Race and Enlightenment: The Story of a Slander 

    In 1945, Columbia University published an obscure treatise by Jean Bodin, which originally appeared in 1566, as part of its “Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies” series. Bodin was a theorist of absolutism, but one who had a profound influence on later natural rights thinkers, and this was his first work, translated from Latin by Beatrice Reynolds. Scholars across Europe and the United States were busy for over more than two centuries, but especially after World War II, collecting and publishing works that they deemed crucial to “civilization.” They sought works that would aid students in understanding and furthering modernity, defined as democracy and human rights, enlightenment, and the scientific method, as well as capitalism. As they sought significant works that would contribute to furthering “civilization” in the present by understanding its past — a kind of scholarly uplift for society — they omitted from their assembled record works that did not fit present desires. Ancient, medieval, and modern works that were not a useful past for liberal modernity were ignored — not revived, not translated, not reprinted, not quoted, not read, not taught. It was thus that they created a modern canon that revolved around and vindicated the issues that they themselves cared about. 

    In the years after World War II, it was increasingly the Enlightenment that garnered such attention, the one that featured John Locke and other theorists of democracy and republics, modern science, and modern economics. As American universities flourished and expanded in the 1950s and 1960s, and efforts to promote human rights and democracy around the world expanded under the auspices of the United Nations, Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, for example, was translated into many different languages. Scholarship on Rousseau and Adam Smith, among many others, flourished. But there was a problem. The Enlightenment occurred in a period of the expansion not merely of rights, but also of European empires, of slavery and subjugation. How should we explain such inequalities? How can all these historical realities be reconciled? 

    Many scholars and critics, starting in the late 1960s with David Brion Davis in The Problem of Slavery in Western Thought and Winthrop Jordan in White over Black, and later blossoming in works such as Edmund Morgan’s American Slavery, American Freedom, sought answers to this paradox. And in seeking those answers, they consulted the same sources already so carefully selected to create the modern canons. They looked to the sources that had been chosen and compiled to represent civilization and modernity, so as to understand the origins of the subjugation, racism, and slavery as well as their supposed opposites. 

    It makes sense, after all. As they went through college and graduate school, those were the texts they read, and were now reading more critically. Of course, they added other sources: as greater access to more documents became available, they read more widely. Edmund Morgan once told me that his research method was to read all books published in the mainland colonies, in chronological order, as they were reproduced in the microfiche database Early American Imprints. And in the decades that followed, as post-colonial theorists built on that critical foundation, their attention has remained on that same canon, on the classics already singled out. It is a bit like the problem that police detectives describe, of the man who loses his wallet at night. Some part of the street is lit up by a street- light, and it is easiest, even instinctual, to look there. But that might not be the best place to look. 

    In that spirit I choose to focus here on the distasteful and the repulsive, on ideas and texts that we should not be teaching or reading, except in context. These are to be found in books and pamphlets that have been excised, on moral grounds, from our uplifting collections about civilization and enlightenment. They propound racist ideas that appear in works that we usually ignore. I have in mind a very particular and repugnant debate, mainly in the seventeenth century, over whether African women had sex (and children) with monkeys, and whether Africans were therefore of a different species and should be seen as bestial or monstrous. It is an ugly chapter in our intellectual history, but we have a lot to learn from it. I was led down this path because the streetlight did not illuminate all the answers.

    My adventure began with the broad claims made by Ibram X. Kendi in his widely read book, Stamped from the Beginning, which, building on earlier post-colonial scholars of “whiteness,” attributed the origins of the repulsive racist idea that I have just described to the Enlightenment, and particularly to Locke’s foundational treatise An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which appeared in in 1690. The term “essay” does it no justice: it is a long and dense philosophical work, published in four books, that, for all intents and purposes, was one of the most widely read treatises of not only Britain’s enlightenment, but also all of Europe’s. Its insistence on ways of knowing, its exploration of how humans come to understand truth and to repudiate falsehood, it provided the definition for individual as well as group “enlightenment.” Paired with Locke’s theories of government, it helped to explain how human beings can and should make their own judgments about government (instead of accepting divinely chosen monarchs). I had read An Essay Concerning Human Understanding comprehensively, and Kendi’s discussion of it clashed with my remembered reading. I had pondered every page for questions of race and racism. How had I missed what Kendi had found? Thus began my journey down a nasty rabbit hole, one that has led me to think more deeply about canons and sources of civilization, and to explore more deeply today’s fierce debates about the connections between racism, slavery, and democracy in America’s (and Britain’s) history. 

    In Kendi’s reading, as in much recent scholarship, the Enlightenment was anything but enlightened. It embodied whiteness and privilege. Its scientific theories created racism. It legitimated slavery. Slavery, in the contemporary “anti-racist” account, emerged in each of England’s thirteen colonies in the Americas as a result of relatively unified (and relatively democratic) support among whites. My point here is not to belabor the realities of racism in early America: on that I think we are all agreed. But I do want to challenge an assumption about its pervasiveness, and where it came from, and especially the idea that it was “stamped” from the beginning. From my study of these sources (and many others) I would argue instead that it was contested from the beginning, and that it changed over time and varied by place. 

    I suggest that maintaining our focus on the works and the authors whom historians in the past identified as progressive helps to conceal a more complex, and more interesting, debate over principles of privilege and power, over racism and inclusion, a debate fiercely fought on many levels in early modern England and its colonies, even as they went through three revolutions over those centuries. Racism and slavery were not isolated from those struggles, but part of larger contests over power. Many scholars and thinkers whom we now identify with the Enlightenment were in fact pushing back against slavery and racism as well as the larger structure of power that had mainly promoted them. 

    Kendi’s analysis of four hundred years of American history in Stamped from the Beginning sorted thinkers into racist, neutral, and anti-racist. He consigned Locke to the racist camp. 

    Locke also touched on the Origin of Species in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Apes, whether “these be all Men, or no, all of human Species,’ depended on one’s “definition of the word Man,” because, he said, “if History lie not,” then West African Women had conceived babies with apes. Locke thus reinforced African female hypersexuality in a passage sent round the English-speaking world. “And what real Species, by that measure, such a Production will be in Nature, will be a new Question.” Locke’s new “Question” reflected another new racist debate that most debaters feared to engage in publicly. Assimilationists argued monogenesis: that all humans were one species descended from a single human creation… Segregationists argued polygenesis. 

    Kendi placed Locke squarely in the ranks of the most racist thinkers, acknowledging that while an obscure Italian thinker named Lucilio Vanini might have broached the repulsive idea in 1616, Locke was the first to popularize it in English. This is a grave charge, and it is somewhat difficult to challenge since Kendi provided no footnotes to the passage that he cited from Locke. 

    Who was Locke responding to? Kendi says Locke was repeating Vanini, an arcane Italian philosopher of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries who seems to have been both a theologian and a freethinker, and an early proponent of biological evolution. It is true that there were some Italian claims about this issue beginning in 1618, and a few even earlier, but in fact the idea was “popularized” by another Englishman, Thomas Herbert, in 1664. And Herbert did much more than popularize this racist canard about black bestiality. He claimed to have observed it! Locke, as we shall see, was actually trying to refute such claims. 

    Making sense of them requires beginning with Jean Bodin’s Method for the Easy Comprehension of History, the work that was translated and included in the history of civilization series at Columbia in 1945. First published in 1566, Bodin’s book appeared in the midst of debates all over Europe about the justice of colonization and over the best forms and practices of government, and amid speculations about all the different peoples that European explorers and colonizers were encountering and describing. Bodin sought laws of human behavior, and he claimed that the Roman historian Tacitus had argued, in an instance of such a law, that people who live in hot climates were more lustful, a conclusion that he validates by basing it on the medical theory of the humors. Bodin then wrote, claiming to be following Tacitus, that “because self-control” for “southerners” in hot climates “was difficult, particularly when plunging into lust, they gave themselves over to horrible excesses. Promiscuous coition of men and animals took place, wherefore the regions of Africa produce for us so many monsters.” Bodin thus maintained, in a single sentence, following an ancient authority, that in Africa human bestiality led to non-human progeny. But his sensational claim was buried deep in a Latin text that was available only to a few scholars. And it appeared on a page full of outlandish claims made by ancient authorities: Caesar’s assertion, for example, that “Britons have twelve wives in common and that brothers cohabit with sisters.” 

    In the early seventeenth century, there were a handful of brief references in European sources to the possibility of interspecies sexuality between people and monkeys, but it is always described that way (as between humans and animals), and it was always treated as a rumor, and in no more than a passing remark. So, for example, the Portuguese explorer André Donelha referred to rumors that he heard about sex between monkeys and women in his book describing his travel to western Africa in 1625. “They say” he wrote, that if a male monkey “meets a woman alone, it makes a match with her.” Donelha said nothing more about it, and he included that brief sentence at the end of a long discussion about monkeys, not people. There was no mention of any progeny of such unions. It does not appear that Donelha’s book (or Vanini’s or Bodin’s) was widely read, except perhaps by a few scholars, though the rumors were being repeated. 

    It was only after the restoration of Charles II to the throne of England that the claims became anything more than rumors, and the effort to proliferate this dehumanizing allegation seems to have been deliberate, emerging in tandem with the English crown’s efforts to become formally involved in the slave trade. Such efforts began mere months after the restoration, and centered on the efforts of the King’s brother James, the Duke of York, who would later brag that the Royal African Company was his idea. England had an earlier company with monopoly rights to trade in Africa, known as the Guinea Company, but no real territorial claims and no fortifications in Africa before 1660. Initially called the Royal Adventurers into Africa, the Royal African Company was its nickname almost from the start. On October 3, 1660, Samuel Pepys recorded in his journal “I heard the Duke [of York] speak of a great design that he and my Lord of Pembroke [Philip Herbert, fifth Earl of Pembroke] have, and a great many others, of sending a venture to some parts of Africa.” James convened the first meeting to plan for a Royal African Company that would organize and provide military support for English trade with Africa later that month. One of his biographers noted that while many at the time reported that James supported trade generally, in practice he was actively involved only in the Americas and Africa. While the public talk was of gold, which was indeed a part of the plan, the private discussion included, from the first, slavery. 

    A part of what Charles and James were promoting in their policies was explicitly racist. Given that all publications had to gain the royal imprimatur to be published, it is subtly revealing to consider what the censors approved. One of the books which earned their approbation was an important work by Thomas Herbert, cousin to Philip Herbert, the Earl of Pembroke, which went through three editions between 1664 and 1677. Significantly, Herbert was cousin to the Earl of Pembroke, who, as Pepys reported, was one of the primary planners of the Royal African Company, and Pembroke was Herbert’s sponsor in court. Herbert was also popular in court circles because he claimed to have protected Charles I at the end of his life, such that Charles II knighted him in 1660. 

    In the 1620s Herbert had traveled along the coast of Africa in the delegation of the English Ambassador to Persia. In 1634 and 1637, he published two identical accounts of his travels, which had a substantial section on Africa. The account was racist in its portrayals, but at first he used relatively generic words about savagery and, as the historian Jennifer Morgan has pointed out, added a claim that African women nursed their children by swinging one of their breasts over their shoulder, a claim that makes them seem less than human. 

    But what Herbert added in 1664 was far worse. He claimed to have witnessed, with his own eyes, African women having sex with apes, and that they were bestial and belonged to a separate non-human species. His discussion went on for many pages. Of Africans, he wrote that 

    Their language is rather apishly than articulately sounded, with whom ‘tis thought they have unnatural mixture… having a voice ‘twixt humane and beast, makes that supposition to be of more credit, that they have a beastly copulation or conjuncture. So as considering the resemblance they bear with Baboons, which I could observe kept frequent company with the Women, … their savage life, diet, exercise, and the like considerations, these may be said to be the descoent [descent] of Satyrs, if any such ever were… Now what Philosophers alledge concerning the function of the Soul may be made applicable to these Animals, that the Soul of Man is gradually rather than specifically differenced from the Souls of Beasts… 

    Herbert’s claims are staggering and foul, but what is most disturbing is the claim of witness: he is pretending to have actually observed these things, so as to create an argument about a different species of human, even implying that Africans do not belong in the category of human at all. In this early stage of the scientific revolution, Herbert was claiming the mantle of empirical authenticity. His edition of 1677 would underscore and elaborate these assertions. 

    Herbert was building not on earlier claims about Africans, but on similarly bizarre claims that Spanish priests had made about Peruvians. 

    Upon which account, the Spaniard of late years made it the Subject of their dispute, whether the West-Indians were of descent of Adam, or no? or whether they were not rather a middle species of Men and Apes? Had it been a quare concerning these Salvages, might have carried with it greater probability. Bocerus also treating of monstrous births in Peru says that it proceeds from a Copulation of Women with Monkeys; which as repugnant to the due course of nature is not to be maintained; though these are a subject for that dispute as much as any. 

    Perhaps the creepiest part is how Herbert describes such activities as repugnant, and argues that if this happened in Peru, why not in Africa, and connects such sexual activities between Peruvians and “apes” with “monstrous births,” with a non-human “middle species.” Herbert then returned to the subject of Africans, to quote Aristotle, in Latin, that “all human beings throughout the world worship god, true or false” and concludes: “I saw no signs of any knowledge of God, the law of Nature scarce being observed: No spark of Devotion. He thus insinuated that Africans were far worse than mere “savages.” They were, quite simply, not human. 

    Herbert’s grotesque addition of such material in 1664, just as the Royal African Company launched the slave trade to its colonies in the Americas and as England began to supply enslaved Africans to the Spanish in Jamaica (their first formal involvement in the Asiento), suggests that pseudo-scientific stories and lies helped to justify the differential treatment of Africans. Herbert added these new claims without traveling to Africa again. He also added new sections in 1664, wherein he made observations about other parts of the world that he had never visited, as other scholars have noted. There is no doubt that Herbert’s imaginative additions — his lies — about African and ape sexuality emerged not from his observations, but out of deliberate propaganda efforts. His claims went far beyond those of Bodin, Vanini or Donelha. They had referred to rumors. He was writing ethnographically and describing what he claimed to have observed. By linking such sex acts to monstrous births, he provided a basis for considering Africans as a different species of non-humans. 

    Herbert’s claims were far from universally accepted. Over the two decades that followed, many would argue with Herbert’s claims that Africans were a separate species. Those who did included Chief Justice Sir Mathew Hale in The Primitive Origination of Mankind in 1676, the only work of his that he allowed to be printed during his lifetime. In the book, over four hundred pages long, Hale asserted the common humanity of all peoples, and argued that heathens, too, have souls. 

    These arguments echoed across the Atlantic. In Barbados, a minister named Morgan Godwyn referred to both the original claims and to Hale’s response. A former student of John Locke’s at Christ Church College, Oxford, he spent fifteen years as a minister in Virginia and Barbados. He mixed up the source of such claims, confusing Herbert with a travel writer named Tavernier, but he took pains to explicitly refute them when he published his Negroes and Indians Advocate in London in 1680. Godwyn reported that even in Barbados many were talking about the allegations of bestiality and bestial progeny, so presumably they were in London as well. He then carefully challenged the accuracy of Tavernier’s account, arguing that mandrills or apes (whom he calls “drills”) who have some of the semblance of men are actually very different from humans. 

    Godwyn alleged that the only people who disagree with his observations — who express “wild opinions” that follow Herbert’s claims about interspecies sexuality — were planters, who were driven to these falsehoods by their hunger for profit. He refers to such allegations of sexual encounters between Africans and apes as a “wild speculation.” He asserts that the claim is made only by those who want it to be true, in order to deny rights to Africans, including their right to baptism. 

    Insisting that such claims of interbreeding between Africans and monkeys were patently ridiculous, he observed that the Africans whom he met in Barbados were smarter than many of the Englishmen around them. He argues, again contrary to Herbert, that Africans have religious sensibilities. All of the Africans he met were people with souls who possessed reason. “The shape and figure of our Negro’s Bodies, and their Limbs and Members; their Voice and Countenance, in all things according with other Mens; together with their Risability and Discourse (Man’s peculiar Faculties). . . These being the most clear emanations and results of Reason, and therefore the most genuine and perfect characters of Homoniety [humanity].” 

    Godwyn asserted that all the Africans he knew were capable of learning to read and to write. “How should they otherwise be capable of Trades, and other no less Manly impoyments; as also of Reading and Writing; or shew so much Discretion in management of Business; eminent in divers of them; but wherein (we know) that many of our own People [Europeans] are deficient, were they not truly Men?” Some have become overseers of plantations, and have been placed in charge of complex financial and management responsibilities. “Or why should their Owners, Men of Reason no doubt, conceive them fit to exercise the place of Governours and Overseers to their fellow Slaves, which is frequently done, if they were but meer Brutes?” He then poked some fun at racist idiocy: “It would certainly be a pretty kind of Comical Frenzie, to imploy Cattel about Business, and to constitute them Lieutenants, Overseers, and Governours, like as [the Roman Emperor] Domitian is said to have made his Horse a Consul.” 

    Godwyn, as noted above, was one of Locke’s few students from his time at Oxford, and almost certainly met with Locke in the 1680s upon his return from Barbados. Locke had a copy of Godwyn’s Negroes and Indians Advocate in his library, and appears to have used the same words, in his brief discussion of the issue, as Morgan; like Godwyn, he referred not to apes or monkeys but to “drills,” short for mandrills, one kind of monkey. Although he read widely in travel narratives, and referred to them frequently in his writings, Locke did not own a copy of Thomas Herbert’s travels. He did own Tavernier’s six volumes, but if he tried to find Godwyn’s reference, which was clearly to Herbert and not to Tavernier, he would have been frustrated, as I was, because it is not there. Locke’s references to the source of the claims that Godwyn was countering were therefore left vague. 

    Locke discussed these claims in a short section in the middle of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and only abstractly. Uncannily, he dedicated his treatise to Thomas Herbert, the eighth Earl of Pembroke, who was the son of Philip Herbert, the patron of Thomas Herbert the traveler (now dead), the current Earl’s cousin. It is almost as though there was a strange trans-generational conversation about these questions — of what defines a human or an animal species — and the current earl was trying to distance himself from his father’s and his cousin’s views. 

    In the third book of his work (§22-23, first edition), Locke speculated about the inadequacies of our words to understand the essence of ideas, including our ideas about the essence of human beings as a distinct species. How do we form an abstract idea about a species, whether human, animal or plant? It cannot be based merely on appearance, as there are animals that look like humans: “there are Creatures in the World, that have shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want Language and Reason.” It cannot be merely by the ability to speak, as there are humans who are born with birth defects, who lack reason, or are born without the ability to speak: “There are Naturals amongst us, that have perfectly our shape, but want Reason, and some of them Language too.” He continued that there is a third category of “Creatures . . that have Language, and Reason, and a shape in other Things agreeing with ours, have hairy tails.” So how do we know who is a human? “If it be asked, whether these be all Men, or no, all of humane Species; ‘tis plain, the Question refers only to the nominal essence.” Unfortunately, he argues, most would draw conclusions based on a judgment of whether the “internal Constitution” reflects the “outward frame.” Locke’s larger effort in this section was to identify the “real essence” of different species and how humans use “abstract ideas” to understand that essence, and to see beyond the outward appearance. Even children with major malformations, whom he here calls “naturals” or “changelings,” still have an “internal constitution” that makes them human, even if these are different from “reasonable men.” They are different from apes (“drills”), even if they share an outward appearance. 

    He then introduces a reference to the allegations that had been floating around: whether “women have conceived by drills” a kind of monkey. He argues that it is difficult to tell a species merely from generation, since different species can generate mixed issue. as when “the mixture of a Horse, and an Ass” makes a mule; it confutes our ability to think about species. Then he wrote the crucial sentence: “For if History lie not, Women have conceived by Drills; and what real Species, by that measure, such a Production will be in Nature, will be a new Question; and we have reason to think this not impossible.” We are left wondering about his source. (Tacitus, via Bodin? Herbert? Godwyn’s unnamed source?) 

    Yet the phrase “if history lie not” already expresses skepticism. Likewise, Locke states that if in fact a woman and an ape could have children, such an offspring “will be a new question” as to what species it is, since it would be, if so, in-between the two. The words “will be” indicates Locke does not in fact believe that anyone respectable has seen it. It might be true—as in the case of an “ass and a mare”—that such a union would produce a mule (which is sterile). But he draws a distinction between a woman (of human species) and a drill (of animal species). 

    Moreover, Locke does not, as Kendi implies, use a racial signifier in this discussion: not “west African women” or “negroes” or “Africans.” He simply uses the word “women,” without any qualifiers. If one did not already know about this debate, one would have no idea what Locke was talking about. Indeed, inasmuch as a reader of Herbert might think he was talking about women in Africa, he states that these are women like all women. It is a dramatic leap from this theorizing about the essence of humanity as a species, and our conceptual understanding of “man” as opposed to animals, to Kendi’s claim that Locke argued that “Ethiopians and apes must have the same ancestry, distinct from Europeans.” Nor is there anything here to suggest that any particular group of women is hypersexual. This discussion is a minor part of Locke’s larger project, which is to understand how humans come to have reason. 

    In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, then, Locke held that any claims that women had sex with apes, “if true,” would not create a separate species. His argument is not as strong as Godwyn’s, but he was also not answering the question directly, as was Godwyn. He was addressing the question of how humans categorize ideas. Kendi’s claim is false and highly misleading. And since Kendi uses the claim that Locke originated this particularly heinous racism to impugn the integrity of Western liberalism, the slander is rather a large one. There is nothing pedantic about getting this intellectual history right. The stakes are considerable. 

    Does referring to such an issue as procreation between women and apes, even in such an oblique way as Locke did here, constitute in and of itself racism, especially if the emphasis is on the claim that women and apes are of two entirely different species? Is it racist to mention the claim explicitly and then to challenge it point by point, as Godwyn did? By such a standard Kendi himself would be racist, as would I, merely for considering this evidence. Kendi claimed that Locke was arguing for a racist position that “most feared to engage in publicly.” But Locke, and especially Morgan Godwyn, whom Kendi also discusses, were arguing against such claims, and especially against such implications. Godwyn in particular is acting as an “antiracist” here, to borrow Kendi’s own categories, and Locke should either be considered an anti-racist or a neutral figure. 

    Why does it matter for Kendi’s larger argument whether or not his analysis of Locke and Godwyn — and of other contemporary thinkers such as Richard Baxter — is accurate? The answer is simple: Kendi makes it appear as though virtually all whites agreed with racist positions that were “stamped from the beginning,” including those whom we might expect to do the opposite, such as “enlightened” thinkers who advocated for human rights, such as Locke. Such references from Locke and Godwyn are Kendi’s “proof.” They permit him to argue that ideas about consent or rights were meant to apply only to whites, and therefore are themselves morally and racially flawed. 

    In this first section of his book, Kendi conflates the arguments of many authors — not only Locke but also Richard Baxter and Morgan Godwyn — with those they are arguing against. The crucial figure with whom they were contending was Herbert, whom Kendi ignores. Kendi instead identifies another French traveler as the father of racial classification and a “friend of Locke’s”: Francois Bernier. Locke did correspond with Bernier, and Bernier did distinguish between four different races of human beings (African, European, Asian, and Laplander), but he did not state that these different races were of different species. For purposes of this consideration, Locke’s work does not reflect any theories of racial difference. The divergence between the actual text of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the Negroes and Indians Advocate, Baxter’s Christian Directory, and Kendi’s interpretation of them makes it appear that Kendi did not read the originals of these texts, but only other scholars who quoted from them. 

    Kendi also claimed that Locke’s family was long involved in the slave trade. “In 1554,” he writes, “an expedition captained by John Lok, ancestor of philosopher John Locke, arrived in England after traveling to ‘Guinea.’” Yet the Dictionary of National Biography — not exactly an arcane or out-of-the-way source — confirms that “John Lok,” the person who traveled to Guinea, died without issue. The philosopher John Locke’s father was John Locke; his grandfather, born in 1674, was Nicholas Locke and he was a clothier by profession. His great-grandfather, born in 1540, was Edward Locke, and his great-great grandfather was Nicholas Locke, born in 1517. They were artisans, not slave traders. Repeatedly, Kendi labels people who criticized slavery and racist ideas — and were persecuted for such criticism — as supporters of both. I would put Richard Baxter in particular in this category: in 1775, the ideas of this alleged racist villain were cited by none other than Thomas Paine to argue against slavery. 

    As for Locke himself, he does not emerge from careful examination with clean hands. Between 1660 and 1675 he and his mentor, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, cooperated with Charles II and his brother James: both owned stock in the Royal African Company (sold in 1675), and both participated on some level in the crafting of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina in 1669, which included language about the powers of masters over slaves (even if, as I have shown elsewhere, most of the provisions corresponded to the earlier charter and to the wishes of the eight proprietors). But Locke’s later work, for which he is best known, arose in critical response to such policies and attitudes by the Stuarts, including the Two Treatises of Government and An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. After the Glorious Revolution, he was appointed to positions of substantial responsibility on the Board of Trade, with colonial oversight, and in that capacity he helped to reverse earlier policies that had given planters fifty acres of land for buying a slave. He also argued that “people of all nations are of one blood” (from Acts 1:17) and that the children of “negroes” and Indians who lived in the colony should be “baptized, catechized and bred christians—” a right that arguably, given then current legal norms that to gain the rights of subjects one had to be Christian, should have enabled them to claim other rights, including potentially manumission. Did Locke do enough to reverse slavery? No. But did he make arguments that indicated that he thought Africans were fully human with rights, and part of the same species? Absolutely. 

    Of course Locke is merely one figure of the Enlightenment, and there were many more over two centuries. It is certainly not my purpose here to exonerate all these figures, some of whom expressed racist sentiments. I wish, rather, to place those comments into broader struggles over power, over empire, over legitimacy; and to insist that outside of such contexts they cannot be properly understood; and to suggest that the Enlightenment had its origins in the struggle against slavery, a struggle which is much older than recent historical discus- sions would have us believe. Likewise, early modern science as it emerged in this period should be put into the context of the religious debates and the travelers accounts and the political structure that surrounded it. Interestingly enough, Charles II’s Royal Society, which promoted science, never gave Thomas Herbert a platform (from what I can discover); he certainly never published in their Philosophical Transactions. 

    And still earlier, it is possible to trace an entire range of speculations about apes and their similarities (or not) to humans made not by scientists or philosophers but by religious figures and the writers of a wide range of pamphlets, many of them not respectable, though their authors are little known. In 1670, for example, in his treatise The Divine History of the Genesis of the World, the cleric Samuel Gott clearly distinguished between “Apes, Baboons, Marmosets, Drills, and I known not what Bestia Fauuns and satyrs, as one degree removed form ourselves . . . yet we [humans] Classicaly differ, and vastly excell them, in our Intellective Spirit.” In 1653, in its second edition, which was enlarged with many woodcuts, John Bulwer’s Anthropometamorphosis reflected on these questions, through both his reading of a Book of Monsters 

    written by the Dutch physician Nicolaes Tulp in 1641, and his own observation of a Guinea Drill that he had viewed that Christmastime near Charing Cross in London. 

    The haire of whose head (which was black) grew very like the haire of a child; it was a compleat Female too, not above eleven months old, and yet it seemed to me to answer the Dimensions which Tulpius gives of his Angola Satyr. The Keeper of it affirmes, it will grow up to the stature of five foot, which is the ordinary size of little men: He would go upright and drinke after the same manner. Her Keeper intended never to cut her haire, but to let it grow in full length, like a womans; in case she should dye, her carkasse was bespoke for Dissection by some Anatomists, who perchance have a Curiosity to search out what capacity of Organs this Rational Bruit had for the reception of a reasonable soule, or at least of such a delitescent reason; which Drill is since dead, and I beleeve dissected, but of the Dissectors and their observations I have not received any intelligence. 

    In 1699 an English scientist would publish a comprehensive account of such a dissection of a Drill, this time with the patronage of the Royal Society. He concluded that it and humans were quite distinct. Moreover, Bulwer proceeded to tell a story that made the woman who had sex with the ape not an African but a European, a Portuguese, woman: 

    Of which monster I may say what Jordanus saies of the aforesaid Orang Outang, or Tulpius his wild man, that it proceeded from the wicked copulation of man and beast, the Devill Cooperating, and Divine revenge (without all doubt) ensuing thereupon: of the same Tribe and Originall were those two children which the Portugall woman bore to the Great Ape, when she was exposed into a desert Island inhabited only by such Apes; a story well known in Portugall, and is worth the reading in Delrio. 

    By the late eighteenth century such debates had become more widespread, and they continued, as in the seventeenth century, to interweave the political with the scientific. A Jamaican named Edward Long, in his history of that island, repeated comments that came from Thomas Herbert, alleging that blacks were a separate species. Thomas Jefferson, in a shocking passage in his Notes on the State of Virginia in 1781, referred casually to “the preference of the Oranootan for the black women over those of his own species.” Jefferson’s Notes originated in his correspondence with the French naturalist Buffon, and his awful remark appears in a section wherein he described supposed differences between white and black peoples. Jefferson was not the founder of modern racism; that dubious accomplishment, as should now be clear, belonged to Thomas Herbert. But once again the only appropriate frame for understanding such racism is the full historical picture. These were questions about which Jefferson was torn. Elsewhere he spoke powerfully about including Africans in the ranks of “all men are created equal,” most notably in his original draft of the Declaration, where he referred to Africans as “MEN,” in capital letters and italics, and in another section of his notes on Virginia, where he wrote that in the event of a slave uprising God would side with the enslaved, as theirs was the cause of justice. It began: “I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice cannot sleep for ever.” 

    My point is that some Enlightenment figures, even as they made arguments that we might today want to celebrate, also reacted to racism, sometimes building upon it, sometimes rejecting it. The figures singled out by earlier scholars as “enlightened” hardly originated racism. The real garbage was usually generated by figures that earlier scholars in the twentieth century did not choose to celebrate, or honor, or reproduce. They are not generally included in our accounts of what we admire as our “civilization.” Such seventeenth-century figures as Herbert and others, who legitimated both the slave trade and slavery for all non-Christians and specifically for Africans and Indians, are a perfect example. If we want to understand the origins of racism, then, we need to look beyond the streetlight, beyond the old canons. 

    We must understand that crucial texts of liberalism and the Enlightenment that to this day anchor our educational and political systems emerged within a context that included the distasteful and the unusual. We must look to the freaks and the monsters, those whose ideas still do not bear reprinting except as excerpts and in context. We need to discover the QAnon of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Such reconstructions should always be in a political context, for the creation of racist ideas was always a political act — propounded, as Godwyn noted in 1680, by those whose interests were at stake, whose “wild opinions” were promulgated “by the inducement and instigation of our Planters chief deity, Profit.” Godwyn acknowledged that “they’ll infer their Negro’s Brutality” to “justifie their reduction of them under Bondage; disable them from all Right and Claims.” 

    Racists were emphatically not “stamped from the beginning.” Racist ideas were contested, and debated, often sharply, by many Enlightenment thinkers who created comprehensive arguments that challenged all hierarchies, including racism and slavery. The evils of racism and slavery provoked in their own time a tradition of antiracism. Even within the limitations of their time and their discourse, these disputations helped to create the foundation for many of the principles of human rights and democracy. 

    To the Sun

    Among the great longer poems of the twentieth century, the circumstances under which Shaul Tchernikhovsky’s To the Sun was composed were perhaps the most unlikely. This sonnet cycle was written in Hebrew in war-torn Odessa in 1919, with Red and White forces struggling for control of the city. Tchernikhovsky, then forty-five, had served on the front lines as a doctor in the Russian army, an experience directly reflected in the seventh sonnet of the cycle. He grew up in a modest- sized town on the Ukrainian steppes, and Russian, not Yiddish, was his first language. The experience of being nurtured there through an intimate bond with nature is explicitly recalled in the first three sonnets of the cycle, as is his feeling of being torn away from that cherished bucolic realm when he came to Odessa while still in his teens. After his army service, working part time as a doctor in Odessa, he was earning barely enough to support himself, his Russian wife, and their young daughter, and food in any case was in scarce supply. 

    In the midst of all this turmoil, Tchernikhovsky chose to compose a hugely ambitious synoptic poem that would tell the story of his calling as a poet, express his passionate credo as a vitalist and a pantheist, articulate a vision of the role of art and also science in human culture, and confront the challenge to that vision posed by violence in history. He did all this, moreover, in Hebrew, a language that was just beginning to be revived as a spoken tongue. The poetic form that he embraced was the sonnet corona, an especially intricate one originating in the Italian Renaissance. It consists of a sequence of fifteen Petrarchan sonnets, with the requisite rhyming octaves and sestets, in which the last line of each sonnet is repeated as the first line of the next sonnet, with the concluding sonnet composed of all fourteen of the first lines in the order in which they first appeared. Tchernikhovsky’s choice of this difficult form is in itself an expression of his deep commitment, even under great stress, to the tradition of humanism, the formal perfection of the corona being a kind of homage to his Italian precursors and a bulwark against the chaos swirling around him in the Russia of 1919. 

    To the Sun is a work of stunning technical virtuosity. Unlike many of the Hebrew poets of his time, Tchernikhovsky had no traditional religious education, and the neo-pagan worldview that To the Sun articulates, conjuring up a fusion of fire and blood in all things, feels authentic to the poet. This translation makes no attempt to emulate the rhyme scheme, for it is hard to see how that could be done without transmogrifying and distorting the meanings of the Hebrew. A compensatory effort has been made to give a certain rhythmic integrity to as many of the lines as possible. Tchernikhovsky’s Hebrew is difficult, often deliberately swerving from the ways in which the language was used by other Hebrew poets of his era. At some points in the cycle, the exigencies of rhyme and meter produce lines that are crabbed and somewhat obscure in the original, and these have not been smoothed out in the transla- tion. But whatever the limitations of this English version, it is offered in the hope that it will make visible to English readers a grand poetic edifice that combines humanistic values with a vivid sense of the world’s pulsating, eternally sustaining life. 

    ROBERT ALTER 

    Our ancestors who were in this place, their backs to God’s temple and their faces to the east, would bow eastward to the sun. 

    BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE SUKKAH

                   1.

    I was to my god like a hyacinth or mallow
      That has naught in its world but its pure beaming sun,
      And an angel came knocking: “Rise, grow, blossom’s scion,
                                                                   burst forth
    In your song, festive song, in sharp thorns.”

    I sucked the juice of the furrow. Like wine the scent
                                                                   whelmed me
      Of the crop-yielding soil with its clods, its soft clods.
      Lacked he prelate and priest in the great city’s temple
    That he led me on here, set me out as his prophet?

    Is the sap on cypress-silver any less in my eyes
    Than your good olive oil glowing gold on the head,
    And the fragrance of pear-tree in the field that I tended

    Than Sabean merchants’ powders, than my nard and my
                                                                   incense?
    And I bowed to you secretly, bent low in reverence.
    Like one stalk of gold grain in stalks heavy with yield.

    2.
    Like one stalk of gold grain in fields heavy with yield
      That sprang up in great beauty and flourished in vigor,
      Like this stalk of grain hiding within it its secret,
    Life’s pledge everlasting and relic of old.

    Like stalk of grain furrow-stolen that suckles the earth
      And moist with live nectar it dreams of its glory,
      I, too, did burgeon! But my soul ever thirsted.
    Ah, day chases day! Shall I call in the writ?

    My dream yet unrealized, my path still hidden.
    When on all sides I am fearful: what for me, who for me…
    Have I come to the border? Have I already crossed it?

    Did my father deceive me and not keep his word?
    A wildflower am I, and my sun is my father.
    He sent me warm rains and decreed mountain mists.

    3.
    He sent me warm rains and decreed mountain mists,
      And the twilight of sea-depths, abode of great silence,
      A dense cloud of fire burning hot in its casement,
    And until it bursts upward, earth’s breadth but confines it;

    The sundial too confining to take in the limit,
      The sun with the clamor of ocean fire on it,
      And words from old times passed by father to father,
    Raptures of great city’s sick, lore of guileless peasants,

    For me to be the axis of the world that he fashioned,
    Its essence, true center, he stored up in abundance
    For the present and future, for the past that sped by,

    And in abundance of charm and colors never shamed me
    And endowed me with much—through his power so strong—
    Light-and-shade’s symphonies, kohl, rouge, and crimson.

    4.
    Light-and-shade symphonies, kohl, rouge, and crimson,
      Cold-crystal mummies and iridescent sea-sleepers,
      The brief moment of life of a spark struck off hot,
    In heavy-hued alabaster and sepulchered shipwrecks;

    And the networks of tree-veins in mahogany’s crosscut,
      Trees that are bloodlogged and shoot up in fury,
      Hues before daybreak, of evening bathed in blood
    That sloughs off gold treasures and will never be poor —

    One melody all, one wondrous high song.
    Can the master of numbers, can he solve the riddle,
    Or life kingdom’s scholars, can you tell it to me?

    Guileless hearts have long solved it, and from innocent hearts
    I, too, absorbed it, for my heart did not cheat me!
    Age-old sorrow I fathomed, each nation’s song charmed me.

    5.
    Age-old sorrow I fathomed, each nation’s song charmed me.
      The dream of On’s soothsayers etched on a wall,
      And the writing of druids incised in chalkstone,
    Amulet on parchment, wizard’s song, poor man’s stammer.

    In writ giving law to age and nation before me,
      Incantations of shepherds that are whispered by sheepfolds,
      In the rapture of magus who is seized by convulsion,
    In the talismans of China does my curious gaze

    Descry but this prayer, flesh-and-blood’s pleading:
    “You who dwell in the secret of being,
    O keep for me the blood.
    Quench not the fire you lit in me through your mercy,

    Liquid fire guarding fire, just one spark from your flames!”
    That is the grand sum in the bitter heart lodging,
    Voice of soul wrapped in light, voice in foreign dark straying.

    6.
    Voice of soul wrapped in light, voice in foreign dark straying,
      Clash within me—for my consecration fell short.
      A realm of stark doubting, of doubting what is certain,
    Pressed round me like a dream in tight-woven raptures.

    And in the living man’s upheavals who clings to each ruling
     Of law piercing law undermining Shaddai,
     A guileless faith’s armor I donned over my khaki
    And in each day’s profaneness its small remnant
                                                                   stayed with me.

    Were it not for the scents of the rich crumbly soil,
    Stifling heat drifting up from the granary’s chaff,
    The shovel’s ring splitting furrow and scythe singing in grain,

    I soaked these up in the village, in that freedom, still a child—
    Who stood by me in the battle, when my heart
                                                                   clenched within me,
    When I stood between the living and one breathing his last?

    7.
    When I stood between the living and one breathing his last
      (What a terrible craft), a sharp scalpel in my hand,
      Some would weep out of joy, some would curse me to my face,
    I soaked up the last light in a dying stranger’s eyes.

    By the thunder of potent cannons that rolled
          through the meadow,
      By the fire flashing to me only in the dark of my trench,
      I traced the last line, wiped the living from my page,
    From a jewel-studded chalice is a precious stone torn.

    And yet in that spark in the guttering eye,
    In the light soaking up light before it blanks for all time;
    And yet in that fire-flash burning and shrieking,

    In the fire calling to fire that bids disaster and ruin,
    It was you who were in them, this your glory
                                                                   that stunned me—
    Too soon did I come or too late did he make me?

    8.
    Too soon did I come, or too late did he make me?
      “Gods” are around me, they fill all existence.
      The stars are my gods, I pray to them enchanted
    By their faces, light of day and pale moon.

    For besides you there is nothing, O sun that has warmed me!
      Sun’s offspring to me are you, the cocoons hanging high,
      Sun’s offspring, looming tree and the mere garlic husk,
    Light and heat’s avatars, the combustible coal.

    And all existence is a voice of prayer, a prayer of all things:
    To you jackal-mothers cry as they litter their whelps,
    The battle trumpet sounds to you as day breaks in the camps,

    Suns in the sphere above, as the sound sweeps them up.
    In the chorus without end I shall sing, not be still:
    In my heart yet rests the dew that descends on Edom’s steppes.

    9.
    In my heart yet rests the dew that descends on Edom’s steppes
      And moistens the sand in the desert of god.
      In my ears the song lives that arrives with the shade
    And a gentle star glitters to primeval lays,

    And primeval night shades the world with its wings,
    And the desert and night become one single secret,
    From their tents gathered peoples bend low on each mound,
    And bow to him, trembling, in their fete, in their blight.

    When the nation’s heavens change over it, those heavens
                                                                   of blue,
    As the face of stars dims for it, and if in the yoke
    Of a sky yet unknown it moves east and west—

    Once a month it comes out in mysterious night
    To hallow the moon as it hallowed it then
    On the peak of Mount Hor, the ancient god’s home.

    10.
    On the peak of Mount Hor, the ancient god’s home,
      It shines in light-clouds gigantic, possessing law-fire!
      From the radiance before it Chaldee Bel bowed by
                                                                   the Euphrates,
    Sphinx’s visage went pale in Nile’s red channel.

    With his scepter El smashes—and stilled is
      The pride of marble-quickening Zeus, and Perun heard
      His word and fled to the forest, and the moth met the worm
    On Lubian priest’s breastplate, Wotan’s cult-trees their prey.

    When age succeeds age and the East once more brightens—
    Nubia’s icons shall quail, Hormuz, Kerub shall be shamed,
    And Arabia’s idols, by the crescent moon’s light.

    And yet still a vision…an age fashions like a smelter
    Its god that is coming—and we worship him gladly—
    For my heart utters song to the sun and Orion.

    11.
    For my heart utters song to the sun and Orion—
      Will you judge me by law, to the dust will you thrust me,
      For to a vulgar folk’s god I will pour no libation,
    In a dance before crowds I will not crown his head.

    In his temple on high, bare of image or scroll,
      In all-in-all’s beauty he sends me no cherub,
      With his noblemen’s patent he comes not to blind me,
    It bears a signed name like the rule for a fool.

    Yet if a wave of great holy bliss sweeps you
    And a tremor of joy in prophetic creation,
    In the wealth of heart’s life that each mystery shares;

    In the surge of your loving with a lusty man’s bounty,
    You found favor with him as gift-garden finds favor
    When the beanpod shall swell and the tree’s fruit shall ripen.

    12.
    When the beanpod shall swell and the tree’s fruit shall ripen,
      Wild weeds, all trespassers of borders and limits,
      When they ripen their seed in the heart of the fruit-skin
    And light-beams are hidden and stored away sifted;

    From them to time’s end, with this earth’s climate
      Changed and its forests’ scent faded,
      With the remnant of structures on poles, rot’s survivors,
    In the graves of great princes, in amphoras and jars.

    After thousands of ages, from a cramped mine it will come,
    Will shine forth from the heights of the towers in courts
    Of all fire-worshippers who burn daughters on pyres,

    Will burn in the brain of the transcendent genius,
                                                                   in the flesh of
    Mosquitoes that sing, and in an empty age lacking
    An extinct world’s idols—they have seized me, with no escape.

    13.
    An extinct world’s idols, they have seized me, with no escape!
      Idols of this nation, all who touch it know beauty,
      Beauty became wisdom, its wisdom was beauty ,
    And it scattered its splendor on Hades and Ocean.

    North winds have bewitched me from among all the trees,
      Recounting frost’s story in patterns of agate;
      Midst the sun-shrines of On, in the temple I sought,
    I imagined this spark that says in me: Repeat—

    But the spark from the East, and from Canaan I kept it;
    Danite idols compelled me, cultic groves filled with trembling,
    Asherah statues, blocks from Tyre, in Ur did I worship.

    Where the way I must choose, where the path?
    Anoint my oil for Yah or shall I choose Zeus,
    Or the very last age’s icons in the kingdom of idols?

    14.
    Or the very last age’s icons in the kingdom of idols,
      Or the song of strength’s dream we shall raise up forever.
      And a man’s eye shall probe and reveal matter’s secrets,
    Permutations of atoms in gold and in tin.

    From the minerals he lays down a line and a path
      To the kingdom of trees and unseen growing things,
      And his one single chain: among molds, the mushroom,
    Green slime on a lake, almond, elephant’s get.

    Heat’s secret is grasped, electricity, and light,
    Magnetism’s mysteries, the barley bloom’s riddle,
    The roused nerve’s tremulations that is stretched without gap,

    And it shall be just one secret, one high secret—the living.
    Then the song shall be sung: this my sun that has warmed me,
    I was to my god like a hyacinth or mallow.

    15.
    I was to my god like hyacinth or mallow,
      Like one ear of gold grain in stalks heavy with yield;
      And he sent me warm rains and decreed mountain mists,
    Light-and-shade’s symphonies, kohl, rouge, and scarlet.

    Age-old sorrows I fathomed, each nation’s song charmed me,
      Voice of soul wrapped in light, voice in foreign dark strayed,
      When I stood between the living and one breathing his last,
    Too soon did I come or too late did he make me?

    In my heart still the dew that descends on Edom’s steppes,
    On the peak of Mount Hor, the ancient god’s home,
    For my heart utters song to the sun and Orion.

    When the beanpod shall swell and the tree’s fruit shall ripen,
    An extinct world’s idols have seized me, with no escape!
    Or the very last age’s icon in the kingdom of idols.

    What Shall We Watch Now?

    Over the past year, there was so much to be afraid of that fear itself grew fatigued. Was the solitude of lockdown passing into a new systemic withdrawal? Or were we practicing turning our blind eye to kids on the streets with guns? 

    Nothing felt as eerie then as the bourgeois comfort that now at last, double vaccinated, we might be getting back to normal. As if there was a proven “we,” let alone any structure of normality available. As if we had not learned yet that the phantom known as our norm had been a deluding pipe-dream for so long. As if the panoramas of fear had not taught us that hope and our future were Ponzi schemes. As if we didn’t know in our bones that the precious “it” — our culture — might be ending, so should we (quietly and discreetly) get whatever we could while there was still time? 

    So even among the pursuers of our liberties, there could be a secret plan of acquiring tactful guns, living on high ground, putting together a goodies satchel of Proust, Musil, Parker, and Mahler, and stockpiling toilet paper. 

    I hoped to make that short paragraph mischievous, as if that was the surest way of getting at you. But black comedy is a showoff relief now, our trick for sidestepping gravity. Blackness went noir in the last century, as horror was glossed as genre. So I want to find an example that can be unsettling. 

    On May 14, 2021, Amazon Prime streamed all ten episodes of Barry Jenkins’ adaptation of Colson Whitehead’s novel The Underground Railroad. Wasn’t that splendid, and a sign of our improvement? Many said that this event was eagerly awaited, not just because Jenkins had achieved a high reputation with Moonlight, but because between the publication of Whitehead’s novel in 2016 and the delivery of the work on film, America had been convulsed by, among other things, the murder of George Floyd and the Black Lives Matter response. Even in the crowded world of streaming shows, intensified by Covid stay-at-home life, The Underground Railroad was anticipated. (But note how this way of describing what happened makes it sound as if white America had been waiting patiently for George Floyd to provide a prompt for our indignation. We are so appealing when we’re angry.) 

    Nothing but opinion can come next, and ordinary opinion has mattered more during Covid because the external view of critics has been minimized by our intense domestic living with television series. So the reviews for, say, The Queen’s Gambit were very positive, but they felt irrelevant next to the way word-of-mouth was making our secretive romance with that show as infectious as the trance attractiveness of Anya Taylor-Joy. Chess became a new home craze, but then the binge was gone as if it had never existed. We have to learn to swim with the streaming. But is The Underground Railroad a test of swimming or drowning? The reviews were very favorable, though I felt a curious wariness that did not properly convey the peril and the exhilaration in yielding to its current. 

    I found the show more expansive because it was so beautiful, while facing several looming facts of shame. In his novel, Whitehead had alluded to the “railway” as not just a network of abolitionists trying to get black people out of the South and the reach of slavery, but as an actual railway system. What amazed me in the film was the realization of tunnels, tracks, and locomotion in a surreal design for rescue. It was so unnerving that it made the mythology within the show suggestive of how the word “underground” signifies a depth of thought and action striving against surface tyranny. To speak of an underground reminds us of how the United States had a mild war; it knew neither bombing nor Gestapo on the stairs. It was mainly a movie war for us. 

    Audaciously — in defiance of every realistic objection that there had not been a real railroad — Jenkins had believed enough in the mystery to get at a true underground of America. That adjective denoted more than “railroad,” for the underground force was an idea — just like dread at a world being occupied by unkind forces. If it helps this proposition, I would say that in Psycho — such a warning about journeying — there is a deliberate shift from the bleak modernism of Phoenix, through semi-desert and nocturnal highway, to a past where a Victorian Gothic house sits above a flimsy cardboard motel. In other words, Psycho in 1960 was feeling out the conflict of change in America, and making it part of the film’s shocking violence in which someone we cherished would be cut to pieces on a journey seeking salvation. 

    Suppose Psycho is a nightmare about the impact of sexual reality on a repressed American society: thus the initial bedroom scene between Janet Leigh and John Gavin sets up the voyeuristic tension that breaks open in the shower-scene slaughter, and the revelation of a buried sexual horror in Norman and his Mother. This is not a story that believes only in photographic reality; it is a legend pulled out of a grave. And that is the way to approach The Underground Railroad. Yes, it’s about slavery in the nineteenth century. But it also feels the struggle between emotional expression and suppression that is the whole history of our United States. 

    Another aspect of that is the absence of the Civil War. It is not easy to be sure “when” the film is set — you would have to be an expert on clothes and décor; but as the film passed by I became more aware of how the famous war did not seem to exist. As I thought about that I was drawn to see that “our” Civil War was in part a white projection on a terrible history and a way of telling ourselves bad things had been cleaned up. But they were not, and because the war is absent from the film a feeling dawned that it still waits to be fought. In 2021 this was something to be afraid of, including that movie, January 6th, which occurred long after Jenkins had finished filming but in which the force of a rogue locomotive reared up out of the ground and aimed at us. 

    There is more to be said about what Jenkins had done. Naturally, there are slaving scenes that are ghastly (as well as natural) — a big one occurs in the very first episode. But as I tried to enter the film’s world, I realized I had never seen a South so palpably and dangerously lovely. You feel the warmth and the fragrance, the swamp and the snakes; the camera dwells on flora and fauna; the light is rare and thick and almost graspable (the photography is by James Laxton); and the natural sounds merge with the remarkable score (by Nicholas Britell) that seems to be feeding on the air. This becomes a transfixing experience, a naturalist’s treasury, but it is a place where appalling things are happening. I had never felt America’s Edenic ambiguity so thoroughly. 

    I haven’t mentioned the acting, black and white, or the serene confidence to take the action off in unexpected directions. To be brief: I loved the film; I watched it as in bingeing, in just three nights, the shifts of light like a storm in our darkened living room. I felt it was a marvel, a great film, a savage rapture, if that is the kind of language you expect from “commentary,” or one more demonstration of the ways streaming — with vivid imagery burning on the walls of our home — is changing our idea of watching. Forget the chance of seeing this in a public place, because that communal aspiration is gone now, eclipsed by our technology. We deserve it in our cave, the last place, where we hope to shelter. 

    As someone often asked to recommend films, I was urging The Underground Railroad on friends. But I thought I detected some reserve. Yes, people had heard it was good, and yes, they understood that it was “important.” But I began to hear that several people had not gone far into the show. Some said the lengthy lashing and burning scene in the first episode had been an obstacle. Yes, they knew they needed to see that violence (they had honored it recently in 12 Years a Slave), but they seemed to feel a little nagged about seeing the pain once more. I wondered if liberals were growing weary of their good cause.

     

    A close friend told me, “I only saw the first episode but was put off by its odd mix of the pretentious and the unemotional, even though many things were happening that should make me feel emotional. It felt academic to me — or something too studied.” I disagreed; my friend was reacting to the magic and its allegorical point of view, which I have just tried to explain. Then, in another conversation with someone else, but taking it in that not enough people seemed to be watching the show all the way through, I heard myself say, “I think there’s something else, which is that some white people do not really want to see black people.” 

    There was a hush when I said that, as if it might be something one should not say — or as if it signaled a degree of racism. I am white; I was English for forty years, and then American for another forty. But I am trying to admit to a failing of the sort that I suspect many black people hear in conversations with whites, no matter how well-intended or liberal the whites think they are, and no matter how tolerant or amused the blacks can bring themselves to be. It’s like the way rich people are not comfortable looking at poverty. (An old joke: a tattered beggar sneaks into the courtyard of a wealthy man’s house. The plutocrat turns to his manservant and says: “Get him out of here. He’s breaking my heart.”) It’s how some men and women cannot be together without fear and desire. 

    We like to see ourselves. We would rather hear our language than one we don’t know. We prefer to be with people we feel share our experience. We are wary of strangers. There is systemic racism, if that means sheer racial difference, and willing it away will not dispel it. Candor can tame its worst defects. And watching can begin to offset prejudice, and tenderize differences. That is the chance for an intelligent society, or one that can warrant hope. Doesn’t Proust tell us about that world? 

    So what can we watch now? What’s on your screen? 

    Watching has changed so much in the spell of Covid, and I don’t see many of the shifts being reversed. One reason is that the changes were well underway before our new way of sickening and dying made us suddenly more inbound. Just as Mare of Easttown is a more involving interaction than the self-satisfied isolationism of Nomadland, so for twenty years now the quality of things seen on the smaller screen — The Wire, The Sopranos, Breaking Bad, Babylon Berlin, Ozark — far exceeded the best that Hollywood put in theaters. I’ll go further: the nature of a criminal society in those long-form series is more intricate, more human, and more political than the armored gloom that envelops the Corleone family in the Godfather films. The Godfather is an enclosed pattern of loyalty followed by betrayal. Its underground is mistrust. Of course it still works on screen, but the meticulous craft of the first two films is an expression of Michael’s pitiless authority. He is making the film, and Coppola cannot challenge him. The films are cultured prisons, or a rite that we honor now with worship from our cells. We want to be in that terrible family. The fantasy of shared power and allegiance smothers any moral issues or a consideration of how crime became truly American when it got organized. And in an age of mounting fears, we yearn for organization and the promise of strong people in charge. 

    I know, this is horrid to hear; it should not be so. But notice the exultation you feel — the assist you are giving — in those finales where the Corleones’ enemies are eliminated. And realize that generations of our kids have seen the two parts of The Godfather only on their home screen, clinging to the watchful dark in the way that Michael Corleone looks out on his wasteland. “Could we rewind, and run that execution again?” 

    By contrast, Babylon Berlin is a study in how insecurity can prompt fascist solutions, just as Ozark is an autopsy on a family breaking apart because of money. When was there a feature film that had a similar wish so fully to analyze poverty? Generally the movie system is fearful of showing that condition, and in terror of asking how it functions. What Hollywood movie comes close to Walter White’s exhausted moral compass and the onset of fanatical self-interest? That is close to what I was saying about the underground pressure in so many of us to carry our cash in hand, with properties and delicacies that will make our life rewarding at the end. Don’t jump to the liberal conclusion that the tremors of slavery are all gone now, not as long as poverty is as widespread an anxiety. Do not minimize how our culture has been telling us to expect the worst, and to be as deft as Butch and Sundance at handling it. Though that script required a merciful freeze frame. 

    There are people in the film industry telling themselves that the theatrical audience is going to come back with a rush. I’m not so sure, because we cannot be expected to ignore how the stuff “on television” is so much more adult and powerful than whatever mainstream movies can think of now. So we have relearned a condition that was there since the start of television: that it feels safer, warmer, and more personal on our own couches. We have liked the renewed intimacy of watching with our people (or alone — that last resort state is sinking in), and following the skilled, extended narratives into the night (the locus of solitude). 

    There is also another development that needs to be admitted. For many of us, with sophisticated television screens, the quality of the home image and the sound are more vivid. (Add headphones for the extra kick of secrecy.) We can get more detailed, brighter, more audible, and more enthralling on the “small” screen than the standards of theater projection, which are often casual or uninterested. This may sound like heresy, but you’d have to be an idiot not to notice it. 

    And in our watching now we are in terror of idiocy. If lockdown has been a kind of imprisonment, then we are inmates desperate to improve ourselves. So we are watching at home with a concentration that has not existed since the golden age of theatrical movies. But our commonality then required a shared space; and what we have now is solitude or the décor of selfishness. In that state it becomes fanciful to maintain the cause of responsibility. We are all slipping into a version of the bitter negation of Congress and its complacency that government cannot, and should not, work. 

    Our “cinema” is in tatters: we welcome the fatuous Mank and begin to forget Kane. Or think of it this way: A Quiet Place Part II (one of the few legitimate successes among recent theatrical openings) does well enough with its preposterous but cute plot situation, though not enough to overcome the fear of a franchising fix in that drab “Part II.” But put that beside the exploration — physical and social — of Albuquerque, Baltimore, New Jersey, Missouri and Berlin in the series that I am recommending. In all cases, the series show how thoroughly money and power are undermining society and our legal confidence. Does that remind you of anywhere you know? It makes me think of San Francisco, where I live, which in its unseemly marriage of money, smugness and squalor acts out the principle that America is not working. It’s not that there could be a realistic thought of making it great again, but can we find a decent way of existing without the melodrama of greatness? 

    The question in watching is whether we can still possess systems that help us see the truth. Or do the systems run us? This is in a context in which the infernal nature of our politics has been intensified because home-viewing has made us gather round the fire. George Floyd has become an archetype by being on our screens: we know that 9 minute 29 second shot by heart. The same can be said for the rolling coverage of the outrage of January 6, a disaster movie that goes on and on, not least in enrolling some observers in the contract that no, it wasn’t really a disaster, while leaving others bemused that it has not justified charges of sedition. Time and again, watching action on the street, our headlong movie keeps asking what we are seeing. 

    I realize that may seem like a naïve homily. But it leads me to this. It is still widely believed that the crises we faced during the Depression and the War (a lesser ordeal than it was for most other countries) were alleviated or made orderly by the spirit and dreaming of Hollywood pictures. That case is worth making, and like most movie sentimentalists I have often made it. But suppose we consider another interpretation: that in those dire years we were fed quite different messages that misguided our trust in white male prowess and authority, female obedience and adorability, and the customary belittling of people of color, of poverty, and of the visible affliction known as ordinariness. It is possible therefore that the vaunted American century, not without the material evidence of power and accomplishment, was built on treacherous ground in which all manner of deviant or ugly systemics were weaving a national fabric that betrayed the American project and covered up the murderous insecurities of the child nation and all its Norman Bates. 

    Inescapably, with so much likely to be happening in the area of “breaking news,” our lust for that breakage has led us into the rivalrous clamor of shows that like to think of themselves as ongoing news platforms, but which are really extended commercials for fixed points of view. Let’s call them Fox and MSNBC. I watch the latter and I assume that most of you are on the same side. But preaching to choirs stops critical thinking. Why does it have to be a matter of sides? Or is that structure as essential as the ads that humiliate any attempt at fact? And if you are intent on reform, begin by forbidding all advertising in our media. Yes, that is how unforgiving and demanding survival is going to be. And how unlikely. That is why you have your satchels ready. 

    How does a cool scientific temperament assess the constant hysteria of the same talking heads agreeing with the fevered questions that Rachel, Lawrence, Sean, Tucker and the others recite? There is no more room for internal argument among the “saved” at MSNBC than among the scoundrels at Fox. The biggest conspiracy among them all is that “we” are watching or caring. Isn’t it plain after all these years that if a liar as complete as Trump is still “on,” then there is no longer a body of “us” paying attention that you would want to belong to? Audiences bear responsibility, too; but we are trained to expect to be pleased. 

    To all of which any partisans would likely ask, “What’s the point then?” Or what’s the chance of leading our screens into an accurate and fruitful discussion of what is happening in our world? Is the reasoned and accurate deliberation for which our political and social system was piloted any longer viable — can it go to series, or an enduring franchise? It is as if we have given up our hopes for reportage in news programming, let alone the informed and reasoned argument over issues. We may deplore the retreat of Congress from governance, but that surrender is daily evident in what we still try to call television news. 

    So it is worth noting the bold chronicle testaments that television has offered in this time. The Underground Railroad is in that category. No matter its fictional atmosphere, or the use of actors reading lines, its intent is to uncover truly underground elements in American history, as the last viable way of making us angry. It asks what are we watching, and what are we seeing? Still, another dear friend, very smart and hard-working, and probably less systemically racist than me, told me that he could not face watching The Underground Railroad because he was so tired, he “needed to veg out.” We all know that retreat. 

    But there are other angry shows that might seem exhausting in prospect. Exterminate All the Brutes, by Raoul Peck, is no less than a diatribe against the Western white man’s true burden, his flagrantly incorrect account of his history in the underprivileged world. It is an HBO venture (with aid from Sky in Britain and Arte in France), and it is the Joe Frazier of such programs, loaded with hostility and an energy that keeps coming at you, no matter the ripostes of reason and the educated leftist leads you might throw at him. 

    Peck is Haitian, a politician and a filmmaker (he did films about Patrice Lumumba, the Rwandan genocide, and Karl Marx before I Am Not Your Negro), and he narrates his own picture in a snarly, incantatory way, like a worm burrowing into our skull. He fights tough (we might complain), but he is intent on clearing out the attic of jumble in which we won’t let go of Columbus, the Alamo, the bracing fun of fascism, or those myths inherited from Westerns. This is a work that throws acid in the face of the John Fordian cult that said — in Fort Apache (1948) and The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (1962) — that “when the legend becomes fact, print the legend.” There are few more damaging mottos in our bag of poisoned fortune cookies. 

    There is one more show to be mentioned, and I think it is the most compelling of them all, a masterpiece (if that boosting helps). What makes its introduction more timely is that you will not have seen it in America, and likely will not. Why is that? Well, the elusiveness begins in its narrative difficulty and its lyrically paranoid voice. It will not easily satisfy those commercial gravities, like Amazon’s decision that they should do The Underground Railroad, for prestige and awards. Yet Adam Curtis’s Can’t Get You Out of My Head will be a harder sell, not least because of its uncanny, seething assembling of items from the immense BBC archive (a Borgesian library of Babel) has probably not cleared the rights for international transmission. So Can’t Get You Out of My Head may pass into its most appropriate medium — that of underground communication, with smuggled links or incomplete Vimeo fragments. Or inexplicable samplers breaking into shampoo ads where Garbo’s head comes off and her teeth fall out in CGI horror at not being suave. The proper delivery of this extraordinary fermenting show is as rumor or legend. 

    I’ll say no more (to foster mystery), except that if you know and treasure Curtis from The Century of the Self (2002) and HyperNormalisation (2016), you may appreciate my opinion that no one was more prescient about the way towards the end of the dear old twentieth century an endless tsunami of internetting was erasing any confidence in fact or news or reporting and letting anxiety turn to havoc (we’ll be right back). You have to see it to feel the crystallization of waking in the dark and not knowing where you are. Real dark is coming back to us. The grid will start to falter and the lucid but manic voice of Curtis (he narrates the show himself) is what you are going to keep hearing. 

    The title that Curtis had chosen is significant, for while his shows are montages of what could be random selections from a Heisenberg archive where you can’t tell the particles from the waves (until you begin to see the beast of pattern emerging, like Grendel in the dark), still Curtis was formed, like many Englishmen of his age, as much by radio as television. The voice is a sacrament still, whether it is some message on the ether describing The War of the Worlds in 1938, or the yelp of Rachel Maddow from another room tonight as you re-reheat the pizza, or the implacable drone of Peter Coyote’s voiceover on the latest iteration of Ken Burns’s America as an idea that seems to have occurred once upon a time. 

    There were two missionary epistles from Burns in the epoch of our plague: in April 2021, with his longtime working collaborator Lynn Novick, he delivered a six-hour Hemingway; and then, working with his daughter Sarah and her husband David McMahon, there are eight hours on Muhammad Ali for September. Why not “honey still for tea” and twelve hours on Johnny Carson by Christmas …? 

    I’m kidding, in a Carsonian way. I have known Burns since The Civil War in 1990, and he is not just a likeable man, but an inspiring figure, so eloquent and persuasive that he might have succeeded in politics if he had not insisted on seeming so young and idealistic. Instead, to all our benefit, he created a kind of religion that uses old imagery and talking heads to make pioneering documentary (it owed something to traditions from Canada and the BBC), and he allied this skill and taste to the cause of PBS. The church became an industry, with album books to accompany major shows, and Burns is loyal still to PBS, even if that outlet feels increasingly archaic in America. Television is wilder and more surreal than the PBS model and Burnsian uplift can contain. 

    The two shows for 2021 were majestic in their scale and assurance, yet oddly empty or missing. The vitality of the two subjects was becalmed under the coverlet of their being American masters (one of the PBS series that owes so much to the Burnsian organization of palatable history). So we had pages of manuscript and rounds of boxing to make us happy tourists at the show, implicitly subscribing (a key word at PBS) to the Rushmore of American greatness. And there was next to nothing, within the testament of Edna O’Brien and Walter Mosley or the inside stuff from boxing journalists, to suggest that Papa and Ali might also have been tortured tricksters, driven mad by America, eternal compromisers and opportunists — like us. The nastiness of Hemingway was bypassed with the gentle but miscast voice of Jeff Daniels, except for one hushed moment from Tobias Woolf at how shocking the master could be. The sexual recklessness and shuffling identity of Ali could not compete with the apotheosis of that palsied torchbearer at the Atlanta Olympiad of 1996. 

    It could be said that both men were so smart it was hard to realize they were chumps too, not so much masters as victims of fame, a suicide and a punch-drunk case. In eight hours of Ali we never got to hear whether he wrote those verses himself, how many women he exploited, and where and how all the money went — or what he felt about it all. There was no inner person. As for Hemingway, it was hinted that he flirted with being deviant, but nothing in the show bothered to assess how his whole thing about male grace under pressure, the right stuff, and sentences like trout in fresh stream water was humbug from a very mannered prose stylist who did not want to write about his own nation and ended up getting the big prize for his worst book, The Old Man and the Sea. 

    The legend sailed on that America could deliver such heroes, and so it was sadder that the actual America had not lived up to Burns’ valiant hopes. Baseball has turned shabby. As for jazz, it is too clerical now and respectable. When I put “Parker” in my satchel, I meant …? It was Bird’s centenary during Covid, but I’m not sure his lyrical outrage is heard anymore. The national parks have not tamed or excused the wasteland. 

    That said, Burns and Novick made a masterpiece in The Vietnam War in 2017, in part because that eighteen-hour film relied on the witness of ordinary victims, including those from Vietnam, and because it could not get the notion out of its head that in those 1960s and 1970s, from The Quiet American to the helicopters tipped into the ocean, the United States gave up its ghost. That is our proper starting place. 

    But the country now seeks vengeance against betrayers and a safe courtyard for its precious isolation. As if that norm is there to be had. As if our enlightenment can be seen before the grid starts to falter. 

    The Legend of Alice Neel 

    The language of art is embodied in paint and line on canvas or paper, in stone or clay or plastic or metal — it is neither a sob-story nor a confidential whisper. 

    LINDA NOCHLIN 

    What makes an artist great? For the duration of the cultural drought that engulfed the plague year, as the rates of illness and death rose, there was hardly an opportunity to consider so decadent a question. Museumgoers were starved, subsisting largely on virtual exhibition tours and Instagram profiles dedicated to Old Master paintings. The ersatz screen-gallery is uniquely numbing. Zooming into and then scrolling through post after post of factureless paintings is like kissing through a sheet of glass. There is a semi-spiritual sensation which can grip a viewer who comes face to face with the actual product of a master’s hands. Standing in front of a genuine work of art, it is possible to enter the charged liminal space between one’s own mind and the artist’s. If one knows how to look, to silence all distractions and concentrate attention entirely on the work alone, the space between the two minds becomes asymptotic, and the capacity to see the world through the eyes of another human being, a brilliant human being, is within reach. This experience is possible only in proximity to the original. 

    When word of the vaccines’ efficacy was reported like the olive branch in the dove’s beak, the art-craving population was in no position to be picky. Museums were opening again and we would eat whatever was put on our plates. This is generally true of the public, pandemic or no pandemic: it will admire what it is told to admire by the appointed experts, but it is especially true regarding visual art. Most people have no idea what makes it good or bad. It is rattling to be confronted by images for which one is unprepared by prior certifying opinions, for which one has no received framework. Many people assume that if a painting hangs on the wall of a museum and they don’t like it, they simply don’t get it. It’s just not their thing, which is not to say that it is in some way objectively deficient. On the contrary, many readily assume that their lack of interest or understanding is a measure of their own shortcomings. It is hard to trust your own judgement when you feel that you are being tested for your cultural literacy. The line of least resistance — to join the consensus and celebrate what is being celebrated — has its rewards. 

    And so, last spring, ravenous and trusting hordes flocked to the Metropolitan Museum of Art for Alice Neel: People Come First. It was Neel’s first retrospective in New York in over two decades. The show had been conceived in 2018, but the delayed opening was serendipitous: in 2021, after a year of perpetual political agitation, in which it seemed as if the same inequities that Neel spent her lifetime protesting were laid bare, “a champion of social justice” (so characterized by the museum website introducing the exhibition) who created “images of activists demonstrating against fascism and racism” as well as “impoverished victims of the Great Depression… portraits of [her] neighbors in Spanish Harlem, leaders of a wide range of political organizations, [and] queer artists and performers” was positioned to model the progressive mood. Neel’s work, said the Met site, is a testament to New York’s “diversity, resilience, and [the] passion of its residents.” A harmonic convergence of politics and culture was occurring. How felicitous it was that Neel’s social consciousness was so aligned with that of her curators, and so pertinent to the political and social upheavals that overran our quarantines. Is it odd that the museum’s webpage mentioned nothing about Neel’s paintings qua paintings, or her skills as an artist qua artist? Maybe not anymore. 

    Who was Alice Neel? What could one expect to learn about her relationship with color and form from a visit to this show? Poring over books and catalogs of her work, the particular energy with which her portraits vibrate is obvious even in reproduction. (She was primarily a portraitist, though she did produce cityscapes and still lifes). Neel painted emphatically. Her late works, which are her most famous, were painted between 1960 and 1984, when she finally was awarded the recognition that she had been awaiting for decades. The books show that the later pictures are brighter than the earlier ones, airy, with stretches of canvas often left blank. She painted people of all shapes and colors. She painted herself, with a strange mixture of candor and complacency, when she was 80. Vitality shrieks across every page. No matter the subject, every pictured canvas gyrates with her idiosyncratic energy, with which one feels a burgeoning familiarity before ever having seen the paintings in person. And so the encounter with the real thing promised to be exciting. 

    “You paint like Alice Neel,” a friend of mine observed when, a year or so ago, he found my Instagram profile and scrolled through samples of my paintings. He made his remark just after the pandemic cast a curtain over the planet, greatly diminishing my chances of seeing one of her works up close. Since that initial instance a handful of others have made similar observations, and so it was with mounting interest that I scheduled my first post-pandemic trip to New York, and my pilgrimage back to the Met. On the appointed day, sketchbook and pencil in hand, I stood in a long queue of masked museumgoers snaking towards the exhibition, sketching the Rodin sculptures which lined the corridor as quickly as I could, with mixed results, before moving onward. 

    At long last the guards granted entry. Seeing the paintings themselves felt a bit like stumbling into a room full of Insta-influencers without the beautifying photo filters or other prettifying maneuvers. I tried very hard to like what I saw, not least because I had spent all that time turning those pages and speculating about the artist with whom I was supposed to have an affinity, but it was no use. I had anticipated thick planes of paint layered deliciously against each other, the way they are in, say, a Leland Bell self-portrait; or delectable Theibaud-like spreads, cakes of radiant palette-knifed colors, satisfyingly overlapping and cutting off one another. Instead, Neel’s portraits felt flat, unexpectedly wan, almost deflated. Hungrily I moved from painting to painting, sketchbook opened to an expectant blank page, searching for something nourishing to copy, some morsel to fold up in paper and take home. But she defeated me. I could find nothing worth lingering over, nothing from which to learn. I shuffled dutifully from one simplistic composition to another, growing irritated by the consistently clumsy perspective, the ghoulish body proportions, the increasingly predictable color choices, the amateurish lines, the unpersuasive fingers, arms, and legs: the startling lack of technical skill. 

    Neel’s mythologized energy was there alright, everywhere, in every face, and even in her buildings and trees. In Aliceland every creature looks like Alice, which is to say, each one was a caricature, and sometimes almost a grotesque, thinned and twisted in a denatured space, their bodies and faces siphoned through her pumping, righteous spirit. Here was Adrienne Rich, from 1973, which looks more like a cartoon than the work of a gifted portraitist. Here was Dominican Boys on 108th Street, from 1955, in which the two bodies are simultaneously swollen and compressed. The best that can be said of this painting is that it looks like outsider art. Did Neel not know how to draw a body? Was this screaming inadequacy a statement of some sort — was it irony, or authenticity, or primitivism? And did no one else notice? Had everyone —museumgoers, curators, critics — conspired to pretend that they could not see what was in front of them? There was nothing brilliant or stimulating or moving about Neel’s interpretative freedoms or her way with a brush. Work after work was shallow, underwhelming, visually vulgar, fully captured in a glance. To paraphrase C.K. Dexter Haven, to hardly know a Neel painting is to know it well. 

    Perhaps I was missing something. After all, there is a consensus. I moved from one room to the next, chewing on nutritionless paintings like popcorn, searching for evidence that would justify the received view. Then I arrived at a place in the show in which the curators had done a very cruel thing to Alice Neel. There was a wall of works done by artists whom they claimed had influenced her. Like visitations from another world, there hung a van Gogh and a Cassatt, and most explosively there was a Soutine — a still life of a rayfish with its belly sliced open, bloody entrails spilling out onto a white tablecloth. Here was something to linger over, and long. Poor Neel didn’t stand a chance. 

    This was a globby and disturbing feast of brushed, carved, and splattered paint. Soutine also has his own eccentric energy, his own refusal to be inhibited by perceptual or painterly decorum, his own contempt for the canons, but there is nothing simplistic about him. I stopped and stared, and continued to stare. I marveled at the glimmers of blue inside the fish’s guts and on the tablecloth. I was smitten by the exquisitely subtle green line on the inside of the pitcher’s handle. How had he known to put that there? Had he used a knife to carve those grooves inside the fish’s fleshy underbelly, as if he were cleaning the fish itself? Imagine the motion he must have made with his hand to create those lines. And that enflaming flash of red running from the bottle towards the blood! How had I not noticed that at once?

    The answer is that this is not a picture that reveals itself at once. There is so much happening in this painting, so many whirlpools and eruptions, so many unexpected details in which representation and abstraction pool into each other — and yet the composition is somehow stable and balanced. How had he designed this chaos so that it hummed? Did he plot it all first, or was he gripped by some kind of exalted frenzy — did it spill out of him like the guts onto the cloth in paroxysms of paint and power, in the end creating a unity that he could not have explained? I recalled an apocryphal story of a film crew recording Matisse while he painted his mural on the wall of a chapel in the south of France. After he watched the film, he angrily accused the crew of perpetrating a deception: “You made it look like I knew what I was doing!” I smiled gratefully at the Soutine. Hardly any of the other viewers were drawn to this corner of the show, so I could stay as long as I liked. When I was satiated, and also drained, I left the exhibit, just glancing at the rest of Neel’s works on my way out. Soutine’s roiling, indigestible table had exposed her thin digestibility. 

    On my way out I paid my respects to the Courbets and the Corots that live in the tiny galleries off the main artery of that wing. This, I thought, is what the Met is for. (And their modern equals, too.) It is now the largest art museum in the United States, with a permanent collection of over two million works, and it is among the most powerful art centers on the planet. The might and the money that it has accrued since its founding in the nineteenth century are reflective of the importance that American culture and society once imputed to art — art, not politics, or fashion, or even social justice. What was an Alice Neel retrospective doing under this roof? 

    “If I ever write a biography,” Alice Neel used to say (she meant autobiography), “I’m going to call it I Am the Century. I’m four weeks younger than the century.” She was born on January 28, 1900. Neel’s faith in her own strengths seems to have been first fed by her contempt for Colwyn, Pennsylvania, where she was raised. Life in a dull town can have that effect on a restless soul. Her marrow-deep commitment to her own artistic drive began in Colwyn, which she left in 1921 to attend the Philadelphia School of Design for Women (now Moore College of Art). Neel’s lifelong commitment to communism — she was the only living American artist to have a show in the Soviet Union, which she financed herself in 1981 — was inchoate in college, where she was acutely aware of what her political heirs would call her privilege. She said of that time, 

    I worked so hard because I had a conscience about going to art school. Not for my own family, but for all the poor in the world. Because when I’d go into the school, the scrubwomen would be coming back from scrubbing the floors all night. It killed me that these old gray-headed women had to scrub floors, and I was going in there to draw Greek statues. 

    Some have maintained that her political orientation was developed in Havana, where she lived briefly with her husband, Carlos Enriquez de Gomez, whom she married in 1926, but really the stirrings started while still in Philadelphia. (She and her husband soon separated, though they never divorced, and she had many other lovers, and children with other men in addition to the two she had with him.) 

    Neel joined the Communist Party in 1935. Her commitment to the CP was total and unreconstructed: decades later she admired Fidel Castro, and did sketches and etchings of Che Guevera. Her poster of Lenin still hangs in the kitchen of her Upper West Side apartment now maintained by her family. Throughout her life she contributed writings and illustrations to Communist publications such as the Daily Worker and Masses & Mainstream. It must be remembered that in those years the CPUSA was the strongest force advocating for African Americans and women in the country. (The year Neel became a member was the same year that the CP founded the National Negro Congress, headed by the socialist and civil rights activist A. Philip Randolph.) In his book Artists on the Left, Andrew Hemingway claims that Neel was “representative of that type of woman artist and intellectual who gravitated to the CP because — whatever its limitations — it offered the most sustained critique available of class, racial and sexual inequality.” At that time, and certainly in her milieu, the Party was the popular social movement, so it is not surprising that she joined. It was her continued, unmodified commitment to Communism that was out of the ordinary: “She remained absolutely a kind of stalwart in her public support of Communism in the USSR,” Hemingway writes. 

    Neel was a profoundly political painter. Her work’s reputation has been buoyed by three cycles of leftist politics: Marxism (1935-1960); second-wave feminism (1970-1984); and contemporary progressivism (2010-2021). For the first three decades of her career, Neel was part of the Social Realist movement, which emerged after the Great Depression and was funded largely by the WPA. At its height the WPA employed over five thousand artists — “everyone was on it,” Neel used to say, “Pollock, Rothko, everybody.” In her book Art and Politics in the 1930s: Americanism, Marxism & Modernism, the historian and critic Susan Noyes Platt argues that artistic movements that emerged in the 1930s can only be understood through a political lens: “Characterizing the thirties in terms of individual artists and styles, the traditional methodology of art history, eliminates the ideological forces and political arguments that shaped the art. This fact is most obvious in the case of Social Realism. Speaking of a Social Realist ‘style’ separates the production of the artwork from its complicated position within the Popular Front, the Communist Party and the New Deal.” 

    Social Realist artists such as Neel, Charles White, Ben Shahn, the brothers Raphael and Moses Soyer (with whom Neel was friendly and whom she painted in 1973), Isabel Bishop, and Reginald Marsh painted works that championed the working class. In this early period especially, Neel was particularly emblematic of this style. The historian Gerald Meyer observed that she “represented an exemplar par excellence of the Party’s hopes for a socially conscious contemporary artist. Her paintings were accessible art, which depicted ordinary people of all races and ethnic backgrounds in ways that captured and dignified their actual state of being.” While living in Spanish Harlem, Neel was moved to capture life as a member of the working class in New York in the aftermath of the Great Depression. 

    Communism was the political movement that influenced Neel’s artistic choices, but feminism is the one with which others have most consistently associated her since the 1970s. When Neel was given a retrospective at the Whitney in 1973, one critic aptly noted that “it is no accident that Alice Neel is finally coming into her own at this point in time, when it is fashionable to ‘discover’ neglected women artists.” Though the upward shift in Neel’s career began in 1960, when Frank O’Hara agreed to sit for her, it was not until the 1970s, a decade into second-wave feminism, that she achieved celebrity. Then as now, feminists kindled to her supreme confidence, to her unabashed faith in her own merit. Neel was a woman who believed that she deserved to be lionized. She regularly called herself a genius and referred to her work as revolutionary. Of Nazis Murder Jews, which she painted in 1936, her biographer Phoebe Hoban quotes her as saying that “if more people had paid attention to that painting earlier, fewer Jews would have been killed.” (The painting depicts a demonstration against Nazism, in which a man in the foreground holds a sign that reads “Nazis Murder Jews,” and in the background a mass of protestors hold signs emblazoned with the hammer and sickle. This was clearly a Communist event, and apparently neither Neel nor the radicals whom she depicted cared that Soviets also murdered Jews.) Such megalomania is never attractive, but in a woman in Neel’s lifetime it seems to have been mesmerizing. 

    In an interview about Alice Neel in 2008, Linda Nochlin (whom Neel painted in Linda Nochlin and Daisy in 1973) argued that Neel’s ego is a constant topic of discussion only because she was a woman: “When a male artist does that you think oh Picasso, why shouldn’t he have that, he’s a genius but of course when a woman artist does that they become a prima donna or an egomaniac, but she was acting like, you know, artists have often acted.” There is no gainsaying, of course, the egotism of male artists. But Nochlin’s defense of Neel misses the point. It is certainly true, as she herself established in 1971 in her epochal essay “Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?,” that centuries of social norms and structural conditions made it much harder for women to aspire towards greatness in the arts, and it was not until very recently that women were allowed to study in art schools at all, and in the manner that men did — and so it was impossible for any woman to establish herself in that world without a “good strong streak of rebellion” and “total inner confidence.” Neel had both, and her causes — racial justice and gender justice — were good causes. What she did not have was the talent to warrant her wild confidence in her own historical importance. (Picasso did.) 

    I do not mean to argue against the self-confidence of women, obviously. A rebellious woman is usually an admirable woman. I mean only to suggest that there is no correlation between rebellion and talent; and also that being on the right side of a social struggle has no bearing upon the aesthetic status of a work of art. Alice Neel’s idea of her own significance is devastatingly refuted by what hangs on the museum’s walls. 

    Neel’s belief in her own powers is relevant to a consideration of her art because it fueled her work. Understanding this element of Neel’s legend is central to understanding her stardom now. Despite several decades with little professional success, in which practically her only supporters were fellow radicals, Neel stayed at it; and when she finally made it, she did not sell only her work, but also her legend. In truth she had to rely upon her story, because she was a woman, and because her work could not stand on its own. By the end of her career, she regularly gave interviews and slideshow presentations of her paintings that were spiced liberally with risqué stories of her past and acidic smackdowns of fellow artists. (“Am I being vicious? Well, maybe just a little vicious.”) Her myth was charming; she was a hit. 

    But then there is the underwhelming work itself. Gallery-goers and critics alike persist in describing her artistic prowess almost as if they are describing some other artist’s work. Her paintings are regularly characterized as mercilessly and richly realistic, as if the viewer is staring at a Neel but seeing a Freud. Throughout her biography Hoban quotes uncomplimentary reviews of Neel’s work as if they are glowing. Of her Whitney retrospective, the reviewer in ARTnews reported that 

    Neel’s style… fall[s] somewhere between van Gogh and Mad magazine. Her colors, gangrenous greens and blues, have the lurid off-key quality of early color television. Offensive to the sensibilities as Neel’s painting can be, they have an ungainly, engaging counter-charm. They can be understood as a major contribution to the high caricature tradition of Daumier that relatively few fine artists have explored. 

    In a characteristically baffling evasion, Hoban writes that this review “with a few humorous disclaimers, highly praised the work,” as if the wicked impiety of Daumier was the ideal to which Neel’s pious paintings aspired. Of other reviews of the same show, Hoban remarks that one critic compared Neel “to Miss Jean Brodie in her prime,” as if such a comparison were a compliment. She continues: “The reviews of the show were more or less glowing. Neel snagged a brief write up in The New York Times, which said, ‘Alice Neels portraits… strike somewhere between benevolent caricature and expressionism as a vehicle for personal release.’” Again, as if this were a good thing. 

    Some other details of Neel’s reception are harder to spin. The retrospective at the Whitney was curated by Elke Solomon, then curator of Prints and Drawings, rather than Marcia Tucker, then curator of Paintings and Sculpture. This seemed to suggest that Tucker did not consider Neel worth featuring. Solomon herself later said that she did not think Neel was an important painter, but that she was given a retrospective because “she was a woman painter who represented a kind of paradigm of someone who persisted in making paintings that represented a certain ideological position.” Bingo! We are getting to the heart of the matter. 

    The survival of the legend of Alice Neel, and its contemporary flourishing, is not owed to her art. It is owed to her politics, and to the politics of our reputation makers. Neel is a progressive saint, and her portraits are icons of the progressive faith. The curators at the Met intuited correctly that Neel’s paintings of black and brown bodies are of a piece with today’s social justice movement. The Neel show, their veneration of her paintings, may be seen as their contribution to the movement. 

    If the curators at the Met disagree with such a conclusion, if in fact they do consider Neel a great artist, they are not notably interested in saying so, or in discussing this dimension of her legacy. In the entirety of the catalog for Alice Neel: People Come First, which includes six essays, only the last essay has more than two paragraphs of description about her artistic choices. All the others consider Neel primarily in a social and political context. Even that final installment, which is about Neel’s relationship with abstraction, is laden with politically charged descriptors like “masculinist formalism” and “feminist innovations,” as if an exploration of something so high-minded as figurative versus abstract art must be justified by the political implications of the analysis. 

    Pardon my naivete, but I thought that the essay called “Painting Fruit” in the catalog would be about Neel’s still life paintings. Silly me. It is a portrait of Neel as ally of the LBTQ community. Fruit is euphemistic, you see: “a veritable orgy of phallic bananas overfills a bowl in the foreground [of one painting].” (I was under the impression that the association of homosexuals with fruit has long been regarded as a slur. Maybe only progressives are allowed to use it.) The catalog of the Neel show is quite startling for the paucity of its discussion of her artistic impact, her artistic technique, and her artistic development. Like the show, it is really just an admiring study of her politics. 

    On June 5, 2020, Kelly Baum, who curated the Alice Neel retrospective at the Met, was doing what many thoughtful Americans were doing in the summer that George Floyd was murdered: looking to history for guidance through the paroxysms of horror and hope that were buffeting us all. On her private Instagram account Baum posted several photographs of Neel portraits, accompanied by the following text: 

    The anti-racist movement needs feminists as allies and god knows white feminists have not always been good allies often the opposite, in fact. I’m…. recalling the activists/socialists/feminists that Alice Neel painted (Mercedes Arroyo, Alice Childress, Irene Pelikis, Faith Ringold) who took an expansive view of liberation, one that triangulated class, race and gender. I wish Neel had painted bell hooks and Angela Davis too — the timing would have been right but the place wasn’t. 

    Baum was not speaking here as a curator. She was merely offering some thoughts to her few hundred followers, who might have been struggling with the same questions as she was. If she wishes to swoon over Angela Davis, it is her right. In the exhibition catalog for the show, however, Baum was not writing as private citizen, but with the authority of the Cynthia Hazen Polsky and Leon Polsky Curator of Contemporary Art at The Metropolitan Museum of Art. In “Anarchic Humanism,” the first essay in the catalog, she and her fellow curator Randall Griffey offer a description of their project: “Besides foregrounding her often under-recognized artistic accomplishments [which they do not go on to describe], this publication positions [Neel] as an artist who engaged with progressive politics throughout her lifetime and attends to her place in the larger cultural history of the twentieth century.” Is this what curators are now trained to do? 

    Evaluating art based on its politics supports both bad art and bad history. The few lame attempts made in the catalog to establish Neel’s importance in the history of art are flecked with dubious and occasionally outright false claims. For example, consider the bizarre statement made by Baum and Griffey on page 22: “In West Harlem Neel also launched one of her most groundbreaking bodies of work: pregnant nudes. This subject is rare in the history of Western Art but Neel’s blunt, forthright manner of representing the distended bellies of expectant mothers is simply without precedent.” This claim is preposterous, as anyone who has flipped to the few pages of colored photographs in Hoban’s biography (which is the least the curators of the retrospective should have done) would know. There, on page 267, Neel’s painting Margaret Evans Pregnant (1978) is reproduced alongside Egon Schiele’s Red Nude, Pregnant (1910). (In the description beneath Neel’s painting, Hoban has helpfully written that “it closely resembles Egon Schiele’s painting Red Nude, Pregnant.”) There are indeed paintings of nude women with distended pregnant bellies that predate Neel’s picture; a cursory search yields examples from Hendrick Goltzius (1599) to Otto Dix (1932). 

    Of Andy Warhol’s work, Neel once remarked that “it may not be an important contribution to art, but it shows great powers of adjustment.” If what Neel meant by “great powers of adjustment” is that Warhol’s success was evidence of a cultural shift, and that he magisterially worked the shift, and possessed a canny sense of his time and his place, the same could have been said of Neel towards the end of her life. It is certainly true that her curators show great powers of adjustment. Their resuscitation of Neel now is evidence of the persistence of the political temperament that she pioneered. It may not be an important contribution to art, but it confirms the triumph of politics in American cultural institutions. 

    A curator ought to be able to answer the question “What makes an artist great?” We should not expect the staffs of our museums to know what makes a political activist a great political activist, or what makes a feminist a great feminist. Nor should we come to them for such judgments, which are nothing more than their opinions. If they admire Neel’s feminism, good for them — as it happens, so do I; but they are not experts in what is right or wrong. The fact that Neel was willing to advocate proudly for herself and to defy the constraints imposed upon her gender tells us nothing about the quality of her art. (Neel herself said that there is no such thing as a feminist way of painting, and that there is no difference between the way a woman paints and the way a man does.) And what would these engagé curators do about artists whose politics they do not share? What about the monarchist masters, and the fascist masters? The walls of our museums are full of fine pictures made by people with politics that liberals and progressives consider reprehensible. 

    “Bad” politics can generate good art. “Good” politics can generate bad art. Will we ever know this again? 

    The Exclamation Point

    For Tom at seventy in Zion

    Sergio Sierra was born in Rome in the winter of 1923. When he was twenty-six years old he received rabbinical ordination, after which he assumed a rabbinical post in Bologna, where he assisted in the reconstruction of the shattered Jewish community. The embers of history’s wildfires had not yet cooled. The great synagogue in Bologna, built by a well-known local architect in a sensitively adapted Art Nouveau style, had been destroyed in a bombing raid in 1943, and it was not until a decade later, and under Sierra’s supervision, that its restoration would be complete. Sierra served in Bologna until 1959, when he left to take up a prominent pulpit in Turin, and to direct its rabbinical college. His talents were not only clerical. The community rabbi also published erudite papers in scholarly journals on modern and medieval themes in Jewish literature. He produced a translation into Italian of Rashi’s commentary on Exodus, and a translation of Bahya ibn Paquda’s eleventh-century masterpiece Hovot Ha’Levavot, or The Duties of the Heart, a monument of Jewish reason and piety, and a translation of Keter Malkhut, or The Kingly Crown, an epic philosophical prayer in rhymed verse by the eleventh-century poet Solomon ibn Gabirol, who has been beloved by readers of Hebrew for a millennium. He also produced a critical edition of one of the most curious works of medieval Jewish literature, the Hebrew translation of Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy by an early fifteenth-century Jew in Perpignan named Azariah ben Yosef ibn Abba Mari, also known as Bonafus Bonfil Astruc, who fled to Italy from persecution in southern France and was one of the very last figures of the golden age of Provencal Judaism. Sierra was yet another of the many rabbinical figures in the annals of Judaism who managed to combine a pastoral calling with an intellectual one, leadership with learning. He served in Turin until 1985, and in 1992 he moved to Jerusalem, where he died in 2009.

    In Rome, immediately after the war, when he was twenty-two, Sergio Sierra bought a book, a small book, about a hundred pages long, and small in format too. It was a translation into Hebrew of Theodor Herzl’s The Jewish State. It had been published a year earlier in Tel Aviv under the auspices of the Department of Youth Affairs of the Zionist Federation, and the fine translation was by Asher Barash, a distinguished Hebrew writer and editor who came to Palestine from Galicia in 1914 and became a founding father of Israeli literature. (He was also the author of perhaps the first Hebrew work on literary theory, which is a terrible responsibility to bear.) When the young man acquired the volume, he proudly stamped his name and address all over it, including on the dust jacket, right above the canonical image of Herzl with his weirdly Assyrian beard. I know all this because I discovered the book in the basement of an antiquarian bookshop in Jerusalem. No doubt Sierra’s heirs had rid themselves of his library. We latecomers fill our shelves from the philistinism of the sons and the daughters.

    But I did not acquire this book — I did not seize on it — for bibliophilic reasons. Herzl in Hebrew is not hard to find. And at the time I had no idea who Sergio Sierra was. What happened was that I opened the book and was shaken to my core. On the front endpaper Sierra had inscribed his name in Italian and in Hebrew, Sierra Yosef Sergio, in a fine hand, and next to his signatures he recorded the date of his purchase. “1945,” he wrote — but not just that; he also underlined “1945” — but not just that; next to “1945” he also added an exclamation point. “1945!”

    The exclamation point undid me. The entirety of a man’s spirit and the entirety of a people’s spirit was in it. It denoted astonishment: we are still here. It denoted ferocity: we really do intend to exist. It denoted resolution: we are still in our fight for the mastery of our fate. It denoted vitality: even now we are strong. It denoted politics: a state will be ours. And it denoted incredulity: could it really be that on the morrow of the greatest catastrophe in the history of these intimates of catastrophe there appeared this book in this language from that city and that land, and it made its winding way to the trembling hands of this ashen Jew? The young man was a believer, and the exclamation point was, for him, a punctuation of providence. I see no metaphysics in it myself, but I do not have the effrontery to deny the intimation of the miraculous that it granted in the rubble.

    In all the years that I have been its custodian, I regularly turn to the little volume to behold the exclamation point. The sight of it fortifies me and refreshes my purposes. Emphasis is one of the central activities of identity. We are known by our emphases. The emphatic gesture of Sergio Sierra in Rome in 1945 has an elevating effect. And also an emboldening one, because we have reached a troubling point in time, less than a hundred years after he penned his inscription, in which the exclamation point must be defended. Was its truth obvious in 1945? It is obvious no more. The despisers of the principles for which it stands are growing in number, not least among Jews. Where there once was an exclamation point, there is now a question mark.

    The story that I have just told would be dismissed by Omri Boehm as “Zionist Holocaust messianism.” Boehm is the most recent in a long line of critics of Zionism who have attributed its success to the Holocaust, when in fact the structures of the Israeli state were built before the Shoah, and the only “upside” of the catastrophe for Israel was to buy it a few guilty decades of sympathy in the world. Boehm’s formulation is incoherent: there are indeed messianists among those who call themselves Zionists, but Zionism represented a repudiation of Jewish messianism, which it disavowed in favor of a new conception of Jewish agency in history. And there is no such thing as “Holocaust messianism,” which is a vaguely obscene phrase. In Boehm’s view, the utility of the Holocaust for the Jews — we are again skirting obscenity: imagine a serious discussion of the utility of slavery for black people — is that “the Holocaust remains opaque to reason and stands outside of normal politics.” He explains: “Emerging from this ahistorical transcendent mystery, Israel remains beyond universalist politics and moral critique.”

    To establish this claim, he devotes many pages in his book Haifa Republic: A Democratic Future for Israel, a rich document of the new thinking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to Elie Wiesel’s theological response to the Holocaust, which he associates with the writer’s lifelong disinclination to criticize Israeli policies. This is nonsense. No, not the bit about Wiesel’s apologetic attitude toward the Jewish state, whose existence he (and survivors like him, and the children of those survivors) could never quite treat as a natural fact of world history. It is true that the large-souled Wiesel disliked controversy and might have played a more helpful role in those moments in Israel’s history when its conduct was worthy of “moral critique.” There were times when I beseeched him, futilely, to do so, to teach, to castigate, to clarify, because many Jews were confused and angered by certain Israeli actions; and once I came to him with a bundle of Biblical and rabbinical texts — he knew them all, of course — that taught the obligation to criticize one’s own. About these matters we agreed to disagree, because we detected in each other the same over-arching love.

    But Boehm is hiding behind Wiesel so as to propagate a caricature of Zionism and its ethos. The response to the Holocaust in the Jewish world was not primary theological, even if the catastrophe did crush many frameworks of explanation. (For whom is suffering of such magnitude not a mystery?) There was certainly nothing “ahistorical” or “transcendent” about the nationalism that roused the Jewish people and established a state. Zionism and the state that it created were among the greatest triumphs of secularization in the modern era, a resounding historical and philosophical rupture, a genuine discontinuity, even if the social authority of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel is a hideous anachronism that should be abolished right after tomorrow morning’s prayers. Zionism, and Israel, is assuredly not “opaque to reason,” though a sickening amount of unreason now flourishes within it. Jewish nationalism proceeded not only through settlement or force; it grew in reasoning, in argumentation, in persuasion, addressed to both Jews and non-Jews, since its very inception. Nor does it stand “outside of normal politics.” It is a cauldron of normal politics, whatever one’s view of the current brew. Its founding documents are an application of “universalist” values to a particular people — a tense enterprise, but an admirable one. The Jewish state is not an occult entity and it is not immune from criticism. No state and no movement and no person is exempt from the duty of self-justification, especially about the treatment of others. Like generations of Israel’s critics before him, Boehm complains that criticism is forbidden. Meanwhile whole careers are made out of it.

    I have never met a Zionist who would not have preferred to persevere in the nationalist cause for another hundred years and Auschwitz not happen. Indeed, the tragic element in the relationship between the Holocaust and Israel is that the chronological order of extermination and statehood was not the reverse of what it was. If Zionism had accomplished statehood — which was not its common goal until 1942, owing to the excruciating events in Europe — a decade earlier, millions of Jews — millions of human beings — might have been saved. Can we all agree to react unambivalently to this fantasy, to share this regret? I wonder. We are witnessing instead an outpouring of lofty regret that Israel was created at all. This nasty ruefulness is owed to certain views of the Palestinian problem, not all of which are entirely incorrect. Fifty-three years of occupation, with no end in sight, is a miserable reality, violations of rights and laws are commonplace, heartlessness abounds, and the frustration is overwhelming. A feeling of despair about the plausibility of a two-state solution, an Israeli state and a Palestinian state, is everywhere, and it suits the cynical and irresponsibly short-term interests of both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. There are no heroes in the leaderships of this conflict.

    Now the feeling has been turned into an idea, known as the “one-state solution.” In such a state, as Boehm describes it, Jews and Arabs in the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea would each enjoy “a sub-sovereign political autonomy with a constitutional federative structure.” He has written his book to call for the end of Jewish sovereignty and the invention of a Switzerland in the Levant. The dissolution of a state — an actually existing state, not an ideological or political hypothesis — is a high price to pay for a release from exasperation. If this were medicine, we would call it quackery and demand an investigation. “At some point”, Boehm declares, “one must admit that the two-state dream has faded into a two-state illusion.” Nowhere does he prove that this is really so. He shows only that the two-state solution will be difficult to enact, and that the political will to enact it is now lacking. Is this not true also of the one-state solution, which upon inspection may be no solution at all? But I am getting ahead of myself.

    The pertinence of the Holocaust to an understanding of Israel is not as a demagogic shield against disagreement, or as a sanctuary for yet another cult of victimization. Nothing large or lasting was ever built on self-pity. In this context the Holocaust stands for a particular lesson about Jewish history, and Zionism is nothing if not a conclusion drawn from Jewish history, or more precisely from the experience of the Jews in the exile. I do not mean to say that the exile was one long death camp. The exile was not completely (in the famous word of a great historian who hated the notion) lachrymose, not at all. But it was lachrymose enough. The frequency of Jewish wretchedness in the exile, of discrimination and oppression and violence, urgently broaches the question of Jewish security and insecurity. Jews in the exile were sometimes happy and sometimes unhappy, and they attained to extraordinary heights of thought and literature and spirituality, but they were generally unsafe. There were no havens. They lived in perennial vulnerability and permanent subordination.

    For some writers and scholars, from George Steiner to Daniel Boyarin, the powerlessness of the Jews was morally glamorous, and their “subaltern status” was the condition of their cultural refinement; and it is certainly true that if the Jews over many centuries did not commit certain crimes, it was partly because they lacked the power to do so. But powerlessness does not confer purity. It confers pain and death. There is no virtue in vulnerability. The Holocaust was the worst that happened to the Jews in exile, but — contrary to Jewish theologians and historians who numinously insist upon its “uniqueness” — it differed from earlier persecutions in degree but not in kind. The Nazis innovated new methods for old evils. The helplessness of the Jews in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s is unbearable to contemplate, but so is their helplessness in Ukraine in 1648, and in the Iberian peninsula between 1391 and 1497, and in Germany in 1298, and in the Rhineland in 1096, and in many other times and places that are too numerous to list here. They are plentifully documented in the annals of Jewish tears. There are many differences between these specific events, which it is the duty of historians to mark, but they should not obscure a certain bleak political commonality.

    Sooner or later Jews were going to see that for their own good they needed to acquire politics and power. But nowhere in Boehm’s book, or in any other espousal of the “one-state solution” that I have seen, is there a shred of interest in the question of Jewish security. In one passage Boehm writes sneeringly that “Israel is designed to protect Jewish ethnicity, Jewish blood,” as if the Zionist insistence upon self-defense is racist. (This slander reminds me of the awful charge that is sometimes made against the motto that “black lives matter.”) No, brother; not Jewish blood, Jewish bodies. They need to be protected, not only on the grounds of their human rights, which even people with armies possess, but also if they are to reconcile with their neighbors. Anyway, the power of the State of Israel was not developed for purposes of conquest and expansion, even if that power, like all military power, has sometimes been abused.

    The military strength of the Jewish state is an ethically and empirically warranted dispensation. Self-defense is a corollary of self-emancipation, or “auto-emancipation,” which was the founding axiom of Jewish nationalism. Is it really necessary to be reminded that Israel has vicious and lethal enemies, and that a large portion of the enmity that it has encountered has been provoked not by its actions but by its existence? There are many ways in which the Holocaust has figured too prominently in contemporary Jewish identity, but it is cheap of Boehm to describe Zionism as “a sort of Angst-based mythical Holocaust messianism.” There is nothing mythical about the suffering and the Angst is real. Jewish anguish is not the only anguish that counts, of course, but it must not be coldly discounted, especially by people who pride themselves on the exquisiteness of their empathy.

    The internecine Jewish debate about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is sometimes portrayed as a quarrel between those who care about Israeli security, the hawks, and those who care about Israeli morality, the doves; but in truth security is itself a moral duty. I wish the rulers of Gaza would grasp this. Safety, too, is a right. Ensuring it is one of the primary duties of government. (As long as thousands of rockets are launched into Israel, the Iron Dome system, and the consequently low casualty statistics in Israel, is not an unfair advantage; it is the evidence of a state’s seriousness about protecting its population.) For this reason, there is also nothing ethically scandalous about the insistence that there must be a Jewish majority in Israel. This is not an undemocratic majoritarianism, unless one holds that all majoritarianism is undemocratic. After all, there will be a majority in a one-state entity, too — a Palestinian majority, which does not seem to trouble the proponents of the exciting new idea. For some reason they are confident that a Palestinian majority will fulfill the ideal of equality more scrupulously than a Jewish majority has done. They have not yet disclosed the historical basis for their optimism.

    Until the political borders and the ethnic borders of a polity — state, province, canton, district, whatever — coincide and perfect social homogeneity is achieved within a single political framework, which will never happen, and for the sake of the moral and cultural development of the citizenry should never happen, there will be majorities and minorities, and the supreme responsibility of a diverse polity will always be to regard minorities democratically, equally, in full and active recognition of their rights. A multiethnic state, which is what all states are, whether they know it or not, cannot escape this duty, which will require it, in the name of social peace and common decency, to control the maximalist and authenticist and exclusivist incitements of each of the groups within its borders. This is the case with the State of Israel, and it will be the case, inshallah, with the State of Palestine, and it would be the case even with the State of Isratine, which was the name that Muammar Qaddaffi gave to his proposal for a binational federated one-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians. (#StrangeBedfellows.) What will determine the justice of any of these compound political entities will be their determination to deploy the principles and the practices of democracy to resist the temptation of ethnic tyranny. There is nothing anti-democratic about the nation-state. It all depends on the character of its governance.

    The concern about Jewish numbers is nothing more sinister than a concern about Jewish security. The nightmare is simple: it is that one day Jews will need to flee to safety and a majority non-Jewish government will deny them entry. There is nothing paranoid, or even fanciful, about such a scenario. It is not “ethno-nationalism,” it is prudence. One of the more outrageous aspects of the new proposal to abolish the Jewish state is that it is being advanced at precisely the moment when anti-Semitism is dramatically on the rise. The old crisis that Zionism was conceived to address, the primal emergency, is back. The higher rates of Jewish emigration to Israel in recent years have been a classical flight for safety, and the highest numbers of Jewish emigrants over the last decade have come from countries whose Jewish communities have been shaken by anti-Jewish violence. Jews and Jewish institutions are being attacked on the streets of many cities, often in the name of Palestine. When Prime Minister Netanyahu — how nice it is to type those words retrospectively! — told the Jews of France to “come home,” he was speaking uncontroversially from the standpoint of Jewish history. (Uncontroversially, that is, for those who have given up on the pluralistic prospects of France. The other French Jews, the majority of them, the ones who have chosen to remain in the fight for the Enlightenment traditions of the country, are certainly in a good fight.)

    Why aren’t Ilan Halimi and Sarah Halimi household names? Jews are still in need of refuge and Israel is still a refuge for Jews. But anti-Semitism does not particularly interest progressives, because it interferes with too many of their dogmas. Never mind that what happened at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh was exactly what happened at Mother Emmanuel church in Charleston. The parallel is ideologically inconvenient. Jews, you see, are white (even when they are brown or black), strong, and privileged oppressors, and they are most perfectly exemplified by Israeli soldiers who shoot at Palestinian children. And so the Jews have been stricken from the canonical roster of threatened groups and scorned identities. It is now considered inclusive to commemorate the painful past of every group except ours. We have the unique honor of being disqualified from intersectionality. Who needs Israel, anyway?

    For Boehm, who is an Israeli philosopher in New York, Jewish majoritarianism is another example of the “bad faith” of liberals, their way of concealing their own acquiescence in ethnic hegemony. In his account, there are only two parties to the debate now: those who are for his “federal binational republic” and those who, whether we know it or not, are objectively for ethnic tyranny and ethnic cleansing because we support the existence of a Jewish state. He detests us, the hawkish doves, the democratic statists, the liberals. His hatred of Israeli liberals is tiresome in the old radical way, according to which liberals are progressives who dare not speak their name or reactionaries who dare not speak their name, but they must in either case be destroyed. Of course liberalism is no more a sign of cowardice than progressivism is a sign of courage. (These days the percentage is in progressivism.) And modern history provides abundant evidence of the calamitous consequences of the radical contempt for liberalism: it has regularly assisted in bringing the worst to power.

    In support of his exercise in simplification, Boehm reverently cites that most dubious authority on Jewish and Zionist subjects, Hannah Arendt, who in 1944, after the Zionist Organization of America adopted a resolution calling for a “democratic Jewish commonwealth” in “the whole of Palestine, undivided and undiminished,” grimly proclaimed that Revisionist Zionism was now “victorious.” In her view, Zionism turned into fascism when it desired a state. “Seventy-five years later,” Boehm writes, “we can see that Arendt was dead right about the collapse of Zionism into its hard-right Revisionist interpretation.” Yet a student of history can see no such thing. Only three years later those same rapacious Zionists joyfully agreed to accept only a part of Palestine, very divided and very diminished, for their commonwealth, when they accepted the United Nations resolution of partition. (The Palestinians were the Revisionists.)

    For the haughty Arendt, as for Boehm, all distinctions are erased: everything to the right of the left is the same. I am reminded of a heated argument I once had with Amos Elon when he loudly announced over dinner that he would not vote in the Israeli election of 1992 because there was no difference between Yitzhak Rabin and Yitzhak Shamir. A year after Rabin beat Shamir, the Oslo accords were signed. Boehm, like the Israeli right, gloats over the failure of that breakthrough. We liberals mourn it, its flaws notwithstanding, because we know how difficult it is to accomplish even a little good and to push evil even a small way back, and because the status quo, which Boehm deplores, really is deplorable. But David Grossman and Moshe Halbertal are not standing in the way of its amelioration.

    The argument for the one-state solution comes with a politics of memory. Or more precisely, with a politics of anti-memory. Its proponents contend that the stasis between the Israelis and the Palestinians — no, there is no stasis, the situation constantly worsens — is the result of Jews remembering too much or remembering too little. Naturally Boehm trots out Nietzsche on the abuse of historical consciousness and the inhibiting effects of memory, though he, like everyone else, has events that he chooses to remember and events that he chooses to forget. He twice quotes, and twice misreads, Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi’s haunting question, “Is it possible that the antonym of ‘forgetting’ is not ‘remembering,’ but justice?” Yerushalmi was not, to put it mildly, hostile to memory; he wrote an entire book lamenting the failure of more critical modes of historical awareness to do for a living culture what memory once did. The point of his remark is, quite obviously, to suggest that remembering is a condition of justice, which cannot be advanced by forgetting.

    Boehm, by contrast, calls for forgetting. “It is time to restore a binational Zionism — with a strong notion of equal citizenship in a one-state solution,” he writes. “One way we can do this is by developing an art of forgetting, a politics of remembering to forget the Holocaust and the Nakba in order to undo rather than perpetuate them as the pillars of future politics.” There are two chapters in Boehm’s short book about this summons to forgetfulness, one about the Holocaust and one about the Nakba. Both of them, a little comically, are about the Jews. We remember our disaster too much and their disaster too little. But there are no injunctions to the Palestinians about the selectivity of their own memories, about their interpretations of their own historical narrative and its political uses. Why would there be? They have the past right, because they are the victims, without historical capability, with no good or bad choices that are relevant to the discussion, just the brutalized objects of Jewish representations and troops. The memories of victims are simple and sacred.

    For many decades I used to wander like an itinerant fire-and-brimstone preacher among the Jewish communities of America, chastising my brethren for certain failures that in my view imperiled the future of our people and our culture, and one of those failures is their inability, or their refusal, to understand what the events of 1948-1949, and more generally the raising of a modern society in the sands, meant for the Palestinians. In school, a fine Zionist school, I was taught that the Palestinian refugee problem was created by the flight of Palestinians at the behest of their leaders. Even before Benny Morris settled the question once and for all, I suspected that the explanation was too tidy and too self-exculpatory. I am the son of refugees, and I have always associated refugee status with prior cruelty.

    Moreover, I do not believe in the innocence of states, of any states; even in a just cause, innocent blood is spilled. (About this the pacifists are right.) The war of 1948-1949 was a just war for the creation of a state that had a right to exist and a need to exist, and also a war of self-defense, but massacres and expulsions were perpetrated. We must not lie, especially to ourselves. The mythmaking powers of national feeling are well known, and they must be corrected by historical and ethical accountings. None of this, of course, absolves the Palestinians of their own mythmaking, and certainly not of the many repulsive falsehoods that their leaders have promulgated over the years about the Holocaust and the Jews. Still, as Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin has incontrovertibly observed, “Israel, a state of refugees, was built on the creation of a state of refugeehood.” One has an obligation to become acquainted with the people with whom one will always live. It is past time for Jews to know, and to honor, the Nakba.

    “The art of forgetting” is no more a guarantee of mutual respect than the art of remembering. Atrocities have been the work of people who believe that they are nullifying the past and beginning again, just as they have been the work of people with ancient grievances to avenge. (Sometimes they are the same people.) Collective memory needs to be carefully and morally managed. I want Palestinians to remember the Holocaust and Israelis to remember the Nakba, because otherwise they will not comprehend each other. I want Jews to remember the Holocaust and Palestinians to remember the Nakba, because otherwise they will not comprehend themselves.

    Moreover, the culture of Zionism was already quite practiced in the “art of forgetting.” I do not refer only to its tendentious interpretations of Jewish life in the exile. Revolution requires a sensation of newness, and so it always erases and exaggerates. Thus, to choose a prominent example, in 1942 the Hebrew writer Haim Hazaz wrote a short story — an essay in fictional form, really — called “The Sermon.” It describes a fiery statement given to the central committee of a kibbutz by an otherwise meek member of the community named Yudka, which can almost be translated as “Jew.” “I wish to announce,” he tells his comrades, “that I am opposed to Jewish history.” And more: “I do not respect Jewish history…No, ‘respect’ is not the word. It’s what I said: I’m against it.” And more: “I don’t accept it…Not a single detail. Not a single line, not a single point. Nothing, nothing…None of it!” Also sprach Yudka!

    This program of revolutionary amnesia, this ferocious rejection of inherited ways, this contemptuous avant-gardism, did not work out so well. It was eventually responsible for bitter fissures in Israeli society and culture, and for the slow collapse of Labor Zionism. No arrangements between the peoples in the land will succeed that are based on the denial of the wounds that they seek with those arrangements to heal. The most that we may permit ourselves to dream of is a coexistence of traumas, of haunted communities.

    The meaning of national identity is not only morbid. One of the blandishments of security is the protection of immanent flourishing cultures. It is well known that alongside “political Zionism” there was “cultural Zionism”, though the former also had cultural preferences and the latter also had political preferences. The political preferences of cultural Zionism have played an important part in the argument for a one-state solution. A distinction is drawn between cultural self-determination and political self-determination, between cultural self-determination and statehood. Statehood, it is said, is not required for cultural fulfillment, for Zionist fulfillment, for Jewish fulfillment. There is some truth to this claim, as the early history of Judaism illustrates: it was Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai, when he petitioned the Roman commander of the siege of Jerusalem to grant him a small coastal town for the creation of an academy of Torah and never mind the fate of the commonwealth, who made Judaism as mobile as the soul and thereby freed Jewish culture from what might be called the Ozymandian anxiety. We have learned about many cultures from their ruins, but Jewish culture is not one of them.

    So isn’t cultural self-determination Zionism enough? The question has been posed heroically by Peter Beinart, in his timely journey leftwards. If the world were flat, Beinart would have fallen off it a long time ago. He has a reputation for courageous dissent against the Sith Lords of the American Jewish community, which is why he is the darling of Jewish millenials everywhere. “You know,” he once scolded me, “criticism can be an expression of love!” Actually, I did know this. “Yes, it can,” I replied, “but it cannot be the only expression of love.” Beinart is deeply worried that his rejection of a Jewish state — “I No Longer Believe in a Jewish State,” he grandiosely proclaimed in the New York Times — will be mistaken for a rejection of Zionism. He aims for heresy, not apostasy. That is why, for example, he has a strange habit of ornamenting the expression of his views with assurances about his religious observance. One afternoon I found him on CNN screaming at a conservative pro-Likud interlocutor that he worships in an Orthodox synagogue and even leads the prayers there. So what? I presume that many of the worshippers in his synagogue disagree with him, since it is an Orthodox congregation. When they lead the prayers, are they right? Beinart is just shul-washing.

    In order to prove that he is not anti-Zionist or post-Zionist, Beinart must locate a definition of Zionism that will give him cover, and identify a current of Zionism that would be satisfied with a political objective short of Jewish sovereignty. As it happens, the history of Zionism is rife with non-statist conceptions of Jewish self-determination. Neither Herzl (the title of his momentous book notwithstanding), nor Pinsker, nor Ahad Ha’am, nor Jabotinsky (some of the time), nor Berl Katznelson, nor David Ben Gurion (some of the time), nor any of the other titans of Jewish nationalism were animated in their work by the goal of sovereignty — until the Biltmore program of 1942, as I noted earlier. It is worth noting that the Biltmore program made no mention of a “Jewish state,” but called for called for “ending the problem of Jewish homelessness” by “establish[ing] a Jewish Commonwealth” which “welcomes the economic, agricultural, and national development of the Arab peoples and states.” A terrible hardening!

    Beinart relies heavily for his new thinking — if his thinking seems so fresh, it is because his knowledge is so recent — upon a splendid book called Beyond the Nation-State: The Zionist Political Imagination from Pinsker to Ben-Gurion by the Israeli intellectual historian Dmitry Shumsky, whose previous study of Zionism in early twentieth-century Prague skillfully shed light on the origins of bi-nationalism. With exquisite scholarship, particularly about Pinsker and Jabotinsky, Shumsky shows that statism was a late development in Zionism, which pictured the Jewish homeland to which it aspired in sub-statist or bi-nationalist terms, and mainly as autonomy within a larger political framework. Shumsky’s analysis seems unimpeachable to me, and also to Boehm, who quotes him at enormous length. But Shumsky’s narrative does not quite provide the Zionist alibi that one-staters and “cultural Zionists” such as Boehm and Beinart seek.

    For a start, the broad outlines of Zionist political thought, its evolution from autonomy to sovereignty, have long been familiar. I learned about the bi-nationalist tradition in Arthur Hertzberg’s seminar on Zionism fifty years ago. Shumsky has discovered new trees in an old forest. More importantly, there is a plain historical explanation for the trajectory of the Zionist political imagination. It is that all these figures, all these builders, lived and worked in imperial circumstances. The Ottoman empire and the Hapsburg empire were the contexts in which the idea of a Jewish homeland was first developed. It was conceived in the terms of its time, on the model of those tolerant multi-ethnic entities, in which the civil and cultural autonomy of ethnicities flourished in the absence of political power, which was held exclusively by the imperial authorities. The Nationalitätenstaat, or “states of nationalities,” that inspired Zionist intellectuals and activists was a notion of Austrian Marxists who were promoting the benign imperial conditions in which they lived into their ideal. The question of sovereignty, in other words, was moot. Shumsky is perfectly clear about this.

    But the empires are gone now. Is it progressive to be nostalgic for them? When the empires collapsed, sovereignty became possible for the nations that they contained and states were formed, as would happen again later with the end of the British empire. Subordinated peoples began to associate self-determination with political power. The Palestinians — who were subordinated to Arabs before they were subordinated to Israelis — would eventually express a similar desire. The vocabulary of self-determination had changed. And in the case of Zionism, there was another reason for the escalation of its political ambition. Its name was Hitler. Is it really any wonder that in 1942 the Zionists chose statehood? Was a rescue from extermination to be found in autonomy? Would a millet have saved the Jews?

    In the judicious conclusion to his book, Shumsky presents his own assessment of the relevance of pre-statist Zionism to the contemporary predicament. He notes “the ever-increasing pervasiveness of a bi-national existence between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea resulting from the repeated failures of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and the constant expansion of the Israeli settlement enterprise beyond the Green Line.” In the light of these discouraging developments, he continues, “one is sorely tempted to pluck the Nationalitätenstaat formula from the Zionist past, to rescue from oblivion the repressed and deliberately forgotten attachment to mainstream Zionism, and to place them squarely on the Israeli and international agenda as the old-new federative alternatives to the apparently no longer viable two-state solution.” This is precisely what Boehm and Beinart and the other high-minded nullifiers of Israel are proposing. But Shumsky is not one of their company. We “would be well-advised to beware of such temptations,” he cautions.

    After all, following many generations of a bloody national conflict and given that Israel’s ongoing control over the occupied territories both Israelis and Palestinians continue to live alongside one another in separate institutional constellations, it is by no means certain that an attempt to reapply the binational models that occupied a central position in the political imagination during the Ottoman and British Mandate periods would meet the current “living concerns” of the two peoples…. Zionism’s conceptions of national self-determination were never subject to a single static political model but were rather reformulated at each given point in time in line with changing historical circumstances.

    (I wish the same historical flexibility could be imputed to the leaders of Palestinian nationalism.) Finally Shumsky elects to disobey the title of his own book and arrives at the sober conclusion that “Israel’s political consciousness would do well to embrace the notion of the division of the Land of Israel/Palestine into two nation-states.”

    Boehm’s advocacy of the autonomist option leads him in an unexpected direction — to the admiration of Menachem Begin. In 1977, after Anwar Sadat’s magical visit to Israel, Begin prepared a plan about the Palestinians for the imminent peace negotiations. It was called “Home Rule, for Palestinian Arabs, Residents of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District.” It was a surprising proposal. Most surprisingly, perhaps, it insisted that the question of sovereignty be left open. Though “security and public order” in the territories would remain in the hands of Israel, the plan terminated the Israeli military government in the occupied territories and established a Palestinian civil authority, headquartered in Bethlehem, whose officials would be democratically elected and provide “administrative autonomy.” It extended a choice of citizenship, full citizenship, for Palestinians in Israel. Palestinian refugees would be permitted to return “in reasonable numbers,” as determined by a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian committee. Palestinians in the occupied territories would enjoy “free movement and free economic activity,” including the purchase of land, as would Israelis dwelling there. Boehm affectionately, and ludicrously, declares that Begin’s “autonomy plan” should more properly be called “the one-state program.”

    Boehm blames the scuttling of Begin’s plan on — who else? — Israeli liberals, who, “deferring to the two-state orthodoxy,” denounced it because they suspected that it was the prime minister’s attempt to fob off the problem of the West Bank on an Austro-Hungarian fantasy. Given Begin’s ideological and oratorical record, there were grounds for such a suspicion. I shared it myself, though I hoped ardently that I was wrong. For there was another element in Begin’s plan that encouraged me: “these principles will lend themselves to re-examination after a period of five years,” he stipulated in his famous speech to the Knesset in 1977. I remember thinking, a Palestinian flag could fly over a Palestine in 1982! Of course it did not come to pass, but not because of anything uttered by Amos Oz. The opportunity was squandered because Yasser Arafat refused to consider Menachem Begin’s proposal.

    The Palestinians turned autonomy, “the one-state program,” down. The rais chose instead to give hysterical speeches and interviews about sumud, or steadfastness, in the PLO’s war against the fascist and colonialist enemy. “The Palestinians,” Boehm writes, “seeking sovereignty, rejected it.” But they did not dismiss the plan because they were seeking sovereignty. They dismissed it for a deeper and less reputable reason: they were not prepared to recognize and to respect the being in the world of Israel. And Boehm’s six words about the Palestinian rejection of Begin’s plan are just about all there is to be found in his book about the role of the Palestinians in the story of the infernal stalemate, which is typical of the progressive prejudice in the discourse about the conflict. This manifesto for a state of two nations is about only one of them.

    Why are Boehm and Beinart so confident that in a single state the lions will lie down with the lambs? What do they know about them that the rest of us do not? Boehm calls his utopia the “Haifa republic” in homage to the decades of Arab and Jewish coexistence in the northern coastal city. There “you get a glimpse of what Palestinian-Jewish cohabitation could one day look like.” He is somewhat prettifying the place. Arabs constitute only twenty-five percent of Haifa’s population: the harmony of the city is owed in part to the small size of its minority, which does not threaten its majority. One of the reasons that we reactionary proponents of the two-state solution long for the establishment of a state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel is so that the minority numbers in both states will make neither of the majorities jittery. The jitteriness of majorities promises trouble. Also, Haifa is not quite the idyll that Boehm depicts. It experienced its own share of the awful Arab-Israeli violence of last year. The assumption that a union of Israelis and Palestinians in a single country is an easy prescription for peace is delusional.

    Beinart, who could use a little sumud of his own, peddles different reassurances. In an essay in Jewish Currents, he moistly reports that “a new generation of Palestinian activists has begun advocating one equal state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.” He has seen the future and it works. Of course it is no wonder that Palestinians, young or old, would endorse the idea of a single state, because that state, owing to demographic realities, will be Greater Palestine. This is the dishonesty in the argument: to be for one state is to be for a Palestinian state with a Jewish minority. Time, as two-staters have grown hoarse from warning, is not on Israel’s side. Still, I have met a few such young Palestinians and they do indeed represent a break with the immobilism and the illiberalism of the Palestinian establishment. I do not doubt their commitment to the principle of equality, even if I cannot suffice with it. It is certainly a thin reed with which to dismantle a state.

    I used to pin my hopes on new people, on new generations. I have since discovered that all the generations contain all the varieties of human types, and that people change. In 1993, a few days after the handshake at the White House, I met with Nabil Shaath, one of Arafat’s key advisors and an architect of the Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement. He was a worldly man, a rational man, a successful businessman, a longtime member of Fatah who became a minister in the Palestinian Authority. We had become friends, I liked him, and I brought him to lunch at the infamously Zionist magazine where I worked. He arranged for a few Israeli and American Jewish advocates for peace, including myself, to meet with Arafat at his hotel in the evening after the handshake. The chairman, he said, wanted to thank us. (Every negative impression I had of Arafat was confirmed by those few hours on the sofa.) At our meeting after the signing ceremony, Nabil spoke in noble and eloquent terms about Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, and about building democracy in Palestinian society. He also talked with uncanny moral and historical sensitivity about the Holocaust. I was exhilarated. Then he moved to Ramallah and became one of the worst kleptocrats in the region and issued despicable pronouncements about Israel.

    Equality may be honored, or dishonored, in one state as in two states. What will tell is the prestige of the principle in the respective political cultures. The enumeration of rights “without distinction of religion, race, and sex” in the Israeli Declaration of Independence has not always been realized in the state that it launched, but it furnished the intellectual, legal, and social foundation for the quarrelsome and reformist politics, the persistent critique of inequality, that has characterized the public discourse of that state, rather in the way that the American Declaration of Independence provided the grounds for criticism of certain repugnant passages in the American Constitution; and Israel’s founding document stands as a lasting rebuke to the contemptible “Nation-State Law” that Netanyahu and his xenophobic supporters manufactured a few years ago. There is a struggle taking place in Israel for the values that will define it, and the struggle is by no means lost. And there are resources for it, for the humane side in it, in the Zionist tradition itself. (“Do you, like the medieval inquisition, fail to understand that diversity is life, and that only death is featureless?” Leon Pinsker wrote that golden sentence in 1861 in a short-lived journal called Sion.) But “cultural Zionism” cannot make a contribution to a struggle over the direction of a state that it wishes to obliterate.

    The political culture of the Palestinians, by contrast, has so far been, let us say, a stranger to the Enlightenment. I do not say this to offend, or with glee. The happiness of my people depends in part on the philosophical condition of the Palestinian people. In the internecine Palestinian war between democratizing forces and theocratizing forces, we, I mean Jews and Americans, must unflaggingly support the former. “If you believe in equality, how can you create a state which claims members of a certain race, or certain religion, belong to it more than others?” Beinart asked in an interview. He was right. He was referring, of course, only to Israel. But it is, in fact, a perfectly Israeli question. Beinart flatters himself about his moral fineness. Political Zionists and two-staters are plentifully to be found in the ranks of the egalitarians. Why are his professions of this shared belief any more credible than ours? Is his formula really so spotless, so devoid of dangers? Can one injustice be righted by another injustice? The Palestinians have for a long time asked that piercing question, but some of their tribunes should ask it also of themselves.

    His interviewer aptly inquired why Beinart’s denunciation of sins against equality does not extend also to Muslim countries, which have not exactly covered themselves in glory in this regard; and the question reminded me of my own disgust with the reticence of the left about Syria, Ukraine, Belarus, Myanmar, Hong Kong, Cuba, and the other locations of authoritarian horror. How in good conscience can one march for Palestinians and not for Syrians? “True,” Beinart replied, “there are other countries who violate this principle. In my opinion, they need to be reformed.” Yes, reform them! But he is not demanding that Israel be reformed. He is demanding that Israel be eliminated. Beinart is breaking new ground in progressive politics: he is cancelling an entire country. I know of no other state whose unjust treatment of others has thoughtful people calling for its erasure. There are concentration camps in China.

    The Israeli occupation of the West Bank, which originated in a war for survival, has been transformed by religion and chauvinism into a moral disgrace for a state that calls itself, and largely is, open and lawful; and the unceasing settlement of the West Bank has been perhaps the greatest strategic blunder in Israel’s history — a nuisance from the standpoint of security, and utter madness if the Israelis are ever genuinely to coexist with the Palestinians. The Palestinians deserve security, and dignity, and identity; and the attributes of nationhood, which include political ones. But no amount of sympathy for the Palestinians warrants this amount of antipathy for the Israelis. They, too, deserve security, and dignity, and identity; and the attributes of nationhood, which include political ones. It has long been known that nationalism is an affair of collective subjectivity: one people cannot dictate to another people how they should represent themselves to themselves, or to others.

    Brit Shalom was an association of formidable Jewish intellectuals, founded in Jerusalem in 1925, that advocated a binational state of Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Martin Buber was its most famous member, whom Peter Beinart likes to cite as his precursor. In the end nothing came of it, because it found no Arab interlocutors: it was a conversation that Jews were having with themselves. As Arthur Ruppin, the sociologist who was its chairman, remarked in a letter, “what we can get [from the Arabs] we do not need and what we need we cannot get.” In 1936, in a volume of essays called Jews and Arabs in Palestine, Ben-Gurion made a comment about Brit Shalom that is worth pondering. “We oppose Brit Shalom,” he wrote, “not because of its desire for peace with the Arabs, but because of its attempt to obliterate the Jewish truth, and to hide the Jewish flag as a price for peace.” There was nothing mystical about his statement, though “the Jewish truth” is a locution that can make a liberal squirm. Its secular meaning is simply that people are fulfilled, as individuals and as groups, in their particularity. Peace is gorgeous but contentless. We seek peace, and the security that is the premise of peace, as the setting for self-fulfillment.

    Jewish peoplehood is one of the most ancient facts of recorded history, and Jewish nationalism is the modern interpretation, according to the protocols of modern politics, of Jewish peoplehood. The people called the Jews constitute a primordial and independent element of the world, irreducible to its other elements, converging with them and diverging from them, and through all the convergences and the divergences remaining themselves and no other, changed but the same. Their story is one of the sublime human stories, and it deserves to command the attention and the esteem of all peoples. After they were expelled from their commonwealth and made slaves and subjects and serfs, with self-governance gone, the Jews learned to live in many cultures and many circumstances, and to combine adversity with vitality. To the world they offered a certain vision of God and goodness, but of the world they asked only to be allowed to be themselves. Yet their demand for apartness, their perseverance in their beliefs and their practices, was more than the world was willing to grant, because the insistence upon difference defied the need of other faiths for universal vindication, even by means of coercion. Suffering became a regular feature of the Jewish exile. The suffering never determined the substance of Jewish peoplehood, or of Jewish religion, not even in the worst of times. But the suffering had to stop, and nobody except the Jews themselves was going to stop it. The people that taught the world about the relation between history and redemption chose to act on their own idea, splitting themselves for the sake of saving themselves. Their self-reliance was both a revolution and a restoration. And so one day, long after they were supposed to have disappeared, in the very land from which they had been banished by empire, the wounded and hopeful people raised a flag. Insofar as “the Jewish flag” is the symbol of this saga — of the end of the suffering, of the reversal of the vast misfortune, of the efficacy of the victims against their own victimization, of the failure of misery to crush a civilization, of the beautiful stubbornness of purposeful survival, of the accession to freedom of the perennially unfree — insofar as the Jewish flag represents all this, then it represents more than statehood, it represents the energies and the potencies of a magnificent people, and it cannot be denied. It has flown over war and over peace, over stirring victories and wise compromises and sordid mistakes. Nobody is without guilt. Power will always be a challenge to wisdom. Introspection is another name for self-rule. Pity the people who need to suppress others to become themselves; pity them and resist them.

    Turning in My Card

    “How many Vietnam vets does it take to screw in a light bulb?”
    “I don’t know. How many?”
    “You wouldn’t know. You weren’t there.”

    In the American military, identity is an enduring obsession. Long before debates swirled through cultural institutions about the value of hyphenated American identities or the relative fixity of gender-based pronouns, the American military had already determined that identity supersedes individuality. Within the ranks, the individual means little, he or she exists as a mere accumulation of various organizational identities — your rank, your unit, your specialty — all of which stand in service to the collective. This obliteration of the individual begins in training, on day one, when every new recruit is taught a first lesson: to refer to themselves in the third person. You cease to exist, you have become “this recruit.” And you are taught, among the many profanities you might hear in recruit training, that there is one set of slurs that is most unforgivable of all: I, me, my. 

    This doesn’t last forever. I served in the Marines and one of the first privileges the Corps granted me on the completion of training was the privilege to again refer to myself in the first person. Except that I was no longer the same person. I was now 2nd Lieutenant Ackerman, my military identity had eclipsed my civilian one. This new identity placed me firmly within the military hierarchy as a junior officer, and from this position I would over years further build out my identity — and thus my authority — within the organization. I would pass through training courses that would give me expertise. I would go on deployments that would give me experience. And I would gain in seniority, which would give me rank. When in uniform, I would literally wear my identity. Badges of identity, indeed: eventually it became the captain’s bars on my collar, the gold parachute wings and combat diver badges that showed I had passed through those rigorous training courses, as well as the parade of multicolored ribbons that at a glance established where I had served, if I had seen combat, and whether I had acquitted myself with distinction. 

    All these colorful pieces of metal on my uniform served the purpose of immediately establishing my place within a hierarchy. Which is to say, the military obsession with identity is not really an obsession with identity at all; it is an obsession with status and rank. And so it has become in the cultural hierarchy of America, where identitarians invoke an elaborate taxonomy of hyphenations and pronouns with the zealotry of drill instructors. Ostensibly, this new language is designed to celebrate individual difference. In practice it annihilates the individual, fixing each of us firmly within an identity-based hierarchy that serves collective power structures.

    As a combat veteran, I have been the beneficiary of identity-based hierarchies for years. But this was not always the case. In April 2004, I took over my first unit, a forty-man Marine rifle platoon. We were based in Camp Lejeune waiting to deploy to Iraq that June. On a rainy day, when I asked some of my Marines to patrol around the base practicing formations we would soon have to employ in combat, Sergeant Adam Banotai, a super-competent (and at times super-arrogant) twenty-one-year-old squad leader in the platoon told me that he thought my plan was a waste of time. He had been to combat, and I had not. Even though I outranked him, he sat above me in an invisible moral hierarchy in which combat sits as the ne plus ultra of status. 

    I decided to respond to this minor act of insubordination. I brought Sergeant Banotai into my office and had him sign a counseling sheet in which I marked him deficient in “leadership.” I explained that leadership required loyalty both up and down the chain of command. By flagrantly refusing to follow orders he had been disloyal to me and, thus, a bad leader. When I explained that I would place this counseling sheet in his service record, Sergeant Banotai didn’t like it one bit. As he signed, he said, “What the fuck do you know about leading Marines, sir. I was leading Marines while you were still in college.” 

    Fair enough; but we still had to go to war together. Only a few weeks after the counseling sheet incident, out on patrol near Fallujah, my Humvee hit an IED. We were driving parallel to a long canal and I was first in the column of vehicles with Sergeant Banotai sitting a few Humvees back. He later told me that from his perspective I simply vanished in a cloud of dust and smoke. As hunks of shrapnel and earth plunked down into the canal, he was certain that pieces of my body were among the debris, and, in a macabre admission, later told me that he imagined having to fish my joints out of the putrid water. What had happened was that two artillery rounds had gone off right next to my door. Fortunately, the rounds had been dug in too deep, so that their blast fountained upward, over my head, leaving me with dust in my throat and ears ringing but little else. I then jumped out of my Humvee. Whoever had detonated the IED fired a few shots at us as I jogged back to Sergeant Banotai. He and I worked together to coordinate our platoon’s response, in which we searched the area and eventually carried on with our patrol. 

    After that day, everything changed. Our operations ran more smoothly, with no complaints. During off hours, Sergeant Banotai and the other NCOs came by my “hooch” to joke with me. We all got along. Several months — and firefights — later, I asked Sergeant Banotai about that sudden shift in attitude. At first he laughed off my question. When I pressed, he became a bit sheepish, even apologetic. “Well, you got blown up,” he said. “After that we decided that you were okay, that you were one of us.” 

    To this day his words bring to mind a moment in Oliver Stone’s Platoon, in which Charlie Sheen’s character, the doe-eyed new soldier Chris Taylor, after being wounded in his first firefight, returns to his platoon after a brief stay in a field hospital. An experienced soldier named King takes him to an underground bunker. Here the old hands are having a little party. When one of them asks, “What you doin’ in the underworld, Taylor?” King replies on his behalf, “This here ain’t Taylor. Taylor been shot, this man here is Chris, he been resurrected.” At which point, Chris joins their party, smoking dope and singing along to Smokey Robinson’s “Tracks of My Tears” along with the rest of the platoon. It is an incredibly human scene and — call me sentimental — I am moved every time I watch it, as it traces my own experience of rejection followed by acceptance born out of combat. Chris’s experience in the firefight has resurrected him. In the eyes of the group — the platoon — he isn’t the abstraction “Taylor” anymore; his spilt blood has made him “Chris,” an individual. 

    For a while, I resented Sergeant Banotai’s response. I was the same person before the IED attack as I was after it, no more or less competent. This need to classify me as “other” because I was not yet a “combat vet” felt capricious, indulgent, condescending, and so against the best interests of the platoon, which needed coherent leadership up and down the chain of command to run smoothly in combat. But of course the metrics of identity are typically arbitrary, and also typically they rarely serve the best interests of the group. Tribal by nature, identity fixates on difference, too often seeking to narrow, as opposed to enlarge, who merits membership in the tribe. Identity is as much, or more, a method of exclusion as of inclusion; it fortifies itself by casting others out.

    There is a famous Bedouin adage, which I first came across in Iraq: “I am against my brother, my brother and I are against my cousin, my cousin and I are against the stranger.” In this remorselessly reductive manner, through the accentuation of differences (as opposed to the assertion of commonalities), one group is pitted against another in perpetuity. In my case, I had power over Sergeant Banotai because I was an officer. In his case, he exercised power over me for a time because he was already a combat veteran. Again, identity is hierarchy, a wolf in sheep’s clothing.

    Eventually we returned from Iraq. Sergeant Banotai left the Marine Corps, shedding that identity, and we shed the attendant hierarchy, the system of rank that had once existed between us. A few years later, when he invited me to serve as a groomsman in his wedding, I was still on active duty. He invited me to wear my uniform to the wedding, if I wanted. I wore a suit instead. We were now simply friends, resurrected (to use King’s word) outside of identity and into individuality, where we remain to this day.

    When he returned from Vietnam, the writer Karl Marlantes went to work at the Pentagon in an anonymous desk job. He had seen the worst of war as a Marine, earning two Purple Hearts in the process. Then, slowly, his actions in Vietnam caught up with him and he received several further commendations, to include the Navy Cross, our nation’s second highest award for valor. In his memoir, What It Is Like To Go To War, Marlantes writes about the experience of earning these medals: “With every ribbon that I added to my chest I could be more special than someone who didn’t have it. Even better, I quickly learned that most people who outranked me, who couldn’t top my rows of ribbons, didn’t feel right chewing me out for minor infractions. I pushed this to the limit.” Marlantes stopped cutting his hair. He grew a mustache that he describes as a “scraggly little thing that made me look like a cornfed Ho Chi Minh.” Eventually, a more senior officer who had also been to Vietnam but “had nowhere near my rows of medals” called Marlantes into his office. “I don’t give a fuck how many medals you’ve got on your chest,” he said. “You look like shit. You’re a fucking disgrace to your uniform and it’s a uniform I’m proud of. Now get out of here and clean up your goddamn act.” 

    Reflecting on the incident in his memoir, Marlantes writes, “I can’t remember the man’s name. If I could, I’d thank him personally. He called my shit.” It takes courage to call someone else’s “shit,” particularly when their externally verifiable identity trumps one’s own. We all know when someone is tossing about identitarian arguments in order to evade the substance of a matter, confidently issuing assertions that cannot stand on their own logic and so instead they hoist themselves up on who, in some framework, they are. Typically, these special pleadings are spoken with that tired preamble, “Speaking as a…” in which the speaker telegraphs their intention to silence dissent through an appeal to identity-based deference, as surely as if they are standing on a golf course shouting “Fore!” down the fairway. As on the golf course, the objective of the intervention is for everyone to get out of the way.

    Rhetorically and psychologically, identity is often wielded as a weapon. Some identities cut sharper than others. I am descended from Ukrainian Jews on one side of my family and Scotch-Irish Texan wildcatters on the other. The world perceives me as a straight white man — a dull blade if I’m hoping to cut with identity. Except that there is one thing that corrects for my disadvantage in the identity sweepstakes and compensates for my dull archaic status: I am a combat veteran. Suddenly my blade is sharp! I am owed deference, and have the standing in the great American identity calculus to shut people up. Late in my military service, I came to understand how my identity accorded me such deference in certain situations, the ability to silence the dissent of those who might disagree with me when discussing, say, our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Some might argue that this is appropriate, that I have earned it. I don’t think so. The authority of experience certainly counts for something, but should it count for everything? Should only those who have the authority of “lived experience” be entitled to raising their voice on certain issues — on race, on gender, or, as in my case, on the critical issues of war and peace? Is Oliver Stone’s Platoon acceptable because he is a Vietnam veteran, while Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now is a work of “cultural appropriation” because he is not? Must one have been to war for one’s opinions about war to matter? 

    Consider an obvious example of the interplay between identity and art. The Catcher in the Rye is commonly regarded as a work of adolescent alienation, but I would argue that it is more properly understood as a war novel. J.D. Salinger was a veteran of the Second World War who landed at Utah Beach on D-Day and fought in the Battle of the Bulge and in the Hürtgen forest, and was among the troops that liberated the concentration camps — but generally he did not take on the war in his work, as if he knew that a limit existed as to what he could directly convey. Yet the voice of Holden Caulfield, for which the novel is renowned, is one whose provenance I recognized after returning from my own wars: it is the voice of the cynical veteran to whom everyone is “a phony,” the vet who wants to visit the ducks in Central Park, to recover to an innocence that will never return and perhaps never was. Take the novel’s last line: “Don’t ever tell anybody anything. If you do, you start missing everybody.” Those are quintessentially the words of a veteran. And yet Salinger scrupulously, as a matter of authorial intention, chose to omit his experience from his work, engaging with it obliquely. Do the new protocols of identity require that we put it back in?

    There is a philosophical problem here: how can you truly know what someone else’s experience is, or what access points he or she — or they, speaking of ever more recent complex identities — brings to a subject? I am not suggesting that identities are necessarily false, but they are certainly subjective, and we need to think more critically about the authority of subjectivity in our society. A good place to begin such critical self-examination would be to propose that there are no classes of people whom we should believe as such. We must show empathy, and make every effort never to begrudge it or hold it back, but after empathy we must inquire after truth, and evaluate the claims that are made on our conscience. Injury does not confer infallibility. Military veterans have sometimes misremembered the experience of battle, and sometimes even lied about it, and they are not immune, nobody is immune, from correction, from being called on “their shit.”

    The appeal to identity as the dispositive consideration in any debate is anathema to an open liberal society. Yet here we are. I recall reading a column by David Brooks in 2015, when the tide was beginning to rise on identity. His column was framed as a personal letter of appeal to Ta-Nehisi Coates on the occasion of the publication of Coates’s Between the World and Me, a book that not only touches on the black experience in America but also on the American experience itself and the validity of our shared experiment in creating a multicultural democracy. It is a book about its author, but also about all of us. Brooks did not agree with some of Coates’ conclusions, and his disagreement rattled him. “Am I displaying my privilege if I disagree?” he plaintively wrote. “Is my job just to respect your experience and accept your conclusions? Does a white person have standing to respond?” Those timid sentences are a kind of epitaph for free and candid — and respectful and constructive — discussion.

    Marlantes, when reflecting on his own standing as a decorated combat veteran, writes that “In the military I could exercise the power of being automatically respected because of the medals on my chest, not because I had done anything right at the moment to earn that respect. This is pretty nice. It’s also a psychological trap that can stop one’s growth and allow one to get away with just plain bad behavior.” This “psychological trap” is now the trap of our culture, in which identity confers authority; a culture that not only stifles the interest in the individual by reducing him and her to a representative and a spokesperson, but also further isolates those groups whose interests it purports to advance. 

    This has certainly been the case among veterans. Few groups in American life are more fetishized. We are elaborately thanked for our service, allowed to board planes in front of the elderly, and applauded at sporting events. Honoring us has become a secular eucharist. Yet when it comes to the devastating issues that disproportionately affect veterans — homelessness, suicide, political extremism — most people look away. Our insularity, our otherness, has done nothing to lift us up. In fact, it has hurt us. A citizen need only render their deference and then be on their way. Be wary of people who pay fulsome respect to your identity, because what they are actually paying respect to is identity’s twin: victimhood.

     

    The first time someone called me a victim was at a moment when I was very publicly engaging with my identity as a combat veteran. In retrospect, this correlation between identity and victimhood seems obvious, but at the time it was not. A group interested in international relations had invited another Marine and me to give a presentation about Iraq, specifically our “on-the-ground perspective.” This was a little more than a year after I had returned from the war. On that day I wore my olive green “service alpha” uniform with its khaki shirt and tie, and before giving my talk I was generously feted around the room by my hosts. It was a distinguished group and, as we sipped soft drinks and nibbled hors d’oeuvres, I learned that certain of the people in the room held rather senior positions in government, or at least positions many levels above a lieutenant of Marines. 

    The presentation began and my co-panelist and I made remarks, showed photographs from our deployments, and did our best to describe the conditions under which the war was being waged. We answered questions from a moderator, the majority of which focused on the tactics of the war as opposed to its strategic utility. In short, we spoke only as junior officers with combat experience.

    Then, when answering a follow-up question, my co-panelist made a comment about the Sunni tribes in al-Anbar province beginning to organize against al-Qaeda in Iraq. He regarded this as a positive development and contended that the United States needed to fully commit to this effort (which eventually become known as the Sunni Awakening) by “surging” even more troops into the country. He believed the war might soon turn a corner. Suddenly we were not talking tactics anymore. We were talking strategy, and he had veered outside the lane proscribed by his identity as a combat veteran. He was now speaking the language of policy among those who held senior policy positions. This was in 2006, a time when the war in Iraq was becoming extremely unpopular. When the moderator asked whether or not I agreed with my comrade, I said that I did.

    The moderator then solicited the next question. Hands shot up. An older woman went first. She asked how either of us could possibly defend the idea of sending more American troops to Iraq. My co-panelist reiterated his arguments — that al-Qaeda had overplayed its hand, that Sunni fears of Shia dominance in the newly formed Iraqi government created an opportunity that could undermine the insurgency, that it was worth making an effort to salvage the blood and treasure America had already expended. Did counterarguments exist? Of course they did. Did this woman engage us on the basis of those counterarguments? She did not. Her disagreement took an entirely different direction. She explained that we supported a surge because the war had made us victims. 

    “I’m very sorry for what you’ve been through,” she said. “But you are victims of this war. Given your experience, I have a hard time believing you can see the situation in Iraq clearly. Emotionally, you’re too invested.” Having made this declaration, she did not sit down, but remained standing in expectation of an answer. Politely, I explained that I was in no way a victim, that I had volunteered to serve in our wars and had volunteered again (I would soon leave for Afghanistan), that my opinions were rooted in my experience and my understanding of it, and that she was free to disagree with my arguments on their merits — but not on some specious claim that I was a victim of the very experience she had come to hear me discuss, and therefore no longer able to think as an individual. 

    The woman refused to relinquish the microphone until making a final point. Although she appreciated hearing an “on the ground” assessment from a combat veteran and continued to offer the somewhat obsequious respect that my identity commanded, I did not have her permission to repudiate the description of myself as a victim. According to her, the very fact that I refused to view myself as a victim was all the more proof that I was one, that the wars had damaged me. I had been blinded by my time at war to the wrongness of supporting any position except the swift and immediate termination of these wars, regardless of the actual conditions. (Never mind that my support for a surge was itself based on my “on the ground perspective.”) The only position that I could properly derive from my experience was one that coincided with her own.

    This incident has stayed with me not because it was unique — on later occasions I would again be called a victim — but because it was the first time that my relatively new identity as a combat veteran had served to disempower me. Another combat veteran, J.R.R. Tolkien, who fought in the First World War, provides an analogy. In his Lord of the Rings trilogy, Tolkien writes about the Rings of Power, particularly the One Ring which gives its wearer the ability to see and govern the thoughts of others; but it also slowly erodes the wearer’s vitality. In Tolkien’s trilogy, the humble hobbit Frodo, whom Tolkien modeled on the common British Tommy with whom he served in the trenches, is the only one who can bear the One Ring because of his pureness of heart; but even it calls to him and haunts him, robbing him of his strength and nearly spelling his demise. 

    Identity, even an identity confirmed by a chest full of ribbons, seduces in a similar way. It is a devil’s bargain — not a heaven in which one serves a nobler cause but a hell in which one reigns. When you wear identity, you can feel its power. But in the long run it takes more than it gives, leaving you bereft of your personal difference — a Gollum enslaved to its service.

    To escape this system of doctrinaire social evaluation, we must each disarm. Is it possible to displace those who brandish identity as a cudgel from the center of our culture to its fringes? Now that would be revolutionary. This would involve us no longer deferring to a person’s identity but rather to their individuality, and recognizing that individuality consists in more than the simple accumulation of sub-identities, the sum total of all our group memberships. Veterans occupy an interesting niche in the politics of identity. As a group our struggles are as real as those faced by other groups. The history of civil rights in America is also the story of America’s veterans; and we, too, enjoy inclusion in legislation with special protections, much like those dispensed to racial minorities and other marginalized groups — including equal employment opportunity, access to housing and education, and protections from targeted crimes. The important difference is that we are not born veterans. It is an identity we come to later. We choose it.

    When I was beginning my military career as a college midshipman, my enthusiasm to become a Marine was boundless. I wore my hair according to regulations (though I was not yet required to do so) and during vacations I found a way to volunteer for an internship gophering papers around the Pentagon. In certain ways I must have been insufferable. That is why, I suspect, a recently retired Navy SEAL Commander, who worked a few cubicles down from mine as a civilian, stopped by one morning. He stood well over six feet tall, and had fought in Beirut, Panama, and Desert Storm, before being forced into early retirement due to a parachuting injury. In sum, he was an intimidating fellow who embodied much of what I hoped to become. Until that morning he had never taken much of an interest in me, and with just the two of us in the office, he had my full attention. “Can I give you some advice?” he said. “I’ve served with a lot of Marines. Some good, some bad. Do you know the difference between the good ones and the bad ones?” Sitting straight in my perfectly creased uniform, I didn’t have a clue. And so he told me: “The good ones never forgot who they were before they became Marines. Don’t you forget, either.”

    I tried never to forget that advice, when I went to war but also when I came home. That is what I mean when I say that I’m turning in my card. I am not going to stop being a veteran, any more than someone from a specific racial, ethnic, or gender group will ever stop having the experiences that come with being a part of that group. But I will not allow this single element of my experience, this one personal attribute out of many, to eradicate the core of who I am. I will not play my veteran card in interactions with others, even if it’s a very good card to play. And I will not allow myself to forget who I was before I became a Marine, or any of the identities — there were many — into which I was born. If I ever do forget the true core of who I am, however elusive it sometimes is, the self or soul that lies beneath all ascriptions of identity, then please use another word to describe me: call me lost.

    Writing and Slaughter

    I

    The Thousand Year Reich had come to an end after twelve bloody years.

    The “belated nation,” which had drawn the short straw when it came to dividing up the overseas colonies of the world and so colonized inwards with the expulsion and destruction of the Jews (this was the writer Heiner Müller’s thesis), had become the scourge of the world, a disgrace among nations. Germany’s dream of expanding eastwards, with military villages and farming communities all the way to the Urals and protectorates everywhere, the evil utopia of world domination envisaged by its Führer, was over. It happened so fast that all anyone could do was rub their eyes. Had these Germans lost their minds?

    After the war, the previously hyperactive nation with its vision of world domination turned inwards. Now the Volk ohne Raum, the nation deprived of its longed-for Lebensraum, was to focus instead on the last unspoiled bit of Heimat, or homeland, left to it — the Feldweg, “the field path” or “country path” extolled by Martin Heidegger, the philosopher of the hour, in a short but widely read essay in 1953. Martin Heidegger, forerunner of the eco-movement, secret hero of the Greens? Something abiding had to be found, something tried and tested, 

    unspoiled, something that by its very nature spoke of Heimat and made defeat bearable as a kind of renunciation. Because, as the philosopher declared, “The Renunciation does not take. The Renunciation gives. It gives the inexhaustible power of the Simple. The message makes us feel at home in a long Origin.” 

    This was the new program, an ecological manifesto avant la lettre, in a mixture of romanticism and the objectivity of the moment, as only a German could write it. There was the lark on a summer’s morning, the oak tree on the wayside and the roughly hewn bench, on which “occasionally there lay […] some writing or other of the great thinkers, which a young awkwardness attempted to decipher.” And right there was the vision of a world into which those weary of civilization could withdraw from the catastrophe of modernity. Only they, these few, the abiding, will someday be able, through “the gentle might of the field path…, to outlast the gigantic power of atomic energy, which human calculation has artifacted for itself and made into a fetter of its own doing.”

    The “jargon of authenticity” was what another German thinker, Theodor Adorno, called it, in his critique of ideology based on what he described as linguistic atavisms at odds with modern life — a reckoning with Heidegger’s philosophical style. His book by that name was perhaps not the last word on the matter, but it was formative in its polemic. The representatives of the Frankfurt School shelved Heidegger as a problem of linguistic aberration, of anti-modern prose. But the thinking behind Heidegger’s work was not to be got rid of quite so easily; the seminal eco-sound of his philosophy could not be switched off as one switches off the radio. Zeitgeist or not: the debate read like a commentary on the economic miracle, the era of motorway construction and the booming automobile industry with its Volkswagen, Mercedes, and BMWs, all made in Germany. Who was on whose side? Who cared about the objections of the newly emerging discipline of sociology, about Adorno’s critique of language, set against the logic of origin in the words of the ontologist Heidegger, who had become suspect as a teacher because he had praised the Führer in his Rector’s speech at the University of Freiburg in 1933, believing in the Platonic discourse of “tyrannous education”? 

    The fixation on overcoming the density of populated spaces had, once and for all, been driven out of the little men of the master race, the descendants of poets and thinkers, who wanted to rule over the peoples of the world. Their territory — which on a map of Europe of 1939, after Germany had gained Saarland and annexed Sudetenland and subsequently all of Austria, stretched as far as East Prussia on the border with Lithuania — had now shrunk to the potent core that the victorious powers divided among themselves. 

    A yeast dough that could no longer rise, that from now on had to be content with what was left of the burned cake. An area between the North Sea in the West and the Oder River in the East: so little room for such a mighty people. Eighty million people who had to learn their lesson. Several different generations who had to grasp in school, in geography lessons, that this was it, once and for all. No more urge for expansion; all outward movement in terms of territory was at an end.

    Hitler’s last feint had not been credible even for a second: his attempt to present himself as a protector against the oncoming inundation of Bolshevism, the core of his morale-boosting speeches — his view that Mein Kampf was only the expression of a “final argument about the reorganization of Europe.” The survivors of his adventure were left with only one option: to turn back into a smaller space, to turn within, to find diligence and modesty. In this, the Germans were well-practiced: fantasists, born dreamers, for whom, once they had repressed their national feelings of guilt, only the worship of silence remained. The silence after the final bell tolls. “It reaches out even to those who were sacrificed before their time through two world wars,” said Heidegger. What this really meant was silence about one’s own memory of the dead that tried to pass over the millions of deaths of others in silence, too.

    A new nation was thus born, a divided one, lifted from the cracked baptismal font by the victorious powers — with the Marshall Plan affiliation with the West on the one side, and on the other side integration into the Eastern bloc under the control of the Soviet Union — forty years of decreed division. Yet after this Cold-War-limbo between the former Allies who had been involved in a coalition against Hitler, the Germans came together again in a Europe characterized by diverse dissolved power blocks, and they now needed to discover how Germany would cope in an epoch of intensified globalization, given its precarious position in the middle of the continent.

    The above is how a speaker at the U.N. General Assembly in New York, a German practiced in self-humiliation, might have begun a speech. It could have been me, perhaps. But what am I trying to say with all this? Quite simply, that history, in capital letters, intruded even into my little life one day. I was still at school, on the outskirts of Dresden, when it first dawned on me what I had gotten myself into, without any of my own doing. Beyond the box hedge in front of my childhood home lay an empire that stretched eastwards to the Pacific, to Vladivostok and to Inner Mongolia. Or in the words of Hölderlin, “I am pulled as streams are by the ending of something that stretches away like Asia.” Hölderlin, another outsider, a poet and misunderstood artist who baffled authority and who served first the nation (and later National Socialism) as a heaven-sent source of quotations because he changed the course of German poetry forever.

    Two scenes from my childhood are still vivid. In the first — a winter’s morning in the late 1970s — I pull the garden gate behind me and lift my rucksack onto my shoulder. I am on my way to school when a Russian military convoy made up of Ural-375 troop carriers races past me on Karl-Liebknecht-strasse, and my gaze is caught by the huge, hulking wheels of the vehicles, the felt coats and steel helmets of the soldiers, and I stand stock still in amazement and forget time.

    What did I know then of Isaac Babel’s Red Cavalry, or Mikhail Sholokhov’s And Quiet Flows the Don, later to be compulsory school reading, or Vasily Grossmann’s Life and Fate, a book I read only decades later, long after the Soviet Union disappeared? But the image of those Russian troops imprinted itself on me, and from that moment on I began to understand German history from the point of view of the Russians, who were cavorting here in my hometown, right on the doorstep. In the beginning it was the cartridge cases that we boys found in the surrounding woods, military badges that we bartered with the Russian soldiers at the barracks gates, not two hundred meters from my parents’ house, in exchange for photos of naked women (from the only East German magazine that printed such pictures). It was not until much later that I read Joseph Brodsky, that brilliant Soviet renegade and the first poet of the transition from East to West, whose verses immediately struck home: “In the beginning, there was canned corned beef. More accurately, in the beginning, there was a war. World War II; the siege of my hometown, Leningrad; the great hunger, which claimed more lives than all the bombs, shells, and bullets together. And toward the end of the siege, there was canned corned beef from America.”

    The second scene is a bit more complicated. We are in the middle of a history lesson in the eighth grade, and the teacher, a strict member of the Communist Party, gives me the task of preparing a lecture. Its theme is the Nuremberg Trials. I head to the Saxon State Library, then housed in the city’s largest barracks complex, also containing troop accommodations and weapon depots belonging to the Soviet Army and the NVA, or the GDR’s National People’s Army. The juxtaposition of scholarship and the military life of the “fraternal armies,” as I experienced it on the way to the silence of the reading room, got me thinking. I procured my first library card and set myself up as a permanent fixture among the books, which soon earned me the respect of the staff and years later led them to allow me to view the archive of Viktor Klemperer. At that time hardly anyone outside Dresden knew the author of one of the most important diaries of the Nazi era; he was known only as the author of LTI, a groundbreaking study of the infiltration of the German language by the ideas of Nazism. His extraordinary diary was discovered in Germany, via the success of the America edition in the West, after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Only then was it recognized across the world for what it is: a rare chronicle of everyday life of the Nazi era in a city (Dresden), from the perspective of an academic dismissed from his post, a persecuted Jew, who experienced the increasing loss of rights first-hand, to the point where he himself was threatened with deportation. This coincided with the destruction of his hometown, Dresden’s downfall in a firestorm, which saved his life. 

    The fruits of my schoolboy work gathering facts on the Nuremberg trial was limited. Still, it had the function of opening the poison cabinets to otherwise censored publications from the West. I was able to study Eugene Kogon, Telford Taylor, Joe Heydecker’s photographs, and the twelve-volume series of writings of the International Military Court, all the monographs available then on the crimes committed in the concentration camps, the ghettos in the East, and behind the fronts. Raul Hilberg’s key work, The Destruction of the European Jews, which appeared in America as early as 1961, was not published in Germany until twenty years later. Claude Lanzmann’s documentary film Shoah was still far beyond all horizons of such “reappraisal.” It was through him that I first learned the Hebrew word for the deflated term “Holocaust.”

    The result, then, was meager compared to the wealth of specialized material available today. But I had been bitten by the bug of historical research, and my work soon began to display worryingly manic features. My lecture to the class did not stop at that one assignment: it kept on expanding, until it took up three whole history lessons — to the great satisfaction of the teacher, who believed my soul had been saved for the anti-fascist cause. In the end I was pretty clued in about the arms industry and the murderous judiciary in the Third Reich, about Hitler’s euthanasia program and the special task forces, the system of forced labor, the extermination camps and the medical experiments performed on inmates.

    I can well imagine what a strange impression a fifteen-year-old must have made lecturing the class on racial politics, Jewish persecution, SS massacres, gas chambers, and the role of German companies in the business of extermination. That was when I first learned with absolute certainty that the firm I.G. Farben supplied Zyklon B, that the Erfurt company Topf & Sons built the crematoria, and that the Allianz AG insurance company insured the barracks of Auschwitz. And even today I can still recite, immediately on waking, the new categories established during the trials, against all precedent of jurisprudence: crimes against humanity; war crimes; and (most astonishingly) crimes against peace. Though often disregarded, the Nuremberg ruling outlawing wars of aggression is valid still today.

    It was then, almost as an aside, that I first heard about the Declaration of Human Rights. But the dour teacher allowed the mention of it to pass without comment. For the Declaration of Rights touched on a taboo in the self-image of the other German state, because invoking universal human rights was the last resort of the opposition. The argument as to whether the GDR was an illegitimate state still divides people today. The Nuremberg trials, I explained to my classmates, were not a case of so-called “victors’ justice,” and that, too, remained uncontradicted. Or had it simply been lost in the mass of material? Fired up by my awakening sense of justice, I was able to quote to my class the American chief prosecutor, Judge Robert H. Jackson, without challenge: “That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.”

    This was a completely new principle, and it sounded so auspiciously redolent of the values of a liberal order that even today, remembering the scene, I am still astonished by the silence in the classroom. It was as if the nations that held court over the mass-murderers and their superiors had wanted for the first time to test out what Kafka in his diaries had called “jumping out of death row.” And for me, it was as if I had won a small victory when the teacher, changing the habits of a lifetime, graded the lecture with an A+, because she could do nothing else. I still recall her fixing her gaze on me like a strange toad, and me staring straight back. 

    Eleven years later, my first volume of poetry appeared, a year before the Soviet empire began to crumble with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Grauzone morgens, or Mornings in the Grayzone, was its title, a book in which scenes like the ones just described added to the overall panorama, but which was more of a search image — you would not find any of the crucial terms in it. Viewed from today, one can see that it followed the scenography of a Tarkovsky film. I happened to have seen his masterpiece Stalker in a Dresden cinema in the early1980s, but only later found the key to his enigmatic film parable in Eliot’s The Waste Land: “‘Who is the third who walks always beside you?’ ‘There is always another one walking beside you.’” Only now am I fully aware of the overlapping motifs. Someone had been walking beside me for a long time. An angel? A superior? 

    One of my poems from that time that reminds me of those days, and of my trips to the Saxon Library. It is called “Accept It.”

    So many days with nothing
    occurring, nothing but those
    brief winter manoeuvres, a few

    mounds of snow in the mornings,
    melted away by evening, and the
    strange moment at the barracks

    was an exotic handbill: this little
    squad of Russian soldiers in
    green felt uniforms, standing in silence

    guarding a bundle of newspapers, and I read
    “коммунист” on top and
    the line came into my mind: “picture

    the wristwatch on Jackson Pollock’s wrist.”

    II

    It is no longer the specter of communism that haunts Europe today. It is the afterimage of authoritarian rule, the dream of right-wing populism among the people, realizable through propaganda and political marketing. All those discredited socialist utopias that vanished with the fall of the Soviet Union have been replaced by backward-looking visions of a strong nation with fortified borders and as self-sufficient an economy as possible. Regressive fantasies stoke the flames of the struggle for majorities. Aggressive discourses of power have long since captured command positions here and there in Europe and America. The theatrical spectacle starring real estate tycoon T, the Twitter King Ubu Roi in the White House, finally came to a close, but it showed where things might be heading in this second millennium. 

    “Retrotopia” was what the sociologist Zygmunt Baumann called it in his last, posthumously published, book, his critique of a world of nationalist politics that leads of necessity to a restricted sense of nationhood, to trade-wars and the rearmament of the nuclear powers — in sum, to the increasing violence to be seen in all spheres, not least in language. Baumann knew what he was talking about: as a Jew he had experienced political violence early on, and he too became an émigré in his thinking. It is hardly an accident that, after much back and forth between East and West, Baumann, who had been born in Poznan in Poland, finally fetched  up in England and died there having found a haven for the time being. 

    The fixation on the past identified in Baumann’s book rests on the need for security for the many uprooted people in Western societies. For a large number of these people, freedom is simply overwhelming: the freedom of the individual as well as that of capital, which dissolves all ties and thus threatens the very basis of their existence. The discomfort with culture goes hand in hand with a transfiguration of the past. The “little people,” Baumann explains, want a return to the tribal fire, as if they had not failed more than once in that undertaking. In times of globalization and the migration that comes with it, phenomena that are experienced as the destabilization and dissolution of local and family life, and in times of growing economic inequality and terrorism permeating many of the precincts of everyday life, the fevered visions arise from what Baumann calls “the lost/stolen/abandoned, but undead past, instead of being tied to the not-yet-unborn and so inexistent future.”

    But what kind of past is that?
    Past that does not pass by
    Past that has been managed
    Past that has not been managed.
    Memory, work of mourning,
    So many pasts that each one of us
    caught up in the whirl remembers differently, But it is supposed to be just one
    the good one, easily told,
    ideally the one where everything was fine Without the masses of the dead
    Without those who went under the wheels, the murdered, those who died miserably for whom there was no past
    and often not even a grave
    ‘Doesn‘t a breath of the air that pervaded earlier days caress us as well?’

    That was the idea of history: in any given situation it is the last stage of time handed down and passed on, or the most recent episode of the Great Narrative in the form of a television series. It is the reassuring intermediate state in which the lives of the living rest on the works of the dead, and everything that has been passed down is at the disposal of the most recent.

    An extreme form of Fascism: the destruction of the past in the course of the struggle for the survival of the fittest, the apotheosis of vitalism, pure technocracy riding roughshod over the interests of human beings. The commemoration only of one’s own dead, to whom monuments and mausoleums are erected. (The march to the Weimar Republic began at the Feldherrenhalle in Munich, the site of Hitler’s putsch in 1923 and during the Hitler years a funerary monument to his dead Nazi comrades.) When the hour of victory struck, the “leaders” of the new Europe came together before the new temples for the commemorative tryst, hands covering their privates. Fascism: “One reason it has a chance is that, in the name of progress, its opponents treat it as a historical norm,” observed Walter Benjamin. “The current amazement that the things we are experiencing are still possible in the twentieth century is not a philosophical amazement.”

    We should not, we are told, be tempted into drawing historical comparisons to understand what is happening today. We need not look to old models of explanation, nor does the reference to the emergence of National Socialism help us. But it may be pertinent to reflect on a few characteristics of classical fascism so as to rule out the possibility that we are dealing with specters of its return, or derivatives of them — new chemical compounds that could be produced out of old elements. 

    It is certainly not wrong to see Fascism as a politics of dynamism. (Its synonym, after all, was “the Movement,” as in “Munich, the capital of the movement.”) In addition to its original history of violence, it was a manipulation of the masses powered by the most modern technological means, especially communications technology — today we would call it a marketing strategy. Opponents were deported to the concentration camps; potential comrades were brainwashed by Goebbels’ propaganda; the Jews were excluded as foreign bodies and finally destroyed (this, however, was unique). Class hatred was replaced with racial hatred. 

    Historians deal with content and process; sociologists inquire into the impact on the structure of everyday life; philosophers concern themselves with the ideas involved and place them in the larger perspective of human thinking. There is agreement on the fact that fascism was a revolution — a revolution of the right, the only one that has ever really succeeded in Germany and caught the imagination of the people. In comparing the two totalitarian movements, Fascism and Communism, the German historian Ernst Nolte sought to provoke, and for a long time he remained a lone voice. But no one can escape the shift of perspective. Anyone who interprets this move as a sign of revisionism, as the philosopher Jurgen 

    Habermas did in the 1980s during the famous Historikerstreit, may be right in a humanist sense, but stands is the way of a proper understanding of political dialectics, of the history of modern tyranny. The two dragons of Communism and Fascism faced each other off snorting with rage. For a time, they competed on the world stage in terms of civilization and aesthetics (as was strikingly visible at the Paris World Fair in 1937), until their totalitarian flirtation descended into war.

    But the question as to which dragon was the more successful at courting the masses leads us straight back to the present, and to a decision that faces us. And this is where Umberto Eco comes in, with his list of “Common Features of Eternal Fascism,” or ur-Fascism, delivered in a speech marking the fiftieth anniversary of Europe’s liberation from Nazism and later expanded into a tract called Il fascimo eterno. The semiotician takes the broad view without really resolving the contradictions: on the one hand, Fascism is, for him, part of the cult of tradition, a rejection of modernity (“blood and soil,” the fixation on race, the condemnation of materialism and the “evils of democracy,” the apotheosis of the Führer-state); on the other hand, it relies on the most modern technology and, over time, even adopts an avant-garde approach, such as Futurism, its aesthetic vanguard. On the one hand, he claims, it is a mythical construction; on the other hand, a praxis, based on action for action’s sake and thus materialist through and through. It exploits natural fears about social disparity (based not so much on income as on background and religion) and exacerbates them. 

    This much is certain: it is a product of nationalism compounded until it is limitless — which is to say, the exploitation of people based on the simple fact of being born in a country where they grew up and were unable to leave (because poverty or loyalty kept them prisoners). Jews who had lived in Germany for generations, for their part permanent exiles, were to remain outsiders forever. Fascism determines who is an outsider and who belongs to the holy community prepared to give their lives for the nation. Fascism is a construction of belonging, the identity of the Volk, including its own people living abroad, beyond its frontiers (in Saarland, the Sudetenland, Romanian Germans and Volga Germans, and so on). 

    It is also the ideology of the have-nots, who interpret capitalism as a conspiracy of plutocrats, millionaires (preferably Jews), but one which can sustain itself only through investment and campaign contributions on the part of big business. It postulates the struggle for survival and a cult of the strong (invoking Darwin in the process) and it doesn’t give a damn if the weak go under the wheels (the tank chains) or drown in the sea. It believes in the idea of a “final solution” for all human problems: away with the weak, the sick, the homeless, the feeble, and the mad, and with any intransigent opponents. A constant war is to be fought, but in the end a Golden Age will dawn in which the biologically superior (not the most intelligent) will lead an orderly family life. It dreams of an elite, but its foot soldiers come from the uneducated levels of society; intellectuals, the educated, the cultured are despised (“the lying press”). Fascism needs heroes, and they must be prepared to go the whole way; they train for death, the final battle, and fight it to the last cartridge. Fascism is a male affair. In the will to battle, women become mere accessories. In Fascism the situation of a woman is always precarious: she is there at best to become the bearer of children and a heroic mother (and a concentration camp supervisor), or even a deputy, an official in the right-wing populist camp, an opponent of abortion. Never a feminist, in any case.

    For some time now I, too, have been concerned with the issue of the nostalgic appeal of Fascism. Has the specter really been banished and burned like the poor witches of the Middle Ages? Can you in fact burn specters, as the Nazis burned books in Berlin’s Opernplatz? 

    Is there a myth that has remained alive — preserved under the rubble of the Thousand Year Reich — that may yet resurface? Heiner Müller wrote: “as once ghosts came from the past / now they come from the future as well.” For a long time I considered such worry to be the product of hysteria. The question of the return of the past only seemed relevant inasmuch as it was gaining traction among historians and sociologists: surely the experts were in a position to say what caused the virulence of these specters, and as long as they could assure me that we find ourselves in a new situation, and that a revival of horrors, whether as farce or operetta, could be ruled out historically, there was no danger. But now I am not so sure.

    III

    It may be that the German in me is gripped, every now and then, by a certain disquiet. That is why I stare as if transfixed at the twelve insane years of Nazi rule, and constantly immerse myself in the growing specialist literature on the subject. Just recently I discovered yet another figure in the generation of young careerists in the Third Reich, a certain Franz Alfred Six. He was one of the co-founders of the Security Service (SD) in what became the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA), the ideal henchman to his boss Heinrich Himmler and a resourceful colleague of his almost contemporary and superior Reinhard Heydrich, who was rumored in the inner circles of the SS to be the heir-apparent to Hitler. Six was one of the pioneers of the “scientific” study of journalism, as director of the Königsberg Institute of Journalism. In 1935 his position as a major in the SS moved him ahead of his colleagues and he was appointed head of the press department at the main office of the Security Service in Berlin; his specialty was research into ideological opponents. It was his office that gathered the huge stream of data concerning all those within Germany and abroad who, whether as organizers or writers or publicists, could be defined as political opponents of the Nazi regime. 

    Six was the man earmarked for the position of Commander of Security Police in London after the occupation of Britain, according to the wishes of his boss Heydrich. The order came personally from Field Marshal Göering. In the event of a successful invasion (“Operation Sea Lion”), not only did all the operational plans of the various services lie ready in the cupboard, but also the lists of all potential opponents to be found on the island. Six’s counterpart at the SS, Brigadier Walter Schellenberg, produced the manual for the planned German invasion, which included the infamous Sonderfahndungsliste G.B. (Special Wanted List GB) that fell into the hands of the Allies after the end of the war. It came into being mainly owing to the diligence of the pedantic researcher Six and his colleagues. Among the approximately 2,700 dangerous subjects to be arrested after the invasion (Winston Churchill was enemy No. 1) are the names Alfred Einstein and Sigmund Freud, but also artists and writers such as John Heartfield, Aldous Huxley, H. G. Wells, and Virginia Woolf.

    Six was the typical armchair perpetrator, an inconspicuous civil servant, presumably often in plainclothes, with the international daily newspapers in his briefcase. He would hardly have stood out at a meeting of stamp collectors, with his round nickel-framed glasses. The fact that he had quickly risen to a position that earned him a villa in Berlin-Dahlem (on Thielallee), a chauffeured service car, and a private office in the city center with three secretaries (Wilhelmstraße, Prinz-Al-brecht-Palais) is a testament to the enormous opportunities for advancement in the dynamic Nazi state, whose inner workings the ordinary German people could hardly envisage. Six was the author of essays with titles such as “The Fate of the European Community” and “Russia as Part of Europe,” but his core business was the creation of comprehensive catalogues of enemies. The walls of his Berlin office were papered with detailed organizational charts in which the world was divided into political groups who presented a threat. He shared with Heydrich the fascination with a certain secret-agent aura, copied wholesale from their British opponents.

    His ambitious project was to coordinate domestic propaganda with so-called foreign studies, geopolitics, and research into the various categories of opposition (Marxists, Socialists, Jews, Freemasons, Jesuits, and members of religious sects), on the basis of the “scientific National Socialism” that he espoused, which was analogous to the ideology of the revolutionary Bolsheviks. The concept of a branch of sociologically and historically defined research into the enemy came from Heydrich, the “man with the iron heart,” as Hitler dubbed his chief functionary at the pompous funeral ceremony after his assassination in 1942, when he was Reich-Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. Like his boss Himmler, he was convinced that he was exposed to a huge and disparate army of opponents, especially after the occupation of half of Europe in a territory “with 200 million people of foreign origin and race,” as Himmler said in his infamous speech in Poznan in 1943. “To win their hearts and minds will only be possible when the great struggle between the two world empires, Germany and England, is decided. Then we will be able to affiliate these thirty million true Teutons to our own nation.”

    Thankfully, it never came to an invasion of Britain. Instead England was to be worn down by air raids until it would agree to peace terms, so that the Nazis could finally turn to Russia, which posed the most serious competition for dominance in Europe. And after the attacks on the Soviet Union, we find Herr Six at work once again. With his own motorized SS command, he drives just behind the advancing front to be the first of the security police in Moscow, and to secure official archives and files from enemy authorities. 

    Historians speak of polycracy in the Nazi state — the competing system of different departments that appeared overnight. Later, depending on the general political climate and the whims of the dictator, they were adapted to the real course of the war. For diplomats, academics, journalists, and born bureaucrats of all kinds, this may have been a nightmare, but in the end they all set about competing to fulfill the Führer’s requirements. They were trained to “work towards the Führer,” a formula found by Ian Kershaw in the files of a Prussian secretary of state.

    This was also what Six and his colleagues from the relevant fields set about doing. In one of the units under his command, the plans for a coordinated Jewish policy were developed, in close consultation with the Gestapo. One of the most prominent of his protégés was Adolf Eichmann, whom Six immediately sent to Vienna after the occupation of Austria in 1938, where he developed the model of a department dedicated to the expulsion and economic plundering of the Jews: the Central Office for Jewish Emigration. At that time various ideas were still in circulation about the resettlement of the Jews: for example, an agreement with Zionist associations, which imagined a separate Jewish state in Palestine, under British mandate at the time. This led to the adventurous “Madagascar Plan,” which soon proved unworkable. Adolf Eichmann, later an expert in deportation, and SS-Sturmbann-führer Herbert Hagen, head of the department called “II/112: Jews” in the Security Department’s main office, were sent on a business trip to Palestine, on the orders of Six, in order to explore the possibilities of an orderly deportation. (The British authorities allowed them to stay in Haifa for only a day, September 26, 1937, and then expelled them from the country, so they set about seeing what was possible in terms of negotiations on the Arab side in Cairo.) 

    As little came of this idea as the plans discussed a year later, at the International Conference on Refugees in Evian, to distribute the Jews as asylum seekers on a quota basis to the participating countries. For now, the borders were closed. The ship was full, as the expression goes — a phrase that appears on cue with every wave of refugees everywhere. After Hitler unleashed the war, the course was set for the extermination of European Jews. Soon the trains began to travel to Chelmno, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Auschwitz. Six million Jewish people were fed into the killing machine by the those driving the policy of extermination.

    The courts later had only to clarify who was directly or indirectly involved in the great crime. Someone such as Six represents the elite of those planners, those who escaped undetected — he represents the cool functionary of the hour. According to Adorno, this coldness was “the basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which Auschwitz would not have been possible.” Or, in the treacherous language of the murderers, “You don’t fight rats with a revolver, but with poison and gas.” (That sentence comes from a memorandum of the Munich SD headquarters to Reinhard Heydrich.)

    In the last years of the war, Six transferred to the Foreign Office, and drove right across Europe, where, as eyewitnesses attest, he spent his time barking at employees of the diplomatic missions and at cultural representatives. For his involvement in the crimes of task forces in Smolensk in the autumn of 1941, he was convicted in one of the smaller trials in Nuremberg, but he walked free after four years in prison in Landsberg, uncorrected and undeterred. He never showed up on the list of the principal authors of Jewish extermination and he was overlooked by historians for many years. It was in reference to his type of person that scholars came to speak of “functional anti-Semitism,” as opposed to the virulent ideological sort — but the “physical elimination of Eastern Jewry” was nonetheless important enough to Six for him to give a lecture on the subject, though whether he ever got his hands dirty remains unclear. His name stands for bureaucratic preparation; he was one of many “intellectuals” who prepared the ground for mass annihilation. He is an abbreviation, a kind of shorthand for genocide, a fleeting file note and a large amount of paper which in the end led to the most extreme consequences. 

    After the war, without missing a beat, Six moved into the automobile industry, as a self-employed management consul tant. The specialist for lethal propaganda became one of the leading marketing experts of Porsche-Diesel Motorenbau GmbH. Untroubled by justice, he lived through the building of the Federal Republic and, in receipt of a handsome salary, he offered his reflections on “The Nature of Marketing.” Fascist propaganda and its methods had its uses in civilian life. An observation from Paul Celan seems apposite: “The germ-free is the murderous; fascism today lies in formal design.” 

    IV

    What refuses to give me any peace is the way a people can make themselves totally available to such purposes. Who would you have been in a dictatorship? I do not have to ask myself this question, because I found myself in the middle of a dictatorship and survived it. Instead I must ask myself the question, who would you have been in the Nazi era, and what would you have done against Hitler? For I, too, would have been inundated by the ubiquitous images and words of the Führer. At the time there was no outside vantage point, so it makes no sense to develop a moral standpoint out of hindsight. The principle of contemporaneity, to which we are bound, excludes us from other historical experiences. All I can say is that as a young child I slept through all knowledge of the Third Reich, and someone might have called to me: keep on dreaming, friend! So the only question can be: can anything be learned from this particular history, if anything can ever be learned from the course of history?

    This brings me to the present. I would like to come back to the problem of writing, and the question of why one writes in the first place. Why live without writing? I know that most people do not ask that question quite so urgently, but it was a question for me from early on. You wander silently within yourself for a long time before you get to the point of scribbling a few lines on a piece of paper, at first only  for yourself and naturally without the least understanding  of history. 

    Let us hear what the philosopher Gilles Deleuze has to say about it. “Writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience.” That is the starting point: we do not know what is driving us, and we can only pull together a few phrases to express what happens to us — to form a provisional response. Writing will sum us up, it shortens what we call life, quite inevitably. The philosopher, Deleuze, standing before the Absolute, then makes leaps and bounds, he is immediately in need of transforming himself — into a woman, an animal, a plant, a molecule — and he is right. “The shame of being a man — is there any better reason to write?”

    No, there is no better reason, but I will skip over his other thoughts on the subject and stop at a statement that immediately seized me and would not let go of me when I read his 

    Essays Critical and Clinical for the first time. “As Moritz said, one writes for the dying calves.” He was referring to Karl Philipp Moritz, an eighteenth-century German writer, a contemporary of Goethe, who was the author of Anton Reiser, a four-volume life story told from below, from the perspective of a child born into poverty and a strict religious milieu. It was the first psychological novel in the German language.

    I was electrified by the quotation and I followed the trail — and came out at myself. My first story, the first piece of prose on which I worked seriously, started at a street crossing in Dresden. I was sixteen at the time. After visiting my grandparents, I was waiting for the tram that was supposed to take me back to the outskirts of the city, to the garden city of Hellerau where we had been living for a few years. I was standing there, staring out into the rain, when a cattle truck roared past me. I will never forget the sight of the animals, the dark eyes of the cows and the calves, the bodies of those destined for death, clearly visible behind the vents of the van. This is where my text began.

    I wrote a soliloquy of a cow being taken to the slaughterhouse. It was written in a primitive stream-of-consciousness style, an interior monologue. I did not know James Joyce or Arthur Schnitzler at the time. I knew nothing of the fact that literature was a technique that could be learned and developed. But with that momentary glance, the glint of a pupil, I had recognized myself in that animal, and the prose began to flow. The piece almost wrote itself. It ended after all the stress and terror of being unloaded on the ramp and driven through a tunnel towards the last station of its suffering, with the moment in which the beast felt the bolt gun pressed against its forehead. I knew the procedure because my grandfather, who spent his life working as a master butcher in the Dresden slaughterhouse, once told me about it. 

    As the ill-treated creature blacked out, the text suddenly broke off. Quite clearly, an unsatisfactory ending for a story. And I felt my failure acutely and buried the manuscript under other half-baked drafts, overcome with a feeling of shame. I was upset because nothing seemed to work. That is the painful secret of writing — I do not know what to expect, just as a laboratory animal during an experiment on himself does not know where the exploration will lead. “To write is not to recount one’s memories and travels, one’s loves and griefs, one’s dreams and fantasies”: that I had understood very quickly. “Literature begins only when a third person is born in us that strips us of the power to say I,” as Deleuze put it. But even without such an “I,” I was stuck for a long time. “Health as literature, as writing, consists in inventing a people who are missing”: Deleuze’s remark sounded pompous, but one day its meaning dawned on me — and so, more or less by chance, I fell into German literature as one of many who dream of a people that does not yet exist.

    “‘You write for the dying calves,’ says Moritz.” I read the German novel which included that sentence early on, but only came across the specific reference thanks to a French philosopher. It is there, in Anton Reiser, but not in quite the same words. This can happen if one simply reads. It is not about the reading itself; it is about stopping at a certain point. And that was the point I had simply passed over. When I returned to the passage, I found more. Moritz continues: “From this time forward, when he saw an animal slaughtered, he identified himself with it in thought, and as he so often had the opportunity of seeing it at the slaughterer’s, for a long time his thought was centered on this — to arrive at the distinction between himself and a slaughtered animal like that. He often stood for an hour, looking at a calf’s head, eyes, ears, mouth, and nose — and, pressing as close to it as possible, as he did with a human stranger, often with the foolish fancy that it might be possible for him to think himself gradually into the nature of the animal. His own concern was to know the difference between himself and the animal; and sometimes he forgot himself so completely as he gazed at it persistently that for a moment he really believed he had come to feel the nature of the creature’s existence. From childhood on, his thoughts were busy with the question — how would it be if I were a dog or some other animal living among men?” 

    From the philosophers, above all Descartes, who saw animals as machines, bundles of reflexes, creatures without reason, one can learn what a discourse is. Literature has always had its own discourses and themes. In this it has always been sovereign and did not need to wait for the social sciences. If asked about my poetics, I would say today that we are working towards a photosynthesis of words and images. Words work at transmission; images reach us from a tiny future that quickly becomes the past. I am referring to the images in all media that overwhelm us every day as a shock experience of the real, right down to our dreams. Every day history drives us out of ourselves and confuses our imagination: history — that brutal translation of time into collective experience. The poet is simply one of many; his problem is how to lay aside the pretentions of poetry. In the end he knows only what anyone can know: that there are so many realities, that they exist independently of us and simultaneously, and the same is true of identities. Even if they are dreamers, the poets, the only thing they do not doubt is that the words and the deeds of our predecessors will catch up with us. In this respect they are especially sensitive, specialists constantly in radio contact with the dead.

    There is something the sociologists call transgenerational transmission. No one can jump out of their historical time, and no one escapes being formed by history. Once it may have been possible, perhaps, in the unimaginable times of myth and fairy tale, but today it is impossible. In the same way, the much-vaunted attempt to draw a line under legacy of German fascism is impossible, too. There is no question of a flight from time, or of a flight inward —even there history will catch up with everyone. Instead, history as a history of violence passes though time and imprints itself with all its dates on our bodies. There is something beyond literature that calls writing into question. And there is literature that criss-crosses history in fictions, literature as what Walter Benjamin called a “secret agreement between the past generations and the present one. Doesn’t a breath of the air that pervaded earlier days caress us as well? In the voices we hear, is there not an echo of now silent ones?” As if responding to his questions, Ingeborg Bachmann declared: “History constantly teaches but it finds no disciples.” 

    She had experience with this, no doubt: she was a woman. But we cannot know, fortunately we cannot know, whether this is the last word on the matter.

    Notes on Assimilation

    There is a passage in Democracy in America in which Tocqueville observes that in a mass of land spanning the width of the continent and extending from “the edge of the tropics” in the south to the “regions of ice” in the north, “the men scattered over this area do not constitute, as in Europe, shoots of the same stock.” On the contrary, “they reveal, from the first viewing, three naturally distinct, I might almost say hostile, races.” It was not simply the seeming incompatibility of the customs, origins, habits, memories, and laws — to say nothing of class positions — that separated the whites, blacks and Native Americans from one another: “even their external features had raised an almost insurmountable barrier between them.”

    This blunt observation prompts one of the book’s more striking asides, in which Tocqueville recounts pausing during his travels at the log cabin of a pioneer in Alabama, on the edge of Creek territory. Beside a spring he encounters a microcosm of American society in the nineteenth century: an Indian woman holding the hand of one whom he assumes to be the pioneer’s young daughter, followed by a black woman. The visual descriptions contain within them the two-pronged tragedy of the American experiment: “The Indian woman’s dress had a sort of wild luxury” that preserved and advertised what we would now call her totalizing alterity; “the Negro woman was dressed in tattered European clothes,” a simulacrum of the people who would never consent to accept her. Both women lavish attention on the five- or six-year-old white “Creole” girl, who already “displayed, in the slightest of her movements, a sense of superiority.” The Indian woman, in Tocqueville’s words, remained “free,” “proud,” and “almost fierce”; the black woman was “equally divided between an almost motherly tenderness and a slavish fear.” In both cases, the Native and the African, Tocqueville sees a cursed choice — the fundamental inability to overcome “the thousand different signs of white supremacy” firmly in place in the new world. Indeed, “nature’s efforts” to draw the oppressed and the oppressors close here only “made even more striking the wide gap between them.”

    There can be no serious discussion of American reality without the sober — and I would argue, dispassionate — acknowledgment of the historical fact of European dominance, which nearly obliterated the seemingly “unassimilable” Native and for centuries diminished the African to a state of wretchedness and isolation verging on inhumanity. Whereas the European — however lowly or removed from Anglo-Saxon Protestant norms — came by choice to this new land, retaining her ties to the old countries that shaped her, the Native and the African were left with nowhere else to go, not even in the realm of imagination or conjecture. For both, the link between emancipation and assimilation is inexorable. There might be many ways of belonging, but there was no possibility of not belonging in any way. Oppressed or free, they were here. Even their exclusion by white society did not release them from finding a way to live in and with America. Their misery was an American misery, as their happiness would be, if ever it were achieved. The question of how to make a genuine home has always been a question of how to blend into a society that was based on your subjection even if — and in fact, precisely because — you coincided with or predated its foundation. Yet there is nowhere else for you to be.

    The psychological reality of this dynamic presented itself fully formed in Tocqueville’s time and has remained alarmingly present through our own. Waves of “non-white” immigrants — from southern and eastern Europe, from Latin America, from Asia, and even sometimes from the Caribbean and the African continent, too — were able successfully to integrate into the national mainstream to the precise degree that they could distance themselves from the enslaved and otherwise unfree and their descendants already living here, whose social condition, often but not always, manifested itself in those conspicuous physical characteristics set in opposition to whiteness. One thing that united a multitude of disparate groups over the years was a diligence about separating themselves from black Americans. Without being glib about the depredations that other ethnicities endured, the question of assimilation in America — of the continuous liberation and integration of a plurality of distinct peoples into a reasonably harmonious mongrel whole — has always been a question that turns on the status and fate of the people deemed “black,” the hardest case, the ultimate case, who have always been living here and on whose exclusion various other forms of belonging have been based. This is an old tension that remains highly pertinent today. (Consider the extent to which, in just the past year, we have witnessed extremely contentious discussions of the degree to which Latinos and Asians can even be welcomed under the umbrella term “POC.”)

    The challenge of finding a place in America was both eased and complicated by those millions of immigrants, whose presence necessarily rendered the question less black and white. If America did not begin as a nation of immigrants but rather as “a white Anglo-Protestant settler society,” as Samuel P. Huntington maintained (though the Puritans were also immigrants), it certainly became one, a multiethnic society of many origins. By the twentieth century the idea of assimilation was championed widely, if not by the nativists and the bigots then certainly by the striving members of various new and marginal groups themselves. These men and women weighed their own prospects for belonging and flourishing in a country that was being transformed by transplants, from a Europe ravaged by famine and war and persecution, and from the former Confederacy as well, whose recently emancipated population found itself searching north and west for the liberty and the prosperity that was denied them in the South.

    The founding text of the assimilationist ideal was The Melting Pot, a mawkish play by a British Jewish writer named Israel Zangwill, which appeared in 1908 and popularized the phrase that is its title (which, not for nothing, would be considered a microaggression today). It told the story of a young Moldovan man who comes to America in the wake of a Russian pogrom that decimated his family. Here he marries the daughter of his family’s oppressor (literally) and composes a symphony that is an ode to a future in which distinctive ethnicities macerate into something bold and new. President Theodore Roosevelt attended the premiere of the play in Washington, D.C.

    The premise of Zangwill’s play was in its titular metaphor: ethnic and religious differences needed to be overcome and annulled, so that a homogeneous social substance remained. Difference was an obstacle to social peace, and the obstacle could be removed by assimilation, which denoted a large or total erasure of prior identities. Assimilation was a particularly ruthless form of integration, because it implied an embarrassment about origins; assimilation was re-invention. “After the prohibition of large-scale immigration in 1924,” Huntington noted in 2004 in Who We Are, his controversial book on immigration and the American character, “attitudes toward America’s immigrant heritage began to change.” By World War II, “ethnicity virtually disappeared as a defining component of national identity.” The preponderance of assimilation literature — books with titles such as How the Irish Became White, How Jews Became White Folks, and Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race —  presented such an optimistic vision of the rise of European immigrants, who had been considered in the nineteenth century not just ethnically but racially distinct from “whites.” This literature ignored Asians and did not know what to make of “Hindus” or Arabs. It was mostly silent about the plight of those deemed black, whose existential predicament was dealt with most powerfully in the literature of “passing,” such as Nella Larsen’s fine novella of the same name and James Weldon Johnson’s subversive faux-memoir  The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man. Yet, as those texts make clear, passing made acceptance a reward for deception. The only way in was to lie, to compromise one’s dignity. This was a curse.

    Full assimilation for American blacks, until quite recently, was predicated on the plausibility of self-negation. Immigrants, again, were also expected to conceal or to distort their differentiating heritages, but they were rewarded for this more quickly and easily. Anti-black racism has a special force in the panoply of American prejudices. The civil rights achievements of the 1960s were victories of the legal code, but there is more to society than law: informal and much more rigid rules of habit and custom continued to frustrate full integration for masses of black people (and to varying degrees people of Native American, Latino, and Asian descent), except for upwardly mobile and fortunate individuals who have somehow been able to traverse these inherently porous and frequently contradictory barriers. The ascent of those individuals was an important fact about what was possible in America, but it proved less than its celebrants thought it did. These exceptions were not “Uncle Toms,” but they were also certainly not the harbingers of racism’s end. With the election of Barack Obama to the presidency in 2008, it did seem, however fleetingly, as though the country had finally reconciled itself to a genuinely pluralistic future in which, at last, blacks had been fully incorporated into the multi-hued national family. But the swift backlash and visceral dissatisfaction — first from the right and then from the left — made it clear that the story of assimilation is very much still being written.

    What is race? Or, perhaps more to the point, what is racial difference? These are related questions whose answers cannot be simply taken for granted, and must continuously be spelled out in plain, jargonless language. It is obvious that human beings differ physically from each other, in both superficial and significant ways. Groups of related individuals do tend to broadly share physical traits that distinguish them from other groups. “When these physical differences involve skin color, eye shape, hair, and facial features, people have for centuries labeled them differences in race,” Huntington explains. “The physical differences exist; the identification of them as racial differences is a product of human perception and decision, and attributing significance to these racial differences is a result of human judgment.” What is decisive is not what we see, but how we evaluate what we see. Or, more fundamentally, that we look carefully. Albert Murray put it most succinctly: “Any fool can see that white people are not really white, and that black people are not black.”

    The story of racial progress has been the story of seeking to render surface-level and socially constructed differences less and less potent — to dilute the self-reinforcing logic of what Barbara and Karen Fields have called “racecraft,” and have shown in their monumental book of the same name to be the illusion of race produced by the practices of racism. (In their formulation, racism — the ideological justification for a preceding economic exploitation — creates race, and not the other way around.) We choose to organize our polity along crude color categories even though, in point of fact, and even in the time of Tocqueville — as the presence of that Creole girl attests — we have always been a heterogeneous population. The average black American derives fully 20 percent of her DNA from Europe, and almost entirely from that continent’s Anglo-Saxon precincts.

    Outside of the great modern black writers — Wright, Ellison, Murray, Baldwin — the fact of our biologically assimilated reality has often been given short shrift in the mainstream conversation. (It is not only that “blacks” contain ample amounts of Europe within them; today millions of “white” Americans possess enough Africa in their DNA to have been enslaved under the laws of hypodescent.) It makes many people uncomfortable to discover that we — as a society and as individuals — already are mixed. The discussion of identity, the sentiment of identity, leads very quickly to a need for purity and a desire for exclusiveness. But it is much too late for purity and exclusiveness: we really do contain multitudes.

    The first time I read Norman Podhoretz’s “My Negro Problem — and Ours” — an infamous and almost unbearably candid essay whose title I am powerless to glance at without cringing — a flash of recognition overtook me almost against my will. I am the titular Negro, that is a fact, though I don’t think he has described me fully. He feared me but he did not know me. Yet what vexed him in the ’60s, and what still vexes us, is not even race, it is the myth and superstition of color grafted onto social circumstance and class. That is why my all-American experience, in which encounters with racism and the disadvantages of color did not block the uses of my talents or the free expression of my views, has also made of me the authorial “white” liberal whose discomfort cascades into guilt. I reject that guilt just as I resent the tribal and despairing essentialism that describes my trajectory as “white.” What I want to be, in the fullness of my heritage, is the disembodied writer seeking, however implausibly, an exit from this whole dishonest bind. “Will this madness in which we are all caught never find a resting-place? Is there never to be an end to it?” Podhoretz raised an important if completely impolitic point: all of us will need to let go of who we were in order to become who we are capable of being.

    The question needs to be continually posed: what exactly is being preserved under the guise and the performance of our inherited racial identities — and at what near- and long-term price? This cuts both ways. What do blacks and other marginalized peoples — groups, it is true, that have always been in flux — cling to by asserting continued difference (regardless of what others would assert on their behalf)? Perhaps more importantly, what do majority and normative populations — which is to say, whites — believe they are maintaining through our exclusion, and what has been that cost?

    Passing narratives have always carried more than a whiff of shame about them. In recent years, depictions of immigrant and non-white communities in America have increasingly been judged based on the degree to which they allow a given group’s distinctiveness to obtain. We hail Junot Diaz for refusing to translate whole blocks of Dominican Spanish just as we praise Jay Z for, in middle age, suddenly deciding to dreadlock his hair. (We don’t know what, exactly, to make of a multicultural cohort of congressional leaders kneeling after the death of George Floyd on the Capitol’s polished marble floors in vivid kente cloth stoles.) The word of the day is unapologetic. This is no doubt an improvement over meek or diminished. It harks back to the earlier slogan of “black pride.” And who can argue against pride? There is, after all, so much for us to be proud of, as the “assimilationist” themselves certainly believe. But what happens when pride is diminished into mere defiance and is pointlessly glorified? It happened in the 1960s and it is happening again. (We need a new Tom Wolfe to bear witness to this era’s bizarre new radical chic.) And what happens to a human being when the part about him that he most cherishes is his defiance? Is that not a travesty, too? Defiance is not the same as self-respect — or it is self-respect turned hysterical, a tensed and defensive perversion of self-respect. A human being is infinitely more than a clenched fist.

    Embedded in this discussion is the accusation that people who desire assimilation are attempting to escape from who they really are. They are said, by the proponents of separation, to suffer from a psychological disorder, a reprehensible lack of self-esteem. Self-hatred is real, of course, and the constant experience of recognition withheld can inculcate it. But there are at least as many reasons for being ashamed of oneself as there are men and women populating the earth — many of which have nothing to do with racial identity at all. And what if that is a false objection in the first place? What if you do not have to erase anything in order to join? This is what Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan discovered in the early 1960s: that Zangwill wrote for another age, that melting down was no longer necessary to establish a position and a commonality in American society. Indeed, what if we find ourselves in a society that accepts us — that frequently admires us — for  not erasing anything, that celebrates our particular and original attributes?

    The zero-sum negotiation between authenticity and acceptance deserves to end. Based on a misunderstanding of American pluralism, it has caused too much pain. It is entirely possible to remain aware of histories of exclusion and domination without conceding the motive for wanting to assimilate going forward. What we need is a new discourse, and beyond that, an infinitely more secure means of imagining ourselves and each other, one that abhors unambiguous and intimidating notions of loyalty and disloyalty, and allows for a kind of national project that does not reject one’s inherited culture but which, on the contrary, understands it as but one arrow in a shared quiver — a single source of strength among many. The most effective way to combat racism is precisely in the name of pluralism.

    What we need is an unpejorative understanding of assimilation that views it simply as a means of experiencing the capaciousness of the world. Assimilation is a welcoming impulse, an expression of nothing more sinister than curiosity. One wishes to assimilate because one wishes during this fleeting life to maximize one’s human potential. But the contemporary hyper-focus on racial difference, and above all on the singular, nefarious power of whiteness, frowns on curiosity and prohibits us from forging the inclusive societies — and the inclusive individuals — that we must ultimately will into existence. While it is true that we may have been an Anglo-Protestant culture at the founding — and I am as right to say “we” as you are — we are far beyond the point of no return: we are now, or very soon will be, a minority-majority country. Such changes to the country’s hardware require a software update — one that incorporates all of these all-Amer-ican differences. This in turn requires the confidence to state a basic truth: the things that one wants to acquire by assimilating or integrating into the mainstream — or, ideally, by forming a new and holistic core culture — are not things that white people own.

    The essence of Homer or Plato is not whiteness. When a black man reads the Iliad and the Republic, he does not steal them from anybody, or trespass into a territory where he does not belong. Baldwin was liberated by the knowledge that Shakespeare also belonged to him. I relish the thought that Kafka and Borges and Dostoyevsky are mine. Yet we are moving, at warp speed, away from such generosity of spirit — away from an appreciation of the blessings of universalism, and of the extent to which they need not threaten the particular.  At New York’s elite Fieldston School, to cite but one depressing recent example, even physics has become an identity-based power struggle. “We don’t call them Newton’s laws anymore,” an upperclassman confided to a journalist. “We call them the three fundamental laws of physics. They say we need to ‘decenter whiteness.’”

    Such a capitulation to racecraft rigs the discussion from the start. Assimilation — or genuine personal cultivation and interpersonal toleration — is a matter of addition, not subtraction. It hungers for more. Newton’s genius was not white, it was human. (And it may have been only his own. Think of all the white people who were not Newton.) When we acquire the ability to see the physical world as he did, we transcend a provincial identity, ours and his, an obsession with provenance, to commune with what is objectively true. We are, every one of us, lifted up. Anyone — black or white or brown — who would assert that the notion of Newtonian physics “privileges whiteness” is only betraying the thinness of their own self-understanding.

    Behind all of these debates, however high-minded, there always lurks the dire question of sex. Who sleeps with who? Who marries who? Whose physical features, superficial as they may be, will wax and whose will wane? These are primal and delicate questions that do not usually inspire rational analysis. And, beyond that horizon, to whose gods or idols will we continue to bow our heads, if we still bow them at all? In France, where I live, a proudly “universal” culture has been reckoning with the pressures of particularism — specifically, with how much latitude it can afford to extend to a young Muslim population that has grown more desirous of the veil the more it has been commanded to stash it away. Here, too, the question of assimilation — of how to make the de facto reality of a multiethnic society work in theory — has begun to rage again. Where America had its melting pot, Paris-centric France could point to le creuset  français, which transformed both paupers from the provinces and immigrants from the colonies into raceless Frenchmen equal within the Republican ideal. Assimilationism was the public philosophy, and not much attention was paid to the matter of how much in the way of cultural and ethnic and religious self-immolation the state could legitimately demand.

    As early as the 1970s and 1980s, the assimilationist tradition faced a “differentialist” reaction. A popular slogan at the time was the droit à la différence.  As in America today, such fervent identitarian sentiment in France gained ground on the right as well as on the left. The philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff has written extensively about the multiculturalist “new right” that emerged around the reclusive and prolific thinker Alain de Benoist, whose ideas have recently migrated to America and inspired the likes of Richard Spencer and other organizers of the disgraceful march on Charlottesville. What was genuinely novel in the French formulation, however, was the xenophilic, counterintuitively antiracist and even egalitarian turn of Benoist and some (but not all) members of the nouvelle droite. Cultural and racial differences were taken as paramount and practically sacrosanct, as the reactionaries sought to preserve abstract collective identities — and communal differences — that they perceived as threatened by mixing of any kind. The political rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen shifted the terms of debate. “As a result,” the American sociologist Rogers Brubaker notes, “the moral and political ambiguity, and the exclusionary potential, of culturalist differentialism were brought into sharp focus — indeed, much sharper focus in France than elsewhere.”  In the wake of an active political right, the slogans had to change. Universalism had to be reaffirmed, politically and polemically. There was less talk in the mainstream about the “right to difference” and more about the right to resemblance, or better yet indifference, which is to say the right to be treated like everyone else. (Philosophers since the Enlightenment have noted that indifference is a form of toleration.) It seemed that French society was intensely focusing again on the assimilationist goal. That is why the recent spread of identity politics in France has come as such a shock — seemingly another damaging import from overseas. Les Americains!  It is certainly true that French political culture does not yet possess a natural and homegrown understanding of pluralism.

    In the United States, the situation is different. We are losing any natural understanding of universalism. At least since the second Obama term, when the Black Lives Matter movement took off in earnest, there has been, on the consensus-shaping left, a pronounced rejection of assimilation as a fundamentally anti-black ideal. “Assimilationist ideas are racist ideas,” Ibram X. Kendi has ruled in his Manichean book How to Be an Antiracist. “Assimilationists can position any racial group as the superior standard that another racial group should be measuring themselves against, the benchmark they should be trying to reach. Assimilationists typically position White people as the superior standard.” This is a sorry misunderstanding of the reasons for assimilation. (Who wants to be white?) It is also the hackneyed accusation of race treason.

    In a slim book that has been anointed, in multiple didactic iterations, the definitive tool for everyone from toddlers to CEOs, Kendi builds on the success of recent “afropessimistic” discourse, and on the fashionable adulation of (early) Malcolm X over Martin Luther King, Jr.,  and traces the failure to emphasize cultural specificity and the maintenance of origins back to W.E.B. Du Bois. “The duel within Black consciousness seems to usually be between antiracist and assimilationist ideas,” he instructs. “DuBois believed in both the antiracist concept of racial relativity, of every racial group looking at itself with its own eyes, and the assimilationist concept of racial standards, of ‘looking at one’s self through the eyes’ of another racial group — in his case, White people. In other words, he wanted to liberate Black people from racism but he also wanted to change them, to save them from their ‘relic of barbarism.’ Du Bois argued in 1903 that racism and ‘the low social level of the mass of the race’ were both ‘responsible’ for the ‘Negro’s degradation.’” Kendi continues by citing the master without commentary, wagering that the cultural mood has shifted enough for the offense in DuBois’ words to be obvious to his readers: “Do Americans ever stop to reflect that there are in this land a million men of Negro blood…who, judged by any standard, have reached the full measure of the best type of modern European culture?” (Du Bois was marveling about a population still living with the memory of slavery.) Kendi expects you to recoil from those words. When I read them, I cheer.

    Kendi’s solution to the enduring reality of inequality in the absence of any assimilationist objective — which has become its own orthodoxy now — is no solution at all. The point is not only that perfect separation is impossible, and would hobble the black community. It is also that Kendi is committing the very sin he has made a career of bemoaning: race-based separatism. Insisting on the perpetual and unalloyed distinctiveness of blacks (or any other historically marginalized group) is as exclusionary as ignoring us had ever been. We are stuck, then. As he argues depressingly elsewhere in the book, “The only remedy to racist discrimination is antiracist discrimination. The only remedy to past discrimination is present discrimination. The only remedy to present discrimination is future discrimination.” Orwell would have loved those sentences. Kendi’s vision of American society is a perpetual juggling trick in which the balls may never come down.

    Cultural relativism is bad for culture, because it looks suspiciously on outside influences. It is tribalism through and through. Like all tribalism, it is easily threatened by others and it threatens others easily. What the proponents of this limiting worldview fail to grasp about assimilation is that, even when it is desired and achieved, it can only ever be partial. Human beings do not and cannot replace each other. When they undergo changes, and accept influences, there are continuities and discontinuities. The differentialists — whether white or black, left or right — have less to fear than they imagine.

    The differentialists loathe a genuinely multicultural society because they are terrified of a genuinely multicultural individual. They lay claim to the entirety of their sons and daughters, every aspect and every dimension of them. They want them to be completely faithful and completely monolithic. They fear that the world is nothing but a slippery slope to defection and betrayal. That is why they subsume the individual, with all her wants and needs, with all her decisions and acts, with all her capacity to self-create, beneath the collective. The individual, except as a loyal representative of her origins, is effaced and forgotten. Individualism itself is regarded as a corrupting deviation from community, which is finally all that matters.

    Why are they so afraid? Perhaps they have not transmitted enough of their tradition to sustain their children within it, so that they may carry it into the “outside world” with confidence. Perhaps, ironically, it is their tradition, and its capacity to meet the modern world, in which they have insufficient faith. Either concern is overplayed. Inherited identity, in all its elements, is never completely alienable. There is no such thing as perfect assimilation, nor should there be. We are all amalgamations, whether we choose to recognize and to cultivate this inner diversity or to stifle it. The notion of hybrid vigor is useful here. Arguing for segregation — whether physical, mental, ethical (one set of standards for you and yours, and another for me and mine) or cultural — is arguing for weakness, or admitting to it. To equate assimilation with racism is to shame and intimidate us out of our birthright — as much a birthright as any authenticity could be. The world and my father’s house: they are both mine.

    If we can intuit why people overemphasize their historical glories, we might also pause to ask what makes them so anxious about loosening or even severing the bonds of past adversity. Why can’t they take yes for an answer? (When it is given, that is. There is still far too much no.) In any case, it is clear that an obsessive focus backward — whether indignant or prideful — hinders the necessary forward motion. It is impossible to transcend racism by doubling down on racial differences. The problem with the anti-assimilationist program of the contemporary left is not that it rejects a diminishing movement by non-whites to an Anglo “core culture” from which everything else is a deviation from the norm, as in Tocqueville’s day. The problem — which is mirrored and even amplified in the regressive populism of a myopic Republican right — is that it fails to meet the imaginative task at hand. To make our future society not just function but flourish, we will all have to assimilate into something outside ourselves, something based on all of us that is entirely new.

    The Fall of the House of Labor

    In 1927, there was a deep economic crisis in Palestine. Unemployed workers would gather in a workingmen’s club in the cellar of Beit Brenner in Tel Aviv to bitterly vent their difficulties. One evening, David Ben-Gurion, then General Secretary of the Histadrut (Zionist Labor Federation in Palestine), addressed them about the future of Zionism and the primacy of the Jewish worker’s role in building the land of Israel. A cry of anger erupted from the audience: “Leader, give us bread!” Ben-Gurion replied: “I have no bread. I have a vision.”

    This episode provides the terms for understanding what has happened to the Labor movement in Israel. There is no famine in the country now, and until the advent of the corona-virus there was no economic distress — but neither is there a vision, or anyone worthy of being described as a leader. How did it come to pass that the movement which built and led the nascent Jewish state from 1935, and the actual Jewish state until 1977, and later wrote several important chapters in Israel’s history, evaporated into a handful of mediocre Knesset members who were attached like a final appendage, almost vestigially, to a parity government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, who was indicted on charges of corruption? The party that built a nation, established a state, and gathered the Jews in their ancient homeland seems to be dying slowly, unattractively.

    In the beginning there was the vision: The Jewish state and the Israeli nation would be built from the bottom up, in a gradual process of shaping society and culture. It was supposed to be a project that combined nation-building and the creation of a new society, a national goal and a social goal. It was to be carried out by Jewish workers animated by universal ideals in a particular place.

    The Labor movement did not stem from the Jewish proletariat in Eastern Europe. That proletariat was not enthralled by the Zionist idea. They preferred to find refuge and a better life in America. Of the few who were attracted to the Zionist idea, most were from the lower-middle class, semi-educated, with ties to Jewish tradition and culture, lapsed yeshiva students who adopted the idea of national and social redemption. They fell under the spell of socialist doctrine, and were motivated by the aspiration to establish a state for the Jews in Palestine. It was a dream that seemed highly unrealistic, and certainly unparalleled in the world: a nation exiled from its homeland for millennia returning to the same land.

    They drew their socialism from the Russian tradition — the Narodniks, a movement that “went to the people,” that sought to reform the Russian nation, and placed the requirement to live in accordance with one’s beliefs at the top of its value system. Believing in socialism and occasionally taking part in demonstrations was not enough; one was expected to live every day in accordance with one’s convictions. When applied to Zionism, this high ideal of philosophical consistency made it inappropriate to advocate Zionism while continuing to live in the Diaspora. It was similarly inappropriate to strive for a life of equality and continue to live as a capitalist. The demand for overlapping belief and action was unique to the Russian Narodniks, and passed from them onto the leftist Zionists, who would come to call it “realization” (hagshamah). 

    This principle, which is typical of small sects, was supposed to apply to a wide public, an entire society, in Palestine. The extreme expression of this conviction was the work of a small minority who went to live a life of equality on kibbutzim, but in the wider circle of workers who were members of the Histadrut impressive efforts were also made to create equality. Thus, for example, the pay scale in the Histadrut was determined in accordance with the number of people in the family, not the person’s standing in the functional hierarchy: according to legend, the person serving tea at the Histadrut, who had a big family, earned more than the head of his department. A Histadrut member was entitled to establish a cooperative in which all the members were partners, but not to employ hired workers, since that was considered exploitation. The aspiration to equality sometimes manifested itself in extreme ideas, such as Ben-Gurion’s proposal in 1923 that the Histadrut become the employer of all workers and pay them an equal salary — a general commune. The proposal was rejected as impractical.

    The utopian aspiration to an egalitarian society lent added value to the aspiration to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. It connected nationalism to the lofty ideals that were exciting Western intellectuals at the time. Between the two world wars and in the decade following World War II, “progressive” circles viewed the Soviet Union as a beacon in a world where fascism and Nazism were running riot, where human dignity was being trampled underfoot, especially the dignity of the Jews. In the West, Russia was perceived as a country that granted Jews equal rights and equal opportunities, and where anti-Semitism was forbidden by law. It was only in retrospect that many people in the West recognized the horrors perpetrated, not least against the Jews, by the Soviet regime. (There were some, dissidents and scholars, who knew of the horrors in real time, and there were those, true believers and ideologues, who denied them.) But at the time when the foundations for the Jewish national home in Palestine were being laid, Russia still served for many people as a prime example of the feasibility of establishing an ideal society. This mixture of socialism and Zionism in the Labor Movement served as a force for recruiting the idealistic element among young Jews in Eastern Europe. Socialism conferred moral worth and universal meaning upon a national movement, which, from its inception, was accused by its critics of undermining the country’s Arab residents. Belonging to a rising global movement for justice ameliorated the harsh life that Jewish workers in Palestine encountered every day. This was worth waking up for in the morning.

    The Labor Movement created an entire philosophy of life that shaped the culture, everyday behavior, folklore, ceremonies, and myths of the growing Jewish community in Palestine. A “New Jew” — that was the idea. This Jew was a free individual who spoke and read Hebrew, was proud and self-reliant, and prepared to defend himself and his brethren. Added to this was the demand for a life of physical labor. Since the late nineteenth century, many Jews had internalized the anti-Semitic argument that they were parasites who fed on the work of the non-Jews among whom they lived. Although there were in fact Jewish farmers, and a great many Jewish craftspeople, this did not prevent them from being cast as parasites. Only the return to the land, the early Zionists believed, to working the soil in the homeland, to “productivization,” could engender a New Jew, and erase the stain on the image of the Jewish people.

    This aspiration was congruent with the needs of the Zionist movement to settle the land, and also to provide employment for those coming to the country, which had no industry or commerce to speak of. The default option was agricultural work, which was grueling, tedious, and financially unrewarding. The Tolstoyan Zionist thinker A.D. Gordon’s notion of the “religion of labor” provided emotional compensation for the hardship, the boredom, and the poverty in the fields: the New Jew returns to the land, from which he draws vitality and virtue. He (and she) redeems the land and the land redeems him. Thus, hard work was presented not as a constraint or an obstacle, but as an ideology, a spiritual and social opportunity, a philosophy of life. Yitzhak Tabenkin, one of the leaders of the Kibbutz movement, described the New Jew as carrying a hoe in his hand and a rifle on his shoulder.

    The equal society and the New Jew were enfolded in social solidarity and assisted by an ideological system. Poems, songs, novels, and innumerable speeches and articles underscored the idea that the Jewish society being built in Palestine is a just and moral society that seeks to right a historical wrong perpetrated against the Jewish people for centuries. It also served as justification for the fact that Jews were settling in a country inhabited by another nation that steadfastly refused to share it with them. There was, of course, a measure of self-righteousness in this self-image, but it enabled the so-called “Arab problem” to be disregarded for many years, and when it was no longer possible to ignore it, in the 1930s, the new awareness of the problem was accompanied by the conviction that “we” were in the right, “they” were the aggressors, and “we” were merely defending ourselves.

    The Labor movement skillfully transformed adversity into a virtue and necessity into a moral advantage. Necessity created abstemiousness, and ideology imbued modesty and poverty with pride. When members of the youth movements sang about their uniform, “The blue shirt is without a doubt superior to all jewelry,” it was an expression of a deep faith in simplicity. Ben-Gurion made the unbuttoned collar a characteristic of Histadrut members, in contrast with the bourgeois suit. Of course there were Jewish bourgeois and even industrialists in the land of Israel at the time, and also workers who longed to live in bourgeois Tel Aviv, but the dominant ethos was one of modesty, toil, solidarity, and a willingness to enlist in great national undertakings.

    In spite of economic hardship, the culture that developed in the country was high culture. Almost miraculously, people who had come from the small towns of Eastern Europe, where books were the only refining cultural force they knew, discovered in the land of Israel an aspiration for beauty. This manifested itself in cultivating gardens in the kibbutzim, where there was barely enough to eat; in the reproductions of Van Gogh’s Sunflowers that were hung in the homes of kibbutz and moshav members; in lending libraries that operated in all the workers councils; in music classes, choirs, and concerts held near Maayan Harod in the Jezreel Valley; in workers’ housing projects in cities built in the Bauhaus style; in the education system and the non-formal education of the youth movements; in the establishment of a national theater and many publishing houses. The aim was to establish a cultivated society possessing a spirit of service, a task-oriented society that also prized theater and art. And all this was supported by a social welfare system: a sick fund assuring medical care for every worker and an employment bureau that allocated work (and included new immigrants, in contrast with the particularistic interest of the local workers) and a guarantee of a pension fund, and much more.

    The above description idealizes a past that was not ideal. There was a degree of coercion in the imperative, “Jew, speak Hebrew!” which made it difficult for new immigrants to integrate into the cultural milieu. There was also coercion in the obligation to be a Histadrut member, which implied acceptance of the principles of socialism, in order to benefit from social welfare programs. And there was always opposition from right and left to the pragmatic compromises dictated by Mapai (the Hebrew acronym for Workers Party of the Land of Israel), which was established in 1930 and expressed what its members viewed as a version of Rousseau’s “general will” in Jewish Palestine. As long as the goal — a Jewish state — was the beacon lighting the way, the flaws of a bureaucratic system and the inequities of favoritism were regarded as minor blemishes in an otherwise glowing picture.

    All this changed after the establishment of the state. The writer Amos Kenan once exclaimed: “The state destroyed my homeland!” He meant that the landscape of Mandatory Palestine, in physical and human respects alike, was becoming extinct. The Arab villages that blended with the hilly landscape were destroyed, and were being replaced with ugly immigrant housing projects that were mutilating the land he loved. Mass immigration subsumed the old Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine). There is a moment in Road to Life, the novel by the influential Soviet educator Anton Makarenko, in which he and his students — abandoned children and adolescents — are about to move from their small and intimate educational establishment, which had nurtured their identity, into a grand institution in which they would become a minority. Makarenko wonders whether his slender disciples, whom he had educated in his collectivist spirit, would be able to prevail over the majority, or if the opposite would occur. This resembles the situation that developed in the State of Israel in the 1950s: within three years, the Jewish population had doubled, and this was just the beginning of an  extraordinary process of growth and development. The new state’s slogan was “the melting pot”: just as immigrants to the United States adapted and integrated themselves to the existing ethos, immigrants to Israel would do the same.

    Deep down Ben-Gurion had misgivings, which were expressed in the early 1950s when he wrote that for generations the Jewish people had dreamed, anticipated, and yearned for a state, but it had never occurred to anyone that when the state was finally established there would not exist the nation to build it. He was alluding, of course, to the catastrophe of the Holocaust. He needed a critical mass of Jews in the country, and so he supported mass immigration, and fought against his advisors who sought to limit it for economic reasons. But like Makarenko, he wondered who would subsume whom. He searched for the miraculous formula that would transform what he called the “torn remnants of tribes” into a nation.

    The old ethos did not stand a chance in the new state. The veterans, the standard bearers of the ethos of modesty, physical labor, and high culture, had become bourgeois. The heroes of the War of Independence, of the struggles against the British, were weary. They now favored a less collective and more individualistic society. Very few of them responded to Ben-Gurion’s calls to enlist in the work of immigrant absorption. Inertia gripped the old pioneers. Even prior to statehood, many of them would have preferred a more comfortable life, less spartan, but it was impossible in the limited economic frameworks of the Yishuv. Now, as the economic horizons expanded, skilled workers, doctors, teachers, and engineers rebelled against the policy that sought to maintain low wage gaps between manual labor and the liberal professions.

    It was a rebellion against the egalitarian state. Equality can be sustained in a small, relatively intimate society in a situation of struggle. Now that the political mission had been accomplished, and the state was established, many people wanted to loosen the pioneering tension. Socialism was still alive, but it had softened and become middle-class, and most importantly it had shrunk into increasingly smaller circles of people who had come of age in Yishuv times. There were still youth movements, and new kibbutzim were still being founded. The Nahal (Fighting Pioneer Youth), a kind of statist continuation of the Palmach (an elite military force in pre-state Israel), was very popular. The songs of the military choirs and bands nurtured the ethos of toil and task, of the willingness to make sacrifices for the greater good. But electric refrigerators and washing machines began appearing in homes, and towards the end of the 1950s the standard of living rose. Can an ethos of simplicity and self-abnegation be maintained in an affluent society?

    Concurrent with the relaxation of the “veterans” — a category that encompassed anyone who came to Palestine before 1948 — the new immigrants arrived. In the first few years they were mainly Holocaust survivors from Europe. They came after years of war and destruction and displacement, and their landing in the immigrant camps or temporary settlements was relatively soft, since they came from nothing, with nothing, and knew they would have to rebuild their lives. These survivors accepted hardship because they were accustomed to hardship, and also because they understood what the absorbers said — in Hebrew, Yiddish, or Ladino. After them came immigrants from the Arab countries, the Mizrahim. Some of them, like the elites of Iraqi Jewry, left behind fine homes and a good life, but after a flight of just a few hours they transitioned from a life of prosperity and stability to one of difficulty and humiliation. They did not understand the absorbers and the absorbers did not understand them.

    The Ashkenazi-Mizrahi rift was born in the 1950s. There was discrimination in favor of Ashkenazim and against Mizrahim. And there was also the standing sociological insult: the melting pot policy assumed that the Mizrahim had to change and adapt themselves to the existing Eastern European socialist ethos. This had implications, among other things, for the foundational status of the father, the traditional family patriarch: he abruptly lost his standing. And there was also the issue of religion.

    The Zionist movement internalized the religious narrative of the land of the forefathers, the return to Zion, and the promised land. The entire Zionist story is founded on it. On the other hand, it made every effort to remove God from the picture. Zionism represented a defiant opposition to historical quietism, to waiting for a messiah to come and save the people of Israel, and instead it sanctified action, the human ability to change the course of history by sheer force of will. The clash between observers of the Jewish faith and secular Jews, who challenged the traditions of the forefathers, began at the inception of Zionism. Herzl did not want to rule on this issue, which could have torn the movement apart. Ben-Gurion, too, wanted to remove the subject of religion from the agenda. He refrained from creating a constitution, recognizing that the dichotomy between secular and religious was a highly charged issue, which was liable to lead to a culture war in a state that was barely standing on its own two feet.

    The spirit of compromise expressed in the Declaration of Independence — the expression “Rock of Israel,” which satisfied secular Jews since the Hebrew phrase could be interpreted literally as “the might of Israel,” and also religious Jews, for whom it was a traditional allusion to God — did not recur in the early years of the state. Most of the government crises revolved around issues of religious or secular education in the immigrant camps and settlements, the public observance of the Sabbath, and the definition of who is a Jew. So long as there was no state, it was possible to live with the dissonance between the secularism of a socialist movement and the moderate religiosity of the Mizrahim. The arguments after the establishment of the state revolved around legislative issues, and mainly touched on the education of the new immigrants from the Arab countries, most of whom were religiously observant.

    The attempt to shape the Mizrahim in the image of the New Jew failed miserably. The New Jew was a program of Westernization that many Mizrahim considered insulting and an obstacle to progress. There occurred a traumatic encounter between two different ideas of modernization. On the one hand, the conservative Mizrahi version sought to maintain the existing order, with gradual adjustments: openness to new professions, economic progress, education, as practiced in the Maghreb countries by the Alliance Israelite Universelle, the French-Jewish organization founded in the nineteenth century to protect the rights of Jews. The Mizrahi intelligentsia sought to climb the social ladder rather than enlist in revolutions. It tried to preserve the patriarch’s standing and family honor, and it viewed the extended family unit as its reference group. It strove to preserve what had been its way of life in the past, though it did not stubbornly resist Westernization. It did not want to lose itself. The other view of modernization, by contrast, was the melting pot ideology, which viewed the young generation as the agents of socialization, and regarded the closely knit family with reservations, as a hinderance to social development, and religiosity as one of the elements preventing integration into modern society. There was something aggressive and invasive in the speed with which the veterans attempted to impose change upon the newcomers. What should have taken at least two generations, they tried to implement in Israel in a decade.

    The predominantly Ashkenazi veterans — with their ideals of simple dress, restraint in expressions of joy and sorrow, and personal modesty — would come to be called “tight-asses” by Mizrahim. In fact those were traits and customs that did not typify Eastern European Jewry, but rather the socialist tribe in Israel. It was only in the quasi-ecstatic circle dancing of the “New Jews” that the shell of restraint sometimes cracked. Otherwise they propounded an austere code of conduct. Accepting collective discipline and subordinating the individual to the community, an ethos that was pronounced in the kibbutzim which were considered a model, was the result of this code. How else are we to understand the willingness of mothers to accept the judgement of the group and relinquish caring for their babies?

    Mizrahim, by contrast, loved elegant dress — the tailored suit was a status symbol. They loved overt emotionalism, vociferousness, and haflot (feasts). In their view, these were all indicators of familial joie de vivre and entirely appropriate behavior. In time, they would become the external expressions of protest against the “appropriate” culture that others sought to inculcate in them. In contrast with community as a coalescing unit, they nurtured the extended family, devoutly honoring father and mother. They did not strictly observe the commandments — soccer games on the Sabbath were the norm — but they did observe tradition, and over time the influence of religion gradually increased. Religion became a badge of their identity.

    One of the main causes of the rift between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim was their conflicting attitudes to manual labor. The lionization of work that was a central element of the ideology of the New Jew was, for Mizrahim, a symbol of discrimination and subordination, which made them the hewers of wood and the drawers of water for the Jewish state. The predominantly Mapai establishment viewed the construction of hundreds of so-called immigrant moshavim (collective villages), and the allocation of some of the means of production to them, as a resounding Zionist success. The immigrants, however, were not asked if this was what they wanted. They would have preferred Tel Aviv over the geosocial periphery, and the fact that they were sent there without being asked, without anyone taking the trouble to explain to them, in their language, what awaited them, created a residue of bitterness 

    and hostility, for which the economic success of the moshavim, and the integration of the younger generation into politics, were no compensation. Manual labor in forestry, which the immigrant camp residents were sent to do since they did not have a profession, or because there was no other work available in the difficult early years of the state, again created a situation in which Ashkenazi managers employed Mizrahi laborers.

    The government’s egalitarian policy — manifested in the austerity program that it implemented in the early 1950s, which rationed essential commodities according to family size, like similar programs implemented in Britain after World War II, and maintained low wages for skilled professionals — was not perceived as especially egalitarian by the new immigrants. They encountered a bureaucracy that was staffed by predominantly Ashkenazi veterans, who did not speak their language and, in the way of bureaucracies, behaved condescendingly. The old workers had become officials. When they preached about the dignity of physical labor, it sounded hollow, coming as it did from people working in a Histadrut or government office. The daily encounter with the clerk in the labor bureau, the receptionist in the sick fund clinic, the teacher, and the school principal was a dialogue of the deaf. Moreover, in the 1960s, a big economic gap opened up between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim. The general rise in the standard of living created the so-called “Second Israel,” which was poorer and less educated, and the patina of egalitarianism had eroded and excluded them. After the “Black Panthers” protests during Golda Meir’s government, significant reforms were implemented to reduce the social and economic gaps, and continued until 1977. But it was too late. Inter-ethnic bitterness and umbrage became one of Israel’s formative components.

    Today, when identity politics ostensibly suspend the contrasts between absorbers and absorbed, between accusers and accused, the difference between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim, which, to a great degree, is identical to the difference between right and left, seems to have always existed. When Ben-Gu-rion was in power, and also during Golda Meir’s premiership, Mizrahi support for Mapai, which went on to become the Labor Party, was taken for granted. For several decades, Menahem Begin’s Herut Party, which after the Yom Kippur War in 1973 would become the Likud, was a minority party in Israel’s political landscape. The first generation of Mizrahim in Israel accepted the political left, although it rejected the ideal of the New Jew. Despite the discrimination, there were many mixed marriages between the offspring of immigrants from Europe and the Middle East. It was only in the 1970s, after the Yom Kippur War, that the tectonic shift began. This raises the question of whether the identity politics currently dominating the political arena was inevitable. Over the years, the demographic scale has always tipped in favor of Mizrahim. But does that mean that the division between the political left and right should be based on ethnicity?

    Historically, the line separating the Jewish left and the Jewish right in Palestine did not revolve around political issues. Although the left was indeed more moderate and pragmatic in its attitude to the issue of the country’s partition, the aspiration shared by all was a Jewish state in the Land of Israel. The left was not “dovish” in today’s terms. The differences between left and right were more in the sphere of social and economic worldviews — between socialism, a workers’ society, a large public sector, and massive state intervention in the economy, on the one hand, and capitalism, individual initiative, and minimal state intervention in the economy, on the other. This was the situation during the Yishuv years, and also, with minor changes, after the establishment of the state. The issue of “Greater Israel” was not on the agenda: when Gahal, the alliance between Herut and the Liberals, was established in the mid-1960s, which marked the conservative Herut’s emergence from the political isolation imposed on it by Ben-Gurion, the Liberals in the coalition demanded that the issue of territory not be included in the party’s platform, a condition that Begin accepted. Mapai was perceived as an activist national ruling party.

    The transition in the definition of the Labor movement from socialist to “dovish” began gradually, almost imperceptibly. The shift started in 1967, after the Six-Day War. The messianic enthusiasm over the renewed connection with the expanses of the land of Israel swept up the vast majority of people in Israel. The Movement for Greater Israel was established by people from the left, including notable writers such as S.Y. Agnon, Haim Gouri, Nathan Alterman. In its early days, Gush Emunim, or the Bloc of the Faithful, which would become the nucleus of Jewish settlement in the West Bank, also included secular Jews, and even people from the left. Jewish settlements were established in the “territories” during the Alignment government (a new term for the Labor movement) and were justified for security reasons, but once out of the bottle the messianic demon could not be put back. At the same time, the standard of living rose and the barriers to employing Palestinian laborers were breached — the aspiration of the Jews for productive work, as opposed to business and finance, was cast aside, as was the romance of manual labor. The former pioneers became contractors and entrepreneurs. The economic frameworks expanded, and as the standard of living continued to rise, socialism receded.

    The transition from a leftwing government to a rightwing government in 1977 was experienced as an earthquake by the left, which had always regarded such a turn of events as inconceivable. Of course it was to be expected that the rule of the Labor Party would come to an end at some point. No political power is eternal, and prolonged rule is always accompanied by corruption. The Labor Movement was no exception. After the debacle of the Yom Kippur War, with the removal of familiar and charismatic leaders from the political arena, namely Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, and the emergence of a duo of leaders who grew up in Israel, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, who competed over the leadership, a political turnabout was to be expected. But when it occurred, it left Labor astounded.

    When the venerable Labor politician Yitzhak Ben-Aharon announced, after the traumatic election of 1977, that he refused to accept the decision of the people, he demonstrated the tragic disconnection between the old left and the new Israel. Begin was a leader who knew how to pluck the right heartstrings, exploiting ethnic differences and old rivalries between employers and employees, between kibbutzim and their neighboring development towns, between the traditionalism of the Mizrahim and the secularism of the left. Begin — who, immediately after the election, appeared in an elegant suit at the Likud Central Committee, put a yarmulke on his head, and said the Shehecheyanu blessing — presented himself and his movement as representatives of those whom the Labor Movement had rejected, from the old members of the Irgun to the Ashkenazi middle class and, most momentously, the Mizrahi communities. It was an “alliance of the downtrodden” against those who had considered themselves the keepers of the general will of the people in Israel.

    Yet the political downfall of Labor did not lead to a resurgence, to an attempt at re-invigoration, to a closing of ranks. Instead it provoked a long lethargy accompanied by a helpless rage. Everyone talked of the need to “go to the people,” to conduct in-depth ideological self-criticism, to educate the people so that they would come to understand their great mistake. The question was, who would do the educating and what would be the content of that education.

    Setting Mizrahim against Ashkenazim was Begin’s strategy in both policy and politics. It was a way to recruit faithful followers, whose political identity would henceforth be the identity of the right. The left could not understand how the Mizrahim, whom they dogmatically regarded as the proletariat, supported the Likud, the party of capitalists, and so it constructed theories about the irrationality of the Mizrahim, about their “false consciousness.” The simpler truth is that the Likud’s rule benefited them. It opened up economic possibilities and social advancement for them, which they had not enjoyed before. The Mizrahi path to advancement was not education, as in the case of Ashkenazim, but independent business, which in their self-perception suited the capitalism of the right. The Likud did everything it could to dismantle the left’s power strongholds: a vilification of the kibbutzim, and high inflation that damaged the economic ability of the workers’ society and Histadrut’s institutions.

    With the implementation of the economic reform of 1985, whose architect was Shimon Peres, then a member of a national unity government, capitalism came to Israel in full force: privatization and the government’s withdrawal from economic intervention. Peres performed a heroic deed that saved Israel’s economy, but it was also the final nail in the coffin of the moderate socialism that remained. The dominance of privatization in the Israeli economy turned socialism into an ideology divorced from reality. These were the years when perestroika was being instituted, however incompletely, in Russia: it transpired that even in the beacon of state-directed economy, the reputation of capitalism was changing. Israel fell into line with the new economic-social trend, alongside Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and the Labor Movement did not have anything else to offer.

    When the left’s social and economic traditions ceased to serve as its political marker, and when nationalism and religion became the political markers of the right, the left turned to a general political moderation to establish its difference. It began with the first Lebanon war, in 1982, which created a rift in the nation. The polarization was clear: the left opposed the war, the right defended it, as well as the Begin government that waged it. A new political lexicon emerged on the left: instead of socialism, liberalism; instead of equality, social justice. In the social protest movement that erupted onto the Israeli scene in 2011, the term “socialism” was nowhere heard. In the mass demonstrations, and among the tent dwellers on Tel Aviv’s Rothschild Boulevard, the proletariat was nowhere to be found.

    In that social justice movement there were no religious people, and no Arabs. There was only the Ashkenazi leftwing-bourgeois tribe, the educated middle class. The composition of the protesters exposed the demographic and sociological origins of the left’s decline and fall. It has now been relegated to the sidelines in Israeli society. It does not represent what is considered important by the majority of the public. Instead of concern for all, it is exercised mainly by individual rights. Liberalism in Israel is identified with defending Israeli democracy, the Supreme Court, and the rule of law. At one time, when Mapai was in government, the person who represented those values was Menachem Begin. They are the positions of an opposition defending the preservation of the existing order. They have nothing important to say about the larger policy questions of security, peace, and economy. And they are now the positions of the marginalized Labor tradition, a measure of the impotence of the left in setting the State of Israel’s agenda.

    Then there was the matter of the Palestinians and the conflict. In the 1990s there flourished the vision of a peace agreement with the Palestinians. The governments that were formed by the left, the Rabin and Barak governments, made efforts to reach an accord with the Palestinians. The Labor Party’s calling card was “two states for two peoples,” a prospect that had never before seemed so close, so real. The State of Israel was finding its place in the Middle East, it was being accepted into the regional club. Those were heady days. But they came to an abrupt end with Rabin’s murder and the Second Intifada, which broke the public’s trust in peace as something attainable. The Palestinians have always had a kind of veto over the fortunes of the Israeli left: when they reject diplomacy or practice violence, they make doves look like fools, at least in the eyes of large numbers of Israelis. Are the Palestinians truly willing to reach a historic compromise with Israel? Perhaps, at this late date, there can be no agreement over fundamental issues, between security for Israelis and justice for Palestinians. The question has become less and less practicable: which current Israeli political leader is capable of withdrawing Jewish settlements from the West Bank? And how many Israelis still care? In all the recent elections the issues were: yes to Netanyahu or no to Netanyahu, yes to the rule of law or no to the rule of law, a democratic Jewish state or a less democratic Jewish state. The Palestinian question, and the question of peace, hardly figured at all. Two parties with more or less similar rightwing agendas competed against one another — one more liberal, one less, but with no real differences in their political platforms.

    What does Labor, and the Israeli left, stand for? The time has come for a historical and philosophical accounting. The Zionist idea was an explosion of historical agency, an extraordinary display of political, social, and cultural optimism. The leaders of the Labor Party were avowed pessimists, who lived in constant anxiety over the fate of the Jewish people, and later of the State of Israel — but at the same time they harbored a profound belief in the elevation of humankind and in the rescue and reformation of the Jewish people. The anxiety never overcame the optimism. The first half of the twentieth century was the single most traumatic era in the history of the Jewish people, and in such a period the Zionist-socialist vision was able to enlist faithful followers who were prepared to sacrifice their lives for future generations — a grand collective mobilization in the name of safety and justice and a morally refined nationalism. This emergency period ended sometime in the late 1950s. When global society began to sanctify the success of the individual, when Israeli society became a sated and self-satisfied society, such grand mobilizations no longer seemed possible, at least on the left. In the 1980s, I argued that the Labor Movement had lost its creativity with the establishment of the state. I think this assertion was correct. The Labor Party was a victim of its success, of fulfilling its tasks. “The state destroyed my homeland.”

    The exhaustion of Israeli socialism is not unique to it. Despite the recent appearance of socialist slogans and tropes in American and European protests, socialism is no longer a living political force. It did not succeed in adapting itself to consumer society, to the new technologies, to cultural apathy, to the flattening of public discourse by the new media. Inequality is on the rise all over the world, but the motivation of the workers in the nineteenth century, to organize and to protect their rights, is not re-emerging today. The left-wing populism of today is more concerned with identity and the remedy of psychological injuries than with radical economic reform. And there is the problem of leadership, or the lack of it. Socialists used to attract and create extraordinary political leaders, who knew how to persuade the masses to follow them. The old generation of Mapai, too, produced a series of genuinely formidable leaders, such as Berl Katznelson, David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, and Shimon Peres. Since the early 2000s, however, there has not been a single impressive figure in the gallery of Labor Party leaders. The problem is not only with the message, but also with the messengers.

    What does Labor have to offer its voters? Contempt for Benjamin Netanyahu is right and easy, but it is not a social philosophy or a political program. In an era of social media, there are powerful advantages for radical slogans, fake news, and hate speech. The traditional Mapai pragmatism, which always endeavored to find the middle ground, to create a practical solution, no longer attracts admiration: it seems disingenuous, compromising, lacking in clarity. Even worse, it seems elitist, in an era in which elitism has become a dirty word.

    And so it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the future of the Labor brand is behind it. It has, in a word, expired. The epic story is over. And the really heartbreaking thing about its feeble conclusion is that the challenge of building a just society and a just peace remains, and more urgently than ever before. Here and there we hear the rumblings of social protest, which have not been heard for decades. Will this bring about a change of course in Israel, a serious reassertion of demands for a better and more egalitarian society? Will the old spirit be revived for new reforms? There are reasons for pessimism. I hope that they are proved wrong.

    And That is Why

    And that is why I paced the corridors
    Of those great museums
    Gazing at paintings of a world
    In which David is blameless as a boy scout
    Goliath earns his shameful death
    While eternal twilight dims Rembrandt’s canvases
    The twilight of anxiety and attention
    And I passed from hall to hall
    Admiring portraits of cynical cardinals
    In Roman crimson
    Ecstatic peasant weddings
    Avid players at cards or dice
    Observing ships of war and momentary truces
    And that is why I paced the corridors
    Of those renowned museums those celestial palaces
    Trying to grasp Isaac’s sacrifice
    Mary’s sorrow and bright skies above the Seine
    And I always went back to a city street
    Where madness, pain, and laughter persisted —
    Still unpainted

    Winter Dawn

    It happens in winter, at dawn,
    that a taxi takes you to the airport
    (yet another festival).
    Half-awake, you recollect
    that Andrzej Bursa used to live
    right here, just outside.
    He once wrote: the poet suffers for millions.
    It is still dark at the bus stop,
    a few people huddle in the cold,
    seeing them you think, lucky souls,
    you only suffer for yourselves.

    Border

    The scent of gasoline crickets
    Vladimir Holan

    Poor people wait by the border
    and look hopefully at the other side
    The scent of gasoline crickets
    skylarks sing
    the abridged version of a hymn

    Both sides of the border face east
    The north is east
    And the south is east

    One car holds a giant globe
    showing only oceans

    A little girl in an ancient Fiat 125
    carefully does homework

    in a green ruled notebook —
    there are borders everywhere