Sahara Dust

    The air is sharp with dust: it’s hard to breathe.
    The sky’s scraped white with it, the light turns gold
    And ominous. I cough and cough and cough.
    It blows each year from Africa, a seethe
    That Pollocks the parked cars with ochre, rust,
    The powdered pigments for the nimbus on
    The icon of a not-quite-sainted saint,
    An “osios” perhaps: holy enough.

     

    The air is edged with dust. The black-bird sings
    The riffed cadenzas of all other springs.
    One magpie clatters, black and white as rain,
    Clearing the grey matter of the brain.
    The trees pull thin air out of light. It’s quaint,

     

    We used to think, Sahara dust. On cue,
    Each year, but more and more. Oxymoron:
    The desert empties but it doesn’t shrink.
    Worn carpet shaken out against the sky!
    If sometimes there are clouds half-lined in zinc,
    And tinted with a putto-bottom pink,
    So are the sickly seasons furbelowed,
    Too-late romantic as Rachmaninoff.

     

    Our children know this evening of dust,
    The chalky sky, my iterative cough.
    It’s like the future to them, tired hit song
    They never have not known, so hum along,
    But still I can’t get used to it. Can you?
    Is being newly old what makes it new?—
    The past so fresh—like wet paint—no—like dew.

    Time, Signature

    When I was small, my grandmother, who taught piano, told
    me someday I would learn to “read” music; I was astonished!
    What ogres, what emperors, what gingerbread, what coffins
    of glass? Perched on five telephone wires, birds noted their
    gibberish, like an unspooled Phaistos disk. When grown-ups
    crescendo-ed overhead, when discords tensed for the felted
    hammer, I went pianissimo, and hid, dampened, beneath the
    black-lacquered forte, my fort. Silence was a box of rest, like
    stale licorice. If only I had the clef to the cryptic grammar!
    Every girl, bored, dreams fairytales. Arching its monobrow,
    the supercilious fermata suspended disbelief. When, later,
    I learned that the only thing written in music was music,
    imagine my disappointment, my relief.

    The Caryatid

    Even though she has set down
    The unwieldy entablature
    And walked back into her life,

     

    Her posture,
    Her disheveled intricate coiffure,
    Betray preoccupation.

     

    Preparing dinner, she slices
    The fluted celery stalk into drums,
    The mushrooms into ionic capitals.

     

    She is too old to be young anymore,
    The moonlight petrifies.
    She has left beauty behind, a ruined porch.

     

    It leaves her lightheaded,
    Being freed from history, that long mis-
    Understanding.

    What Brings Bad Luck

    Hat on the bed,
    A peacock feather
    Dragged indoors
    From the blue-eyed weather,

     

    Reflection smashed,
    A baker’s dozen,
    Chain letter from
    An estranged cousin,

     

    The bumbershoot
    Bloomed in the hall,
    The ladder’s lintel,
    The owl’s call,

     

    The horseshoe’s frown,
    The salt knocked over
    & not tossed across
    The left shoulder,

     

    A lone magpie,
    A pre-glimpsed bride,
    Friday next,
    The bed’s wrong side,

     

    The sable cat
    Bisecting your way,
    A crack underfoot,
    The Scottish play,

     

    A gleaming penny
    Not picked up,
    New shoes set
    On a tabletop,

     

    Scissors left open
    From sheer habit:
    A month begun
    Without “rabbit, rabbit,”

     

    The grave (whose?) trodden,
    The wish (hush!) spoken,
    A run of good luck
    Still unbroken.

    Jump Rope Song

    (with a nod to X.J. Kennedy)

     

    The rope that makes of air a sphere,
    Or else a grin from ear to ear,
    Is something earth-bound feet must clear

     

    When the parabola swings round.
    Right before the snapping sound,
    You have to float above the ground.

     

    The trick is tempo, neither slow
    Nor fast, and rhyming as you go,
    And then forgetting what you know

     

    (The end of every glad endeavor).
    You count, until the numbers sever,
    Since nobody can skip forever.

    Our Literature

    On the gloomy days, when the American catastrophes are too much to bear, I turn to my bookcases for solace and even something like friendship, and the shelves throw a welcoming arm over me. The bookcases are organized on the principle of no principle, and nowhere among them is there a section dedicated strictly to the traumas and treasures of life in our unhappy country. Still, scattered here and about are a number of squat volumes in sumptuous black dust jackets, all of the same height, devoted to flights of the American imagination — a sufficient number of those books, such that, if I ever gathered them together, a proper bookcase devoted to them alone would stand before me. These are volumes in the publishing series called the Library of America, which brings out the classics of American literature, Emerson and Mark Twain and little-known names like William Bartram, the ornithologist, and onward to Saul Bellow and beyond, perhaps too much beyond, in a uniform edition.

    One of those volumes plops into my hand. The cover is maybe a little too sumptuous. A glossy ribbon of red, white, and blue traverses the middle, as if it were a military sash on a colonel’s dress uniform. The publisher’s logo at the bottom of the spine is the Stars and Stripes, configured to suggest an open book. When I open the actual book, still more stars and more stripes blink upwards from the endpapers and the flyleaves. It is the Fourth of July. A tiny bugle says hello every time a page turns. Patriotism at the Library of America does not suffer from timidity. But I do like the feel of those books on my fingers, their heft, the cloth binding, the texture of the paper, and the buttery black dust jackets.

    It was Edmund Wilson who proposed the idea for those books, and his way of doing so figures in the lore of the series. He came up with the idea during World War II, which was perhaps not an ideal moment for founding a new literary institution. Nor was he in command of major finances, or any finances at all, though significant financing was going to be needed. Still, he talked up his idea, and he persisted in doing so into the 1950s. And only in the 1960s, at a vexing moment in his life, did signs of progress come his way. He was in trouble for non-payment of taxes. The IRS was threatening to jail him. And Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who was a White House assistant to President John F. Kennedy, put in a word on his behalf.

    Kennedy turned out to be an Edmund Wilson admirer. This was not an obvious thing to be, from a White House standpoint. Wilson had lately published a book about the Civil War in which he described Lincoln as a tyrant and the United States as a sea slug. And just then, in 1963, he published a pamphlet, The Cold War and the Income Tax, in which he explained that, given how abhorrent was America’s foreign policy, he was right not to have paid his income tax. But Kennedy was a lucid thinker. Apart from encouraging the tax authorities to show mercy, he decided to award Wilson a Medal of Freedom. The IRS objected. The president responded: “This is not an award for good conduct but for literary merit.” In one of the sections of The Cold War and the Income Tax, Wilson sketched his concept for a publishing series of the American classics. And Kennedy wrote a letter endorsing the idea.

    Wilson had competitors and enemies beyond the IRS, though. These included the academic literary scholars and their professional organization, the Modern Language Association, or MLA. The scholars and the MLA were promoting their own editions of American literary classics at the university presses. The MLA and the universities commanded a degree of political influence, and they stymied Wilson’s project at every turn, even if he did have a letter from the president. Wilson needed to enlist the support of major foundations, and the MLA made sure to get in his way. Finally he wrote up his frustrations in an essay called “The Fruits of the MLA,” which ran in two parts in the New York Review of Books. By then it was 1968, a year of insurrectionary riots, and Wilson, nothing loath, went about staging his own riot in the pages of the essay. He explained that some of the supreme classics of the American literary past had fallen out of print, which was a disgrace. He explained that still other classics had remained in print, but only in editions published by the university presses in conformity with the MLA’s very exacting scholarly principles.

    Wilson was endowed with a regal self-confidence, and he had come to feel that, if anyone could speak on behalf of America’s literature across the centuries, he was that person. And, on behalf of American literature, he had no patience for the MLA and its scholarly principles. He observed that, under the MLA’s supervision, teams of academic scholars had gotten hold of various writings by William Dean Howells, or Melville, or Mark Twain, and had pickled them in footnotes and pointless annotations, which rendered the books unreadable. The labor that had gone into amassing those scholarly annotations was, in Wilson’s word, a “boondoggle.” The book prices of the unreadable university editions, thanks to the boondoggle, rendered the books unaffordable, except to institutions.

    And then, having paused (as his readers may imagine) to pour himself another martini, he threw in a few remarks on the nature of academic life more generally in America. He noted a preposterous quality: “the absurdity of our oppressive PhD system of which we would have been well rid if, at the time of the First World War, when we were renaming our hamburgers Salisbury Steak and our sauerkraut Liberty Cabbage, we had decided to scrap it as a German atrocity.” He noted the consequences of this academic system for American literature: “The indiscriminate greed for this literary garbage on the part of the universities is a sign of the academic pedantry on which American Lit. has been stranded.”

    In other countries, he observed, publishers had figured out how to preserve and present their own national literatures in attractive formats. The model was the Bibliothèque da la Pléiade in France, which published a “library” or series of the leading French writers from across the centuries. The Pléiade volumes were leather-bound and handsomely designed, and, to judge from the displays in the French bookstores, they were a popular success, too. Perhaps if Wilson had been in less of a rush to show the United States at a disadvantage, he might have noted that, in spite of every achievement, the Pléiade had a lore of its own, some of which might bring us to reflect, by way of contrast, on America’s virtues. The Pléiade was not founded by one of the old-time French publishers, but, instead, by an immigrant to France who was Jacques Schiffrin, from Russia. Schiffrin got the project started in 1931 with a little help from André Gide, plus some investments from Peggy Guggenheim. Schiffrin was a crafty publisher, resourceful in his frugality. I know this because one day at the Strand second- hand bookstore in New York I bought an ancient copy of the original volume in his series, an edition of Baudelaire, only to discover that, when I went to read it, the decaying leather cover split apart and revealed a padding of old newspapers. This filled me with respect, once I had gotten over my indignation. Luxury leathers and gilt lettering (another feature of the series) were meant to be alluring. But the series was also meant to be accessible to a large public.

    And, to be sure, with the moderate prices that penny-pinching made possible, the Pléiade right away became too big for Schiffrin to handle on his own. With Gide’s help, he merged it into the much larger publishing house that was Gaston Gallimard’s. Only, a difficulty arose. In 1940, under German rule, the Aryan code went into effect, and, because Schiffrin was not only Russian but Jewish, Gallimard dismissed him from the house and kept the Bibliothèque de la Pléiade for himself. Schiffrin and his family just barely succeeded in escaping to Morocco, and then, once again with Gide’s help, to New York — a story that was told some years ago by Schiffrin’s son, the late André Schiffrin, an eminent American publisher, in his memoir A Political Education. But the German occupation came to an end, and Gaston Gallimard turned out to be content with how things had worked out. Jacques Schiffrin’s keenest desire was to return to France and resume his old responsibilities and prestige at the Gallimard house as the publisher of the Bibliothèqe de la Pléiade. But Gaston Gallimard was not interested in sharing what by then he regarded as his, and he went on publishing the series by himself.

    About the books themselves, though, Wilson was right. The Bibliothèque de la Pléiade was a beautiful series, all in all. A reader today may have to imagine some of the beauty, given that in our own era France’s version of the MLA has achieved an influence over the Pléiade, and various editions in the series have come to resemble the American university editions that Wilson so vigorously detested. Svelte volumes from the early years have swollen into fat little things, bulging with hundreds of pages of arcane scholarly annotations, printed in type fonts so tiny as to resemble dust motes. Endnote numbers creep across the pages like insects. And the book prices have swollen in tandem with the annotations. In Wilson’s time, however, the Pléiade volumes were designed to fit into a man’s coat pocket or a lady’s purse. They were books that a reader could carry to the locations where reading actually takes place, which is not typically the university library, but may be, instead, the garden bench, or the café table, or the subway, or, for people such as Wilson, who used to read while walking the streets, the busy sidewalk. And the texts were uncluttered with notes and footnotes. You could read those books without feeling that a miniature professor was hectoring you from the bottom of the page.

    So he proposed an American series on the model of the early Pléiade. It was a project to bring into print and keep in print first-rate editions of the principal and well-remembered American writers of long ago. And the project was to bring into print the not-so-well-remembered writers, too, if their works were of permanent value — the historical writings, for instance, of Francis Parkman, the author in the late nineteenth century of France and England in North America, about the European colonizers and the Indians. Parkman, in Wilson’s estimation, was one of the American masters of historical literature, whose works had disappeared almost entirely from the bookstores. By presenting his argument for this sort of thing in the New York Review, and by launching his insults at the universities and their indiscriminate greed for academic garbage, and by pointing out academic boondoggles, he succeeded finally in attracting sympathetic attention from people with institutional power.

    His co-conspirator in this enterprise was the publisher Jason Epstein, a generation younger than himself, who was a pioneer of paperback publishing in the United States, not to mention one of the founders of the New York Review. And Epstein began, at last, to make progress. He did this at the Ford Foundation, where President Kennedy’s National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, one of the colossally failed architects of the Vietnam War, had ended up in charge; and again at the National Endowment for the Humanities, during the period when Joseph Duffey (who died not long ago), was President Jimmy Carter’s appointee. It was a tale of bureaucratic machinations and big guns of the Democratic Party, as recounted a few years ago by David Skinner in the NEH magazine, Humanities. The progress was less than rapid.

    By the time the initial volumes made their way into the bookstores, it was 1982, and Wilson was ten years gone. And yet those first volumes turned out to be faithful to Wilson’s original concept in every way, except perhaps in their chunky size, which was not nearly as compact as the Pléiade editions. Also, it is hard to imagine how Wilson might have reacted to the Fourth of July bric-à-brac. But the basics were correct. The volumes were free of disfiguring footnotes and other scholarly intrusions. A small amount of useful information was tucked, instead, discreetly into the back pages, where it belongs. The initial set of books were by authors whose names would define the project for the general public: Whitman, Hawthorne, Melville, Harriet Beecher Stowe. One of the Hawthorne volumes was not up to standard. The editors chopped up Hawthorne’s short-story collections and, in a professorial sneak-attack, rearranged the stories in a pedantic order of their own. The other volumes were superb. And, in homage to Wilson, the initial set was followed right away by two volumes of Parkman’s history of colonial North America, even if Parkman’s volumes were never going to be a commercial success.

    The Library of America adhered to one more concept of Wilson’s, which was fundamental to him, though it was not something that he went on about in The Cold War and the Income Tax or in the New York Review of Books. This was still another inspiration that he drew from the French — in this instance from Hippolyte Taine, the literary critic, who was a great passion of Wilson’s. Taine, back in the 1860s, was the founder of modern literary theory — the founder, that is, of the idea that literature ought to have a theory, and science ought to be its basis. In Taine’s view, the moral sciences and the physical sciences were ultimately the same, and the science of literature ought to be comparable in some way to physiology or chemistry. He explained it in the introduction to his monumental History of English Literature: “No matter if the facts be physical or moral, they all have their causes; there is a cause for ambition, for courage, for truth, as there is for digestion, for muscular movement, for animal heat. Vice and virtue are products, like vitriol and sugar; and every complex phenomenon arises from other, more simple phenomena on which it hangs.”

    The simple phenomena that bore on the science of literature added up, in Taine’s formula, to race, place, and time. This meant, respectively, the influence of ethnic or national traits on literature; the influence of geographical location; and the influence of historical events. It is true that, in elaborating these ideas, Taine arrived sometimes at dubious judgments. The Aryan races, he figured, were beautifully poetic, metaphysically gifted, and scientifically innovative, whereas the Semitic races were faultily poetic, metaphysically stunted, non-scientific, and fanatical — which, then again, perhaps proves Taine’s thesis by showing that he, too, was a man of his race, place, and time.

    The belief that he had come up with something scientific filled him, in any case, with confident energy. Taine was superbly well-read in one language after another, vivid in his descriptions, skilled in his summaries. And the science itself, such as it was, allowed him to conjure a living quality in the history of literature. He pictured a world populated by writers across the generations, neighbors, and kinsmen of one another, engaged in the easy conversation of people who share a background and inhabit the same terrain, even if they do not inhabit the same century — writers who produce their individual works, and, at the same time, by entering into colloquy with one another across the ages, produce the cumulative thing that is a national literature.

    Taine saw a triumphal quality in all this. It was the triumph of individual temperament, one writer after another, set against the landscape of national traits and the past; and, then again, a triumph of the national temperament. And he saw a heroic quality in his own enterprise, as the scientific historian of literature. He believed that, by revealing the material factors that enter into literature, and by revealing the literary traits that result, he had uncovered the mechanisms that would permit writers and critics in the future to confer a conscious shape on the evolution of their own national literatures. We could become, in his phrase from an essay in 1866, “masters of our destiny.”

    Wilson adored Taine even as a child. His father kept an English translation of the History of English Literature on his shelves at home in New Jersey, and those volumes appear to have been young Wilson’s introduction to criticism and the history of literature. It was Taine whom Wilson read in the street, as a young man in New York. He wrote at length about Taine in his study of Marxism, To the Finland Station, which came out in 1940. But his principal effort to bring Taine to bear on questions of his own time was in a book that he published three years later, even if, on that next occasion, he did not invoke Taine overtly. This was The Shock of Recognition: The Development of Literature in the United States Recorded by the Men Who Made It — one of Wilson’s most brilliant books, though one of his least known, and long and egregiously out of print.

    The Shock of Recognition is a compendium of commentaries by leading American writers (plus one or two Europeans) in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on the work of other leading American writers, perhaps from their own epoch or from an earlier one. These are commentaries by writers who have felt a shock of recognition upon reading one another — commentaries that amount to an ardent and even intimate conversation between one writer and the next. Wilson drew his title from Melville’s essay, “Hawthorne and His Mosses,” which expresses how excited Melville was to discover the profundities of Hawthorne. But there is also a commentary by Henry James on Hawthorne, and by T.S. Eliot on Henry James and Hawthorne both, and so forth, with each entry presented by an omniscient Wilson, who, like Taine, appears to be at home across the entire reach of literature everywhere.

    The immediate purpose of the book was to make accessible a series of lively discussions, some of them not well-known. But the larger purpose was to demonstrate that an American literature does exist — a national literature in Taine’s sense, consisting of conversation across the generations among writers whose social backgrounds and language and dwelling places and shared historical experiences lend coherence to their discussion. The notion that an American literature exists was a nationalist conceit in the decades immediately before the Civil War. Sometimes it was a battle-cry for worldwide democratic revolution, no less, as in Melville’s essay on Hawthorne, or in Whitman’s poetry. But even in those years the idea of a national literature seemed to be more of a slogan or an aspiration than a description of reality.

    For wasn’t American literature mostly a stunted and provincial branch of the fertile literature that was England’s — even if a few blowhards were claiming otherwise? Wasn’t the soil of American civilization too thin to produce a genuine literature — even if now and then a lonely genius wandered out of the forest and published a book? Wasn’t America’s truest talent a gift for inventing industrial gadgets, and not for expanding the literary imagination? Those were Henry James’s beliefs. But Wilson wanted to demonstrate that American writers did recognize one another, and they did so from one generation to the next, and they did not merely look to England and Europe. The American writers understood their project to be in some respect cumulative. And their conversation was itself a literary achievement — an imaginative reflection on the American imagination over the course of time. Here, in sum, was a consciousness that was also a self-consciousness — “the developing self-consciousness of the American genius,” in Wilson’s phrase.

    He himself was a classic representative of the long American tradition, in its original and narrowly tribal version. Wilson was a Mather on his mother’s side, descended collaterally from the Puritan divines, which meant that he came from the same Calvinist background that, half a century before he was born, which was in 1895, had produced all but a few of the writers from those earlier times whom we still read today. It was natural for him to think of the literature in its long history as an extended conversation within a relatively cozy world of families and schoolmates and neighbors, which is how things did use to be in nineteenth-century New England — with an additional branch in a New York that descended from the Dutch, and another branch in the white South. About the African-American branch he was willfully ignorant, which I suppose is likewise the tradition, though in Wilson’s case the willfulness is hard to understand. He was a contributor to V. F. Calverton’s Modern Monthly in the 1930s and friendly with Calverton himself, and he had to go out of his way not to draw something for The Shock of Recognition from Calverton’s much-admired Modern Library compendium from 1929, An Anthology of American Negro Literature, a pioneering work.

    And yet he did understand that, even in his own intimate circles, the old American coziness was giving way to something more capacious. The most talented of his own closest literary companions when he was young — his Princeton schoolmate F. Scott Fitzgerald and their Vassar contemporary Edna St. Vincent Millay — were Irish Catholics, which, ethno-religiously speaking, represented a bit of a novelty in American literature. The novel development suggested still more novelties to come. And they came. These were developments that might have given pause to Hippolyte Taine. Then again, Taine, too, understood that populations change, and national cultures adapt and advance. The great forward step for English literature, in Taine’s interpretation, was achieved, after all, as a result of the Norman conquest of 1066, which allowed the French to civilize the Saxon barbarians. The non-WASP conquest of a previously WASP literature in the United States, then, the arrival not just of Irish Catholics but of everyone else as well, on top of the contributors to Calverton’s anthology, who had been here all along — this did not have to be a bad thing.

    But the old American tradition, the central trunk, did have to be rendered accessible to people who might not come by it in the simple way that Wilson did, amid the marvels of father’s bookshelves, or bestowed upon him by a beloved English teacher at prep school. Here was an obvious purpose of The Shock of Recognition. It was to show writers and readers that a self-aware American tradition did exist, and to display its nature, and to allow everybody to enter into it. Or the purpose, more grandly, was to show Americans what was American civilization, from the standpoint of the writers whom he took to be the central personalities. He had given up Marxism only recently, but he retained something of the deep idea that had animated him during his Marxist years, which was the ambition, Taine’s and Marx’s alike, to put knowledge to practical use and become “masters of our destiny,” which in this instance meant becoming conscious of our own culture and capable of adapting it as we like.

    Wilson came up with his proposal for an American Pléiade in the same period, and it should be obvious that in doing so he was extending what he had done in The Shock of Recognition. His compendium of American commentaries was 1,300 pages and came to an end in 1938. But the proposed new book series of American classics was going to be, in principle, endlessly elastic. In this respect, too, it was going to resemble the Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, whose own series has by now expanded to some eight hundred volumes, which is perhaps too many — a concession to the need for annual commercial successes of some kind, even if the Pléiade editors can reasonably explain that the French literary tradition is, in fact, enormous. (And the editors can explain that, because the French tradition has sometimes claimed to be a universal tradition, they have reason to publish writers from other languages, too, in French translation.) And so it has been with the Library of America, which has likewise expanded.

    There are some three hundred volumes in the Library of America by now, which is more than sufficient in some ways, and less than sufficient in other ways. Among those hundreds of books are boxed sets of science fiction and sports writing, not to mention a volume of commentaries on Peanuts, the Charlie Brown cartoon, which, to be sure, is imaginative. And snobbism is yesterday’s yesterday. And a good essay is a good essay. Still, an extra couple of volumes of Whitman are crying out to be included. There is an original sin to overcome in Whitman’s case, which was that, because he was such an outsider, nobody in his own time ever brought out the shelf-long Complete Works that were standard for the other great writers. But he is, after all, the national poet, and shouldn’t his complete poetry, and not just Leaves of Grass, be easily available, and his literary criticism, and his political essays? The Library of America has brought out two volumes of Wilson himself, as is appropriate. And yet another four or five Wilson volumes are likewise crying out for inclusion: his study of the American Indians, his labor reporting, his essays on Canadian literature, his study of Marxism, his novels, his poetry, and his book about the literature of the Civil War, not to mention his private journals, which are marvelous. The original Pléiade ambition was, after all, to publish full editions of the major writers, and not just a couple of representative works, which meant Gide’s journals and not just his novels and essays. But I do not mean to complain. The Library of America has just now brought out an unpublished novel of Richard Wright’s, The Man Who Lived Underground, thereby rescuing Wright, not for the first time, from the unappreciative and censorious publishers of his own era, which is precisely the mission: to preserve and protect the American literature.

    I wonder if something like the Library of America could ever be founded in an era like our own. Wilson’s proposal ran into obstacles that were daunting enough, such that it was forty years before his project came to anything. But at least in those years America enjoyed a degree of self-confidence, culturally speaking, and the Democratic Party was not averse to occasional feats of policy innovation. It should be remembered that, in the Kennedy and Johnson era, the New Frontier and the Great Society were not just programs for social reform at home and democracy promotion abroad, but were also, in a small degree, intended to shore up the national culture. Kennedy made a point of turning the White House into a center for the arts, and Johnson took the impresario instinct to another level by establishing the National Endowment for the Humanities and its sister, the National Endowment for the Arts, quite as if arts and letters were matters equal in dignity, if not in budget, to agriculture and transportation. The Library of America was one more of those new institutions, on a miniature scale. It was different only in that, after the NEH funding had gotten it launched, the winds of independent financing filled its modest sails, and onward it floated, propelled now and then by further gusts of NEH beneficence, and guided not at all by Washington, but, instead, by Wilson’s colleague Epstein, and his own colleagues and successors. Those were cultural achievements of the Democratic Party, directly or indirectly.

    Only, that was long ago. Today everybody understands that anyone who stood up to speak on behalf of the higher zones of the national imagination would get shouted down at once in the name of one or the other of populism’s contemporary demands, which are the leftwing demand for identity representation and the rightwing demand for a dismantling of higher zones in general. And the Democratic Party could hardly be expected to rise above those debates. I wonder even if anybody in the upper ranks of the party has given thought to these matters. If the Democrats did stop to reflect, however, they might observe that America’s political troubles right now appear to descend in some degree from a collapse in cultural understandings, which might suggest that, back in the day, John Kennedy and the Johnson administration were on to something with their cultural promotions, and some kind of policy to shore up the culture and its literature would fit rather well with policies meant to shore up the highways and the climate.

    But I never meant to go on about politics. How did I even get started? I began this reflection standing in front of my bookcases, fondling one book or another as they slip into my hands — here is Emerson: Selected Journals 1820-1842, and here is Emerson: Selected Journals 1841-1877 — precisely in the hope of leaving politics and its miseries behind. I wanted a vacation from the politicians. I wanted to read about the Over-Soul! But there are no vacations. The times are to blame, of course. Or maybe the volumes are to blame, with their Fourth of July covers and the spangled logos. Or the Biden administration is to blame, with its repeated and all-too-thrilling echoings of Democratic Party grandeurs of long ago.

    Where Have You Gone, Baby Face? 

    I watched too much Turner Classic Movies at an early age. It can be a burden: all my celebrity crushes have been dead for at least twenty years, and to this day I think that marcelled hair looks normal. But my obsession with films of the 1930s and 1940s can also instill another bias in a contemporary movie nut: I have no doubt that the depiction of women in Hollywood films has never been as good – that is, as rich, as varied, as focused, as human – as it was during the height of the studio system. The fortunes of women in real life may have gone up, but the fortunes of women in movies have gone down. 

    This is, admittedly, non-obvious: this has been a banner year for movies by, for, and about women. There are more female writers and directors working now than at any point in the past century (more on this later). Modern movie women can pursue careers instead of relationships; they are allowed to talk about racism or raise kids out of wedlock. So what’s missing? Hollywood, for one thing. Women’s pictures in the new ‘10s and ‘20s are mostly produced outside the major studios, and their audience is limited to the kinds of people with a high tolerance for indie movies. At best, this can produce sharp, sincere character studies which would have been impossible a hundred years ago; at worst, there is a self-conscious, artsy unfunness to the whole endeavor: entertainment is for children and comics fans, but we’re here to watch a miscarriage or a rape. A quick look at any top-ten grossing list of the past shows a market dominated by big-budget action movies and pre-existing intellectual property. Almost all of them have male leads, excepting the occasional action heroine or Disney princess. The blockbuster model is hardly only a woman’s issue –I have it from reliable sources that men also like interiority and nuance in their motion pictures – but the marginalization of female roles is one of its more noticeable side effects. 

    The present situation makes it easy to write off the scarcity of women on the big screen as a necessary consequence of commercial, profit-driven Hollywood-style cinema. But this is not so. Molly Haskell first described the problem in 1975, in her classic study From Reverence to Rape: “Women, in the early and middle ages of film, dominated. It is only recently that men have come to monopolize the popularity polls, the credits, and the romantic spotlight … back in the twenties and thirties, and to a lesser extent the forties, women were at the center.” Haskell was writing in response to the New Hollywood movement — a brief, brilliant blip in movie history when major studios let young European-inspired directors make movies about anything they wanted. Most often, they wanted to make movies about themselves, or their alter egos — at any rate, about men. I’m not knocking it. The artist-driven approach produced many great films, which also happened to be overwhelmingly male. Hollywood has changed since then, but the balance has not changed with it. 

    The ironic truth is that it was at the height of the studio system — the great American movie factory — when women ruled the screen. The really important thing to understand about the cinema landscape of the 1930s is how much bigger it was: major studios such as Paramount and MGM would start and finish a new movie every week. Before television and the internet and $15 tickets, people watched more movies. Not only that, but the movies they watched were more varied — and, frankly, much girlier. If modern Hollywood is selling a certain kind of escapism, rooted in the heroic fantasy that a single exceptional individual can save the world, depression-era studios specialized in aspirational elegance and glamour. The super-powered heroes and global stakes that are so universal in today’s blockbusters were unheard of in the 1930s. Instead, the most popular films of the decade include weepy female-led melodramas, musicals (whether the Astaire/ Rogers vehicles at RKO, the scrappy, down-to-earth stage door movies at Warner Brothers, or Lubitsch’s pseudo-European operettas at Paramount), romantic comedies, and literary adaptations from Little Women to The Wizard of Oz and Gone With The Wind. Even the most swashbuckling boys’ adventure films had major roles for their female co-stars – what would Errol Flynn have been without Olivia de Havilland? 

    Since the studios of the 1930s produced many times more movies than their modern equivalents, the range of problems they manage to depict is correspondingly broader. While navigating a stricter set of taboos than their modern counterparts, studio-era filmmakers evinced a much wider curiosity about women’s lives. A list of major dramas would touch on, among other subjects, mothers forced to relinquish their children to give them a better life (Stella Dallas, Lady For A Day, That Certain Woman), elderly couples separated by financial necessity (Make Way For Tomorrow), prostitutes with tuberculosis (Camille), womens’ prisons (Ladies They Talk About, Condemned Women, Ladies Of The Big House), religious chicanery (The Miracle Woman), violent gangster ex-boyfriends (Midnight Mary, The Purchase Price), and romances between upper-class men and working-class women, whether as Cinderella story (Alice Adams) or tragedy (Three Wise Girls, Forbidden). By placing women at their center, these movies were able to analyze an entire society — they were what the Indian cinema of the same era called “social films.” 

    These varied films share some common characteristics. More often than not, economic issues are front and center. This was the great depression: poverty was the background radiation of everyday life. Hard times produced a smart, scrappy, unsentimental breed of heroine. It is impossible to 235 imagine a bimbo in a ‘30s movie; the type simply does not exist. If a woman uses her sex appeal, it is always with intention and purpose. The overwhelming emphasis of these films is what their leading ladies want and what they will do to get it. Consider Gone With The Wind, which is really much more about the 1930s than the 1860s. Scarlett O’Hara is the quintessential ‘30s heroine when she makes a dress out of old curtains to seduce Rhett, and when she brutally claws her way back into a life of luxury, and most especially when she swears that she will never go hungry again. Of course she is completely awful, but she wants to survive, and Vivian Leigh’s performance keeps us magnetized for almost four hours through the sheer force of that desire. 

    Even the most sensitive and brilliant of the women’s pictures of our day can start to feel a bit anemic in comparison. Our heroines are more realistic, more enlightened, and even more profane than their ‘30s counterparts, but also weaker and less ambitious. We like movies to be authentic and personal — sometimes the word “raw” gets tossed around — and in our culture the easiest way to show authenticity is through vulnerability. Pain feels more real to us than grit or desire. As a result, there is a distinct prestige bias for female suffering. Just last year we have had The Assistant (sexual harassment), Promising Young Woman (rape), Never Rarely Sometimes Always (abortion), Pieces Of A Woman (stillbirth), and Beanpole (all of the above and then some). Interestingly, most of the critically acclaimed films that do not revolve around some formative sexual or obstetric trauma are period pieces. The closer these movies get to describing our real present-day experiences, the more likely they are to depict women whose bodily autonomy has been intimately violated. 

    The movies of the 1930s are not at all shy about female suffering, or even sexual violence; at least they were so before the infamous Motion Picture Production code was implemented in 1934. The difference is in how this suffering is depicted: in the old films the suffering is the start of a story rather than its subject. Studio-era filmmakers were less interested in the inner mechanics of trauma than in actions that their heroines took in response — victimization as an engine for agency. One of my favorite examples, Blondie Johnson, begins when the titular protagonist quits her job after being sexually harassed by her boss. After spending one night on the street, her ailing mother promptly dies, because this is 1933 and the concept of laying it on too thick had not yet been invented. Blondie — played by the remarkable and somewhat eponymous Joan Blondell — decides to get rich whatever it takes. She starts running confidence games, dates a gangster, and gradually moves up the ranks. Soon enough, she has bumped off the boss and taken over his lucrative bootlegging operation. In the end, she gets to have her cake and eat it too: as a sop to the censors, she is arrested and convicted, but the boyfriend survives, and they tearfully promise to build a new life together — on the level. The whole thing is great fun. Like Gone With The Wind, it is a clear empowerment fantasy: Blondie gets her own back against a system that failed to protect her, and she does it without relying on men. Blondell specialized in this type of no-nonsense working-class dame, and she does a brilliant job of channeling Blondie’s anger and cynicism as they gradually harden into steely self-sufficiency. We want to see her be ruthless, and we are happy for her when she no longer has to be. 

    Yet Blondie is still a good girl at heart. Things take a darker turn in the infamous Baby Face, also from 1933, starring Barbara Stanwyck. Our heroine, Lily Powers, is the daughter 237 of a slimy speakeasy owner in Pittsburgh. She is regularly groped by her father’s customers, and it is heavily implied that he is pimping her out to them, too. The movie really starts when Lily responds to an everyday instance of sexual harassment by pouring scalding hot coffee on the offender’s lap. What’s really remarkable is the casual way she does it — the same natural motion she would use to pour a drink, with just a hint of a sneer. “Oh, excuse me,” she drawls. “My hand shakes so when I’m around you.” Lily has only two friend in the world: a black waitress, Chico, and an elderly German cobbler. He tells her to read Nietzsche (really — the camera zooms in on the book), from whom she takes away a new credo: “all life, no matter how we idealize it, is nothing more or nor less than exploitation.” (Before the censorship board got to it, the rest of the cobbler’s advice read as follows: “That’s what I’m telling you. Exploit yourself. Go to some big city where you will find opportunities! Use men! Be strong! Defiant! Use men to get the things you want!”) 

    When her father dies in a gruesome explosion, Lily takes the lesson to heart. She heads to the big city, and soon enough is sleeping her way to the top of a major New York bank. There is a clever bit where the camera slowly and salaciously pans up the building as she rises from the office boy to the manager to the bank’s president. Stanwyck plays Lily with a combination of concentrated contempt and barely suppressed rage — at herself, at men, at the world. When an altercation between two of her lovers leads to a murder-suicide, she barely reacts. In the end, she settles down with the bank president’s successor, a smart, rich playboy who has her number and loves her anyway. As in Blondie Johnson, there is a last-minute and somewhat dutiful gesture at redemption: about thirty seconds before the credits roll, she is given the chance to trade in her million-dollar jewel collection for a chance to start a new life with him. We can believe they go on to live a happy life together, but I don’t think it matters either way. Lily Powers can save her husband or she can keep her loot. It is her choice. 

    Every time I watch Baby Face, I find myself thinking about how impossible it would be to make it today. It is not that Lily is a bad girl — we have those. It is how thoroughly she gets away with it. The film offers no judgement. It hides no guilt or embarrassment about its ambitious and amoral heroine. A more modern film might try and build up our sympathy with Lily by giving her a moment of softness, hesitation, or weakness — that de rigueur vulnerability. It might emphasize her trauma or the injustice of the society that enabled it. Baby Face does not bother. This is one of Stanwyck’s most closed-off performances, and it does nothing to weaken her electric and sympathetic bond with the viewer. That’s another thing about ‘30s movies: sympathy is not earned by weakness, but by strength. 

    The same principle is at play in Stella Dallas, a very different Stanwyck tour de force. Here, in 1937, she plays a poor mill-worker’s daughter, Stella Martin, who marries Stephen Dallas, a gentleman currently down on his luck. They have a daughter, Laurel, but gradually they drift apart as Stella’s vulgarity offends her husband’s more refined sensibilities. Stella is loud and garish and associates with race-track gamblers, but she does love her daughter, and she is horrified when her reputation gets in the way of a teenage Laurel making her own high-society match. In the end, she decides to protect Laurel by giving her up to be raised by Stephen and his new equally well-bred second wife. The final shot of the movie is of Stella standing alone in the rain, smiling wrenchingly as she looks through the window at Laurel’s wedding. It is a blatantly manipulative maternal tear-jerker, but it works. 239 Stella’s pain has made her strong. Stanwyck’s performance is so powerful precisely because it is so contained. Filmmakers of the 1930s (and 1940s and 1950s) understood that stoicism is more brutally effective at wringing tears out of an audience than any raw emotional breakdown or drawn-out screaming childbirth. We weep for Stella because she refuses to weep for herself. 

    The same principle — drawing audiences in through strength and self-sufficiency — is equally alive in ‘30s comedies. The sunnier counterparts to films such as Blondie Johnson and Baby Face are the glorious pre-code Warner Brothers musicals — movies such as 42nd Street, Footlight Parade, and Gold Diggers of 1933. They explore many of the same themes — exploitation, sex, capital, Joan Blondell’s legs — but with happy endings and tap dancing instead of gang violence. I can briefly summarize all of them: there is a stage musical production featuring a wide-eyed ingenue (Ruby Keeler) who pursues a romance with a juvenile man (Dick Powell) while surrounded by a rotating cast of wisecracking chorus girls (Joan Blondell, Una Merkel, Ginger Rogers, Aline McMahon). These were some of my favorite movies as a child. I was enthralled by the huge, trippy Busby Berkeley musical numbers; everyone was so snappy and smart and fast on their feet. I did not realize until much later that all of these women were fairly explicitly trading sex for money, although the title of Gold Diggers should really have been a tip-off. 

    The plot of that movie centers on four dancers thrown out of work when their show shuts down. They want the same 240 thing as Lily Powers wants: to marry rich, and as quickly as possible. But what she sets out to get with cruelty and grim determination, they pursue with ingenuity and charm. Since this is the softer side of depression-era cinema, they even get to fall in love. Again, there is no judgement here: only a shared understanding that one does what one must do to get by. If you want to understand what the movie is really about, I recommend pulling up the opening number on YouTube. It involves Ginger Rogers and a line of backup dancers in bikinis made out of coins singing about how we’re all so prosperous now that the depression is over. At the end of the song, the men from the bank show up to repossess the sets. In an early scene, Blondell’s character reminisces about her old Park Avenue penthouse while McMahon casually leans out the window to steal the neighbor’s milk. If they do manage to marry into a life of wealth and security, it is really no more than they deserve. The whole thing is adult fun, and not in the R-rated sense. Rather, it’s that these women are grown-ups: capable, self-possessed, resilient, and realistic, but not without a good sense of humor. 

    This kind of sexual license was impossible after 1934, when the Motion Picture Production Code introduced a strict set of standards for on-screen conduct — there was to be no profanity, miscegenation, glorification of crime, ridicule of the clergy. Licentious nudity was forbidden, as was the implication of cohabitation before marriage, and filmmakers were urged to be cautious about married couples sleeping in the same bed. The really remarkable thing, however, is that the people who came up with this list of rules were less afraid of sex than we are now. The lingering threat of sexual violence is more common than sex as a fulfilling, mutually pleasurable activity. Is there an on-screen couple today who are obviously enjoying themselves half as much as Nick and Nora Charles? After the code, all that sexual energy had to go somewhere, and so it was channeled into a new kind of comedy: the screwball. 

    The enormous success of Frank Capra’s It Happened One Night almost single-handedly launched Columbia Pictures into the ranks of the major studios in 1934 while setting the tone for every screwball comedy that followed. More than any other genre, I think, screwball exemplifies the fluid, lunatic equality of the cinema of the 1930s. The man and the woman in a screwball comedy (and if we can write a cultural phenomenon as significant as the Marx brothers off as an exception, there is always a man and a woman) live in their own private world. They start out embedded in some kind of a civilization — the upper classes, a house full of elderly encyclopedia writers, the mob, not that it really matters — whose rules and norms fall away as the couple is pushed together. Too much is happening to them too quickly for everyone else to keep up. 

    It Happened One Night opens with sheltered heiress Ellie Andrews (Claudette Colbert) jumping off her father’s yacht in Miami, swimming to shore, and catching a greyhound bus to New York City, where she falls in with the unemployed newspaper reporter Peter Warne (Clark Gable). High society and newspapers are two of the most popular screwball settings — both of them come with a rigid hierarchy and a specific, impenetrable constellation of tacit and explicit values that practically invites a benign sort of blasphemy. Those codes of conduct matter because we can leave them behind to watch Peter and Ellie, alone, in the middle of nowhere, gleefully turning all of them upside-down. 

    One of the funniest scenes in the movie comes when a gaggle of private detectives hired by Ellie’s father show up at a motel where the couple are staying under an assumed name. Peter and Ellie are having a very real fight when the cops burst in — but she instantly puts on an injured Southern housewife bit and he effortlessly plays along. This is the first time we see how intimately they understand each other, how comfortably they fall back into playing a game with the two of them against the world. This is how screwball works: all the anarchy and nonsense and plot contrivances are a scaffold for two people to develop a deep sympathetic attachment to one another. Think about the scene in Holiday with Katharine Hepburn and Cary Grant doing back-flips in the playroom of her family’s mansion while the grown-ups congregate downstairs, or the bit in Trouble in Paradise where Miriam Hopkins steals Herbert Marshall’s pocket-watch while he makes off with her garter, or when Ellie leaves her aviator fiancée at the altar to hit the road with Peter and spend their honeymoon in another cheap motel. In the process of falling in love, they recognize each other and begin to recognize themselves, without the impositions of family or class or sex. Screwball love is never simple or unspoken. At its best it is a perpetual give-and-take, a partnership, the continual process of making each other a better, freer person. 

    In sum: women on the screen in the 1930s project strength. They are independent and smart and stoic and, yes, very sexy. But is this so much better than what we have now — and what does “better” mean? Is it more realistic? More feminist? I could not say. Trauma does not reliably make people stronger. Weakness is a central part of being human. Everyone experiences it, and the stories we tell should reflect it. On the other hand, sometimes we all like to see ourselves in a position of strength, with irreducible inner resources, and utterly without self-pity. And comedy is an admirable response to hardship — a sign of mastery. I miss the scrappy depression-era way of looking at the world. It is not the only way to go through life, 243 but we could use a little more of it. 

    The question remains — what changed? There are a lot of things Hollywood studios took more seriously other than contemporary indie producers (starting and ending, of course, with profit). But female audiences were high on the list. Until the 1940s, when studios started conducting empirical research on audience composition, it was widely assumed that most people who went to the movies were women. Even then, the attitude took a long time to die. In Picture, Lillian Ross’s account in 1952 of the making of John Huston’s The Red Badge of Courage, she describes an early meeting with Dore Schary, the head of production at MGM: “There was resistance, great resistance, to making ‘The Red Badge of Courage.’ In terms of cost and in other terms. The picture has no women. This picture has no love story. This picture has no single incident … these are the elements that are considered important in determining success or failure at the box office.” Imagine an era when not having any women was the first and most obvious predictor of a box office flop! 

    The industry focus on female audiences is even starker in fan magazines such as Photoplay and Modern Screen. A quick glance at the advertisements makes it clear who their readers were — the most popular products are cosmetics, laundry soaps, and outfits worn by the stars — “faithful copies of these smartly styled and moderately priced garments on display in the stores of representative merchants whose firm names are conveniently listed on page 115.” These fan magazines helped to create another key element of classic Hollywood filmmaking: the star persona. Working closely with the studio’s own publicity departments, fan magazines gave stars a continuous identity that they carried with them from picture to picture. (Today we would call it their “brand.”) Greta Garbo was invariably alluring and otherworldly. Norma Shearer was poised and ladylike. Marlene Dietrich was sexy, exotic, and independent (though – as the magazine occasionally reminded its readers – she still loved nothing more than visiting her little daughter and husband back home in Germany). A spate of articles around Katherine Hepburn’s screen debut in 1932 crafted the narrative that would, with remarkable precision, define her career for the next six decades: a sophisticated thespian with patrician New England roots, but also something of a tomboy. One glowing review noted that she made her stage debut at age eight in a production of Beauty and the Beast – and she played the beast. 

    The magazines’ female readers were encouraged to view female stars as aspirational figures. They identified with the character that the star created for herself much more than with their role in any particular film. In one fascinating letter published in the January, 1934 issue of Photoplay, a Miss A. M. Johnson describes her own cinematic education as an awkward young girl: “Watching the incomparable Shearer, she learned to have poise and self-assurance. Watching the breathtaking beauty of Marlene, the ethereal loveliness of Garbo, the lady-like Harding and the sweet sincerity of Hayes, she kept on learning. She isn’t timid any longer, or lonely. She is popular now. She had, for the asking, the greatest teachers in the world.” One of the reasons ‘30s stars always projected strength is because audiences in that era did not go to the movies to see reflections of their own weakness. 

    The stars were supposed to be like them, but better: more glamorous, more poised, more capable. The most successful 245 of these actresses — Katherine Hepburn, Bette Davis, Barbara Stanwyck, Joan Crawford, Greta Garbo — had the power to shape the material they were given. Indeed, they shaped it simply by bringing their enormous individuality to bear. It is impossible to imagine any other human being making some of the acting choices that, say, Bette Davis does in Jezebel. The part is a rebellious Southern belle, but she plays it with a fragile, manic intensity, floridly and tragically, her eyes bugging out and her hands contorting into claws. (The rumor is that the role was her consolation prize from Warner’s for not getting cast as Scarlett O’Hara, and we should all take a moment to imagine what that movie would have been like). It is great and she is great and there is absolutely nobody like her — there has never been anybody like any of them. This is the genius of the star system. 

    Male stars did not attract nearly the same level of identification from their audience. As the film critic Dan Callahan has observed, “the limitation of so many of the screen men of the classic Hollywood period is their sense that men should not be acting at all.” There were plenty of fine actors in classic Hollywood, but with a very few exceptions — James Cagney, Cary Grant — none of them had the all-consuming personalities of their female counterparts. The stoicism of ‘30s women becomes a kind of repression in the men, most of whom struggled with the belief that projecting someone else’s emotions was just a little bit unmanly. All of that changed, of course, with Marlon Brando and Montgomery Clift and the Method. It created a new license for male vulnerability on screen — and it brought an end to the old kind of female star. 

    A lot of things happened at the same time in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1948, after a long legal battle, the studios’ 246 corporate owners were forced to sell off their theater chains, leaving their films without guaranteed buyers. Television was cutting into their market. Fewer movies were being made, and more of these were spectacles designed to compete with the small screen. The apparatus that had produced larger-than-life stars was collapsing, and audiences were gravitating towards a different kind of actor. For whatever reason, the women coming out of the Actor’s Studio never caught on with film audiences. Method actresses such as Kim Stanley and Geraldine Page had thriving stage careers but could not make the transition to the silver screen. Clift’s breakout performance in Red River and Brando’s in On The Waterfront are open, sensual, and sensitive — the kinds of parts that would have been reserved for women just a few years earlier. It is almost as if there was only so much emotion to go around: when the creative space available to men expanded, the room for women shrank. 

    Another popular explanation for Hollywood’s shift in focus during these years is a decline in the number of female creators, but I have never given this theory much weight. It is true that there was a cadre of influential female writers in Hollywood in the 1930s — women such as Anita Loos, Lillian Hellman, Frances Marion, Mary McCall Jr., and Ruth Gordon. Mary Pickford went from being a major star to a major producer, first of her own films and later as one of the founders of United Artists. But women were never more than about fifteen to twenty percent of screenwriters over the course of the decade (exact numbers are hard to find because writers were so often uncredited) — in fact, there were about as many as there are today. That is still an improvement on subsequent decades, but a significant drop from the 1920s, when almost half of all screenwriters were women. The most powerful women in ‘30s Hollywood were those who started their career in the silent era. It was the rare exceptions, such as Dorothy Parker 247 or Adela Rogers St. John, who broke into the business after it switched to sound (it helped that, like many sound-era screenwriters, they came from established literary careers). There was only one working female director — Dorothy Arzner — and female producers were always a small minority. 

    One of the great ironies of the studio era is that the rise of the talkies liberated women on screen while drastically limiting their creative role behind the scenes. On-screen women of the 1930s were more intelligent, more sophisticated, and generally more grown-up than they were in the 1920s, simply because they could speak. The greatest silent film actors – men as well as women – excelled in their ability to play broad types. There is only so much one can do with just a face, even when one has a face as infinitely expressive as Lillian Gish. But in the ‘20s it was common for studios to buy scenarios from freelancers. There were some highly paid staff scenarists (with Frances Marion leading the pack), but far fewer than sound-era studios would employ in their writers’ stables. Without dialogue, writing for the screen was less important and less prestigious, and thus, unsurprisingly, more female. The talkies brought a new crop of established writers to Los Angeles – journalists and playwrights, both largely male professions. 

    The surprising thing, then, is not that the women of ‘30s cinema were mostly written by men, but how little difference it seems to have made. I have never been able to tell whether a given movie from the 1930s was written by a man or a woman. They are equally likely to feature female protagonists and focus on women’s issues. Arzner is a fine director, but I have not been able to identify a uniquely female subjectivity in her work — because female subjectivity was so much the norm in the Hollywood of her day. 

    Loos, one of the most important and prolific screenwriters of any gender, said this about the movies in a late-in- life interview: “None of us took them the least bit seriously.” Hollywood in its earliest decades was full of people who treated their work with a mixture of perfectionism and contempt. They worked fourteen-hour days, spent years polishing scripts or invented new lenses just to get a particular effect, but they knew that the studios they worked for were glorified factories churning out a movie a week. Nobody involved in this system saw themselves as an artist –—and if they did, they saw themselves as slumming it. Instead, they were brilliant craftsmen. And the truth is that it doesn’t take lived experience or any kind of special or arcane knowledge to write formidable female characters, just close observation and dedicated craftsmanship. 

    Here is an unexpected hope: perhaps the rise of the streaming giants will restore some of that factory mentality. Netflix has fifty-one movies on its slate for this year. There are more people making more movies in mainstream Hollywood than at any point in the past eighty years. And that means more stories — about strength and weakness, about men and women, about a million other things. It might not be the old studio system come again, but surely it is no less capable of exploring all the aspects of human personality, of delivering to the screen the fullness of human life. 

    American Inquisitions 

    Fyodor Dostoevsky published the first installment of The Brothers Karamazov in February, 1879. The novel was the culmination of a decade of ideological strife, during which Dostoevsky had noted a steady slide toward populism. Socialism, the passion of Dostoevsky’s youth, was an enthusiasm still on the march. The author of The Brothers Karamazov was a devout Orthodox Christian and a conservative, a reactionary perhaps. He poured the expansive politics of his era into The Brothers Karamazov and especially into a phantasmagoric chapter — often read on its own — titled “The Grand Inquisitor.” For the past one hundred and forty years, this text has been mined for clues to modern politics. In the verdict of Lionel Trilling, “it can be said almost categorically that no other work of literature has made so strong an impression on the modern conscious- ness.” Modern consciousness was never more receptive to “The Grand Inquisitor” than in the 1930s and 1940s, when Dostoevsky was typically read as a prophet of totalitarianism. 

    Dostoevsky had foreseen this interpretation. In a letter written while he was completing The Brothers Karamazov, he worried about a regime that would provide “one’s daily bread, the Tower of Babel (i.e. the future reign of Socialism), and complete enslavement of freedom of conscience.” Enter the Grand Inquisitor. In the novel he directs the Inquisition in sixteenth-century Spain, having co-opted Christian mercy and replaced it with a cynical recipe for social control. According to Dostoevsky’s great biographer Joseph Frank, the Grand Inquisitor “has debased the authentic forms of miracles, mystery, and authority into magic, mystification, and tyranny.” His church enjoys absolute power. It traffics in mystification and magic. It caters cunningly to people’s spiritual needs and efficiently to their physical needs. For those who rebel against this domination masquerading as religion, there is the Inquisition. Thus did the Grand Inquisitor anticipate the techniques of the KGB, the Gestapo, and the political systems that those organs of oppression were meant to protect. 

    Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor is plausibly a proto-Bolshevik or a proto-fascist. Yet such readings can reduce this text to a kind of prophetic political journalism, to commentary avant la lettre on the cataclysmic 1930s. Read it again now, in the middle of our own tribulations. Detached from those long-ago debates, “The Grand Inquisitor” emerges as a timeless meditation on authoritarian attractions and on freedom’s vulnerabilities. As the Grand Inquisitor declares, “man prefers peace, and even death, to freedom of choice or the knowledge of good and evil… Nothing is more seductive for man than his freedom of conscience, but nothing is a greater cause of suffering.” The dilemma of politics in this text is that freedom is a dilemma. Freedom of conscience causes pain, which is precisely the emotional resource on which the Grand Inquisitor draws: freedom’s impositions are the secret of his power. The avowedly illiberal Dostoevsky was dramatizing a spiritual reality — freedom of conscience as a burden, a task, an impossible ideal — that is no less pervasive in free societies than in those regimes designated by the totalitarian label. 

    Perhaps “The Grand Inquisitor” is not just a discourse about them, the unfortunate totalitarians overseas. Perhaps it is also about us, citizens empowered by the Bill of Rights and basking in liberty. So considered, “The Grand Inquisitor” could be as illuminating about the United States, past and present, as it was supposed to be about Stalin’s Soviet Union or Hitler’s Germany. Without ever going to the extremes of sixteenth-century Spain, without an established church or a dictatorial government, the United States has never lacked for inquisitions. They have appeared, disappeared, and reappearedthroughout American history, exquisite barometers of the national mood and the objective correlatives of political and cultural power. They are as often creations of society as of government. They cast their strange, lurid light on the seductions and the suppressions that emanate from freedom of conscience. And they are once again abroad in the land. 

    The birthplace of the American inquisition is Salem, Massachusetts. In 1692, several members of this provincial New England community were put to death after a public investigation into witchcraft. Many outbreaks of alleged witchcraft had occurred in early modern Europe, and Salem was not at all unusual in the way it combined civil and theological authority, the supernatural and the legal, the magical and the scientific in order to save itself from witches. Nor were the guilty in the “Salem witch trial” quietly executed. They were given the role of exemplary perpetrators. The trial, the public exposure of their guilt, was the point. Only by seeing the forest into which the few had strayed could the many find their way to righteousness. 

    Historians disagree about the roots of what happened in Salem. It may have been material, a redistribution of property through the convenient discovery of witches. It may have been psychosexual, a letting go of forbidden energy under the pretense of witchcraft or amid a sprawling investigation into witchcraft. It may have been the anxiety of a religious elite convinced that the Massachusetts Bay Colony was not as homogeneous or as devout as it was supposed to be. The full inventory of motives for those tribunals may be lost to the vagaries and the hyperbole of the historical record. Whatever the actualities of the event, Salem’s legacy in American history is not institutional or legal or political. It is symbolic. 

    With the creation of the United States, memories of Salem in 1692 began to acquire a gothic frisson. Witchcraft became the stuff of Hawthorne stories and then Halloween kitsch. The Salem witch trials were a ready metaphor for obscurantism, for of theocrats, of those who believed in witches, the zealotry of those who wish to destroy a human being accused of witchcraft. It was this bequest of the seventeenth century that was rejected in the language of the American eighteenth century, in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Salem’s murk was left behind in the clean lines of Thomas Jefferson’s University of Virginia, proof positive of a new republican order. Universities would deliver what they were meant to deliver — enlightenment. The United States was born in the age of reason, though reason was often more a proposition than a reality in the new country. Reason had at least been put on a pedestal. 

    Instead of medieval inquisitions, then, the United States would concentrate on delivering justice. Few societies are as enamored of law as is the United States: the approach to justice through law speaks to the raison d’etre of the American republic. The nineteenth-century figure who best captured this infatuation was Abraham Lincoln, a lawyer by trade. Moved as so many other northerners were by the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850 and by the moral upheavals of the subsequent decade, Lincoln’s genius was to fight the Civil War with an eye to its legal outcome, which would be the guarantor of its moral outcome. His enduring achievements were the Emancipation Proclamation and the constitutional amendments that widened the scope of American citizenship. His literary-political style, like Jefferson’s, was precise, careful, analytical. His mysticism never clouded his mind. “With malice toward none, with charity for all” — such phrases banish the inquisitorial spirit. 

    But beware the romance of Lincoln’s oratory. In Lincoln’s time and after, there was often malice toward many and charity for few. Lincoln and Jefferson did not get the last word, and the inquisitorial spirit turned out to be a regular feature of American modernity. In the twentieth century it bubbled up from the extremes of the political spectrum. The Left went first. In the hothouse world of radical politics, the Dostoevskian dramas playing themselves out in the Soviet Union had an American resonance. It began with left-wing factionalism and culminated in the career of Joseph Stalin. (The Bolsheviks owed their name to factionalism, to their false claim to majority status and their mockery of their opponents as Mensheviks, the minority.) Stalin practiced the darkest arts of factionalism and, by logical extension, of inquisitions. Improvising rituals of investigation and confession, he had his enemies paraded before the Soviet public. Fewer than twenty people were put to death in Salem in 1692. Stalin had millions incarcerated and executed. The Massachusetts Bay Colony could not compete with the modern world in paranoia and dogmatic cruelty. 

    The American Communist Party slavishly followed Stalin and praised Stalinism. It justified the Moscow trials as it would the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. The American Communist Party also conducted a holy war against the Trotskyites, casting the demons out and subjecting those who wanted to stay on board to “party discipline.” The American Communist Party did not have the instruments of repression available to Stalin, who ruled over a police state that
    could conduct inquisitions of the sort portrayed in 1940 in Arthur Koestler’s epochal novel Darkness at Noon, a book that self-consciously retraces The Brothers Karamazov. Yet American communism endorsed the methods of the Soviet trials, which ensured that ideological and political enemies, having been publicly denounced, were airbrushed out of the historical photographs. 

    The reach of far-left sentiment — sometimes communist, sometimes not — was more cultural than political in the 1930s. It was an influence on educated people. The party and its fellow travelers were formidable enough to initiate a curious inquisition in the 1940s, just as an era of radical efflorescence was ending. In 1948, Whitaker Chambers, a former communist, accused Alger Hiss, a former State Department employee, of having spied for the Soviet Union. As if by magic, Chambers got put on trial. In the courtroom and in the press, he was accused of mendacity, of pathology, of homosexuality. A witness for the prosecution, he was not convicted, of course; but his reputation was irreparably damaged. An avid Dostoevsky reader, Chambers identified with Nikolai Rubashov, the persecuted protagonist of Koestler’s Darkness at Noon. At the same time, of course, Hiss was found guilty; he had been a spy, and Chambers, as would much later be shown definitively, had been telling the truth. For many of Hiss’s supporters, the trial itself had been a witch hunt. This tendency to see inquisitions in politically inconvenient investigations was an omen of political polarization to come. 

    The archetypal twentieth-century inquisition arose from the ashes of the Hiss case. One politician who profited from the case was Richard Nixon, Chambers’ friend and defender. Eisenhower chose him as his Vice President in 1952 in part because of Nixon’s barbed anti-communism. Another politician observing the Hiss case closely was Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, who possessed most of theGrand Inquisitor’s cynicism and only some of his cunning. McCarthy was less moved by the Cold War and by the facts of communism, American or otherwise, than by the political opportunities that he saw in anti-communism. Ideology as such was not really McCarthy’s forte — not to the degree that personal ambition was. He was skilled in the relent- less application of power, updating the practice of inquisition for the age of mass media. He wrapped the techniques of character assassination in the garb of legal and senatorial procedure. McCarthy was and remains the virtuoso inquisitor of American history. 

    McCarthy founded his harassment on fear and guilt and gullibility. The Cold War’s unclear borders and its reliance on espionage raised punishing questions of friend and foe. McCarthy presumed enmity and, having presumed it, he found enemies. Where there was no actual subversion, it was invented — by projecting the Cold War’s mood back onto the 1930s, when an affiliation with communism could mean so many things. McCarthy compounded the guilt of his victims by prodding them to “name names.” An inquisition inquires: it must ask or, better yet, interrogate. But interrogation can take place in different ways, in different spirits; not all questions that take the form of asking for the truth actually want the truth. Even when it inquires, an inquisition is not the same thing as an inquiry. A person publicly interrogated is made culpable by the sheer fact of having been interrogated. Though McCarthy’s fans enjoyed the television show that the Senator put before them, they also took his words at face value. McCarthy’s fictions left their mark on reality. 

    For McCarthy, generating fear was indispensable. It was not he who fired people. He was holed up in the Senate. He let the fear ripple out across the country, from the State Department to Hollywood. Guilt by association ran rampant. Treason 257 committed by communists, which did occur in the 1930s and 1940s, was not the only crime about which investigations were launched. Certain books were declared treasonous; some were removed from the libraries of American embassies. Works of art by those implicated in the Red Decade could be treasonous too, and for McCarthy and his supporters there was no way a person, once accused, could be exonerated. Naming names did not expiate anybody. To the contrary: it transformed public into private guilt, while guilt by association made fear ubiquitous, a virus for which there was no vaccine. People got fired mostly because their employers were afraid. As often happens, the institutions buckled. 

    The Salem witch trails and McCarthyism met in 1953 in Arthur Miller’s play, The Crucible. Miller’s parable challenged the modernity of McCarthyism. In the year of our Lord 1953, the salience of 1692 was supposed to be shocking. So too was the religiosity of the Puritan colony, which was not impossibly distant from Eisenhower’s America. The Puritans’ fanaticism foreshadowed McCarthyism. It was the all too familiar precedent, the resurrected template. The Crucible attributed a power-hungry, manipulative darkness to the divines of seventeenth-century Salem, whose purpose (in the play) was transparently McCarthy’s purpose — to deceive, to destroy, to terrify, to ruin, to control. Less grandly, Miller developed a political analogy in The Crucible. Like McCarthyism, Puritan justice was conservative in Miller’s eyes and as such it was dour, rigid, intolerant, and hierarchical. 

    Miller was himself a political progressive. McCarthy’s war on progressives allowed Miller to adorn the play’s hero, John Proctor, with the attributes of a liberal — as Miller understood these attributes. Porter is a handsome “farmer in his middle thirties,” one who “had a biting way with hypocrites… even-tempered, and not easily led.” Proctor’s Enlightenment courage, his Voltaire-inflected liberalism, inspires sympathy. A moderate churchgoer, he struggles with his having committed adultery. He cannot stop the trial from running its course. He is put to death, but he will not name names and he rises up at the play’s end and condemns the hypocrisy that is closing in on him. He asserts his freedom of conscience, which is his honor — “Because it is my name!” Proctor’s freedom is to not go along with injustice and, by not going along, to speak the truth. He robs an illiberal hypocrisy of its ultimate victory.

    Like John Proctor in The Crucible, Bill Clinton felt persecuted in his second term as president. Clinton was yet another reader of Arthur Koestler, and he, too, likened his interrogation at the hands of Kenneth Starr to scenes from Darkness at Noon. There were severe limitations to the analogy, of course. In its obsessive, self-righteous cadences, in its prurient interest in private matters, the Starr report certainly belongs to the literature of inquisitions, but it is hard to see the “trial of Bill Clinton” as a bona fide inquisition. Inquisitions are group phenomena. They are rituals of strength and weakness. They intentionally cross the lines of guilt and innocence, since doing so enhances their scope and spreads their message. Clinton, a sitting presi- dent, was guilty of a sexual liaison with an intern and of lying about it. He was too compromised and unique for his troubles to reach the level of an inquisition. He also stayed in office and did not fall very far from grace among his supporters. When Hillary Clinton ran for president in 2016, memories of the Clinton-Lewinsky affair resurfaced without becoming a major stumbling block for Democratic voters. 

    The contemporary cycle of American inquisitions began 259 after Clinton’s presidency. It was something new in the annals of inquisition, and not because people had changed. What had
    changed in our time was technology, and with it the public sphere. Social media mirrored a confluence of novelties. Opinions could be generated in new ways, and reputations and personal histories were publicly available in new ways. Whereas in the past a letter to the editor would have to be accepted for publication, making the press the key arbiter of the public domain, social media eliminated oversight. This gave opinions the speed of lightning, liberating disclosures and emotions that in the past were mostly confined to private conversation or to the proverbial grapevine. There was no time for introspection or a second look. The public sphere was accelerated and democratized as it had never been before. 

    The public sphere’s democratization had its bright side. The capacity of the powerful to suppress awkward or awful information about themselves diminished abruptly. Individ- uals and groups acquired access to a public sphere — mediated though it was by corporations — that could not be controlled. This assisted in the exposure of crimes sometimes in the form of information and testimony, sometimes through photographs and sometimes, as the technology got better, through video. It was not until the second decade of our century that we began to understand just how manipulable the public sphere had become. In the twenty-first century’s first decade, social media could be the hoped-for vehicle of democratic progress, holding the high and mighty to account. What obtained for the United States obtained even more dramatically outside of the United States. Authoritarianism had met its nemesis in social media. Was that not the lesson of Tahrir Square in 2011 and of the Maidan in 2014? 

    But democracy also met its nemesis in social media, and not only because authoritarian governments — in Russia, China, and elsewhere — had learned to use them for their own ends. The dark side of the public sphere’s democratization lay in its canonization of aggression. Expressing aggression was suddenly effortless and seemingly cost-free for the many who expressed it. Social-media aggression alternates between the random and the targeted, the light-hearted and the deadly, but it is anything but a trivial aspect of American political culture. In 2014, feminist critics of misogynist video games were not just argued against on social media. They were subjected to odious attacks made in the most brutal language, and to threats of violence that may or may not have been purely rhetorical. This aggression was a grotesque comedy for its advocates and a terrifying ordeal of intimidation for its victims — video-game posturing intended to silence voices and thus to dominate the public sphere. But ugly as it was, unprecedented as it was, the acts of aggression did not backfire. There was no mass revulsion against them. They went largely unchecked. 

    “Gamergate” prefigured the miserable election of 2016, during which several long-term trends converged. One was the collision between politics and social media, without which Trump could not have become president. He channeled the natural bellicosity of social media, its aura of unreality, its malicious humor, its absence of restraint, its invitations to violence. Another development was a metastasizing factionalism, for which Trump and his critics were at fault, a zero-sum attitude toward politics that promoted an abyss between the political parties, between Left and Right, between the signifiers of political friendship and the telltale attributes of a political foe. The election of 2016, its rough texture followed by its revolutionary outcome, ushered in a new inquisitorial 261 age. Enmities encourage inquisitions. 

    The record of recent inquisitions reveals an interesting asymmetry. Trump’s victory in 2016 gave him immense political power. He never accepted the separation of powers and constantly encroached on the independence of the judiciary. With some limits, he had the power of the state behind him. The Democratic Party did not disappear under Trump: it regained the House of Representatives in the mid-term elections and mounted two impeachment trials. “The resistance” found compensation for four years of exile from political power in the awesome cultural power linked in one way or another to progressive sentiment. Under Trump, the consequential inquisitions on the Right relied on state power, while the consequential inquisitions on the Left relied on cultural power. It has been an era rich in progressive inquisitions. 

    The story of Marie Yovanovich is a useful example. As Ambassador to Ukraine, she found herself in the middle of Trump administration schemes to find or to fabricate damaging material on Hunter Biden, Joe Biden’s son, who has some business connections to Ukraine. Ambassador Yovanovich did not comply. Phony accusations of her political bias circulated in the press. Social media piled on. The ambassador was recalled from Kyiv as a response to baseless accusations. The Trump administration never lifted a finger to clear her reputation for the obvious reason that it was the Trump administration that was besmirching her reputation. As inquisitions go, it could have been worse, and given the factionalism of American politics Ambassador Yovanovich’s persecution by Trump made her an overnight hero on the other side of the political spectrum. Had Trump won a second term, government-led inquisitions would have come fast and thick.

    The practice of twenty-first century inquisitions has found a congenial home on the Right. A perceived transgression and at times a real transgression is the starting point. Social media cacophonously cries out for justice. The pressure mounts and an institution is asked to take action — usually by firing someone. Suffice it to say that these procedures have little to do with a courtroom trial. They have no prior rules; they do not require anything remotely resembling due process; the accused is not necessarily given his or her chance to mount a defense. An example here is Will Wilkinson, a vice-president at the Niskanen Center who sent out a crude tweet in January 2021 and was fired after a burst of right-wing anger on social media and in the press. The anger entailed a misreading of Wilkinson’s tweet. His poor taste was misconstrued as an incitement to violence. The misreading is a predictable, almost a necessary ingredient of such frenzies. The perplexities of evidence are irrelevant to the inquisitorial mind. 

    The same inquisitorial technique is familiar on the Left as well. Its popularity owes something to the Left’s special agony in the Trump years, when a viciously coarse and anti-progressive man was in the White House while the majority of the country’s elite cultural institutions were becoming more overtly progressive. Those institutions found solace for the loss of political power in the exercise of social and cultural power. They took after those who deviated too egregiously from progressive etiquette. Whether the offense was real or perceived was often beside the point, as were in many cases the intentions of the offender. Motive is the concern of trials. Criminal law revolves around intent. Inquisitions, by contrast, presume motive and intent, and look only for confirmation and satisfaction. Again, due process, which used to be a pillar of the liberal worldview, was nowhere to be found. The effect 263 of these inquisitions has been a climate of fear, a growing conformity of speech and behavior, a resigned acceptance of a bullying authority. 

    The most extraordinary inquisition conducted by progressives in the Trump era was of Trump himself. Owing to the Trump campaign’s bizarre ties to the Russian government, and to Trump’s egregious comments about the excellence of Vladimir Putin, and of course to the fact that Trump was Trump and guilty by definition in the eyes of his enemies, he was found guilty of being a Russian asset. This indeed may been the case, but the evidence — even after the exhaustive Mueller investigation, after countless books on the topic, after round after round of first-rate investigative journalism — is still not there. In the inversion of a courtroom trial on which inquisitions rely, Trump was guilty from the outset. A thousand data points were gathered into a narrative repeated for months by journalists and experts on CNN, MSNBC, and other platforms. Social media added to the ministrations of this exuberant jury. Trump’s nods to Salem and to his being enmeshed in a latter-day witch hunt were not altogether wild. His baroque hypocrisy was that he was energetically engaged in witch hunts of his own. 

    For those convinced that Trump was a Russian spy, evidence could easily be subordinated to optics. Senator McCarthy had operated on a similar principle, exploiting a populist suspicion of the diplomats in striped pants, the fancy kind of people likely to join a treasonous conspiracy. Trump made matters worse by himself employing the inquisitor’s tactics — against government employees such as Ambassador Yovanovich and against whichever celebrity or athlete or journalist or politician (Republican or Democrat) annoyed him. Much of his campaign against Hillary Clinton ran on guilt by association: she was a Clinton, a globalist, a feminist, a liberal, and therefore not to be trusted with the presidency. Or, better yet, she was all of these things and should therefore be locked up. Eager to scorch the political earth, Trump could be seen as deserving an inquisition. Live by inquisition, die by inquisition. 

    While an inquisitorial spirit was proliferating on the Left and the Right, many of the people who fell within its sights were not household names. Beginning in earnest in 2016, progressive institutions proved receptive to inquisitions also of lesser-known and low-profile personnel. These institutions were sensitive to the verdict of social-media campaigns, less interested in individual cases and more alert to the perception of wrongdoing than to the complexities and obscurities of lived reality. They displayed little patience, critical thinking, fairness, and courage. It is typical of inquisitions that those who instigate them are at ease with the fear they unleash. Fear is their tool. The fear of a potential misstep that many now feel at progressive institutions preemptively internalizes the inquisitor’s tactics. 

    A striking case study is Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, a hundred miles or so from Salem. In 2018, a black student at Smith off on her own and eating lunch was approached by a janitor and a campus police officer. She was asked what she was doing, as reported in a detailed New York Times article. The student later went on Facebook to describe her upset. News articles projected the student’s side of the story — that she had been discriminated against — though the
    college looked into the incident and found out that the student was eating in an empty dorm. By approaching her, the unarmed officer and janitor had been following protocol. There was no evidence that they were motivated by prejudice. The incident 265 was most likely a misunderstanding on the student’s part. 

    Knowing what it knew, the college administration stayed silent when photographs, names, and email addresses of the Smith employees involved in the incident were made public. Accusations of guilt touched an employee not at work at the time. Death threats, whispering campaigns, and public humiliation followed, while the college did little to defend its employee, offering no proof of his guilt but implying it because the student had perceived malign intent in their actions. Their punishment, of course, was not execution. It was not getting fired outright, although one employee was eventually furloughed and had trouble finding another job because the accusations of racism were so well known in the Northampton community; her reputation has been destroyed. The punishment was the repetition of untruths by those in positions of authority and the requirement that the employees undergo anti-racism and intersectionality training. 

    The willful misreading and misinterpretation on display at Smith College bore the imprint of an inquisition. Beyond the fear shadowing the accused, beyond the social media moralizing and the stigmatization at will, this story of inquisition speaks to the enormous power of these public abuses. The handful of poorly paid employees who fell into the inquisition’s net were not a threat to the college or the community. They sought out no controversy. The power and suffering brought down on them was the power to control the narrative, which is that Smith College is a valiantly progressive institution awash in a sea of structural racism and doing its best to right the age-old wrongs of American society. The employees’ humiliation was necessary in the scheme of things. They had gotten in the way of a popular and righteous narrative, of a tempest of virtue. 

    Freedom of conscience is not protected by the Constitution. It is not equivalent to religious freedom or to freedom of speech. Religious freedom intersects with freedom of conscience in the phrase “conscientious objector,” someone who for religious reasons cannot fight in a war. This status accords civic space and moral prestige to conscience. It is generous in its assumption that people are not uniform, that their conscience might indicate something rare about them and something inviolable. A majority enlists. A small minority conscientiously objects. Freedom of speech is similar. It is by definition the freedom to lie and to offend and to criticize, the freedom to explore life in all its heterodox constructions. No established church in religion, no government restrictions on speech (with some qualifications) — more than anything these constitutional rights are protections. American citizens cannot be forced to attend any one church. They cannot be told by the government what a newspaper can publish or what a scholar can write. These are their rights. 

    Though it can be violated, freedom of conscience cannot be legally protected. It is a loose set of principles or ideas. One is the freedom to choose, which is impossible without the freedom to err. When choice becomes crime — murder, theft, rape — freedom of conscience is abrogated. Short of crime, though, freedom of conscience deserves a wide latitude. Even when choice tips over into crime, freedom of conscience is not erased forever. It is implicit in the criminal’s recovery and in the possibility of moral transformation: one might still recognize a crime, feel remorse for it, and try to change one’s ways. Freedom of conscience is also individual. The state does not set its terms. No church can guarantee it. To survive it must be respected as something that everyone seeks or finds to the same degree. Freedom of conscience enables moral lives that are autonomous, that allow people — making mistakes — to choose the good as they see it and the good that is not imposed, not homogeneous, not obvious, the good that is idiosyncratic and non-conforming, the good that is always a work in progress. 

    Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor focuses with ferocity on freedom of conscience. He relieves the people over whom he rules of their freedom, knowing that freedom of conscience carries with it ordeals of reflection and responsibility: choosing the good comes naturally to no one, and is at best a fleeting triumph over one’s internal limitations. Having freed his subjects of freedom, the Grand Inquisitor rewards them with moral uniformity: his church apportions dogmas, happily adjudicating all aspects of behavior and winning for itself immense power along the way. In this the Grand Inquisitor sees a version of happiness: obedience, authority, a narrative handed down from above, so that people can calmly go about their business. They are safe now. His inquisitions deliver them from the temptation of choice and from the onerous inner life in which conscience either flourishes or fails. By burning people alive, his inquisitions regulate conscience — not the consciences of the dehumanized victims but the consciences of the weak and fascinated onlookers. 

    If freedom of conscience cannot be legislated, how can it be defended? Its importance must first be acknowledged. Inquisitions translate people into cardboard enemies. They script them, they reduce them and diminish them and fill in all the blanks, meeting the psychological needs of their audience. Hence the never-ending political utility of inquisitions: they satisfy large numbers of people. They are populist theater. As long as our current factionalism reigns, we will be stuck with inquisitions. When you have raised the cost of expressing an unpopular opinion, when you lead individuals to censor themselves, when dissent (either for or against power) can result in the loss of one’s livelihood and social acceptance, then you have violated the freedom of conscience. Conversely, honoring another person’s freedom of conscience constrains the extra-legal machinery of ascribing guilt, of shunning. It argues for a light touch, for not going all in and for being especially vigilant about the points at which public shaming and the will to power converge. Freedom of conscience elevates the ideal of a merciful public sphere, an uphill battle in our unforgiving public sphere, addled as it is by the social- media furies and by incentivized sensationalism. Morte tua vita mia is the moral code of the internet. 

    The recent travails of Smith College illustrate the menace of a moral landscape without freedom of conscience. To the college administration, the employees accused of harassing a student were so unfree in conscience as to be almost without agency. Since they were regarded as unfree, as pillars of structural racism until proven otherwise, their actions and their intentions had no bearing on their destiny. Guilty or not in practice, they deserved their public shaming in theory. The college administration also felt justified in tolerating a public inquisition because it was certain of its own enlightened attitudes. The Grand Inquisitor would have approved. He is not, in his own view, a man who causes harm. “We shall triumph,” the Grand Inquisitor says in The Brothers Karamazov, “and shall be Caesars, and then we shall plan the universal happiness of man.” His hold on power is so firm because his policing of public morality leads to happiness. And what is a 269 bit of collateral damage in the vast enterprise of bettering humanity? 

    Precisely because freedom of conscience is not a right and cannot be a right, it is precarious. (“They have brought their burden to us and laid it humbly at our feet,” the Grand Inquisitor proudly declares.) No ACLU can be endowed in the name of this pre-political virtue. Its preservation — or its evisceration — will come from the culture, the climate of opinion, the spirit of laws, and from the education that art and philosophy confer. Repressive societies have amassed the richest literature of conscience. They make heroes and martyrs: while they exact a cruel price, and sometimes the ultimate price, from those who say no, they transform Václav Havel and Nelson Mandela and Sophie Scholl and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Liu Xiaobo into great historical figures, whose hands may have been tied but whose conscience was free. But less repressive societies, and even some open societies, too readily congratulate themselves in these matters. They may not make martyrs, but they sometimes forget the labyrinthine lessons of moral freedom, thus unlearning the balancing acts of a culture that can thwart inquisitions big and small, of a culture that refuses to speak the final word about the guilt or the misdeeds of other people, even of criminals. The scales of justice can easily be melted down and repurposed as the crucibles of endless recrimination. Let us fight inquisition with inquiry. Even if there will always be witch hunts, there will never be witches. 

    Staple Lady

    Next time her skull is sliced open,
    she must have a mind limber as rubber,
    bending to the pain. Under the bright lights
    of the icy theater she will melt, allowing the saw’s buzz
    to fade into the sound of the surgeon entering
    her interior, surveying the field of tumors for the bad one.

    When he finds it, there will be no escaping
    his blade. She will hear him hack through her anesthetic fog
    and scrape at her numb meninges wall, vanquishing
    the invader. Perhaps she is only dreaming,
    she thinks: when she awakens she will be
    at home, puzzled but refreshed

    from this deeply troubled sleep. But then
    she feels the bone door closed and stapled
    shut, cancelling her delusion. Later she is told
    that the enemy is gone but his colluders, claiming
    innocence, remain. A new vigil begins as she watches
    and waits for them to regroup, organize and grow.

    She confesses that she loves her staples. Furtively,
    she caresses them throughout the day. They are her secret
    cranial adornment. Under her hair, in all their metallic glamor,
    they are hers alone to enjoy. Daily, she attends to them holding
    closed her incision, tenderly washing and polishing
    them so they shine like a zipper, ready for the grab.

    Meanwhile, inside, the humors rise and fall like the tide, sway
    to the east with the wind, hold fast against
    the western torment brewing. Above, the wise sagittal
    sinus keeps things churning, as the heart pumps
    furiously below and the mind—her determined mind—keeps
    flexible but centered on the task of healing and staying healed.

    Gingerly, she peers through her two
    still functioning eyes, the skull’s port-hole access
    to the sea, and beyond, to the healing world
    for whom she will endure still more incursions, stay
    supple and ready, if only
    in the end she can stay a while.
    To the god who does not exist she prays—teach me to ride
    the storm safely, past the fatal depths, to the receding shore.

    For the Afterlife

    She wanted a crypt like the temple of Dendur,
    an enormous monolith unshakeable as their marriage.

    He favored the granite sarcophagus gaily
    decorated with Victorian swirls and oak leaf cornices.

    She wanted poplars tall and straight—leafy and shameless
    as Italian trees of summer, if sadly deciduous.

    He preferred cypresses, their constancy through the seasons:
    shrubs—yew or arbovite—modest, low to the ground.

    She fancied a stone table with seats for friends to come dine
    al fresco. He said a few high-back benches would do.

    She said as long as they’re comfortable, without Hallmark
    card prayers or one-size-fits-all labels like “Father” and “Mother.”

    When they settled on the white granite love seat carved
    from a single block, its elegantly supportive back to the forest,

    they were told it was impossible to order now
    that the factories making them in China and India were closed.

    Everything in the world was closed. Yet they strolled,
    faces masked, every day, in these grounds, secure

    in their solitude, among the decorated dead,
    the veterans from Gettysburg, the Somme, Normandy and
    Saigon

    and all the wars against measles, flu, whooping cough
    and plague,
    whole families wiped out by one contagion or another resting

    now in the rolling hills and burial mounds, under
    marble markers by now mostly effaced, amid medals
    and flags stabbed

    into the earth to celebrate their valor, here among the
    ancient oaks
    and stalwart pines, clustered in stately groves joined
    each to each by pebbled paths and avenues—daily they walked,
    stopped and even sat, feeling strangely welcome and
    terribly alive.

    Invalid Afternoons

    1.
    Precocious in her dotage, she teeters like a top unravelling,
    now spinning, now faltering, now lunging across
    living room carpets, over

    William Morris tendrils and Bokara medallions, past
    the leather sofa and beyond,
    arriving at the south window.

    She stoops over the hope chest with her watering can,
    drenching the amaryllis, dotting orchids and jade with ice,
    then pruning the cactus blossoms.

    One by one, she pulls off their delicate,
    erotic red heads, leaving
    the sheath for the next flower to occupy, and the next.

    She is not dying, she reminds herself, though today she feels
    a sort of emotional anemia come over her, a thinning
    inside, a rising-up of white corpuscles over red.

    There is shame, she thinks, in yielding
    to this voluptuous ennui, shame
    in failing to school the mind past boredom, past

    the exquisite temptation of absolute emptiness.
    Didn’t her mother tell her a commonplace—
    that she had no inner resources?

    To be complacently bored, she preached, is to be
    an ill-bred donkey:  Solo los burros se aburren,
    the refrain of her childhood. Her mother’s go-to line.

    She plays it now, over and over, and almost laughs
    to think somehow it has to do with her
    after a lifetime of ardor and infatuation.

    2.
    In her nostalgia she thinks of snow and snow days,
    of lazy afternoons with children demanding snow
    men and snow balls and snow angels

    and excursions to the park along the majestic snow-laden
    Avenue of Pines, the ancient trees hanging over
    the picture-perfect American families,

    the snow-packed branches
    now protecting, now threatening.
    Now gone.

    Today the March winds cut through a snowless city, a barren
    light over it all, exposing late-winter detritus, impending
    decline, the house silent, as she detects in her lungs

    a breeze, imagines a multitude of voyages, remembers
    landscapes, a lake—near frozen—a boat, a shoreline, the sound
    of waves breaking inside her chest, an impediment, a voice—

    something from deep inside the rim, something
    unreachable, the waters rolling towards her, rolling,
    her briny cough a harbinger

    of who knows what
    in her future, something illegible, distilled,
    a promise in the unfathomable sea of self, of selves.

    3.
    But life is good, she thinks today, as she hears
    the irrepressible cardinal, newly arrived,
    beseeching his mate, sees

    the neighbor’s calico alert, though the bird is out of reach—
    Stubbornly, he waits for some sudden splendor to fall
    into his lap, his tail twitching.

    The bird is immoderate
    in his casual exultances. She loves him
    immoderately, loves the world

    immoderately for all its violence and decadence. Even
    its boredom is lovable. She wants
    never to leave it. Never.

    4.
    Under the yews the tulips push through the loam. Life
    insisting its way back again. Ötzi, the frozen mummy found
    in the Alps, had thirty varieties of pollen in his stomach,
    some ibex meat and two chunks of wild goat.

    There was evidence of arthritis and over fifty wounds, all
    treated with Copper Age acupuncture, tattoo-style,
    from head to toe.
    When they chipped him out of the glacier he was smiling
    his Neolithic smile: what fleeting happiness
    before the avalanche felled and swallowed him?

    Nine Little Girls 

    Some years ago, deep into a confounding research assignment for which I had been combing through the website of the South Dakota legislature, I stumbled upon the recorded testimony of a woman describing in detail her own rape and torture, and the tortures of her sisters by the same hands. In her account the acts, which allegedly took place in the 1960s and 1970s, continued for several years and had begun when they were all children some fifty years earlier. The discovery of that testimony was a thing that happened to me, an event in my life, in the way realizing for the first time that my parents will grow old and die was an event in my life. The sound of her voice, the stories she told, gripped me, and attached me to a group of people I had never met, to a story that, before that evening, had nothing at all to do with me and my world. 

    We are surrounded, of course, by reports of atrocities of various kinds, and the mass of them often has the unfortunate effect of inuring us to many hells. But on that day I encountered a human voice and, despite our cultural preoccupation with trauma, which should have readied me to understand what I heard, I did not know how to think about what the woman’s voice was saying. In a confrontation not with data points, but with a personal account of extreme cruelty, I was without adequate resources. I recognized the problem of my human unpreparedness. 

    The horrors needed to be studied and reflected upon over time. There were implications that I needed to work out, and understandings that I needed to develop. Framings that had seemed sturdy and fundamental now felt flimsy. I experienced the testimony of those abused women as new knowledge, which ruptured trusted conceptions of justice and duty. It was not obvious to me that justice was possible here, or that this evil could be punished. My strongest sensation was of having been inducted into a darker acquaintance with the world.

    The story stayed with me. What follows is not an attempt at investigative journalism or historical scholarship. I wish only to share what I discovered, in order to give an account of how I tried to find a mental and social context for certain acts, and to offer some reflections about how to think about them. Much of the grisly information relayed here is in the public domain. It turns out that there is a lot that we do not know, and do not comprehend, about the public domain. 

    Geraldine Charbonneau believes that the scars from her abortion must have been there since just before her seventeenth birthday, though for most of the intervening decades she couldn’t remember the procedure that left them, or the rape that she says necessitated it. Like all eight of her sisters (Louise, Francine, Mary, Barbara, Joann, and three others who wish to remain anonymous), and like most victims of childhood sexual assault, she claims that she repressed memories of the abuse that she sustained while a child and a teenager. Louise, Geraldine’s older sister, alleges that she was in third grade when she became the first of her family to be abused by the priests and nuns at St. Paul’s Mission School (now called Marty Indian School), a Catholic school in Marty, South Dakota. The nine sisters were born and raised in Olga, North Dakota into a tribe of the Anishinaabe people known by the federal government as the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, to a strong-willed matriarch, the mother of seventeen children. They were among those Native toddlers whose parents had willingly sent them to Native boarding school in order to secure an education that could supply the skills necessary to thrive in this country. Others across the country were ordered from their homes by government officials, still others were allegedly forcibly taken from their families. 

    Both Charbonneau parents died without ever hearing their daughters’ stories. Like other children at similar boarding schools across the country, the nine sisters say they were warned not to tell anyone about the abuse they alleged took place there. When the nuns at St. Paul’s discovered that Geraldine was pregnant, they warned her that if she revealed her condition to her parents, all three of them would burn in eternal hell. In a clandestine operation in the school’s infirmary, Geraldine recalls, her fetus was aborted and forced into the incinerator in the basement. “They always kept a fire burning in the incinerator room,” she said. “ I know now that’s where they put the unborn child. They burned it.” 

    Since the inception of the Native American boarding school movement, the goal of these institutions has been the deracination of young Native Americans and their assimilation into American life. The schools were considered a potential solution for the “Indian Problem” beginning in the 1870s. They were conceived as a progressive alternative to the reservation policy, which had long been the favored policy in America. In 1869 the New York Times declared that “the only possible method [with which to keep Indians from hindering American growth] would seem to be to rigidly confine Indians to certain specific localities, until by their good conduct or progress in civilization they can be allowed perfect freedom.” Two and a half decades later, in an article entitled “Senator Dawes Talks to the Cambridge Indian Rights Association” the Times reported favorably about Dawes’ support for the reservation policy: “ [The Indian] is losing the last acre of his heritage. He can no longer retreat from the advance of civilization. We must either support him in idleness or else devise some way to make him a part of us and absorb him into our body politic. As we cannot exterminate him, we must make something of him.” 

    Colonel Richard Henry Pratt, the pioneer of the Native American boarding school movement, and the founder of Carlisle, the first off-reservation boarding school, delivered a speech in 1892 entitled “Kill the Indian, Save the Man.” In it he conceded that the only good Indian is a dead one, a nod to General Philip Sheridan’s infamous evaluation, but he urged the country to commit bloodless — that is to say, cultural — genocide. If granted entry into what he and most other whites of the period considered an indisputably superior way of life, Pratt assured his audience, the Indians would abandon their traditions willingly. This, he thought, was a far more humane and effective method than Jefferson’s reservation strategy, by which Natives were sequestered on patches of land “held apart from all association with the best of our civilization.” Pratt was proposing to erase them with kindness, or at least tolerance. 

    Many Natives agreed with him about the reservations, and about the hope of assimilation. There were Indian teachers and parents who supported Pratts’ schools, and who clung to the chimera of a “white man’s chance.” Pratt’s promise was made at the start of a great wave of immigration that would alter the American sense of belonging and identity. He conjured a future in which it was possible for a Native to become an American in a pre-multicultural context. It was, in essence, a melting-pot argument for America’s indigenous population. What is most unnerving about Pratt’s famous oration is its jumble of progressivism and racism. The speech champions the liberal truth that there is something essential and irreducible in all people that transcends their particularity. Pratt espoused a jarringly humanist argument. It was 283 also a universalist argument, rather like the French view of citizenship since the Enlightenment: erase your difference,
    lose your traditions, and you will be welcomed as members of the general society. 

    This mottledness in Pratt’s objectives, the mixture of good and evil, of benign and malign intentions, is characteristic of much of the Native American experience. It is a messy story, peopled with unlikely alliances and incongruous endings, and whereas the larger moral picture may be clear, and the historical verdict about American prejudice unequivocal, the story closer to the ground is clouded with complexities. There are plainly abhorrent actors whom some Natives defend. For decades after the rumored abuses that took place at Native American boarding schools had become semi-notorious within many Indian tribes, there were Native subcultures in which Carlisle was revered. 

    The first compulsory education clause affecting Native Americans appears in 1858 in a treaty between the United States and the Pawnees. Such clauses would appear in ten other treaties before the end of the treaty period in 1871. In 1891, federal legislation was passed which extended compulsory school attendance to all Indians regardless of tribe. In 1893, for a single year, it was legal for government officials to withhold “rations or the furnishings of subsistence either in money or in kind to the head of any Indian family” for failure to send Indian children between the ages of eight and twenty-one to school the previous year (this legislation and its revocation the following year can be found in chapter 7 of the US Code title 25). Nonetheless, there are cases of children being forcibly separated from their families well into the twentieth century. Consider the case of Dennis Seely, who was removed from his home and sent to the Tekakwitha Indian Mission in Sisseton, South Dakota in 1946 (further horrifying details of the Seely case, which have been made public, are of a piece with those of the nine sisters). In 1929 much of the authority to enforce Native school attendance was given to the states. The Meriam Report, commissioned by the Department of the Interior and published in 1928, focused on reservation and boarding school poverty. All 847 pages of the report, detailing a truly appalling episode in our nation’s history, are easily accessible online. Regarding the Native American boarding schools, it reads in part: 

    For several years the general policy of the Indian Service has been directed away from the boarding school for Indian children and toward public schools and Indian day schools…. It is, however, still the fact that the boarding school, either reservation or non-reservation, is the dominant characteristic of the school system maintained by the national government for its Indian wards. 

    The survey staff finds itself obliged to say frankly and unequivocally that the provisions for the care of the Indian children in boarding schools are grossly inadequate. 

    The outstanding deficiency is in the diet furnished the Indian children, many of whom are below normal health. The diet is deficient in quantity, quality, and variety……. 

    The boarding schools are frankly supported in part by the labor of the students. Those above the fourth grade ordinarily work for half a day and go to school for half a day…. The question may very properly be raised as to whether much of the work of Indian children in boarding schools would not be prohibited in many states by the child labor laws. 

    Just ten years after Carlisle’s founding, 10,500 of the roughly 36,000 Native student population went to Native boarding schools shaped by Pratt’s social-evolutionary philosophy. A web of these schools spread across the country over the course of the next century. 

    Allegations about the mistreatment of Native students at these establishments are as old as the schools themselves. Children were allegedly forced to eat lye soap for speaking their native tongue, whipped for running away, and beaten simply for holding one another’s hands. Some died from malnourishment. Disease due to overcrowding was rampant. Richard Monette, professor of law at UW-Madison, former president of the Native American Bar Association, and a graduate of a boarding school in North Dakota (and former chairman of the Turtle Mountain Tribe), put it this way: “Native America knows all too well the reality of the [Native] boarding schools, where recent generations learned the fine art of standing in line single-file for hours without moving a hair, as a lesson in discipline; where our best and brightest earned graduation certificates for homemaking and masonry; where the sharp rules of immaculate living were instilled through blistered hands and knees on the floor with scouring toothbrushes; where mouths were scrubbed with lye and chlorine solution for uttering Native words.” 

    Still, as always, the history is complicated. Not all student experiences at Native boarding schools are alike. Some former students recall their time at these schools fondly. For many it provided an education and an opportunity to develop inter-tribal Native identities, since schools often mixed students from different tribes. Michelle Dauphinais Echols, the Charbonneau sisters’ cousin and lawyer, is one such alumna. Like her cousins, she attended St. Paul’s. Even after spending the better part of the past decade pursuing justice on the nine sisters’ behalf, she describes the years she spent at the school happily. It was with her help, patience, and example that I was able to explore this episode. 

    What follows are the accounts that the nine sisters have given about their time at St. Paul’s in the 1960s and 1970s. These stories have been edited for brevity and clarity. 

    On the first Monday of every school year all of us would undergo the same initiation ritual: Straight off the bus we’d be organized into one long line and then stripped naked. Once we reached the front of the line, nuns would pour DDT powder, a poisonous insecticide, over our heads and bare bodies [for delousing]. We were told this was because we were dirty Indians and had to be debugged. If we tried to wash the powder off, we’d be forced back in line and the process would simply be repeated. Every single year, the first Friday evening at the end of that first week the entire school would assemble, and they would screen films of Jews in concentration camps lined up towards the gas chambers. The next morning all of us would be led into group showers where we would finally be permitted to wash off that powder. After washing each child would stand naked in front of the nuns waiting for us just outside the bathroom in order to inspect our bodies. They would  bend us over and touch us before finally permitting us to collect our clothes and redress. From that very first week, that fear of being put into the gas chamber was instilled and remained throughout our time at St. Paul’s. 

    There were all kinds of horrors awaiting us after that initial trial. Some of us suffered permanent frostbite, some still bear physical scars from the beatings administered by the nuns and priests. Some of us were beaten so badly we had to be hospitalized for up to ten days. Some of us were sodomized. Some have scars from births and abortions from being raped by our caretakers. Once, on an outing to a lake, one of the boys went into the water and started to drown and we were all screaming asking them to help him but the priests and nuns just ignored us and he died. No one took care of us. We had no mother or father figures. There were no toys. We made friends quickly. We had to — friendship was a form of protection. We always had our cliques. We had to have our cliques to look out for one another, or we would have been severely beaten on a daily basis. The staff hated us. They made us know they hated us in no uncertain terms. They gave us no affection. We wouldn’t have known what a hug was or how to have a bond with anybody if it hadn’t been for the summers back home with our mother. We were the lucky ones because we got to go home. There were students there who couldn’t afford the trip back, and they had to stay at that place the whole year round. 

    School was 700 miles away from our hometown. There was no way to connect with family. They made sure of that. Even our aunt and uncle, who lived on the grounds because they worked at the school, never got to see us. From the moment you got there it was total isolation at Marty. They enforced it by beatings, strappings, shaving heads, by saying “You’ll go to hell. Your parents will die and they’ll go to hell.” If one of us was at one table and we saw our sisters at another we didn’t dare say hello, just made eye contact. No talking at all. Sometimes when they fed us that mush we’d put it in our hands and go wash them at the sink, and that was the only time we’d be able to lean against a friend or touch their shoulders. If you were caught touching you got the worst beating of your life. 

    There was always the lurking of a priest or of this one man, the groundskeeper, who worked there and who also molested us. It was like they had different signals that they gave each other. Like for instance, the man who molested Louise would hold her to a chair by the front of her clothes and use his finger on her. And sometimes a few of his fingers. And then he would leave her there and we would see him making a motion with his hand to one of the priests and he would come over and do what he wanted with her. Was the hand motion a sign that she was ready for intercourse? We couldn’t be sure. But we remember definitely the secret looks they gave each other, and the snide remarks they’d make about young girls becoming women. Geraldine says her sexual abuse started when she was eight. Father George began to try and touch her and kiss her. Father George kissed her several times which made other children tease her and say that Father George was in love with her. Father Francis was in the room when Father George 289 kissed her. He laughed and accused Father George of saving Geraldine all for himself. 

    Father Francis was clever. He tricked Barbara into trusting him. The way he did it was, he knew that our aunt and uncle lived on the grounds and that we couldn’t go see them on our own, and we were so desperate for some connection with family. Father Francis would say ‘Come with me, I’ll take you to visit your uncle.’ And she missed our mom and dad so much so she’d go with him. And then after he’d gained her trust he would take her to the church basement and force her to fondle him and perform oral sex. Once there was a coffin in the church basement, maybe they were preparing the body for burial in there, and he lifted her up and showed her, there was a dead woman in it and he put her in that coffin next to the corpse and said if Barbara ever told anyone he’d lock her up in there. So we learned to keep quiet. 

    The groundskeeper who abused Louise had a big ring of keys with him all the time. When we were in the little girls dorm, so we must have been about fourth graders, we would say to each other “did you hear some keys? Some keys clinking in the night?” Because we used to hear them jingle. And on the nights that we heard them jingle, we’d see a priest in the dorm at night. We learned to pull the blankets up over our heads and hold our breath so he wouldn’t pick our bed to climb into. Once Louise went to the bathroom in the middle of the night and came back and found a man in her bed. This man with the keys was letting them in through the tunnels that run under the school, for the pipes, you know. The tunnels are still there now. They run underground connecting every building in the school — the rectory, the church, and the dorms. That’s how the priests got in. 

    The nuns were in on it, too. They let the priests do what they wanted, and they abused us too. They used to pull our blouses down, making believe that they thought we’d hidden something in our bras, but knowing full well we hadn’t. They just wanted to humiliate us. It was a team effort. We were handed around like used clothing, and nobody cared. Even the missionaries who worked at the school were in on it. There was no one to turn to and we knew it. We were told that we would be hurt if we told anybody, that they would kill our parents and our parents would go to hell. We certainly couldn’t turn to our parents so we buried it so deep inside that there was no way it would ever surface. 

    For many years none of the sisters spoke of their alleged abuse to each other or to anybody else. This is not uncommon. According to CHILDUSA, if child victims of sexual assault disclose at all, they do so during adulthood. The median age of disclosure is 48, the average age is 52. Of those who do disclose, only 6% to 15% contact authorities, while most others confide only in friends. That is why many state statutes of limitations for cases of childhood sexual assault, if they exist at all (some states have no SOL and permit plaintiffs to come forward at any time), provide timeframes for plaintiffs to bring their case after memories are likely to have resurfaced, rather than immediately after the incident occurred. 

    Geraldine Charbonneau was alarmed when asked by her gynecologists, who recognized the scarring, if she had gotten an abortion early in life. She had buried the memory of the procedure since it had happened. It was not until a family gathering in 2009 that one of the sisters, Louise, told the others that she had been abused at St. Paul’s and asked if they had been too. Barbara Kay Charbonneau recalled that “We all cried but nothing was said. It was so traumatic, so incomprehensible. But the memories came back one right after the other…. It was like Pandora’s Box was opened.” 

    The sisters had been approached in 2006 by other alumni who were members of a class action suit seeking recompense for abuses sustained by students at boarding schools such as St. Paul’s. Between 2003 and 2010, over a dozen alumni of South Dakota’s Catholic boarding schools filed civil lawsuits against the federal government, the Catholic Diocese of Sioux Falls, and various religious orders operating the schools. The following descriptions of abuse are from the Complaint for Zephier, et al. v United States of America (2003): 

    a. Plaintiff, Sherwyn Zephier, attended Boarding School at St. Paul’s at Marty, South Dakota, in the Yankton Reservation, where he was beaten and witnessed nuns regularly commit sexual assaults on boys; 

    b. Plaintiff, Adele Zephier, attended Boarding School at St. Paul’s at Marty where she was sexually abused by a priest, who would put his hands under her dress and fondle and penetrate her. She was also physically abused by the nuns, one of whom would pick her up by her hair, shake her, and lock her in a closet for hours. 

    c. Plaintiff, Roderica Rouse, also attended St. Paul’s at Marty Boarding School, and was physically beaten and sexually abused by a priest in the same manner as Adele Zephier. 

    d. Plaintiff, Lloyd B. One Star, attended the St. Francis Board School in South Dakota, on the Rosebud reservation. He was physically beaten and sexually abused from the age of 6 to age 10 by multiple priests and nuns, which included oral sex and sodomy. He was threatened physically by the priests if he told about the abuse. He was beaten and tortured continuously for a week, including head slappings and paddlings, for telling his father about the abuse. 

    e. Plaintiff, Edna Little Elk, attended the St. Francis Boarding School on the Rosebud reservation in the period 1921-24. She was locked in an attic for days because she did not speak English. She was beaten and stripped by both nuns and priests. She witnessed her cousin, Zona Iron Shell, beaten to death in front of her. She also witnessed other girls being sexually fondled by priests. 

    f. Plaintiff, Christine Medicine Horn, attended the St. Pauls Boarding School at Marty. Because she did not speak English, she was thrown down a three-story laundry chute. She was also stuffed in a trash can and locked in an incinerator for not speaking English. She was forced to strip to her underwear, when she was whipped with a leather strap. 

    g. Plaintiff, Lois L. Long, attended the Holy Rosary Boarding School in the Pine Ridge Reservation. Because she was left-handed, her educator accused her of Satanism and attempted to “cure” her by tying her left hand which caused permanent physical injuries. She was repeatedly stripped and beaten by nuns. During baths, the nuns would fondle her and attempt to “wash the devil out” of her. 

    After memories of their alleged abuse resurfaced, the sisters joined Bernie v Blue Cloud Abbey, a class action suit that was a consolidation of eighteen cases. In 2010, days before the case was scheduled to go to trial, the South Dakota Statute of Limitations (SOL) for childhood sexual assault (SDCL 26-10-25) was amended to bar claims against entity defendants after plaintiffs reach the age of 40. (Recall that the average of disclosure for cases of childhood sexual assault is 52 and the median age is 48.) 

    The amended SOL was drafted and introduced by Steven Smith, a lawyer for the Congregation of the Priests of the Sacred Heart, the religious order that operates St. Joseph’s Indian school. At the time the bill was drafted, Smith was the lawyer for the defendants in about a dozen pending cases of abuse alleged to have occurred at St. Joseph’s Indian School. The judge applied the new statute of limitations retroactively, and dismissed the case. About the amended SOL and the judge’s decision to retroactively apply it just days before the suit went to trial, Joelle Casteix, western regional director of Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, observed to WOMENSENEWS: “you bet the South Dakota legislation was designed to keep Native American lawsuits out of the courts. The Church has a hard time defending itself because it has the proof. It keeps a paper trail on sexual-abuse complaints.” And indeed during discovery for the case letters surfaced in which, for example, Abbot Thomas Hillebrand wrote to a victim and former student, in November 2008, “[Denis Quinkert] does know that he was going through a crisis in his vocation and a deep struggle with his own sexuality. And he is deeply sorry for the hurt that he caused you…. The favor that I want to ask is that you do not mention that incident outside of the sacrament of Confession. It causes a lot of damages to his character and sets off all sorts of alarms in the official Church.” 

    Every year since 2010, the Charbonneau sisters and their families return to South Dakota to lobby for a change in legislation that would allow them to bring their case to trial. In 2015 Michelle Dauphinais Echols drafted an amendment to the South Dakota SOL which would permit the sisters to reopen their claim and allow other survivors to bring forward their claims as well. The bill failed. After conversations with opponents of her original amendment, Dauphinais Echols drafted a new proposal which, if passed, would create a two-to- three year loophole in the 2010 Statute of Limitations, during which time plaintiffs would be permitted to bring their case to court. This bill failed as well. In 2018 Dauphinais Echols created the advocacy group 9littlegirls, dedicated to bringing awareness to child sexual abuse and to pursuing justice and healing. Every year she and her cousins, with bipartisan support from South Dakota representatives, present the bill to the legislature, and every year it is defeated. 

    II 

    A person raped can never be unraped. They will have those scars inside themselves until they die. The sisters’ pain is the silent, festering pain of overlooked people. It is not exquisite, glamorous, articulate, or redemptive. Nobody marches to denounce it. They suffer in obscurity, and the obscurity, the indifference of their surroundings to their story, compounds the suffering. They live with their understanding of all that was done to them and all that has not been done for them. 

    We have been taught that the knowledge of tragedy can transform societies. There are victims, such as Raphael Lemkin, coiner of the term “genocide,” who are able to salvage dignity from their personal tragedies by forcing others to be transformed by their experiences and the knowledge they managed to harvest from them. Lemkin, whose mother, father, and forty-seven other relatives were killed in Treblinka in 1943, dedicated most of his life to this effort. But there is nothing about victimhood that confers a capacity to do such work. The general truth is that tragic circumstances do not make ordinary people into extraordinary people. And people with the internal resources to bring tragedy eloquently and affectingly to our attention are rarer than tragedy itself. There were the slaves and there was Frederick Douglass. It is not the responsibility of a victim to know how to make use of her pain or give it lasting voice. Pain grants no wisdom, only the need for it. 

    No consolation will come to the nine sisters, but their stories should be known anyway. There are practical reasons for this, and I will list and explain them, but first I must say that the primary effect of their story is to explode our faith in happy endings. By telling their story or arguing for reform we can fulfill the duties of ethical beings and that is some comfort, but the sisters are themselves beyond the reach of solace. For them, the horror is irreversible. It is essential that we grasp this about all victims of atrocity — we must understand the aftermath in which they are condemned to live. 

    The South Dakota legislature will not give these sisters their day in court, and even if they did, the law still would have little capacity to enforce justice in their case. The scars will stay, they are indelible. The cultural genocide will not be undone, despite the astonishing power of Native cultures to sustain and to flourish. In 1975 St. Paul’s School, like many of these institutions, was transferred from the church to tribal control and became Marty Indian School. There is no one left even to punish. The alleged rapists and sadists are long dead: their mortality, and popular indifference, protected them. There should be monuments in the streets in South Dakota commemorating the horrors that were done there. High school students throughout this country should know the disgraceful history of these boarding schools. But if all this were to happen, by some social miracle, still justice would not be done. The wounded will remain the wounded. 

    And we do not have the luxury of saying that we tell these stories to stop evils like them from happening again. Our cultural obsession with utility, our impulse to respond always with practical steps, misleads us. This will happen again. Such horrors will be repeated. We know too much about human nature to believe only in human goodness, and in the efficacy of historical lessons. One of the essential characteristics of humankind is that it contains evil. There will always be evil people, and many of them will escape punishment, and there will always be an overwhelming majority of disinterested onlookers, a mass of unmoved movers, who will facilitate that evasion. 

    In this story the onlookers play a particularly disturbing part. After all, as people like to say, the story is complicated. Not all the students were brutalized. Many enjoyed their time at the Native boarding schools. Should the alleged tragedies of some overshadow the normalcy of others? Many Native survivors with the strength to seek justice are asked this question. Why soil the reputation of whole groups and whole institutions by making them known only for their crimes? Aren’t they much more than the darkness they harbor? These are questions that have been asked also about the rapes and abuses that were perpetrated against other students at different sorts of schools in America. The question is basically an invitation to lie or to look away, and in so doing to damage the victims and distort the history still further. In the protracted wrestling with these issues in many Catholic dioceses in America, the path of truth was eventually chosen. If children in Boston deserve truth and protection, so do children in South Dakota. Perhaps we feel awkward about intruding upon the privacy of another community, but all ethical criticism and action is a kind of intrusion. 

    Most victims will not be rescued, and their aftermath will stretch on, and those who could have saved them, or ameliorated their conditions, but did not, will not be absolved of complicity. Yet we must be careful not to tell these stories in order to absolve ourselves. The act of telling the story redeems no one — not us, not the victims. The tales may increase the ethical sensitivities of the hearers — or they may be treated only as stories, a passing disturbance of our minds with a beginning and an end, a structure which has the effect of abrogating shock. As an incentive to change, narrativity’s power may be exaggerated. These stories must be inducted into our national collective memory, alongside every other significant episode in our national history, the magnificent and the repugnant, for another reason: because America should know what America is. 

    There is a pop-therapeutic axiom that talking through pain or anxiety will diminish its power. Americans believe in the salvific power of speech. One long heart-to-heart and the world is already a better place. Let’s talk it out. That platitude is actually a sugary dilution of The Talking Cure, which has an interesting origin. It was first conceived by Bertha Pappenheim and inducted into our lexicon by Freud, who included hers as the first of six case studies in Studies on Hysteria. But it is worth noting that Pappenheim did not talk through her pain in the way that contemporary mental health advocates seem to think she did. She found, in consultation with her doctor, Josef Breuer, that her somatic disorders — headaches, partial paralyses, loss of sensation — would begin to weaken if she could recall aloud to him the repressed traumas and emotions related to the initial manifestations of each symptom. This process has little to do with let’s talk it out, with the theory that assumes that there is something inherently healing for a survivor about telling others their stories. Pappenheim wanted Breuer to fix the symptoms of a wound that itself could not be fixed. She wanted respite, not consolation or redemption. And respite was the most that the discursive therapeutic setting could offer her. 

    Talking it out is not always healing. It certainly has not been so for the Charbonneaus. Recalling their childhood, which they had for years done their best to forget, is excrucating for them. Silence is a natural reaction to the experience of horror, and a dignified one. Within the Native American community, the sisters are among many who have withdrawn into silence. Children of the survivors of the Native boarding schools were told by their parents not to go looking for clues about what happened in those places. Often this silence is an expression of shame, which many of these descendants say colored their childhoods, and was bequeathed to them. The shame makes the heavy memory heavier. 

    Some say it is fatal. The sisters who survive her believe that Louise Charbonneau, who died suddenly in 2020, just three weeks before she and her sisters planned to return to the South Dakota Legislature once again, could not bear to retell her story. They say that the looming burden, the annual pilgrimage back in time, hastened her death. During testimony for the proposed amendment, Geraldine told the legislators: “I feel the Creator took her home so she didn’t have to come here again, so she didn’t have to be raped all over again by your ‘no’ vote.” Is it ever a victim’s responsibility to relive her trauma? 

    In cases of atrocity, it is essential that the onlookers, and not just the victims, bear the burden of remembering. For over two centuries, since Carlisle’s founding, these stories have remained outside our national collective memory. It is a moral imperative that this willed amnesia be cured — not just among the tribes, and not just in South Dakota and North Dakota, and all the other states in which the boarding schools stood. These atrocities deserve to be incorporated into the shared past of the country, out of respect for the humanity that was desecrated and as an impediment to future desecrations. I say impediment advisedly. Collective memory, and even historical knowledge, certainly cannot preclude the recurrence of injustice. One of the saddest and most erroneous claims of the post-Holocaust sensitivity to atrocity is its confidence that the remembrance of past evil will prevent future evil. Survivors and victims bet a lot on the power of memory to dissuade people from violent action. But by now we ought to know better. “Never Again” did not prevent Bosnia, or Rwanda, or Syria. The destruction of the concentration camps built for Jews in Europe did not prevent the construction of the concentration camps built for Uighurs in Xinjiang today. 

    Evils must be remembered by people to whom they did not happen. We must remember other people’s histories. It is reasonable to wonder whether people can remember things that they have not experienced. Doesn’t that defy the nature of individual memory? But we do so all the time. We call this ubiquitous and mysterious phenomenon collective memory. Descendants of slaves never experienced slavery, and yet they are right to say that they remember it. The children of Holocaust survivors never experienced the Holocaust, and yet they are right to say that they remember it. It is possible to achieve great proximity to the experiences of other people. 

    In order to remember what did not happen to you, you have to immerse yourself so completely in the knowledge of the past that an inner intimacy with it is achieved and it takes on the sensation of personal acquaintance. The instrument of this intimacy, of this acquaintance, is the imagination — not the imagination of fantasy but the imagination of fact. Every year on Passover every Jew is enjoined to conceive of herself “as if she herself had left Egypt” two thousand years before her birth. That “as if” is the ancient rabbinical euphemism for the imagination. Even remembering episodes of one’s own group’s history is a creative exercise which requires an imaginative leap. The imagination is an ethical instrument. It has to be such: if the only evils one could conceive, abhor, and fight are those one has experienced oneself, then fortunate people would be useless against injustice. Which, for this reason, they often are. 

    The women of Olga, North Dakota are not like anyone I have ever known. Their personal histories are quite alien to me. We are children of different Americas, and I have no natural understanding, based on my own life history, of how these Ojibwe women lived and what they endured and how they interpreted it, though it may be easier for me to incorporate their stories into my collective memory because my own tradition supplied a training course in the importance of such strenuous empathy. (I have thought many times while researching the story of the Charbonneaus that the Jewish tradition’s emphasis on memory was essential preparation for this work.) But despite the differences between us, the distance in space and in background, the emphatic otherness, these women have haunted me, have been with me, since that night three years ago.

    In the space of an evening, I went from knowing almost nothing about these stories to becoming familiar with myriad specific details, and then to imagining minutes and hours that occurred decades ago in strange places where I have never been. By becoming aware of them, and by extension of all the men and women like the nine sisters whose lives were permanently mutilated by similar ordeals, these stories became in some sense also mine. I say this humbly. Again, I am not like them, and I have not suffered anything like what they have suffered. But it would be wrong to turn away from them for that reason, to invoke “alterity” and try to forget what I have learned. Difference should not be an excuse for indifference. If one does the work of study and imagination, the arduous and respectful work, then the gulf can be adequately traversed — certainly enough to impose moral and social and political responsibilities. Strangely, solemnly, in ways totally unlike the victims and their communities, I remember. They are a part of me. Now they are a part of you.