I.
Every quixotic idea has its origins in books of chivalry. Mine began in reading about English political history in the eighteenth century. From Macaulay and Namier, I learned how the Whig Party governed England for seventy years on the basis of a parliamentary majority secured through a corrupt system and fraudulent elections. This strange situation was most memorably portrayed by Hogarth, with his scathing paintings and engravings of rotten boroughs where even the dead were allowed a vote. But then a set of sudden reforms, allied with the emergence of a free press, ushered in genuine competition between parties. The story ended well.
Reading this in Mexico, reflecting on this saga of political progress, an obvious thought immediately occurred to me: if this happened in England two centuries ago, why not in Mexico now? The result was an essay called “For a Democracy Without Adjectives,” which I published in 1984 in Vuelta, an extraordinary journal founded in 1976 by Octavio Paz, where I worked as deputy editor. In left-wing circles, it was common to degrade democracy by adding adjectives such as “bourgeois” and “formal.” What we needed, in my view, was democracy, period. Without adjectives, without condescension, without the fantasy that there is something better.
No sooner had my essay appeared than the government instructed its hired writers to attack my proposal as both senseless and dangerous. The journalistic, academic, and political Left, still wedded to the paradigm of the socialist revolution, came out against me as well, trotting out the old Marxist cliches about the falsity and inadequacy of democracy. The National Action Party (PAN), which since 1939 had gradually sought to construct a citizenry that recognized the worth of free elections, was at that time a center-right presence in Mexican politics, but it was weak. Nobody, or almost nobody, saw that the democratic liberal alterna-tive proposed in 1910 by Francisco I. Madero to counteract the dictator Porfirio Díaz was the right and proper way out for Mexico. Madero led the first and very brief phase of the Mexican Revolution. In 1911, he was elected president in fair and free elections. He presided over a purely democratic regime for fifteen months and was overthrown and murdered in a coup backed by the American ambassador. This started the violent phase of the revolution that lasted until 1920 and left one million people dead, after which Mexico abandoned Madero’s democratic ideal. The PRI was founded in 1929 and held total power until the end of the century.
Liberal democracy, I argued, was also a solution for Latin America more generally, as it seemed to be indicated by the rejection of military governments in the 1980s in Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay. These countries, each by degrees and all by the holding of elections, were moving in that direction. But liberal democracy was still not viewed positively by the region as a whole, with the notable exceptions of Venezuela and Costa Rica. In fact, in Colombia and Peru, as well as in Central America, the most viable means to power was still the one mapped out by the Cuban revolution, whose prestige remained intact in Latin American universities and among Latin American intellectuals.
The Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, for example. In 1984, Vuelta published Gabriel Zaid’s “Nicaragua: The Enigma of the Elections,” in which Zaid declared that the Sandinistas had the perfect card to play in order to discredit American “aggression”: they could simply call elections, from which one of their number would undoubtedly emerge triumphant. They used liberal means for illiberal — more precisely, dictato-rial — ends. This anti-Sandinista heresy cost Zaid dear: in Mexico, and across Latin America, the left vilified him as an ally of Reagan. That same year, on being awarded the Frankfurt International Book Fair Prize, Octavio Paz called for exactly the same thing: democracy in Nicaragua. The response to his challenge was a symbolic lynching: outside his home on Paseo de la Reforma in Mexico City, protestors burned posters bearing the image of his face.
The next year, the front cover of Vuelta’s April issue was devoted to an essay by Octavio Paz called “PRI: Time’s Up.” Paz bravely argued that the PRI must open the way for profound political reform. The PRI was an ingenious kind of dictator ship, but a dictatorship nonetheless. Elections were organized by the Interior Ministry, and the PRI won every legislative and executive position all over the country. This closed political structure, which had been in operation for six decades, struck Paz as unsustainable and wrong. And indeed it was. The power wielded by the president was not only excessive, it bordered on the imperial: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the Supreme Court of Justice, the governors and legislatures of all thirty-two states, answered directly to him. The so-called “Mexican Republic,” which on paper, in the Constitution, was “representative, democratic, and federal,” in practice verged on an absolute monarchy, a monarchy of a party, with the outgoing president choosing his successor at six-year intervals. The single lever of power in Mexico was the PRI, the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution, which properly speaking was not a party at all, but rather a machine geared for the winning of elections, as well as an efficient social mobility agency and patronage network in the way that it doled out public money and public positions. And there was yet another undemocratic feature to this alleged democracy: freedom of expression was limited to a few newspapers. (It was little more than a whimper on radio and it was non-existent on television.)
The history of dissent is often best documented in journals, and so Vuelta again: in that same issue in April 1985, Zaid had a piece called “Scenarios For The End of The PRI,” among which he included a major earthquake — an actual earthquake, he was not speaking metaphorically — that would lead to the total discrediting of the political system. He was prophetic: the earthquake came to pass in September of that year, a terrible natural catastrophe. The incompetence of the government’s response exposed its failings to all, and many Mexicans in central and northern Mexico began to believe that democracy might be a possibility. Various other factors added to this new awareness, among them the PRI’s disastrous handling of Mexico’s oil revenues, which in 1982 led the country to default on its sovereign debt.
As the evidence of the PRI’s damage continued to mount, the left began to react to this demand for change by non-revolutionary means. Two years after I made my proposal for a democracy without adjectives, the distinguished Trotskyite historian Adolfo Gilly published an essay admitting that the idea might be worth taking seriously. The title of his piece was “A Modest Utopia.” It was a sign of the times. With the involvement of parties on the left and the right, of unions, students, the teaching class, intellectuals, journalists, businesspeople, and broad, plural movements all throughout civil society, Mexico was beginning its move to democracy. Significantly, electoral fraud started to be seen as a national embarrassment. In 1988, one such fraud snatched victory from the hands of the presidential candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who could at that point have put out a call for a revolution but instead opted for the historic decision of creating the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), which for the first time in Mexico’s history unified every leftist grouping. Elections took place again in 1994 and 2000, the latter organized and overseen by the Federal Electoral Institute, an independent body. Ernesto Zedillo, the twentieth century’s last PRI president, behaved in an exemplary fashion and facilitated an orderly and peaceful transition.
Finally, at the turn of the century, the seemingly impossible happened: Mexico, the country of the Aztec tlatoani, of the Spanish viceroys, of the caudillos, of the imperial presidents, put an end to seven decades of PRI rule and elected Vicente Fox, a PAN candidate. A pluralistic Congress was also elected, with the three main parties represented. Perhaps for the first time since a distant experiment in the 1800s, there was full autonomy for the Supreme Court of Justice. Government at the state level enjoyed hitherto unknown independence. There was unfettered freedom of expression in the written press, and on radio and television too. “Democracy without adjectives” no longer seemed so quixotic.
II.
“Stick to my theory and you won’t go wrong,” my beloved teacher, the historian Richard M. Morse, once said to me. Over the course of a twenty-year friendship, he never took issue with my essays on behalf of liberal democracy in Mexico, nor with my critical history of paternalist and personalist rule in Mexico from 1810 to 1996. But Morse did not agree with my premises. His entire body of work on Ibero-America — as he preferred to call Latin America — emphasized the unlikelihood, the impossibility even, of liberal democracy ever fully taking root in these countries. And the strangest part about his theory was his insistence that the inappropriateness of liberal democracy to the region was not a reason for complaint. Who was this American historian who was disqualifying us from the moral and political order to which so many of us aspired, from the greatest political arrangements ever devised?
Though he was a distinguished and admired teacher at places such as Yale, Stanford and the Wilson Center in Washington (where he was director of the Latin American Center), Morse was not an ordinary academic, but rather a thinker in the mold of Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset, with a passion for Ibero-American culture. Born in New Jersey in 1922, he was the scion of one of New England’s oldest families, for generations deeply involved in commerce with Asia. One of his forebears was the inventor of the famous code. Morse began his academic career at Princeton, where he was a disciple of the critics Allen Tate and R. P. Blackmur. There he edited The Nassau Literary Review, in whose pages he published reports, stories, and a play inspired by a series of trips in the early 1940s to Cuba, Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. In Chile he met the Minister of Health, a young socialist who argued that the United States owed a historical debt to the South American countries. His name was Salvador Allende. In Mexico he interviewed Pablo Neruda (who was the Chilean ambassador) and the philosopher José Vasconcelos. Morse enlisted in the Army in 1943, seeing action in the Pacific, and on his return enrolled at Columbia University, where he studied under Américo Castro, the great historian of Spain’s blended Arabic, Christian, and Jewish past. From him Morse learned the rich possibilities of the comparative cultural method.
Perhaps his most significant mentor was Frank Tannenbaum. An anarchist in his younger days, Tannenbaum developed a peculiar sensibility trained on exposing the darker aspects of life in the United States. He wrote books on inhumane prison conditions, on slavery’s cultural legacy, on racism in the South, on social inequality. And this sensibility also put him in sympathy with the Mexican Revolution. Between 1929 and 1951, Tannenbaum wrote three important books on Mexico and several more on Latin America. From him Morse learned that Ibero-America is not a crooked branch on the Western trunk but a civilization in its own right, with values — such as the peaceful coexistence and free mixture of races and cultures — from which the United States had a great deal to learn.
On his travels through the continent, Morse had picked up on a feature of Latin American society that moved him deeply: “Not that Latin America was a racial paradise, but at least the differences in color did not eclipse the human presence.” This social blessing became personal when he met the woman who would turn out to be his interpreter of Latin American life. Her name was Emerante de Pradines. Born in 1918, a great-grand-daughter of the founder of Haiti, the daughter of a celebrated musician, and in her own right a classical dancer and a student of Martha Graham, Emy met Richard in New York, where, in 1954, they were married. This inter-racial union cost them socially, professionally, and within their own families. In a time of acute racial discrimination in the United States, the couple set up in Puerto Rico, where Dick (as he was known to us) took a teaching post at the university. They lived there between 1958 and 1961, and had two children. Emy was beautiful — she would often wear a headpiece with flowers in it, which can be seen on the cover of the LP Voodoo, her recording of Haitian songs. Enveloped in this magical sensibility, Morse returned from Ibero-America bewitched. His intellectual interest in “the other America” had become an existential choice. Hence his determination to get to the bottom of the “historical nature” of the two Americas, and to display to the world (and to himself) the riches of the path that he had chosen.
I understood none of this when I met him in 1981. One day, as I was going through proofs of Vuelta, I got a call from Morse asking me to join him for breakfast. I gladly agreed. Some years earlier I had read his essay “The Inheritance of New Spain” in Plural, which was the predecessor of Vuelta. In it Morse for the first time compared the Weberian idea of political patrimonialism with the Thomist Spanish state that for three centuries had ruled Spain’s overseas territories without its legitimacy ever being disputed. This was a novel and significant idea, which Octavio Paz went on to assimilate in his numerous essays on Mexican history. Paz was persuaded by Morse’s view of the persistence of that order (“Thomist” in Morse’s terms, “patrimonialist” according to Weber) in the Mexican regime in the run-up to the revolution. The quasi-monarchical PRI also functioned in effect as the heir of that old conception, in a body politic that was presided over by the presidential head — a Hispanic, corporatist, durable, and inclusive edifice in which there was room for all the supposedly antagonistic classes. Not a democracy, but not a tyranny either. What a surprise: the key to the political history of Mexico was to be found in Thomas Aquinas! How could I not want to meet the man who came up with such a notion?
We went for coffee in Mexico City and talked for hours. I asked him where the idea of Thomism as a founding philosophy in Ibero-America had originated. “It’s a long story,” he said, “and I’m pulling it together in the book I’m about to finish.” This book was Prospero’s Mirror, a comparative study of the cultures of North and South America, for which he considered it necessary to go back to their shared historical basis, all the way to the medieval past. Only in this way, Morse believed, could the fundamental differences be grasped: the imperatives of the political unification of an island in the case of England, the imperatives of the incorporation of the new American world in the case of Spain. And then, without further ado, he embarked on a detailed narration of the “preparatory role” played by Peter Abelard, the twelfth-century scholastic, in the modern philosophical tradition. From that point onward, Morse claimed, by way of the embryonically experimental, tolerant, pluralist work of William of Ockham, a trajectory emerged that was to lead to the great scientific, philosophical, and religious revolutions of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, culminating in two distinct “historical paths.”
In the anglophone world, which was enthusiastic in its embrace of those revolutions, the path led to Hobbes and Locke, the founding fathers of English political culture in the seventeenth century. But a century earlier, Iberian thought had inaugurated another path when it adopted Thomas Aquinas as an authority. With the “architectural feat” (as Morse called it) of the Summa Theologica as their starting point, three generations of Spanish philosophers, jurists, and theologians had constructed the “cultural premises” of the Hispanic sphere: the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546), his followers Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) and Melchor Cano (1509-1560), both also Dominicans, and the Jesuits Juan de Mariana (1536-1624) and Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). “They had the ascendancy,” Morse told me, and then came another surprise: “but they had a formidable adversary, who was not an Englishman but an Italian.” He was referring to Machiavelli. Needless to say, I came away dazzled by all this.
These ideas were first published in Morse’s famous essay “A Theory of Spanish Government,” which appeared in 1954. It brought to the table the “Machiavellian” elements of late fifteenth- and early-sixteenth century Spanish rule. Ferdinand II of Aragon himself seemed to embody the prince imagined by Machiavelli (who in fact saw him as such, in The Prince as well the Discourses on Livy). Isabella I of Castile, by contrast, represented the “Thomist” vision of absolute monarchy. This dichotomy between Renaissance and medieval ideals had long ago been “a gut feeling,” Morse wrote, but over the years he discovered that his intuition had ample foundation in Spanish intellectual history of that era. Although in Spain the tension had been resolved in favor of Thomism, Morse maintained that the Machiavellian element — present, to a different degree, in the conquistadors Cortés and Pizarro — was to persist in a latent or “recessive” state for almost three centuries.
It emerged again, it exploded, in the form of the Ibero-American caudillos who arose out of the wars of independence in the nineteenth century. At the close of the eighteenth century, Spanish America, “hierarchical, multiform, pre-capitalist, was poorly prepared for enlightened absolutism, and far less for any sort of Lockean constitutionalism.” But a direction was open that would have been unthink-able three hundred years earlier: nothing less than the fusion of the two prototypes, the Thomist state and the Machiavellian caudillismo, leading to new varieties of legitimate rule. This was the final and most unexpected theme in Morse’s electrifying essay. Ten years later, in the essay “The Heritage of Latin America,” Morse charted this correlation between Thomist and Machiavellian ideas against the Weberian categories of patrimonial and charismatic rule.
Prospero’s Mirror has never been published in English, but a year after our fateful meeting it was published in Spanish. Owing to that book, which I have read countless times, our friendship began. I had discovered Morse’s code.
He began the section that he called “The Iberian Path” — the course taken in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries — with a quotation from The Tragic Sense of Life by Miguel de Unamuno:
I feel that I have within me a medieval soul, and I believe that the soul of my country is medieval, that it has perforce passed through the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Revolution — learning from them, yes, but without allowing them to touch the soul.
Spain had indeed “passed through” those mutations, as well as the scientific revolutions of the Middle Ages, virtually untouched. And this resistance was not a question of religion alone. In this sense, the north-south religious axis — the great distinction between the Protestant north and the Catholic south — was neither unique nor essential. After all, Italy and France, both Catholic, had adopted the scientific and philosophical precursors to modernity.
The persistence of Spain’s “medieval soul” was owed to a variety of causes: the relative weakness of the feudal lords (versus the autonomy of their counterparts in England, France, and Italy); the power of the ancient Spanish cities at their peak; the growing power of the Castilian crown in the face of liberal Aragon; the centuries-long centralizing efforts of the Reconquista, the culmination of which coincided with the discovery of America. Combined with the early-sixteenth-century challenge of Lutheranism, which unified the Iberian Peninsula against it, the revelation of the New World turned out to be decisive. The imperative of integrating a Christian legal system into the indigenous societies was the determining cause in the Spanish taking up Thomism again. It was a philosophy particularly apt to the task. “The Spanish turn to Thomism,” Morse observed, “is explained… by the need to reconcile the rationale of a modern state with the assertions of an ecumenical world order […] and to adapt the requirements of Christian life to the task of making non-Christian peoples a part of European civilization.”
This titanic task — inaugurated a full century before England’s first colonial ventures — would go a long way to explaining the concentration of Spanish intellectual efforts on theological, philosophical, juridical, and moral speculation from the sixteenth century onwards. Almost across the board, mathematics and natural sciences were overlooked. Nor were the Spanish universities centers of independent thought: they were institutions isolated from the outside world and designed to produce servants of the state.
Morse did not claim that the Thomist revival in Spain was the whole story; Prospero’s Mirror alludes also to Spanish humanism of the sixteenth century. But this atmosphere of relative pluralism and openness, which was characteristic of the reign of Carlos V, finally came down on the side of a “Thomist” consensus on “the nature of government: its sources of legitimacy, the proper reach of its power, its responsibility in guaranteeing justice and fairness, and its ‘civilizing’ mission with regards non-Christian people in its domain and overseas.” In short, it was the discovery, settlement, and conversion of Latin America that led to the Thomist turn in Spanish imperial policy. The ideas did not impose themselves on reality; the reality imposed itself on the ideas.
The accession of Philip II (1556-1598) definitively set the course against all “the heretics of our time”: humanists, Erasmians, followers of Luther, readers of Machiavelli. It was during Phillip’s reign, in Morse’s view, that the structure of imperial Spain assumed the form that would (in essence) prevail until 1810. This Thomist mold would have a bearing on all spheres of life: political, religious, juridical, economic, social, academic, intellectual. And nothing could have been further from the Thomist interpretation of power and its ecumenical Christian vocation than the ideas expounded in The Prince: the state as the art (artifice, occupation, practice; not moral theory) of governing. These were irreconcilable visions, and the conflict between them reached beyond the borders of Spain. Though Aquinas’ philosophy represented a new solution for the unprecedented circumstance of having discovered America, for various thinkers he was emblematic of the old way: thoroughly Christian, oriented towards the common good, inspired by faith as much as by reason, following the dictates of natural law inscribed by God in man’s conscience. Machiavelli, by contrast, represented the modern way: removed from religious inspiration, pessimistic (or realistic) when it came to the goodness of man, oriented to the exercise of power and the establishment of stable states inspired by the patriotic, republican ideals of the classical world, and all of this in line with the dictates of reason.
In Morse’s account, it was not Machiavelli’s “absolutism” that made his Spanish critics uncomfortable (this was anyway shared by the Spanish state), but the threat of tyranny in a political order in which divine providence had been expelled from the workings of history. In 1559, three years into Phillip’s reign, and after an intense debate, Machiavel-li’s masterpiece was added to the list of banned books. Morse contended that the neo-scholastics succeeded in preventing the influx of Machiavellianism into Spain between the sixteenth century and the dawn of the nineteenth century. The theologian who elaborated the legal, religious, and moral foundations of the relations with the non-Christian peoples and territories of Latin America was Francisco de Vitoria. But the thinker who was responsible for what Morse called “the Spanish political choice,” that is, the philosophical foundation of the Spanish state as a legitimate structure of rule, was Francisco Suarez.
Suárez, who was born in Spain in 1548 and died in Portugal in 1617, was the author of thirty works on metaphysics, theology, law, and politics. In his system, mankind comes to the political by way of morality, metaphysics, and religion. For him, “the state is an ordered entity in which the wills of the collective and of the prince harmonize according to natural law and the interest of the felicitas civitatis, or common good.” The Suárezist state had certain fundamental features which, with slight differences between the Hapsburg and Bourbon dynasties, were in effect throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Paternalism, for a start: in Suárez’s design, the state is an “organic architecture,” an “edifice built to last,” a “mystical body,” at the head of which stands a father who fully exercises the “dominant legal authority” over his subjects. This constitutes an “absolutism tempered by ethics, by Natural Law… and maintaining the common good as a goal.” This paternalistic and tutelary concept of power presupposes the predominance of immutable natural law over fallible human laws: “Society and the body politic are conceived as though they were ordered by the objectives and external precepts of natural law, not by the dictates of individual consciences.” Moreover, sovereignty passes ineluctably from the people to the monarch. For Suárez, the people are the original depositories of sovereignty (which originates in God), but there is an underlying political pact (pactum translationis) whereby the people not only delegates this sovereignty to the prince or monarch, but actually disposes of it. The monarchs are not mere “mandatories,” as in the English tradition or even that of the French Revolution, custodians of a freely revocable power. In the Thomist tradition, power is total, undivided, and difficult to revoke: “The people have the same obligations as the king to the pact made with him, and cannot claim back the ceded authority so long as the prince abides by the conditions of the pact and the norms of justice.”
Suarez was careful to provide for a popular right to insurrection and even to tyrannicide; but in order to reach such an extreme measure (which was never put into practice in the history of the Spanish monarchy, unlike in England and France) the tyrant and the injustice had to be “public and manifest,” and in no case could revenge be the motive for revolt. The execution of a monarch was the correction of the monarchy, not the abolition of it. And finally Suarez’s state was characterized by a corporatist centralization. Medieval customs had deep roots in this political edifice: society was organized in strata and associations that related to each other not directly but through the monarch, from whom emanated all public initiatives, prebends, concessions, and mercies of the kingdom, and whose figure was the underlying source of the social energy. This state was a profoundly medieval entity.
Those are the premises that propped up the political edifice of Spanish monarchy and Spanish statehood until 1810, when the wars of independence broke out in Latin America. The legacy of this political culture, according to Morse, would remain active for the following two decades, with one very surprising component: the resurrection of Machiavelli, whose work was not so much read as embodied by caudillos from Mexico to Patagonia.
III.
In the glorious year 1810, the disappearance of the paternalist monarch, who was sanctioned by tradition and faith, discredited the existing Spanish bureaucracy. At this hinge point in Latin-American history, the most urgent challenge was to identify a substitute authority that would enjoy the approval of the populace. Thus it was that the intellectual and political elites of Latin America, trapped between the impossibility of a return to the imperial Spanish order and the immediate reality of the strongmen produced by the movement for independence, sought to adopt liberal constitutionalism.
This dream — as Morse called it — did not last long. By the third decade of the nineteenth century, the region had left behind that first moment of republican idealism. Other such moments would come, but they would prove just as fragile and fleeting. No less than Simón Bolívar himself experienced this disenchantment with what he called “the republics of the air,” which he considered legalist and removed from the complex social and racial actualities of the nascent South America. Morse suggests that Bolivar, in his search for an alternative, discerned a solution that had a clear imperial and “Thomist” thrust:
Bolívar, South America’s most famous leader, was caught between the vision of an amphictyony or “league of neighbors” of the Hispano-American peoples and the clear awareness of the local, feudal oligarchies and the peasants tied to the land that could only give rise to purely phantasmal nations. It is reasonable to suppose that the term amphictyony, used by Bolívar and proper to the neoclassicism of the idea, deep down represented his instinct for Hispanic unity rooted in a heritage that had medieval overtones.
Bolivar called his vision Great Colombia. Morse speculated that “if Bolívar had not feared being like Napoleon, and had abandoned the George Washington model, perhaps the destiny of the Great Colombia would have been saved.”
In other words, had Bolivar embraced (with modern overtones, in a somewhat republican or, even better, monarchical form) the Thomist concept of the “built-to-last” corporatist order, Bolívar would have found the legitimating formula that was required to unify the new nations. This did not happen. The Congress of Panama organized by Bolívar in 1826 offered the first hint of an Ibero-American project, but that was as far as it went. Any attempt to regulate the region’s internal issues at a continental level was abandoned. Bolívar, as they say of futile endeavors, was ploughing the sea.
Beyond the world of ideas and plans, in the void of legitimacy left behind by the collapse of the Spanish edifice, the people followed the surviving captains of the wars of independence. They were akin to the Italian condottieri of the Renaissance era. Machiavelli’s mark was reborn in these men of daggers and pitchforks, these new conquistadors: the caudillos. “On almost every page of his Discourses and even in The Prince,” Morse explains, “Machiavelli’s advice could almost be based on the exploits of the caudillos.” It was hugely important, for example, in establishing the rule of charisma. “There is nothing more certain nor more necessary in the halting of an enraged crowd,” Machiavelli instructed in his Discourses, “than the presence of a man worthy of veneration and who projects this image.” Another requirement for personalist rule was an intimate knowledge of “the nature of the rivers and the lakes, [to be able to] measure the expanses of the lakes and the mountains, the land, the depths of the valleys,” which was prescribed in The Prince. These prescriptions were met to an astonishing degree in what we know from the memoirs of José Antonio Páez, both a companion to and an adversary of Bolívar, the “great lancer” of the Venezuelan plains. And, Morse continued, the same went for the likes of Facundo Quiroga in Argentina, José Gervasio Artigas in Uruguay, and Andrés de Santa Cruz in Bolivia.
The problem is that legitimacy based purely on charisma cannot hold. Machiavelli himself recognized the need for the prince to govern according to “laws that provide security for the people as a whole.” The prince’s command “cannot last if the administration of the kingdom lies with the men of one sole individual; it is advisable therefore that the government should in the end be the work of many and be upheld by many.” This transition from the leadership of a homegrown caudillo to a “republic” (nominal but at least stable) required that the government be established on the basis of certain “original principles.” Translated to Ibero-America, these ideas meant laying the foundations for a “paternalism oriented towards the public good.” Should this fail to be achieved, the social groupings — some of them predominantly indigenous — would go back to being as scattered as they always had been. With the Thomist foundation lost, and the threat of a pure but unsustainable leadership system under charismatic caudillos, Ibero- America’s early days were marked by attempts to avoid being engulfed by violence and anarchy, and to build relatively stable and legitimate governments.
The solution devised by the countries of Latin America was a compromise between Thomism and Machiavellianism, with an added veneer of Lockean constitutionalism. These sources of legitimacy corresponded to Weber’s famous classification: charismatic, traditional, legal-rational. (Morse, like Weber, was careful to emphasize the “ideal” nature of these types, which never exist in their “pure” state.) Morse concluded that over the course of a century, from the end of the era of independence to the early decades of the twentieth century, three “modes of stability” emerged.
The first “mode of stability” had at its core a charismatic leader who was associated with a project symbolically greater than himself but actually centered on his person: Bolívar’s Andean federation, Francisco Morazán’s Central American union, the constitutionalism of Benito Juárez in Mexico, and even Gabriel García Moreno’s theocratic state in Ecuador. Another variety of this type is represented by the military caudillos who imposed themselves on society by seduction and by force: Juan Manuel de Rosas in Argentina, Antonio López de Santa Anna in Mexico, and Doctor Francia (known as el Supremo) in Paraguay. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the presence of European capital in Ibero-America favored a third kind of individual leadership: the caudillo-presidents who made a formal show of respect for constitutionalism, most notably Porfirio Díaz.
The second attempt at stability adhered to patrimonialism, the traditional kind of legitimacy put forward by Weber, which in Ibero-America had Thomism as its origin. This was no longer a matter of reinstating the absolute monarchy of the Hapsburgs, or of literally applying Francisco Suárez’s doctrine. Instead it involved the creation of a new order inspired by the paradigm that had demonstrated its effectiveness over the course of three hundred years. Chile was an example. In Morse’s account: “A businessman from Valparaíso, Diego Portales… [came up with] a document with a considerable aura of legitimacy. The constitution of 1833 created a strong executive without stripping Congress or the Courts of their counterbalancing powers. The first president, General Prieto, had the aristocratic bearing that Portales lacked: a steadfast Catholic, Prieto was unswerving in spite of the various political factions. The first presidents discharged their duties in double periods: the winning candidate was chosen by his predecessor. Thus, the paternal structure of the Spanish state was preserved, with the concessions to Anglo-French constitutionalism necessary to maintain the image of a republic that had impugned the monarchic regime.”
Yet the most complete application of the traditional or “Thomist” model in the twentieth century was undoubtedly the case of post-revolutionary Mexico. Most notable here was the survival of the old Spanish mold in society, politics, culture, and economy — Suárezism in a Mexican setting. After an insurrection against a tyrant, the Revolution went back to the origin: once again, all the riches that lay beneath the earth became the property of the state, as they had under the Spanish crown. The cooperative system of ejidos, through which land was distributed among the peasants, was named in commemoration of the communal lots in old municipal Spain. The indigenous once more enjoyed a special protection; rural and industrial workers alike sheltered under the paternalism of the state. The capitalists, administrators, and businesspeople, along with the labor unions among professionals and teachers, were drawn towards the politico-administrative nucleus of the government and then, only secondarily, towards competitive interaction.
And then there was the third route, the “rational” route, to stability: a competent bureaucracy and public respect for the law. The example cited by Morse for this model was Argentina, which between 1860 and 1946 attempted “a modified version of liberal democracy.” On the basis of new affluence linked to the export of grain and livestock, and in spite of the marked concentration of wealth and power in the rural oligarchy, Argentina succeeded in integrating the great influx of immigrants and generating a middle class. With this foundation, and assisted by ethnic homogeneity and technological advances, “a series of statesman-presidents were able to promote and guide the development of Argentina, conforming to a reasonable degree with the Lockean constitution of 1853.” The power struggles of that time did not pave the way to tyrannical rule, but to the advent in 1890 of a liberal party of the middle classes, the Radical Party, which rode a number of important electoral reforms (free suffrage, the right for votes to be secret) to take the presidency in 1916. And yet, in Morse’s judgement, the Radical Party put a brake on the social and economic progress, on the advancement of workers and the urban middle classes, and it was weak in the face of the landowning oligarchy. The price was high: “Only in this context would the frustrated middle classes succumb to the lowest sort of demagoguery, and to Juan Domingo Perón.”
For Morse, the experience of the twentieth century showed the durability of Thomism allied with the charismatic legitimacy of the Machiavellian kind, whose liberal-democratic constitutionalism was mainly for show. Not only that: Morse would declare that only on this basis could Latin American nations, and stable and legitimate governments, be constructed. (Morse had no interest in analyzing the military dictatorships of the southern cone, such as those of Argentina and Chile, because they were merely tyrannies without any legitimacy.)
In 1989, a collection of Morse’s essays, called New World Soundings, was published by the Johns Hopkins University Press. Six years later, in homage to his work, we put out a translation of the book at the small press that we had founded at Vuelta. At the end of his long and winding journey — forty years of scholarship and reflection on Latin America — Morse enumerated his “premises” for the construction of Latin American governments. They may be summarized in a “ten commandments” of political rule in Ibero-America:
• The lived world is natural, it is not a human project. “In these countries, the feeling that man constructs his world and is responsible for it is less deep and less widespread than in other places.”
• Disdain for written law. “This innate feeling for natural law is accompanied by a less formal attitude towards the laws formulated by man.”
• Indifference to electoral processes. “It is difficult for free elections to summon the mystique conferred on them in Protestant countries.”
• Disdain for parties and for democratic practice, including legislative procedure and voluntary, rationalized political participation.
• Tolerance for illegality. The primacy of natural law over written law means a tolerance for even criminal practices and customs which in other societies go punished, but in these societies are seen as “natural.”
• An absolute handover of power to the ruler. The sover-eign people surrenders power to the ruler; it does not merely delegate it. That is, in Latin America the old, original pact between the people and the monarch remains intact.
• The right to insurrection. The people conserve “a keen sense of fair treatment and of natural justice” and “are not indifferent to abuses of the power they have given away.” This is why uprisings and revolutions — so commonplace in Latin America — tend to be born out of grievances against an authority that has become illegitimate. The insurrection needs no elaborate program: it is enough for it to seek to reclaim a sovereignty that has been tyrannically abused.
• Non-ideological charisma. A legitimate government needs neither a defined ideology, nor a plan to bring about an immediate and effective redistribution of wealth, nor a majority of the vote. A legitimate government requires only “a profound sense of the moral urgency” often embodied in “charismatic leaders with a special psycho-cultural appeal.” Tyrants cannot enjoy legitimacy.
• Formal appeal to the constitutional order. Once in power, to overcome personalism — or in Weber’s terms, to routinize the charisma — the leader must stress the importance of the literal application of the law as a means for the institutionalization of the government.
• The personal ruler is the head and the center of the nation. Like the Spanish monarch, “the national government […] functions as the source of energy, coordination and leadership for the unions, corporate entities, institutions, various social strata and geographic regions.”
Morse, then, was not exactly an enemy of liberal constitutionalism in Ibero-America, but neither was he its friend. He settled on an understanding of the region’s political prospects that was deeply cultural and deeply pessimistic about the possibilities of liberal democracy.
IV.
Richard Morse died in Haiti in 2001, when the turn-of-the-century democratic euphoria was at its peak. At that bright moment in history there was nothing to suggest that I needed to reconsider his illiberal theory of the “cultural premises” of Ibero-American politics. I had moved away from it in a more optimistic direction, to the cause of democratic liberalism, and I felt certain that I was right to have done so. History seemed to be justifying my hope.
And then Hugo Chávez appeared. I was sufficiently interested in his case that I decided to travel to Venezuela to write a book about him. Power and Delirium, I called it. Every single one of Morse’s ten commandments was evident in Chavez, with an additional element: as well as the charismatic legitimacy of the president and the traditional legitimacy of the paternalist corporate state, there was the legitimacy of the ballot box. Chávez realized that the armed forces were not necessary for the establishment of a dictatorship: he could instead monopolize public truth, and rewrite history, and close down freedom of expression, and keep his electoral base in a condition of permanent mobilization, and invent enemies within and without, and distribute money, and call elections that he would almost always win. Encouraged by Fidel Castro, Chavez’s inspiration and spiritual father, his model was also taken up in Bolivia and Ecuador. There was no need for Argentina to adopt it because Chavismo was, in essence, the mode of domination exercised by Perón and Evita, which, with astonishing continuity, has remained in force for over seventy years.
In parallel with Chávez’s rise, a charismatic leader the same age and with very similar attributes emerged in my own country, in the shape of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the president of Mexico, widely known as AMLO. He fought and lost the presidential elections of 2006 and 2012 but, undeterred, he ran again in 2018. All of Morse’s ten commandments were evident in him too, but he added a new spirit: the spirit of messianism. Lopez Obrador genuinely feels himself to be Mexico’s redeemer. AMLO is not just another populist; he is a populist who wears the nimbus of holy anger. He has compared himself to Jesus, feeling equally crucified by his opponents. And now he is both Jesus and Caesar.
AMLO sees himself — and many Mexicans share his view — as a political redeemer. He is the way, the truth, and the light of the people. And in such a salvific framework, everything about his rule falls into place. Redeemers, after all, do not lose; or if they do, the world also loses. In AMLO’s view, his doom would be Mexico’s doom. Redeemers, moreover, will spend their entire lifetime in the struggle for power. Once it is attained, always in the name of the people, always in communion with the people, these redeemers want it all, without divisions, deviations, or dissents. And they seek to retain power in perpetuity, until their last breath.
In my attempt to understand the phenomenon of Lopez Obrador, I wrote a book in the run-up to the 2018 elections, already convinced that he was going to win. It was called El pueblo soy yo, or I Am The People, and it is an anatomy of Latin American populism. In writing it I went back to Morse’s theory of Latin American history. My book became, in fact, a dialogue with Morse. He was no longer nearby, in his George-town home where we shared so much, so our debate took place entirely in my head. I certainly needed to revisit his arguments in order to try to refute them. Was he correct to warn me that liberal democracy in these countries, in my country, is a chimera?
I chose to write him a long letter in which I sought to rehabilitate the liberal tradition of Ibero-America in the twentieth century. In part, it read:
In your work you pay little attention to the Ibero-American countries which, well into the twentieth century, succeeded in building precisely that liberal legitimacy, those Lockean arrangements, that seemed inauthentic to you. At the same time, you overlook various political figures and intellectuals from the nineteenth century who sought to consolidate a reasonably democratic liberal order. Above all I think of Andrés Bello, the early mentor of Simón Bolívar and the father of the Chilean Constitution. An unforgivable omission. What would have become of Diego Portales without Bello? It was fortunate that the authoritarian Portales placed his trust in the eminent humanist, philologist, poet, philosopher and legislator Bello, educated in England and with a deep knowledge of its political philosophies, the creator of the Chilean Civil Code. Bello’s permanent exile from Venezuela since the eve of the Revolution of Independence in 1810 — he represented his newborn republic in England and stayed there for two decades — was an irreparable loss for his native country and an abiding blessing for Chile, where he established himself in 1829. It wasn’t the Thomist model that saved Chile; it was Bello, the most learned man of his time. You don’t so much as mention him.
And what would have become of Mexico without the separation of the church and state, and that modicum of institutional structure that we owe to the liberals of the generation of la Reforma, the founding fathers of Mexican liberal thought, laws, and institutions in the mid-nineteenth century. You do mention Juárez — but he was not, as you suggest, a Machiavellian caudillo who used the Constitution of 1857 as a trick to consolidate power. He was a reader of Benjamin Constant, a liberal of the kind you have little time for. And the Constitution was not a trick. His was a government that respected the division of power, the law, and the institutions, and also individual liberty and individual security.
You were quite right to leave aside the tyrants that populate our history: Juan Vicente Gómez, Trujillo, Somoza, Stroessner, Pinochet, Argentina’s military juntas, and so many more. They had force without legitimacy, and your work was looking for sources and forms of legitimacy. But these nineteenth- and twentieth-century tyrants and the “legitimate” dictators you adduce (such as Perón and Castro) had something significant in common: a disdain for democracy, for liberalism, and for freedom of expression. These liberal qualities, along with almost all the elements constitutive of “Lockean” liberalism, did not merit your attention.
Yet a modest page in the press, with its ferocious caricatures and satirical verses, its incendiary articles and its great prose writers, was always raised against all of the dictators. Journalists and writers such as Juan Montalvo, Juan Bautista Alberdi, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, José María Luis Mora, Francisco Zarco, Manuel González Prada, and José Martí. And many more. All would have joined the republican Martí in saying: “About the tyrant?
About the tyrant say everything, say more!” Many went to jail, many were cast out, some were killed. But however precariously, and against terrible risks, they persisted in their vocation of liberty. With the arrival of the twentieth century, freedom of expression was consolidated in the countries with the deepest democratic vocation, such as Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Colombia. There are newspapers still in print today that have been in circulation without a break for a century and a half. These historical newspapers are living monuments to liberty. They have been bastions in times of confusion, manipulation, and lies. And you ignored them.
What would Morse have made of Latin American populism in the twenty-first century, of this populist golden age? Combining elements of his theory, I can imagine his collective portrait of various Ibero-American leaders on the left and the right. A charismatic leader with “a special psycho-cultural appeal” comes to power by means of the ballot box and, with all the excitement of the demagogues of old, promises to establish again the traditional order, the arcadia of the past. A utopia is just around the corner. But since the reality of things does not comply with such reactionary plans, and since the leader harbors ambitions of retaining power in perpetuity, and since democracy and liberty are for him — a Machiavellian, when all is said and done — only the means for securing absolute power, he will go on to undermine, slowly or at breakneck speed, the freedoms, the laws, and the institutions of democracy, until they have all been stifled or destroyed.
We may recognize this dark portrait in every day’s headlines. It describes the political decline of our own times. And what would Morse have made of the ominous replication of this Ibero-American archetype in the United States, in the person of Donald Trump? I am sure that, being a believer in democracy, he would have condemned it, but to my mind his advice would have remained the same: “Stick to my theory and you won’t go wrong.” I did stick to it, inasmuch as it explains a great deal about Ibero-American political history — or rather, I stuck only to a part of it, because its erudite portraiture is incomplete. It egregiously omits the liberal tradition, which has fitfully accomplished a great deal in various Latin American countries, and which is still alive. And so in the end I abandoned my friend’s teachings on historical grounds, because of what it omits, and on moral grounds, because I do not wish to give up hope.
I am quite certain that there is no charismatic, populist, patrimonialist, culturally reactionary, corporatist, paternalist, Thomist-Machiavellian solution to the weaknesses and inequalities of Latin America. Only the decency and the rationality and the patience of a liberal order offer us a chance. We must remember and honor those ideas, because ideas are the seeds of political possibilities: without the idea of freedom there will be no freedom. It is true that such liberalism is not exactly the bulk of our cultural inheritance, but neither is it without precedent at this late date in the history of Latin American societies. There are times in the lives of individuals and nations, moreover, when we must modify and even reject some of what we inherited. For injustice is also a significant part of what was bequeathed to us.
Perhaps my quixotic idea is not so quixotic after all. Perhaps Macaulay and Namier are indeed relevant to the future of Latin America. Perhaps it is still possible to rescue “democracy without adjectives” for Mexico, and even for Venezuela and Cuba. After all, our inheritance is manifold and multivocal: it contains two political traditions, two theories of legitimacy, two visions of how and why we should live peaceably and fairly together. Thomas Aquinas, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Francisco Suárez are still alive. But so, too, are Andrés Bello, and all those brave journalists and liberal politicians of the nineteenth century, and all our democrats of the twentieth century, such as Francisco I. Madero, Rómulo Betancourt, Daniel Cosío Villegas, Octavio Paz, and Mario Vargas Llosa. My master Morse and I will go on debating forever. I pray that he is wrong.