Mortifying

    Thirty-five minutes into the movie The Piano Teacher, there occurs an indelible scene. In a dim bathroom cluttered with drugstore label sprays, lotions, and other feeble concoctions designed to fend off decay, a middle-aged woman in a silk robe briskly zips open her pocketbook and removes a folded slip of paper, which she unfolds to reveal a razor blade. Armed with this instrument, she turns around, slips off her flip flops, opens her robe, and sits on the edge of her bathtub with her legs splayed. She moves resolutely but without authority, with a kind of robotic resolve, as if she were complying rather than presiding, mechanically obeying an inner necessity. The camera displays her in profile. A pink hand mirror rests on a ledge by the tub among bottles of various shapes and sizes. She snatches up the glass and holds it out between her knees with one hand, still gripping the blade in the other. Then Erika Kohut, the piano teacher, leans forward intently, carefully adjusts the mirror until she appears satisfied with her view, moves the knife towards her groin, and slices inside herself several times with strained and steady force. A curtain of flat auburn hair conceals all her face except her lips, which are puckered perhaps in pain, perhaps in concentration. She breathes heavily, apparently exerting great effort. Rivulets of crimson liquid spill out of her and into the porcelain basin. Then the mutilation is halted abruptly by banality. “Erika, dinner is ready!” her aging mother, with whom she lives in a cramped apartment, summons her from the other room. “Coming, Mother!” replies the dutiful daughter while snatching a thick menstrual pad from an open bag beside her and pressing it to the wounds between her legs.

    It has been reported that at the press screening for The Piano Teacher at the Cannes Film Festival in 2001, members of the audience guffawed at this scene. Their laughter in response to the self-mutilation just witnessed was as sickening as it was unwarranted — significantly more discomfiting than the blood in the bathtub. If the director, Michael Haneke, had intended the mortification to be funny — he does in fact have a profoundly twisted sense of humor — he should not have cast Isabelle Huppert as Erika. Huppert possesses a ferality which somehow does not mitigate her natural sophistication. And in the scene in the bathroom Huppert is feral in precisely the way that a woman’s hatred of her own womanhood is feral.

    Yes: a woman’s hatred of her own womanhood. It exists, it snarls in our bellies; and Huppert’s peerless performance is among its rare open expressions. She brilliantly communicates in the bathroom scene the gravity of her ferocious behavior. Owing to her marrow-deep conviction, conscious or not, of the significance of that drawn blood, the savagery that Erika Kohut perpetrates against herself is exhilarating. I do not mean to deny that it is also grotesque, revolting, and wrenching. And yet it is at the same time emphatically thrilling in the way that it is always thrilling when a person acts openly upon a perplexing, wounding, and unacknowledged truth. The blood is a shibboleth and the truth that it communicates extends beyond the inner torments of this piano teacher. Her action is symptomatic of the cruel reality that there is a long tradition — longer than most contemporary women know — of womanly self-mortification. Those streams of crimson encapsulate a common and time-honored and baffling compulsion: a woman’s compulsion to attack herself.

    What accounts for this propensity is a mystery, but the evidence for the compulsion is plentiful. Of course, most women, or more women, casually contract or stunt themselves rather than slice and starve themselves. But the slicing and the starving are hardly unheard of, and they are manifestations of the same proclivities, and are emphatically more common in women than men. Women are three to four times more likely to suffer from anorexia and bulimia and to cut than men are. Those numbers are strikingly reminiscent of another grizzly statistic: men are four times more likely to be murdered and to commit murder than women. It would seem that men brutalize one another and women brutalize themselves. (There are holes in such generalizations, of course.) In his learned and compassionate book Cutters, the psychotherapist Steven Levenkron describes these tendencies so well he seems to explain them:

    In the case of girls, they will absorb the blame for most behaviors directed against them. Whether it’s a natural component inherent to femininity, a sense of physical helplessness, or a combination of both, disorders of self-harm, for the most part, affect girls and women. These include cutting, anorexia, bulimia, and other self-harming behaviors. Males, for the most part, tend to externalize blame and emotional discomfort by acting out on others, from street fights to rapes and homicide… While we see crossovers in both genders, the patterns favor the classic models for aggression.

    In ordinary places such as locker rooms, sidewalks, and shopping centers, or in moments of intimate confidence, if you have been paying attention, you will have caught glimpses of forearms riddled with slashes of pale pink flesh, or dark red grooves, thick and deep. The character is familiar: the “fucked up” over-achiever; the type-A freak with a 5.00 GPA and a razor blade in her backpack; or a calorie counter pulled up on her iPhone.

    “Fucked up” is hardly a useful clinical description or a worthy literary appellation, but it is the term that, shamefully, often comes to mind. The reason is that generally we have not bothered to consider her charitably or deeply. We have squandered abundant opportunities to develop compassion for her. To outsiders she seems crazy, even selfish, depriving herself of the sustenance offered her, and forcing her friends and family to agonize over her poor choices. But strictly speaking she has not made choices, and her actions were not catalyzed by mere melodrama. Of all mental illnesses, eating disorders have the highest mortality rate. Between five and ten percent of people who suffer from anorexia die within ten years of developing the disease, and roughly twenty percent die within twenty years. Patients admitted to hospitals for anorexia or bulimia are told outright that they will likely come back, that escape from their own mental cells is practically impossible. Hope is extinguished in these personal purgatories. Yet the contemporary discussion about female self-harm is tinctured with a maddening unseriousness. In the popular imagination the bony, bleeding, scarred young girls are considered hysterical, even ridiculous. “Fucked up” is a terribly unimpressive thing to be.

    The general discussion of these disorders curdles with glibness bordering on contempt in the medical profession as well. When Levenkron first discovered that one of his patients had resorted to self-mutilation, he asked colleagues if they had encountered similar cases. His fellow psychotherapists would respond with chilling disinterest: “Oh yeah, another cutter. They’re pretty sick cookies.” This blasé attitude about cutting and other instances of analogous self-harm is baffling, given the carnage. Perhaps that is the reason so little is known about why women do this to themselves. The platitudinous explanations generally given are as satisfying as celery sticks. It is endlessly repeated that these girls are motivated by a need for control. But what, exactly, have they been deluded into believing that they can control through self-harm? Starvation saps a person of the energy to think clearly, so perhaps they are ceding control as much as gaining it.This so-called explanation is simply a description of a symptom the cause of which remains mysterious and unexamined.

    It is also said that their violent self-mortifications are owed to a pathological desire to be skinny. Perhaps that accounts for some of the violence, but it cannot account for all of it. Women have been starving themselves for far longer than thigh gaps and jutting collarbones have been in vogue. In her classic study Holy Feast and Holy Fast, the medievalist scholar Caroline Walker Bynum shows that since the medieval centuries food and fasting have been central to female spirituality:

    Although women were only about 18 percent of those canonized or revered as saints between 1000 and 17000, they were 30 percent of those in whose lives extreme austerities were a central aspect of holiness and over 50 percent of those in whose lives illness (often brought on by fasting and other penitential practices) was the major factor in reputation for sanctity… most males who were revered for fasting fit into one model of sanctity — the hermit saint (usually a layman) — and this was hardly the most popular male model, whereas fasting characterized female saints generally. Between late antiquity and the fifteenth century there are at least thirty cases of women who were reputed to eat nothing at all except the eucharist, but I have been able to find only one or possibly two male examples of such behavior before the well-publicized fifteenth-century case of the hermit Nicholas Flüe.

     

    The earliest known examples of food-avoidant female saints occur in the Low Countries in the late 1100s. Mary of Oignies was born in 1170, and was renowned for practicing extreme asceticism. She ate no meat, hardly any fish, and subsisted largely on vegetables and bits of bread so old and coarse that the morsels would draw blood while scraping the roof of her mouth. Her biographer, James of Vitry, asked her how it was possible that her fasts and her frantic sobs (she cried when meditating on Christ) did not cause crushing headaches. She answered: “These tears are my feast; they are my bread day and night; they… feed my mind rather than emptying and afflicting my head, they bring satiety to my soul.” Many female saints experienced communion with God as food itself, and during ritualistic intervals they could not stomach ordinary food. Upon receiving an unconsecrated host, Mary of Oignies vomited and then washed her mouth to obliterate the aftertaste. During the last year of her life, Margaret of Ypres (1216-1237) could swallow nothing but the eucharist. Juliana of Cornillon (c.1192-1258) practiced extreme fasting and as a teenager craved the eucharist and preferred prayer to food. When her caretakers endeavored to persuade her to eat, she insisted that “I want better and more beautiful food.”

    These women, and there were many more, are our spiritual ancestors. Of course, not every teenager who starves herself is straining for spiritual transcendence, but they aren’t merely maladjusted adolescents, either. Something significant and deep is at work. It is a mistake to consider these two types, the starving saint and the scarred woman, as essentially distinct. What they share is fundamental: womanhood.

    Erika Kohut, broken and brazen, cuts at her womanhood directly. She attacks the inheritance that coerces her to raise the blade. Women often torment their bodies, but it is rare for a woman to acknowledge through this peculiar violence that her womanliness itself inspires this brutality. Something about womanhood, some obscure quality or conditioning, predisposes her to conceive of herself as an enemy, or as a prison — something to be tamed, or wrestled into submission. In that gut-twisting scene Erika attempts female castration, as if trying to break free from a self-sabotaging parasite that lives in and off her. Her attempt is strikingly ineffectual. She does not exhibit relief the way cutters do when physical pain, delicious as dopamine, releases them from psychic torture. But Erika is attempting an impossible exorcism. She does not evidence relief because relief is not attainable. (Elsewhere in the film her continued difficulties as a woman are made crushingly clear.) There is no effective method for disentangling the strains of self that are harmless from those that she must expel. For there are — enmeshed, inextricable — two selves: the self attacking and the self attacked; the girl whose body has grown beyond girlhood and rebelled against her, and the woman. They are inseparable; a single life.

    Erika Kohut’s violence is freakish because of its extremity and its brutality. But there is a cornucopia of related behaviors to which we have become inured. Erika radically exemplifies something grotesquely ordinary. Women tend or are taught to contract themselves, to starve or mutilate their bodies or their minds. Shrinking is a woman’s business. Constant social and cultural training, implied and overt, prepares us to take up this self-undermining practice. It is painful to blunt ourselves, but it keeps us from operating at full strength, and that is a possibility we fear and cannot countenance. Women have been taught not to permit themselves to be intimidating. To paraphrase Colette, a female genius indulges in self-denial.

    Not all women carry razor blades in their pocketbooks, of course. But the extraordinary can teach us about the ordinary. It is useful to study the extreme cases, the freaks, the fanatics, the swollen iterations, to better understand the rest. In The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James considers only religious extremists in order to understand the religious temperament. His reasoning is compelling: inflamed essences and hyperbolic expressions are useful because in them the essential is exaggerated in a manner that makes it easier to detect and therefore to understand all the instances of a type: “we learn most about a thing when we view it under a microscope, as it were, in its most exaggerated form.” Erika’s attack is exaggerated, but her exaggeration makes manifest what is commonly the case. 

      But why is it commonly the case? What is it about the prospect of womanhood that inspires such fear and repulsion, a terror so great that a girl would choose to deprive her body of the energies that would catalyze and sustain menstruation, breast development, childbearing hips, and flowing hair? Where does the horror come from? Is it justified?

    In 1954, five years after The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir wrote a novel that was never published in her lifetime. It appeared only a few years ago and was translated into English by Sandra Smith in 2021. It is titled Inseparable, and in it Beauvoir tells the profoundly affecting story of a remarkable young girl, Andrée, through the eyes of her beloved friend Sylvie. As Andrée matures, her exceptionalism grows more apparent. This becomes increasingly unbearable for those around her, particularly her mother, an exacting Catholic woman who can tolerate erratic or conspicuous behavior in young girls, but not in young women. This story schools us in an age-old truth about the history of womanhood in society: it is a terrible thing for a woman to be special. Andrée deserves a prominent place in the annals of womanly mortification.

    ​Andrée Gallard and Sylvie Lepage meet in school in Paris when they are both nine years old — still young enough for Andrée’s gifts not to inspire envy or contempt. She is easy to admire, evidently precocious, irreverent but too young yet to be perceived as impudent or intimidating. There is a gripping, unsettling aura about her. She isn’t socialized the way the other girls in her class are, she “didn’t use the tone of voice she should have when talking to a teacher… [and] she walked with the confidence of an adult.” 

    Andrée introduces herself to Sylvie by explaining that she had started school a year late because two summers earlier she had been “burnt to a crisp” while roasting potatoes over a campfire. Her dress caught fire and the flesh on her thigh was burned straight through to the bone. Andrée tells this story with an air of impatience, bored at having repeated it so many times. Throughout the novel she demonstrates this same inhuman (or superhuman) disregard for physical pain — a warning that she is capable of seriously damaging her own body. She lacks the fear of physical suffering that paralyzes healthy, ordinary people. Madame Gallard relays another example of the same disregard when she tells “the story of Andrée’s martyrdom” to Sylvie’s mother:

    The cracked skin, enormous blisters, paraffin-coated dressings, Andrée’s delirium, her courage, how one of her little friends had kicked her while they were playing a game and had reopened her wounds — she’d made such an effort not to scream that she’d fainted.

     The extremity of this story inspires admiration and even awe in Sylvie, who feels suddenly as if nothing remotely interesting or important has ever happened to her.

    Sylvie had been a model student, top of her class in her first year. She maintains her perfect record, but she studies and reveres the contempt that Andrée harbors for the platitudinous and respectable ideas that the teachers at their conservative school spoon down the young girls’ throats. Throughout the long year spent lying flat on her back while her charred flesh bubbled and grew back, Andrée had read voraciously and developed opinions about fictional and historical figures and eras about which Sylvie knew very little. “Many of these opinions were subversive, but given her young age, the novices forgave her. ‘That child has personality,’ they said at school.” But how long before “personality” becomes “problematic”? How long until a forceful girl becomes a troublesome teenager, and then a dangerous woman?

    Sylvie’s love for her friend is pure, deep, and clean of jealousy or intimidation, as genuine friendship always is. She is aware that Andrée is exceptional, different in kind, that she possesses a power Sylvie cannot understand, and she revels in that knowledge.

    What gave her the greatest prestige in my eyes were certain unique characteristics whose meanings I never understood: when [Andrée] looked at a peach or an orchid, or if anyone simply said either word in front of her, Andrée would shudder and her arms would break out in goosebumps; those were the times when the heavenly gift she’d received — and which I marveled at so much — would manifest itself in the most disconcerting way: it was character. I secretly told myself that Andrée was one of those child prodigies whose lives would later be recounted in books.

    After summer vacation, when she and Andrée are separated for the first time since their meeting, Sylvie suddenly realizes that Andrée has inspired such intense love in her that she cannot bear to live without her. It is the most mature experience her young life has so far afforded.

    As the two girls grow, Sylvie’s love remains the only love which Andrée will ever receive that deepens rather than weakens as she becomes more formidable. Already by their second year together, the teachers have grown weary of Andrée’s wit and transgressiveness. She has by now recovered from the burns and is spirited and healthy. The stronger and more vivacious she becomes, the less likable she is. That first year she was manifestly weak, physically compromised, and this feebleness made it easier for others to conceive of her as needy rather than threatening. By now their concern has evaporated, and so has their patience. “They found her contradictory, ironic, prideful; they reproached her for making snide remarks. They never succeeded in catching her being downright insolent because Andrée carefully kept her distance, and that was perhaps what irritated them the most.” Generally, when young girls behave badly, their teachers depend on their mothers to rebuke them, to sound alarms about reputation and to instill within them the importance of appearances. But Madame Gallard indulges Andrée, and so there was little the teachers could do.

    ​Unlike Sylvie’s mother, Madame Gallard does not put much stock in the opinions of the schoolteachers. She does not hector Andrée about what the neighbors might think if they see her walking about the streets alone, or whether the other little girls call her odd or rude. At first it seems that Madame Gallard is much more permissive than the mothers Sylvie has come to know in Paris, but eventually Sylvie recognizes with foreboding that “her smile hid a trap,” and that Andrée’s evident freedom came at a price. Andrée is the second of seven children and is expected to care for her younger siblings and to participate in endless religious and familial duties, all enshrouded in piety. The social responsibilities that other girls her age must fulfill are in her case dwarfed by something of greater significance: God’s will and the sacrifices that it necessitates.

    Andrée willingly makes these sacrifices, which are fueled by the love that she feels for her family generally and her mother above all. That love is ferocious. The intensity of her filial passion is commensurate with the rest of her burning spirit, and greater than her mother can conceive or even deserve. For, tragically, Madame Gallard loves Andrée the way she believes a good Catholic mother ought to love one and all of her children, rather than in a way that is particular to Andrée and reflective of her difference, her impressive peculiarity. Andrée knows this, and it breaks her heart. She will be punished by a society that cannot tolerate exceptionalism in women — a punishment often exacted by other women.

    Madame Gallard knows that as Andrée gets older, her independence will shrink. She permits her freedoms early, when they are unimportant, and when they will not hinder her from submitting to tradition and loyalty. When Andrée reaches adulthood she will be expected to marry a man of her parents’ choosing, and renounce the individuality that she had been at liberty to cultivate. But Andrée understands none of this. In their second year of school, when her responsibilities to her family had only just begun to intensify, she tells Sylvie that she is “tired of being a child.” She imagines that the tightening fetters are features of childhood, and so she longs for adulthood. But she has it backwards: they will get tighter as she gets older, the more womanly she becomes, the farther she develops from prepubescent innocence. She is not afraid yet, but she will be.

      The parable of the strong young woman and her unjust destiny continues. Sylvie has an epiphany about the terms of Andree’s existence when she observes her in her father’s library in the country. There, amid the complete works of Joseph de Maistre, the writings of Louis Veuillot, and the photographs of Andrée’s bearded ancestors, Sylvie sees clearly for the first time that Andrée is shackled in place by the inherited past: “Amid all those austere gentlemen, Andrée seemed out of place, too young, too delicate, and, especially, too alive…. I had often envied Andrée’s independence; suddenly, she seemed a lot less free than I was. Behind her, she had this past; and around her, this large house, this enormous family: a prison whose exits were carefully guarded.” Andree’s vigorous soulfulness suddenly seems too weak to withstand the pressures of tradition and the expectations of family. Andrée never stood a chance.

    Achingly, Sylvie recognizes that Andrée is complicit in her own imprisonment. In Steven Levenkron’s book, he describes a precocious daughter who is dispossessed of her own childhood because her parents expect her to shoulder parental obligations at a young age. Such a child believes that if she fails to play the role set for her, she will forfeit her parents’ affection. The child internalizes the anger that should be healthily directed at the parent, for fear of squandering the dregs of love that have been allotted to her. This case describes Andrée well. She longs for a larger horizon and at the same time believes that her aspirations are treasonous and sinful. She plays both mother and child in the tribunals of her imagination, both rebelling and scolding herself for her rebellion.

        Sylvie goes on to study philosophy at the Sorbonne. There she befriends the brilliant Pascal Blondel, whom she introduces to Andrée, and the two immediately kindle to one another. He is the first believing Catholic who has succeeded in earning Andrée’s admiration and who does not encourage her to abandon her gifts in the name of religious zeal. Hungry for assurances that her powers are not essentially wicked, Andrée applies Pascal’s forgiving theology like balm to her inflamed and confused self-conception: “‘If He has granted us His gifts, it’s so that we will use them,’ [Pascal] often told her. These words filled Andrée with enthusiasm; you would have thought that an enormous weight had been lifted from her shoulders.’’

    Andrée had absorbed from her environment the conviction that the expression of her individuality was itself a sin. She, like Simone Weil, another brilliant woman who attended the Sorbonne at the same time Simone de Beauvoir did, believed that humility was the highest calling and a religious responsibility. “Humility is the refusal to exist outside God,” Weil wrote. “It is the queen of virtues. The self is only the shadow which sin and error cast by stopping the light of God, and I take this shadow for a being. Even if we could be like God it would be better to be like muck which obeys God.”(Dying in exile in a London hospital in the summer of 1943, Weil starved herself to death, though there is some debate about whether her refusal to eat was an expression of solidarity with occupied France or the result of illness.) This form of faith, which similarly torments Andrée, is not gendered. Pascal, too, believes that hubris is a sin. But though philosophical belief is universal, the personal interpretation of it and its absorption into an individual psyche is particular; and so Andree’s relationship with the problem of humility and hubris differs from Pascal’s. Unlike him, Andrée is predisposed to interpret her gifts themselves as hubristic, as deplorable indulgences of pride, and to hold herself accountable to God for every instance of their cultivation. It is difficult for her, as it is difficult for many women, to justify aspirations to excellence and distinction. Andrée reminds herself often that her mother never does anything for herself but dedicates all her time to others, and she believes that it is her duty to do the same. (This is reminiscent of the medieval women saints in Bynum’s study, for whom feeding and healing others comprise the essence of their religious devotion.) Andrée suspects that she is capable of greatness, and that consciousness itself is, in her mind, incriminating. She longs to live fully and to renounce absolutely — both with equal vehemence.

    These internal contradictions will tear Andrée to pieces, and she will respond to them the way women so often have responded to them. When Sylvie visits her in the summer, she notices immediately that Andrée has grown very thin. One of the young Gallard sisters murmurs to Sylvie that “Mama tells her off, but she doesn’t eat a thing.” Andrée’s duties have metastasized beyond bearable proportions, and they have succeeded in crushing her spirit. She confesses to Sylvie that she prays every night that she will die in her sleep. Andrée reports that Madame Gallard has discovered that she is in love with Pascal. Sylvie is not worried, insisting that Madame Gallard will find Pascal beyond reproach since he is a Catholic, but Andrée explains despairingly: “a love match is suspicious.”

    Meanwhile the social responsibilities that Andrée had more or less evaded have at last been demanded of her at full force. Andrée bakes pies, sets and clears tables, takes the twins on outings, and makes small talk at parties. Madame Gallard trains her daughters, the way women have always trained one another, to keep things running, to plug the interstices, to conduct the business that men neither notice nor think to perform, and to do it in a whisper. These standards are imposed upon women by other women for the sake of men. And the competence that results, the gentle and practical intelligence, the tasteful self-restraint, is wholly devoid of prestige. Andrée must cultivate it, but she will not be honored for it. This is training for a life darting from event to event, paying respects at funerals, organizing charity sales, birthing, calming, and marrying off children, setting guests at ease, and facilitating or performing cleanups — a life of manners and mores, a life of duties, not victories. There is no glory in this work, and it is all that is permitted of her. With each task, each tender directive, it is pounded into Andrée’s battered heart that if she loves her family truly and responsibly then she must renounce herself. It is a poisonous, merciless lesson.

    Andrée despises the mindless labor, she has contempt for her own station, but she loves her mother and so plays the role to perfection for as long as she can bear it. Finally, though, the moment of violent self-mortification arrives. One day towards the end of the summer, she is instructed to chop wood before taking her sisters on an outing — a task that she dreads. In the shed she deliberately cuts her foot with the ax, certain that the wound will deliver her from the asphyxiating chores. “I couldn’t stand it anymore,” she whispers to Sylvie.

    A few days into her convalescence, Madame Gallard reports that she will not oppose her relationship with Pascal as long as the two get engaged immediately. Pascal refuses, arguing that they are too young to speak of an engagement. Madame Gallard decrees that Andrée cannot remain in Paris and mandates a two-year-long exile to Oxford, far away from Sylvie’s influence and Pascal’s stimulations. Pascal concurs, and tells Andrée that her desire to be in the same city as him is an expression of corporeal weakness, that it is sinful. Andrée, ever susceptible to accusations of sin and shame, internalizes his castigation and repeats it to Sylvie like a dutiful marionette: “They’re right, and I know that very well. I know very well that yielding to the flesh is a sin: I must avoid the temptations of the flesh. We must be brave enough to face the facts.” Sylvie listens with swelling horror. She knows that Andrée cannot bear such a prolonged separation from the people she loves.

    A week or so before her scheduled eviction, Andrée visits Pascal’s house and asks to speak to his father. In a feverish fit she begs him to accept her, not to hate her, and asks again and again why he is against her. Pascal, who recognizes her voice from the other room, calls a taxi to take Andrée to the hospital. Madame Gallard forwards a telegram to Sylvie the next day explaining that Andrée has been delirious all night. Four days later she dies. The last thing she said to her mother was, “There’s a problem child in every family: and that’s me.” Andrée is buried in her family cemetery in the country, to decay for eternity alongside the bones of her triumphant ancestors. Sylvie attends the funeral, paying respects for the last time to the greatest love of her life. She notices bitterly that Andrée’s “grave was covered in white flowers. In some strange way, I understood that Andrée had died, suffocated by that whiteness. Before leaving to catch my train, I placed three red roses on top of those pristine flowers.”

    Inseparable is based on the true story of Simone de Beauvoir and her closest childhood friend, Elisabeth Lacoin. Elisabeth Lacoin, or Zaza, as Simone called her, died two weeks before her nineteenth birthday, after falling in love with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a fellow student to whom Simone had introduced her. According to Zaza’s doctors, she died of viral encephalitis, but the circumstances of her death were just as mysterious as those of Andrée’s in the novel. In the introduction to Inseparable, Beauvoir’s adopted daughter Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir confides that if one were to ask Simone what had caused Zaza’s death, she would have said that “Zaza died because she was extraordinary. She was assassinated; her death was a spiritual crime.” Simone recounts Zaza’s story in her autobiographical work Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, but Inseparable is the only book dedicated entirely to Zaza’s tragedy.

    It is difficult for a young girl to forgive herself for being extraordinary. It is difficult for an extraordinary woman to spare herself. The conflicting loyalties that strangle Zaza are familiar. They are structurally the same as the contradictory conceptions of proper femininity that revive like multi-headed hydras in every generation, preying on the special ones, the ambitious ones, the glittering ones, the odd ones, the high achievers who long for control over their own fate, for the authority to grant themselves permission, or the authority to snuff out the elements within them that rebel. Thwarted in their spirits, they overpower themselves; they are quick studies, trained through guilt to become self-saboteurs.

    Is it outrageous to draw parallels between Zaza’s short life and the lives of contemporary women? After all, since her burial in that dusty graveyard there have been several tsunamis’ worth of feminist victories. Haven’t we made progress? Or, as an exasperated interlocutor put it to me recently, “what more can feminists possibly want?” (This remark was made before a woman’s right to choose was imperiled.) Isn’t the fate of Andrée and Zaza a thing of the past? Is a woman who is afraid of womanhood merely a coward, or out of touch? Have the emaciated adolescents lining the high school hallways not gotten the memo? Shouldn’t they just see a doctor? Didn’t they hear about #MeToo, and wasn’t #MeToo the most recent in a long sequence of battle cries, each one a little more triumphant than the last? Why on earth are we still talking about this?

    ​These questions betray a fundamental misunderstanding. Feminism is a political movement. It operates primarily in a single realm of human life — the political realm. The nerve endings and muscles that it has developed are effectual or not, clumsy or not, exacting or not, within that realm. The movement ought to be judged according to the progress it has eked out through political means. But most of life takes place outside the realm of politics, and so there are many realms of life in which feminism has no teeth. Second-wave feminism insisted that “the personal is political,” and the Women’s Liberation Movement adopted that slogan because it wanted to persuade women to draw political conclusions from their own grim experiences. Yet that slogan, like all slogans, was intended more to be effective than to be truthful. History has proven it wrong. Since the 1960s political liberation has strengthened, but personal liberation remains illusory. The reason is simple: the emancipation of the soul from its inherited demons cannot be accomplished by Congress or the courts.

    The personal is not reducible to, or contingent upon, the political. Today (and for all time) this bifurcation hermetically seals off the realms in which a woman is encouraged to be an aggressive Girl Boss from the realms in which she is shamed (by herself as much as anyone else) for asserting her autonomy. In The Second Sex, Beauvoir lucidly described this confounding inevitability:

    The advantage man enjoys and which manifests itself from childhood onward is that his vocation as a human being in no way contradicts his destiny as a male… for a woman to accomplish her femininity, she is required to be object and prey; that is, she must renounce her claims as a sovereign subject. This is the conflict that singularly characterizes the situation of the emancipated woman. She refuses to confine herself to her role as a female because she does not want to mutilate herself; but it would also be a mutilation to repudiate her sex.

    Women who battle to smash the glass ceiling by day (and are feted for doing so) find themselves mysteriously compliant when confronted with a Tinder date’s odious demands and expectations. Suddenly these women cannot permit themselves to disappoint a stranger. (There was more dignity in complying physically with God’s demands, or in disappointing Him.) In these two realms, they are trying to fulfill contradictory roles: the role that feminism set for them, and the role that their womanhood imposes on them. Feminism is emphatically not the same thing as womanhood.

    And so it should not surprise us, it should not strike us as antiquated, that a daughter of the twenty-first century is just as likely as Elisabeth Lacoin to extinguish herself. Why hasn’t feminism taught her otherwise? Because that is not what feminism can do. Feminism can advocate for equal pay, but it cannot convince the women in the boardroom that they deserve to be there. The movement cannot teach a woman to like or admire or respect herself. It cannot eliminate from the consciousness of a young girl the stifling certainty that achieving proper womanhood will always mean developing a virtuosic capacity for self-denial, for self-abnegation, for self-mortification. Each new generation of girls is remorselessly inducted into this repressive sisterhood. Failing to equip ourselves, our daughters, and our sisters, with the capacity for emancipation, for inner emancipation, is not a feminist failing: it is a human one.

    The War Has Happened

    It is a dreary world, gentlemen.

    GOGOL

    The most consequential event of our time, I pray, will be the heroism of the Ukrainians. Here are men and women fighting and dying for liberal democracy. It was beginning to seem as if such a thing were no longer possible. Worse, no longer desirable. Here in the West, Jeshurun waxed fat and kicked. We have just been through years of contempt for liberal democracy, and the great disparagement is hardly over. We have been told that everything bad in our age is the fault of liberalism, or worse, neo-liberalism, whatever that is. It has been blamed for just about all the unhappiness in the world; and so the peddlers of a new happiness gloatingly call themselves post-liberal, on all sides of the rotted ideological spectrum. Sometimes one has to rub one’s eyes in disbelief at the intensity of the hatred for liberal democracy: do these fools really understand what they are saying? And then Vladimir Putin, with perfect candor about his lack of scruple and an inhuman absence of shame, attacked Ukraine. The question of his motivation is murky, like everything about this dead little man; there are those who attribute his war to strategic considerations and those who attribute it to mystical ones. Yet Putin’s objective could hardly be more plain: it is to stop the spread of liberal democracy, which in recent years has been exhilaratingly identified with the political evolution of Ukraine. Like his Soviet predecessors, Putin fears nothing more than sharing a border with freedom, which has a way of getting through barbed wire.

    One of the most striking features of the discussion about the war in Ukraine is how little the anti-liberal left and the anti-liberal right have contributed to it. The left does not support Russia, of course; but it does not support American support for Ukraine either, at least not with its customary relish. What the Ukrainians can expect from the progressives is an airlift of thoughts and prayers. I suspect that what really outrages them about Putin’s invasion, even more than its war crimes, is that it might beget an increase in the American defense budget; or worse, a revival of “the Washington foreign policy establishment” and “the Washington elite,” by which they mean anybody who holds a view contrary to theirs. This is populism as national security policy. In recent decades progressives have been more fascinated by Islam’s martyrs than by liberalism’s martyrs. They certainly do not look favorably upon the new activism of American foreign policy that has been engendered by the Ukrainian war. In their view, American foreign policy should be nothing more than a commemoration of the Iraq war unto the end of time. Our disgraceful retreat from Afghanistan was celebrated as precisely such a tribute to our post-Iraq wisdom. And now Putin comes along and spoils things. Just when we thought we were out, they pull us back in! (In fact, the conjunction of events was not a coincidence: our flight from Afghanistan made the moment auspicious for the Russian aggression.) In the curious logic of left-wing isolationism, the danger of Putin’s imperialism is that it may beget American imperialism, since all American interventions are by definition imperialistic. Putin has played into LBJ’s hands, if you see what I mean. And so here is Frantz Fanon, I mean Pankaj Mishra, warning that “Putin’s atrocities in Ukraine have now given” that aforesaid establishment “an opportunity to make America seem great again.” (No, not seem; be.) And here is Glenn Greenwald solemnly reporting Noam Chomsky’s remark that “fortunately” there is “one Western statesman of stature” agitating for a diplomatic solution to the war. That saving giant of diplomacy is Donald J. Trump. The spectacle of Chomsky’s degeneration is delightful.

    As for the post-liberal right, they are stuck with their admiration of Viktor Orban, who is stuck with his admiration of Vladimir Putin. They all deserve each other. In Poland, at least, even the post-liberals, including some of the prophets whom certain American reactionary intellectuals revere, have been clear about their opposition to the Russian war, but then Poland, for the obvious reason, has always been especially wakeful about Russia. Yet even as the horrors in Ukraine abound, the poisonous post-liberal vapors proliferate. A few months ago I came across a piece by Patrick Deneen, one of the most important thinkers that Hungary has produced, in which he discussed the thought of Augusto del Noce, a twentieth-century Italian Catholic philosopher who wrote probingly about modern atheism, which he interestingly called “natural irreligion.” Deneen said that “Del Noce saw further and better than most of his contemporaries that the great totalitarian threat of our age emanated not ultimately from the dictatorships of so-called communist regimes of the Soviet Union or China, but from the unfolding liberal logic of the West.” A bit of explication: Stalinist Russia and Maoist China were “so-called communist” because communism, in the teaching of the right-wing post-liberals, was at bottom liberalism. Really. Deneen posted that sentence about the totalitarian threat of the West while the Russian troops were massacring Mariupol. They were committing those atrocities, and many others, precisely in the name of the ethnonationalism and the anti-liberalism that these Western reactionaries have been urging upon us. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the writings of these Western ingrates, and for my sins I have read a lot of them, look to me like little more than a symptom of the decadence that they deplore.

    The West has found a teacher in Volodymyr Zelensky. He is stripping the banality from the truths that we hold to be self-evident; teaching us what we already know but have demoted to cliché and the inertness of civil religion; refreshing our sense of the beauty of our dispensation, all its current grotesqueries notwithstanding. He is a new kind of contemporary hero: the fighting liberal. He has the authority of his courage. When we assist him in his fight for liberal democracy, we are returning the favor. No such figure has emerged out of Europe since Havel, though it is doubtful that Havel could have presided over the management of a war. (How is it that both of these moral leaders came from the theater? Rousseau would have been baffled.)

    In 2014 I spent many hours in Maidan, the central square of Kyiv, or rather in its ruins. It was the charred scene of one of democracy’s finest battles. The place had been instantly turned into a memorial to the protestors who were murdered there. There were candles everywhere, in brightly colored holders that contradicted the bleakness of the scene. There were flowers, photographs, posters, crosses, and yellow-and-blue flags. The pavements were torn up, and tires were piled high in black towers that served as barricades. Fires caused by the government’s onslaught had blackened the surrounding buildings, which were also scarred by the bullets of police snipers. There were tents in which demonstrators from the “revolution of dignity” stubbornly lived, refusing to retreat from the scene. It was an honor to stand there. Even secular people have holy grounds. I might as well have been in the streets of Paris in 1871, or at Garibaldi’s spedizione. The impression was indelible; it melted me and steeled me. Before I went to Kyiv, I believed that I was headed for a city that aspired to be a Western city, and that I was going there to applaud its aspiration. When I arrived in Kyiv, I recognized my mistake. Kyiv already is a Western city. There is nothing aspirational about its openness, its pluralistic vitality, its reforming energy. To be sure, it was still in the middle of a struggle; the old order, authoritarian and corrupt and oligarchic, will not gently quit history’s stage. But the forces of freedom — in a place such as Maidan one learns to use those words without irony or sophistication — seemed to be winning. If they had lost, Putin would not have attacked.

    Were we prepared, intellectually and operationally, for Putin’s war in Ukraine? We must consider this question carefully, because we are not headed for a halcyon age. In our conflicted country, there has been only a single consensus in recent decades. It is that the United States should shrink its station in the world, that it must no longer loom so large, that it needs to “reduce its footprint” and “play the long game,” that it must adjust its ends to its means, that for itself it must come first (and then brook no seconds), that American leadership is more of a problem for the world than a solution. All the parties, each for their own reasons, concurs in these miniaturizing propositions, which became known as “responsible statecraft.” Occasionally they would just come right out and say it, as when the despicable J. D. Vance declared that “I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another.” Spoken like a true hillbilly. But there are many other foreign-policy hillbillies, alas, some of them denizens of the Acela corridor and even of Aspen, who harbor a similar indifference to the fate of countries and peoples beyond our borders. Those whose consciences do not permit them to openly express their callousness prefer to call themselves “realists.” Realists almost always advocate the same positions as isolationists, except that their op-ed pieces are longer.

    The ethical phoniness of realism found its perfect avatar in Barack Obama, who draped Elie Wiesel’s language over Henry Kissinger’s policies. The war in Ukraine is substantially the consequence of the moral and strategic timidity of Obama, who opened a strategic vacuum in the Middle East that Putin quickly proceeded to fill and thereby to inaugurate the contemporary (and until then, unlikely) resurgence of Russia. It is important to recognize that the strategic vacuum was made possible by a moral vacuum: if it had been the policy of the United States that, one way or another, with force or without, with allies or without, we would not stand idly by the genocide in Syria, we would have retained a regional position that might have kept Russia at bay. Obama’s apologists refer to his timidity as a respect for complexity. As someone who is in the complexity business myself, I can testify that sometimes we abuse the idea. Realists have a condescending way of believing that people who disagree with them are unaware of the facts, that only they, the wised-up members of the panel, know the score. They like to point out that a course of action is difficult and has costs, though usually it is a course of action of which they disapprove on other grounds. Every decisive historical action is difficult and has costs. Even us bloodthirsty interventionists know that. But justice — the word never appears in the discourse of realists, except in their “to be sure” sentences — requires that we not be daunted. We may fail and we may make mistakes, but at least we can live with ourselves; and more important than whether or not we can live with ourselves, since the suffering of others is not primarily about us, other people can live.

    In individuals, we regard the unwillingness to help, to come to the rescue, as a flaw of personal character. Is the same selfishness in collective action a flaw of national character? In individuals, we regard the secession from one’s surroundings, the withdrawal from effective participation in one’s world, as a personal disorder. Is the same truncated relationship to reality in the collective a national disorder? Is isolationism psychotic?

    Oh, for a little American hubris.

    We need to overcome our appetite for futurist indignation. During the years of ISIS, one could not escape the observation, offered always with astonishment, that here was an eighth-century caliphate in the twenty-first century. Amazing! Well, no. Everything that takes place in this moment is of this moment. We must see the entirety of the world in which we live. We chose to regard ISIS as an anachronism because it comforted us. Religious violence, we needed to believe, is not typical of our times, but a relic of earlier times, a florid exception to the Whiggish linearity in which we wallowed. We denied the intractability of history, the persistence with which certain features of human experience survived past the enormous changes that we were busily exalting. We were so dazzled by the discontinuities that we belittled the continuities. History offended our futurist excitement. Obama liked to play the man from the future. He pronounced that the important foreign policy challenges for which we must now prepare ourselves are Ebola and climate change. Meanwhile the world around him was becoming more and more Hobbesian, with aggressions and savageries to match the traditional ones. As he, and a great many other mandarins, enjoyed the globalist cool, the world was turning increasingly local and increasingly Westphalian, which is to say, it was becoming more familiar to those who bother about the past. In his first campaign Obama once said, in one of his many reassurances that the Russians were too weak for us to worry about them, that “you can’t be a twenty-first century power and act like a twentieth-century dictatorship.” But you can. In significant ways the twenty-first century still is the twentieth century. (In our domestic tribulations, too.) Stephen Kotkin was right when he recently argued, and showed, that “the Cold War never ended.”

    After Antonio Gutteres, the Secretary General of the United Nations, toured Bucha and its bodies, he remarked: “The war is an absurdity in the twenty-first century. The war is evil.” He was half-right. Bucha is now one of the capitals of modern barbarism, alongside Urumqi, Rakhine, Aleppo, Srebrenica, Nyarubuye, Lidice, Guernica, and the rest. But evil is not absurd, and to call it absurd is to evade its force. Absurdity is a category of logic and art. Evil is an inalienable feature of the history made by human beings. It has a logic of its own, which is why it creates its intellectuals and its mobs. If only falsehood were always absurd! The war in Ukraine is not absurd, because it is evil. One of the reasons that we were intellectually unprepared for the war in Ukraine is that we spent decades exalting newness and declaring old things obsolete. Here is another example. In 2010, the Obama administration released its defense budget, a “reform budget,” along with a new security document. Since many military appropriations were to be cut, people assumed that the cuts were driven by fiscal considerations. But the cuts were of a piece with a new conception of national security. They were driven by historical and strategic concepts. The document announced that land wars were a thing of the past, and that henceforth we could accomplish our military objectives mainly with Special Ops and drones. It was a fine document of the anti-Iraq-war ethos, and completely deluded. The new strategy was lauded for its moral superiority: fewer innocent civilians would be killed by such more precisely targeted operations. (Of course this inevitably led to the objection that the lower toll made the use of force more likely, so that limited strikes, too, lacked legitimacy, which by my lights leads directly to the brink of pacifism, or at least to a revival of the Kellogg-Briand nonsense, which anyway was already taking place.) But you cannot conquer territory, or hold territory, or expel an enemy from territory, from the air or like thieves in the night. And here is the war in Ukraine, mile after mile of it, town after town, to disprove all this advanced strategic illusion. We are sending heavy weaponry to the Ukrainians because there is no other way for them to expel the invader. History can be trite, which is how it readies us.

    It was stirring to watch the reception of the Ukrainian refugees in Poland and the other Eastern European states. When was the last time that we saw refugees warmly welcomed and no controversy attached to their plight? Then I remembered my Syrian friends and the travails of their community in its own flight. I imagined how they must have felt when they saw all those hugs and smiles in Przemysl and elsewhere. In Europe, you see, Ukrainians are not exactly the other. (That is what scares Putin.) There is nothing wrong with helping people who are like oneself, but it is not the most exacting test of one’s compassion.

    We wasted so much time in the long prelude to the Russian invasion. While Putin was amassing a vast force near the Ukrainian border, we argued with ourselves about the likelihood of war. Those who contended that war was coming, based on the incontrovertible evidence of Putin’s massive preparations for it, were regarded as the hawks, when in fact they were the realists. The doves, though these terms are coarse in these circumstances, insisted upon more diplomacy. They thought that pushing the elevator button again would make it come faster. Diplomacy became a kind of placebo for people who were not in the mood for another conflict that would in some way, hot or cold, involve us. American officials protested that a diplomatic solution was possible even as Putin’s tanks started rolling. One of my favorite errors of the Obama administration made its appearance in the Biden administration: the off-ramp. Remember, we have been here before. Putin’s current invasion is the third act of his protracted war on Ukraine: in 2014 he stole Crimea, and soon afterward he launched a separatist rebellion in Donetsk and Luzhansk, which in the aftermath of his recent failure to take Kyiv he is now attempting to complete with his own troops. During the Crimean crisis, which strictly speaking was not a crisis at all, since Putin stole it with impunity, Obama kept talking about the need to find Putin an off-ramp, a way out, as if the role of the United States was to be sagaciously helpful to Russia so that it could learn from its mistakes. (I was reminded of this misplaced magnanimity when a Democratic congresswoman recently said that the American task now is “to craft a win for Putin.”) But Putin was not looking for the off-ramp. He was, quite plainly, looking for the on-ramp. He found it and he took it. He has been taking the on-ramp in Ukraine for most of a decade. And anyone who knows that there is an on-ramp knows that there is an off-ramp. If they do not avail themselves of it, it is because they have a different itinerary in mind. Anyway, the option of turning around and going home is always there: other, equally proud states have done so, such as France and the United States. Putin is in Ukraine because he believes that Ukraine is his, Russia’s, its “near abroad,” or Novorussiya; and that therefore he need not restrain himself from destroying its democratic experiment. “We’ve sought to provide possible off-ramps to President Putin,” Secretary Blinken said in March. “He’s the only one who can decide whether or not to take them.” But then he added, immediately, and with an admirable alteration in tone: “So far, every time there’s been an opportunity to do just that, he’s pressed the accelerator and continued down this horrific road that he’s been pursuing.” Meanwhile the Ukrainians themselves have not bothered about the ramps. They have been courageously attacking the highways.

    Re Putin and religion: I was reading a Hebrew poem, published in 1940, about the “Winter War,” the Russian invasion of Finland in the previous year, which in some respects reminds one of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The poet referred to a strange incident that was reported by a newspaper in Stockholm. It appears that Finnish pilots flew sorties over Leningrad in which they dropped hundreds of little Bibles on the city, “because they believed it would have a decisive influence on the spirit of the Red Army.” Imagine! Putin, meanwhile, has a Patriarch in his pocket. “We have entered into a struggle that has not a physical, but a metaphysical significance,” Kirill has cravenly intoned. The religious heroes of the war in Ukraine are the Ukrainian clerics in the Orthodox Church who have turned against their Muscovitepontiff for being a slaughterer’s stooge.

    The United States responded slowly to Putin’s “special operation” because we were not mentally ready for it. We have caught up, certainly, but it always feels like catch-up. A great power — and we are one, whether we delight in it or not — cannot be always reactive. For a long time now, too much of American foreign policy has consisted in crisis management. In a world accelerated past the point of reflection, this was somewhat inevitable; but still resistance must be offered. The name of that resistance is strategy, or geo-strategy, or grand strategy. A few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union I was sitting with Walter Laqueur, a wise and erudite man, and one of the first analysts to write books about “Putinism” and the rise of the new Russian right, and he remarked that it had been a long time since he had heard the word “strategy” in Washington. “Geo-strategy,” he said, “has been replaced by geo-economics.” This was certainly true of the booming 1990s, but he was alarmed by more than the economicist interpretation of foreign affairs. His words have haunted me. The meaning of strategy is an infamously complicated subject, and the co-existence within it of empirical and moral elements, of facts and purposes, the integration within a single “intellectual architecture” of all the dimensions of warfare, is hard to pin down. What I mean by it here is only this: a prior understanding of what we want, and why. This understanding must be developed quite consciously as a historical plan, as a program for action and a standard for readiness. It should not be confused with the intellectual frameworks that we possess before events happen. It is, in fact, a challenge to those frameworks, which usually are little more than attitudes or moods or prejudices drawn from recent experience. A strategist is not indifferent to circumstances, but he is not a slave of circumstances either. He has a calling to shape and mold and alter a reprehensible or disadvantageous order, and an intense sensation of agency, and a certain pleasure in the exertion of intelligent will. He is comfortable with the proposition that power exists to be used. He recognizes the difference between flexibility and reactiveness; he is not rigid, but he is also not winging it. The problem, of course, is that a historical plan is a blueprint for time, but time does not stand still. There will be contingencies and emergencies that will allow no delay, if a response is to be effective, and they will require more than impulsiveness and improvisation.  If you tarry in response to a genocide, for example, you have not understood the nature of the challenge. Surprise is inevitable, but shock is unforgivable. Our preparedness starts in our imagination. (Obama was a peculiar case: he was good at strategizing, whatever the merits of his strategy, but bad at reacting.) Does the United States have a grand strategy? In the culture of endless repeal in which our politics now takes place, our partisan seesaws of doing and undoing, can the United States have a grand strategy? One of the primary conditions of strategy is constancy. But is anything that we do any longer durable? The problem is not, as George Kennan and Henry Kissinger liked to insist, democracy, or the impact of domestic opinion upon planning. It is, rather, the debasement of our democracy into what seems to be a permanent condition of unsettledness, our hot-headed unreliability about precedents, our infernal volatility. If we need to reduce the erratic nature of our public life, it is not least because the era is rapidly approaching in which we will find ourselves in great power rivalries of unclear but significant duration. Indeed, the era has already begun. Strategically speaking, the resurgence of Russia may be a sideshow to the ascendancy of China, but sideshows can last generations. The Soviet Union lasted seventy years — a blip in the arc of history, but not in the fate of many millions of people. I am not convinced that we are yet up to the task. The proof is in our platitudes. Until our withdrawal from Afghanistan, we spoke constantly of “the forever war.” Of course there was nothing interminable about it, as we eventually demonstrated. The important question was not its length but its wisdom. If a particular use of American force is morally and strategically justified, and there were ferociously different views about Afghanistan, then we must develop a new talent for patience and learn to think (as the economists say) secularly, or else we will condemn our actions to futility from the start. One of the lessons of our retreat from Afghanistan was that America can be waited out. (There is also the matter of costs, but the number of dead Ukrainians and Russians in only the first few months of combat should provide some context for the human costs that we suffered in Afghanistan, which was 2,401 dead in twenty years.) In any event, “the forever war” was swiftly replaced by a new platitude, which is that we must beware of getting into “a new cold war.” It is past time to put some intellectual pressure on this slogan. For a start, a cold war is preferable to a hot war. More importantly, our destiny is not entirely up to us: if Russia or China behave towards us (or our allies) in a hostile manner, then we are in a cold war with Russia or China. And so we already find ourselves in two cold wars. We can choose, of course, not to fight them, and hide between our oceans; but thankfully we have not made that choice, even if we are still profoundly uncomfortable with the accurate description of these global realities. Anyway, there is nothing to trouble our sleep about being the most powerful adversary of the most powerful tyrannies. Except that we must not sleep! The term “cold war” has become a term of imprecation, a dystopian word, because the Cold War, I mean the one that took place between 1946 and 1991, is erroneously remembered as an unprincipled contest between two deranged nuclear powers who went around the world committing crimes and abuses. It was nothing like that, though we did commit our share of crimes and abuses. It was an honorable struggle against totalitarianism that over many decades was conducted more or less firmly and more or less rationally and in stirring consonance with our principles; and every decent man and woman should tremble at the thought of what life everywhere would have been like if we had lost.

    Biden is ringingly correct when he says that the future will be characterized by a struggle between democrats and autocrats. But is this a worldview or a strategy? It all depends on what he does about it.

    In The Atlantic, where everything can be found, an American historian argues that World War II does not look the same when seen from an Asian standpoint. I do not doubt that this is so. In Asia, quite obviously, the anti-fascist powers were also imperialist powers. The implication of this colossal fact, according to the author of the article, is that we must retire our moral understanding of the war. It was not a war between good and evil. It was “a lethal collision of self-interested rivals.” The author even writes admiringly of a notorious Indian nationalist who escaped to Germany and raised an Indian force to fight alongside the Wehrmacht and later alongside Japan against British India. For him, “this wasn’t an invasion but a liberation.” Good for him. But why should the enlargement of our understanding about the Asian theater distort our understanding of the European theater? The Indian viewpoint about the war in South Asia does not refute the European viewpoint about the war in Europe, or the Jewish viewpoint, or the viewpoint of the resistance fighters across Europe who, even in societies rife with collaboration, were animated by the certainty that their enemy was evil. If the experience of Indians was different from the experience of Europeans and Americans, then the experience of Europeans and Americans was different from the experience of Indians. The rule of particularity and partiality applies to all, and the one cannot be used to discredit the other. (And Japan did not exactly fight the war with the impeccability of just war theory.) Yet the moral delegitimation of World War II, like the moral delegitimation of the Cold War, is attempted not only for the sake of a sounder historiography. It has also a policy purpose. The ultimate warrant for the principle of American interventionism, the decisive historical prooftext for the view that American power can be a force for good in the world, is World War II. Take it down and the withdrawalist program for American foreign policy is complete. Persuade people that even “the good war” was a bad war and they can serenely repair to their gardens, where most of them already are.

    What is the outcome that we seek in Ukraine? An end to the conflict is not a sufficient objective. The most urgent thing about a conflict is not always to end it as soon as you can. (I am not speaking about a nuclear conflict, but the anxiety about nuclear war was skillfully stimulated by Putin to disrupt Western enthusiasm for Ukraine, and in some quarters it worked like a charm.) A “sovereign, independent Ukraine,” as Blinken put it, looks to me like the proper goal, though it is finally the Ukrainians who will formulate the acceptable terms for the cessation of hostilities. If I were them, I would not rest until the removal of every Russian soldier from their soil. When Secretary of Defense Austin declared that “we want to see Russia weakened to the degree it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” I cheered. Putin started a vicious and unprovoked war against the civilians of a sovereign state that poses no threat to him except insofar as it seeks to join the community of liberal democratic nations, and thereby he showed himself to be a menace whose capacity for cruelty and recklessness we need no longer speculate about — an active and genuine enemy. In the years prior to his resort to his army, he was tireless in his intrigues and interventions in the democratic processes of the West, which we tolerated. His invasion of Ukraine has also exposed the startling mediocrity of the Russian military. And so Austin was right to suggest that a weak Russia is within our interest and within our grasp, and that we are not ourselves in search of the off-ramp. But Austin’s statement disturbed people who regard every expression of American toughness as a slippery slope to Baghdad. In the New Yorker, for example, a jittery reporter noted that “U.S. officials now frame America’s role in more ambitious terms that border on aggressive.” Aggressive! We have vowed not to send a single American soldier to Ukraine. Biden repeated this promise over and over long before the war began. (I wondered why, as a tactical matter, he would make such a promise to Putin. But he was not making it to Putin, he was making it to the progressive wing of his party.) What the Biden administration has splendidly done — with extraordinary quantities of heavy weaponry, and with intelligence, and with increasingly pitiless sanctions, and with its “ambitious” rhetoric — is display seriousness and steadfastness in its support of a just cause. Given the lameness of American foreign policy in the Obama and Trump years, this should be a reason for rejoicing. We are not only reacting, we are also acting. It is finally time for an adversary to be nervous about us.

    The professionals call the problem “escalation control.” I do not mean to make light of it. There are risks that we must beware. But surely escalation control cannot mean that we never respond with greater strength, especially in response to an escalation on the other side. There are escalations of degree and escalations of kind, a great many instruments with which to change the course of a conflict or determine its outcome. Not all of them are crazy, and not all of them lead directly to armageddon. We must be prudent, but we must not be played. Even Raymond Aron, the most powerful advocate of prudence in modern times, once remarked that “prudence does not always require either moderation or peace by compromise, or negotiations, or indifference to the internal regimes of enemy states or allies.” Aron’s variety of prudence, as he demonstrated in his long life of political philosophy and political engagement, was decidedly vertebrate. Too often in recent years American prudence decayed into American passivity. I miss the days when we were feared. They overlapped with the days when we were trusted.

    When bad actors anywhere in the world gather to plan an invasion or a repression or an expulsion or a genocide, does anyone at the table intervene with the question, “But wait — how will the Americans respond?” Does the prospect of American power any longer stay any villain’s hand?

    As a matter of historical record, America has “projected” its power abroad for many reasons, not all of them laudable; but the only state in the modern world that made dictators and murderers think twice, or go slow, or surrender, was the United States. (I exclude the Soviet Union in World War II, because it was a murderous dictatorship that helped to defeat a murderous dictatorship.) If there are to be obstacles or impediments, they will have to come from us.

    Closely related to the question of escalating is the question of being “provocative.” In the run-up to the war, while we were arguing among ourselves about its likelihood and Putin was gathering his forces, we should have been sending arms to the Ukrainians — sophisticated arms, lethal arms. The realists among us warned that this would provoke Putin. It turned out soon afterward that he required no provocation; he was pre-provoked. The Ukrainians knew this. In truth, any close student of Putin’s behavior could have known this. The same hesitation had been expressed in the persistent opposition about the expansion of NATO since the 1990s, which came down to the view that in the name of our national security we need to respect Putin’s “perceptions.” People used to say the same thing about the Soviet Union — that we needed to understand the subjective roots of its foreign adventures, since it was “expanding because it felt encircled.” In a famous sentence of the Long Telegram in 1946, George Kennan suggested that “at bottom of [the] Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is [the] traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” But who was intending then — who is intending now — to attack Russia? Surely there are limits to the therapeutic approach to states and statesmen. How mistaken do “perceptions” have to be before we cease to respect them in our planning? And if the “perceptions” are fantasies of aggression and domination and extermination, then conflict is more likely, and we must have less forbearance about them. NATO is a purely defensive alliance that was formed when the nations of Western Europe had good reason to organize for their own defense. They still do: it is not a trivial point that none of the countries that Putin has attacked were in NATO. Ukraine poses no military threat to Russia. Neither do Poland and the Baltic states. Meanwhile Putin, by military and cyber and other means, has been attacking countries large and small. Many people have lost their lives to Putin’s paranoia, which is a clinical term for “perception.” This same hesitation about active American measures in Ukraine was advocated during the debate about American military support for the besieged state in the 2010s. Those of us who argued for the dispatch of lethal weaponry to the Ukrainians were not dreaming that they would march triumphantly into Moscow. (We also had no idea that they would perform as brilliantly on the battlefield as they now have done.) We wished only to raise the costs on Putin’s aggressions and to prepare the ground for a political process. We were accused of irresponsibly poking the bear. But the bear poked us. The unfortunate consequence of such prevarications is that we are often tardy in our operational thinking.A story about escalation control: Two men have been condemned to death. They are lined up against the wall as the firing squad gets into position. Their hands are bound. Before they are blindfolded, the captain of the firing squad approaches them and asks if they have a last request. One of them asks for a cigarette. The other turns to him angrily and says, “Don’t make waves!”

    I was in Paris during the first week of the war. It was the most important week in European history since that delirious week in the autumn of 1989, when the Berlin Wall was brought down. It was, indeed, a kind of mirror image of that week — the antithesis of delirium, which is sobriety. The very air was sober. (In Montparnasse such a change registers rather sharply.) I could feel the European shudder. In conversations with friends and strangers, there was a sudden gravity, a somber acknowledgment that the holiday may be over. A struggle was at hand. In Robert Kagan’s terms, Venetians were talking like Martians. The salient emotion was not fear; it was anger, and then determination. The intensity of popular solidarity with Ukraine was palpable. Extraordinary things began to happen. Germany brought to a close the entirety of its post-war national security policy and raised its defense budget. I never believed that anything could morally offend the International Olympic Committee, but even it sought a way to punish Russia. Almost nobody looked back regretfully on the expansion of NATO. NATO acquired a new pride, as people to the east were now sacrificing their lives for their dream of belonging to it. It also acquired a new salience: in the first months of the war it was impossible to avoid the impression that Europe was leading America. This was in part the result of the loss of European confidence in America during the Obama and Trump years, but it was nonetheless wonderful. And even more wonderful was to watch us, the Americans, finally get up to speed. Eventually the Biden administration began to act with a magnificent decisiveness. The magnitude of our assistance to Ukraine, and its spirit, has been historic. (I wish that we had worked out a transfer of aircraft as well. Maybe we will.) As Stephen Kotkin concluded, “the West has rediscovered its manifold power.” At last! And American popular support for our government’s efforts has so far been running high in the polls. Who cares about the “performativity” of all the Ukrainian flags one sees in the windows and on the internet? “Performativity” is an important element of culture, and for now American culture is championing the good fight. But for how long? It is never safe to bet on American attention. Still, whereas no society can, or should, be maintained in a permanent condition of apocalyptic excitation, perhaps we will come out of this crisis with a more lasting tension about the enduring realities of the world.

    Whenever I visit Ukraine, I mourn, and not only for Ukrainians. My origins are there, and they are bloody. In the summer of 1941, in a forest near Boryslav, in western Ukraine, or Galicia, where my mother’s family lived and owned oil wells, a pogrom was committed by local Ukrainians against local Jews, and she, at the age of twenty-two, was among the Jews tasked with collecting the mutilated corpses and arranging for their proper burial. They included her uncle Elimelech. I drove by the forest and past “our” rusted derricks on my way to Schodnica, the small town where her large clan lived, and where, in a makeshift room dug out beneath a barn, she survived the last year or so of the war, under the protection of Poles who had worked for her father in the oil fields. After I satisfied myself that I had located the gentle slope on which her house once stood, and completed my inner convulsions, I went back to Lemberg, or Lviv, where I sought out the high school that she attended. (In Lemberg she saw Josephine Baker!) It took me two days to realize that I was using an outdated Hapsburg-era map, and that Zygmuntowska Street was now Gogolsa Street. The head of the school welcomed me warmly and took me to a room where some physical remains of my mother’s gymnasium — pennants, stationery, and so on — were framed and respectfully exhibited. At a nearby synagogue, once renowned for its murals, I prayed like a good son and then kicked around in the trash — the place was being renovated, I’m not sure for whom. In the trash I discovered a book. When I dusted it off, I was thunderstruck: it was Job — an edition of the Book of Job, two hundred and some pages, published not too far away in Zhitomir in 1872. Its end-pages were covered in Hebrew and Polish scribbles in a beautiful hand, and it came with the commentaries of Rashi and a certain late nineteenth-century rabbi named Shmuel Sternberg from the nearby town of Vinitsiya, who prefaced his commentary with a remarkable introductory essay in which he quarreled with modern non-Jewish Biblical critics as well as medieval Jewish Aristotelians, and displayed enormous literary sensitivity to the sacred text. The hounded volume also came with fire stains and water stains. I rescued it. It is now my Ukrainian Job.

    Years later, when I went to Kyiv, the same shadows accompanied me. Around the corner from my hotel was a huge equestrian statue of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, the seventeenth-century father of Ukrainian nationalism and one of the most reviled figures in Jewish history. His successful war against the Poles included some of the most hideous atrocities in the annals of anti-Semitic violence. This is from a Hebrew chronicle of 1648, about what befell Jews in the region of the Dnieper River: “Some of them were flayed and their bodies were thrown to the dogs. Some of them had their arms and legs cut off and they were thrown onto the roads, where wagons rode over them and horses trampled them. Some of them were buried alive. Children were slaughtered in the arms of their mothers, and many children were torn into pieces like fish. Pregnant women were cut open and watched their fetuses crushed. Other pregnant women were cut open and a live cat was placed in their bellies, which were then sewn back up, and their hands were cut off so that they couldn’t remove the cats from their bellies.” When I was growing up I knew Jews for whom “Khmielnitsky” was still a common curse word. And here was the hetman on a pedestal, in monumental bronze. To further upset my Jewish heart, I was told that the nineteenth-century building before which the statue stood, painted oddly in pink, was the courthouse in which Mendel Beilis was tried for ritual murder in 1913. Passing the statue and the courthouse, I walked down a steep cobbled street toward the old city, and along the way, directly across from the house where Bulgakov was born, I encountered a stall selling antiques from the Great War, including Nazi helmets and a slightly tattered waistcoat with a yellow star pinned to it. I could have had the yellow star for three hundred dollars. I was more inclined to spit.

    Yet I was there, along with some like-minded friends and comrades, to offer my support — I gave a few speeches and press conferences — to the noble struggle of the Ukrainians for liberal democracy. There was Khmielnitsky, but here was Maidan. There were moments when it was too much for my mind to hold. The plurality of loyalties can sometimes hurt. I knew all the arguments against the tyranny of collective memory, and against collective responsibility, and against historical inevitability; and the history of my own people vividly demonstrated the benevolent effects of liberal democracy and its Torah of rights. How can a Jew not support democracy? Yet how can a Jew surrender his skepticism about historical metamorphosis? I made a point of meeting many Ukrainian Jews, old and young, from all walks of Ukrainian life, and asking them for their assessment of their situation. Every one of them, including officials of the community who knew both the government and the democracy movement, responded with unalloyed confidence about the future. They knew the same history that I did, and they lived there. Who was I to contradict them? I had always believed in the possibility of progress, as every member of every minority must, or else they may fulfill their own fatalism. For Jews, there were always only two paths out of the persecuting world: democracy and Zionism. They are the two epic experiments in Jewish emancipation, the two great historical alternatives to the European bargain, which was autocracy punctuated by magnanimity and helplessness punctuated by happiness. I had yahrzeit for my father in Kiev, and I found myself reciting the kaddish with an unexpected élan. During this war, the embrace of the Ukrainian struggle by American Jews has been thrilling to behold (even the Israeli government, which never misses a chance to seem small, finally got it right); it represents, among other things, a poignant overcoming of memory by morality. The past always provides reasons for ethical relaxation, especially the past of once-oppressed groups, which is rich in occasions for anger; but they are wise who refuse to mistake the betterment of their conditions for a betrayal of their traditions.

    Hope, because it is premised on uncertainty, is perfectly compatible with vigilance; but there is a certain kind of vigilance, an expectation of the worst that crosses the line into morbidity, a prior weariness that is not so much an inference from reality as it is an interpretation of it, that destroys hope. The first requirement for political leadership, and for political participation, is an immunity to despair.

    This morning the Director of National Intelligence told Congress that “we assess President Putin is preparing for a prolonged conflict in Ukraine during which he still intends to achieve goals beyond the Donbas.” She added, “Putin most likely also judges that Russia has a greater ability and willingness to endure challenges than his adversaries.” About this he may not be wrong, at least as regards us. The Ukrainians can give us lessons in how not to relent. The important reckoning now must be with the history of our credulity, with the poverty of our geopolitical imagination, with our national lassitude about what lies out there. The war has happened. Those words, la guerre a eu lieu, gave the title to an essay that Merleau-Ponty published in Les Temps Modernes in October, 1945. Its subject, in the aftermath of the victory, was the mentality of the French on the eve of the conflict, which in his view left them ill-equipped for the perils of their time. “Events kept making it less and less probable that peace could be maintained,” he wrote. “How could we have waited so long to decide to go to war? The reason was that we were not guided by the facts. We had secretly resolved to know nothing of violence and unhappiness as elements of history because we were living in a country too happy and too weak to envisage them. Distrusting the facts had even become a duty for us. We had been taught that wars grow out of misunderstandings which can be cleared up and accidents which can be averted through patience and courage. We lived in a certain area of peace, experience, and freedom, formed by a combination of exceptional circumstances. We did not know that this was a soil to be defended but thought it the natural lot of men. From our youth we had been used to handling freedom and to living an individual life. How could we have learned to commit our freedom in order to preserve it?” There is pain in the philosopher’s words. He is not scoring political points. When he writes that “our standards were still those of peacetime,” he is a little elegiac, and he certainly is not mocking happiness and peace. But he is also insisting that a society has cognitive responsibilities. Nothing will determine its fate more than its ability to see clearly, and then not to flinch at what it sees if what it sees is really there. The first readiness is mental readiness.