Chiminea

    1
    A girl puked on the tour bus
    on the switchback up Vesuvius.
    Her mother looked the other way
    —out the window. Where else?
    Wildflowers, hardy and tender,
    seemed unaware of the perils
    of flourishing in cinder.

    We trudged, as through beach sand,
    and when we got back on, sand
    had been shoveled onto the mess.
    I got my contraband: pumice
    out of the core’s juices—color puce—
    alarmingly warm from the crater,
    that supreme indifferent mater.

    2
    Chimeneas were all the rage.
    Hemispheric, the copper bowl
    hung fire, like the globe:
    a cross-sectioned model.

    In the dark behind us, what?
    Panthers, birds of prey.
    Night inverts the hierarchy.
    The flames of February purify

    the pique, the umbrage, the stuffy
    dreams, the nasal cathedral
    close with incense. Hence
    our embers spray and cleanse,

    our ash an alkaline scrub.
    Never mind the Pompeiian brain
    that turned to black glass—
    a dark crystal ball wherein came to pass

    the future: us, reflected in its sheen.
    Having excavated his dream
    (for we found the skeleton in bed),
    we speculate now on papyrus scrolls

    compressed into coded coals
    that rose into the skies as smoke,
    the burnt sacrifice of lyric,
    ode, supplication, obloquy.

    3
    The log wouldn’t take right away,
    and we had no accelerant.
    My son fetched dryer lint,
    which did its voodoo. It burned
    for the duration of a movie.
    (Firecrackers, leftover, passé,
    reminded us the year had turned

    but wetly they popped, distant,
    anticlimactic.) The full moon
    was lost in cloudcover, mist,
    winter’s high dew point.
    For as long as the hero kissed
    the heroine, or a great fortune
    was tied up in red tape,

    we would hold out for the plot
    which, abstracted to this,
    was passion’s caveat—
    its propensity to ashes
    swelling on a pillow of gases
    then subsiding under the stars and
    scouring meteors.

    The Mesocosm

    Two sounds in the house lately:
    clanking barbells and electric guitar
    behind garage and bedroom doors.
    J.’s mesocosm failed; he flagrantly
    excused himself on the basis of gender,
    as the gathering of mud and spores,

    weeds and worms for “nurturing”
    is not the métier, apparently, of boys.
    Dear A., I myself was quite taken
    with the idea that we can bring
    a world to life like animated toys,
    a sealed jar sustaining frog and fen.

    So much for that. It’s the fall equinox:
    the radio broadcast Vivaldi twice.
    I know the change by the slant of light—
    slant of light + concerto. The clocks
    quietly gallop. Maybe it’s the promise
    of achieving equilibrium, under tight

    conditions, of carbon and oxygen
    in give and take. I’m in dire need of
    —what to call it?—magic. I worry
    that Zoom is ruled by djinn
    that filter out the wavelength of love
    and so I wear my evil eye jewelry,

    as you advised, against being too
    much in view: that tiny frog on display ….
    (like the specimen I saw once
    on a man’s gold ring in Italy. Who
    could wear that showpiece of the atelier?
    Only, perhaps, a witty prince.)

    Personal adornment is out anyway.
    Yet the citrus trees have kept up
    appearances (no shortage of lemons).
    I watch the progress day after day
    of those novitiate spathes that erupt
    from the peace lily…. a summons

    from the offices of mediation. (Laws
    are stipulated by plants too. See stipule).
    Occasionally a rare aircraft
    lights up the tropopause.
    Where is the workshop of the soul?
    His bed, I averred. You laughed.

    Those late spring nights the street
    was overrun with frogs, I walked with care:
    a purse, a pulse … a pulse-in-a-purse
    mimicking the heart that skipped a beat
    or made a choice in error
    it couldn’t, then or now, reverse.

    Cold-blooded hearts everywhere I stepped!
    Lentil-colored, stippled, with the froideur
    of the ex-lover. What’s one more plague?
    Outside, it’s too hot. Summer’s overslept,
    a season out of touch with the calendar.
    The strip malls, dear A., exude nutmeg.

    Against Translation

    A couple of years ago we rented a beautiful apartment in London, a large flat where we must have stayed four or five times. It was perfectly comfortable and perfectly private, and the location, directly behind the British Museum, was ideal for visits to theaters and museums. It was decorated in the taste of a refined gay man of my parents’ generation. It had good Chinese porcelain, carefully chosen oriental rugs, witty French prints. It also contained the kind of photographs which, in that mysterious way, have grown dated without becoming quite old — gently pushed, by an accumulation of tiny changes, into the past. Some minute evolution in eyewear, some invisible reformulation of lipstick, some arcane improvement in cameras, betrayed their age. They did not look ancient. But though I couldn’t say exactly why, I knew that the pretty young bride was now middle-aged, and that a lot of the jolly middle-aged folks at Angkor Wat were now dead. 

    I also knew, as soon as I walked inside, that the house belonged to an American. I saw this by the shapes and colors of the books on the hallway shelves. It had never occurred to me that American books from the middle part of the twentieth century had such a specific appearance. Few had dust jackets. Their bindings came in serious colors: rusted reds, navy blues, vomity greens. Some were bound in something that looked like floral wallpaper, and that must have looked lovely when fresh; but few made the strenuous effort to be attractive that later books would. Their type was generously spaced. Their paper was sturdy, made of crushed rags. 

    I was unprepared for them to strike such a chord. Even before I saw the titles or the authors, I knew exactly what this library was. These were the books that my grandparents had on their shelves. In our world of painless communication and cheap travel, it was rare to see something that made my fatherland feel so distant. Here were the tastes and interests of Americans two generations removed from me, people I had known as a child: the people who came into the world around the turn of the twentieth century, and left it at its close. These were the books they had read at school, when they were young, and kept all their lives, even when moving across the ocean. They were too precious to give away — but not valuable enough to sell, not valuable enough for the kids, if there were kids, to keep. Most could be found for a few dollars in online bookstores. It was a miracle that such a collection had survived. 

    During my first week in the flat, I foreswore friends in order to pick through it. There was something about it that I wanted to understand. As I went along shelf after shelf, I felt an upswelling of emotion, suddenly close to people I thought I had finished mourning years before. Perhaps for the last time, I was a boy spending the night in my grandmother’s house. I wanted to chronicle it, catalog it, before it disappeared forever. 

    I noted its specifically national focus: overwhelmingly American. The only foreign country that was well represented was England, which was not, in literary terms, a foreign country. The American classics began with the great founders of our nationality: Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, Bradford’s History of Plymouth Plantation. There were some nineteenth-century books, including a Life and Character of Stephen Decatur, published in Middletown, Connecticut in 1821; and M. Sears’ The American Politician, published in Boston in 1842, containing portraits of all the presidents “from Washington to Tyler.” Most of the books were fairly common, or had been: two volumes of Bancroft’s History of the United States, and parts of a series called “American Statesmen,” which included Lincoln but also Lewis Cass and Thomas Hart Benton, this latter written by no one less than Theodore Roosevelt, who also wrote another volume about Oliver Cromwell. There were books about Charles Francis Adams and Seward and Sumner; Mark Twain at Your Fingertips; Mencken’s The American Language. There was a selection of books about California: Cable Car Days in San Francisco; Oscar Lewis’ The Big Four, about the railroad barons; and a book from the dawn of the twentieth century called The Wild Flowers of California by Mary Elizabeth Parsons. There were works by Stephen Crane and Walt Whitman, Melville’s White Jacket and Bret Harte’s Luck of Roaring Camp; Our Old Home by Hawthorne and Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres by Henry Adams; The Titan by Theodore Dreiser and Lorenzo in Taos by Mabel Dodge Luhan; Frank Norris’ The Pit and Edna Ferber’s Giant and Thomas Wolfe’s You Can’t Go Home Again and Willa Cather’s A Lost Lady. There were seven volumes of the writings of John Greenleaf Whittier, and six of the Works of Edgar A. Poe. 

    Of the British and the Irish, the usual authors were represented. George Eliot, Sterne, Defoe; several volumes of Evelyn Waugh, The Real Bernard Shaw, books by Virginia Woolf, The Gothic Revival by Kenneth Clark, Revolt in the Desert by T.E. Lawrence. There was Tinker’s Boswell beside an illustrated Life of Samuel Johnson in a couple of dusty boxes. There was a large multivolume set of Dickens, Morley’s Life of Gladstone, Travels with a Donkey by Robert Louis Stevenson, Letters of James Joyce, Byron’s Poetical Works, Alec Waugh’s Hot Countries, Thackeray’s Vanity Fair, De Quincey’s Works, Lady Chatterley’s Lover, The Secret Agent by Joseph Conrad, Sir Walter Scott’s Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. And there was a smattering of foreign books, mostly French, alongside some Russian classics and some books from and about antiquity, in translation. There was Napoleon’s Correspondence with King Joseph, Eve Curie’s Madame Curie, Balzac, Marmontel, Molière, Dumas, Hugo, Rabelais, and ten volumes of The Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset. 

    I include this list as a record of something once so common that it would not have been noticed, much less documented: the library of the literate middle-class American, born around the turn of the twentieth century. The books themselves, individually, were not strange; it was the collection, representing the idea of a library shared by every educated person, that had disappeared as utterly as the readers of Bret Harte or Morley’s Life of Gladstone. The culture that connected people of my generation was popular television and music, and the consumeristic emphasis on newness meant that nothing lasted long. I noticed when I traveled that bookstores were as crammed with seasonal novelties as shoe stores; and used bookstores — this has been one of the saddest developments of my lifetime — had mostly disappeared. 

    As I perused these books, the feeling of going back into a past — my own, my culture’s — filled me with a sense of reverence for an ancestral world. Even the kinds of books, like the multivolume sets, spoke of some other age. Were they expensive — like a Christmas present, something you might have to save up for — or cheap, cheaper than the individual books? I remembered them displayed, like encyclopedias, in the homes of my childhood. Now I only ever saw them at the very top of the shelves of second-hand bookstores, dirty — because rarely touched — and dirt cheap. They were too handsome to toss. But did any bookseller expect to find a taker for those seven volumes of Whittier? It was easy to imagine that an author might once have dreamed of having his career crowned in such a way. Now these sets were dust traps. Where would one begin to read such a thing? Who, now, would bother? 

    “It’ll last another ten years,” a friend, a rare books dealer in New York, once said to me. He had made a career selling the archives of authors to American research libraries. These libraries thrilled me. I worked in one as an undergraduate, and was dazzled by the range of its collections, the sum of the efforts of centuries of American bibliophiles. These libraries were a great collective work, our cathedrals, our monasteries. But the era of archives was over, he thought. Part of this was due to the passage of paper. Researchers of the future would not have the pleasure of rustling letters, or the ability to see the scary way a once-neat handwriting starts to unravel during a painful breakup, or as a writer grows old. There would be no more envelopes with postage stamps from exotic lands — no more finding, caught between the pages, the stray hairs of a great poet. Activity that had once been the province of paper had moved onscreen. 

    Books, he said, were disappearing. 

    Books had always disappeared, in a different way, as they passed from literature into the history of literature. Their life cycle, if they last long enough to have one, begins with a first reader. It is exciting to read writing that is not yet a book, a possible book from the future. If this writing is published, there will be a moment of publication, when a book’s destiny is unknown. We know most books will be ignored; only the lucky ones will be embraced and attacked, interpreted and misinterpreted and translated, reprinted and revised and reviled. During this process, the book is contemporary, part of what people are talking about — the current life of the culture. This life eventually winds down, and as a book has a first reader, it has a last one, too: the last person who picks it up and reads it as an artifact from his own time. When this last person puts it down, it belongs to the past. 

    But that is not the end. Now comes the first person who reads a book from the past, the first who looks through it in order to see another age. In this guise — as a reference, a school requirement, an object of study — its life can be far longer than its flash of contemporary relevance. It joins a culture that connects people to something bigger than themselves, that gives them a sense of where they came from. And they keep that culture alive because it defines their sensibility and helps them to understand it. This is why time burnishes the greatest works. Yet their beauty will change. It will come to require a key — as a poem by Virgil, immediately comprehensible to any Roman, requires years of careful study by those for whom Latin is not a natural language, and for whom the religion of Rome is a quaint mythology. As centuries pass, that knowledge becomes available only to those willing to dedicate years to acquiring it. I did not know anyone who naturally understood the world that produced a Greek statue or a painting by Jan van Eyck. But I had known plenty of people who had read Theodore Dreiser or Thomas Wolfe when “everyone” was reading them — before they had been handed over to antiquarians and graduate students. There is no one alive who remembers them that way now. 

    I noted the information I was finding about the men to whom this library had belonged. The older was Ney Lannes MacMinn. There was a book, Riley Child-Rhymes with Hoosier Pictures, which seemed to have been kept to remember an Indiana childhood. There was a date, August 7, 1922, and a place, Hammond, Indiana. I thought he must have been about to leave home then, perhaps for college, since another date follows: January 14, 1923, Champaign, Illinois. He was, however, a bit older, as I learn from the single internet page with any information about him, from Northwestern University. 

    He was born in Brockway, a dot on the map of western Pennsylvania, in 1894. He studied at Westminster College, further to the west, near the Ohio border. He served with the United States Army for two years in World War I, and remained in France to study at the University of Toulouse. Upon his return to the United States, he completed a master’s degree at the University of Illinois, and then went to Northwestern, where he completed his Ph.D. in 1928. His archive, at Northwestern, ranges from 1924 to 1994, “with the bulk of the material from 1941-1967,” the year he died. This entire archive fits in a single box. 

    Online, I find one photo of MacMinn. It is a news photo, for sale for nine dollars. He is in a study. He is not wearing a tie, and the jacket of his suit hangs, rumpled, on the back of his chair. On the shelves and table, books and papers are piled in a way that suggests frenzied thought. The room and the attire suggest that the photographer has snapped him in the heat of some great scholarly endeavor; he had not had the time to fix his clothes, put on his jacket, make his office more presentable. His face is timid, almost haunted. He is hunched in his chair — as if aware of the self-consciousness of this pose — as if crushed by the library and what it seemed to expect of him — by the photo and the role it asked him to play. There is a handwritten caption on the back: 

    This American professor of Philosophy has chosen a housboat on the seine to live and pursue his work: A learned 70 year old American, professor Ney Lannes Macminn became aquinted with France as a combattant in 1914-1918, and then as a student at the Faculte de Toulouse. He always retained a certain nostalgia for it so after receiving a doctorate in philosophy in England, he bought a house boat in Holland and went to sttle in Paris on the Seine where his boat is moored near the Concorde. A specialist in social questions and especially of the great English Phlosopher of the 16th century Thomas Morus, he is preparing a large work on the relations between the Utopias of the 16th century. Professor Ney Lannes Macminn in the library installed inside his houseboat and which contains 6,000 volumes and precios manuscripts. 

    From photo and caption, a dream emerges, and a life story. A war sweeps a bookish small-town kid to Europe. We do not know what he saw in that war. But we know that he retained a “certain nostalgia” for France. For forty years, semester after semester, Midwestern winter after Midwestern winter, as his first students were themselves starting to grow old, he cherished a dream of taking up the life that he had glimpsed. The brief Northwestern biography said that he had been married and divorced twice. I had the strong feeling that he was gay. There was a note from the archive description: “The correspondence, spanning the years 1939-1967, is primarily between MacMinn and Macklin B. DeNictolis, a former student and close friend of MacMinn’s.” Perhaps there had been a boy in Toulouse; perhaps you could live in France as you couldn’t in Illinois. He dreamed of going back, bringing those six thousand volumes, writing his large work, mooring his boat “near the Concorde.” And then, on that boat, he would discover that it was too late. Such a dream was bound to be disappointed; I imagine I see that awareness in the photograph. He died three years later, the work unwritten. 

    I do not know how the library I saw, which had nothing like six thousand volumes, reached its next proprietor. On the internet, which contains almost no information about him, I find that Carson Kohle was born in 1932 in Ventura County, California, and died in London in 2011. I cannot find any pictures of him, and wonder at how someone who lived in central London in 2011 could be so absent from the internet. He seems to have been a businessman, and though I assume the slightly aged family pictures show relatives, there are no names besides his. His taste was outstanding. He had a penchant for exotic travel, and in his time — he was born fourteen years before my parents — travel was far easier than in MacMinn’s. His books reflect that easy time. The old canon expanded to include works from all over the world: A Survey of Zairian Art, Woolf in Ceylon, Chronicle of the Chinese Emperors, L’art du Mexique ancien, Art & Architecture of Cambodia. 

    When I left MacMinn’s books in the purgatory between the rare and the out-of-date, the antique and the merely old, I turned, with relief, to these bright illustrated volumes. MacMinn’s books witnessed a single tradition; Kohle’s, the moment when that tradition burst into a wider world, preparing for the Great Expansion of which I was a part. It was like seeing an old museum add a wing for Asian or Pre-Columbian art. Such an addition would complete a view of the world. It would assert a cosmopolitan ideal that felt natural to me. It was a globalized culture, but when viewed alongside MacMinn’s library, it seemed firmly anchored within a specific national culture. And you needed a national culture before you could generate, or create, an interest in the cultures of other nations. 

    I have spent decades translating books and advocating for international culture. I am proud of this work, especially my part in bringing Clarice Lispector from Portuguese into English. This project, sustained over decades, corrected an injustice: she now stands in her rightful place among the great writers of the twentieth century. Yet even while I was doing this work, I was growing more skeptical of my assumption that an international culture can exist, at least more than superficially; of the idea of the museum with expanding wings. 

    I did much of this work in the Netherlands. During my many years living there, I marveled at two things. The first was how well, how easily, how nearly accentlessly the Dutch spoke English. For English speakers, used to thinking of speaking a foreign language as something like a superpower, the assumption that everyone could and should speak at least a couple of languages seemed dazzlingly superior. At the same time, I marveled that, though fluent in our language, the Dutch always sounded, when talking about the United States, like people offering insights into the affairs of a celebrity known only from glossy magazines. (“I can’t believe Jennifer Aniston is dating a guy who clearly doesn’t deserve her.”) They explained our country to us with an overfamiliarity, a shallowness, that annoyed Americans in the Netherlands. We were frequently forced to endure denunciations of racism, the Second Amendment, or the Electoral College, as if, until the Dutch had come along to explain them, these were things Americans had never noticed. I doubt that Omanis or Sri Lankans were schooled about their own societies as often, or as thoroughly, as we were. And this illusion of intimacy was made possible by a knowledge of our language. 

    Those conversations, and their relentless superficiality, revealed that knowing how to speak and understand a language — which children master before kindergarten — was only the tiniest part of knowing a language, which even native speakers rarely achieve. I shudder to think what percentage of Americans can consistently write and speak without errors of grammar or spelling. (I shudder even more to think that this number is higher in the United States than in most other countries.) Yet grammar and spelling are only the surface. Imagine a newspaper, written in perfectly correct English, that covers the culture, sports, economics, and current events of Oman, written for an Omani audience. You could read it. But you would miss a lot. 

    My Dutch neighbors would always be missing something about us. And I would always be missing something about them. Indeed, the deeper I went into languages, the more I bumped up against an immovable barrier: that intuitive feel for the resonances in a word — a question of music, of something you felt physically, in your ear. Even without complicated vocabulary or poetic turns of phrase, words sound different in different languages. The most straightforward English sentence sounded entirely different when turned into Dutch, to which English is closely related. This mystery suggested something besides the complaint that translation is difficult — and something besides the cliché, which made me impatient, that something is “lost in translation.” After all, something, namely a new book, is also gained in translation. Even the limited access that translation provides is preferable to no access at all. 

    The push for translation has been a central part of the literary culture of our time. Like the new wing for Asian or African art, this was something I cheered. But it rests on presuppositions, as I slowly started to understand, that have not been adequately examined. 

    It is not easy to learn your own language. French kids had French class; Dutch kids took Dutch. I, like every American child, was taught English every day until I graduated from high school. I learned spelling, punctuation, vocabulary, grammar. I learned something else, too, though I didn’t realize it at the time. Learning how to read and write meant being brought into a community, inducted into a tradition. By learning what people around me mean by the words they used, I was being prepared for citizenship within the culture into which I was born. I would not be like those people reading an Omani newspaper, seeing effects without being able connect them to causes. 

    This preparation demanded years. It was an immersive training for immersion. It had a ritual aspect, and it taught a sense of community, the value of a collective experience, of “we.” We were being instructed in filial piety. To see oneself as a son or daughter is to understand that one has emerged, inevitably and inalterably, from a specific time and place; and by connecting the speakers of a language with those who lived before, my teachers were preparing us to play a modest part in the great collective work of our particular tradition. 

    This tradition existed in sharp opposition to another aspect of our culture, whose values were derived from the fashion and music industries, from popular television and our never-ending election “cycles.” The basis of the consumerist society was the illusion of uninfluenced individual liberty and choice. The study of grammar, however, revealed that we did not have choices in some basic matters. It revealed structures so deeply embedded that we were unaware that they were structures. Unless a teacher points it out, it would never occur to an English-speaker that our sentences use a subject-verb-object order — and that such a structure, so inevitable to us, would be unnatural to the speakers of many other languages. And as we study Shakespeare, for example, we learn that so many of the words we use to structure our interior lives are the product of a single long-dead writer. Thoughts we assume are our own move in grooves set down centuries before us and make our minds different from those of people who speak another language. 

    I came to think of a language as an old city. When I first came to Holland, I was struck by the Amsterdam canals, perfectly preserved relics of the days of Rembrandt, miraculously handed down to us from a distant Golden Age. But as I grew more familiar with the city, I realized that I had been tricked into thinking that the city was a perfectly intact Baroque relic. When I examined it house by house, I found buildings in dozens of completely unrelated styles: neoclassicism, Jugendstil, postmodernism, rococo, brutalism. Yet none of these novelties — and some were wildly extravagant — disrupted the general impression of unchanging, venerable age. I became fascinated by the question of how this coherence was maintained. 

    I concluded that the style did not matter as much as the restrictions imposed on any building here. Every builder was bound by a series of rules, some of which seemed obvious and some of which did not. Climate, for instance: Amsterdam’s location in a northern marshland. Geology, which placed a layer of sandstone beneath a shallow skin of water. History, which laid down the streets, dug the canals, divvied up the lots. Economics, which made land too expensive to permit large projects. Politics, which forbade certain constructions. Any building had to adapt to these limits, no matter what façade you put on it. The result was a near-perfect visual harmony. 

    I came to think of a book as a house, and of a literature as an old city. The products of millions of anonymous hands, both a city and a literature contained an enormous range of constructions, and had room for an astonishing diversity; but they also emerged in a specific place, under specific conditions, and imposed — invisibly, invariably — a series of views on their inhabitants. Like a city, a literature took its character from the continuous encounter of young people with a tradition. Their responses added to it, like new houses in an old city. It was this chain that distinguished a city from a collection of houses, a literature from a collection of books. It seemed urgent to understand the foundations upon which our city — our language — was built. Literature told us what our words meant, who and what we were. 

    “Whoever writes in Brazil today is raising a house, brick by brick, and this is a humble and stirring human destiny,” wrote Clarice Lispector in 1971, using another architectural metaphor. “We are hungry to know about ourselves, with great urgency, because we need ourselves more than we need others.” In Brazil, there were many reasons for this urgency. One was historical. Unlike the English, Spanish, or French colonizers, the Portuguese forbade printing from 1500, when they first arrived, until 1808 — three hundred and eight years of forced cultural dependency. The nation had been starved of its own literature, and this explained part of the hunger, the great urgency, that Lispector described: the need “to use a Brazilian language inside a Brazilian reality.” 

    This was an older story. In one form or another, many countries shared a history of colonization or censorship. In recent years, however, a new threat had emerged that was different from the old attacks on languages and their literatures. This was the threat of English, the threat from English, the imperial language, all the more insidious because it looked so attractive. For billions of non-writers, English was the language of education and economic advancement. For writers, English held out the promise of a truly international readership. To be published in English meant joining the broader conversation to which artists aspire. It also meant the prospect of a financial independence unavailable to writers who could only sell their books in a single small country. 

    English was so useful, it offered so many possibilities, and it was precisely this usefulness that threatened even languages protected by rich and populous states: this was the argument of the Japanese novelist Minae Mizumura in The Fall of Language in the Age of English. The book reflects on her unusual life story. Owing to her father’s work, she moved to New York at twelve, then stayed in the United States for twenty years, all the way through graduate school. This meant that when she embarked on a writing career, she had the luxury, which almost no other Japanese writer shared, of being able to choose English. But she didn’t. She rejected a language spoken “everywhere” in favor of a language spoken in a single nation. Japanese had millions of readers, but nowhere near as many as English. 

    Mizumura had made a brave choice, a choice with integrity, one that required a certain stubbornness. The promise of English was the allure of “universality,” but it also had the unintended effect of downgrading every other language to “local” status. Why be local when you can be universal? My partner, a Dutch novelist, had his early books translated into English, and this, for any Dutch writer, was the opportunity of a lifetime. It meant escaping the country-and-a-half where Dutch is spoken in order to be read all around the world — in the English-speaking countries and in lots of others, too, since an editor at a publishing house in Paris or São Paulo or Tokyo who cannot read your work in Dutch can read it in English. For a while, he was published all over the world. But despite excellent reviews the books sold indifferently, and eventually they stopped being translated. 

    This was more demoralizing than if the possibility had never existed in the first place. In earlier times, it hadn’t. With only the rarest exceptions, Dutch, Brazilians, and Japanese built houses in their own cities, never expecting to be read beyond their own countries. Now the possibility of projection was dangled in front of writers, from novelists to poets to the authors of self-help books. In recent years we have seen writers outside English become global phenomena: Elena Ferrante, Karl Ove Knausgaard, Haruki Murakami. But such a literary life, the popularity owed to translation, began to seem a little fake to me. And when I read Mizumura I found myself agreeing that, strictly speaking, literary universality does not exist. The books I loved were, after all, about something, not everything. But even in practical and commercial terms, the prominence of English created more losers than winners, favoring, like so many other forms of globalization, a handful of instantly recognizable and inoffensive brands. 

    I was never “against translation.” I spent more time studying languages than almost anyone I knew — aware that even the most dogged student could never master more than a handful, and dependent on translators to read the classics of those languages that I would never be able to learn more than superficially. I will probably never learn enough Russian or Greek, say, to be able to read the books in those languages without which no person could really consider himself educated. But I didn’t read foreign books in order to consider myself educated. I read them because I liked them. And because I could: either I had studied the language or publishers and translators had made them available to me. For years, I read more in foreign languages or in translation than in English. I probably still do. 

    But my reading reflected scholarly interests — in Brazilian literature, for example — that were not easily generalized to a broader English-speaking public. It was hard enough to find readers for even authors of unquestionable canonical status. It took twenty years of work to bring Clarice Lispector into English. This meant translation in the sense of “Englishing,” as well as in the Latin sense of bringing something across. This is the work of proselytization. It meant, in this case, spending five years writing a critical biography. It means everything that goes into publishing a translated book once the text is ready, from making sure that it is attractively designed to making sure that it gets sent out to influential people to making sure it gets reviewed to making sure it gets into bookstores to getting blurbs, writing introductions, giving interviews, speaking at universities, assisting theatrical productions, sending and answering thousands of emails. Not everyone has the time or the ability or the interest to do this. As a profession, after all, translating is even less lucrative than writing. But I never thought of it as a profession; I thought of it as a labor of love.

     

    Yet in the twenty years since I began working on Clarice Lispector, the rhetoric around translation changed. From something that belonged to the field of scholarship or to art or to love, it started to become a kind of obligation. The increasing dominance of English made people like me feel that we ought to do something to counteract an unjust situation of which we were the apparent beneficiaries. English had come to appear as an unearned and inherited “privilege,” like certain skin colors or class origins or sexual orientations, and it was an important part of the sensibility of my generation to foreswear such privileges, to work to reverse them. I myself imagined that my work with Lispector was a way of resisting the dominance of English. For those who did not want literature to become another corporate monoculture, the privilege of English was a source of guilt — a moral affront, even, that accounted for the stridency which surrounded discussions of translation in the English-speaking world. 

    In those discussions, no one questioned the basic goodness of translation. It was good for the authors translated, who gained access to a readership they would otherwise have lacked. It was good for us — mostly meaning educated, middle-class American and British readers. Without translated literature, we would be doomed to provincialism. Even worse: the provincial refusal to publish, to buy, or to read foreign books was in fact a kind of chauvinism, a high but still very low variety of xenophobia. (I was never sure who was actually refusing.) For these reasons, the bookshelves of my generation were far more international than those of our grandparents, the kinds of bookshelves that I found in London. At least in our tastes, we were principled cosmopolitans. 

    Many of these books were, of course, marvelous — books we would have hated to be without. And those of us who advocated for translation saw ourselves as the heirs to a movement of broadening the canon, expanding it, as our parents’ generation had fought to include works by certain artists, particularly women and African-Americans, who had been excluded by old prejudices. That movement had been accused of undermining the idea of a common heritage. It was true that, in some quarters, the “canon” was spoken of with a sneer. But that was never the intention of the people I knew who had dedicated themselves to reform and expansion in this area. We simply wanted to make more books available to more people. And over the years this movement brought to light all sorts of fine overlooked works. 

    Yet reading books like Mizumura’s made me wonder if we had looked at this work — at translation generally — too uncritically. The emphasis on success in English that Mizumura lamented meant a transfer of critical power to people outside a writer’s own language. I knew what she meant, because, through my work on Clarice, I had inadvertently become one of those people. My efforts had earned her global prominence and had earned me the love of many Brazilians. I had not “discovered” her — she had been venerated in her own country for years by the time I came along — but it was true that my biography, and then the series of translations I published, brought her a new level of international recognition. She was, for example, the first Brazilian on the cover of The New York Times Book Review. For me, it was exciting to see a labor of love — carried out in obscurity, and at great expense, over many years — rewarded with such affection. For Brazilians, it was exciting to see one of their own so warmly applauded abroad, and this success brought her a new level of recognition within her own country. At the same time, I was well aware that I had brought her into the imperial language, and that I would not have received a fraction of this gratitude if I had brought her into Dutch, French, or Japanese. 

    Was that right? I knew from conversations with writers around the world that the prospect of success in English was distorting the way people received their own language. As more and more books were translated, the judgment of a few faraway “gatekeepers” was elevated above the judgment of the readers of one’s own language. It was nice to enjoy critical success in São Paulo or Tokyo or Amsterdam, but if the possibility existed for success in New York, then “local” success, success in one’s own language, was no longer enough. One’s book was placed in the hands of foreigners, for whose interest one was grateful; but they could never replace the healthy critical culture, the thoroughly knowledgeable culture, the deeply racinated culture, that intellectual and artistic life requires. 

    On our end, the English-speaking end, it was important to remember the distinction between cosmopolitanism and dilettantism. We were people for whom it was common to eat a different cuisine every night of the week — Thai on Monday, Italian on Tuesday. A wide-ranging taste in food was a central aspect of our sensibility, and a penchant for travel — we were better traveled than any other generation in history — had committed us to tourism, which is a meager way of acquiring knowledge. Tourism is not only an itinerary, it is also a cognitive state. And visiting foreign countries is not the same as dipping into foreign literature, in which so much understanding depends on years of difficult and sustained scholarship. The deeper you sustain that scholarship, the more you appreciate how many works really could not be translated. You cannot have the building without the whole city. 

    Even within a language, cultural differences can be difficult to bridge. Any American who has lived in Britain, any Briton who has lived in America, knows that a shared language is no guarantee of understanding. We comprehend each other’s words, but we know how little this can mean in practice: without having lived in Britain, Americans rarely understand the jokes on British television, for example. Was translation creating a simulacrum of a common language? I became skeptical that even closely related cultures — say, Britain and America — could ever really understand one another. I became skeptical even that they need to. What they need is to respect one another. 

    “We need ourselves more than we need others,” Clarice Lispector wrote. Could an English-speaker say the same? 

    Much of my life has taken place within a certain English dialect. It was my mind, my home. And it seemed inclusive. You did not need to belong to a particular race or tribe in order to speak it. It was the vehicle for the diversity seen in the great English-speaking cities, where people of different backgrounds lived together more in harmony in than conflict. Yet it was also the vehicle for gentrification, for homogenization — for condos and branding and duty-free stores and management consulting. Like the internet, it was “universal,” prized precisely because it seemed free of any connection with any one place or people. That was fine for those whose interest in the language was chiefly transactional. But for us to view our own language as a neutral medium, denuded of its particularity and uncoupled from its history and culture, was to risk turning our own city into an airport mall, stripped of vitality or personality, a space without past or future, where business is conducted in the most inert and boiled-down form of English. This is a place where everyone is only passing through, and a language that exists only in the present tense. 

    This denatured language, this nondescript space, was appropriate for an age of globalized capitalism — for a time of generalized forgetting, an era when the past had lost its authority. When I saw that library in London, I thought of a change that my professor friends were always warning about: their students knew so much less, had read so much less, than students did five or ten years ago. It was easy to dismiss this as the whingeing of the middle-aged, but I had heard it from enough different people in enough different places that it came to seem plausible. It always reminded me of a sentence from an interview I once read, I don’t remember with whom, but I did remember the phrase, and especially the italics. His students, someone said, had never heard of Carol Burnett — “and they never will.” 

    As a Brazilian or a Japanese would have felt a pang at sacrificing their cultural heritage, so, too, did I. To see that library was to see something that was impossible to reduce to a neutral, indistinct, universal language. It was so specific: this culture, not that culture; a particular culture; my culture. Ours was one of the oldest continually written literatures in the world, an uninterrupted stream that goes back beyond even Beowulf. But if our books are no longer read, if that tradition is not kept alive, then the great river of our language — the White Nile of Britain and the Blue Nile of America and all their smaller tributaries — will be reduced to a drool of tweets and ads. A city cannot paint itself, collect its own trash, restore its own cathedrals, and neither can a cultural tradition maintain itself: people need to maintain it. Yet that cultural maintenance, that literary education, has passed out of fashion, even out of legitimacy, and it is not likely to return. The books that made up my tradition are no longer read — and they never will be again. 

    When speaking of the substance of that education, it was easy to quibble about texts — Beowulf ? — and lose sight of the goal. This was to teach people how to read, and how to understand what they read. Easy to describe, this goal was difficult, expensive, and time-consuming to reach. The reading that was taught by the old education demanded a protracted and intense focus, a wariness of sheer novelty, that is at odds with nearly everything in contemporary culture; and so, without the authority of the past, we have been delivered to the tyranny of opinion, and all of us now live in the disinformation age. 

    The evidence is everywhere that native speakers of English no longer understand their own language, and no longer bother to try. They no longer require of it anything more than practical communication; as in the rest of their lives, they demand of their language mainly efficiency and informality and velocity. And if this is the case with our own language, how much could we understand of anyone else’s? And how, absent years of dedicated scholarship, could books from other contexts be read or understood? Much advocacy of translation relied on the idea that it was enough to bring a foreign text into our language, and serious readers would do the hard work of diving deeply. But one risk of emphasizing works in translation was never spoken: that a smattering of Polish or Yoruba or Chinese books would be playing into the same vogue for novelty, for passing sensations and transient enthusiasms — for multicultural sanctimony — that was undermining every other area of our cultural and social life.

    There is nothing wrong with reading a book from a culture that one does not know well, but I do not understand the insistence that in itself this is a positive good. It depends on the book; it depends on the reader. And it strikes me that, after years of following these debates, I rarely heard a justification beyond “diversity”: an unanswerable concept that dispensed with other justifications — artistic, scientific, scholarly, spiritual — for translation. It was harmless to enjoy Swedish crime novels or Elena Ferrante, but such enjoyment no more implied a familiarity with Scandinavian or Italian literature than enjoying Mexican food denotes a familiarity with Mexican culture. 

    Translation without context can be a form of consumerism, of tokenism, of — dare I say it? — “cultural appropriation.” The real problem with “cultural appropriation” is that it does not appropriate deeply enough. Clarice Lispector called Brazilians “fake cosmopolitans,” and the term seems uncomfortably appropriate to us: people forever dipping in and out of cultures they hardly understand. By expanding into too many other worlds, we have sacrificed depth in our own, and cut ourselves off from what was particular, and profound, about us. 

    Translation — not the thing but the unquestioned emphasis on its virtue — started to feel to me like another philistinism masquerading as worldliness: another part of the infrastructure. The way we read, the way we engage with the world, resembles the ways we travel: journeys that, though distant in terms of mileage, were almost always inside our own class. As Chesterton observed, travel narrows the mind. 

    During my years in Europe and Latin America, I realized that most contemporary books that ended up being translated were written by the people whom “we” felt comfortable with. These were the people who lived in the neighborhood we would choose to live in if we lived in Bogotá or Budapest, the class of people, shaped by the infrastructure, who shared our tastes, politics, and cultural interests. I started to become sure that a book from or about Paris, Texas, would have been far more instructive to people like us than a book from or about Paris, France. Frequent-flying is no proof against provincialism, as anyone who has ever observed frequent flyers knows. 

    It took me a long time to realize this. It took me a long time to grasp that reading international literature might make one less cultured, less educated. When I found the library in London, I saw why it would be pointless for people with such a shaky sense of their own culture to try to engage with others. Instead of deepening our understanding of our tradition, we had opted for engagement with people who, though from other places, were in so many ways just like us — not least in their detachment from their own culture. This was why Mizumura seemed so radical to me. She had made a choice that nobody I knew had made. 

    For her, English was a threat. Most advocates for translation in the English-speaking world agree. But as I looked at those volumes, I began to wonder if the culture that threatened other languages was hollowing out English, too. That culture goes by many disparaging names. It was called “corporate,” “capitalist,” “neoliberal”; it was taught as “Business English.” It was the vehicle of the infrastructure, for the most basic communication: for checking into a hotel, sending an email, participating in a sales conference. It makes no claim to tell you who or what you are. It is a language that calls for an app, not a library. 

    I felt it as a loss the way I regretted the loss of other sensibilities: the way I regretted that other once-distinct groups to which I belonged, gay people, for example, or Texas people, had been absorbed by the globalized monoculture. This was the feeling that Mizumura described in seeing Japan reduced to just another satrapy of the empire, its culture — because it is not conducted in English — second-rate almost by definition. Since English is our natural language, it is a bit harder for us to see that this universal language, so convenient for us, is becoming thin and bland and insecure, or how “Business English,” the lifeless argot of transactionalism, is seeping into real English. 

    Another reason for the erosion of our literary tradition, for the passage of those books into obscurity, was that we started to regard our own culture with increasing wariness. Behind the movement in favor of translation was a feeling of failure that had been creeping up on us. When I was younger, it seemed harmless enough to indulge in performative guilt about the dominance of English. Constant atonement for sins we had not ourselves committed was, after all, a salient characteristic of our culture, and often enough yet another expression of our comfort and security. It was an expression, too, of the belief in philanthropy that colored so many of our interactions with people from different backgrounds. Translation was a form of atonement for being exempted from the increasingly universal requirement to learn English. 

    As I grew older, the movement for translation started to express something else. Many of us who grew up in triumphant America experienced, as we entered middle age, a loss of confidence in the culture that raised us. We felt despairing about political reform. We were embarrassed by the condescension of our philanthropy, and appalled by the empire that we stood to inherit. We started to see our language as a force that, like our armies and corporations, swept everything before it. Like other great languages, English was the product of a great empire; and some embraced translation as a form of resistance to that empire, to a culture we felt was ill — a culture that, in some fundamental way, had failed. 

    Maybe it had. There was no doubt that there was a lot in our collective past that was shameful — though how this made us different from every other nation was never clear to me. What was clear was that feeling ourselves to be the worst was — like feeling ourselves to be the best — characteristic of our particular form of national narcissism. And I thought that, if we were going to turn our backs on our patrimony, we ought to do it consciously. We ought, at the very least, to know what that culture was, what it had been 

    The Quiet Scandal of College Teaching

    In 1925, student delegates from twenty colleges met at Wesleyan University to discuss a growing concern on America’s campuses: the poor quality of teaching. They decried dry-as-dust professors who filled up blackboards with irrelevant facts while students doodled, read novels, or dozed off. At larger schools, “section men” — soon to be known as teaching assistants — led aimless discussions or simply lectured, in a dull imitation of their elders. What was the point of going to college, the students assembled at Wesleyan asked, if you didn’t learn anything in class? “It is not that college boys have ceased to have a good time on the campus,” wrote a correspondent from the Boston Globe, one of several national newspapers that covered the conference. “It is rather that an increasing proportion of them are wondering what college is all about and why they are there.” The keynote address was delivered by James Harvey Robinson, a historian and one of the founders of the New School for Social Research, who dismissed most college teachers as “insufferable bores.” He urged the students to “stand up and kick” against poor instruction, because “college belongs to them.”

    Belongs, indeed. In a higher education system financed mostly by tuition dollars, the customer is king. Colleges and universities have become full-service lifestyle stations, competing for students and catering to their every material need. Become your best self, the brochures proclaim; find the real you. But if you look at the pictures, you will see that everyone is somehow finding their best selves in really nice gyms, dormitories, and dining halls. Of course, there is enormous variation across our 4,700 degree-granting institutions; almost half of the student population attend community colleges, for example, which are almost never residential. But every school must fill the coffers and balance the books. And the best way to do that is to advertise “the experience” — that is, the fun you will have in those beautifully appointed spaces — or the opportunities they will provide to you down the road. 

    I, too, had a lot of fun in college, which opened doors to the Peace Corps, high school teaching, graduate school, and the professoriate. Yet it also opened my mind to strenuously different ways of seeing the world. Surely, college should be about something more than a four-year party that sets you up for a decent-paying job; it should improve the way you think, by exposing you to rigorous and imaginative instruction in the classroom. That is what the students who gathered at Wesleyan a century ago agitated for, and I think they were right. 

    It is hard to find that dissident spirit on our campuses right now. To be sure, students “stand up and kick” — to quote Robinson — about a wide range of issues, especially those related to race. Over the past five years, they have demanded compulsory diversity training for faculty, multicultural centers for minority students, limits on campus police, and much else. But they have not demanded better teaching. During the recent pandemic, students at dozens of schools petitioned for tuition discounts on the altogether reasonable grounds that Zoom classes were not as good as the regular kind. But there was no organized protest to improve virtual instruction or to replace it with in-person classes once that became possible. My own university invited students back to campus last spring but continued to teach them virtually. And most of the students seemed fine — or more than fine — with that. They got the college experience, albeit a socially distanced one. And they could take classes in their pajamas, interrupted only when their Wi-Fi went down or when their tech-challenged professors hit the wrong button. 

    I did the best I could, teaching all those faces in all those boxes, but it was not good enough. As a wide swath of surveys confirmed, students thought they were learning less in online classes than in face-to-face ones. That was especially true for low-income and first-generation students, who more often lacked reliable internet connectivity or a quiet place to work. To their credit, some institutions provided grants and other kinds of emergency assistance to these students. But the worries over “equity” were not matched by a broader concern about the overall quality of education that our institutions were delivering to everybody. Our campuses get riled up whenever someone alleges that a certain group does not have equal access to the educational goods of the university. But whether the university itself is good at educating does not seem to exercise us at all. “Nothing can straighten out the college question except good teaching,” declared a student leader in 1924 at Dartmouth, one of dozens of schools to witness protests over poor instruction. “Everything else is besides the point.” Today, college teaching is mostly besides the point. Almost nobody stands up and kicks about it; instead we sit on our hands. 

    This complacency has one over-riding cause: the research revolution, which began in the late 1890s and was kicking into full gear by the time of the Wesleyan conference. First at larger universities and eventually at smaller schools, institutions organized themselves around the production of knowledge. Replacing the avuncular ministers and doctors who taught at the nineteenth-century colleges, a new generation of specialists came to dominate the professoriate. They were “doctors,” too, but of a different type: they had earned a Ph.D. by performing original research in the laboratory or the archive. Whether they could teach was besides the point, as William James noted glumly in 1903. “Will anyone pretend for a moment that the doctor’s degree is a guarantee that its possessor will be a successful teacher?” asked James, who taught psychology and philosophy at Harvard but did not possess a Ph.D. in either field. 

    The question answered itself. Faculty were hired and promoted based on their research potential and achievements, not whether they could successfully educate the students in their charge. Indeed, a reputation for skilled teaching could be the kiss of death to an academic career. “Many college professors are suspicious of a colleague who appears to be a particularly good teacher,” a dean at Ohio State admitted in 1910. “There is a rather widespread notion in American Universities that a man who is an attractive teacher must in some way or other be superficial or unscientific.” If callow undergraduates could understand what you had to say, the argument went, how significant could it be? 

    In the 1920s, the undergraduates struck back. University enrollments skyrocketed, fueled by overall economic prosperity and — especially — by the revolution in gender norms: consigned mainly to women’s colleges before that time, female students flooded into the larger universities. That meant ever more crowded lecture halls where students strained to hear the professor so they could copy down what he said before spitting it back on a test. You didn’t have to be John Dewey to know that this was not a good way to learn. Echoing a quip attributed to Mark Twain (although there is no record of him saying it), students routinely described college as the place where the professor’s lecture notes passed to the student’s notebook without passing through the brains of either. 

    Others denounced the instructional system as “Fordized,” a ruthless human factory that mass-produced students just as Henry Ford built cars. In campus editorials and demonstrations, they demanded smaller seminar-style classes, independent tutorials with professors, and a range of other reforms to “personalize” their education. They also developed and distributed evaluation forms about their professors, a bottom-up student movement that was later appropriated by college administrators. Professors almost uniformly resisted such ratings, which brought a sharp rejoinder from the Cal-Berkeley student newspaper. “The Academic Senate is naturally concerned with the privileges of the faculty, but we are just as naturally concerned with the rights of the students,” it declared in 1940, after the Senate refused to endorse student evaluations. “Who is to protect them against poor teaching?” 

    The next great wave of growth in higher education arrived after World War Two, when the G.I. bill brought millions of new faces into American college classrooms. Half of American students in 1947 were military veterans, who did not suffer poor teachers gladly. “If pedagogic desks were reversed and the veteran in college now were given the opportunity to grade his professor, he would give him a big red ‘F’ and rate him as insipid, antiquated, and ineffectual,” one journalist wrote, taking note of veterans’ complaints about boring lectures, useless discussion sections, and so on. Nor did faculty members shy away from criticizing their own. In 1951, an English professor at the University of Detroit published a list of the “Seven Deadly Sins of Teaching”: failure to prepare, sarcasm, dullness, garrulity, tardiness, digression, and belligerence. A University of Missouri professor reduced the list to four bad-teacher types: Ghost, Wanderer, Echo, and Autocrat. The Ghost discouraged discussion and exited class right after the bell; the Wanderer rambled from one topic to another; the Echo simply repeated what was in the textbook; the Autocrat treated students as if they were inmates in a prison. 

    As in the interwar years, students demanded smaller seminars and discussion sections to leaven the anonymity and tedium of large lecture classes. But when the University of Chicago psychologist Benjamin Bloom played back recordings of seminars to student participants, asking them to reconstruct their experience, fewer than half recalled any “active thinking” at the time. In the era of McCarthyism and the Red Scare, moreover, professors and students were often reluctant to share political opinions in class. Universities responded by offering courses and training sessions to improve classroom dialogue and instruction. But most faculty members eschewed such activities, which they associated with early-childhood teaching and especially with the low-status, much-maligned schools of education that prepared America’s K-12 instructors. 

    So the universities moved in the opposite direction, creating gigantic televised classes that could — at least in theory — expose the “best” professors to thousands of students at the same time. By 1959, over a hundred colleges and universities provided nearly five hundred televised courses to half a million students around the country; at one institution, Penn State, more than one-quarter of the students were registered for at least one TV class. But the televised revolution fizzled over the next decade. Students found TV courses dull and impersonal, “giving the feeling that I was looking thru a window at the class,” as an Ohio University student explained. Likewise, faculty who taught TV courses said they missed face-to-face interaction with their students. They also feared that television would introduce a new spy in the form of “Cyclops, the one-eyed mechanical man,” as a worried professor wrote. Television was easy to record, capturing words that could be used against a teacher later. It also brought in wider audiences, who were in turn more likely to raise political objections to something that was said in class. 

    All these patterns repeated in the 1960s and early 1970s, the third and greatest era of growth in American higher education. Between 1960 and 1964 alone, student enrollment rose from three million to five million; by 1973, it topped ten million. Before World War Two, no American university had more than 15,000 students; in 1970, fifty institutions did. That meant huge lecture classes as well as more courses taught solely by teaching assistants, who received little or no preparation for the job. It also triggered protests by students, who denounced “mass classes” (as the giant courses were called) alongside racial discrimination, nuclear proliferation, and America’s war in Vietnam. During the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in 1964, the student leader Mario Savio blasted not just the university’s repression of political expression but also the poor quality of its classroom instruction. Echoing student demonstrators in the 1920s, Savio said Berkeley was a “knowledge factory” that regarded students as “raw materials”; he also said the university treated them like IBM computer cards, a more contemporary technological metaphor. (Do not fold, bend, or mutilate.) 

    In 1970, a presidential commission on campus unrest connected the nationwide spate of violent protests that year — including eight thousand actual or attempted bombings and seven thousand arrests — to weak undergraduate teaching. College professors “have become so involved in outside research that their commitment to teaching seems compromised,” the commission found. Unrest was most common at the largest universities, which had “failed [students] in a larger moral sense” by herding them into enormous classes taught by disengaged faculty members or inexperienced graduate students. 

    Have we failed our students, in a larger moral sense? I believe that we have, in four ways. 

    First, we have not evaluated or incentivized teaching in a meaningful or intellectually defensible fashion. I taught for twenty years at New York University, where I was observed in the classroom by a supervisor exactly once — in my very first semester. I am now entering my sixth year at the University of Pennsylvania and have not been observed at all. What does that tell faculty — and students — about how much we value teaching? 

    Defenders of the universities will point to student evaluations, which have become ubiquitous across higher education. Colleges and universities fought them for years but eventually capitulated, reasoning that the institutions could provide a more comprehensive and statistically valid analysis than the student organizations that had rated professors since the 1920s. Not incidentally, the evaluations also provided a ready answer when a regulator, a donor, or a parent complained that colleges were not taking teaching seriously enough. Student evaluations can indeed tell us important things about a college teacher: whether she returns work on time, whether she makes herself available out of class, and more. What they cannot tell us is whether her course is academically sound. That is a professional judgment, rendered properly only by fellow experts in the field. When I wrote a book on college teaching, I did not submit it to students for their evaluation; it was instead vetted by specialists in the history of higher education, who decided if I had something important to say. But my own college teaching is evaluated by people who are typically taking their very first class about the topic. If we truly believed in the importance of teaching, we would subject it to peer review in the same manner as our research. We instead allow ourselves to be judged almost entirely by novices, which again speaks volumes about what we really value. 

    Predictably, their judgments reflect all the cultural biases in our society: students rank men more highly than women, whites more highly than non-whites, attractive professors more highly than less attractive ones. Worst of all, student evaluations have contributed to declining student workloads and runaway grade inflation. About forty-three percent of college letter grades in 2011 were A’s, up from thirty-one percent in 1988 and fifteen percent in 1960. Over roughly the same years, the average amount of studying by people in college declined almost by half, from twenty-four to thirteen hours per week. In a recent survey of undergraduates at twenty-four different institutions, half of the respondents reported that they were not taking a single course requiring a total of twenty pages of writing. You cannot blame all of that on student evaluations, of course. But the faculty’s best route to a high rating is to scale back assignments and hand out lots of good grades, and this cannot be good for the academic or moral development of our students. In a study in 2010 at the Air Force Academy, where a mandatory curriculum allows for convenient natural experiments, professors who gave higher grades received higher student evaluations — but their students did worse in subsequent classes. Professors who graded more strictly got lower evaluations, but their students performed better later on. In short, student evaluations do not protect against poor teaching, as the Berkeley newspaper imagined. If anything, they make it even worse. 

    What about teaching awards? Don’t they make all of us teach better, or at least work harder at it? That has been another refrain of the universities, which instituted a wide range of teaching prizes following the student protests of the 1960s. While I was at NYU, I was fortunate to receive its university-wide Distinguished Teaching Award. There was a lovely dinner, at which my dean called me to the podium to receive a medal and then, in her kind remarks, she proceeded to tell the audience about the books I had written! That spoke volumes, too. The reason I got that job was my research, not my teaching. And everyone knows that they can earn more by publishing another book or article — and receiving the higher base pay that comes with promotion — than they can by winning a one-off teaching award. 

    Recent history is littered with instances of professors who won teaching prizes and were denied tenure; the more you exert yourself in the classroom, the less time you have to produce the research that actually makes or breaks you. All of this was already apparent a half-century ago, when the classicist William Arrowsmith noted that teaching prizes, devised to enhance the low institutional importance of undergraduate instruction, actually confirmed it. “At present the universities are as uncongenial to teaching as the Mojave Desert to a clutch of Druid priests,” Arrowsmith told the convention of the American Council on Education in 1966. “If you want to restore a Druid priesthood, you cannot do it by offering prizes for Druid-of-the-year. If you want Druids, you must grow forests. There is no other way of setting about it.” 

    One way to do it would be to institute real professional preparation for college teachers. But here, too, we have failed our students. 

    This is not a new problem. In 1947, Harry Truman’s President’s Commission on Higher Education issued a ringing demand to make higher education available to any capable citizen who wished to obtain it. But none of that would work, the commission cautioned, unless America also taught a new generation of professors how to teach. “The most conspicuous weakness of the current graduate programs is the failure to provide faculty members with the basic skills and the art necessary to impart knowledge to others,” it declared. “College teaching is the only learned profession for which there does not exist a well-defined program of preparation toward developing the skills which it is essential for the practitioner to possess.” As a Rice University professor quipped, a new college teacher was like someone who was briefed about an airplane’s engine and then told to fly the plane. “Tragedy for the pilot is almost inevitable; in the case of the young instructor, the tragedy befalls his students,” he wrote. 

    Actually, it was hell for everyone. In his brilliant and heartbreaking memoir, Becoming a Man, the gay author and activist Paul Monette recalled the tedium and anguish of TA-ing a Yale freshman literature class in the 1960s for “overgrown high-school jocks who thought literature was sissy stuff.” He struggled in vain to convince them otherwise. “To them it was just depressing and weird, and what did they have to know for the final?” Monette remembered. “Only four years older than they and painfully out of my depth, I felt skewered by their boredom as they rolled their eyes at one another, all of us counting the minutes till the bell rang.” 

    By then, some of the colleges had been shamed into providing graduate students with a few non-credit seminars or training sessions about classroom instruction. Like teaching prizes, however, these efforts tended to confirm the same problems that they targeted. The Harvard biologist Kenneth Thimann began one such session by reminding participants that “the young teacher must always keep in mind the importance of doing individual research which is essential to his career,” which was surely one lesson that Harvard doctoral students did not need to learn. But he also urged them to get as much teaching experience as they could during graduate school, when the stakes were lower. Thimann told the story of an American medical officer stationed in Japan, where he diagnosed a soldier in his unit with appendicitis. Having never performed the requisite operation, the officer captured a stray dog and removed its appendix; after that, he felt confident operating on the soldier. Likewise, Thimann said, doctoral students should experiment on undergraduates to prepare themselves for teaching jobs later on. The message was clear: teaching isn’t brain surgery or rocket science, but it does require practice. Just do it for a while, and you will get the hang of it. As a professor friend of mind likes to joke, he learned to teach the same way he learned to have sex: on the job. 

    Today, most universities have established a bit more formal training for rookie teachers. At Penn, for example, TA’s take a three-day workshop before we throw them to the wolves. That is an improvement on what came before, but it is hardly a ringing affirmation of the importance of teaching. To get a Ph.D., you need to spend many years immersing yourself in a discipline so you can — ideally — contribute an original idea to it. And to teach a group of undergraduates? A class or two will suffice. Most of these sessions are sponsored by centers for teaching and learning, the tragic heroes in this bleak winter’s tale. Nearly all our colleges and universities have established such offices, which provide programming and consultation for faculty members as well as training for graduate students. I have deep respect for what the centers do, but they are fighting an uphill battle. Indeed, the very need to create a separate unit devoted to teaching demonstrates its diminished status, even at small liberal arts colleges. “A Center for Teaching?” an emeritus professor at Colby asked incredulously in 1992, after the college established one. “I thought that’s what the whole college was.” It isn’t, and it hasn’t been for a very long time. 

    Also consider this: a majority of college teachers are now adjunct or contract faculty. This is the third way we fail our students. If we really cared about their education, we would not slough it off on itinerant laborers. When I was in graduate school in the early 1990s, we were told that the old guard would retire and that we would get their jobs. That was right on the first count and wrong on the second one. Many professors did retire, but institutions replaced them by hiring adjuncts — at several thousand dollars per course — instead of new full-time faculty members. A fortunate few of us actually got hired onto the tenure track, which now feels like winning the lottery. Everyone else had to drive from campus to campus, picking up courses here and there and waiting for the real job (with a living wage, health insurance, and even a desk) that would never come. A quarter of part-time faculty rely on public assistance; some of them live in cars, and others have turned to sex work to make ends meet. In 2013, Pittsburgh newspapers reported the death of an adjunct professor who taught French for twenty years at Duquesne University. She never earned more than $20,000 in a year, so when her classes were cut she was rendered almost homeless. She died at 83, with no health insurance or retirement benefits. 

    You would think that an institution so exquisitely attuned to “social justice” would bridle at this radically unjust situation. But a professor quoting the n-word out loud from a James Baldwin book generates vastly more indignation than the systematic exploitation of adjuncts, which barely registers on the campus outrage meter. We have made our undergraduates into accessories to this crime, and it is not clear how many of them know or care about it. But they should care, because it harms their own education as well as the lives of their struggling instructors. Surveys have shown that adjuncts spend less time interacting with students than full-time professors do; they are also more likely to give multiple-choice tests, less likely to assign papers, and less likely to require multiple drafts of them. This is not because the adjunct faculty are lazy; it is because of the conditions of their labor. Many of them do not have offices, so it is hard for them to find space to meet with students. Most of all, they simply do not have enough hours in the day to perform the tasks that good teaching requires — planning lessons, grading essays, responding to emails, and so on — while commuting between several campuses and trying to publish research that might qualify them for one of the handful of tenure-track jobs that come up each year. 

    Nor do they have any job security, which might be the biggest injustice of all. If you are an adjunct, you can be let go at any time and for any reason. Maybe the enrollment in your course dipped, or a full-time faculty member decided she wanted to teach it. Or, perhaps, your school simply didn’t like what you had to say. In Virginia, an adjunct instructor who told his class that the massacre at Virginia Tech in 2007 had been overhyped by the national media — because so many victims were white women — was fired the next day. An Iowa adjunct was dismissed for calling the Biblical story of Adam and Eve a myth; another part-timer in the state was not renewed after students complained that he had assigned them “offensive” course readings, including a book by Mark Twain. More recently, a New Jersey community college fired an African-American adjunct instructor after she went on television to defend a Black Lives Matter event that asked non-Blacks not to attend. That is a complicated position, and surely there are many reasonable objections to it. But now her students will not get to hear them, or her. She’s gone. 

    Which brings us to the greatest moral failure at our universities now: the narrowing of expression in our classrooms. 

    In a student survey released last year by Heterodox Academy, over half of the respondents said they were afraid to voice their opinions in class. White students were more reluctant to share their views on race; men were more reluctant to discuss gender; Republicans were less likely to speak about politics. Other research by the same organization shows that faculty — especially those who are centrist or conservative — are also biting their tongues, in class and outside of it. In a poll of 445 professors, over half said they believed that expressing a dissenting view at work could hurt their careers. People are especially afraid of getting slammed on social media and by university “bias response teams,” which allow anyone who believes they have been harmed by a comment to register an anonymous objection to it; this triggers an investigation by the institution, which is also charged with devising punishments for offenders. When asked why they did not share opinions in class, over one-third of respondents in the Heterodox student survey cited fears that they would be reported for violating a campus harassment or speech policy. 

    We have been here before, too. In the 1950s, a pall of fear and censorship fell over American colleges and universities. Back then, of course, people on the Left had more reason to worry: hundreds of professors were fired for alleged communist affiliations or for refusing to disclose them. But that understates the day-to-day toll of the Red Scare in college classrooms. “Now I no longer say what I think, but what I’m told to say,” one professor told a researcher. Topics related to communism and Soviet Russia were the most dangerous, even at smaller schools that proudly touted their liberal bona fides. “We don’t discuss Red China; instead, we discuss whether the student should wear shoes or not!” quipped a professor at the famously bohemian Antioch College. But many faculty members also avoided mention of the New Deal and other government social programs, which conservatives had tainted as “Red” in spirit. “Quite often I’m a little afraid to say anything about Social Security, etc. that may be interpreted as leftist,” a historian in Louisiana admitted. Students reported supposedly subversive comments by their professors to college administrators; indeed, a faculty member grimly observed that students were “the best Gestapo” on campus. “In American democracy it is our boast that we exalt the individual, provide for freedom of thought, cultivate the open mind, inculcate respect for differences of opinion, provide for freedom of the opposition, recognize the rights of the non-conformist,” one university official remarked in 1954. “But, as a general rule all of these procedures and noble ideals are violated or ignored in the college classroom.” 

    That is the case today, too, except fewer people decry or even admit it. When last year’s polls came out about student and faculty self-censorship, I did not hear a single major university leader bemoan the results. And now that Republican politicians are making hay over the matter, we are even less likely to acknowledge it. After Governor Ron DeSantis of Florida signed a law requiring state higher education institutions to conduct surveys to see whether students and faculty “feel free to express beliefs and viewpoints,” an official with the American Association of University Professors deemed the measure “a solution in search of a problem.” In fact, it is a terrible solution to an all-too-real problem. DeSantis has suggested that colleges might have their budgets cut if they inhibit student speech, which could allow him to penalize any speech of which he disapproves; the measure also lets students record their professors during class and sue if they think that their “expressive rights” are being violated, a truly appalling specter to anyone who has actually taught in a college classroom. (Don’t like a professor’s politics, or even the grade she gave you? Sue her!) 

    But the answer is not to circle the wagons and pretend that everything is fine, when we know it is not. The noble ideal of free exchange is being violated or ignored in the college classroom, just as it was in earlier eras. Only now we are afraid to say that we are afraid. And if the professors do not speak up, the students will lose out. They are scared, too, and they are looking to us to set a different tone and example. I don’t begrudge the adjunct faculty for keeping their mouths shut: they have to eat, after all. But the rest of us have no excuse. Whenever I write a column denouncing fear and self-censorship on our campuses, I receive at least one appreciative email from a colleague. Sometimes they ask if I have received blowback; others will remark that I have guts, or another more intimate body part. My reply is always the same. I don’t have guts, or the other body part. I have tenure. What’s it for, really, except to say and write what is on our minds? 

    And what is college for, except to challenge the minds of our students? That was the question raised by the Wesleyan conference, a hundred years ago, and it is every bit as pressing today. We simply cannot fulfill our duty to our students unless we devote ourselves more rigorously to their instruction. Zoom will not save us, any more than television did in the 1950s; the internet has its uses, to be sure, but it cannot substitute for the real revolution that we need. That will require actual professional preparation for teaching and peer review of the same, plus a livable wage for everyone who engages in it. But it will also require us to raise our voices on behalf of freedom of thought, open minds, differences of opinion, and all the other small-l liberal values that have undergirded good teaching in all times and places. I know there are some students who believe we should restrict classroom inquiry and dialogue in the name of larger social goals, especially the struggle against racism. But those students are wrong, and we condescend to them when we refrain from saying so. 

    And maybe, just maybe, we can help inspire them to demand what is truly and rightfully theirs: an institution that puts undergraduate instruction first, above everything else. On a Zoom call during the pandemic, a student told me that she was despondent that Penn had brought students back to campus but was not teaching them in person. I told her that I felt the same way, but that my views didn’t much matter; the only ones that would count were, yes, those of the paying customers. If enough of them refused to send in their spring tuition until they got face-to-face classes, I suggested, they would get face-to-face classes right away. “Professor, this isn’t the ‘60s,” the student replied, smiling sadly. No, I thought, in some ways it is the ‘60s: the campus is again rife with agitations and causes. Why not this one? Students protested poor teaching in the past, I told her, and the future is up for grabs. She and her peers should seize it. 

    Images

    MARIANNE 1960
    MARIANNE 1960

    GOOD GREEK COFFEE
    GOOD GREEK COFFEE


    GRECIAN WOMAN STUDY


    MONTREAL WOMAN NO. 1


    JUST TO HAVE BEEN


    MY FIRST WIFE


    MONTREAL WOMAN NO. 2


    MONTREAL VISITOR NO. 1


    VIBRANT BUT DEAD

    Liberalism, Inebriated 

    Does liberalism have poems? Are there liberal poets? John Stuart Mill, who loved Shelley and who celebrated “human feeling,” thought so: “Although a philosopher cannot make himself, in the peculiar sense in which we now use the term, a poet, unless at least he have that peculiarity of nature which would probably have made poetry his earliest pursuit; a poet may always, by culture, make himself a philosopher.” But a philosopher of liberalism? 

    Charles Baudelaire, a contemporary of Mill, died in 1867. In 1869, a collection of his prose-poems — a form that he helped to invent — was published under the title Le Spleen de Paris, a phrase that Baudelaire had himself used for a selection of these texts. The title has been translated as Paris Blues. (The original title was much better.) Baudelaire believed that life is a struggle between spleen and ideal, and in his work he studied the former and championed the latter. Among the prose-poems in the posthumous book was one called “Enivrez-vous,” which first appeared, in February1864, in the newspaper Figaro. It has been translated into English by Michael Hamburger as “Be Drunk.” 

    Here it is, in full: 

    One should always be drunk. That’s all that matters; that’s our one imperative need. So as not to feel Time’s horrible burden that breaks your shoulders and bows you down, you must get drunk without ceasing. 

    But what with? With wine, with poetry, or with virtue, as you choose. But get drunk. 

    And if, at some time, on the steps of a palace, in the green grass of a ditch, in the bleak solitude of your room, you are waking up when drunkenness has already abated, ask the wind, the wave, a star, the clock, all that which flees, all that which groans, all that which rolls, all that which sings, all that which speaks, ask them what time it is; and the wind, the wave, the star, the bird, the clock will reply: ‘It is time to get drunk! So that you may not be the martyred slaves of Time, get drunk; get drunk, and never pause for rest! With wine, with poetry, or with virtue, as you choose!’ 

    Now that’s a liberal poem! “Enivrez-vous” is liberal in its celebration of freedom; profoundly anti-authoritarian, it offers a license to its readers. Getting drunk and so refusing to surrender to drudgery, suffering, or the inevitability of aging and death—to be a martyred slave of Time —is not as sin, an offense, a transgression, or a violation of anything. It is a right. But it is no mere right; it is an “imperative need,” something that counteracts “Time’s horrible burden.” 

    You might object that the poem is not so liberal after all, because what I am calling a license takes the form of an imperative, a kind of mandate: “One must always be drunk.” But this is a poem, not a treatise, and a license would be far too grudging or qualified, and a lot less fun. “One may drink” or “one has the right to drink” would not have the right valence or spirit. (Note well: This is not a poem about, or an essay on, tolerance. It asks you to act, not to tolerate. Its subject is your attitude toward yourself, not your attitude toward others. Anyhow, tolerance is begrudging.) 

    The poem is also liberal in its recognition, at once mischievous and celebratory, of the diversity of preferences and tastes — of what one gets drunk on. In his Autobiography, Mill said that On Liberty was meant as “a kind of philosophic text-book of a single truth,” which is “the importance, to man and society, of a large variety of types of character, and of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and conflicting directions.” For some, wine is best; for others, poetry; for others, virtue. (For some, it is all three.) The power of the poem comes, of course, from the oddity of the juxtaposition. It is not all that shocking or even interesting for a poet to celebrate getting drunk. It is far more interesting (and far more liberal) for a poet to link wine, poetry, and virtue, and to see them all as sources of inebriation. A part of the merriment, and the clarity, of “Enivrez-vous” is its insistence that poetry and virtue can get you drunk, too. 

    It is not easy, of course, to explain how virtue in particular can make one drunk, without becoming high-minded or sanctimonious, or patting oneself on the back. Sure, many people do get “drunk on power,” and those who act on behalf of causes, including horrific ones, seem to have some kind of erotic attachment to what they do. (Consider O’Brien in Orwell’s 1984. Was he drunk? Maybe.) But that is not what Baudelaire had in mind. Many of those who help other people, and whose life is defined in part by good works, feel thrilled, or excited, or something like that, by what they feel privileged to do. The neuroscience is worth investigating here. Doing good works is associated with the release of oxytocin and the production of dopamine — and that can make you feel intoxicated (and drunk). 

    It is true that, for Mill and many other liberals, some pleasures are higher than others, and those of poetry and virtue are higher than those of wine. In my view, they are right. But let’s not say that too loudly, or with too much earnestness, or with a condemnation of the lower pleasures. Liberals insist on accepting divergent conceptions of the good, and equally important, on acknowledging and celebrating diverse kinds of good. 

    “Enivrez-vous” is quintessentially liberal as well in its insistence on human agency, and on activity rather than passivity. (“As you choose!”) The reader is instructed to get drunk as well as to make the choice about exactly how. Different people can exercise their agency in different ways. If you choose to get drunk on poetry — as Baudelaire evidently did, along with wine — that is fine; so too if you get drunk on good works. And of course, the listed options for intoxication are merely illustrative. The reader is invited to think: What, exactly, gets me drunk? (That is, in fact, an excellent question to ask.) 

    Mill was similarly insistent on the importance of human agency. In speaking of happiness, he urged that we mean “not a life of rapture; but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive.” Baudelaire was speaking not of mere moments but of “a life of rapture,” but then he was that sort of poet. 

    “Enivrez-vous” is liberal in its exuberance — its pleasure in its own brazenness, its radical openness to experience, its defiance, its rebelliousness, its implicit laughter, its love of life and what it has to offer. It is the very opposite of dutiful. Its middle finger is raised. It is far more exuberant than Mill’s On Liberty, but it is exuberant in the same way. It, too, celebrates activity and joy. Baudelaire found a way to combine those two celebrations without the slightest sentimentality. His poem opposes everything desiccated and lifeless. It exemplifies what it celebrates. Baudelaire’s poem might even be seen as a companion to Mill’s book. Consider Mill’s embrace of “experiments in living”: Mill had his own ways of getting drunk. (“Enivrez-vous” was probably written in the same decade as On Liberty.) 

    Here is Mill on Shelley, whom he preferred to Wordsworth: “He is a poet, not because he has ideas of any particular kind, but because the succession of his ideas is subordinate to the course of his emotions.” (Recall Mill’s emotional recovery, with the help of poetry, in his account of his nervous breakdown in his memoir.) And here is Blake on Milton: “The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of Angels & God, and at liberty when of Devils & Hell, is because he was a true Poet and of the Devil’s party without knowing it.” Baudelaire was not of the Devil’s party, but he was a true Poet, and he knew something about Hell. 

    Baudelaire had a lot to say about poetry and its place in life. In 1846, in a short essay called “To the Bourgeois,” he insisted that people must “be capable of feeling beauty, for just as not one of you today has the right to forego power, equally not one of you has the right to forgo poetry.” He added that it is possible to “live three days without bread; without poetry, never; and those of you that maintain the contrary are mistaken; they do not know themselves.” The most important words are here the last five: those who think that they can live without poetry lack self-knowledge. Poetry, then, does not fall below virtue (or wine). And indeed, Baudelaire’s elevation of poetry can be associated with what philosophers call “liberal perfectionism,” elaborated by Mill and Joseph Raz, which is respectful of freedom of choice and the diversity of preferences and values, but which insists on a distinctly liberal conception of the good life, one that involves cultivation of the higher pleasures and one’s own capacity for agency. 

    Nothing about Baudelaire is simple, of course, and the same is true of liberalism. In politics, Baudelaire was emphatically not a liberal. He was dedicated to art, not democracy. He was anti-republican and pro-aristocracy, and he admired de Maistre — a true and complete horror, and a virulent enemy of all things liberal. Though he participated in the revolution of 1848 in Paris and was to be found on the barricades, Baudelaire lost interest in politics after Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte’s coup in 1851, and his political attitudes became an extension of his cultural philosophy and his high aestheticism. And yet “Enivrez-vous,” read on its own, is unmistakably the product of a liberal imagination. 

    We live in a period in which liberalism is under considerable pressure. On the left, “liberalism,” or more specifically “neoliberalism,” is said to be old and dead and boring and dull, to be over and exhausted, to have failed dismally. Some people on the left hold it responsible for an assortment of social evils, including poverty, climate change, inequality, racism, sexism, the demise of labor unions, the rise of monopolies, technocracy, and a general sense of alienation and disempowerment. On the right, and particularly the religious right, “liberalism” is said to have ruined everything. It is allegedly responsible for much that is bad — a growth in out-of-wedlock childbirth, a repudiation of traditions (religious and otherwise), a rise in populism, an increased reliance on technocracy (the bane of both left and right), inequality, environmental degradation, sexual promiscuity, a deterioration of civic associations, a diminution of civic virtue, political correctness on university campuses, and a general sense of anomie. 

    I have put liberalism in quotation marks, because the set of ideas that is under attack is not always specified, and because its connection to liberal political thought is not clear. Any list of liberal thinkers would have to include John Milton, John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, Mill, Benjamin Constant, Mary Wollstonecraft, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Hayek, Isaiah Berlin, Jurgen Habermas, John Rawls, Raz, Amartya Sen, Ronald Dworkin, Martha Nussbaum, and Jeremy Waldron, among others. (Walt Whitman and Bob Dylan could be counted as liberals as well. Whitman, sounding a lot like Baudelaire, only more saccharine: “Do anything, but let it produce joy.” Dylan, sounding a lot like Baudelaire, only more edgy: “Everybody must get stoned.”) A lengthy book could easily be written about the differences between Bentham and Mill, and in important respects Hayek and Dworkin are not on the same team. But all of these thinkers share a commitment to human agency, and to the idea of human dignity. 

    It would be a mistake to treat the author of Fleurs du Mal as a liberal, but Baudelaire’s poem does capture something essential about the most appealing forms of liberalism: the insistence on freedom, on the diversity of tastes and preferences, on human agency, on a kind of exuberance without apology. Liberalism must not be treated as an instruction manual. It is not an edict; it has to be made, not followed. But because of what it understands about the human spirit, and because of its hopes for that spirit, it is the right thing to make. “Enivrez-vous” helps to explain why. 

    Lambs and Wolves

    For paradise to be possible either the lion must lose his nails, or the lamb must grow his own. 

    HANS BLUMENBERG 

    Before setting out to Moriah, where he intends to obey God’s command to sacrifice his son, Abraham loads the wood into Isaac’s arms and carries the burning torch and a sharp knife himself. On the way his son asks, but where is the lamb for a burnt offering? The question is devastating, as is Abraham’s answer: My son, God will provide himself a lamb. It is a scene of unspeakable cruelty. (The murder of Abel is a crime statistic by comparison.) For Isaac is doubly innocent. Unaware of God’s command, and presumably too inexperienced to beware fathers bearing torches, he is psychologically innocent. And since he has presumably done no wrong, he is morally innocent as well. All this weighs on Abraham, and it is meant to. He has agreed to be the hand by which innocence is extinguished. 

    There are other mythical traditions in which a father might kill a son without qualms, whether to gain divine favor or to assure a military victory. But the Hebrew Bible is a different sort of book. Its God is a test giver who keeps an eye on the moral spectator. Isaac turns out to be just a prop in a drama revolving entirely around his father. Once Abraham has proven his infinite resignation before God — without, in the end, committing the unspeakable — nothing more is required of the human lamb and the incident is not mentioned again. The real test for Isaac will come later, when he becomes an adult and is saddled with two difficult sons. One wonders if he ever thought back to that strange afternoon. He certainly would not have been encouraged to dwell on it. In Judaism there is no cult of the innocent white lamb. 

    In Christianity there is. The Gospels rewrite the Abraham drama and present a divine Father who for mankind’s sake willingly sacrifices his divine-human Son, who just as willingly offers himself up. In this version, the Father is the prop and the innocent Son is the story. This focus on sacrificed innocence explains why lamb imagery suffuses the Christian imagination and shows up so often in scripture, theology, and the arts. But it is an ambiguous symbol. In the Gospel of John, Jesus announces, I am the good shepherd: the good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep. Early Christian iconography relied heavily on this metaphor, beginning with catacomb paintings showing the Redeemer with one lamb draped over his shoulders while two others accompany him. The image implies that to be a good Christian is to be a good lamb, harmless and willing to be led by someone who knows the way. 

    John the Baptist had something different in mind when he declared, on first seeing Jesus, Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world. Now we are asked to think of Jesus not as a wise caretaker but as an innocent victim allowing himself to be beaten, lashed, spat upon, and crucified. A self-immolating Isaac. This image of a passive redeemer would leave a far deeper impression on the Christian imagination than that of the Good Shepherd. But as a symbol it leaves something to be desired. The God of the Hebrew Bible is a fearsome God, leading His people out of the wilderness in a pillar of cloud to the lands they will conquer. A suffering Christian can surely identity with the suffering Lamb of God. But where is the solace, where is the guidance, where is the hope of gaining protection? 

    The other John, author of the Book of Revelation, provided one answer. As his revelation begins, we are introduced to a repulsive exterminating beast with seven horns and seven eyes who has been sent to settle every divine score. Like Oedipus solving the riddle of the sphinx, or King Arthur extracting Excalibur from the stone, the lamb confronts a challenge that others cannot meet: opening the Book of the Seven Seals, which will bring about the end times. As the lamb breaks the first four seals, the four horsemen of the apocalypse emerge, the first on a pure white steed, the last on a black one. With the fifth, those slain for the Word of God emerge from darkness, demanding vengeance against their killers, which they will soon have. The bloody work begins when the sixth seal is broken, revealing the rulers and the rich, who try to hide themselves from judgment and cry out, Hide us from the face of him that sitteth on the throne, and from the wrath of the Lamb! No one answers and they are doomed to eternal suffering. When the dust settles, John looks out and the destruction has been swept away. He sees a new heaven and a new earth. The lamb is still there, though he has been cleaned up and is about to be given in celestial marriage to the New Jerusalem. And the city had no need of the sun, neither of the moon, to shine in it: for the glory of God did lighten it, and the Lamb is the light thereof. That, and its defense force. 

    The scene in the Christmas creche is so familiar that it takes some effort to realize how strange it is. The exhausted parents we recognize. But who are these silk-robed and turbaned men who bow and kneel before an infant? And what about the animals, who seem just as mesmerized as the visitors? Even the little lamb approaches and leans its head over the manger to get a closer look. 

    We are all Magi when it comes to children. Like other animals we are hardwired to protect our young. But the subjective feelings that accompany this instinct point to something beyond mere preservation of the species. How we imagine children to be really reflects how we imagine the world ought to be. This has not always been true for all peoples and societies, but of ours it is. The death of a child affects us very differently from the death of an adult. Even the death of other species’ young disturbs some people. They will eat beef and mutton but wouldn’t think of touching veal or lamb. In what sense grown animals are less innocent and worthy of protection than young ones is difficult to discern, especially given that the latter will face the same fate as the former if they reach maturity. One might even make a clever case that eating lamb or veal saves the animal from months or years of suffering in captivity. But that is really not what our feelings are about. They are about holding onto a world picture. The child in the cradle has no idea what a burden it already carries for us. 

    We oscillate between two ways of thinking about the newborn before our eyes. One is to see it as a blank slate, knowing nothing, intuiting nothing, having neither moral nor immoral instincts (or weak ones). This can fill us with a sense of promise as we project its life into the future. Seeing an infant, Rousseau wrote, is like seeing nature in early spring: 

    I see him bubbling, lively, animated, without gnawing cares, without long and painful foresight, whole in his present being, and enjoying a fullness of life which seems to want to extend itself beyond him. I foresee him at another age exercising the senses, the mind, and the strength which is developing in him day by day, new signs of which he gives every moment. I contemplate the child, and he pleases me. I imagine him as a man, and he pleases me more. His ardent blood seems to reheat mine. I believe I am living his life, and his vivacity rejuvenates me. 

    Rousseau was a pessimist who saw life as a trial, not only in his particular case but for everyone who is forced to share the world with others. Why then doesn’t he foresee the grown child suffering in such a world? Because he, like most of us, is inclined to saddle children with expectations that their new lives might somehow redeem our own, or redeem life itself. We are always on the lookout for occasions to rejuvenate our hopes in rejuvenation, from wedding days to Inauguration Days. They are all opportunities to convince ourselves that this time it really will be different. 

    If the child’s innocence is a blankness, an absence of pre-determined qualities, we can be hopeful about its prospects. But if we think of its innocence instead as the presence of something valuable, a kind of purity or moral perfection, then more melancholy thoughts might occupy us. Not because we see something dark in the infant’s eyes, but because we imagine that its perfection can only be diminished or lost over time. On this assumption, infants are not starting a journey into a world they will make their own through experience. Rather, they stand as an alternative to our fallen world, a symbol of what we might have been had we not succumbed to it. Experience, which leaves permanent stains on the sheets of the soul, is their greatest enemy. And so it must be postponed, blunted, diluted. Save the children! This might mean that we must protect them from harm until they can protect themselves. Or it might mean that we should preserve the child-like within them, or within ourselves, or within our society. Or even that we should hold up innocence as a civilizational ideal and stave off knowledge about our intractable world, distrust it, and listen instead to the bleating of the lambs. 

    Ancient documents tell us that in the Mediterranean world of the first century BCE adults were using children as spiritual mediums in the theurgic ceremonies of mystical cults. A child would be selected for the job and blindfolded, and then the cult’s adepts would begin secret incantations to entice the divine to make its presence manifest. This was one of them: 

    Come to me, you who fly through the air, called in secret codes and unutterable names, at this lamp divination that I perform, and enter into the child’s soul, so that it may receive the immortal form in mighty and incorruptible light. 

    This done, the blindfold would then be removed, and the child would be asked to look into a flame or a bowl of oily liquid and report to the adults whatever he or she saw in it. The assumption was that children, lacking experience and perhaps imagination, were less likely to be blocked by their own thoughts and feelings and illusions, and thus were purer conduits for unadulterated truth. We make the same assumption whenever we say out of the mouths of babes, unconsciously quoting the Psalms. It is a very old thought. 

    Americans are particularly taken with it, as we see in the movies they produce and flock to. Steven Spielberg is the great mythogogue of the wise innocent child, and in this domain his masterpiece is Close Encounters of the Third Kind. Aliens are coming, but before they arrive children begin to have premonitions of them, which they receive in complete serenity. When the time comes and spaceships begin to hover and emit a blinding light, the children giggle. When the mothership lands, they toddle up to it and are met by hairless, sexless aliens who look like stretched out infants with very large heads. The children grab their hands and enter the ship as if that were the most natural thing in the world. Grown-ups in the movie are portrayed as oblivious or resistant, their age and experience having closed their minds. Except, of course, for the one exceptional adult who has never really grown up. He has revelatory dreams and spreads the Good News despite being treated as a madman. In some films of this genre the news about the aliens delivered by the children can be bad, very bad. But no one listens to these little prophets until it’s too late — and now they’re here. 

    In the history of myth, children have been portrayed not only as prophets or mediums of a higher power, but as partaking of those powers by virtue of their youth. Tibetan Buddhists are only one people to have searched for a child to lead them. The very fact that Jesus came as an infant and did not descend from heaven in adult form was long taken in the Christian tradition as a sign of the spiritual potency of innocence. In the Middle Ages there developed a myth, long taken to be historically accurate, about a supposed Children’s Crusade that took place in the early thirteenth century. It recounted the exploits of a group of children who were said to have spontaneously marched across Europe and organized their own brigade to seize the Holy Land from the heathen Turk and to shame adults unwilling to make the ultimate sacrifice. 

    To take a modern example, consider Heidi, the nineteenth-century Swiss children’s book that remains a perennial favorite. Its basic theme has been adopted and adapted in countless books and movies. In all these stories an innocent, preferably dimpled little girl is put into the care of a gruff old man or woman. This adult treats her abysmally at first, but little by little is transformed by the child’s relentless, not to say tiresome, good cheer and good deeds. The cherub turns her cheek again and again until the adults begin to see how cruel they have been, but even more how they have darkened their own lives. How? By refusing to look on the sunny side. The story ends with a tearful embrace between innocent child and the now healed adult. And why not? If the Messiah came as a child, why shouldn’t the psychotherapist? 

    At the age of seven, any child would throw the first stone. 

    MICHEL HOUELLEBECQ 

    Children are naturally good. They are honest, pacific, sympathetic, and wise. No parent of a two-year-old or a thirteen- year-old will be taken in by this myth. The market for it is expectant couples, forgetful grandparents, and the childless. But innocence is not all we project onto children. We also express our fears about evil in the world, spooking ourselves with tales of demon-possessed infants and child killers. As if on cue, when Spielberg began making his movies in the 1970s Hollywood also gave us films such as The Exorcist and The Omen, reflecting the other half of our disassociated fantasies about the young. Both spawned popular movie franchises, and The Exorcist, which won the Academy Award for Best Picture in 1974, is one of the highest grossing films in history. 

    The first of the genre was The Bad Seed, released in 1956, an eerie film about a cute little blonde girl who kills friends and neighbors without the least trace of guilt. Soon she is revealed to be the granddaughter of a serial killer, therefore his “seed.” On learning this her mother tries to kill the child, but fails. In the novel on which the movie was based, the mother then commits suicide, leaving the child free to continue murdering and haunting our imaginations. A brilliant ending. At the time, though, it ran up against the Hays Code, which dictated that onscreen crime could never be shown to pay. And so a more uplifting ending was written, in which the little girl is struck dead by lightning in the final shot. (Thus fulfilling a fleeting fantasy that all parents have had at one time or another.) 

    The ancient world seems to have had less trouble recognizing children’s capacity for wickedness. Even the Hebrew Bible contains a story about it. In the Second Book of Kings we read of Elisha, who has just taken on the mantle of prophet after Elijah was taken up to heaven in a chariot of fire. One day, while making his way to the city of Bethel, Elisha runs into a large group of boys who tease him and mock his baldness. He does not turn the other cheek, nor does he use the episode as a teaching moment. Instead he curses the boys in the name of the Lord, the Scripture says. Immediately two bears appear out of the forest and maul them to death. 

    The infant-besotted New Testament, on the other hand, keeps children’s capacity for cruelty at bay. Jesus suffers the children to come to him and exhorts his disciples to be like them. But in a classic example of the return of the repressed, a second century Christian author aiming to celebrate the supernatural powers of the Messiah left an apocryphal text, known as The Infancy Gospel of Thomas, that portrayed children in a much darker light. Its hero/anti-hero is the pre-adolescent Jesus, who is portrayed with an almost cinematic vividness. Straight away we are introduced to a young Messiah who curses a child found messing with something he built on the sand; the boy shrivels up like a tree. When another boy inadvertently bumps into Jesus while running, he drops dead on the spot. Seeing what a menace the young savior was turning out to be, parents of the other children in the village complain to Joseph and Mary, only to be struck blind. Finally Joseph stirs up his courage and confronts his son. Why do you do such things?, he asks. The child only stares at him stonily and replies, Do not vex me. A horror movie moment. 

    Perhaps in the early centuries of Christianity, when pagan realism was still a force, it was easier to confront the gap between the idealized image of Jesus in the manger and the actual children with whom adults have to cope. The most profound analyst of this gap was Augustine. He is rarely mentioned in books and anthologies on child psychology, no doubt because he rejected the Pelagianism that still undergirds our secular culture. We generally assume that human evil can be traced back to human action (early childhood traumas, social conditions) and that the damage can be undone by human means: social reform, pedagogy, therapy. In other words: human beings are not born with evil propensities, we make them bad. 

    Augustine saw the logical flaw in this assumption. Of course, bad influences harm us. But we cannot explain the evil that children commit by pointing to the world created by evil adults, since those adults were once children. We face an infinite regress. The real difficulty is accounting for the fact that anyone is capable of evil at all. Augustine appealed to the Fall and original sin to solve the conundrum, a move that few are still willing to make. But we have been unable to come up with another concept to explain the conditions of the possibility of evil in children. We try to block out the thought that a young boy can pull on a ski mask, load his gun, walk into a school cafeteria and kill classmates he was joking with the day before. That among the children sitting at Jesus’ feet were a few who preferred Barabbas

    Augustine saw such propensities within himself as a youth. As he recounts in the Confessions, one day he was playing with a group of friends and they decided to steal some pears from a nearby orchard. They weren’t hungry and threw the pears away immediately. Why did they do it? This question plagued Augustine for many years, not as a matter of guilt but as a barrier to self-understanding. Only just before his conversion could he see why he had done it: my pleasure was not in the pears; it was in the crime itself. I loved my fall, he admits, I loved the shame. Tyrants and even murderers can have motives for their crimes; I did not. I am worse than they. Though the crime was petty, it was radically evil because it was gratuitous. Radical evil cannot be reduced to pleasure seeking or fear, nor can it be explained away as a reaction to previous harms. Radical evil we commit just because. And our capacity to commit it is innate. 

    Augustine’s examples of ordinary child behavior, rather than adult crimes, gives his argument force. But of childhood crimes we also have plenty of examples. In a famous case dating back to the 1990s, two ten-year-old boys in Kirkby, England, abducted, tortured, and murdered a two-year-old by the name of James Bulgar. They had planned everything. They kicked and stomped on him, threw bricks and stones at him, crushing his skull, and mutilated the rest of him. Batteries were shoved into his mouth and he was placed on train tracks where his body was cut in two by a train. The internet will oblige you with countless similar stories if you are inclined to look for them. They serve to remind us that, on the map of the human psyche, Columbine is not far from Neverland. 

    Lovers slip home from trysts beneath the palm trees. 

    MARGARET MEAD 

    So how do we reconcile the Gospels’ image of innocent children at the feet of Jesus with Augustine’s image of sinful ones stealing a neighbor’s pears? Without resorting to casuistry, it is not easy. Which is why even in our post-Christian culture we see educated opinion about innocence swing from one extreme to the other without finding a settled resting place. Nowhere is this more evident than in our thinking about the sexuality of children. 

    The revolution in Western attitudes toward sexuality that began in the early twentieth century is still misunderstood. It remains conventional to portray the intellectual and cultural transformation that followed as a glorious and uncomplicated release from the suffocating grip of Puritanism and an escape into an equally uncomplicated sexual freedom. Freud, who did more than anyone to trigger the change, did not at all see things that way. His insight was that in not accepting children’s sexual nature, their desires and their aggression, Christian societies were preventing them from integrating passions and experiences into a productive, autonomous adult life. Maturity, not liberation, was Freud’s goal. The same is true of Margaret Mead, whose hugely influential anthropological study, Coming of Age in Samoa, which appeared in 1928, idealized Samoans’ guilt-free attitude toward sex. She did not, however, prescribe these practices for Western societies, which she considered impossible; the point was to make her readers reckon the psychological costs of living with pointless, pervasive sexual guilt. Like Freud, she wanted to help us cope better with the adult world that we have built for ourselves, not escape it. 

    What neither Mead nor Freud anticipated was that their work would inspire educated adults in the West — and soon just about everyone else — to demand that the new stigma- free approach to childhood sexuality also be applied to themselves. With astonishing speed in the decades following the Second World War, free sexual exploration went from being considered an early stage in childhood development to being a life ideal for adults intent on offloading their hang-ups. In the 1960s Mead complained publicly that this was not at all what they meant, to no avail. It is hard not to see the sexual revolution that began a half-century ago as inspired in part by a kind of innocence-envy. What’s good for the gosling should be good for the gander, no? If taboos are inherently bad (something Freud and Mead never asserted) and impulses are inherently good (ditto), wouldn’t escaping the first and unleashing the second restore a lost innocence? Of course not. Instead we discovered that the pursuit of a second sexual innocence for adults could rob many children of their first. 

    Extravagant examples of this inversion began popping up in the 1970s. A well known one was a commune formed in Friedrichshof, Austria, by the artist Otto Mühl, a former Wehrmacht soldier who after the war fell under the influence of Wilhelm Reich. Mühl created a group called the Action-Analytical Organization, whose program was to liberate society from its psychological dependence on repressive bourgeois norms and consumerism through free love, group therapy (which mainly involved screaming), and a return to nature. He built an enormous complex in the countryside that housed dozens of children who slept communally in one area, and many more dozens of adults who slept communally in another. In the group’s home movies we see footage of smiling long-haired men working the fields and women with closely-cropped hair running around topless, a baby hanging from each breast. We see naked children playing in the mud or smearing themselves with paint, to the delight of the grown-ups. And we see a room full of naked adults imitating the children by rolling around on the floor in a therapeutic group grope, sometimes jumping up to deliver primal screams before diving back into the scrum. It’s hard to imagine such scenes delighting the unfortunate children who witnessed them. Inevitably, rumors of child sexual abuse began circulating, and, just as inevitably, they proved true. Adolescent girls, it turned out, were regularly taken to Mühl for sexual initiation, while boys would be taken to the woman he called his wife for the same reason. And parents let this happen, out of ideological conviction or studied ignorance. By the 1980s the law caught up with Mühl and he was finally convicted of pedophilia and spent seven years in prison. 

    But it was the subtler intrusion of images of sexualized children into Western popular culture that has had the most lasting effects. One cannot help thinking that the Gospel’s image of children as innocent of sexual desire, pure little putti, had the boomerang effect of exciting a perverse adult desire to see that innocence violated, or at least toyed with. In 1976, a year before Close Encounters was released, Jodie Foster appeared as a fourteen-year-old prostitute in Martin Scorsese’s Taxi Driver, and won an Academy Award for her efforts. Upping the ante, Louis Malle cast Brooke Shields as a twelve-year-old prostitute in Pretty Baby in 1978. Even more insidious, given its omnipresence, was the new blatant sexualization of young girls in advertising. In the 1980s pre-pubescent girls began to appear in billboard and magazine ads in absurdly tight jeans, topless with hands covering their half-developed breasts, blow-dried hair and makeup, looking knowingly into the camera. Nothing comes between me and my Calvins. At the same time beauty pageants were being organized where girls under ten years of age were transformed into wink-wink miniature seductresses, singing slightly risqué songs and making suggestive dance moves at competitions. (Today parents take home videos of their own children doing this and post them online for delighted friends and family.) Indecency was continuously and radically defined down. A former Miss Vermont Junior Queen, when challenged by a writer for putting her child in competitions, replied: Do I put makeup on her? Yes. But I don’t think I overdo it for a 5-year-old. 

    And then, beginning in the 1980s, the mood swung wildly in the other direction and Americans found themselves gripped by a collective panic about their little lambs. It began in 1983 when a mentally unstable mother in Southern California went to the local police and began making bizarre claims that the childcare center her son attended routinely raped and abused children. After interviewing many of the children, overeager police and unscrupulous therapists using dubious “recovered memory” techniques began arresting members of the center’s staff. The trials that followed, the longest and most expensive in American history to that point, were reported on breathlessly by the local and national press, and copy-cat accusations kept being made around the country for years, long after the original stories had been debunked and the accused were exonerated. One staff member spent five years in prison without ever being convicted of a crime. Not long afterward, of course, we learned about a genuine scandal, the massive global cover-up of systematic child abuse committed by Catholic priests, which only reinforced the fears. 

    Strangely, though, Americans remain strangely indifferent to the most obvious violations of children’s sexual innocence all around them. Advertising firms still portray flirty, pouting pre-teen girls to hawk their products, and young Pretty-Baby actresses are still cast in movies which other children see. Young boys with internet connections can watch the sexual torture of women online without fear of the overweening state stepping in. And countless teen and pre-teen girls routinely post self-made videos of themselves stripping or masturbating for the pleasure of their boyfriends; or they upload the clips for free to highly profitable porn sites where pedophilicly inclined adults can enjoy themselves for free. Meanwhile, after having been driven to school by their frightened parents, adolescents are given lectures about obtaining explicit consent from the opposite sex before trying to hold hands or plant a first kiss. The result being that pleasure is the only thing American young people are still innocent of. 

    Innocence is like a dumb leper who has lost his bell, wandering the world, meaning no harm. 

    GRAHAM GREENE 

    Millions of adults around the world call themselves Christians. But can a Christian be an adult? It’s a fair question. 

    The Hebrew Bible, overflowing with family sagas, Bildungsromane, and political intrigue, reveals the world and its ways even while bringing divine judgment down upon them. Adults marry, have children, educate them, cultivate land, seek and give counsel, get angry and are appeased, suffer and smite their enemies, get ill and die. There are good characters, evil characters, and many ambiguous ones such as King David, who swings from sin to repentance and back again, like a metronome. God, too, has his bad days, and the Hebrews never know quite what to expect of him. So they are forced to learn from experience and live with uncertainty. The characters of the Hebrew Bible mature before our eyes, and we mature as we read their stories. 

    Children and lambs get more than their due in the Gospels, but we learn next to nothing about adult life. Jesus is precociously wise and has nothing to learn, no capacities in need of development. Mary says hardly a word, and Joseph doesn’t speak at all. The disciples are little more than stick figures. James and John have trouble staying up at night; Peter is something of a coward; and Thomas needs the evidence of his fingers to accept Christ’s resurrection. Beyond that, we learn nothing about them, not even about the extraordinary Judas, who seems to have strayed in from the Old Testament. Jesus does not prepare his disciples for carrying the burdens of adulthood in their families and communities. Instead he admonishes them, If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple. A good disciple drops his nets and follows without asking questions. What his wife and children eat that night we are not told. 

    The early Christians were an apocalyptic sect that expected Jesus to return in their lifetimes, so it makes some sense that they were little inclined to plan for their own futures or their children’s, or create anything durable in the world. But the longer Christ’s return was delayed, the more Christians had to accustom themselves to living in a world they found alien. Discipleship turned out to be more complicated than being reborn as a child, or imitating a lamb, or washing the feet of the poor. It required a knowledge of life, of human psychology, of political necessity. This their new scriptures did not confer on them. And so, as time went on and the Church became a vast bureaucracy and a force in world affairs, it conformed more and more to the ways of that world and lost its soul. 

    That, in any case, was the view of the Protestant Reformers, whose alternative was to return to the unmediated words of the Savior, which now any believer could read in a vernacular tongue, and hold fast to them in the face of whatever challenges the world posed. One does not have to be a Counter-Reformation polemicist to recognize that however much this return to the sources enriched the inner spiritual lives of the Protestant faithful, it also induced a constriction in their conception of terrestrial life and its inevitable demands. Simple believers looked to the Gospels, then to the world, and the world looked pretty simple right back at them. Be harmless as doves…consider the lilies of the field… love your enemies…whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also…forgive men their trespasses…take therefore no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. That doesn’t sound so hard. And the Old Testament, reread in light of the Gospels, seemed pretty straightforward, too. Under the klieg light of sola fide, Abraham, Jacob and Esau, Moses, even Job resembled ordinary Christians just like you and me. A rich tradition of Protestant systematic theology developed in the Reformation, beginning with Calvin’s monumental Institutes of the Christian Religion. But on the ground every time a Protestant church’s doctrine has been formalized, hierarchies of authority established, and centers of learning founded, there has arisen within its ranks little Luthers who denounced this betrayal, calling the faithful back to a more “primitive” Christianity (their term, not mine). Which is why the history of the Protestant churches resembles nothing so much as a child’s game of leapfrog, where the point is to keep one step ahead of maturity. 

    Pure? What does it mean? 

    SYLVIA PLATH 

    Everyone needs experience with experience. Certain pious protectors of the innocent labor under the illusion that piety can only be preserved by waging a war against it. Life, they think, is a siege that can only be survived by retreating to the cloister, the yeshiva, the madrasa, the gated community, or the home school. The illusion behind their illusion is an old and crude psychology of mimesis, which holds that acquainting people only with good things will make them good and banishing all bad ones will keep them from turning bad. Even Plato may have believed this. But it is false: to guard ourselves against evil we must learn to recognize it, and to recognize the ruses people use to hide evil intentions from us. The more good one wants to do in the world, the more knowledge one needs of it, not less. 

    Historically the greatest victims of these prophylactic illusions have been women, who have been secluded and kept ignorant of life in many cultures and on many and shifting grounds. Young girls have been caged during menstruation to maintain their purity, then kept under surveillance to guarantee their virginity until marriage. The need to assure paternity has been invoked to justify this obsession with virginity; so has the symbolic need to maintain the sacredness of public rituals, as, for example, with the Greek Pythia and the Roman vestals. But the Christian convent is a unique institution. 

    In theory, convents were established to encourage spiritual contemplation and to relieve innocent Christian women of worldly cares so they could serve others. In practice, convents were often dumping grounds for poor families unable to afford dowries or even food, or for rich families wanting to park their daughters somewhere safe before marriage. The acts of charity accomplished by the sisters over the centuries are legendary in their modesty. But until recently young nuns received little formal education unless they managed to learn Latin (something few priests were willing to teach them), and no informal education on how to deal with men, property, politics, or much else in the outside world. And they certainly learned nothing about their own sexual desires, which could only be satisfied in illicit ways. By the eighteenth century, a large European literature had developed chronicling the misadventures of young girls sent to convents at an early age, where they either had a sexual awakening (proving the futility of seclusion), or were sexually abused (proving its perversity), or remained innocent, only to be preyed upon by unscrupulous men when they left. The most influential of such tales was Diderot’s La Religieuse (The Nun). Drawn from a contemporary true story, the book takes the form of a series of letters written by a young woman forced by her parents to take vows and enter a convent, where she is treated brutally. When her petition to leave the order is denied, she is transferred to a second convent, where the Mother Superior tries and fails to seduce her, and ends up killing herself. Under the shock, the young woman becomes anorexic and practices self-mutilation before finally managing to escape. 

    Much has changed for women in Western societies and many other parts of the world. But in the vast United States there are still pockets of radical religious believers who in the name of purity do their best to keep the minds and bodies of their children, especially girls, from developing. With predictable results. Consider the case of Elissa Wall, author of Stolen Innocence: My Story of Growing up in a Polygamous Sect, Becoming a Teenage Bride, and Breaking Free of Warren Jeffs, published in 2008. Elissa, or Lesie as she was commonly known, had the misfortune to be born in 1986 to a family that belonged to a break-away Mormon sect in the American Southwest. The tragedy begins with her mother, Sharon, who was also brought up in the Church’s cloistered community. Sharon received no sex education, no preparation for marriage apart from learning that women belonged to men body, boots, and britches (as she put it), and that at every moment, without fail, they must keep sweet, an injunction that recurs with creepy regularity in this memoir. At an early age she was compelled to marry, then was “reassigned” to another man when that marriage broke down. Eventually six of her children would rebel against the strictures of the Church, and when she was ordered to permanently cut off relations with them she complied, telling one of them, I’d rather see you die than fight the priesthood. Her greatest fear was not the priesthood, though. It was the outside world, about which she knew nothing. 

    Lesie’s fate seemed sealed. She was molested at the age of two and her parents knew it. At the age of seven she was rebuked by the prophet’s deranged, sex-obsessed son Warren for inadvertently holding the hand of a cousin during school recess, and at the age of fourteen she was made to marry a different cousin whom she loathed. Totally unaware of sexual relations or how children are conceived, she resisted her husband, who was equally ignorant about it all. Eventually he just raped her, after which she swallowed a bottle of aspirin and a bottle of ibuprofen, hoping to kill herself. Lesie became pregnant several times over the next few years, but mercifully miscarried every time. She celebrated her second anniversary joylessly at a local Denny’s restaurant, in a rare trip outside the sect’s camp. 

    The rest of Lesie’s memoir is devoted to her escape, her discovery of “true love,” and her brave and successful efforts to bring to justice Warren Jeffs, who is currently serving a life sentence for sexual assault of a child, among other crimes. But the memoir is much more than a conventional prison break story. The unforgettable scenes are not of cruelty and horror, though there are plenty of those. They are the scenes that evoke a suffocating, and in the end tyrannical, innocence that holds even the adults in its grip, creating an environment ideal for predators who are no more worldly than their victims. Lesie grew up in a Christian dystopia where the directive keep sweet was as effective a means of control as any police force. 

    Their singleness, their ruthlessness, their one continuous wish makes the innocent bound to be cruel, and to suffer cruelty. The innocent are so few that two of them seldom meet — when they do meet, their victims lie strewn all round. 

    ELIZABETH BOWEN 

    In every life the license to innocence should expire. Societies with public rites of passage into adulthood mark this moment with ceremonies that put everyone on notice that it is time to put away childish things. Only in the United States, it seems, is the license valid for life. Appeals to history and expertise fall on deaf ears here because Americans are convinced that life belongs to the living, that anything is possible with enough effort, and that in a democratic society everyone’s opinion ought to count and be weighed on the same scale — the scale of sincerity, not truth. Like members of the ancient Roman mystical cults that used children as spiritual mediums, Americans are more inclined to listen to their inner child than to scientists with their charts and graphs, who they believe probably have some secret agenda. 

    This prejudice is not happenstance. It flows naturally from the national myth of America as a new creation, brought into being in a self-conscious act of will after the Old World botched history up. Yet this birth was also, in a deeper mythical sense, a rebirth, the return of Adam to Eden after centuries of exile. The human race was granted its second innocence at Plymouth Rock. Consequently, the great fear is that Adamic America will bite the apple again and be cast out into the twilight world of skepticism, uncertainty, guilt, and compromise, where every other nation lives. Any backsliding into contaminating experience must be resisted or immediately forgotten. What is every American presidential election but a ritual for restoring the collective virginity? The country lives in what William James called a state of congenital amnesia, which is what makes American politics, domestic and foreign, so frustratingly predictable. Mr. Smith is always going to Washington and Mr. Deeds is always going to town, but they never learn anything and leave as proud of their redeeming ignorance as when they arrived. America saunters through history as the Neonatal Nation, the Playpen Upon a Hill. 

    Reinhold Niebuhr explicitly blamed this arrested development on the Christianity that he himself professed. Or rather, on the optimistic, dewy-eyed, whistle-while-you-work version of Christianity that Americans of every faith and non-faith practice when confronted with difficult political realities, particularly abroad. Niebuhr called for a return to the fundamental insights of Augustine, whose doctrine of original sin provides, he thought, a more realistic psychological foundation for understanding human political behavior. During the Great Depression Niebuhr was a minister in Detroit, and the experience of strikes and strike breakers turned him into a committed socialist engaged in improving conditions for workers and the poor. It also taught him that fallen people do bad things if they have the power to do them, and so a counter-power must be developed and exercised to turn the world right side up. Protestants, as he saw it, have rarely been good at that. They are torn between withdrawing from politics to keep their aprons clean, or self-righteously using it to establish God’s moral kingdom on Earth without recognizing their own fallen nature. The harmless Lamb of the Gospels or the vengeful Lamb of Revelation: American Protestantism doesn’t offer a third model. 

    During the Cold War, Niebuhr became an important voice in public debates about American foreign policy, which he saw swinging perpetually between naïve isolationism, principled internationalism, and thoughtless brute force. He cannot be pegged into any conventional ideological category. He argued for the necessity of actively resisting Soviet expansionism, but also of discerning when and where to pick a fight, and for observing limits when engaged in it. He supported the building of a nuclear deterrent, but opposed the Vietnam War. He also understood why the United States came to be hated in many parts of the world, and why his fellow Americans could not comprehend this. Nations, as individuals, who are completely innocent in their own esteem, are insufferable in their human contacts. Niebuhr was, in other words, that rare thing, an American political adult. He knew from experience that innocence is the mother of political cruelty and that its wages are often death, usually for other people. 

    In the minds of many Americans we are the Billy Budd of nations, with only the loveable fault of believing that people are basically good and that all problems have solutions. In truth, we too often resemble Travis Bickle, the raging innocent who becomes an exterminating lamb in Taxi Driver. A Vietnam veteran with scars on his back to prove it, Travis returns home in the 1970s and finds himself driving a cab in New York, where every street corner is a cross between Vanity Fair and the Inferno, strewn with garbage and men in superfly outfits and women in hot pants looking for tricks. Travis loathes it and vows to clean it up. He is looking for a cross to nail himself to. And so he writes himself into a chivalry tale, choosing a random teen prostitute as his reluctant damsel in distress, and her two-bit pimp as his nemesis. Travis is no spontaneous naïf; he is a master of strategic planning worthy of a general’s star. He chooses his weapons carefully; he eats right and works out; and every night he prowls the ill-lit streets waiting for his chance to set the world back in simple order. In a silent homage to the noble savage, he shaves his hair into a Mohawk and struts like a cowboy. One night he heads out on his divine mission, muttering keep sweet and pass the ammunition. And blood splatters the camera lens. 

    Art and Anger

    Poetry can sometimes offer to the young a piercingly accurate formulation of their inchoate suffering. I remember reading, at twenty-three, two lines in a new book: 

    For to be young
    Was always to live in other people’s houses. 

    Perhaps some poet had said it before, but if so, I hadn’t come across it. I learned from those lines what I was — a provincial girl in a house constituted by persons so alien to me that they were in effect “other people.” It had not occurred to me that one could think of one’s parents as “other people.” It was not “our house” — it was “their house.” And where, then, was my house, and how could I find it? And who were my people, if not those in the house with me? 

    The poem containing those lines was “The Middle-Aged,” written in her twenties by Adrienne Rich. It is spoken in the plural “we” by newly adult siblings, as they consider the house in which they grew up — its values, its conditions of “belonging,” its rules, its “people.” That house of their childhood was established by what the title estrangingly refers to as “the middle-aged,” the parents now being judged by the altered eyes of their altered young. 

    When I read those revelatory lines in Rich’s second book, The Diamond Cutters, I knew almost nothing of her life. I hadn’t the slightest notion, before reading her lines, of how to frame the defects — always felt — of my life as a child, but I learned from the lightning-bolt of her page that my life was being lived in some other people’s house, and they did not understand me, nor I them. Later, reading about Rich’s early life (she was born in 1929 and died in 2012), I saw that really we had little in common except that as adolescents we had found ourselves living with people different from us: they were “other people” and we had to live in their house. That formulation — so insistently phrased in the poem — was what Rich so assuagingly offered me. She had “solved,” by naming it, the inexplicable misery in which we both had existed as adolescents. We could not speak aloud our disturbingly deep disquiet with the life imposed on us. The problem of a coerced silence was already troubling Rich earlier; her first book, published when she was an undergraduate, had included a poem called “An Unsaid Word,” recommending self-suppression in love. She had to train herself not to interrupt the thoughts of “her man,” knowing that “this [was] the hardest thing to learn.” 

    The tyranny of the socially unsayable is a pervasive theme in the work of some fiery writers, and the anger provoking their fury often creates, in their verse, problems of tone. In “Easter, 1916,” Yeats encounters on the street former friends planning armed revolt against English rule and finds himself betraying a poet’s most exigent obligation: to speak intellectual and emotional truth in accurate words. After briefly greeting the conspirators, whose willingness to kill he cannot condone, he bitterly utters first a self-reproach for his cowardice in avoiding truthful conversation, then, using identical words, reproaches himself for actually lingering and prolonging his “meaningless words,” an offense worse, because hypocritical, than the first: 

    I have passed with a nod of the head,
    Or polite meaningless words,
    Or lingered awhile and said
    Polite meaningless words. 

    Such early self-restriction in fear of social ostracism is likely to result in a later explosion of language. Yeats, for instance, finding “polite meaningless words” intolerable, quite rapidly turned the hitherto unsayable into the complexly said, willing to bear the opprobrium that meets defiance of social norms. Other poets, such as Rich, have a more uncertain evolution within contrary states of feeling. 

    Rich, conventionally reared, found a relief from self-censorship in discreet poems such as “The Middle-Aged.” Like the endangered Hamlet discovering that he must keep silence concerning his father’s murder — “But break my heart, for I must hold my tongue” — Rich could not at first become entirely candid about her prolonged suffering (fully revealed to her readers in the recent biography by Hilary Holladay). Her unhappiness — partly situational (an uncongenial family, a failed marriage, social expectations of women), partly physical (as her early rheumatoid arthritis became crippling), and partly uncontrollable (resentment against her father’s estrangement from her after she married a Jew) — generated a growing tumult in her work, fortified by a commitment to a newly enthusiastic feminism especially directed against “the patriarchy.” After her marriage, Rich found it impossible to hold her tongue as she had done in “The Middle-Aged,” and made the search for a responsible tongue a life-long endeavor. 

    But like most young protestors, she had on the whole no tolerance for ambiguity, no empathy for opponents, no metaphors for a middle way. If we look back to her chief predecessor in social protest, Milton, we can see him as our most eloquent denouncer of silence in his moving elegy for his fellow-student Edward King (bearing the Greek pastoral name “Lycidas”) who, like Milton, was being trained for the priest- hood and already composing poetry. Milton’s anonymous surrogate, who sings the elegy for his companion Lycidas, witnesses with horror a flock of local sheep abandoned to hunger and disease by their criminal shepherd-guardians. In a second dereliction of their duty, the guardians have left the sheepfold open to nightly invasion by the “privy paw” of the “grim wolf.” Starvation, disease, and massacre meet the innocent eye of the young singer, and his shocked voice reveals the hideous results of the guardians’ vices: 

    The hungry sheep look up and are not fed,
    But swollen with wind and the rank mist they draw,
    Rot inwardly, and foul contagion spread;
    Besides what the grim wolf with privy paw Daily devours apace[.] 

    Reacting to that appalling scene of starving sheep and bloody corpses, the singer excoriates the total silence of the bystanders with three bitter words: “and nothing said.” The grim wolf every single day, day after day, preys on the hapless sheep, and though everyone witnesses the ghastly daily sight, no one utters a word: the wolf “daily devours apace, and nothing said.” Milton is allegorically rebuking the corrupt English bishops, as the bystanders’ fear of episcopal vengeance creates a moral abyss between religious duty and social intimidation. After the young singer’s lurid words of denunciation — swollen, rank, rot, foul, grim, devour, and not least the subhuman paw — the accusation arrives, surprisingly, with maximum understatement: “and nothing said.” There is no immediate divine vindication of the singer’s judgment; the evil shepherds are not punished, not in this poem and not in this life. Only in eternity will they be condemned. 

    Milton is the principal model for English civic fury, but Rich had other poets in mind as well. The punishment for poetic subversion in Dickinson is banishment, with one’s name blackened by rumor. “Don’t tell!” she warns any fellow-dissenter. In the Johnson edition, where Rich would have found the poem, it reads: 

    I’m Nobody! Who are you?
    Are you – Nobody – too?
    Then there’s a pair of us!
    Don’t tell! They’d banish us – you know! 

    Dickinson’s contempt for female social timidity (“Such dimity convictions”), however youthfully and lightly voiced in “I’m Nobody,” prohibits her from choosing a name from the restrictive role-identities bestowed on women — “Daughter,” “Wife,” “Mother.” She prefers to hide out as “Nobody,” defying the parental and institutional assumption that women will take their husband’s name after marriage and will fit themselves into some group-identity. (I was struck, on a visit to Dickinson’s churchyard in Amherst, by two tombstones, side by side: on the first, two lines identify a man by name and dates, but the neighboring stone says only “His Wife.”) 

    In the even-toned blank verse of “The Middle-Aged,” Rich, just out of college, ventures her first explicit sally against the dutiful silence expected of her by her parents, equally silent themselves. The reader is made to feel the otherness of parents to their adult children by Rich’s strange use of definite articles, beginning in her title. (Normally, we have to acquire the abstract sociological category of “the middle-aged” before we can refer to our parents as merely one set of “the” middle- aged; the title firmly places the parents as permanently socio- logically distanced.) As the young adults reflect on their apparently irreproachable parents, their opening vignettes display innocuous adjectives paired with equally innocuous nouns (the parents’ “safe” faces, “placid” afternoons, “measured” voices), and continue with comparably “innocent” verbs as the parents “lay the tea” or “trim the borders.” Nothing could be less alarming. Yet the verbs immediately following the resuscitated memories are angry and pained: the parents’ qualities and behavior — so unoffending, so inoffensive — are to the siblings the very features that they now recoil from, disclosing how “afflicted,” how “haunted” they became, as they grew into adolescence, by the stiflingly conventional “custom of the house.” 

    The irreconcilable cohabiting of parental peace and adolescent affliction generates the unforeseen but undeniable aphorism that so disturbed me when I was twenty-three: “For to be young / Was always to live in other peoples’ houses.” The “peace” in the house, a tacit agreement by the parents to conceal unlovely marital truths, became unreal to the adult children evaluating it later because it was theirs “at second hand,” an ill-fitting temporary hand-me-down. 

    The poet insistently disavows the comforts of the parental house even as she names them: the peace, “not ours,” the customary life of the house, “not ours.” Even the domestic status symbols — the expensive Venetian “silver-blue Fortuny curtains” — have become repellent. The parents’ nostalgic reminiscence of a Christmas party betrays their wish to keep the children children: the parents have to reach back fourteen years to remember the last Christmas party enjoyed by all. Now a second abstract “grown-up” formulation arrives: not only was the house alien in its otherness, but everything about it testified to the ubiquitous parental motive: “Signs of possession” (the upper-class decor) and, more sinisterly for the children, signs “of being possessed.” The children are as yet uncritical, essentially owned by the parents who mold their taste: wanting what their parents have amassed, they view their domestic environment “tense with envy.” In adulthood, the childhood envy has mutated into hostility. 

    The rest of the poem undoes the concealments of the house. There is a brief attempt to mitigate the parents’ avoidance of candor as Rich recalls the forms of kindness directed at the children: “they” would have given “us” anything, she says — the bowl of fruit was filled “for us”; there was a room upstairs we must call “ours” (we recall the earlier decisive “not ours. . . not ours”). Yet the twenty-year gap separating the generations now produces the “children’s” harsh verdict. Against all the apparent parental devotion Rich instances the persistent scars testifying to secrets never mentioned. The estranging article “the” reappears to present the inscrutability of those mute domestic presences, their unhappy origin never divulged: “the coarse stain,” “the crack in the study window,” “the letters locked in a drawer and the key destroyed.” Finally, as the poem closes, the siblings come to understand the artificial “peace” of the house and what was crucially integral to it: “how much [was] left unsaid.” “Unsaid,” — like Milton’s more vehement “And nothing said” — goes on reverberating, 

    The unsaid continued to preoccupy Rich; her protest against parental authority, suggested rather than nakedly expressed in “The Middle Aged,” turns aggressive in “Tear Gas,” a poem she published when she was forty, establishing the parents as cruel enemies: 

    Locked in the closet at 4 years old I beat the wall
    with my body
    that act is with me still.

    Dickinson had made a comparable complaint:

    They shut me up in Prose –
    As when a little Girl
    They put me in the Closet –
    Because they liked me “still” – 

    Rich’s anger against authority mounted to stereo- type in some poems of her forties, as it does in the aesthetically untenable “Rape,” in which she forgets that a demonic rendering of a fellow human being is rarely persuasive. Here the demon is the neighborhood “cop,” who began as a boy you knew: “he comes from your block, grew up with your brothers, / had certain ideals.” (The hazy second-person address — “you” — frequent in Rich, exempts the poet from directness: is she addressing herself, the woman in the poem, the reader, or all three?) The “cop” has been brutalized by his own barbaric training, and as the woman reports her rape to him, she notes (or thinks she does) his sexual arousal by her tale; at that point he becomes indistinguishable to her from her rapist. “There is a cop who is both prowler and father,” says Rich, improbably opening the poem by intimating that the father of the reader, too, could become a prowler, since the two identities are apparently compatible. The woman’s perception that the “cop” is taking pornographic pleasure in her tale makes her feel raped a second time; she has to “swallow” his sadistic relishing of the details, as she confesses them, of the assault. The cop’s indecent “glistening eyes” fuse him with her rapist. As the poem closes, the woman leaves the precinct, intimidated and shamed: 

    He has access to machinery that could get you put away:
    and if, in the sickening light of the precinct,
    and if, in the sickening light of the precinct,
    your details sound like a portrait of your confessor,
    will you swallow, will you deny them, will you lie your
    way home? 

    As the cop becomes her “confessor,” he becomes a Father in the ecclesiastical sense. And who is to say that the woman’s brothers —- once, like the cop, guiltless children — have not evolved in the same direction as their boyhood playfellow? Rich widens the stain of rape until it envelops not only three adult male social roles — father, sibling, and priest — but also two male criminal roles — the morally compromised cop, the criminal prowler. 

    If “Rape” is Rich’s moral sermon, her aesthetic sermon from that violent period of verbal coarseness is the poem preceding “Rape” in Diving into the Wreck: “The Ninth Symphony of Beethoven Understood at Last as a Sexual Message.” To convey her perception of the music, she summons up theatrical words: terror, howling, yelling at Joy from the tunnel of the ego, gagged and bound and flogged with chords of Joy, and the/ beating of a bloody fist upon/ a splintered table. Not everyone will recognize the symphony in this physically ferocious version. And “Rape” disappoints because in its indignation it sacrifices believability by demonizing generic males in both private and public functions. Although denunciation can be a distinct pleasure, the pleasure it gives is not an aesthetic one. Melodrama, caricature, and stereotyping weaken protest. In any credible poem, whether protest-poem or not, intellectual reflection, social perception, and aesthetic intuition fuse into an imagined entity that does not defy believability. 

    It takes even great poets some time to come to these virtues of reflective practice. Consider Eliot’s early poem called “The Love Song of St. Sebastian,” with its unintentional hilarity of rhyme: 

    You would love me because I should have strangled you.
    And because of my infamy;
    And I should love you the more because I mangled you. 

    All indignant poets eventually learn the impotence of a purely oppositional ideology. Milton’s Adam comes to understand that the response to evildoing must indeed be acts, but not the Satanic ventures of literal or conceptual war. Rather, as the Archangel Michael tells him, he must add to what he knows, 

    Deeds to thy knowledge answerable, add faith
    , Add virtue, patience, temperance, add love,
    By name to come called charity, the soul
    Of all the rest. 

    (Later, under the pretext of a pre-Christian plot, Milton allows physical violence sanctioned by divine “motions” as the blinded Samson kills the Philistines — and himself — by pulling down their temple. Intemperance can recur as temper- ament reasserts itself.) 

    If the expressive caution of “The Middle Aged” had to explode into such belligerent poems as “Rape” and “The Ninth Symphony” (both omitted in Rich’s Selected Poems), Rich eventually found her way to a more finely filtered language of social protest by turning from polemic absolutes into an aspiring recognition of “The Cartographies of Silence.” She calls on herself and her agitated sympathizers to arrive at “a deeper listening, cleansed / of oratory, formulas, choruses, laments, static / crowding the wires.” In the “Transcendental Etude,” dedicated to Michelle Cliff (who became her life-partner), Rich hopes to exhibit “a whole new poetry beginning here,” “as if a woman quietly walked away / from the argument and jargon in a room.” She begins to assemble for her poetry a nest of varied items from both nature and art, better coinciding with her acknowledgment of her multiple selves: she will write “with no mere will to mastery, / only care for the many-lived, unending / forms in which she finds herself.” As she attempted to broaden her lyric repertoire into a globally epic one, her fame grew, and her readings were crowded by hundreds of listeners. Many women found in her work (as I had done as a girl) feelings and situations largely unrepresented in past poetry, but salient in their own domestic and social lives.

    Still preoccupied by the pervasiveness of the familial unsaid, however, Rich returned to the topic at fifty-two, writing a new sequence repeating the familial scrutiny undertaken in “The Middle-Aged.” “Grandmothers,” an affecting three-part meditation, names Rich’s grandmothers in the initial two subtitles of the sequence: first, her widowed maternal grandmother, Mary Gravely Jones, an Alabama Episcopalian who visited the Rich family rarely and formally, all the while “smoldering to the end with frustrate life,” harboring “streams of pent-up words,” a literary forebear quoting poetry to her grandchildren. She left behind an unpublished play, but after her marriage gave up writing. Next comes Rich’s widowed paternal grandmother from a New York immigrant Jewish family who had relocated and prospered in Vicksburg, Mississippi: Hattie Rice Rich is remembered for her “sweetness of soul,” but lacks a home of her own, and is shuttled every half-year from her son’s house to her daughter’s house, on one occasion (recalled by her granddaughter) sobbing at the imposed transfer. The poet remarks on the paradoxical life of her grandmother, incapable of living independently outside an immediate family context: “You had money of your own but you were homeless.” Finally, in the third poem of the sequence, “Granddaughter,” Rich reproaches herself for her past egotism, for not speculating upon the inner lives of her grandmothers (fellow females inhabiting the same house), for not having written “words in which you might have found / yourselves.” The grandmothers — both widowed, unanchored, untethered, pitiable — had, at least to their young granddaughter’s eye, no life of their own once their years of wifehood and childrearing had ended. It is a forlorn poem, its vignettes credible, its sympathies deep, its self-reproach a surprise after Rich’s earlier presumption of personal righteousness in her most polemic period. 

    The quieting of rage is everywhere in the late verse. (One can even long at times for the excitement and fervor of Rich’s youthful poems.) The self-judgment threaded through the poet’s later work does not entirely erase Rich’s warm memories of the wild exhilaration of her youth in the city: friends, old neighborhoods, talk, poetry, imagined projects, sex, loud music. But beneath the nostalgic illusory elation lie the graves of that lively company, and the poet’s memorial request must be posed to her own hovering death: 

    Cut me a skeleton key
    to that other time, that city
    talk starting up, deals and poetry

    Tense with elation, exiles
    walking old neighborhoods
    calm journeys of streetcars

    revived boldness of cats
    locked eyes of couples
    music playing full blast again
    Exhuming the dead.        Their questions 

    Holladay’s biography (unfortunately lacking a chronology) tracks the volatile quarrels of Rich’s life and verse. The poet’s first fierce declaration of independence expended itself on the lifelong quarrel with her autocratic Jewish father Arnold Rich, a brilliant physician and professor, the first Jewish doctor at the Johns Hopkins Medical School. He had extirpated from his family every trace of Jewishness, marrying a gently reared Protestant woman trained as a classical pianist and bringing up his daughters as Episcopalians. In “Sources,” a long and absorbing autobiographical poem reflecting on her father’s life, Rich addresses their permanent estrangement after her marriage in 1953 to Alfred (“Alf”) Conrad (originally Cohen) from an Orthodox Jewish family, a Harvard graduate student in economics (soon promoted to faculty status). No member of either family attended the wedding. 

    There followed in Rich’s life a more open quarrel with political power, pursued together with her husband (who had not been awarded tenure at Harvard) as they moved to New York in 1967, where she taught in Columbia’s MFA program as she and Alf both joined the SEEK scheme of alternative education at the City College of New York, where Alf had been appointed Chair of the Economics Department. In this more public form of protest, Rich condemned the inadequacy of government support — for the schools, for the improvement of race relations, for equal justice, for women — and in the SEEK program she taught mostly minority students. 

    Her increasingly demanding feminism led to a quarrel with marriage itself, as in 1970 she forsook cohabitation with her husband and three sons to live alone in a small New York apartment (while returning each night to cook for the family). Her husband, treated too late for a profound depression, shot himself a few weeks after their separation. The boys returned to Rich’s care, and, according to Holladay, remained close to their mother, all visiting her in California as her death approached. Rebelling against her father’s wish to erase from his life and his family all remnants of his Jewish origin (which included changing his surname from Reich to Rich and keeping a secular household), Rich began to place more emphasis on her own half-Jewish status, and to recognize the extent of American anti-Semitism. 

    In her final quarrel with social norms, she wrote about lesbian sexual experience, and lived with her lesbian partner. Her inner ideological and aesthetic conflicts — visible, although pent-up, in “The Middle-Aged” — continued to seek fully formed expression. As she chose to widen her gaze from those personal conflicts, she undertook panoramic Whitmanian catalogues of anonymous lives, aiming — by ranging through space and time — at an epic “objectivity” rather than subjective self-disclosure. Her decision is formulated in “And Now”: 

    I tried to listen to
    the public voice of our time
    tried to survey our public space
    as best I could 

    Her apologetic tone — “I tried,” “as best I could” — marks her adult sense of her own fallibility and her own limitations as a poet. She also became newly willing (in “The Spirit of Place”) to admit the conflicts struggling to articulate themselves within the human personality. In New England, “the spirit of the masters / flickered in the abolitionist’s heart. . . / while the spirit of the masters / calls the freedwoman to forget the slave.” She concedes that she and her companions must decline utopian aims and take on the imperfect world 

    as it is. not as we wish it
    as it is. not as we work for it
    to be 

    Her sermons, increasingly addressed to herself, repent her earlier wish to control others, and criticize her susceptibility to ideological “counterfeit light”: 

                  …hold back till the time is right

    force nothing, be unforced
    accept no giant miracles of growth
    by counterfeit light 

    It is fair to say that the anger exhibited by Rich against all forms of male domination was gradually accompanied by a deep-seated querying of herself. In a poem called “The Phenomenology of Anger,” she represents herself as besieged by “Self-hatred, a monotone in the mind,” especially as she finds her own rage inextricable from any adult awareness of selfhood, time, and history: 

    Every act of becoming conscious
    (it says here in this book)
    is an unnatural act 

    In “Cartographies of Silence,” warning against the black-and-white judgments of hasty or unscrutinized anger, she reminds both herself and others who had found themselves seduced by ideological passion that “We must disenthrall ourselves”: 

    cleansed
    of oratory, formulas, choruses, laments, static
    crowding the wires. 

    Like the Polish poet Zbigniew Herbert, who found himself incapable of replicating the clichés of Communist dogma (“Really, it was a matter of taste”), Rich came to feel revulsion against the very sound of pre-scripted and prescribed words. In truth it is only a matter of time before a writer who respects the resources of language can no longer echo programmed group-speak, however politically virtuous. 

    Yet nothing is harder to sacrifice for a social reformer than the audience-aimed style and psychological reassurance of the doctrinal “we.” Even when Rich thinks to abandon the “choral” resonance accompanying the miraculous multiplication of the lonely “I” into the powerful “we,” she cannot forsake it, although she alters its extension: her closing “we” in “Transcendental Etude” turns out to be not a sisterly chorus but the fused pronoun of the erotic couple. That idyll, however, cannot wholly compensate for the predicament of “the pitch of utter loneliness” in which each unique poem is “a cry to which no echo comes or can ever come.” Although Rich has claimed the rise of “a whole new poetry” when a woman has “quietly walked away / from the arguments and jargon,” she discovers that although feeling can be communal and choruses legitimate in pressing for political reform, the only authentic resources for a responsible poet must be her own penetrating imagination and her hard-won idiosyncratic style. 

    From her early decision in “The Middle-Aged” to expose the unsaid to her later dedication to accurate social reportage and the mitigation of declamatory hyperbole, Rich’s poetry records the faithful psychological trajectory of one complicated mind, whose central topic became the sufferings of the subordinated, especially those of women. It must be noted that certain groups of the American subordinated — the blind, the sterile, the impoverished males — did not much interest her. Her political base was always her own smarting social afflictions encountered as a woman, a daughter, a wife, a mother, an exile from her family, a non-observant Jew, a lesbian, a disappointed lover. Her insight into the emotions of others never attained Whitman’s spectacular capacity to “effuse” himself into other personalities whose lives were altogether different from his own — a preschool child, an alcoholic, a slave, a soldier. His profound imagination of another’s existence justified his unforgettable line, “I am the man, I suffered, I was there.” 

    Rich’s heated arguments in prose as well as poetry against the coercive customs of her own society brought her fame, chiefly among women, but also led her at times into a regret- table coarseness of expression that she had the courage to abandon in later life, gaining intellectual credibility by a worthy sacrifice of her raised voice. Even as a young poet, Yeats arrived at the realization that “Out of the quarrel with others we make rhetoric; out of the quarrel with ourselves we make poetry.” Rich made a half-peace with that truth but continued until her death her Whitmanian outward-looking and sometimes vague inventory of suffering, poverty, and needless death in the United States and abroad. Rich’s catalogues are in theory unending, and like Whitman’s they can sometimes go on too long; they gain plausibility insofar as the items in the inventory embody her specific perceptions of the ubiquity of social failure and the unforeseeable distribution of vice and virtue. 

    It is not yet clear how Rich will fare in literary history. From her earliest lyric exposures of the unsaid to her later extended investigations of self and society, and from her bracing essays and other prose, she won an audience that was perhaps less attracted by poetic energy than by social critique. (The same could be said of Ginsberg’s audience.) But when the temporary topical relevance of any century’s poetry fades, its imaginative and stylistic powers survive. As Stevens says in “Men Made out of Words,” “The whole race is a poet that writes down / The eccentric propositions of its fate.” 

    Race and Enlightenment: The Story of a Slander 

    In 1945, Columbia University published an obscure treatise by Jean Bodin, which originally appeared in 1566, as part of its “Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies” series. Bodin was a theorist of absolutism, but one who had a profound influence on later natural rights thinkers, and this was his first work, translated from Latin by Beatrice Reynolds. Scholars across Europe and the United States were busy for over more than two centuries, but especially after World War II, collecting and publishing works that they deemed crucial to “civilization.” They sought works that would aid students in understanding and furthering modernity, defined as democracy and human rights, enlightenment, and the scientific method, as well as capitalism. As they sought significant works that would contribute to furthering “civilization” in the present by understanding its past — a kind of scholarly uplift for society — they omitted from their assembled record works that did not fit present desires. Ancient, medieval, and modern works that were not a useful past for liberal modernity were ignored — not revived, not translated, not reprinted, not quoted, not read, not taught. It was thus that they created a modern canon that revolved around and vindicated the issues that they themselves cared about. 

    In the years after World War II, it was increasingly the Enlightenment that garnered such attention, the one that featured John Locke and other theorists of democracy and republics, modern science, and modern economics. As American universities flourished and expanded in the 1950s and 1960s, and efforts to promote human rights and democracy around the world expanded under the auspices of the United Nations, Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, for example, was translated into many different languages. Scholarship on Rousseau and Adam Smith, among many others, flourished. But there was a problem. The Enlightenment occurred in a period of the expansion not merely of rights, but also of European empires, of slavery and subjugation. How should we explain such inequalities? How can all these historical realities be reconciled? 

    Many scholars and critics, starting in the late 1960s with David Brion Davis in The Problem of Slavery in Western Thought and Winthrop Jordan in White over Black, and later blossoming in works such as Edmund Morgan’s American Slavery, American Freedom, sought answers to this paradox. And in seeking those answers, they consulted the same sources already so carefully selected to create the modern canons. They looked to the sources that had been chosen and compiled to represent civilization and modernity, so as to understand the origins of the subjugation, racism, and slavery as well as their supposed opposites. 

    It makes sense, after all. As they went through college and graduate school, those were the texts they read, and were now reading more critically. Of course, they added other sources: as greater access to more documents became available, they read more widely. Edmund Morgan once told me that his research method was to read all books published in the mainland colonies, in chronological order, as they were reproduced in the microfiche database Early American Imprints. And in the decades that followed, as post-colonial theorists built on that critical foundation, their attention has remained on that same canon, on the classics already singled out. It is a bit like the problem that police detectives describe, of the man who loses his wallet at night. Some part of the street is lit up by a street- light, and it is easiest, even instinctual, to look there. But that might not be the best place to look. 

    In that spirit I choose to focus here on the distasteful and the repulsive, on ideas and texts that we should not be teaching or reading, except in context. These are to be found in books and pamphlets that have been excised, on moral grounds, from our uplifting collections about civilization and enlightenment. They propound racist ideas that appear in works that we usually ignore. I have in mind a very particular and repugnant debate, mainly in the seventeenth century, over whether African women had sex (and children) with monkeys, and whether Africans were therefore of a different species and should be seen as bestial or monstrous. It is an ugly chapter in our intellectual history, but we have a lot to learn from it. I was led down this path because the streetlight did not illuminate all the answers.

    My adventure began with the broad claims made by Ibram X. Kendi in his widely read book, Stamped from the Beginning, which, building on earlier post-colonial scholars of “whiteness,” attributed the origins of the repulsive racist idea that I have just described to the Enlightenment, and particularly to Locke’s foundational treatise An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which appeared in in 1690. The term “essay” does it no justice: it is a long and dense philosophical work, published in four books, that, for all intents and purposes, was one of the most widely read treatises of not only Britain’s enlightenment, but also all of Europe’s. Its insistence on ways of knowing, its exploration of how humans come to understand truth and to repudiate falsehood, it provided the definition for individual as well as group “enlightenment.” Paired with Locke’s theories of government, it helped to explain how human beings can and should make their own judgments about government (instead of accepting divinely chosen monarchs). I had read An Essay Concerning Human Understanding comprehensively, and Kendi’s discussion of it clashed with my remembered reading. I had pondered every page for questions of race and racism. How had I missed what Kendi had found? Thus began my journey down a nasty rabbit hole, one that has led me to think more deeply about canons and sources of civilization, and to explore more deeply today’s fierce debates about the connections between racism, slavery, and democracy in America’s (and Britain’s) history. 

    In Kendi’s reading, as in much recent scholarship, the Enlightenment was anything but enlightened. It embodied whiteness and privilege. Its scientific theories created racism. It legitimated slavery. Slavery, in the contemporary “anti-racist” account, emerged in each of England’s thirteen colonies in the Americas as a result of relatively unified (and relatively democratic) support among whites. My point here is not to belabor the realities of racism in early America: on that I think we are all agreed. But I do want to challenge an assumption about its pervasiveness, and where it came from, and especially the idea that it was “stamped” from the beginning. From my study of these sources (and many others) I would argue instead that it was contested from the beginning, and that it changed over time and varied by place. 

    I suggest that maintaining our focus on the works and the authors whom historians in the past identified as progressive helps to conceal a more complex, and more interesting, debate over principles of privilege and power, over racism and inclusion, a debate fiercely fought on many levels in early modern England and its colonies, even as they went through three revolutions over those centuries. Racism and slavery were not isolated from those struggles, but part of larger contests over power. Many scholars and thinkers whom we now identify with the Enlightenment were in fact pushing back against slavery and racism as well as the larger structure of power that had mainly promoted them. 

    Kendi’s analysis of four hundred years of American history in Stamped from the Beginning sorted thinkers into racist, neutral, and anti-racist. He consigned Locke to the racist camp. 

    Locke also touched on the Origin of Species in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Apes, whether “these be all Men, or no, all of human Species,’ depended on one’s “definition of the word Man,” because, he said, “if History lie not,” then West African Women had conceived babies with apes. Locke thus reinforced African female hypersexuality in a passage sent round the English-speaking world. “And what real Species, by that measure, such a Production will be in Nature, will be a new Question.” Locke’s new “Question” reflected another new racist debate that most debaters feared to engage in publicly. Assimilationists argued monogenesis: that all humans were one species descended from a single human creation… Segregationists argued polygenesis. 

    Kendi placed Locke squarely in the ranks of the most racist thinkers, acknowledging that while an obscure Italian thinker named Lucilio Vanini might have broached the repulsive idea in 1616, Locke was the first to popularize it in English. This is a grave charge, and it is somewhat difficult to challenge since Kendi provided no footnotes to the passage that he cited from Locke. 

    Who was Locke responding to? Kendi says Locke was repeating Vanini, an arcane Italian philosopher of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries who seems to have been both a theologian and a freethinker, and an early proponent of biological evolution. It is true that there were some Italian claims about this issue beginning in 1618, and a few even earlier, but in fact the idea was “popularized” by another Englishman, Thomas Herbert, in 1664. And Herbert did much more than popularize this racist canard about black bestiality. He claimed to have observed it! Locke, as we shall see, was actually trying to refute such claims. 

    Making sense of them requires beginning with Jean Bodin’s Method for the Easy Comprehension of History, the work that was translated and included in the history of civilization series at Columbia in 1945. First published in 1566, Bodin’s book appeared in the midst of debates all over Europe about the justice of colonization and over the best forms and practices of government, and amid speculations about all the different peoples that European explorers and colonizers were encountering and describing. Bodin sought laws of human behavior, and he claimed that the Roman historian Tacitus had argued, in an instance of such a law, that people who live in hot climates were more lustful, a conclusion that he validates by basing it on the medical theory of the humors. Bodin then wrote, claiming to be following Tacitus, that “because self-control” for “southerners” in hot climates “was difficult, particularly when plunging into lust, they gave themselves over to horrible excesses. Promiscuous coition of men and animals took place, wherefore the regions of Africa produce for us so many monsters.” Bodin thus maintained, in a single sentence, following an ancient authority, that in Africa human bestiality led to non-human progeny. But his sensational claim was buried deep in a Latin text that was available only to a few scholars. And it appeared on a page full of outlandish claims made by ancient authorities: Caesar’s assertion, for example, that “Britons have twelve wives in common and that brothers cohabit with sisters.” 

    In the early seventeenth century, there were a handful of brief references in European sources to the possibility of interspecies sexuality between people and monkeys, but it is always described that way (as between humans and animals), and it was always treated as a rumor, and in no more than a passing remark. So, for example, the Portuguese explorer André Donelha referred to rumors that he heard about sex between monkeys and women in his book describing his travel to western Africa in 1625. “They say” he wrote, that if a male monkey “meets a woman alone, it makes a match with her.” Donelha said nothing more about it, and he included that brief sentence at the end of a long discussion about monkeys, not people. There was no mention of any progeny of such unions. It does not appear that Donelha’s book (or Vanini’s or Bodin’s) was widely read, except perhaps by a few scholars, though the rumors were being repeated. 

    It was only after the restoration of Charles II to the throne of England that the claims became anything more than rumors, and the effort to proliferate this dehumanizing allegation seems to have been deliberate, emerging in tandem with the English crown’s efforts to become formally involved in the slave trade. Such efforts began mere months after the restoration, and centered on the efforts of the King’s brother James, the Duke of York, who would later brag that the Royal African Company was his idea. England had an earlier company with monopoly rights to trade in Africa, known as the Guinea Company, but no real territorial claims and no fortifications in Africa before 1660. Initially called the Royal Adventurers into Africa, the Royal African Company was its nickname almost from the start. On October 3, 1660, Samuel Pepys recorded in his journal “I heard the Duke [of York] speak of a great design that he and my Lord of Pembroke [Philip Herbert, fifth Earl of Pembroke] have, and a great many others, of sending a venture to some parts of Africa.” James convened the first meeting to plan for a Royal African Company that would organize and provide military support for English trade with Africa later that month. One of his biographers noted that while many at the time reported that James supported trade generally, in practice he was actively involved only in the Americas and Africa. While the public talk was of gold, which was indeed a part of the plan, the private discussion included, from the first, slavery. 

    A part of what Charles and James were promoting in their policies was explicitly racist. Given that all publications had to gain the royal imprimatur to be published, it is subtly revealing to consider what the censors approved. One of the books which earned their approbation was an important work by Thomas Herbert, cousin to Philip Herbert, the Earl of Pembroke, which went through three editions between 1664 and 1677. Significantly, Herbert was cousin to the Earl of Pembroke, who, as Pepys reported, was one of the primary planners of the Royal African Company, and Pembroke was Herbert’s sponsor in court. Herbert was also popular in court circles because he claimed to have protected Charles I at the end of his life, such that Charles II knighted him in 1660. 

    In the 1620s Herbert had traveled along the coast of Africa in the delegation of the English Ambassador to Persia. In 1634 and 1637, he published two identical accounts of his travels, which had a substantial section on Africa. The account was racist in its portrayals, but at first he used relatively generic words about savagery and, as the historian Jennifer Morgan has pointed out, added a claim that African women nursed their children by swinging one of their breasts over their shoulder, a claim that makes them seem less than human. 

    But what Herbert added in 1664 was far worse. He claimed to have witnessed, with his own eyes, African women having sex with apes, and that they were bestial and belonged to a separate non-human species. His discussion went on for many pages. Of Africans, he wrote that 

    Their language is rather apishly than articulately sounded, with whom ‘tis thought they have unnatural mixture… having a voice ‘twixt humane and beast, makes that supposition to be of more credit, that they have a beastly copulation or conjuncture. So as considering the resemblance they bear with Baboons, which I could observe kept frequent company with the Women, … their savage life, diet, exercise, and the like considerations, these may be said to be the descoent [descent] of Satyrs, if any such ever were… Now what Philosophers alledge concerning the function of the Soul may be made applicable to these Animals, that the Soul of Man is gradually rather than specifically differenced from the Souls of Beasts… 

    Herbert’s claims are staggering and foul, but what is most disturbing is the claim of witness: he is pretending to have actually observed these things, so as to create an argument about a different species of human, even implying that Africans do not belong in the category of human at all. In this early stage of the scientific revolution, Herbert was claiming the mantle of empirical authenticity. His edition of 1677 would underscore and elaborate these assertions. 

    Herbert was building not on earlier claims about Africans, but on similarly bizarre claims that Spanish priests had made about Peruvians. 

    Upon which account, the Spaniard of late years made it the Subject of their dispute, whether the West-Indians were of descent of Adam, or no? or whether they were not rather a middle species of Men and Apes? Had it been a quare concerning these Salvages, might have carried with it greater probability. Bocerus also treating of monstrous births in Peru says that it proceeds from a Copulation of Women with Monkeys; which as repugnant to the due course of nature is not to be maintained; though these are a subject for that dispute as much as any. 

    Perhaps the creepiest part is how Herbert describes such activities as repugnant, and argues that if this happened in Peru, why not in Africa, and connects such sexual activities between Peruvians and “apes” with “monstrous births,” with a non-human “middle species.” Herbert then returned to the subject of Africans, to quote Aristotle, in Latin, that “all human beings throughout the world worship god, true or false” and concludes: “I saw no signs of any knowledge of God, the law of Nature scarce being observed: No spark of Devotion. He thus insinuated that Africans were far worse than mere “savages.” They were, quite simply, not human. 

    Herbert’s grotesque addition of such material in 1664, just as the Royal African Company launched the slave trade to its colonies in the Americas and as England began to supply enslaved Africans to the Spanish in Jamaica (their first formal involvement in the Asiento), suggests that pseudo-scientific stories and lies helped to justify the differential treatment of Africans. Herbert added these new claims without traveling to Africa again. He also added new sections in 1664, wherein he made observations about other parts of the world that he had never visited, as other scholars have noted. There is no doubt that Herbert’s imaginative additions — his lies — about African and ape sexuality emerged not from his observations, but out of deliberate propaganda efforts. His claims went far beyond those of Bodin, Vanini or Donelha. They had referred to rumors. He was writing ethnographically and describing what he claimed to have observed. By linking such sex acts to monstrous births, he provided a basis for considering Africans as a different species of non-humans. 

    Herbert’s claims were far from universally accepted. Over the two decades that followed, many would argue with Herbert’s claims that Africans were a separate species. Those who did included Chief Justice Sir Mathew Hale in The Primitive Origination of Mankind in 1676, the only work of his that he allowed to be printed during his lifetime. In the book, over four hundred pages long, Hale asserted the common humanity of all peoples, and argued that heathens, too, have souls. 

    These arguments echoed across the Atlantic. In Barbados, a minister named Morgan Godwyn referred to both the original claims and to Hale’s response. A former student of John Locke’s at Christ Church College, Oxford, he spent fifteen years as a minister in Virginia and Barbados. He mixed up the source of such claims, confusing Herbert with a travel writer named Tavernier, but he took pains to explicitly refute them when he published his Negroes and Indians Advocate in London in 1680. Godwyn reported that even in Barbados many were talking about the allegations of bestiality and bestial progeny, so presumably they were in London as well. He then carefully challenged the accuracy of Tavernier’s account, arguing that mandrills or apes (whom he calls “drills”) who have some of the semblance of men are actually very different from humans. 

    Godwyn alleged that the only people who disagree with his observations — who express “wild opinions” that follow Herbert’s claims about interspecies sexuality — were planters, who were driven to these falsehoods by their hunger for profit. He refers to such allegations of sexual encounters between Africans and apes as a “wild speculation.” He asserts that the claim is made only by those who want it to be true, in order to deny rights to Africans, including their right to baptism. 

    Insisting that such claims of interbreeding between Africans and monkeys were patently ridiculous, he observed that the Africans whom he met in Barbados were smarter than many of the Englishmen around them. He argues, again contrary to Herbert, that Africans have religious sensibilities. All of the Africans he met were people with souls who possessed reason. “The shape and figure of our Negro’s Bodies, and their Limbs and Members; their Voice and Countenance, in all things according with other Mens; together with their Risability and Discourse (Man’s peculiar Faculties). . . These being the most clear emanations and results of Reason, and therefore the most genuine and perfect characters of Homoniety [humanity].” 

    Godwyn asserted that all the Africans he knew were capable of learning to read and to write. “How should they otherwise be capable of Trades, and other no less Manly impoyments; as also of Reading and Writing; or shew so much Discretion in management of Business; eminent in divers of them; but wherein (we know) that many of our own People [Europeans] are deficient, were they not truly Men?” Some have become overseers of plantations, and have been placed in charge of complex financial and management responsibilities. “Or why should their Owners, Men of Reason no doubt, conceive them fit to exercise the place of Governours and Overseers to their fellow Slaves, which is frequently done, if they were but meer Brutes?” He then poked some fun at racist idiocy: “It would certainly be a pretty kind of Comical Frenzie, to imploy Cattel about Business, and to constitute them Lieutenants, Overseers, and Governours, like as [the Roman Emperor] Domitian is said to have made his Horse a Consul.” 

    Godwyn, as noted above, was one of Locke’s few students from his time at Oxford, and almost certainly met with Locke in the 1680s upon his return from Barbados. Locke had a copy of Godwyn’s Negroes and Indians Advocate in his library, and appears to have used the same words, in his brief discussion of the issue, as Morgan; like Godwyn, he referred not to apes or monkeys but to “drills,” short for mandrills, one kind of monkey. Although he read widely in travel narratives, and referred to them frequently in his writings, Locke did not own a copy of Thomas Herbert’s travels. He did own Tavernier’s six volumes, but if he tried to find Godwyn’s reference, which was clearly to Herbert and not to Tavernier, he would have been frustrated, as I was, because it is not there. Locke’s references to the source of the claims that Godwyn was countering were therefore left vague. 

    Locke discussed these claims in a short section in the middle of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and only abstractly. Uncannily, he dedicated his treatise to Thomas Herbert, the eighth Earl of Pembroke, who was the son of Philip Herbert, the patron of Thomas Herbert the traveler (now dead), the current Earl’s cousin. It is almost as though there was a strange trans-generational conversation about these questions — of what defines a human or an animal species — and the current earl was trying to distance himself from his father’s and his cousin’s views. 

    In the third book of his work (§22-23, first edition), Locke speculated about the inadequacies of our words to understand the essence of ideas, including our ideas about the essence of human beings as a distinct species. How do we form an abstract idea about a species, whether human, animal or plant? It cannot be based merely on appearance, as there are animals that look like humans: “there are Creatures in the World, that have shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want Language and Reason.” It cannot be merely by the ability to speak, as there are humans who are born with birth defects, who lack reason, or are born without the ability to speak: “There are Naturals amongst us, that have perfectly our shape, but want Reason, and some of them Language too.” He continued that there is a third category of “Creatures . . that have Language, and Reason, and a shape in other Things agreeing with ours, have hairy tails.” So how do we know who is a human? “If it be asked, whether these be all Men, or no, all of humane Species; ‘tis plain, the Question refers only to the nominal essence.” Unfortunately, he argues, most would draw conclusions based on a judgment of whether the “internal Constitution” reflects the “outward frame.” Locke’s larger effort in this section was to identify the “real essence” of different species and how humans use “abstract ideas” to understand that essence, and to see beyond the outward appearance. Even children with major malformations, whom he here calls “naturals” or “changelings,” still have an “internal constitution” that makes them human, even if these are different from “reasonable men.” They are different from apes (“drills”), even if they share an outward appearance. 

    He then introduces a reference to the allegations that had been floating around: whether “women have conceived by drills” a kind of monkey. He argues that it is difficult to tell a species merely from generation, since different species can generate mixed issue. as when “the mixture of a Horse, and an Ass” makes a mule; it confutes our ability to think about species. Then he wrote the crucial sentence: “For if History lie not, Women have conceived by Drills; and what real Species, by that measure, such a Production will be in Nature, will be a new Question; and we have reason to think this not impossible.” We are left wondering about his source. (Tacitus, via Bodin? Herbert? Godwyn’s unnamed source?) 

    Yet the phrase “if history lie not” already expresses skepticism. Likewise, Locke states that if in fact a woman and an ape could have children, such an offspring “will be a new question” as to what species it is, since it would be, if so, in-between the two. The words “will be” indicates Locke does not in fact believe that anyone respectable has seen it. It might be true—as in the case of an “ass and a mare”—that such a union would produce a mule (which is sterile). But he draws a distinction between a woman (of human species) and a drill (of animal species). 

    Moreover, Locke does not, as Kendi implies, use a racial signifier in this discussion: not “west African women” or “negroes” or “Africans.” He simply uses the word “women,” without any qualifiers. If one did not already know about this debate, one would have no idea what Locke was talking about. Indeed, inasmuch as a reader of Herbert might think he was talking about women in Africa, he states that these are women like all women. It is a dramatic leap from this theorizing about the essence of humanity as a species, and our conceptual understanding of “man” as opposed to animals, to Kendi’s claim that Locke argued that “Ethiopians and apes must have the same ancestry, distinct from Europeans.” Nor is there anything here to suggest that any particular group of women is hypersexual. This discussion is a minor part of Locke’s larger project, which is to understand how humans come to have reason. 

    In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, then, Locke held that any claims that women had sex with apes, “if true,” would not create a separate species. His argument is not as strong as Godwyn’s, but he was also not answering the question directly, as was Godwyn. He was addressing the question of how humans categorize ideas. Kendi’s claim is false and highly misleading. And since Kendi uses the claim that Locke originated this particularly heinous racism to impugn the integrity of Western liberalism, the slander is rather a large one. There is nothing pedantic about getting this intellectual history right. The stakes are considerable. 

    Does referring to such an issue as procreation between women and apes, even in such an oblique way as Locke did here, constitute in and of itself racism, especially if the emphasis is on the claim that women and apes are of two entirely different species? Is it racist to mention the claim explicitly and then to challenge it point by point, as Godwyn did? By such a standard Kendi himself would be racist, as would I, merely for considering this evidence. Kendi claimed that Locke was arguing for a racist position that “most feared to engage in publicly.” But Locke, and especially Morgan Godwyn, whom Kendi also discusses, were arguing against such claims, and especially against such implications. Godwyn in particular is acting as an “antiracist” here, to borrow Kendi’s own categories, and Locke should either be considered an anti-racist or a neutral figure. 

    Why does it matter for Kendi’s larger argument whether or not his analysis of Locke and Godwyn — and of other contemporary thinkers such as Richard Baxter — is accurate? The answer is simple: Kendi makes it appear as though virtually all whites agreed with racist positions that were “stamped from the beginning,” including those whom we might expect to do the opposite, such as “enlightened” thinkers who advocated for human rights, such as Locke. Such references from Locke and Godwyn are Kendi’s “proof.” They permit him to argue that ideas about consent or rights were meant to apply only to whites, and therefore are themselves morally and racially flawed. 

    In this first section of his book, Kendi conflates the arguments of many authors — not only Locke but also Richard Baxter and Morgan Godwyn — with those they are arguing against. The crucial figure with whom they were contending was Herbert, whom Kendi ignores. Kendi instead identifies another French traveler as the father of racial classification and a “friend of Locke’s”: Francois Bernier. Locke did correspond with Bernier, and Bernier did distinguish between four different races of human beings (African, European, Asian, and Laplander), but he did not state that these different races were of different species. For purposes of this consideration, Locke’s work does not reflect any theories of racial difference. The divergence between the actual text of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the Negroes and Indians Advocate, Baxter’s Christian Directory, and Kendi’s interpretation of them makes it appear that Kendi did not read the originals of these texts, but only other scholars who quoted from them. 

    Kendi also claimed that Locke’s family was long involved in the slave trade. “In 1554,” he writes, “an expedition captained by John Lok, ancestor of philosopher John Locke, arrived in England after traveling to ‘Guinea.’” Yet the Dictionary of National Biography — not exactly an arcane or out-of-the-way source — confirms that “John Lok,” the person who traveled to Guinea, died without issue. The philosopher John Locke’s father was John Locke; his grandfather, born in 1674, was Nicholas Locke and he was a clothier by profession. His great-grandfather, born in 1540, was Edward Locke, and his great-great grandfather was Nicholas Locke, born in 1517. They were artisans, not slave traders. Repeatedly, Kendi labels people who criticized slavery and racist ideas — and were persecuted for such criticism — as supporters of both. I would put Richard Baxter in particular in this category: in 1775, the ideas of this alleged racist villain were cited by none other than Thomas Paine to argue against slavery. 

    As for Locke himself, he does not emerge from careful examination with clean hands. Between 1660 and 1675 he and his mentor, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, cooperated with Charles II and his brother James: both owned stock in the Royal African Company (sold in 1675), and both participated on some level in the crafting of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina in 1669, which included language about the powers of masters over slaves (even if, as I have shown elsewhere, most of the provisions corresponded to the earlier charter and to the wishes of the eight proprietors). But Locke’s later work, for which he is best known, arose in critical response to such policies and attitudes by the Stuarts, including the Two Treatises of Government and An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. After the Glorious Revolution, he was appointed to positions of substantial responsibility on the Board of Trade, with colonial oversight, and in that capacity he helped to reverse earlier policies that had given planters fifty acres of land for buying a slave. He also argued that “people of all nations are of one blood” (from Acts 1:17) and that the children of “negroes” and Indians who lived in the colony should be “baptized, catechized and bred christians—” a right that arguably, given then current legal norms that to gain the rights of subjects one had to be Christian, should have enabled them to claim other rights, including potentially manumission. Did Locke do enough to reverse slavery? No. But did he make arguments that indicated that he thought Africans were fully human with rights, and part of the same species? Absolutely. 

    Of course Locke is merely one figure of the Enlightenment, and there were many more over two centuries. It is certainly not my purpose here to exonerate all these figures, some of whom expressed racist sentiments. I wish, rather, to place those comments into broader struggles over power, over empire, over legitimacy; and to insist that outside of such contexts they cannot be properly understood; and to suggest that the Enlightenment had its origins in the struggle against slavery, a struggle which is much older than recent historical discus- sions would have us believe. Likewise, early modern science as it emerged in this period should be put into the context of the religious debates and the travelers accounts and the political structure that surrounded it. Interestingly enough, Charles II’s Royal Society, which promoted science, never gave Thomas Herbert a platform (from what I can discover); he certainly never published in their Philosophical Transactions. 

    And still earlier, it is possible to trace an entire range of speculations about apes and their similarities (or not) to humans made not by scientists or philosophers but by religious figures and the writers of a wide range of pamphlets, many of them not respectable, though their authors are little known. In 1670, for example, in his treatise The Divine History of the Genesis of the World, the cleric Samuel Gott clearly distinguished between “Apes, Baboons, Marmosets, Drills, and I known not what Bestia Fauuns and satyrs, as one degree removed form ourselves . . . yet we [humans] Classicaly differ, and vastly excell them, in our Intellective Spirit.” In 1653, in its second edition, which was enlarged with many woodcuts, John Bulwer’s Anthropometamorphosis reflected on these questions, through both his reading of a Book of Monsters 

    written by the Dutch physician Nicolaes Tulp in 1641, and his own observation of a Guinea Drill that he had viewed that Christmastime near Charing Cross in London. 

    The haire of whose head (which was black) grew very like the haire of a child; it was a compleat Female too, not above eleven months old, and yet it seemed to me to answer the Dimensions which Tulpius gives of his Angola Satyr. The Keeper of it affirmes, it will grow up to the stature of five foot, which is the ordinary size of little men: He would go upright and drinke after the same manner. Her Keeper intended never to cut her haire, but to let it grow in full length, like a womans; in case she should dye, her carkasse was bespoke for Dissection by some Anatomists, who perchance have a Curiosity to search out what capacity of Organs this Rational Bruit had for the reception of a reasonable soule, or at least of such a delitescent reason; which Drill is since dead, and I beleeve dissected, but of the Dissectors and their observations I have not received any intelligence. 

    In 1699 an English scientist would publish a comprehensive account of such a dissection of a Drill, this time with the patronage of the Royal Society. He concluded that it and humans were quite distinct. Moreover, Bulwer proceeded to tell a story that made the woman who had sex with the ape not an African but a European, a Portuguese, woman: 

    Of which monster I may say what Jordanus saies of the aforesaid Orang Outang, or Tulpius his wild man, that it proceeded from the wicked copulation of man and beast, the Devill Cooperating, and Divine revenge (without all doubt) ensuing thereupon: of the same Tribe and Originall were those two children which the Portugall woman bore to the Great Ape, when she was exposed into a desert Island inhabited only by such Apes; a story well known in Portugall, and is worth the reading in Delrio. 

    By the late eighteenth century such debates had become more widespread, and they continued, as in the seventeenth century, to interweave the political with the scientific. A Jamaican named Edward Long, in his history of that island, repeated comments that came from Thomas Herbert, alleging that blacks were a separate species. Thomas Jefferson, in a shocking passage in his Notes on the State of Virginia in 1781, referred casually to “the preference of the Oranootan for the black women over those of his own species.” Jefferson’s Notes originated in his correspondence with the French naturalist Buffon, and his awful remark appears in a section wherein he described supposed differences between white and black peoples. Jefferson was not the founder of modern racism; that dubious accomplishment, as should now be clear, belonged to Thomas Herbert. But once again the only appropriate frame for understanding such racism is the full historical picture. These were questions about which Jefferson was torn. Elsewhere he spoke powerfully about including Africans in the ranks of “all men are created equal,” most notably in his original draft of the Declaration, where he referred to Africans as “MEN,” in capital letters and italics, and in another section of his notes on Virginia, where he wrote that in the event of a slave uprising God would side with the enslaved, as theirs was the cause of justice. It began: “I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice cannot sleep for ever.” 

    My point is that some Enlightenment figures, even as they made arguments that we might today want to celebrate, also reacted to racism, sometimes building upon it, sometimes rejecting it. The figures singled out by earlier scholars as “enlightened” hardly originated racism. The real garbage was usually generated by figures that earlier scholars in the twentieth century did not choose to celebrate, or honor, or reproduce. They are not generally included in our accounts of what we admire as our “civilization.” Such seventeenth-century figures as Herbert and others, who legitimated both the slave trade and slavery for all non-Christians and specifically for Africans and Indians, are a perfect example. If we want to understand the origins of racism, then, we need to look beyond the streetlight, beyond the old canons. 

    We must understand that crucial texts of liberalism and the Enlightenment that to this day anchor our educational and political systems emerged within a context that included the distasteful and the unusual. We must look to the freaks and the monsters, those whose ideas still do not bear reprinting except as excerpts and in context. We need to discover the QAnon of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Such reconstructions should always be in a political context, for the creation of racist ideas was always a political act — propounded, as Godwyn noted in 1680, by those whose interests were at stake, whose “wild opinions” were promulgated “by the inducement and instigation of our Planters chief deity, Profit.” Godwyn acknowledged that “they’ll infer their Negro’s Brutality” to “justifie their reduction of them under Bondage; disable them from all Right and Claims.” 

    Racists were emphatically not “stamped from the beginning.” Racist ideas were contested, and debated, often sharply, by many Enlightenment thinkers who created comprehensive arguments that challenged all hierarchies, including racism and slavery. The evils of racism and slavery provoked in their own time a tradition of antiracism. Even within the limitations of their time and their discourse, these disputations helped to create the foundation for many of the principles of human rights and democracy. 

    To the Sun

    Among the great longer poems of the twentieth century, the circumstances under which Shaul Tchernikhovsky’s To the Sun was composed were perhaps the most unlikely. This sonnet cycle was written in Hebrew in war-torn Odessa in 1919, with Red and White forces struggling for control of the city. Tchernikhovsky, then forty-five, had served on the front lines as a doctor in the Russian army, an experience directly reflected in the seventh sonnet of the cycle. He grew up in a modest- sized town on the Ukrainian steppes, and Russian, not Yiddish, was his first language. The experience of being nurtured there through an intimate bond with nature is explicitly recalled in the first three sonnets of the cycle, as is his feeling of being torn away from that cherished bucolic realm when he came to Odessa while still in his teens. After his army service, working part time as a doctor in Odessa, he was earning barely enough to support himself, his Russian wife, and their young daughter, and food in any case was in scarce supply. 

    In the midst of all this turmoil, Tchernikhovsky chose to compose a hugely ambitious synoptic poem that would tell the story of his calling as a poet, express his passionate credo as a vitalist and a pantheist, articulate a vision of the role of art and also science in human culture, and confront the challenge to that vision posed by violence in history. He did all this, moreover, in Hebrew, a language that was just beginning to be revived as a spoken tongue. The poetic form that he embraced was the sonnet corona, an especially intricate one originating in the Italian Renaissance. It consists of a sequence of fifteen Petrarchan sonnets, with the requisite rhyming octaves and sestets, in which the last line of each sonnet is repeated as the first line of the next sonnet, with the concluding sonnet composed of all fourteen of the first lines in the order in which they first appeared. Tchernikhovsky’s choice of this difficult form is in itself an expression of his deep commitment, even under great stress, to the tradition of humanism, the formal perfection of the corona being a kind of homage to his Italian precursors and a bulwark against the chaos swirling around him in the Russia of 1919. 

    To the Sun is a work of stunning technical virtuosity. Unlike many of the Hebrew poets of his time, Tchernikhovsky had no traditional religious education, and the neo-pagan worldview that To the Sun articulates, conjuring up a fusion of fire and blood in all things, feels authentic to the poet. This translation makes no attempt to emulate the rhyme scheme, for it is hard to see how that could be done without transmogrifying and distorting the meanings of the Hebrew. A compensatory effort has been made to give a certain rhythmic integrity to as many of the lines as possible. Tchernikhovsky’s Hebrew is difficult, often deliberately swerving from the ways in which the language was used by other Hebrew poets of his era. At some points in the cycle, the exigencies of rhyme and meter produce lines that are crabbed and somewhat obscure in the original, and these have not been smoothed out in the transla- tion. But whatever the limitations of this English version, it is offered in the hope that it will make visible to English readers a grand poetic edifice that combines humanistic values with a vivid sense of the world’s pulsating, eternally sustaining life. 

    ROBERT ALTER 

    Our ancestors who were in this place, their backs to God’s temple and their faces to the east, would bow eastward to the sun. 

    BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE SUKKAH

                   1.

    I was to my god like a hyacinth or mallow
      That has naught in its world but its pure beaming sun,
      And an angel came knocking: “Rise, grow, blossom’s scion,
                                                                   burst forth
    In your song, festive song, in sharp thorns.”

    I sucked the juice of the furrow. Like wine the scent
                                                                   whelmed me
      Of the crop-yielding soil with its clods, its soft clods.
      Lacked he prelate and priest in the great city’s temple
    That he led me on here, set me out as his prophet?

    Is the sap on cypress-silver any less in my eyes
    Than your good olive oil glowing gold on the head,
    And the fragrance of pear-tree in the field that I tended

    Than Sabean merchants’ powders, than my nard and my
                                                                   incense?
    And I bowed to you secretly, bent low in reverence.
    Like one stalk of gold grain in stalks heavy with yield.

    2.
    Like one stalk of gold grain in fields heavy with yield
      That sprang up in great beauty and flourished in vigor,
      Like this stalk of grain hiding within it its secret,
    Life’s pledge everlasting and relic of old.

    Like stalk of grain furrow-stolen that suckles the earth
      And moist with live nectar it dreams of its glory,
      I, too, did burgeon! But my soul ever thirsted.
    Ah, day chases day! Shall I call in the writ?

    My dream yet unrealized, my path still hidden.
    When on all sides I am fearful: what for me, who for me…
    Have I come to the border? Have I already crossed it?

    Did my father deceive me and not keep his word?
    A wildflower am I, and my sun is my father.
    He sent me warm rains and decreed mountain mists.

    3.
    He sent me warm rains and decreed mountain mists,
      And the twilight of sea-depths, abode of great silence,
      A dense cloud of fire burning hot in its casement,
    And until it bursts upward, earth’s breadth but confines it;

    The sundial too confining to take in the limit,
      The sun with the clamor of ocean fire on it,
      And words from old times passed by father to father,
    Raptures of great city’s sick, lore of guileless peasants,

    For me to be the axis of the world that he fashioned,
    Its essence, true center, he stored up in abundance
    For the present and future, for the past that sped by,

    And in abundance of charm and colors never shamed me
    And endowed me with much—through his power so strong—
    Light-and-shade’s symphonies, kohl, rouge, and crimson.

    4.
    Light-and-shade symphonies, kohl, rouge, and crimson,
      Cold-crystal mummies and iridescent sea-sleepers,
      The brief moment of life of a spark struck off hot,
    In heavy-hued alabaster and sepulchered shipwrecks;

    And the networks of tree-veins in mahogany’s crosscut,
      Trees that are bloodlogged and shoot up in fury,
      Hues before daybreak, of evening bathed in blood
    That sloughs off gold treasures and will never be poor —

    One melody all, one wondrous high song.
    Can the master of numbers, can he solve the riddle,
    Or life kingdom’s scholars, can you tell it to me?

    Guileless hearts have long solved it, and from innocent hearts
    I, too, absorbed it, for my heart did not cheat me!
    Age-old sorrow I fathomed, each nation’s song charmed me.

    5.
    Age-old sorrow I fathomed, each nation’s song charmed me.
      The dream of On’s soothsayers etched on a wall,
      And the writing of druids incised in chalkstone,
    Amulet on parchment, wizard’s song, poor man’s stammer.

    In writ giving law to age and nation before me,
      Incantations of shepherds that are whispered by sheepfolds,
      In the rapture of magus who is seized by convulsion,
    In the talismans of China does my curious gaze

    Descry but this prayer, flesh-and-blood’s pleading:
    “You who dwell in the secret of being,
    O keep for me the blood.
    Quench not the fire you lit in me through your mercy,

    Liquid fire guarding fire, just one spark from your flames!”
    That is the grand sum in the bitter heart lodging,
    Voice of soul wrapped in light, voice in foreign dark straying.

    6.
    Voice of soul wrapped in light, voice in foreign dark straying,
      Clash within me—for my consecration fell short.
      A realm of stark doubting, of doubting what is certain,
    Pressed round me like a dream in tight-woven raptures.

    And in the living man’s upheavals who clings to each ruling
     Of law piercing law undermining Shaddai,
     A guileless faith’s armor I donned over my khaki
    And in each day’s profaneness its small remnant
                                                                   stayed with me.

    Were it not for the scents of the rich crumbly soil,
    Stifling heat drifting up from the granary’s chaff,
    The shovel’s ring splitting furrow and scythe singing in grain,

    I soaked these up in the village, in that freedom, still a child—
    Who stood by me in the battle, when my heart
                                                                   clenched within me,
    When I stood between the living and one breathing his last?

    7.
    When I stood between the living and one breathing his last
      (What a terrible craft), a sharp scalpel in my hand,
      Some would weep out of joy, some would curse me to my face,
    I soaked up the last light in a dying stranger’s eyes.

    By the thunder of potent cannons that rolled
          through the meadow,
      By the fire flashing to me only in the dark of my trench,
      I traced the last line, wiped the living from my page,
    From a jewel-studded chalice is a precious stone torn.

    And yet in that spark in the guttering eye,
    In the light soaking up light before it blanks for all time;
    And yet in that fire-flash burning and shrieking,

    In the fire calling to fire that bids disaster and ruin,
    It was you who were in them, this your glory
                                                                   that stunned me—
    Too soon did I come or too late did he make me?

    8.
    Too soon did I come, or too late did he make me?
      “Gods” are around me, they fill all existence.
      The stars are my gods, I pray to them enchanted
    By their faces, light of day and pale moon.

    For besides you there is nothing, O sun that has warmed me!
      Sun’s offspring to me are you, the cocoons hanging high,
      Sun’s offspring, looming tree and the mere garlic husk,
    Light and heat’s avatars, the combustible coal.

    And all existence is a voice of prayer, a prayer of all things:
    To you jackal-mothers cry as they litter their whelps,
    The battle trumpet sounds to you as day breaks in the camps,

    Suns in the sphere above, as the sound sweeps them up.
    In the chorus without end I shall sing, not be still:
    In my heart yet rests the dew that descends on Edom’s steppes.

    9.
    In my heart yet rests the dew that descends on Edom’s steppes
      And moistens the sand in the desert of god.
      In my ears the song lives that arrives with the shade
    And a gentle star glitters to primeval lays,

    And primeval night shades the world with its wings,
    And the desert and night become one single secret,
    From their tents gathered peoples bend low on each mound,
    And bow to him, trembling, in their fete, in their blight.

    When the nation’s heavens change over it, those heavens
                                                                   of blue,
    As the face of stars dims for it, and if in the yoke
    Of a sky yet unknown it moves east and west—

    Once a month it comes out in mysterious night
    To hallow the moon as it hallowed it then
    On the peak of Mount Hor, the ancient god’s home.

    10.
    On the peak of Mount Hor, the ancient god’s home,
      It shines in light-clouds gigantic, possessing law-fire!
      From the radiance before it Chaldee Bel bowed by
                                                                   the Euphrates,
    Sphinx’s visage went pale in Nile’s red channel.

    With his scepter El smashes—and stilled is
      The pride of marble-quickening Zeus, and Perun heard
      His word and fled to the forest, and the moth met the worm
    On Lubian priest’s breastplate, Wotan’s cult-trees their prey.

    When age succeeds age and the East once more brightens—
    Nubia’s icons shall quail, Hormuz, Kerub shall be shamed,
    And Arabia’s idols, by the crescent moon’s light.

    And yet still a vision…an age fashions like a smelter
    Its god that is coming—and we worship him gladly—
    For my heart utters song to the sun and Orion.

    11.
    For my heart utters song to the sun and Orion—
      Will you judge me by law, to the dust will you thrust me,
      For to a vulgar folk’s god I will pour no libation,
    In a dance before crowds I will not crown his head.

    In his temple on high, bare of image or scroll,
      In all-in-all’s beauty he sends me no cherub,
      With his noblemen’s patent he comes not to blind me,
    It bears a signed name like the rule for a fool.

    Yet if a wave of great holy bliss sweeps you
    And a tremor of joy in prophetic creation,
    In the wealth of heart’s life that each mystery shares;

    In the surge of your loving with a lusty man’s bounty,
    You found favor with him as gift-garden finds favor
    When the beanpod shall swell and the tree’s fruit shall ripen.

    12.
    When the beanpod shall swell and the tree’s fruit shall ripen,
      Wild weeds, all trespassers of borders and limits,
      When they ripen their seed in the heart of the fruit-skin
    And light-beams are hidden and stored away sifted;

    From them to time’s end, with this earth’s climate
      Changed and its forests’ scent faded,
      With the remnant of structures on poles, rot’s survivors,
    In the graves of great princes, in amphoras and jars.

    After thousands of ages, from a cramped mine it will come,
    Will shine forth from the heights of the towers in courts
    Of all fire-worshippers who burn daughters on pyres,

    Will burn in the brain of the transcendent genius,
                                                                   in the flesh of
    Mosquitoes that sing, and in an empty age lacking
    An extinct world’s idols—they have seized me, with no escape.

    13.
    An extinct world’s idols, they have seized me, with no escape!
      Idols of this nation, all who touch it know beauty,
      Beauty became wisdom, its wisdom was beauty ,
    And it scattered its splendor on Hades and Ocean.

    North winds have bewitched me from among all the trees,
      Recounting frost’s story in patterns of agate;
      Midst the sun-shrines of On, in the temple I sought,
    I imagined this spark that says in me: Repeat—

    But the spark from the East, and from Canaan I kept it;
    Danite idols compelled me, cultic groves filled with trembling,
    Asherah statues, blocks from Tyre, in Ur did I worship.

    Where the way I must choose, where the path?
    Anoint my oil for Yah or shall I choose Zeus,
    Or the very last age’s icons in the kingdom of idols?

    14.
    Or the very last age’s icons in the kingdom of idols,
      Or the song of strength’s dream we shall raise up forever.
      And a man’s eye shall probe and reveal matter’s secrets,
    Permutations of atoms in gold and in tin.

    From the minerals he lays down a line and a path
      To the kingdom of trees and unseen growing things,
      And his one single chain: among molds, the mushroom,
    Green slime on a lake, almond, elephant’s get.

    Heat’s secret is grasped, electricity, and light,
    Magnetism’s mysteries, the barley bloom’s riddle,
    The roused nerve’s tremulations that is stretched without gap,

    And it shall be just one secret, one high secret—the living.
    Then the song shall be sung: this my sun that has warmed me,
    I was to my god like a hyacinth or mallow.

    15.
    I was to my god like hyacinth or mallow,
      Like one ear of gold grain in stalks heavy with yield;
      And he sent me warm rains and decreed mountain mists,
    Light-and-shade’s symphonies, kohl, rouge, and scarlet.

    Age-old sorrows I fathomed, each nation’s song charmed me,
      Voice of soul wrapped in light, voice in foreign dark strayed,
      When I stood between the living and one breathing his last,
    Too soon did I come or too late did he make me?

    In my heart still the dew that descends on Edom’s steppes,
    On the peak of Mount Hor, the ancient god’s home,
    For my heart utters song to the sun and Orion.

    When the beanpod shall swell and the tree’s fruit shall ripen,
    An extinct world’s idols have seized me, with no escape!
    Or the very last age’s icon in the kingdom of idols.

    What Shall We Watch Now?

    Over the past year, there was so much to be afraid of that fear itself grew fatigued. Was the solitude of lockdown passing into a new systemic withdrawal? Or were we practicing turning our blind eye to kids on the streets with guns? 

    Nothing felt as eerie then as the bourgeois comfort that now at last, double vaccinated, we might be getting back to normal. As if there was a proven “we,” let alone any structure of normality available. As if we had not learned yet that the phantom known as our norm had been a deluding pipe-dream for so long. As if the panoramas of fear had not taught us that hope and our future were Ponzi schemes. As if we didn’t know in our bones that the precious “it” — our culture — might be ending, so should we (quietly and discreetly) get whatever we could while there was still time? 

    So even among the pursuers of our liberties, there could be a secret plan of acquiring tactful guns, living on high ground, putting together a goodies satchel of Proust, Musil, Parker, and Mahler, and stockpiling toilet paper. 

    I hoped to make that short paragraph mischievous, as if that was the surest way of getting at you. But black comedy is a showoff relief now, our trick for sidestepping gravity. Blackness went noir in the last century, as horror was glossed as genre. So I want to find an example that can be unsettling. 

    On May 14, 2021, Amazon Prime streamed all ten episodes of Barry Jenkins’ adaptation of Colson Whitehead’s novel The Underground Railroad. Wasn’t that splendid, and a sign of our improvement? Many said that this event was eagerly awaited, not just because Jenkins had achieved a high reputation with Moonlight, but because between the publication of Whitehead’s novel in 2016 and the delivery of the work on film, America had been convulsed by, among other things, the murder of George Floyd and the Black Lives Matter response. Even in the crowded world of streaming shows, intensified by Covid stay-at-home life, The Underground Railroad was anticipated. (But note how this way of describing what happened makes it sound as if white America had been waiting patiently for George Floyd to provide a prompt for our indignation. We are so appealing when we’re angry.) 

    Nothing but opinion can come next, and ordinary opinion has mattered more during Covid because the external view of critics has been minimized by our intense domestic living with television series. So the reviews for, say, The Queen’s Gambit were very positive, but they felt irrelevant next to the way word-of-mouth was making our secretive romance with that show as infectious as the trance attractiveness of Anya Taylor-Joy. Chess became a new home craze, but then the binge was gone as if it had never existed. We have to learn to swim with the streaming. But is The Underground Railroad a test of swimming or drowning? The reviews were very favorable, though I felt a curious wariness that did not properly convey the peril and the exhilaration in yielding to its current. 

    I found the show more expansive because it was so beautiful, while facing several looming facts of shame. In his novel, Whitehead had alluded to the “railway” as not just a network of abolitionists trying to get black people out of the South and the reach of slavery, but as an actual railway system. What amazed me in the film was the realization of tunnels, tracks, and locomotion in a surreal design for rescue. It was so unnerving that it made the mythology within the show suggestive of how the word “underground” signifies a depth of thought and action striving against surface tyranny. To speak of an underground reminds us of how the United States had a mild war; it knew neither bombing nor Gestapo on the stairs. It was mainly a movie war for us. 

    Audaciously — in defiance of every realistic objection that there had not been a real railroad — Jenkins had believed enough in the mystery to get at a true underground of America. That adjective denoted more than “railroad,” for the underground force was an idea — just like dread at a world being occupied by unkind forces. If it helps this proposition, I would say that in Psycho — such a warning about journeying — there is a deliberate shift from the bleak modernism of Phoenix, through semi-desert and nocturnal highway, to a past where a Victorian Gothic house sits above a flimsy cardboard motel. In other words, Psycho in 1960 was feeling out the conflict of change in America, and making it part of the film’s shocking violence in which someone we cherished would be cut to pieces on a journey seeking salvation. 

    Suppose Psycho is a nightmare about the impact of sexual reality on a repressed American society: thus the initial bedroom scene between Janet Leigh and John Gavin sets up the voyeuristic tension that breaks open in the shower-scene slaughter, and the revelation of a buried sexual horror in Norman and his Mother. This is not a story that believes only in photographic reality; it is a legend pulled out of a grave. And that is the way to approach The Underground Railroad. Yes, it’s about slavery in the nineteenth century. But it also feels the struggle between emotional expression and suppression that is the whole history of our United States. 

    Another aspect of that is the absence of the Civil War. It is not easy to be sure “when” the film is set — you would have to be an expert on clothes and décor; but as the film passed by I became more aware of how the famous war did not seem to exist. As I thought about that I was drawn to see that “our” Civil War was in part a white projection on a terrible history and a way of telling ourselves bad things had been cleaned up. But they were not, and because the war is absent from the film a feeling dawned that it still waits to be fought. In 2021 this was something to be afraid of, including that movie, January 6th, which occurred long after Jenkins had finished filming but in which the force of a rogue locomotive reared up out of the ground and aimed at us. 

    There is more to be said about what Jenkins had done. Naturally, there are slaving scenes that are ghastly (as well as natural) — a big one occurs in the very first episode. But as I tried to enter the film’s world, I realized I had never seen a South so palpably and dangerously lovely. You feel the warmth and the fragrance, the swamp and the snakes; the camera dwells on flora and fauna; the light is rare and thick and almost graspable (the photography is by James Laxton); and the natural sounds merge with the remarkable score (by Nicholas Britell) that seems to be feeding on the air. This becomes a transfixing experience, a naturalist’s treasury, but it is a place where appalling things are happening. I had never felt America’s Edenic ambiguity so thoroughly. 

    I haven’t mentioned the acting, black and white, or the serene confidence to take the action off in unexpected directions. To be brief: I loved the film; I watched it as in bingeing, in just three nights, the shifts of light like a storm in our darkened living room. I felt it was a marvel, a great film, a savage rapture, if that is the kind of language you expect from “commentary,” or one more demonstration of the ways streaming — with vivid imagery burning on the walls of our home — is changing our idea of watching. Forget the chance of seeing this in a public place, because that communal aspiration is gone now, eclipsed by our technology. We deserve it in our cave, the last place, where we hope to shelter. 

    As someone often asked to recommend films, I was urging The Underground Railroad on friends. But I thought I detected some reserve. Yes, people had heard it was good, and yes, they understood that it was “important.” But I began to hear that several people had not gone far into the show. Some said the lengthy lashing and burning scene in the first episode had been an obstacle. Yes, they knew they needed to see that violence (they had honored it recently in 12 Years a Slave), but they seemed to feel a little nagged about seeing the pain once more. I wondered if liberals were growing weary of their good cause.

     

    A close friend told me, “I only saw the first episode but was put off by its odd mix of the pretentious and the unemotional, even though many things were happening that should make me feel emotional. It felt academic to me — or something too studied.” I disagreed; my friend was reacting to the magic and its allegorical point of view, which I have just tried to explain. Then, in another conversation with someone else, but taking it in that not enough people seemed to be watching the show all the way through, I heard myself say, “I think there’s something else, which is that some white people do not really want to see black people.” 

    There was a hush when I said that, as if it might be something one should not say — or as if it signaled a degree of racism. I am white; I was English for forty years, and then American for another forty. But I am trying to admit to a failing of the sort that I suspect many black people hear in conversations with whites, no matter how well-intended or liberal the whites think they are, and no matter how tolerant or amused the blacks can bring themselves to be. It’s like the way rich people are not comfortable looking at poverty. (An old joke: a tattered beggar sneaks into the courtyard of a wealthy man’s house. The plutocrat turns to his manservant and says: “Get him out of here. He’s breaking my heart.”) It’s how some men and women cannot be together without fear and desire. 

    We like to see ourselves. We would rather hear our language than one we don’t know. We prefer to be with people we feel share our experience. We are wary of strangers. There is systemic racism, if that means sheer racial difference, and willing it away will not dispel it. Candor can tame its worst defects. And watching can begin to offset prejudice, and tenderize differences. That is the chance for an intelligent society, or one that can warrant hope. Doesn’t Proust tell us about that world? 

    So what can we watch now? What’s on your screen? 

    Watching has changed so much in the spell of Covid, and I don’t see many of the shifts being reversed. One reason is that the changes were well underway before our new way of sickening and dying made us suddenly more inbound. Just as Mare of Easttown is a more involving interaction than the self-satisfied isolationism of Nomadland, so for twenty years now the quality of things seen on the smaller screen — The Wire, The Sopranos, Breaking Bad, Babylon Berlin, Ozark — far exceeded the best that Hollywood put in theaters. I’ll go further: the nature of a criminal society in those long-form series is more intricate, more human, and more political than the armored gloom that envelops the Corleone family in the Godfather films. The Godfather is an enclosed pattern of loyalty followed by betrayal. Its underground is mistrust. Of course it still works on screen, but the meticulous craft of the first two films is an expression of Michael’s pitiless authority. He is making the film, and Coppola cannot challenge him. The films are cultured prisons, or a rite that we honor now with worship from our cells. We want to be in that terrible family. The fantasy of shared power and allegiance smothers any moral issues or a consideration of how crime became truly American when it got organized. And in an age of mounting fears, we yearn for organization and the promise of strong people in charge. 

    I know, this is horrid to hear; it should not be so. But notice the exultation you feel — the assist you are giving — in those finales where the Corleones’ enemies are eliminated. And realize that generations of our kids have seen the two parts of The Godfather only on their home screen, clinging to the watchful dark in the way that Michael Corleone looks out on his wasteland. “Could we rewind, and run that execution again?” 

    By contrast, Babylon Berlin is a study in how insecurity can prompt fascist solutions, just as Ozark is an autopsy on a family breaking apart because of money. When was there a feature film that had a similar wish so fully to analyze poverty? Generally the movie system is fearful of showing that condition, and in terror of asking how it functions. What Hollywood movie comes close to Walter White’s exhausted moral compass and the onset of fanatical self-interest? That is close to what I was saying about the underground pressure in so many of us to carry our cash in hand, with properties and delicacies that will make our life rewarding at the end. Don’t jump to the liberal conclusion that the tremors of slavery are all gone now, not as long as poverty is as widespread an anxiety. Do not minimize how our culture has been telling us to expect the worst, and to be as deft as Butch and Sundance at handling it. Though that script required a merciful freeze frame. 

    There are people in the film industry telling themselves that the theatrical audience is going to come back with a rush. I’m not so sure, because we cannot be expected to ignore how the stuff “on television” is so much more adult and powerful than whatever mainstream movies can think of now. So we have relearned a condition that was there since the start of television: that it feels safer, warmer, and more personal on our own couches. We have liked the renewed intimacy of watching with our people (or alone — that last resort state is sinking in), and following the skilled, extended narratives into the night (the locus of solitude). 

    There is also another development that needs to be admitted. For many of us, with sophisticated television screens, the quality of the home image and the sound are more vivid. (Add headphones for the extra kick of secrecy.) We can get more detailed, brighter, more audible, and more enthralling on the “small” screen than the standards of theater projection, which are often casual or uninterested. This may sound like heresy, but you’d have to be an idiot not to notice it. 

    And in our watching now we are in terror of idiocy. If lockdown has been a kind of imprisonment, then we are inmates desperate to improve ourselves. So we are watching at home with a concentration that has not existed since the golden age of theatrical movies. But our commonality then required a shared space; and what we have now is solitude or the décor of selfishness. In that state it becomes fanciful to maintain the cause of responsibility. We are all slipping into a version of the bitter negation of Congress and its complacency that government cannot, and should not, work. 

    Our “cinema” is in tatters: we welcome the fatuous Mank and begin to forget Kane. Or think of it this way: A Quiet Place Part II (one of the few legitimate successes among recent theatrical openings) does well enough with its preposterous but cute plot situation, though not enough to overcome the fear of a franchising fix in that drab “Part II.” But put that beside the exploration — physical and social — of Albuquerque, Baltimore, New Jersey, Missouri and Berlin in the series that I am recommending. In all cases, the series show how thoroughly money and power are undermining society and our legal confidence. Does that remind you of anywhere you know? It makes me think of San Francisco, where I live, which in its unseemly marriage of money, smugness and squalor acts out the principle that America is not working. It’s not that there could be a realistic thought of making it great again, but can we find a decent way of existing without the melodrama of greatness? 

    The question in watching is whether we can still possess systems that help us see the truth. Or do the systems run us? This is in a context in which the infernal nature of our politics has been intensified because home-viewing has made us gather round the fire. George Floyd has become an archetype by being on our screens: we know that 9 minute 29 second shot by heart. The same can be said for the rolling coverage of the outrage of January 6, a disaster movie that goes on and on, not least in enrolling some observers in the contract that no, it wasn’t really a disaster, while leaving others bemused that it has not justified charges of sedition. Time and again, watching action on the street, our headlong movie keeps asking what we are seeing. 

    I realize that may seem like a naïve homily. But it leads me to this. It is still widely believed that the crises we faced during the Depression and the War (a lesser ordeal than it was for most other countries) were alleviated or made orderly by the spirit and dreaming of Hollywood pictures. That case is worth making, and like most movie sentimentalists I have often made it. But suppose we consider another interpretation: that in those dire years we were fed quite different messages that misguided our trust in white male prowess and authority, female obedience and adorability, and the customary belittling of people of color, of poverty, and of the visible affliction known as ordinariness. It is possible therefore that the vaunted American century, not without the material evidence of power and accomplishment, was built on treacherous ground in which all manner of deviant or ugly systemics were weaving a national fabric that betrayed the American project and covered up the murderous insecurities of the child nation and all its Norman Bates. 

    Inescapably, with so much likely to be happening in the area of “breaking news,” our lust for that breakage has led us into the rivalrous clamor of shows that like to think of themselves as ongoing news platforms, but which are really extended commercials for fixed points of view. Let’s call them Fox and MSNBC. I watch the latter and I assume that most of you are on the same side. But preaching to choirs stops critical thinking. Why does it have to be a matter of sides? Or is that structure as essential as the ads that humiliate any attempt at fact? And if you are intent on reform, begin by forbidding all advertising in our media. Yes, that is how unforgiving and demanding survival is going to be. And how unlikely. That is why you have your satchels ready. 

    How does a cool scientific temperament assess the constant hysteria of the same talking heads agreeing with the fevered questions that Rachel, Lawrence, Sean, Tucker and the others recite? There is no more room for internal argument among the “saved” at MSNBC than among the scoundrels at Fox. The biggest conspiracy among them all is that “we” are watching or caring. Isn’t it plain after all these years that if a liar as complete as Trump is still “on,” then there is no longer a body of “us” paying attention that you would want to belong to? Audiences bear responsibility, too; but we are trained to expect to be pleased. 

    To all of which any partisans would likely ask, “What’s the point then?” Or what’s the chance of leading our screens into an accurate and fruitful discussion of what is happening in our world? Is the reasoned and accurate deliberation for which our political and social system was piloted any longer viable — can it go to series, or an enduring franchise? It is as if we have given up our hopes for reportage in news programming, let alone the informed and reasoned argument over issues. We may deplore the retreat of Congress from governance, but that surrender is daily evident in what we still try to call television news. 

    So it is worth noting the bold chronicle testaments that television has offered in this time. The Underground Railroad is in that category. No matter its fictional atmosphere, or the use of actors reading lines, its intent is to uncover truly underground elements in American history, as the last viable way of making us angry. It asks what are we watching, and what are we seeing? Still, another dear friend, very smart and hard-working, and probably less systemically racist than me, told me that he could not face watching The Underground Railroad because he was so tired, he “needed to veg out.” We all know that retreat. 

    But there are other angry shows that might seem exhausting in prospect. Exterminate All the Brutes, by Raoul Peck, is no less than a diatribe against the Western white man’s true burden, his flagrantly incorrect account of his history in the underprivileged world. It is an HBO venture (with aid from Sky in Britain and Arte in France), and it is the Joe Frazier of such programs, loaded with hostility and an energy that keeps coming at you, no matter the ripostes of reason and the educated leftist leads you might throw at him. 

    Peck is Haitian, a politician and a filmmaker (he did films about Patrice Lumumba, the Rwandan genocide, and Karl Marx before I Am Not Your Negro), and he narrates his own picture in a snarly, incantatory way, like a worm burrowing into our skull. He fights tough (we might complain), but he is intent on clearing out the attic of jumble in which we won’t let go of Columbus, the Alamo, the bracing fun of fascism, or those myths inherited from Westerns. This is a work that throws acid in the face of the John Fordian cult that said — in Fort Apache (1948) and The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (1962) — that “when the legend becomes fact, print the legend.” There are few more damaging mottos in our bag of poisoned fortune cookies. 

    There is one more show to be mentioned, and I think it is the most compelling of them all, a masterpiece (if that boosting helps). What makes its introduction more timely is that you will not have seen it in America, and likely will not. Why is that? Well, the elusiveness begins in its narrative difficulty and its lyrically paranoid voice. It will not easily satisfy those commercial gravities, like Amazon’s decision that they should do The Underground Railroad, for prestige and awards. Yet Adam Curtis’s Can’t Get You Out of My Head will be a harder sell, not least because of its uncanny, seething assembling of items from the immense BBC archive (a Borgesian library of Babel) has probably not cleared the rights for international transmission. So Can’t Get You Out of My Head may pass into its most appropriate medium — that of underground communication, with smuggled links or incomplete Vimeo fragments. Or inexplicable samplers breaking into shampoo ads where Garbo’s head comes off and her teeth fall out in CGI horror at not being suave. The proper delivery of this extraordinary fermenting show is as rumor or legend. 

    I’ll say no more (to foster mystery), except that if you know and treasure Curtis from The Century of the Self (2002) and HyperNormalisation (2016), you may appreciate my opinion that no one was more prescient about the way towards the end of the dear old twentieth century an endless tsunami of internetting was erasing any confidence in fact or news or reporting and letting anxiety turn to havoc (we’ll be right back). You have to see it to feel the crystallization of waking in the dark and not knowing where you are. Real dark is coming back to us. The grid will start to falter and the lucid but manic voice of Curtis (he narrates the show himself) is what you are going to keep hearing. 

    The title that Curtis had chosen is significant, for while his shows are montages of what could be random selections from a Heisenberg archive where you can’t tell the particles from the waves (until you begin to see the beast of pattern emerging, like Grendel in the dark), still Curtis was formed, like many Englishmen of his age, as much by radio as television. The voice is a sacrament still, whether it is some message on the ether describing The War of the Worlds in 1938, or the yelp of Rachel Maddow from another room tonight as you re-reheat the pizza, or the implacable drone of Peter Coyote’s voiceover on the latest iteration of Ken Burns’s America as an idea that seems to have occurred once upon a time. 

    There were two missionary epistles from Burns in the epoch of our plague: in April 2021, with his longtime working collaborator Lynn Novick, he delivered a six-hour Hemingway; and then, working with his daughter Sarah and her husband David McMahon, there are eight hours on Muhammad Ali for September. Why not “honey still for tea” and twelve hours on Johnny Carson by Christmas …? 

    I’m kidding, in a Carsonian way. I have known Burns since The Civil War in 1990, and he is not just a likeable man, but an inspiring figure, so eloquent and persuasive that he might have succeeded in politics if he had not insisted on seeming so young and idealistic. Instead, to all our benefit, he created a kind of religion that uses old imagery and talking heads to make pioneering documentary (it owed something to traditions from Canada and the BBC), and he allied this skill and taste to the cause of PBS. The church became an industry, with album books to accompany major shows, and Burns is loyal still to PBS, even if that outlet feels increasingly archaic in America. Television is wilder and more surreal than the PBS model and Burnsian uplift can contain. 

    The two shows for 2021 were majestic in their scale and assurance, yet oddly empty or missing. The vitality of the two subjects was becalmed under the coverlet of their being American masters (one of the PBS series that owes so much to the Burnsian organization of palatable history). So we had pages of manuscript and rounds of boxing to make us happy tourists at the show, implicitly subscribing (a key word at PBS) to the Rushmore of American greatness. And there was next to nothing, within the testament of Edna O’Brien and Walter Mosley or the inside stuff from boxing journalists, to suggest that Papa and Ali might also have been tortured tricksters, driven mad by America, eternal compromisers and opportunists — like us. The nastiness of Hemingway was bypassed with the gentle but miscast voice of Jeff Daniels, except for one hushed moment from Tobias Woolf at how shocking the master could be. The sexual recklessness and shuffling identity of Ali could not compete with the apotheosis of that palsied torchbearer at the Atlanta Olympiad of 1996. 

    It could be said that both men were so smart it was hard to realize they were chumps too, not so much masters as victims of fame, a suicide and a punch-drunk case. In eight hours of Ali we never got to hear whether he wrote those verses himself, how many women he exploited, and where and how all the money went — or what he felt about it all. There was no inner person. As for Hemingway, it was hinted that he flirted with being deviant, but nothing in the show bothered to assess how his whole thing about male grace under pressure, the right stuff, and sentences like trout in fresh stream water was humbug from a very mannered prose stylist who did not want to write about his own nation and ended up getting the big prize for his worst book, The Old Man and the Sea. 

    The legend sailed on that America could deliver such heroes, and so it was sadder that the actual America had not lived up to Burns’ valiant hopes. Baseball has turned shabby. As for jazz, it is too clerical now and respectable. When I put “Parker” in my satchel, I meant …? It was Bird’s centenary during Covid, but I’m not sure his lyrical outrage is heard anymore. The national parks have not tamed or excused the wasteland. 

    That said, Burns and Novick made a masterpiece in The Vietnam War in 2017, in part because that eighteen-hour film relied on the witness of ordinary victims, including those from Vietnam, and because it could not get the notion out of its head that in those 1960s and 1970s, from The Quiet American to the helicopters tipped into the ocean, the United States gave up its ghost. That is our proper starting place. 

    But the country now seeks vengeance against betrayers and a safe courtyard for its precious isolation. As if that norm is there to be had. As if our enlightenment can be seen before the grid starts to falter. 

    The Legend of Alice Neel 

    The language of art is embodied in paint and line on canvas or paper, in stone or clay or plastic or metal — it is neither a sob-story nor a confidential whisper. 

    LINDA NOCHLIN 

    What makes an artist great? For the duration of the cultural drought that engulfed the plague year, as the rates of illness and death rose, there was hardly an opportunity to consider so decadent a question. Museumgoers were starved, subsisting largely on virtual exhibition tours and Instagram profiles dedicated to Old Master paintings. The ersatz screen-gallery is uniquely numbing. Zooming into and then scrolling through post after post of factureless paintings is like kissing through a sheet of glass. There is a semi-spiritual sensation which can grip a viewer who comes face to face with the actual product of a master’s hands. Standing in front of a genuine work of art, it is possible to enter the charged liminal space between one’s own mind and the artist’s. If one knows how to look, to silence all distractions and concentrate attention entirely on the work alone, the space between the two minds becomes asymptotic, and the capacity to see the world through the eyes of another human being, a brilliant human being, is within reach. This experience is possible only in proximity to the original. 

    When word of the vaccines’ efficacy was reported like the olive branch in the dove’s beak, the art-craving population was in no position to be picky. Museums were opening again and we would eat whatever was put on our plates. This is generally true of the public, pandemic or no pandemic: it will admire what it is told to admire by the appointed experts, but it is especially true regarding visual art. Most people have no idea what makes it good or bad. It is rattling to be confronted by images for which one is unprepared by prior certifying opinions, for which one has no received framework. Many people assume that if a painting hangs on the wall of a museum and they don’t like it, they simply don’t get it. It’s just not their thing, which is not to say that it is in some way objectively deficient. On the contrary, many readily assume that their lack of interest or understanding is a measure of their own shortcomings. It is hard to trust your own judgement when you feel that you are being tested for your cultural literacy. The line of least resistance — to join the consensus and celebrate what is being celebrated — has its rewards. 

    And so, last spring, ravenous and trusting hordes flocked to the Metropolitan Museum of Art for Alice Neel: People Come First. It was Neel’s first retrospective in New York in over two decades. The show had been conceived in 2018, but the delayed opening was serendipitous: in 2021, after a year of perpetual political agitation, in which it seemed as if the same inequities that Neel spent her lifetime protesting were laid bare, “a champion of social justice” (so characterized by the museum website introducing the exhibition) who created “images of activists demonstrating against fascism and racism” as well as “impoverished victims of the Great Depression… portraits of [her] neighbors in Spanish Harlem, leaders of a wide range of political organizations, [and] queer artists and performers” was positioned to model the progressive mood. Neel’s work, said the Met site, is a testament to New York’s “diversity, resilience, and [the] passion of its residents.” A harmonic convergence of politics and culture was occurring. How felicitous it was that Neel’s social consciousness was so aligned with that of her curators, and so pertinent to the political and social upheavals that overran our quarantines. Is it odd that the museum’s webpage mentioned nothing about Neel’s paintings qua paintings, or her skills as an artist qua artist? Maybe not anymore. 

    Who was Alice Neel? What could one expect to learn about her relationship with color and form from a visit to this show? Poring over books and catalogs of her work, the particular energy with which her portraits vibrate is obvious even in reproduction. (She was primarily a portraitist, though she did produce cityscapes and still lifes). Neel painted emphatically. Her late works, which are her most famous, were painted between 1960 and 1984, when she finally was awarded the recognition that she had been awaiting for decades. The books show that the later pictures are brighter than the earlier ones, airy, with stretches of canvas often left blank. She painted people of all shapes and colors. She painted herself, with a strange mixture of candor and complacency, when she was 80. Vitality shrieks across every page. No matter the subject, every pictured canvas gyrates with her idiosyncratic energy, with which one feels a burgeoning familiarity before ever having seen the paintings in person. And so the encounter with the real thing promised to be exciting. 

    “You paint like Alice Neel,” a friend of mine observed when, a year or so ago, he found my Instagram profile and scrolled through samples of my paintings. He made his remark just after the pandemic cast a curtain over the planet, greatly diminishing my chances of seeing one of her works up close. Since that initial instance a handful of others have made similar observations, and so it was with mounting interest that I scheduled my first post-pandemic trip to New York, and my pilgrimage back to the Met. On the appointed day, sketchbook and pencil in hand, I stood in a long queue of masked museumgoers snaking towards the exhibition, sketching the Rodin sculptures which lined the corridor as quickly as I could, with mixed results, before moving onward. 

    At long last the guards granted entry. Seeing the paintings themselves felt a bit like stumbling into a room full of Insta-influencers without the beautifying photo filters or other prettifying maneuvers. I tried very hard to like what I saw, not least because I had spent all that time turning those pages and speculating about the artist with whom I was supposed to have an affinity, but it was no use. I had anticipated thick planes of paint layered deliciously against each other, the way they are in, say, a Leland Bell self-portrait; or delectable Theibaud-like spreads, cakes of radiant palette-knifed colors, satisfyingly overlapping and cutting off one another. Instead, Neel’s portraits felt flat, unexpectedly wan, almost deflated. Hungrily I moved from painting to painting, sketchbook opened to an expectant blank page, searching for something nourishing to copy, some morsel to fold up in paper and take home. But she defeated me. I could find nothing worth lingering over, nothing from which to learn. I shuffled dutifully from one simplistic composition to another, growing irritated by the consistently clumsy perspective, the ghoulish body proportions, the increasingly predictable color choices, the amateurish lines, the unpersuasive fingers, arms, and legs: the startling lack of technical skill. 

    Neel’s mythologized energy was there alright, everywhere, in every face, and even in her buildings and trees. In Aliceland every creature looks like Alice, which is to say, each one was a caricature, and sometimes almost a grotesque, thinned and twisted in a denatured space, their bodies and faces siphoned through her pumping, righteous spirit. Here was Adrienne Rich, from 1973, which looks more like a cartoon than the work of a gifted portraitist. Here was Dominican Boys on 108th Street, from 1955, in which the two bodies are simultaneously swollen and compressed. The best that can be said of this painting is that it looks like outsider art. Did Neel not know how to draw a body? Was this screaming inadequacy a statement of some sort — was it irony, or authenticity, or primitivism? And did no one else notice? Had everyone —museumgoers, curators, critics — conspired to pretend that they could not see what was in front of them? There was nothing brilliant or stimulating or moving about Neel’s interpretative freedoms or her way with a brush. Work after work was shallow, underwhelming, visually vulgar, fully captured in a glance. To paraphrase C.K. Dexter Haven, to hardly know a Neel painting is to know it well. 

    Perhaps I was missing something. After all, there is a consensus. I moved from one room to the next, chewing on nutritionless paintings like popcorn, searching for evidence that would justify the received view. Then I arrived at a place in the show in which the curators had done a very cruel thing to Alice Neel. There was a wall of works done by artists whom they claimed had influenced her. Like visitations from another world, there hung a van Gogh and a Cassatt, and most explosively there was a Soutine — a still life of a rayfish with its belly sliced open, bloody entrails spilling out onto a white tablecloth. Here was something to linger over, and long. Poor Neel didn’t stand a chance. 

    This was a globby and disturbing feast of brushed, carved, and splattered paint. Soutine also has his own eccentric energy, his own refusal to be inhibited by perceptual or painterly decorum, his own contempt for the canons, but there is nothing simplistic about him. I stopped and stared, and continued to stare. I marveled at the glimmers of blue inside the fish’s guts and on the tablecloth. I was smitten by the exquisitely subtle green line on the inside of the pitcher’s handle. How had he known to put that there? Had he used a knife to carve those grooves inside the fish’s fleshy underbelly, as if he were cleaning the fish itself? Imagine the motion he must have made with his hand to create those lines. And that enflaming flash of red running from the bottle towards the blood! How had I not noticed that at once?

    The answer is that this is not a picture that reveals itself at once. There is so much happening in this painting, so many whirlpools and eruptions, so many unexpected details in which representation and abstraction pool into each other — and yet the composition is somehow stable and balanced. How had he designed this chaos so that it hummed? Did he plot it all first, or was he gripped by some kind of exalted frenzy — did it spill out of him like the guts onto the cloth in paroxysms of paint and power, in the end creating a unity that he could not have explained? I recalled an apocryphal story of a film crew recording Matisse while he painted his mural on the wall of a chapel in the south of France. After he watched the film, he angrily accused the crew of perpetrating a deception: “You made it look like I knew what I was doing!” I smiled gratefully at the Soutine. Hardly any of the other viewers were drawn to this corner of the show, so I could stay as long as I liked. When I was satiated, and also drained, I left the exhibit, just glancing at the rest of Neel’s works on my way out. Soutine’s roiling, indigestible table had exposed her thin digestibility. 

    On my way out I paid my respects to the Courbets and the Corots that live in the tiny galleries off the main artery of that wing. This, I thought, is what the Met is for. (And their modern equals, too.) It is now the largest art museum in the United States, with a permanent collection of over two million works, and it is among the most powerful art centers on the planet. The might and the money that it has accrued since its founding in the nineteenth century are reflective of the importance that American culture and society once imputed to art — art, not politics, or fashion, or even social justice. What was an Alice Neel retrospective doing under this roof? 

    “If I ever write a biography,” Alice Neel used to say (she meant autobiography), “I’m going to call it I Am the Century. I’m four weeks younger than the century.” She was born on January 28, 1900. Neel’s faith in her own strengths seems to have been first fed by her contempt for Colwyn, Pennsylvania, where she was raised. Life in a dull town can have that effect on a restless soul. Her marrow-deep commitment to her own artistic drive began in Colwyn, which she left in 1921 to attend the Philadelphia School of Design for Women (now Moore College of Art). Neel’s lifelong commitment to communism — she was the only living American artist to have a show in the Soviet Union, which she financed herself in 1981 — was inchoate in college, where she was acutely aware of what her political heirs would call her privilege. She said of that time, 

    I worked so hard because I had a conscience about going to art school. Not for my own family, but for all the poor in the world. Because when I’d go into the school, the scrubwomen would be coming back from scrubbing the floors all night. It killed me that these old gray-headed women had to scrub floors, and I was going in there to draw Greek statues. 

    Some have maintained that her political orientation was developed in Havana, where she lived briefly with her husband, Carlos Enriquez de Gomez, whom she married in 1926, but really the stirrings started while still in Philadelphia. (She and her husband soon separated, though they never divorced, and she had many other lovers, and children with other men in addition to the two she had with him.) 

    Neel joined the Communist Party in 1935. Her commitment to the CP was total and unreconstructed: decades later she admired Fidel Castro, and did sketches and etchings of Che Guevera. Her poster of Lenin still hangs in the kitchen of her Upper West Side apartment now maintained by her family. Throughout her life she contributed writings and illustrations to Communist publications such as the Daily Worker and Masses & Mainstream. It must be remembered that in those years the CPUSA was the strongest force advocating for African Americans and women in the country. (The year Neel became a member was the same year that the CP founded the National Negro Congress, headed by the socialist and civil rights activist A. Philip Randolph.) In his book Artists on the Left, Andrew Hemingway claims that Neel was “representative of that type of woman artist and intellectual who gravitated to the CP because — whatever its limitations — it offered the most sustained critique available of class, racial and sexual inequality.” At that time, and certainly in her milieu, the Party was the popular social movement, so it is not surprising that she joined. It was her continued, unmodified commitment to Communism that was out of the ordinary: “She remained absolutely a kind of stalwart in her public support of Communism in the USSR,” Hemingway writes. 

    Neel was a profoundly political painter. Her work’s reputation has been buoyed by three cycles of leftist politics: Marxism (1935-1960); second-wave feminism (1970-1984); and contemporary progressivism (2010-2021). For the first three decades of her career, Neel was part of the Social Realist movement, which emerged after the Great Depression and was funded largely by the WPA. At its height the WPA employed over five thousand artists — “everyone was on it,” Neel used to say, “Pollock, Rothko, everybody.” In her book Art and Politics in the 1930s: Americanism, Marxism & Modernism, the historian and critic Susan Noyes Platt argues that artistic movements that emerged in the 1930s can only be understood through a political lens: “Characterizing the thirties in terms of individual artists and styles, the traditional methodology of art history, eliminates the ideological forces and political arguments that shaped the art. This fact is most obvious in the case of Social Realism. Speaking of a Social Realist ‘style’ separates the production of the artwork from its complicated position within the Popular Front, the Communist Party and the New Deal.” 

    Social Realist artists such as Neel, Charles White, Ben Shahn, the brothers Raphael and Moses Soyer (with whom Neel was friendly and whom she painted in 1973), Isabel Bishop, and Reginald Marsh painted works that championed the working class. In this early period especially, Neel was particularly emblematic of this style. The historian Gerald Meyer observed that she “represented an exemplar par excellence of the Party’s hopes for a socially conscious contemporary artist. Her paintings were accessible art, which depicted ordinary people of all races and ethnic backgrounds in ways that captured and dignified their actual state of being.” While living in Spanish Harlem, Neel was moved to capture life as a member of the working class in New York in the aftermath of the Great Depression. 

    Communism was the political movement that influenced Neel’s artistic choices, but feminism is the one with which others have most consistently associated her since the 1970s. When Neel was given a retrospective at the Whitney in 1973, one critic aptly noted that “it is no accident that Alice Neel is finally coming into her own at this point in time, when it is fashionable to ‘discover’ neglected women artists.” Though the upward shift in Neel’s career began in 1960, when Frank O’Hara agreed to sit for her, it was not until the 1970s, a decade into second-wave feminism, that she achieved celebrity. Then as now, feminists kindled to her supreme confidence, to her unabashed faith in her own merit. Neel was a woman who believed that she deserved to be lionized. She regularly called herself a genius and referred to her work as revolutionary. Of Nazis Murder Jews, which she painted in 1936, her biographer Phoebe Hoban quotes her as saying that “if more people had paid attention to that painting earlier, fewer Jews would have been killed.” (The painting depicts a demonstration against Nazism, in which a man in the foreground holds a sign that reads “Nazis Murder Jews,” and in the background a mass of protestors hold signs emblazoned with the hammer and sickle. This was clearly a Communist event, and apparently neither Neel nor the radicals whom she depicted cared that Soviets also murdered Jews.) Such megalomania is never attractive, but in a woman in Neel’s lifetime it seems to have been mesmerizing. 

    In an interview about Alice Neel in 2008, Linda Nochlin (whom Neel painted in Linda Nochlin and Daisy in 1973) argued that Neel’s ego is a constant topic of discussion only because she was a woman: “When a male artist does that you think oh Picasso, why shouldn’t he have that, he’s a genius but of course when a woman artist does that they become a prima donna or an egomaniac, but she was acting like, you know, artists have often acted.” There is no gainsaying, of course, the egotism of male artists. But Nochlin’s defense of Neel misses the point. It is certainly true, as she herself established in 1971 in her epochal essay “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?,” that centuries of social norms and structural conditions made it much harder for women to aspire towards greatness in the arts, and it was not until very recently that women were allowed to study in art schools at all, and in the manner that men did — and so it was impossible for any woman to establish herself in that world without a “good strong streak of rebellion” and “total inner confidence.” Neel had both, and her causes — racial justice and gender justice — were good causes. What she did not have was the talent to warrant her wild confidence in her own historical importance. (Picasso did.) 

    I do not mean to argue against the self-confidence of women, obviously. A rebellious woman is usually an admirable woman. I mean only to suggest that there is no correlation between rebellion and talent; and also that being on the right side of a social struggle has no bearing upon the aesthetic status of a work of art. Alice Neel’s idea of her own significance is devastatingly refuted by what hangs on the museum’s walls. 

    Neel’s belief in her own powers is relevant to a consideration of her art because it fueled her work. Understanding this element of Neel’s legend is central to understanding her stardom now. Despite several decades with little professional success, in which practically her only supporters were fellow radicals, Neel stayed at it; and when she finally made it, she did not sell only her work, but also her legend. In truth she had to rely upon her story, because she was a woman, and because her work could not stand on its own. By the end of her career, she regularly gave interviews and slideshow presentations of her paintings that were spiced liberally with risqué stories of her past and acidic smackdowns of fellow artists. (“Am I being vicious? Well, maybe just a little vicious.”) Her myth was charming; she was a hit. 

    But then there is the underwhelming work itself. Gallery-goers and critics alike persist in describing her artistic prowess almost as if they are describing some other artist’s work. Her paintings are regularly characterized as mercilessly and richly realistic, as if the viewer is staring at a Neel but seeing a Freud. Throughout her biography Hoban quotes uncomplimentary reviews of Neel’s work as if they are glowing. Of her Whitney retrospective, the reviewer in ARTnews reported that 

    Neel’s style… fall[s] somewhere between van Gogh and Mad magazine. Her colors, gangrenous greens and blues, have the lurid off-key quality of early color television. Offensive to the sensibilities as Neel’s painting can be, they have an ungainly, engaging counter-charm. They can be understood as a major contribution to the high caricature tradition of Daumier that relatively few fine artists have explored. 

    In a characteristically baffling evasion, Hoban writes that this review “with a few humorous disclaimers, highly praised the work,” as if the wicked impiety of Daumier was the ideal to which Neel’s pious paintings aspired. Of other reviews of the same show, Hoban remarks that one critic compared Neel “to Miss Jean Brodie in her prime,” as if such a comparison were a compliment. She continues: “The reviews of the show were more or less glowing. Neel snagged a brief write up in The New York Times, which said, ‘Alice Neels portraits… strike somewhere between benevolent caricature and expressionism as a vehicle for personal release.’” Again, as if this were a good thing. 

    Some other details of Neel’s reception are harder to spin. The retrospective at the Whitney was curated by Elke Solomon, then curator of Prints and Drawings, rather than Marcia Tucker, then curator of Paintings and Sculpture. This seemed to suggest that Tucker did not consider Neel worth featuring. Solomon herself later said that she did not think Neel was an important painter, but that she was given a retrospective because “she was a woman painter who represented a kind of paradigm of someone who persisted in making paintings that represented a certain ideological position.” Bingo! We are getting to the heart of the matter. 

    The survival of the legend of Alice Neel, and its contemporary flourishing, is not owed to her art. It is owed to her politics, and to the politics of our reputation makers. Neel is a progressive saint, and her portraits are icons of the progressive faith. The curators at the Met intuited correctly that Neel’s paintings of black and brown bodies are of a piece with today’s social justice movement. The Neel show, their veneration of her paintings, may be seen as their contribution to the movement. 

    If the curators at the Met disagree with such a conclusion, if in fact they do consider Neel a great artist, they are not notably interested in saying so, or in discussing this dimension of her legacy. In the entirety of the catalog for Alice Neel: People Come First, which includes six essays, only the last essay has more than two paragraphs of description about her artistic choices. All the others consider Neel primarily in a social and political context. Even that final installment, which is about Neel’s relationship with abstraction, is laden with politically charged descriptors like “masculinist formalism” and “feminist innovations,” as if an exploration of something so high-minded as figurative versus abstract art must be justified by the political implications of the analysis. 

    Pardon my naivete, but I thought that the essay called “Painting Fruit” in the catalog would be about Neel’s still life paintings. Silly me. It is a portrait of Neel as ally of the LBTQ community. Fruit is euphemistic, you see: “a veritable orgy of phallic bananas overfills a bowl in the foreground [of one painting].” (I was under the impression that the association of homosexuals with fruit has long been regarded as a slur. Maybe only progressives are allowed to use it.) The catalog of the Neel show is quite startling for the paucity of its discussion of her artistic impact, her artistic technique, and her artistic development. Like the show, it is really just an admiring study of her politics. 

    On June 5, 2020, Kelly Baum, who curated the Alice Neel retrospective at the Met, was doing what many thoughtful Americans were doing in the summer that George Floyd was murdered: looking to history for guidance through the paroxysms of horror and hope that were buffeting us all. On her private Instagram account Baum posted several photographs of Neel portraits, accompanied by the following text: 

    The anti-racist movement needs feminists as allies and god knows white feminists have not always been good allies often the opposite, in fact. I’m…. recalling the activists/socialists/feminists that Alice Neel painted (Mercedes Arroyo, Alice Childress, Irene Pelikis, Faith Ringold) who took an expansive view of liberation, one that triangulated class, race and gender. I wish Neel had painted bell hooks and Angela Davis too — the timing would have been right but the place wasn’t. 

    Baum was not speaking here as a curator. She was merely offering some thoughts to her few hundred followers, who might have been struggling with the same questions as she was. If she wishes to swoon over Angela Davis, it is her right. In the exhibition catalog for the show, however, Baum was not writing as private citizen, but with the authority of the Cynthia Hazen Polsky and Leon Polsky Curator of Contemporary Art at The Metropolitan Museum of Art. In “Anarchic Humanism,” the first essay in the catalog, she and her fellow curator Randall Griffey offer a description of their project: “Besides foregrounding her often under-recognized artistic accomplishments [which they do not go on to describe], this publication positions [Neel] as an artist who engaged with progressive politics throughout her lifetime and attends to her place in the larger cultural history of the twentieth century.” Is this what curators are now trained to do? 

    Evaluating art based on its politics supports both bad art and bad history. The few lame attempts made in the catalog to establish Neel’s importance in the history of art are flecked with dubious and occasionally outright false claims. For example, consider the bizarre statement made by Baum and Griffey on page 22: “In West Harlem Neel also launched one of her most groundbreaking bodies of work: pregnant nudes. This subject is rare in the history of Western Art but Neel’s blunt, forthright manner of representing the distended bellies of expectant mothers is simply without precedent.” This claim is preposterous, as anyone who has flipped to the few pages of colored photographs in Hoban’s biography (which is the least the curators of the retrospective should have done) would know. There, on page 267, Neel’s painting Margaret Evans Pregnant (1978) is reproduced alongside Egon Schiele’s Red Nude, Pregnant (1910). (In the description beneath Neel’s painting, Hoban has helpfully written that “it closely resembles Egon Schiele’s painting Red Nude, Pregnant.”) There are indeed paintings of nude women with distended pregnant bellies that predate Neel’s picture; a cursory search yields examples from Hendrick Goltzius (1599) to Otto Dix (1932). 

    Of Andy Warhol’s work, Neel once remarked that “it may not be an important contribution to art, but it shows great powers of adjustment.” If what Neel meant by “great powers of adjustment” is that Warhol’s success was evidence of a cultural shift, and that he magisterially worked the shift, and possessed a canny sense of his time and his place, the same could have been said of Neel towards the end of her life. It is certainly true that her curators show great powers of adjustment. Their resuscitation of Neel now is evidence of the persistence of the political temperament that she pioneered. It may not be an important contribution to art, but it confirms the triumph of politics in American cultural institutions. 

    A curator ought to be able to answer the question “What makes an artist great?” We should not expect the staffs of our museums to know what makes a political activist a great political activist, or what makes a feminist a great feminist. Nor should we come to them for such judgments, which are nothing more than their opinions. If they admire Neel’s feminism, good for them — as it happens, so do I; but they are not experts in what is right or wrong. The fact that Neel was willing to advocate proudly for herself and to defy the constraints imposed upon her gender tells us nothing about the quality of her art. (Neel herself said that there is no such thing as a feminist way of painting, and that there is no difference between the way a woman paints and the way a man does.) And what would these engagé curators do about artists whose politics they do not share? What about the monarchist masters, and the fascist masters? The walls of our museums are full of fine pictures made by people with politics that liberals and progressives consider reprehensible. 

    “Bad” politics can generate good art. “Good” politics can generate bad art. Will we ever know this again?