sound…. Every man who steeps himself in the spiritual possibilities of his art is a valuable helper in the building of the spiritual pyramid, which will some day reach to heaven.
Schoenberg’s student, Anton Webern, brought out the more rebellious side of the project. “We broke its neck!” he said of tonality. The miserable philosopher Theodor Adorno, an earnest student of both Hegel and Spengler, focused on the consequences of “psychological differentiation” between epochs. Modern consciousness, he wrote, “now debars the means of tonality, which is to say, the whole of traditional music. Not only are these sounds obsolete and unfashionable. They are false. They no longer fulfill their function.” Generations of composers added a line, like visitors scribbling in a guestbook at a hotel. The modernist Pierre Boulez proclaimed: “The tonal system has gone through a kind of historical evolution, and you cannot go back. That’s impossible.” The less modernist Alfred Schnittke lamented: “Earlier music was a beautiful way of writing that has disappeared and will never come back; and in that sense it has a tragic feeling for me.” Those who deviated — like Constant Lambert, who in 1934 declared Sibelius the defining composer of his age — had their entries torn out Contributing a kind of ideological backing track the whole time was what Ernst Gombrich once called “Hegelianism without metaphysics” — the entrenched belief, among cultural historians, that great art is always a kind of encrypted signal of its time. This entered the game as early as 1843, when the Hegelian critic Carl Schnasse wrote: “The genius of mankind expresses itself more completely and more characteristically in art than in religion…. Thus the art of every period is both the most complete and the most reliable expression of the… spirit in question.” Echoes of this idea have sounded every decade since. To give just one more example, the Swiss art historian Heinrich Wölfflin declared, in 1888: “To explain a style cannot mean anything but to fit its expressive character into the general history of the period, to prove that its forms do not say anything in their language that is not also said by the other organs of the age.” The result, today, is that we filter out any artists or movements that fail to fit the story that we wish to tell about the “modern” spirit: namely, that it is austere, self-critical, skeptical about beauty, and hostile to tradition.

But the modernist line was, ultimately, a lie. Tonality never “died.” Nor have we been “stuck” since. If you were to whizz Liszt to the present, he would be stunned by the range of music written since his death — just think of Stravinsky, Sibelius, Britten, Messiaen, Reich, Ligeti; the whole jazz tradition from King Oliver to Ornette Coleman (and beyond); the Beatles and the Beach Boys; funk, disco, hip-hop, metal, electronica, and, for those who go looking, a million and one other strange stylistic hybrids. The last hundred or so years have been perhaps the most innovative in musical history.
Fétis was not wrong, of course, that something in the intrinsic grammatical rules of tonality allows us to predict what happens when you crank up the harmonic complexity knob. But we knew that. In 1785, in the opening bars of his so-called “Dissonance Quartet,” Mozart had experimented, in the words of one contemporary critic, with deliberately over-seasoning his harmonies, yielding a musical dish that could easily have been prepared by Schumann or Mendelssohn fifty years later. The tortured Renaissance composer Carlo Gesualdo (1566–1613) toyed with chromatic harmonies that today sound like a retrospective echo of Wagner. The skittish Fugue No. 12 by Anton Reicha (1770–1836), a Czech composer and a friend of Beethoven, could easily be mistaken for one of Conlon Nancarrow’s pointillistic pieces for player piano a century and a half later. Assuming you use a similar complexity setting, tonality seems to produce surprisingly consistent results across time. None of this means that it is somehow predetermined to “end up” in one or other particular place. Nor does it suggest that one could ever fully “exhaust” it: tonality appears to be almost as boundless and malleable as the great primitive syntactic superstructure that underlies our natural languages.
The funny thing, looking back, is that the first few decades of the twentieth century were ostensibly a time of great cultural despair. Belief in Hegel’s actual “optimistic” philosophy had long waned, replaced by various iterations of post-Kantian skepticism and a widespread sense that nothing could anymore be trusted. Indeed, Adrian Leverkühn, the austere composer in Thomas Mann’s novel Doctor Faustus, was based on an imagined hybrid of Schoenberg and Nietzsche — his purported motive for abandoning tonality being a kind of tit-for-tat rejection of beauty as payback for the loss of faith in truth. And yet neither Schoenberg, Kandinsky, Adorno, nor any of the others, were nihilists in the true sense of the word. They believed profoundly, to the point of near-insanity, that what they were doing mattered. Therein lies the tremendous appeal of historicism — the promise, that, somehow, thanks to the benevolent protecting hand of history, the great wave of philosophical acid sloshing over every last belief of ours nonetheless leaves the things that matter unscathed. Indeed, standing there stoically, and watching everything else disintegrate around us, they matter even more.
It is this that we still cannot quite let go of. But we must. Art should not be boxed in by imaginary historical thresholds, like a slapstick artist slamming into an invisible wall. Stasis in one area of culture need not spell stagnation elsewhere. Nor, indeed, should we distract ourselves from the genuine philosophical predicaments we face as a culture with vapid pleasantries about being “on the right side” of history. To somewhat out-Schoenberg Schoenberg, historicism, the willingness to give history the last word, was a cop-out — a crutch in a moment of crisis. “Comfort, with all its implications,” he wrote in the Harmonielehre, “intrudes even into the world of ideas and makes us far more content than we should ever be.” Indeed. What would art, philosophy, literature look like if we abandoned historicism — if we abandoned the concept of cultural modernity itself? We should permit ourselves to find out. After all, history may judge historicism very badly.
