My Jacobs of Weariness

    To Artur Sandauer

      Higher 

                  reveilles of shape

                                   habitations of touch

                  all weathers of the senses . . . 

     

    Lowest — I

             the staircase of reality

             rises from my breasts.

     

    And I feel nothing.

    Nothing succulent.

    Nothing colorful.

             I’m not only not

             a testament hero

    I’m worse than a flounder

             glued to the river’s deathbed

             with bunched balloons of breath

             fleeing upwards

    worse than a potato mother

             who sprouted vast antlers of roots

             herself wizened

             almost gone

    Smite me

    oh construction of my world!!

    This apartment can be inspired

    the window’s wing

    I’m in my nook

    my ears hum

    weeds carried on Noah’s line

    in the painting, it’s incomplete,

    old brown greens fluttering

    for three hundred years

    and an angel’s bent elbow

    ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ 

    what is this art

    when centuries fly

    interplanetarily

    us knocking at our own doors

    all will dissolve

    still something calls for

    a gesture

    seeking

    an angel’s elbow

    Gray Eminences of Rapture

    Oh how I rejoice

             that you are sky and kaleidoscope 

             that you have so many artificial stars

          that you glow in a monstrance of brightness,

                         when I place your perforated

                         half-globe

                         over my eyes

                         under the air.

             How unstrained in abundance,

             oh colander spoon!

     

    The stove too is beautiful:

    it has tiles and chinks,

    it may be grizzled,

                   silver,

                  gray—even drowsy. . . 

    but especially when

    it shuffles its glints

    or as it sets

    and through the whole rhythm of its imperfections

    whitely poured

                  in charred bells

    it flows into elements

    of monumental bedding.

    Artless Art

    The Lamb

            Little Lamb, who made thee?

            Dost thou know who made thee? 

    Gave thee life, and bid thee feed 

    By the stream & o’er the mead,

    Gave thee clothing of delight,

    Softest clothing, wooly, bright,

    Gave thee such a tender voice,

    Making all the vales rejoice?

            Little Lamb, who made thee?

            Dost thou know who made thee?

     

            Little Lamb, I’ll tell thee,

            Little Lamb, I’ll tell thee;

    He is callèd by thy name,

    For he calls himself a Lamb.

    He is meek, & he is mild,

    He became a little child.

    I a child, & thou a lamb,

    We are callèd by his name.

            Little Lamb, God bless thee! 

            Little Lamb, God bless thee!

        

    William Blake

     

    Nothing is harder to comment on than a piece of art which successfully pretends to artlessness, to be “merely” transcribing what a voice utters — or seems to utter: in real life nobody actually converses in rhyme, but readers of rhymed or rhythmic poetry accept the pentameters of “To be or not to be” as Hamlet’s “natural” way of speaking, just as audiences of opera accept the convention that whatever Rodolfo is “saying” to Mimi will be conveyed in song. In the rhyming lines of William Blake’s “The Lamb,” we hear a single voice speaking, in rhyme; there is no narrator, no editorial comment, no concluding summary. And no self-revelation by the artist-author.

    Although Blake was fiercely concerned with politics, and within a few years was to write long poems called The French Revolution and America, his little illustrated booklet called (and I imitate the original typeface) SONGS of Innocence, which appeared in 1789, offered poems of a simplicity that was hailed then (and sometimes even now) as “pure,” “childlike,” “transparent,” “sweet,” and of course “innocent.” The Songs utterly baffled me — as the productions of a grown man — when I first encountered them in high school, and I set them aside in favor of any poem (from Milton’s “Nativity Ode” to Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn”) which seemed properly and deeply reflective in thought and language. (Poems are meant, said Stevens, “to help us live our lives,” and in high school that was what I wanted from them.) 

    Later I decided, before even entering a doctoral program, that I wanted to write a dissertation on W. B. Yeats, but I knew that I had first to understand Blake. Yeats, in his twenties, had co-edited Blake’s works, and derived from them aspects of his own theory of poetry. When I entered Harvard’s graduate program, seeing that no course was addressing Blake in detail, I asked one of my professors to direct a semester-long “reading course” on Blake for me. Since he generously agreed, we met every week and read all of Blake’s poetry. My teacher tolerated our initial pursuit, but when my later papers began to concern Blake’s long “prophetic books” — mythological, obscure, and stormy fantasies about weirdly named people (“Oothoon”) living in weirdly named places (“Golgonooza”) — he groaned and said, “Helen, the awful things you are having me read!” But Yeats, following Blake’s declaration that “I must Create a System or be enslav’d by another Man’s,” indeed developed his own erratic mythological system, called A Vision, and my (imperfect) absorption of Blake gave me an entrance to writing on it. (My dissertation on Yeats became my first book, and I am still grateful to that reluctant teacher.) 

    Blake’s long poems, composed, like oratorios, of arias and choruses, are accompanied by his stunning but mysterious illustrations. (They may be found online in The Blake Archive.) They puzzled me, but I was still more puzzled by the ostentatious simplicity of “The Lamb” and other poems in his Songs of Innocence. Was there more to this artless art than I could see? I had faith in the sincerity of Blake’s promise to his readers in Jerusalem, composed between 1804 and 1820:

                           I give you the end of a golden string,

                           Only wind it into a ball,

                           It will lead you in at Heaven’s gate

                           Built in Jerusalem’s wall.  

    But how to find the golden string? An unforgettable lyric usually startles by some original feature, some conceptual or linguistic thread calling attention to itself. With intuition and investigation, the clue glows, the golden ball is wound up, and the poem assembles itself into an intelligible structure. But I could not find, for many years, any such golden string of entrance into “The Lamb.”

    BC Before introducing “The Lamb,” and explaining my dissent from the usual readings, I must add something about the origin and form of Blake’s two lyric sequences, Songs of Innocence and Songs of Experience. Even before he issued his engraved Songs of Innocence — with its appealing title page, elaborately designed, minutely populated, and beautifully colored — Blake had composed, as we know from his notebooks, dark poems, shocked and shocking, centered on female betrayal and male jealousy. In 1793, with Songs of Innocence completed, Blake published some of those despairing notebook poems with other lyrics in a collection called (I reproduce the text-format) SONGS of Experience, emphasizing the difference from the earlier sequence by repudiating the italic font of Innocence in favor of roman for Experience. He released only four copies of this booklet because he had changed his mind about the actual relation of the two sequences to each other. They should not, he realized, be presented as opposites but as complements. The following year — and ever after — he published the two sequences together, inextricably twinned in a single volume which bore an expansive and informative title page, cunningly expressive via the fonts ROMAN and italic, changing even the small introductory word “of” in its first two appearances to expose the contrast in the sequences: SONGS of Innocence and Of Experience, Shewing the Two Contrary States of the Human Soul. At the foot of the title page lie the prostrate figures of Adam and Eve wearing fig-leaves after their expulsion from Eden. 

    In spite of Blake’s blunt assertion that his poems convey “the two contrary states of the human soul,” readers persisted in identifying Innocence with Childhood and Experience with Adulthood, identifying the two “Contrary States” as successive life-periods rather than as fluctuating emotional and intellectual moods. If the two states of the human soul (“the” restricts them to only two) are recurrent from infancy to death, they might more accurately be designated Naïveté and Knowledge. They can in fact be two equally true renditions that allegorize a single event, as in, for example, the paired poems about the birth of a child, “Infant Joy” and “Infant Sorrow.” In Innocence, under the title “Infant Joy,” a young mother imagines a virtual dialogue with her newborn but as yet unbaptized child. “Infant Joy” could more properly be called “A Mother’s Joy,” since it describes her state of mind. The speechless infant (Latin infans, “unable to speak”) seems to be requesting that the mother confer on it a pre-baptismal “human” name in lieu of the ecclesiastically required saint’s name:

    “I have no name:

    I am but two days old.”

    The mother immediately responds, deferring to the baby’s implied wish,

    “What shall I call thee?”

    The infant names itself (or, rather, the mother, once again, imagines what she would like to have the baby say):

    “I happy am, 

    Joy is my name.”

    And the mother offers a hopeful prayer for her child:

    “Sweet joy befall thee!”

    The baby’s “self-chosen” name, perhaps imagined by the mother (as Leo Damrosch suggests), as the capitalized female name “Joy,” is thus made identical with its hoped-for fate (a lower-case “joy”) and the elation of reciprocal exchange (“Joy” from the infant, “joy” from the mother) in the (imagined) dialogue begins to be felt. 

    The baby’s original “self-chosen” adjective was “happy,” and the mother in the second stanza, where dialogue ceases, provides the second of her own two adjectives (she has already uttered “sweet,” necessarily true of the abstraction “Joy”). Now, gazing at the bodily form of her infant, she chooses “pretty,” an aesthetic characterization, suitably small:

    “Pretty joy!

    Sweet joy but two days old,

    Sweet joy I call thee:

    Thou dost smile,

    I sing the while,

    Sweet joy befall thee!”

    The young mother addresses her silent baby in Blakean baby-talk, cooing in repetition her “pretty” and “sweet,” while recording the mutual and simultaneous happiness of mother and child. “I call thee sweet joy,” says the mother, caroling a series of praises in her delusion that she understands what her baby is “saying” and that it understands what she is “saying back.” It is actually her own upbrimming joy that the singing mother projects into the “smile” of her infant in this “innocent” ventriloquial, alliterating, and rhyming companionship: “Thou dost smile, / I sing the while.” 

    By his conclusive title-page-twinning of Innocence and Experience in 1794, and by characterizing the two nouns as “Contrary States,” Blake is embodying the law he had announced a year earlier in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: “Without Contraries is no progression.” He now asks himself to enlarge his perception by imagining a Contrary to maternal joy, expanding from Joy to Sorrow as he holds contrary moods in his mind at the same moment. While the fond mother is preparing her soul to dote on her child, what must be the state of soul of the actual newborn infant? 

    “Infant Sorrow,” the baleful song of Experience corresponding to “Infant Joy,” is an enraged monologue from the infant as he (who is ungendered in the poem; I use “he” for convenience) recapitulates the ignominy of his birth. With three paralleled verbs (“groan,” “weep” and “leap”) he fuses his tortured and unarmed birth-leap into dangerous Infant-Experience with the simultaneous dismal fall into Parent-Experience of his appalled mother and father. He pipes his birth-cry as his mother groans in agony and his father bursts into tears:

    My mother groan’d! my father wept,

    Into the dangerous world I leapt:

    Helpless, naked, piping loud,

    Like a fiend hid in a cloud.

    Who is thinking that the baby, with its unintelligible scream, is arriving like a monstrous “fiend hid in a cloud?” Its mother, of course, as we know from Blake’s draft of a different poem, “A Little Boy Lost,” in which a child — a truthteller like Lear’s Cordelia — says that it cannot love its parents more than itself. Hearing that reasonable assertion, the mother cries out in revulsion, “O that I such a fiend should bear!” (That Blake ultimately transfers the word “fiend” to a sadistic priest who burns the baby alive in “a holy place” does not erase, from the mind of the modern reader who knows the draft, Blake’s initial impulse to let the demonic epithet emerge from the mother.) 

    Just as he had “channeled” in “Infant Joy” the young mother’s delusion that she and the baby are in dialogue, so, as he continues “Infant Sorrow,” Blake “channels” the resentful baby’s angry thoughts as he announces the elements of his state, binding them by alliteration — he struggles, strives, and sulks:

    Struggling in my father’s hands,

    Striving against my swaddling bands,

    Bound and weary I thought best

    To sulk upon my mother’s breast.

    Although the infant writhes to escape the constraints of both nature (his father’s grip) and culture (the binding swaddling bands), he finds himself helpless, and sinks back, with no “Infant Joy” at all, to sulk upon his mother’s breast. And since Joy and Sorrow are two contrary states of the human soul, the allegorized Joy (in a mother) and Sorrow (in an infant) can arrive simultaneously on the poet’s page. The mother’s idea of the joyous internal state of her baby is pathetically naïve, while the baby’s infernal idea of itself — from its first horrible Experience — is entirely credible. 

    It must not be forgotten, in reading such songs as “Infant Joy” and “The Lamb,” that every single poem in Songs of Innocence has been written by an adult being who knows exactly what Experience always brings. The reader’s consciousness of the concealed adult author of Innocence must figure in any account of Blake’s art in the artlessness of “The Lamb.” I differ from earlier readers in believing that the poem “The Lamb” is — when we look at its companion poem in Experience, “The Tyger” — composed by the author-as-Tyger looking back with pity, on its deluded childhood state. The Tyger, accustomed in his early life to being a docile Lamb, has suddenly awakened in a wholly unfamiliar body, burning with the inner flame and armed with teeth and claws. We must see the nature of the child-speaker through the Tyger’s lens, because we too are Experienced (as well as perpetually Innocent), passing constantly, in each episode of life, from Ignorance to Knowledge, from naïveté to awareness. Throughout our life, if we do not refuse perception of our soul-states, we continue to undergo successive falls into Experience. In Blake’s long poem Vala, one character (speaking, we understand, for Blake himself) sums up the price of the soul’s repeated passage from ignorance to awareness, from error to wisdom, from hope to desolation:

    What is the price of experience? do men buy it for a song?

    Or wisdom for a dance in the street? No, it is bought with the price

    Of all that a man hath, his wife, his children.

    Wisdom is sold in the desolate market where none come to buy,

    And in the wither’d field where the farmer plows for bread in vain. 

    What, then, are we to make of “The Lamb?” It was sometimes carelessly thought that Blake was speaking in his own voice to the Lamb, but the single line, “I a child, and thou a Lamb,” establishes that Blake has created a fictional child, who speaks to an equally fictional Lamb. The two initial questions put to the Lamb by the child seem innocent enough, since they reproduce the first question in the Christian catechism as adapted for children: “Who made you?” (This calls up its answer, “God made me.”) Any churchgoing Christian of Blake’s day would recognize the child’s Biblical allusions: from Psalm 23, “He maketh me to lie down in green pastures; he leadeth me beside the still waters”; and from Psalm 114, a metaphor of nature expressing lamb-like joy: “The mountains skipped like rams, and the little hills like lambs.” There seems nothing here to “interpret,” once one recognizes the Christian references echoed by the churchgoing child-speaker: he knows that God made the Lamb; that John the Baptist called Jesus “the Lamb of God” and that Jesus applied the epithet to himself; that God (as Jesus) became a “little child”; and that Jesus said “Learn of me, because I am meek and lowly of heart.” The Christian reader would also know that the child has sung Charles Wesley’s two hymns for children (published in 1742): “Gentle Jesus, meek and mild, / Look on me, a little child,” and “Lamb of God, I look to thee; / Thou shalt my example be; / Thou art gentle, meek and mild, / Thou wast once a little child.” It seems that the child is now charmingly conveying his religious knowledge to a “little lamb,” met in the meadow. The invisible author of the poem is presumably delighting in his vignette of a young child as innocent “teacher.” 

    The child makes his first departure from religious echo-paraphrase into unconscious originality as his attention turns — with no feeling of impropriety — from received doctrine to his bodily senses of touch and vision. Lambs in the meadow are to him huggable pets, and as he recalls embracing them, he imagines a God who has bestowed on the Lamb his unBiblical “softest clothing, wooly, bright.” In fact, Blake reproduces the “hug” in Innocence via the poem called “Spring,” in which the child-speaker converses (in wholly sensuous terms) with a Lamb: the child has not yet been brought under the Vicar’s indoctrination.

    Little Lamb

    Here I am,

    Come and lick

    My white neck.

    Let me pull

    Your soft Wool.

    Let me kiss

    Your soft face.

    I propose that Blake knowingly composed “The Lamb” as an ironic text. Because the poem has a child-speaker, Blake has decided on stylistic simplicity in its stanza form, rhyming, rhythm, vocabulary, grammar, syntax, and two-stanza structure. Critics have had very little to say, therefore, about “The Lamb,” preferring by far to expatiate upon its paired Experience poem, “The Tyger.” 

    Tyger! Tyger! burning bright

    In the forests of the night,

    What immortal hand or eye

    Could frame thy fearful symmetry?

    The speakers of the two poems seem like wholly different personages, and the animals they address could hardly be less alike: the child-speaker of “The Lamb” seems to have fellow-feeling for the Lamb, while the speaker of “The Tyger” is terrified by the predator that has appeared before him. The Creator of the beast is imagined as an immortal and inscrutable artist, using both physical force (“hand”) and conceptual design (“eye”) to inaugurate an unprecedented visual symmetry, not the familiar symmetry of beauty but one of fright and fear. Since selections in anthologies have reinforced the notion that Blake composed Innocence about childhood and Experience about adulthood, the “paired poems” of the two sequences are examined for difference rather than for resemblance. Yet one must arrive at some view considering the Lamb and the Tyger as Contrary States rather than Opposite Animals. 

    An ironic reading of “The Lamb” arises from our scrutinizing the little drama between child and lamb. Under what circumstances did the child learn the truths that he is teaching the lamb? We deduce that the child has just begun attending the lessons in Christian belief offered to the youngest children of the Infant Class at Sunday School. On the child’s first day, the Vicar has humiliated the newcomer by omitting any kind of welcome such as “Little Child, I greet thee, / Little Child, I greet thee”, which would match his closing “professional” dismissal: “Little Lamb, God bless thee! / Little Lamb, God bless thee!” Instead the Vicar situates his little student at a disadvantage by putting to him the first question in the catechism — “Who made thee?” — to which the child, not knowing the answer and feeling ignorant, remains dumb. Refusing to reveal the correct answer, the Vicar once again exhibits the child’s vacancy of mind, insisting a second time on the question, this time revealing the child’s lack of knowledge: “Dost thou know who made thee?” The child hangs his head in embarrassment. Having established the child’s inferiority, the Vicar finally, in the second stanza, offers the missing answer. “Little child, I’ll tell thee,” he says, then grandly repeats his intention with “Little child, I’ll tell thee,” implicitly boasting of his own superior knowledge and demonstrating the child’s earlier inadequacy of response. 

    We find ourselves asking, as we think about the poem, why the child has chosen to address a lamb, but as soon as we raise the question, we realize that every local child who has preceded Blake’s child in the Infant Class surely knows the answer to the opening question, so that the only available creature younger and more ignorant than himself is the Lamb. The whole drama now presents itself to us as a role-playing drama arranged by the child, in which he is playing the Vicar and the Lamb is cast as his own first-day self. When he, imitating the Vicar, poses the question in its variant form as a determiner of the child’s cognitive capacity — “Dost thou know who made thee?” — the Lamb is helplessly silent (as the child himself had been). The Lamb, questioned, is satisfactorily speechless, and now the child, addressing the “ignorant” Lamb, can take on, in the second stanza, the satisfactory (if evil) role of the twice triumphant Vicar: “Little Lamb, I’ll tell thee, / Little Lamb, I’ll tell thee.” 

    The Vicar, as we deduce from the poem’s reflection of his Infant-Class teaching, has been carefully selecting and sanitizing the portions of Christian belief purveyed to the child. The Vicar’s lessons never mention the vengeful God of Isaiah and the Psalms, nor the violent Jesus who drives the moneychangers from the temple, nor why Jesus calls himself a Lamb (metaphorically anticipating the Passover when he will be slaughtered). In fact, although the child has been told the Christmas story (“He became a little child”), the tragic story of the Passion and Crucifixion remains concealed from him, as does the divine virtue of violence in moral condemnation, defamation, or exclusion. 

    When a child hurting from a visit to the dentist replays the visit with a younger child, the former victim must become of course the pain-inflicting dentist: the whole point of the role-playing is for the child to reverse the roles, to take on the triumph of the victor and thereby triumph over his past passivity. We become spectators of the child’s “innocent” sadism as he humiliates the Lamb (thereby revealing the way in which he was himself humiliated by the Vicar). And our heart sinks at how much the child will ultimately have to learn about the life of Jesus — above all, the harsh tragedy of the Crucifixion. The implicit cruelty of the child, as, unaware of his own ignorance, he complacently and proudly dominates the Lamb, represents his first step into Experience as he (by design) defeats the hapless Lamb, his ideal (because language-less) victim. 

    Even before composing “The Lamb,” Blake understood that there never has been, nor could there ever be, a time of entire and sinless Innocence. In a marginal inscription in the manuscript of The Four Zoas (never illustrated, never published) he writes:

    Unorganized Innocence, An Impossibility.

    Innocence dwells with Wisdom but never with Ignorance.

    BC The animal Blake chose as the contrary to the “innocent” Lamb is the Tyger. And the poem, in its short-form lyric drama, recounts, in my view of it, the frightening passage into Experience as the (male) adolescent undergoes it. The little child, formerly clothed in the soft white garment of the docile Lamb, wakes up overnight to sexual power and aggressive physicality as he discovers himself metamorphosed, with no warning, into a Tyger. He has become a predator whose substance is flame and whose habitation is darkness. Apprehensive questions, as rhythmic as the anvil-strokes of the Maker at the forge, burst out of the adolescent as he becomes the protesting witness of his own overnight transformation — by some unseen and apparently malevolent agent — into an unrecognizable and “evil” creature.

    This Beast is the result of a Blakean seventh day of Creation. God has already said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.” And since a man was indeed created in the image and likeness of God, according to Genesis, can it be that the Tyger is another image and likeness of the divine? And since God has pronounced his creations good, did he smile in approbation as he contemplated his creature of savage strength, the Tyger? The angelic Stars, seeing the Tyger, regard its creation as a catastrophe, because it reveals that human erotic desire and human lust for aggression must be understood as aspects of God: “Did he smile his work to see? / Did he who made the Lamb make thee?” Later, in his illustrations to the book of Job, Blake gives his definitive answer to the adolescent’s frightened speculation. The divine “voice out of the whirlwind” represents himself to Job as the creator of two monsters, Behemoth and Leviathan, praising their nature and their powers. In Blake’s engraving, the Behemoth of land and the Leviathan of sea, both magnificently hideous, share a single design: inside a circle, Behemoth stands above on land and Leviathan twists below in the sea. The design bears as its subscribed title God’s own words to Job: “Behold now Behemoth, which I made with thee.” “Did he who made the Lamb make thee?” Yes, the voice has implied, and he made you, Job, and with you Behemoth and Leviathan, the sacred monsters who are as holy as any other creature. “For everything that lives is holy, life delights in life, /Because the soul of sweet delight can never be defiled.” With those two lines in his America, Blake entered his fundamental creed in 1783, even before he twinned Innocence with Experience. 

    The adolescent investigating the burning state of his soul knows, as he frames his questions to the Tyger, that there are two fires in nature: the celestial fire of the sun and the volcanic fire underground. Where did the maker find the molten raw material for the Tyger? “In what distant deeps” (of Hell) — and then he must extend the boundaries of the question to the alternative — “or [celestial] skies” — “burned the fire of thine eyes?” He answers his own question by admitting the need to search out the fire by ascent into the air: “On what wings dare he aspire?” The fire lives with God: the human soul would be incomplete without sexuality and aggression, lust and war; otherwise the soul would find itself permanently arrested in the Contrary state, the naïveté of Innocence

    The mild appearance of the Tyger in Blake’s engraving accompanying the poem has often been criticized, even mocked. But because this Tyger is an image and likeness of God, we must see him as one of the transfigured predators in “the Peaceable Kingdom” prophesied in Isaiah 11: 6-7, in which not only does the Wolf dwell with the Lamb, but the carnivores are transformed into herbivores:

    The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them…. And the lion shall eat straw like the ox.

    Blake had once thought (in “Night” in Innocence) that this transformation could take place seamlessly, in a final heavenly phase of the predators’ existence: after the predators have massacred the herbivores, the “mild spirits” of the sheep inherit celestial new worlds. The lion, weeping tears of gold, joins them there as the guardian of the sheepfold, who tells the lamb, that he, the lion, newly herbivorous, can follow him in grazing:

    “And now beside thee, bleating lamb,

    I can lie down and sleep;

    Or think on him who bore thy name,

    Graze after thee and weep.

    For, wash’d in life’s river,

    My bright mane for ever

    Shall shine like the gold

    As I guard o’er the fold.”

    In this transcendent state of “Organized Innocence,” Innocence is no longer ignorant and Experience is no longer destructive. 

    But Blake found no relief in castrating the Tyger (or the Lion) into a herbivore cohabiting with the Lamb. Instead, in the apocalyptic Four Zoas, he constructed a Last Judgment in which the roaring Lions regain all their strength. The ninth night has come, the grapes of wrath are being trampled, and the harvest grape-wagons are brought to the winepress by “ramping tygers” and “furious lions”: 

    Then Luvah stood before the Wine press; all his fiery sons

    Brought up the loaded Waggons with shoutings; ramping tygers play

    In the jingling traces; furious lions sound the song of joy

    To the golden wheels circling upon the pavement of heaven, & all

    The Villages of Luvah ring.

    Blake, without dismissing individual sexual emotions, aged into despair over collective evils. He declared love to be, and declared Love to be the true religion of Jesus, and preached peace by the forgiveness of sins and the eternal brotherhood of man. He ended his last and longest “prophetic book,” the Jerusalem of ninety-eight illuminated engravings, in visionary prophecy of a redeemed time. In its grand rhetoric, he has come farthest from the concise art and artlessness of Innocence and Experience

    Does it make any difference to represent “The Lamb” as a poem constituted by irony instead of by innocence? Yes, if it renders a truer account of Blake’s representation of Innocence. If the art concealed by its artlessness enlarges our view of Blake’s capacity for moral subtlety, then we may see, among his thousands of vigorous lines, more such subtleties. It is not until we have the two poems before us that we perceive the Lamb’s four-beat verse-speech to be technically identical (as trochaic tetrameter rhyming couplets) to that of the Tyger, establishing their indivisible continuity of being. Only in the Vicar’s word-for-word repeated formal “staging,” opening and closing each stanza of “The Lamb” does the child imitate the Vicar’s original words “Little Child, who made thee?. . . Little Child, God bless thee!” (The child merely substitutes “Lamb” for the Vicar’s “Child.”) Only the lines reproducing the Vicar’s “professional” speech are written in three-beat form: this is the Vicar’s ungenerous rhetoric. But as soon as we move into the Lamb’s hazy recollections of church-instruction, we see that he, by contrast, speaks in four-beat lines, ampler than those of the Vicar. The Lamb’s utterances are “smooth,” with “sweet” rhythms, even though their metrical signature of successive downbeats is not usually a mild music. The four-beat equally trochaic lines of “The Tyger,” with their truculent “anvil-beats,” reproduce the “grownup” form of the Lamb’s four-beat mildness. We take no particular notice of the meter as we read, “Gave thee life, and bid thee feed / By the stream & o’er the mead”—but who could fail to notice the distortion of sentence-form and the hammering percussive questions in the heated, equally trochaic, downbeats of “The Tyger? 

    What the hammer? What the chain,

    In what furnace was thy brain?

    What the anvil? What dread grasp

    Dare its deadly terrors clasp?

    Keeping the same meter, Blake “acts out” for us the metamorphosis from placidity to terror as Innocence discovers itself mutating from ignorance into Experience.

    The art of the artless tempts every artist: its “vitreous finish” (Heaney on Yeats) repels explanation of its effect. It can be childish (as in “The Lamb”) or unbearable (“Those are pearls that were his eyes”). In music it is idyllic (the shepherd’s pipe), in art confounding (“This is not a pipe” accompanying a pipe). It grounds theology (“I am that I am”) and establishes morality (“Thou shalt not kill”). It can be the quintessence of sublimity: at the heavenly banquet Herbert’s final words are “So I did sit and eat.” It can have a deadpan humor: “What do you read, my lord?” “Words, words, words.” But it is in tragedy that the art of artlessness reaches its greatest eloquence: Desdemona, dying, when asked “O, who hath done this deed?” replies, “Nobody — I myself.” And the broken Lear, bending over the dead Cordelia, comes to the end of language: 

                            Thou’lt come no more. 

    Never, never, never, never, never.

    After an unbearable death, nothing comes to mind but Lear’s five-word line.

     

    The Shape of a Question

    A fragile creature that cannot be broken is confounding, and this juxtaposition of delicacy and strength renders it freakishly powerful. Isabelle Huppert is so constituted. This is evident from almost every one of the dizzying number of films in which she has appeared. Her aura is incongruously encased in an exceedingly slim frame. Animated by the whirling of an inhuman engine, she provokes awe, disgust, lust, and adoration. She has said that the art of acting requires a peculiar combination of passivity and power, and passive power is precisely what she exudes. It emanates from her with unmistakable and inexplicable force. Huppert is just over five feet tall, and thin in a way that would be grotesque if she were slightly taller. If you held her with your hands on each of her hips, pressing your thumbs down along the slope of her hip bones, you would feel as if you could break her in half. She would look you dead in the eye and invite your violence.

    It is impossible to identify which combination of her physical characteristics confers beauty — she is slightly too pretty to be plain and not by any conventional standard sexy enough to justify her undeniable physical magnetism. Huppert burns even when she is icy. She always does — every variation of her, in all of the hundreds of films and plays in which she has been serially reincarnated. Some believe that it is an actor’s job to camouflage herself so that the person playing the part seeps entirely into the character and disappears. For some, that is what is meant by “acting.” Huppert thinks otherwise. In all of her roles she is always also herself. This is especially remarkable because of her subtlety, her utter lack of interest in “pulling focus”; she is not always Isabelle Huppert in the way that Al Pacino is always Al Pacino and Vanessa Redgrave is always Vanessa Redgrave. She says that her filmography is a kind of autobiography, which is to say that she has been hundreds of women, and all of them are charged with her electricity, her passive power, her sex and heat and frigidity. 

    Annick Huppert, née Beau, gave birth to her fifth child on March 16, 1953 in Paris’ sixteenth arrondissement. She and her husband, Raymond, named their baby Isabelle and raised her in Ville d’Avray, a suburb seven and a half miles from the center of Paris. (It is the setting of the movie Les dimanches de Ville d’Avray, which won the Oscar for best foreign film in 1963, as Huppert proudly repeats.) Raymond was a Russian Jew who married a Catholic, and the Hupperts sent all their children to the St. Cloud Gymnasium, a Catholic school which Isabelle attended until she was sixteen years old. (Her parents married directly after the war. She has never spoken publicly about how her father made it through that catastrophe, or how being the daughter of a Jew who survived the Nazi occupation hardened, softened, or in any other way altered her.) 

    Encouraged by her mother to pursue a career in the arts, she enrolled at the Conservatory of Versailles, and then earned a BA in Russian Literature from the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales before studying at the Conservatoire National Supérieur d’Art Dramatique in Paris. Her teachers were Jean-Laurent Cochet and Antoine Vitez, who furnished French cinema with the next generation’s Milky Way, producing stars such as Gérard Depardieu, Daniel Auteuil, Emmanuelle Béart, Fabrice Luchini, and of course Huppert. When asked what she learned at the conservatory, Huppert insists she learned nothing at all. She either never absorbed or willfully purged its teachings. She attended the school because it was where young people who wanted a career in theater and film taxied before takeoff. She and her peers took part in the ritual of knocking on the doors of directors they admired looking for work, a rite of passage among young theater students. 

    In this way she won her first film role in 1972. She achieved national recognition five years later as Pomme in The Lacemaker, a tragedy about a shy girl driven insane by her own timidity. For this part she won the BAFTA award for Most Promising Newcomer. Claude Chabrol, a director whose temperament and philosophy of cinema were preternaturally compatible with hers, cast her as his lead in Violette Nozière in 1978. If a director agrees to work with Huppert, he must be prepared to cede significant freedoms, since her film style is unique and immovable. She changes the ether of the movie. Chabrol didn’t mind: her ether enriched his. The two would go on to make seven movies together. (He died in 2010 while their eighth collaboration was incubating.) 

    Violette Noziere recounts the true, gory tale of a Parisian murderess who, in 1933, poisoned both her parents and incensed all of France. She was the Lizzie Borden of the French petit-bourgeois, only without the acquittal. The film earned Huppert the first of her two best actress awards at Cannes, and is the earliest instance of a stereotypical Huppert part: severe, disturbing, mysterious, riveting, somewhat opaque, and deepened by a feral intelligence. Throughout the 1980s she worked with some of the greatest directors in the world, including Jean-Luc Godard (Every Man for Himself, 1980, and Passion, 1982), Joseph Losey (La Truite, 1982), Diane Kurys (Entre Nous 1983), Andrzej Wajda (The Possessed, 1988), and of course Claude Chabrol (Une Affaire de femmes, 1988). 

    Today Huppert is considered one of the greatest actresses alive, in both theater and film. A.O. Scott has called her the world’s greatest actress, and in The New York Times list of “The 25 Greatest Actors of the 21st Century,” published in 2020, Huppert came in second behind Denzel Washington. This status was secured over a long and frenetically busy career, but it was cemented most powerfully in 2001 by her unforgettable performance as Erika Kohut in Michael Haneke’s The Piano Teacher. She played an emotionally stunted, self-mutilating pianist who lives in a small apartment with her monstrous mother. Erika, who has been capable of experiencing passion only through music, suddenly discovers to her horror that she has fallen in love with one of her students. Driven by a ferocious appetite that she cannot constrain, she begs him to engage in sadomasochistic sex. His compliance and subsequent disgust are equally devastating to her. Early in the film she slices inside her own vagina with a razor blade; in the final scene, she plunges a kitchen knife into her shoulder while walking out of a performance hall. Her self-contempt is excruciating to witness.

    2016 was the most impressive year of her film career to date. She received her first Oscar nomination for Elle, a movie about a rape victim who seeks out and seduces her rapist, and L’Avenir, a film about a middle-aged professor, was heralded as one of the best movies of the new century. The similarities between her characters in the two films have been noted, but the differences between them are profound and significant. In the public imagination Huppert is caricatured as a perverse exhibitionist. Michèle, the protagonist of Elle, is the kind of role that viewers assume she would choose to play because it is known that her characters are often weirdly sexed. But that is hardly what is most interesting about Huppert’s character in Elle. Michèle is hypnotically complicated. We witness her struggle in every realm of life: as a mother, a daughter, a businesswoman, an erotic being, and a victim. That complexity is what drew Huppert to the role. But the role of Nathalie in L’Avenir, a professor attempting to make sense of her life after a series of personal and professional catastrophes, is equally Huppertian. She doesn’t choose roles because they are edgy. Edginess is just another familiar category, but Huppert is not governed by familiar considerations. For her even the edge is too close to the center. Her art takes place on another plane.

    Huppert’s relationship to her medium is strange, and not only for the obvious reason that she often plays similarly discomfiting, unpleasant, and unusual people. She is doing something uncommon through acting, and whatever this strange project is it defies articulation. Huppert’s belief in the limitations of language is mystical. It is symptomatic of a sophisticated lack of faith in human reason. She is impatient with ordinary human trust in language’s communicative capabilities, and with the common intolerance for mystery that language is often enlisted to dispel. She thinks that human behavior is chronically incomprehensible, and she makes films which reflect such a conception. Her films do not tell their viewers how to interpret them. As she puts it, she makes movies “in the shape of a question, not in the shape of an answer.” She vivifies characters without fully understanding them, and she chooses characters who thwart transparency and defy explanation. She is certainly uninterested in cultivating the kind of intelligibility that viewers crave in movies and people crave in life. Huppert does not harbor those cravings. She has remarked that “we always feel slightly misunderstood and misjudged in life. We should gain strength rather than weakness from it. I always feel misunderstood, and yet that is what I seek.” She does not analyze her roles, she feeds herself into them, syncopating herself to their rhythms or mixing their rhythm with hers. 

    There are actors and directors and viewers for whom cinema offers the opportunity to present coherent narratives made up of legible characters who do the things they do for discernible reasons. Sometimes these reasons and the actions that they precipitate are morally reprehensible and sometimes they are morally sound. Sometimes they are both these things. Rarely are they wholly bewildering. For the kinds of actors and directors who make films which broadcast who is good and who is bad — and they are the sort whose products sell at the box office — the characters in their movies respond to stimuli the way people have been taught to think they ought to respond. “Cinematic” here means, among other things, comprehensible, transparent, even obvious. When horrible things happen to them, the characters get upset. When a character commits horrific crimes, the viewer knows why she does it and so does the character herself. Villains are unattractive unless it is made clear to the audience that they are somehow contrite, or at least victims themselves. A great actress is expected to know precisely why the character she plays so much as cocks an eyebrow, and to communicate this understanding to the audience so that the audience acquires the same knowledge, and learns, if not to like the character, then at least to understand her. Understanding is paramount. Bafflement, mystery, irrationality— all endemic to the human experience — are not seriously treated. One of the illusions upon which we have come to depend in film is that, as Jean Renoir imperishably instructed, everyone has his reasons.

    But in life, far more often, no one does. That is Huppert’s creed. 

    Consider the following vignettes from three of Huppert’s most representative works.

    From Violette Noziere (directed by Claude Chabrol, 1978):

    Violette Nozière sits quietly at the kitchen table beside her balding father and watches him with thickly lined, unblinking eyes. He swallows all of the water mixed with his allotment of white powder, which she has told him and her mother the doctor prescribed for all three of them. She had brought the powder home in her purse, carefully encased in three paper packages with one of their names on each. When his glass is empty she raises her own, which she has filled with milk to disguise the fact that it contains no powder, and downs its contents in one gulp. A trickle of white glimmers at the corner of her lip which she curls slightly while looking into her father’s eyes. The red nail polish on the hand grasping the glass complements her deep lipstick and the auburn hair elegantly curled close to her head. She is out of place in the drab, cramped apartment with her dowdy father and mother. Violette replaces the glass on the table and, still unblinking, says that “It tastes better that way.” He turns to his wife and instructs her to add milk to her concoction. “I don’t like milk,” she grimaces before drinking half her own glass. “Oh, it tastes horrible!” She crosses the length of the dining room in two strides, enters the small space which serves as a kitchen, and pours the remaining liquid in the sink. Violette watches with concentration but without apparent anxiety. Then she stands and yawns while her mother mutters over her shoulder, “I’ll fetch the roast. It’s overcooked.”

    Père Nozière rises shakily and tries to tell his daughter to go take a nap, but he cannot fully form the words. “My Vio.. My Viole…” he coughs, clutches the table and then falls backwards onto the floor, wheezing for breath. “What’s the matter?” his wife shrieks, rushing towards him. She simultaneously stoops down and turns back towards her daughter. “Violette, stand up, your father is sick!” But almost immediately her own body begins to contort. She groans, exhales hoarsely, tries to pull herself up off the floor and then looks in horror at her daughter before gasping and falling between the table and the wall.

    Violette waits for silence before kneeling beside her father to see if he is still breathing. She retches and rushes towards the bathroom to vomit, then stumbles back into the dining room, crouches over her mother’s inert body and searches her pockets for the keys to the bureau in which her parents have hidden their savings. She finds it, walks with purpose to her parents’ bedroom, unlocks the bureau and rummages through its contents. She finds the money, which she balls up in her fist. Then she walks back into the dining room, sits at the table set for three, pulls the baking pan with the overcooked roast towards herself, hacks off a large piece, and eats it with her fingers. 

    From L’Avenir (directed by Mia Hansen-Løve, 2016):

    “Salut!” Nathalie calls to her husband while tossing her keys and her bag on the console near the front door. “Oof!” She walks swiftly to the couch, throws herself down, and swings her feet up onto the coffee table and her head back into the pillow. She has walked to and from work in heels. The walls and the upholstery of the small apartment are white, and the sun shines through the glass double doors which open onto the balcony and reflects gently off the lacquered wooden table. Husband and wife are both professors and their walls are lined with tightly packed books whose spines provide most of the color in the room. “I’m exhausted. Aren’t you?” Her husband walks gingerly towards her from the kitchen, his face strangely grim. 

    “What is it? Why so down?” she asks him, still slumped against the cushions. 

    “Nathalie, I must tell you. I met someone.” 

    “What do you mean?” she says, pulling her legs down and leaning towards him. Without changing her tone or expression, she asks, “And why tell me? Couldn’t keep it a secret?” 

    “I’m moving in with her.” 

    “What?” Her voice rises very slightly, and her eyes widen but do not glimmer. He sits down across from her and looks at his feet and then over at his wife’s face. “Are you sure?” she asks him, quietly but firmly. 

    “Yes, I’m sure.” 

    “Has it been going on for a long time?” 

    “A while.” 

    “A student?” 

    “Of course not.” 

    “Who then?” 

    “You don’t know her.” 

    She pauses, looks away, and then mutters to herself, “I thought you’d love me forever… How stupid!” She stands and walks past him towards the kitchen. 

    “I’ll always love you, Nathalie. You know it.” 

    “Oh, stop it,” she murmurs. 

    She spends the next morning grading papers on the balcony, but caps her pen and stands when she hears her husband come home. “Lunch is ready, just warm it up,” she tells him. “You’re not eating?” “Not here.” Nathalie walks past him and out the door.

    From Elle (directed by Paul Verhoeven, 2016):

    A man in a black ski mask forced his way into Michèle’s spacious high-ceilinged living room, threw her to the ground, ripped open her shirt, and raped her. He left his victim on the floor. A streak of blood covers the length of her left thigh. Fragments of glass and china are littered around her head, as she had pulled the tablecloth on which she had been eating to the floor while flailing to escape. A black and blue mark is rapidly materializing over her left eye. She sits up slowly, blank-faced, and dimly notices the debris beside her. She retrieves a broom and dustpan and sweeps the clanking shards up and into the trash. She strips, throws out the dress she had been wearing, and draws a bubble bath. In the tub blood rises to the surface and stains the bubbles above her groin.

    She dries off and dresses, then orders sushi on the phone. “Some hamachi. Two pieces. What is a ‘holiday roll’? … Okay… Thank you.”

    Her son rings the doorbell and apologizes for being late. “How are you?” he asks.

    “I’m ok.” 

    “What’s that?” He gestures towards the bruise above her eye. 

    “I fell riding my bike.” 

    “That thing?” He nods at the bicycle. 

    “Yes.” 

    “Looks like you never rode it.” 

    “And you can see why,” She replies, walking past him and into the dining room. “So, you’ve carefully avoided saying what this job is.”

    He admits he has just started an entry level job at McDonalds. “Mmm.” She grunts, displeased but not surprised. 

    “I bought you a present,” he tells her while rooting around in his bag. He hands her a framed photograph of himself with his arms around a very pregnant young woman. “It was all Josie’s idea, really.” Michèle tells him he looks very handsome and then hands back the frame. He places it on the end table. “Josie has all kinds of ideas about decorating.” 

    “How much money do you want for the apartment?” she asks, abruptly. 

    “I didn’t ask for money.” 

    “Noooo, it was just me hearing voices.” 

    “I planned to ask you for collateral, not money.” 

    “And Josie’s boyfriends? Any of them moving in, too?” 

    Startled, he drops the bit of sushi clenched between his chopsticks onto his pants. “Shit! These were just cleaned!” 

    When she stands to retrieve a napkin from the cupboard, she moves the framed photograph that he has just given her behind a pair of candlesticks. 

    “That girl is clearly dysfunctional. You know nothing about her, except that she was raised in a commune of idiots who never bathe.” 

    “An arts collective!” 

    “Why you? What’s she after?” 

    “What could she be after? I have no money.” 

    “I do!” 

    “What’s with you today?” 

    She looks glumly at him while chewing. After he leaves she rifles through a drawer of tools and finds a small hammer. That night she holds it beside her on the pillow while she sleeps.

    For the entirety of their respective films, each of these women torment viewers with their perplexing behavior. In Violette Noziere, after it has been discovered that she poisoned both her parents, a judge says to her, “I am trying to understand.” And Violette replies, “There is nothing to understand.” Neither Michèle nor Nathalie do anything like poison their parents, but both respond unpredictably, maddeningly, to the things that happen to them. And if similarly probed, both Michèle and Nathalie would have responded just as Violette did: “there’s nothing to understand.” Understanding is emphatically not the point.

    Interviewers — who, like most of us, abhor ambiguity — routinely ask Huppert why her characters make the choices they make, assuming that an actor’s job is to furnish her characters with motivations. If pressed, Huppert insists that bafflement was precisely her objective. She is not being coy. Her acting is devoid of psychological causation. She doesn’t know why Violette poisoned her father and mother, or why Nathalie didn’t scream at her husband when he announced that he was leaving her for another woman, or why Michèle pursues a sexual relationship with her rapist. And Violette, Nathalie, and Michèle do not understand themselves any better than Huppert does. They are in this way exactly like ordinary human beings.

    Another subject about which Huppert is regularly asked is her “process,” since it is assumed that playing complex, emotionally taxing parts requires research, or preparatory rituals, or a litany of exercises. “Did you study the character’s profession?” “Did you read scholarly historical works about the period?” “Did you talk to the director about your character and did you together decide why she behaves as she does?” Huppert has been peppered with these and analogous questions in virtually every interview she has done since Violette Noziere. She has been explaining for just as long that these questions evince a total misunderstanding of how she approaches film. For one thing, her relationship with a director is the most essential element of every movie she makes: she picks her movies on the basis of who is directing them, and she never talks to the directors about her character. In fact, the two directors with whom she has enjoyed working most, Claude Chabrol and Paul Verhoeven, said nothing to her while she was in front of the camera. Their communication was all non-verbal:

    [Verhoeven and Chabrol] never said anything verbally. But there are different ways to communicate between a director and an actress. Cinema is a language in itself and it is certainly more powerful than anything that can be communicated verbally. I think there was direction but it was all about the mise en scène and the camera movements and camera frames and that language was strong enough and eloquent enough that we didn’t have to go through the usual explanations. I think that all questions are indiscreet for a director and I expect a different kind of answer so it doesn’t bother me if Paul [or Claude] didn’t ever say a word to me.

    Enveloping herself in the mise-en-scéne of the role is entirely how she readies for it. “I don’t do any research.” “There is no preparation.” “When you decide to do a role, something starts to grow within you.” 

    Once she has committed to do a part, Huppert’s process is “very technical,” by which she means it is tactile. Among the most important elements are wardrobe and hair and make-up. Costume envelopes her in this new person’s weather. They help Huppert to decide “how she’s going to move, how she’s going to walk,” and facilitate a kind of chemical reaction. She “clicks chemically,” and she does “it more by intuition than reflection.” This strange alchemy creates a new person, an admixture of Huppert and her character, which is among the reasons that Huppert always feels so startlingly present, so immediate, on screen. “[This is] the only way to make [the character] live, which is the ultimate goal. To make it close to life, to the truth, and the only way to be close to life is to impose yourself.” There is no mediation between her and the roles that she plays. No inner program, no “method,” comes between Huppert and her character. 

    It was determined at some moment in recent history that the swiftest way of communicating Isabelle Huppert’s prestige to American audiences was to christen her “the French Meryl Streep.” Insofar as both women command, in their respective countries, an almost religious reverence, the analogy is useful. It is also misleading: Streep’s and Huppert’s conceptions of acting are diametrically opposed. There is no more fruitful exercise for grasping the demands that Huppert makes of her audiences than to compare her approach to film acting with Streep’s. 

    In a documentary about the production of Kramer vs. Kramer that was released in 2001, twenty-two years after the movie it considers, Streep commented that “if there’s anything that runs through all my work, all my characters, it’s that I have a relationship with them where I feel I have to defend them.” (Is there a less Huppertian sentiment?) Joanna Kramer, the part which won Streep her first Oscar, was Streep’s personal cause from the moment that she auditioned for the role. She had read the novel on which the film was based to prepare for her audition — research! — and believed that in the book Joanna was presented as “an ogre, a princess, an ass.” When Dustin Hoffman asked Streep at her audition what she thought of the story, she hectored that they had gotten the character all wrong: “Her reasons for leaving Ted are too hazy. We should understand why she comes back for custody. When she gives up Billy in the final scene, it should be for the boy’s sake, not hers. Joanna isn’t a villain; she’s a reflection of a real struggle that women are going through across the country and the audiences should feel sympathy for her.” Huppert, of course, is totally uninterested in garnering sympathy from her audiences. She scoffs: “I don’t really bother with the idea that a character should be ‘sympathetic’; you know it’s not really my problem… It’s true that I believe in the power of cinema to make a character attractive [but] without being sentimental or without being too much explained.” Kramer vs. Kramer could not sustain such a character. It belongs to a different genre of film.

    The movie is based on a book whose author, Avery Corman, had written it for the stated purpose of rebutting the “toxic rhetoric” that feminists had been unleashing on men, whom he felt were collectively painted as “a whole bunch of bad guys.” Streep considered it her responsibility to give feminists a voice in a movie-length anti-feminist diatribe. She got her chance. During shooting one day, the director pulled her aside and asked if she would rewrite the speech that Joanna gives in the final court scene. This was the opportunity Streep had been hoping for: “I thought [Joanna] was a rat in a maze, you know she had no choice, sick people often don’t have a choice, and I thought she was mentally ill, depressed, out of control… I knew I had the chance at the end to come back and explain who this terribly imploded person was.” Without that speech, the whole movie would have been a meditation on Ted Kramer’s admirable development as a father. Joanna would barely have been in the movie at all, and viewers would have seen nothing of her as a mother. Feminism was on trial, and Streep took the stand to fight for it. This was acting as apologia, acting as politics.

    Huppert would never have done that. She would never have auditioned for the part in the first place. An anti-feminist diatribe is not a movie in the shape of a question, it is a movie in the shape of an exclamation point, and it belongs on a protest sign at a rally, not on a screen in a movie theater. Kramer vs. Kramer takes place in a universe in which every character is campaigning to be the good guy. Huppert could never vivify a character like that: 

    I never try to idealize a story or people. I like to show there is no clear border between the good and the bad… It’s by instinct it’s not a crusade. I’m not trying to defend anybody. It’s just that I like to see myself as the audience by which I mean I don’t like to be told lies. I never thought good feelings made good films, I can’t act any other way. It’s like a scorpion. A scorpion can do nothing but sting, and I can’t act any differently than I do it.

    It would be wrong to deduce that Huppert gives less of herself to her characters than Streep does. On the contrary, Huppert throws herself entirely into every breath that her characters take. Every gesture and every sigh is charged, but none are justified. If you grabbed her character by the shoulders in the middle of the movie, shook her and demanded that she explain herself, she would not be able to oblige with explanations. She would not understand herself well enough to do so.

    And isn’t that how life is actually lived? “There is nothing to understand.” Logic is not an operating principle for the vast majority of the significant actions that human beings take. We have compulsions, and shames, and furies, and appetites, and we act on these things or we resist them. Those acts of surrender or resistance make up who we are. We are the records of what we do. Most of what is significant in human life is not intelligible, cannot be articulated through language or conceived of accurately in our own minds, and so cannot be lucidly grasped and then lucidly communicated. Actions can be accepted or reckoned with, or rejected, condemned, or argued with, but they cannot be thoroughly and satisfactorily understood. 

    This incomprehensibility is a deeply troubling aspect of human existence, and one that we arrange to ignore because to recognize it would be paralyzing. We will never give up the delicious delusion of our own transparency. We constantly ask ourselves why the people we love or the people in power or the people across the street do the things they do. We must believe that they have a reason, and we must believe that we can grasp it. We ask ourselves this question so often that it requires no articulation — and the cleverer we are, the better we get at formulating answers which provide us with partial comprehension. This can be more dangerous than total confusion, since it blocks from view the parts of life that defy reason. There is always more to a person than can be rationally grasped. Huppert knows this, she regularly demonstrates it, and she forces audiences to reckon with it. This is why she is terrifying, and why we are drawn to her and repulsed by her. It is this quality which makes our skin crawl. 

    Trying to convey the fullness of life through language is like kissing instead of loving — something is exchanged but not remotely the desired good. Belief in the incommunicability of certain kinds of knowledge, belief in the existence of knowledge that cannot be commensurate with language, and comfort with those beliefs — all this carries us to the edge of mysticism. Bertrand Russell claimed that Wittgenstein was a mystic because he was happy to discover that there was knowledge that fell outside of language’s purview. In his later introduction to the English translation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Russell wrote of its author: “totalities concerning which [he] holds that it is impossible to speak logically are nevertheless thought by him to exist, and are the subject-matter of his mysticism.” Among those totalities are good and evil, which in Wittgenstein’s view subsisted outside the realm of language. “If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language.” 

    Suspicion of the power of language is destabilizing, and Huppert is destabilizing in precisely this way. Society, and all the artifices and etiquettes which regulate it, cannot survive this suspicion. A white-knuckled faith in the capacity to express all essential thoughts out loud in words is predicated on the belief that there is no essential knowledge which defies the capability of words. I do not see how such a faith can survive even a little experience in the world. Yet without it we are crippled by fear. This fear propels us to construct fictional universes in which everything of any importance can be verbalized. But “good” and “evil,” squeezed into those four-letter words and safely separated by a coordinating conjunction, are not like this. Most treatments of those concepts defang rather than reckon with them. Huppert has those fangs, and she bites us with them. Look her dead in the eye and invite her violence.

    The Rise of Narrative and The Fall of Persuasion

    I

    “We tell ourselves stories in order to live.” This must be the most overly admired sentence by the most overly admired writer of our time. It is the renowned opening of Joan Didion’s essay “The White Album,” a canonical document of high-end alienation, and it long ago achieved fortune-cookie status. Didion was making the unsophisticated point that we abhor incoherence and so we attempt to defeat it by ordering it with interpretation. “We interpret what we see.” Yes, yes. “We live entirely, especially if we are writers, by the imposition of a narrative line upon disparate images, by the ‘ideas’ with which we have learned to freeze the shifting phantasmagoria which is our actual experience.” We certainly do, though this is still a long way from an interesting view of knowledge. 

    The problem, of course, is that the phantasmagoria keeps shifting. No sooner has Didion stabilized the mental situation than incoherence again rears its ugly head. It turns out that stories may not settle the matter. “I am talking here about a time when I began to doubt the premises of all the stories I had ever told myself, a common condition but one I found troubling. I suppose this period began around 1966 and ended around 1971.” There follows her account, so adamantly cool as to be overheated, of the grand convulsions of the 1960s, which in her telling turns out to have been a lot of fun: she is in a recording studio with the Doors (“Manzarek ate a hard-boiled egg”), she hangs out with Eldridge Cleaver, she shops at I. Magnin for the dress (“Size 9 Petite”) that Linda Kasabian will wear at her trial for the murder of Sharon Tate and the others at the house on Cielo Drive owned by Roman Polanski (“[he] and I are godparents to the same child”). She also goes to Hawaii a lot. Didion finds no meaning in any of this, only a vast disorientation, a senseless crack-up. “I believe this to be an authentically senseless chain of correspondences, but in the jingle-jangle morning of that summer it made as much sense as anything else did.” Hers are stories unlike other stories, because they are “stories without narrative.”

    But of course there is a narrative — “a script” — in Didion’s annals of her adventures, which she, like all narrators, has composed according to a principle of selection, a criterion of significance, from among all the incidents of her life in that period. It is the conventional narrative, of which she was one of the primary authors, that the 1960s were history’s epic pivot, that nothing since has ever been the same or will ever again be what it seems to be, that there never were phantasmagoria like those phantasmagoria, that the participants in those convulsions (and certainly their chroniclers) were aristocrats of consciousness, that the highest status is insiderhood and the chief arena of significance is the scene, that Dionysus is an American, that reason is for squares, that it is too late for liberalism, that the entertainment industry stands in some relationship to questions of ultimate importance, that we are living in (and driving through, with the wind in our hair) the ruins of our civilization — the whole helter-skelter-gimme-shelter narrative of the second half of the twentieth century in America. This, too, is a story, an invented version, a constructed tale; it is the tale of breakdown and privilege that Didion peddled, with epicene austerity, in all her writing. She made incoherence chic. Her contribution to the culture of her time was not to warn it about the seductions of story — as per her famous adage, if indeed it is a warning — but to invent a new story for it, a story of storylessness. She was not alone in this enterprise, obviously: her story is an old story. The fracture and fragmentation of experience is one of the cliches of modern culture, the failure of traditional narrative to capture a reality that has allegedly outstripped our powers of understanding and representation. She, too, told herself a story, a calming and fortifying story, in order to live. She, too, could not suffice with what a Muslim thinker once called the incoherence of the incoherence. Maybe nobody can. 

    “We tell ourselves stories in order to live.” This is a practical view of narrative. We tell stories because we need them. We tell the ones that meet the need. Without them we could not stir, or in any way advance; we would be stranded in the inundation of random occurrences, in confusion and fear. And the stories that we tell about ourselves are ourselves; they create us, which is to say, we create us. The striking thing about this utilitarian view of narrative — and about the larger belief in the supremacy of narrative — is its indifference to the question of truth. Compare Didion’s sentence with another famous one: “We possess art lest we perish of the truth.” Nietzsche made that observation in 1888. It, too, is a practical recommendation, concerned more with the wounding psychological consequences of a perfect lucidity than with the actual substance of what we cannot bear to know. It is odd to hear Nietzsche speak of the truth, when it was he who gave the world “perspectivism” and degraded truth into an expression of power; but at least his formulation comes with the implication that it is indeed truth that may be too much for us, that truth is what we are evading when we accept the embroideries of narrative. We tell ourselves lies in order to live. Yet the alternative to truth that Nietzsche contemplates, the preference for a more pleasing and elevating standpoint, is not merely what used to be called, in Didion’s California, a “coping mechanism.” It is not a shelter for the weak but a value for the strong. He precedes his comment with this: “For a philosopher to say, ‘the good and the beautiful are one,’ is infamy; if he goes on to add, ‘also the true,’ one ought to thrash him. Truth is ugly.” This enlarges and ennobles Nietzsche’s point about the role of illusion in life. The mind in flight from truth is not seeking only to get by, to muddle through, to locate a haven, to get hip; it is ambitiously searching for a place in the heights — in beauty, which philosophically may be no less exalted than truth. As always, Nietzsche’s subject is how to live. But who can live merely to tell stories in order to live?

    The narrativization of reality, the takeover of public and private discourse by story, hardly needs to be demonstrated. Storytelling is now itself a flourishing profession, a respectable career, a revered occupation. Organizations and institutes have vice-presidents for storytelling; the Ancient Mariner is a consultant. The narratorial imperative reaches to the highest levels of power: one commentator on contemporary politics has called this “the Scheherazade strategy.” Reflecting on his first term in office, Barack Obama once remarked that “my biggest failure was not to tell a story,” adding that “the nature of this office is to tell a story to the American people that gives them a sense of unity and purpose and optimism.” In 2017, the People’s Daily in Beijing, praising Xi Jinping as “the master storyteller,” instructed its captive readers that “telling stories has been a common characteristic of celebrated statesmen and thinkers in China and beyond since ancient times, and it is a clear characteristic of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s leadership style.” (He hides his vivacity well.) Emmanuel Macron, who never tires of vividly recounting the past glories of France, was Paul Ricoeur’s assistant at Nanterre when the philosopher was writing Memory, History, Forgetting, one of his grand defenses of narrative. 

    It is story time in the gardens of the West. What these days is not a story? We translate everything into narrative. I once heard a lecturer in philosophy teach his students “the story that Kant tells about reason.” (Once upon a time, there was a manifold of perception…) I have my story, you have your story, we have our story — which is to say, we now regard the entirety of a life and the entirety of a society as a tale, though we may differ about the plot. In politics, a candidate must have a story; in business, a company and a product must have a story; in law, a lawyer and a client and a judge must have a story, until the “narrative turn” in the legal academy became so overwhelming that the study of law and literature became the study of law as literature. Perhaps as a recoil from quantitative social-scientific historiography, from the “cliometricians,” or perhaps out of a more fundamental sense of inadequacy owed to what Henry James described in The Sense of the Past, his last and unfinished novel, as a desire for “evidence of a sort for which there had never been documents enough or for which documents mainly, however multiplied, would never be enough,” the writing of history in our time has become increasingly a summons to the campfire, stories about the powerful and stories about the powerless, riots of color and charm, lively yarns about exemplary lives to serve as prooftexts for sermons about the way we live now, so that the satisfactions of reading history approach the satisfactions of reading fiction or journalism. (If journalism is the first draft of history, history sometimes seems like the second or third draft of journalism.) In journalism, the warm anecdote has replaced the cold fact in setting the tone for reportage, as even breaking news opens in the style that used to be called “feature writing.” (“Jesus, 31, a wandering Galilean with soft eyes and a hard sense of purpose, could no longer stand the incessant clanging of the coins. He had walked this street many times before, but this time the large polished stones that formed the avenue outside the Temple felt different. He was a long way from the verdant banks of the harp-shaped lake in the north on whose peaceful waters he had recently strolled. Romans were everywhere.”) War reporting has yielded substantially to war stories, which have the laudable effect of humanizing the faraway ordeals but do not leave the reader with a strategic or historical grasp of the conflicts. In medicine, cancer now has a “biography” and the gene has an “intimate history” and the cell has a “song”; all of these informative entertainments are the result of the enormous influence of the twinkling Oliver Sacks, who turned case studies into bewitching fables and made medicine safe for Robin Williams. How many readers of these romps through science can judge the methods and the findings that they deftly relate? But the American public likes to be put to bed with a story. 

    Twenty years ago Jerome Bruner, who had previously written an influential essay on “the narrative construction of reality,” began a book called Making Stories this way: “Do we need another book about narrative, about stories, what they are and how they are used? We are so adept at narrative that it seems almost as natural as language itself. Our lives with stories start early and go on ceaselessly: no wonder we know how to deal with them. Do we really need a book about as anything as obvious as narrative?” And then he proceeded to deliver a thoughtful one. But the obvious, of course, can be the most recondite subject of all. Whether or not storytelling, or some kind of fonction fabulatrice, is one of our evolutionary traits, whether or not we are in our essence what has been called homo narrans, it is past time to point out that there are many ways to organize knowledge and to describe feelings, and that narrative is only one of them. However natural the impulse to narration seems, it needs to be de-naturalized, so that we may discover the particular distortions that it, like all arrangements of human experience, manifestly or latently conveys. What follows is a brief catalog of those distortions, or some of them, so as to suggest what may be the highest price that we are now paying for our addiction to stories.

    The great challenge of the rush of experience is to make order out of it, to find some way to bring its endless welter under mental control by giving it form. Our lives are shapeless until we decide to do something about it. The most common method of unifying the bedlam of sensations and relations and occasions is to translate it into narrative. For every life many narratives are possible — many lines can be run through it, and many threads; we choose the one that we prefer, usually on unexamined grounds, and we give it our names. Some professors call this “self-fashioning.” The stories that we choose need not be simple, but they must be intelligible. They need not be linear, but they must show a pattern, and the pattern must show movement. The storification of a life, or of anything, is an account of how it went from here to there. Storytelling, by means of memory or imagination, is a shaping exercise. For this reason it leaves us confident and even consoled. (The wise Frank Kermode used to speak of “the consoling plot.”)

    But how many years does one have to live before one recognizes the specious nature of this confidence, and of the clarity upon which it purports to be based? Every shaping exercise is an editing exercise; stories are created by what they leave out as much as by what they leave in. (In some instances the omissions can be responsible for cruelty, symbolic or real, toward the excluded.) There is no such thing as the whole story, or the story of the whole; there are only the products of selectivity. The transparency about experience to which stories aspire is a deceiving ideal. Unlike stories, experience does not possess a beginning, a middle, and end, except of course the end that abruptly terminates it all; and many religious traditions have been spun to make the end of endings, the final ending, itself into an episode in a narrative, posthumously within reach of coherence and continuity. The notion of the immortality of the soul represents a spectacularly stubborn commitment to narrative form. 

    Moreover, the temporal structure that a story imposes upon experience can interfere with, well, the experience of experience. The forward propulsion of narrative, its controlling structure, does not adequately capture the way moments and hours and days are actually lived. If verisimilitude of some kind is the aim of narrative representation, we should beware the total erasure of the commonplace chaos. A story is an exchange of the here and the now with the there and the then. It is a displacement, a means of transport; it abolishes time and place to create another time and another place; and it traps the present between the past and the future, and encourages us to regard the present developmentally, historically, as a stage and a station. In this way it flattens and diminishes the present even as it sets it within a framework of meaning.

    But historical meaning is hardly the only meaning there is. The present deserves to be protected against the hastenings of narrativity. It may be ephemeral, but it may be beautiful. Precisely because it will soon slip away and become the past, the present should be lingered in, prepared for, relished, cultivated. It is the most vulnerable temporal mode of all, not least to contemporary busyness, to the frantic blur of our efficient existences, which were conceived in part to save us from the sensual and spiritual challenges of a particular moment in a particular setting, of finding what we seek where we happen to be found. Pleasure, for instance, happens only in the present. For the way we live now, however, there may be nothing more impossible than a non-utilitarian and non-historical understanding of the immediate. 

    And who believes, really, that we heroically fashion ourselves? Indeed, there is something positively unheroic about identity. Surely it is more plausible to think of the self as an inflection of its givens, a revision of its inheritances. The inflection may be radical and the revision may be heterodox; but much can be accomplished without the silly conceit of self-creation. We do not begin in emptiness, though if we are not careful we may end in it. The eighteenth-century English poet erred: we are never, at any moment in our lives, wholly originals or wholly copies. I am always more than the story I tell about myself, and always less. The story that I tell you about me may be a fabrication; I may be posing as me, not least for the rewards of the tale. No man is the final authority on himself. And no man is an inevitability. The élan of narrative, the assurance of the storytelling spirit, confers an impression of inexorability upon what it recounts, which is one of the reasons that children like to hear the same story over and over. They enjoy the foreknowledge, the ceremonial disappearance of uncertainty. But adults, too, are not immune to the thrills of teleology. The appeal of both religion and science is owed in part to their power to make contingent lives feel like inevitable outcomes, and thereby liberate people from accountability for their fates; and both religion and science, which have ideas at their core, are received by most people as stories. 

    Storytelling is designed to inculcate certain responses, certain mental stances, in the listener. They are passivity, credulity, and wonder. All of them are stances of surrender. A storyteller desires nothing so much as a rapt audience upon whom a spell may be cast; there is an element of mesmerism at work in narrative. “You could hear a pin drop.” I have always been partial to that impudent pin. Wonder is an easily cheapened emotion; it is often the consequence of manipulation. In our time the greatest exponent of narrative and its magic is Salman Rushdie, whose novels have become so saturated in exotic conjurings that in other hands they would be decried as Orientalism. He refers to stories as “wonder tales.” He sees in them nothing less than a mark of our species: “We were born wanting food, shelter, love, song, and story.” It is a somewhat arbitrary list, but his point is that “man alone is the storytelling animal.” Never mind that there are also other pursuits and activities that are characteristic only of humans. About the universality of story there can be no doubt. Rushdie supplies a definition: “Story is the unnatural means [even if this is our very nature?] we use to talk about human life, our way of reaching the truth by making things up.” I will return to the question of the relation of story to truth. Rushdie adds that “fantasy is not whimsy” and that “the fantastic is neither innocent nor escapist.” But that is hardly the rule. Three cheers for whimsy! I am reminded of Walter Benjamin’s remark that “anyone who has never been bored cannot be a storyteller.” 

    Rushdie writes in praise of fairy tales and folk tales and myths, many of which certainly are repositories of wisdom and ingenious pedagogical tools, though this begs the question of how pertinent the message is to the form and its enjoyment. The justification of narrative should not be achieved by transforming stories into parables, by making them into allegories of “truth.” Rushdie argues ardently for narrativity in part because it “is pretty much out of fashion these days,” since “we live in an age of non-fiction.” Clearly we see the cultural situation differently. He defends fabulism under the impact of his deep love for the stories of his childhood, which arouses in me an old suspicion that wonder tales are a technique of infantilization.

    This set me to pondering the stories of my own childhood. I was not raised upon the infinite richness of the South Asian storybook, of course; nor did I grow up with Hans Christian Anderson or the Brothers Grimm. I never even read The Phantom Tollbooth. The wonder tales of my youth were the stories of the Hebrew Bible, except that we were emphatically discouraged from regarding them as stories. The record of God’s words and the words of His prophets was not a storybook; it was a revelation of the truth. There was nothing playful about hearing it or reading it. Still, owing in large measure to the endless narratological imagination of the ancient rabbis, for whom the scriptural tales were exasperatingly elliptical and could not sate their appetite for the sacred past, we had many stories. I remember warmly, for example, the legend of Ashmedai. He was the lord of the demons. When King Solomon was building the Temple, he needed to find a rare insect (or bird) called the shamir in order to cut stones from the local quarry, since the Torah had explicitly prohibited the use of iron tools in the creation of the altar in the Tabernacle. The shamir had the strange power of splitting stone, and only Ashmedai knew where the shamir was. The king dispatched his chief warrior to capture the demon, and equipped him for the quest with a ring inscribed with God’s true name. The warrior cleverly succeeded in his difficult mission and after a rather colorful journey brought Ashmedai to Solomon. Ashmedai divulged the location of the shamir, and it hewed and split the stones, and the Temple was built — but Solomon made the mistake of imprisoning the demon, who tricked him, the wisest king who ever lived, and contrived to take his place on the throne. Ashmedai sent Solomon into exile, where he wandered for three years in humble poverty and learned many lessons. (Those episodes now put me in mind of the jataka stories.) Eventually the king returned and routed the evil pretender, though the sight of the wrathful and defeated demon so terrified him that he never again slept a night without a company of guards. 

    As a boy I kindled to all the extravagant details of the story. I even grasped the moral in some of its moments. When I grew up, I learned that scholars call the demon Asmodeus, and that the main contours of the tale are in the apocrypha and the Babylonian Talmud, and that the tale was marvelously embellished in many ancient and medieval sources. (In kabbalistic legend, Ashmedai was the spawn of a night that King David spent with the roof-dancing she-demon daughter of Lilith!) I also discovered that the study of the tale pleased me more than the memory of the tale. I lost interest in child-like wonder because I am no longer a child. Adult wonder is another matter, to be sure, but it is as scarce as the shamir, and generally it has not been given to me, when it has been given to me, by stories. The ethos of storytelling prides itself on its primordiality: it harks back to earlier and therefore more authentic times — indeed, as Walter Benjamin put it in one of his many tributes to narrativity, it restores us to “the absolute power of the authentic.” There is something brazenly anti-modern and pre-modern about the enterprise, a magical extension of the oral tradition, of the romance of the archaic. “Experience that is passed from one mouth to the next is the source from which all storytellers have drawn,” Benjamin writes ruefully. I say ruefully, because he is certain that “the art of storytelling is dying out.” It has been usurped by the novel — “the demise of storytelling in the rise of the novel” — in which narrative is mercilessly trapped inside a book. 

    Storytelling has also been overthrown by a “new form of communication,” which Benjamin presciently calls “information.” Information, he writes, “is valuable only for the moment in which it is new,” whereas a story “does not use itself up.” That is a very timely distinction. All this is in keeping with Benjamin’s larger theory of the depletion of experience by modern capitalism, and also with the anti-bourgeois hunger of his Weimar generation for atavistic, non-rational, subterranean energies. A book, in his view, is not an experience, though he certainly lived as if it is. (His anger about the destruction of story leads him to cite Paul Valery’s defense of patience and craft in his exquisite little essay “The Embroidery of Marie Monnier,” a text that should be required reading now.) It is hard not to sympathize with Benjamin’s scorn for the accelerations of modern life, even when it issues in philistine pronouncements such as this one: “We have even managed to abbreviate stories. We have witnessed the development of the ‘short story,’ which has withdrawn from the oral tradition and no longer allows for that slow accumulation of thin, translucent layers which offers the most fitting image of the process in which the perfect story is revealed through the stratification of numerous retellings.”

    There is, then, an anti-intellectual temper in the cult of story. Scheherazade is not particularly interested in explanation; credulity and wonder are not the states of mind most conducive to thought. The specificity of an event, which is the storyteller’s strength, the savor of the particulars, defeats the generalizing impulse about human behavior that is the beginning of philosophical and historical reflection. A narrated sequence of events gives an impression of causality where causality has been invented, not confirmed: that is a part of its magic, of its storiness. The charm, or the fascination, or the horror, of a story lies in the subsequence and the succession of its incidents. Every story is definitive, but only for itself. Benjamin praises Leskov’s stories for “the chaste brevity that eludes psychological analysis,” so that even opacity of character counts as a virtue. The more folkloric, the better. 

    The advocates of storytelling always champion its relationship to wisdom, but wisdom is not the same as understanding, or explanation, or critical inquiry. Perhaps this is what Benjamin inadvertently reveals when he writes, “we know only how to moan and complain, not how to tell stories.” I am not suggesting, of course, that stories should be anything other than stories; only that their contribution to our comprehension of the world may be limited by their form. A story may be a world but it is never the world. And a story is not an analysis, just as you cannot tell a joke point by point. To be sure, the tyranny of analysis would be as partial and misleading as the tyranny of narrative, but we are not suffering from the tyranny of analysis. After all the paeans to the suspension of disbelief, it is time to say a few words on behalf of the suspension of belief. 

     

    II

    The aesthetic and emotional satisfactions of narrativity should not delude us into accepting its techniques as the most useful or illuminating method for the exposition and the resolution of the problems that we face. If we tell ourselves stories in order to live, we also challenge stories in order to live. It is wonderful, therefore, to discover the beginnings of a backlash to what Peter Brooks has denounced as “the mindless valorization of storytelling.” (His recent book, Seduced by Story: The Use and Abuse of Narrative, which meticulously exposes “the pervasive narrativism that dominates our culture,” is the best backlash of all.) Some of the dissents are old, such as Lawrence Stone’s castigation in 1979 of “the revival of narrative” in the writing of history. “The narration of a single incident or personality can make both good reading and good sense,” he observed. “But this will be so only if the stories do not merely tell a striking but fundamentally irrelevant detail of some dramatic episode of riot or rape, or the life of some eccentric rogue or villain or mystic, but are selected for the light they can throw upon certain aspects of a past culture.” There are realms, in other words, in which stories are not enough, in which they demand too little. There are questions that cannot be answered by a narrator, reliable or otherwise.

    In legal discourse, it may be that narrativity is inalienable: aren’t “fact patterns” stories? But in law, too, there have been dissenters. Martha Minow, who otherwise approves of narrativity as a method for advancing legal analysis, has some doubts. “Stories do not articulate principles likely to provide consistency in generalizations to guide future action,” she warns, and her warning is good not only for law. She rightly adds that “stories on their own offer little guidance for evaluating competing stories.” Should the criteria for such an evaluation be literary, then? But this is a narrative domain in which literary criteria are beside the point. 

    In law, the most formidable indictment of the limits of narrativity has been made, not surprisingly, by Catherine MacKinnon. Cautioning against the epistemological dead-end of Rashomon and its pile-up of versions, she asks: “Are all stories equal as long as they are stories?” She, too, is concerned about the deception that may be perpetrated by a calm recitation of a series of events: “Maybe only one thing did happen, just not the one we were told.” MacKinnon recognizes what we might call the humanistic advantage of stories — “the breath of human life animates stories as it never did facts”, and one of its effects is that “empathy is encouraged” — but there are inquiries (and not only legal ones) that require more than empathy, more than the sage recognition that everybody has their reasons.

    Most importantly, MacKinnon makes the stark and unsentimental point that stories are inadequate as instruments of justice. “The form itself is certainly no guarantee of a view from the outside or the bottom.” This goes against the grain of the present-day culture of justice-warrioring: a recent contribution to the progressive literature, for example, is entitled We Need New Stories. MacKinnon asserts that “storytelling as method originated in powerlessness and can bring a fear of power with it. Instead of telling power it is wrong, tell it a story.” More, “storytelling can be a strategy for survival when one dare not argue.” Anyway, “how do you counter the appeal of a story that power wants to believe? A story on the other side, of which there are many, has not been enough.”

    It may be that MacKinnon is too dismissive of the cultural basis for political change, but she is right that a story about politics or for politics must not be mistaken for politics itself. For MacKinnon, and here we come to the heart of the matter, the fatal weakness of narrative in the context of society and politics is that it may be false. “Lies are the ultimate risk of storytelling as method.” Such a worry is undergirded by MacKinnon’s splendid and militant belief in what has become perhaps the most contested idea of our time: that politics must be based on truth. Stories may have many winning qualities and still be rankly untrue. “Stories can be powerful, evocative, resonant, death-defyingly influential, yet cover up the most relevant possible facts.” (Consider this dictum from the unlamented Sean Spicer in the White House press room: “I think we can sometimes disagree with the facts but our intention is never to lie to you.”) The imagination may be necessary for a vision of justice, but there is nothing imaginary about injustice; and a vision of justice, which may be communicated unforgettably by stories, is not a remedy for injustice. 

    Rhetorically and methodologically, the antithesis of narrative is argument. I propose that the popularity of story in American life has something to do with the fact that we are living in a society that is beyond argument. I would even suggest that as the fortunes of narrative rise, the fortunes of argument fall. A society in flight from evidence and logic does well to seek shelter in the telling of tales. The proper methods of persuasion — reason and a skeptical examination of emotions — are too onerous for Americans now. An empiricist readiness for discovery, even the most rudimentary sort, is a bridge too far. The democratic torment that we commonly decry as “polarization” comes down to this: What do you do in a political order designed for persuasion when persuasion is no longer possible? 

    An open society is based upon the malleability of opinion, so that its members, when presented in good faith with information and argumentation that contradict what they believe, will change their beliefs; but behold, beliefs in America do not change. We are a republic of the unrevised and the unreconstructed. In the practice of politics, this petrification of belief has led to a conceptual innovation: the “persuadable,” the coveted voter whose mind is not yet made up or whose made-up mind is still hospitable to new “input.” There was a time, not too long ago, when the burning question for political strategists was whether to win with the base or the independents, whether to hunker down or reach out. But the prospects of reaching out are no longer very promising, and so the hunt is on for the unicorns that graze between the elephants and the donkeys, for the rare citizens in an environment of fevered partisanship who can still be convinced. Indeed, they may hold the honor of democracy in their hands. 

    But how to persuade the persuadable? Dare we reason? I fear not. I will give an example. At a pastoral summertime gathering of people with ideas and people with money to pay to hear the ideas, there recently appeared a representative of an admirable national organization that was created in the belief that “growing partisan animosity is the crisis of our time” and therefore convenes meetings of people who disagree with each other for the purpose of recovering a common sense of humanity. It is an unimpeachable objective; when people have asked me what to do about polarization, I have always advised them to go out and make a friend of someone whose views they despise. But I have a nagging feeling that these breakthroughs in goodwill will not solve the problem but only dodge it, and also abrade some of the toughness that is required for serious politics. When the representative of this organization addressed the gathering, she said: “If you actively want to get to truth, the thing you have to build is trust, and the way you build trust is not by getting stuck on the conversation about what’s true, but by making progress on the conversation about what’s meaningful.” I heard in her words a melancholy acknowledgement of the difficulty, and even the futility, of engaging in discussions about true and false and right and wrong. 

    As a practical matter, trust will certainly help, especially when it is founded on the realization that the apotheosis of trust occurs between people who are significantly different from one another. And yet I wondered whether this trust is not just a way of softening the blow of a contradiction that cannot be eliminated. One of the oldest techniques for treating the pain of contradiction is to stay away from the question of truth. And the preference for meaning over truth is really just the postponement of a reckoning, of the dreaded hour of verification. Listening to the good woman offer her approach to social harmony, and nodding in agreement that we should indeed wish “to get to truth,” I pondered whether you can fight the contempt for truth with the suspension of truth, however temporary and tactical. My hunch is that those eclectic and compassionate conversations will never get to the work of argument, that the friendships sweetly coaxed out of the reds and the blues will be based on the avoidance of the substance of genuinely momentous disagreements. (As Lyle Lovett sang, “Baby, I just judge the distance, not the words I hear.”) I was not surprised to learn, when I went to her group’s website, that the first rule of its convenings is to “emphasize storytelling.” 

    In politics, and in business too, the tension between story and belief goes almost unrecognized, and instead narrative is cheerfully included among the tools of persuasion. Here is a typical passage from one of the many books addressed to executives who are confronted with the problem of “convincing others when facts don’t seem to matter”: “All success, in life and in business, is based on the skill of persuasion. Put simply, you can have the best product, the best plan, the best policy, but if you’re not telling your story in a way that connects and resonates with your audience, none of that matters. You will not persuade people to choose your company or follow your lead.” It is all a question of narrative skill — an affair of rhetoric and theater. “What is more important,” our executive coach asks, “having a good story to tell or telling your story well?” She does not deny that quality is an important factor in making the sale, but she grimly points out that “the best product [does] not always win in the marketplace.” And so we must avail ourselves of the black arts of non-rational and not-factual influence. 

    But what kind of persuasion is accomplished by storytelling? I fear that many people confuse being moved with being convinced, and mistake susceptibility for a fair mind. Being moved, even by tragedy, is always welcome, especially by people who like to exercise their inwardness; but fictions, and tendentious depictions of human experience, can also be profoundly moving. The sophistry of emotional athleticism is no better than the sophistry of intellectual athleticism. I hope that you are shaken to your core by a visit to the Holocaust Museum, but I will not expect your visit to persuade you of my views about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The National Museum of African American History and Culture rattled me deeply, but I still do not concur that this country was founded in 1619. The stories in those institutions are overwhelming, but they are not the final word on their respective subjects or a sufficient foundation for political opinion and political consensus. Tears are not proofs. In the difficult task of distinguishing the true from the false, emotions should have no place, even if they will never be completely banished. One of the conditions of the mind’s work is that it resist the heart, at least if it seeks a conclusion that will be acceptable to people with different minds and different hearts. 

    The problem of other hearts is just as decisive for the achievement of social agreement as the problem of other minds. I cannot expect you to agree with me because of what is in my heart. If you do not feel what I feel, there is nothing I can do about it — and there is nothing you can do about it either, which is why, in a dialogue in which it is my intention to convert you to my opinion, I will not offer my emotions as a reason for you to accept my thoughts. And if your refusal to accept my opinion is based on your feelings, then I must lower my expectations of our encounter: my feelings cannot refute your feelings, just as my story cannot refute your story, and at some point the discussion of our difference of opinion must arrive at the harsh business of refutation, especially if our difference is a contradiction and both of us cannot be right. Attempting to change somebody’s mind by changing somebody’s heart is the definition of demagoguery. 

    The most urgent question for our riven politics is how to proceed from contradiction — more specifically, whether compromise can be extracted from contradiction without a loss of intellectual integrity or a betrayal of group solidarity. The road from contradiction to compromise is Madison’s road, the high road, the American road, and it is premised on the possibility of partial agreement, which is to say, on the possibility of mental flexibility. And here the problem becomes thornier. After all, “uncompromising” is also a term of praise. Compromise can denote weakness and infirmity. We sometimes admire mental inflexibility, since it signifies genuine conviction and strong belief. Shouldn’t we hold strong beliefs? They are certainly preferable to drifting between worldviews as between brands, and to acquiescing to ideas that are in vogue. There is dignity in partisanship. The real task, then, is to hold strong beliefs undogmatically.

    But how? Psychologists have for a long time recognized that — in the words of Lee Ross, Mark H. Hepper, and Michael Hubbard in 1975 — personal impressions and beliefs “become relatively autonomous from the evidence that created them.” They call this problem “impression perseverance” or “belief perseverance” — perseverance beyond the reach of reasons, which is one of the symptoms of the death of persuasion. More recently the taxonomy of bias developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky addressed the same perplexity. The classic study of this phenomenon appeared in 1956 in When Prophecy Fails, an almost cinematically riveting account by Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter of a small community of millenarians in the American Midwest whose expectation that the world would end on December 21, 1954 did not come to pass, but whose disappointment did not damage or alter their orientation. Their experience of “disconfirmation” had the opposite effect: they simply chose another eschaton. Their mental framework was irrefutable. They stuck to the story.

    The phenomenon of “disconfirmation” and the strategies of recovery from it is familiar to historians of religious and political messianism. One cannot base a faith on circumstances and keep it for long, since circumstances change. But one can keep a faith forever by insulating it from circumstances. There is nothing so wonderful as unfalsifiable encouragement. Like all victims of eschatological disappointment, the dejected adventists in Festinger’s, Riecken’s, and Schachter’s account resolved to secure against history their belief about history. These are the opening words of the book:

    A man with a conviction is a hard man to change. Tell him you disagree and he turns away. Show him facts or figures and he questions your sources. Appeal to logic and he fails to see your point.

    We have all experienced the futility of trying to change a strong conviction, especially if the convinced person has some investment in his belief. We are familiar with the variety of ingenious defenses with which people protect their convictions, managing to keep them unscathed through the most devastating attacks.

    But man’s resourcefulness goes beyond simply protecting a belief. Suppose an individual believes something with his whole heart; suppose further that he has a commitment to this belief, that he has taken irrevocable actions because of it; finally, suppose that he is presented with evidence, unequivocable and undeniable, that his belief is wrong: what will happen? The individual will frequently emerge, not only unshaken, but even more convinced of the truth of his beliefs than ever before. 

    Out of this mental predicament, this refusal to be permanently disconfirmed, Festinger developed the concept of cognitive dissonance, which he introduced a year later. Cognitive dissonance is the mental pressure caused by a discrepancy between one’s view of a situation and the situation itself. Insofar as this inner stress represents, at least in part, a concern for validation by the world beyond oneself, cognitive dissonance is a kind of tribute to the tenacity of the empirical attitude. It signifies that one has not been completely swallowed up by subjectivity, and that subjectivity has not been deemed to be adequate for establishing a sense of reality. 

    Cognitive dissonance, in other words, is the distressed state of awareness that precedes relief and reconciliation. What America needs now is a pandemic of cognitive dissonance. Everybody’s story is too satisfying; everybody’s view is too invulnerable. We need a season of wavering and wobbling, if we are to enjoy the rewards, and not just the costs, of strong conviction. As J.B.S. Haldane once said, “a little more thought and a little less belief.”

    There is a certain irony to the process of persuasion: one goes from being persuadable to being persuaded, and then from being persuaded to being unpersuadable. Once one is satisfied that something has been properly verified, one becomes mentally unavailable to further contributions to the subject. Out of the working of an open mind comes a closed mind. When one has been persuaded by evidence and by argument, dogmatism can seem rational. Yet we cannot be content with such a conclusion, and not only because dogmatism is the problem and not the solution. The process of persuasion does not usually work, alas, in a rational manner, as I have just described it. The unconvinced mind is not a vacant mind; it is already stocked with opinions which it asserts firmly even though it may not have justifications for them. The reasons for an opinion generally do not precede it. Contrary to rational procedure, they follow it. The American sense of reality is now marred by an overwhelming preponderance of opinions that are held in the absence of reasons. 

    Are we, then, to give up on reasons? Is narrative our best bet? I hope not, though there are grounds for gloom: the psychology of opinion-formation is not truth’s most reliable ally. Instead we should take a closer look at what it means to hold strong beliefs undogmatically. We might begin, for example, by adjusting our standards for certainty. They should be higher than doubt but lower than dogma. The purpose of such a mitigation is not only to avoid the intellectual and political pitfalls of the absolutist mentality; it is also to acknowledge that the supply of evidence and argument never dries up, so that perfect certainty is never warranted. As long as there is life, there is surprise. The quest for inductive knowledge, for learning from the phenomenal world, is never over, because conditions change and there are new things under the sun; and rational discussion is never over, because in such a discussion a rigorous and well-wrought intervention is forever welcome. (That is why we still debate with Aristotle but not with Ptolemy.) In the sealed world of perfect certainty there are always the escape hatches of empiricism and reason, however small or hard to locate they are.

    Intellectual honesty demands not only intellectual open-mindedness but also intellectual open-endedness, even when we are properly satisfied that we are on terrain sufficiently solid to allow us to proceed. Any belief that is thrown into crisis by the possibility that one day it may have to be revised is an overweening belief. This is true even of religious faith, if one cares about its intellectual integrity. Our politics, which is now a war between perfect certainties, must become a war between sufficient certainties; between strong believers, not true believers; and certainly not between reeds in the wind and the wind.

    Scholarship and the Future of Society

    Historians like to say that correlation is not the same as causation. But evidence of correlation is often the starting point for an inquiry into causation. Here is one such inquiry: How might the loss of humanistic thinking generally, and historical thinking specifically, be connected to the current dysfunction of American politics and to the erosion of America’s position in the world?

    In asking this question, I do not mean to suggest that the loss of humanistic and historical thinking is the only cause, or even most important one; clearly there are many causes. Some very important ones relate to form or structure, such as closed primaries and gerrymandering. But a quasi-mechanistic diagnosis of what ails the United States is inadequate. Something even more fundamental has gone wrong — a sickness of the soul, not just a sickness of the body. A sickness of the body calls for the sciences. A sickness of the soul calls for the humanities. The difficulty is that the humanities, as currently constituted, are in no position to provide a remedy, having themselves contributed to the illness in the first place.

    Properly understood, the scholarly humanities have both substantive and procedural commitments, which feed each other. The substantive commitment is that human beings are worth trying to understand in all their diversity and complexity. The procedural commitment is that there are certain rules, particularly concerning the use of evidence, that one must follow in attempting to understand human beings. These two commitments secure each other: we have rules to ensure that we are trying to understand people on their own terms, because it is so tempting to narcissistically impose our own humanity on others; and we see people in all their complexity because our rules encourage us to do so. The importance of rules is why the scholarly fields are called the scholarly disciplines, and not the scholarly do-whatever-you-wants.

    All the humanities enlarge our understanding of what it means to be human, but only the study of history does so by tethering that understanding to the largest store of facts (however they are interpreted) about real human behavior that we have, which is the past. This axiomatic realism is what distinguishes history from literature. While the other humanistic disciplines cultivate similar qualities of empathy and imagination, only the study of history subjects those qualities to the procedural requirements governing the interpretation of historical evidence. Unlike writers and poets and painters, historians must answer to those requirements: they are obliged to refrain from cherry-picking or inventing evidence, to consider alternative explanations, to test their hypotheses, and so forth, not only for the sake of intellectual rigor but also because we study real people, with no more or less human dignity than we ourselves possess.

    The complex interplay between the study of human beings who lived in the past and the rules governing that study are essential to the formation of a humane sense of self — one bounded by, and bounding, a sense of other selves. The historian and philosopher R. G. Collingwood called this interplay “re-enactment” and saw it as fundamental to self-knowledge and to the knowledge of others. From his perspective, re-enactment involves a delicate balancing act between self-surrender and self-assertion, passivity and activity, altruism and narcissism. On the one hand, it requires trying to set one’s own ego aside in order to see the world through someone else’s eyes. On the other hand, the only way to translate, or make sense of, someone else’s life experience is in the context of one’s own. This attempt at sense-making is active, not passive: the historian re-enacting another’s knowledge “criticizes it, forms his own judgement of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern in it.” Hence, Collingwood reasoned, “it may thus be said that historical inquiry reveals to the historian the powers of his own mind.” Since people can gain these forms of self-knowledge and knowledge of others only through the historical method, it is as vital in the present as it is for the past: “If it is by historical thinking that we re-think and so rediscover the thought of Hammurabi or Solon, it is in the same way that we discover the thought of a friend who writes us a letter, or a stranger who crosses the street.” People who cannot think historically, in other words, are cut off from their own humanity and that of others, cut off from Milton’s “human face divine.”

    Much as historical thinking nurtures inter-subjective humility, so it nurtures inter-generational humility. If “re-enactment” of another’s experiences is how we establish our sense of self in space, then it is also how we establish our sense of self in time. The historian William Appleman Williams beautifully connected the methods of the historical discipline to its inter-generational substance:

    The method of history is neither to by-pass and dismiss nor to pick and choose according to preconceived notions; rather it is a study of the past so that we can come back into our own time of troubles having shared with the men of the past their dilemmas, having learned from the experiences, having been buoyed up by their courage and creativeness and sobered by their shortsightedness and failures. We shall then be better equipped to redefine our own dilemmas and problems as opportunities and possibilities and to proceed with positive rather than negative programs and policies. This enrichment and improvement through research and reflection is the essence of being human, and it is the heart of the historical method.

    Practicing the historical method cultivates, or ought to cultivate, a humble sense of our own temporal finitude, and along with it a sense of inter-generational stewardship. In effect, it extends the golden rule through time: do unto past generations as you would like future generations to do unto you. By treating past generations as subjects to be understood, rather than as objects to be manipulated for contemporary advantage, the present generation stakes its moral claim to be treated with the same respect by future generations.

    Indeed, one way to convey the social, cultural, and political stakes of the scholarly humanities is to say that they secularize the moral and epistemological dilemma at the heart of the Christian doctrine of original sin. The dilemma consists of being unable to have knowledge — of self and of goodness — without disunion from God and each other, and of being unable to be self-knowing and good without union with God and each other. This is the great theme of Genesis and of its finest exegesis, Milton’s Paradise Lost. Until Adam and Eve eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, they live in perfect union with God and with each other, and their bliss is ignorance. God himself creates the possibility of disunity by giving them free will, because He understands that unity without freedom lacks faith and goodness (“Not free, what proof could they have giv’n sincere / of true allegiance, constant faith or love, / Where only what they needs must do, appeared, / Not what they would?”). Total unity is, in a sense, totalitarian. Adam’s and Eve’s decision to eat from the tree constitutes the first act of human freedom and the origins of knowledge — of good as different from evil, of humanity as different from God, of human beings as different from each other. In Paradise Lost, it also constitutes the beginning of history, which will end at the time of the Second Coming, when Milton’s God (as in 1 Corinthians 15:28) will once again be “All in All” — a state of perfect unity.

    During this period of history, humankind exists in a state of epistemological and moral dilemma. We cannot know ourselves without having a sense of otherness, but a sense of otherness easily transmutes into a sense of self-inadequacy (self-abnegation) or justifies a sense of self-superiority (narcissism). As Reinhold Niebuhr put it,

    Self-consciousness means the recognition of finiteness within infinity. The mind recognizes the ego as an insignificant point amidst the immensities of the world. In all vital self-consciousness there is a note of protest against this finiteness. It may express itself in religion by the desire to be absorbed in infinitude. On the secular level it expresses itself in man’s effort to universalize himself and give his life a significance beyond himself. The root of imperialism is therefore in all self-consciousness. 

    Here is expressed the basic dilemma of historical re-enactment identified by Collingwood. Historians can enlarge their self-knowledge only by acquiring knowledge of others. But that attempt to understand others easily transmutes into a loss of sense of self, whereby one becomes subsumed into the infinitude of evidence (and never publishes), or into a tyrannical sense of self, whereby one imposes one’s own selfhood on others (by cherry-picking evidence in support of one’s preferred thesis). The same dilemma exists across time as well as space. Historians can become so absorbed in the past that they cannot translate it to the present (antiquarianism), or they can become so dominated by the present that they refuse to try to understand the past on its own terms (presentism). Historical re-enactment is thus a constant toggling between what Martin Buber called “I-thou” relationships and “I-it” relationships, between empathizing with others as subjects through unity with their consciousness and studying them as objects through disunity with their consciousness.

    By accustoming people to live with this dilemma, the scholarly humanities tend to inoculate against humanity’s worst scourges: the perennial false promise of ideological absolutism, and the distinctively modern false promise of technocratic optimization. Both of these are forms of anti-politics, to borrow David Bell’s term in these pages, pretending to offer an escape from the world of dilemma, which is to say from the world of liberal-democratic politics — the world of compromise, of messiness, of choosing between bad and worse options rather than between good and bad options. Like Christian humanism, secular humanism teaches that the acceptance of dilemma is humane, while attempts to escape it lead to gross inhumanity. The similarities go farther still. Both Christian and secular humanism seek goodness rather than perfection, because both understand that perfection belongs to an inhuman realm, and thus that any human quest for perfection is hubristic. Both are anti-utopian. Both have a sense of limits, especially of self-limitation, as an ethical imperative, so as to honor the humanity of others and acknowledge the imperfections of one’s own. Both accept the impossibility of fully straightening out humankind’s crooked timber; both see that attempts to do so must lead to great evil. Both have a conservative streak, which does not prevent them from pursuing progress but does make them sensitive to its imperfections and downsides.

    Both also involve living with doubt about how well or badly one is doing as measured against a sense of the absolute, which is how Niebuhr defined religion. In Christianity, the absolute is God; in the scholarly humanities, the absolute is what Donne called “that library where every book shall lie open to one another.” For Donne, God, and only God, was the perfect scholar, whose hand was capable of translating the chapters of human life into a better language and re-binding the leaves that scattered with original sin. But Donne encouraged the pursuit of scholarship by heeding the message of the tolling bell, which calls us to read as many chapters of humanity as we can in our fallen state. Partial failure is guaranteed. Thus scholars who hear the tolling bell feel both a sense of the absolute and a sense of doubt about their proximity to it.

    Humanistic proceduralism, the imperative of method, which has the moral force of the biblical commandments, exists to calibrate scholars’ doubt. On the one hand, following procedure gives scholars confidence in the integrity of their work. On the other hand, following procedure prevents this confidence from transmuting into arrogance, a false belief in the definitiveness of their work. Procedure forces humanists to slow down, to be attentive to the complexity of evidence that narcissists, imperialists, and tyrants try to over-simplify. Scholars submit to the discipline of procedure, even — especially — when they would rather rush into print, in order to ensure that they treat their subjects as real people to be understood and explained, not as abstract projections of their own egos to be praised or blamed.

    This scholarly practice is also a political one. Understanding its politics is critical to defending liberalism against its opponents.

    The most common scholarly analogy for liberalism is science, and understandably, given that its historical instantiations have tended to believe in the scientistic trinity of rationalism, technology, and progress. In its scientific mode, liberalism is apt to be experienced as cold, lonely, and alienating. It lacks a sense of connection to other human beings as thinking, feeling creatures. But liberalism also has a humanistic mode, which cultivates empathy where scientific liberalism does not. Empathy need not lead to feelings of warmth — it can lead to revulsion, as indeed it sometimes should — but it is a precondition for friendship and love. How can any human union — marital, national, or otherwise — survive without friendship and love, without re-enacting at human scale what the religious mind understands as the communion between God and man?

    The strongest humanistic scholarship supplies the strongest possible basis for mutual understanding, and therefore for the strongest secular unions. Those bonds are humanistic bonds. In a wonderful essay in these pages, Michael Ignatieff correctly observed that rigorous scholarship, whether humanistic or scientific, has an “intransigently solitary” quality that places it “in radical contradiction” with “the ethos that liberal democracy encourages — civility, deliberation, compromise.” But as he himself notes, rigorous scholarship also “demands a difficult kind of honesty, a willingness to concede defeat when the evidence is against you, and enough resilience to resume the search for the answer that still eludes you.” Given that “the evidence” in the humanities consists of other human beings, scholarship has a profoundly social as well as solitary (or anti-social) quality. The willingness to concede when the human evidence gathered by the scholarly process fails to provide the outcome one wants — this is the essence of liberal democracy. If following the rules doesn’t get you the result you want, you don’t get to change the rules.

    Like liberal democracy, humanism, whether religious or scholarly, balances rights and obligations, self-assertion and self-restraint. The “post-liberals” on the right today err by reducing liberalism to the former and ignoring the latter. Liberalism evolved its balance of rights and restraints in reaction against the violence caused by political and religious absolutism. Liberalism diagnosed this violence as stemming, in a sense, from narcissism — from the monarchical or religious ego run imperialistically amok, as concerned with its own rights as it was unconcerned with anyone else’s. Liberalism did not oppose religion per se — if it did, it would not protect religious liberty alongside other liberties — but rather a particular kind of religiosity, one whose anti-humanism and inhumaneness made its earthly as well as heavenly ambitions totalitarian. Liberalism’s conceptualization of the rights-bearing individual as the proper locus of political order was indeed a major innovation, but so, too, was its insight that nothing, not even religion or kingship, licensed the abrogation of individual rights. All people, religious or otherwise, however convinced of their own righteousness, were obliged to limit the pursuit of their own perceived rights within the bounds of non-conflict with others’ rights.

    Liberalism thus evolved as an antidote to authoritarian libertinism, not as a license to it, contra the post-liberals. Its innovation of the rights-bearing individual was necessarily accompanied by the innovation of the obligations-bearing individual. The bearer is individual, but the obligations are communal. This dual innovation so closely mimics the logic of Christian humanism as to call into question whether it was any more an Enlightenment innovation, which is how some of its defenders as well as its opponents understand it, than a religious bequest. In effect, liberal democracy, like scholarly humanism, has the functional equivalent of the doctrine of original sin.

    This functionally religious logic helps to explain why liberal democracy attracts opposition not only from religious absolutists but also from neo-Nietzscheans, with whom the religionists sometimes make strange bedfellows. If liberal democracy had no restraints, if it were truly a system of libertinism and licentiousness, neo-Nietzscheans would have nothing to complain about. They could pursue meaning and authenticity however they wished; they could be supermen, and beyond good and evil. But liberal democracy does not permit them to do so. It demands that they, like everyone else, balance their self-assertion with their self-restraint.

    Historically, liberal conceptions of self-restraint have extended from the political to the sexual realm, and this extension helps to explain why the counter-reaction to liberalism so often focuses on gender and sexuality. A defining characteristic of the premier liberals of the nineteenth century, the Victorians, was their ethic of sexual self-restraint (which disappears in post-liberals’ account of liberalism as libertine). This ethic had a strong norm, however honored in the breach, against men having sex outside of marriage; it sought to domesticate testosterone, so to speak, and thus can be seen as feminizing. Unsurprisingly, some particularly trenchant critics of liberalism have been men — such as Nietzsche, Foucault, and Costin Alamariu (a.k.a. “Bronze Age Pervert,” a prominent thinker on the “new right”) — whose sexuality has not conformed to Victorian norms.

    These men, whose politics do not fall neatly on a left-right spectrum, take liberalism’s bourgeois sexual repressiveness as a metaphor for liberalism as a whole. For them, liberalism is simply a mask for power, one that in some profound sense alienates humanity from itself. The queer theory of Foucault’s disciples, the gay aestheticism of Diaghilev, and fascism’s “aestheticization of politics” (to borrow Modris Eksteins’ borrowing of Walter Benjamin) all owe an intellectual debt to this neo-Nietzschean tradition. Wokeness is the political project associated with the intellectual tradition of queer theory, a branch of critical theory; fascism is the political project associated with that of Nietzscheanism. Although the historical instantiation that dominates our image of fascism — Nazism — was deeply homophobic, fascism need not be; indeed the homo-sociality of the trench spirit that the Nazis sought to recreate, as well as the homo-eroticism of Nazi art, reflect the neo-Nietzschean influence. Fascism may be understood as a toxically masculine response to what fascists regard as the toxic femininity of liberalism.

    The point here is not that reading Foucault makes you woke or reading Nietzsche makes you a fascist, any more than reading Marx makes you a communist. The intellectual traditions of critical theory, Nietzscheanism, and Marxism are complex; reading in them can deepen and enrich one’s commitment to liberal democracy no less than overturn it. The political projects with which these traditions have historically been associated cannot be reduced to them.

    But that said, these traditions lend themselves to certain political projects. What unites woke queer theorists and fascist neo-Nietzscheans with post-liberal religious believers is a shared opposition to liberal-democratic humanism. Woke queer theorists don’t like that this tradition has restraints. Fascists and post-liberals don’t like that the restraints in this tradition operate against them. Gay fascists and post-liberals may split over the question of homosexuality, but they share an anti-feminism, rooted in their sense of liberalism as excessively feminized. All of these people — woke queer theorists, fascists, and post-liberals — have given up on working out norms around gender and sexuality, or around anything else, that comport with liberal-democratic humanism, as if decency lies elsewhere or nowhere at all.

    Viewing this formidable array of opponents to liberal-democratic humanism, you might think that the scholarly humanities, and especially historians, would rally to the defense of their finest traditions, demanding maximal procedural rigor in the pursuit of substantive excellence. You would, of course, be wrong.

    The scholarly humanities have momentously decided to join, rather than to try to beat, the forces arrayed against liberal-democratic humanism. As the rhetoric of war against internal enemies has suffused the new right, the humanities have declined to treat their allergy to the study of war and foolishly ceded military history and its larger implications to parochial clique. Instead of fighting under the sign of Clausewitz, whose understanding of war as the continuation of politics by other means expressed his profound humanism, they have chosen instead to fight under the sign of Foucault, whose inversion of the Clausewitzian dictum reflected his equally profound anti-humanism. The Foucauldian inversion — that politics is the continuation of war by other means — is an anti-politics. It replaces the argument, persuasion, negotiation, compromise, and tolerance at the heart of liberal-democratic politics with a brute struggle for power. It is as though ostensible humanists have decided to try to fight what they regard as fascism on fascism’s own terms. For people who see themselves as beleaguered resistance fighters, symmetrical warfare is a strange strategic choice — though a more rational one for those who occupy a strong position on the commanding heights of culture.

    Wokeness is the most remarked-upon result of this strategy, but it is much more symptom than disease. It could not have ravaged the body humanistic if it had encountered a stronger immune system, one with a greater commitment to scholarly process. Key tenets of wokeness, which draws on multiple branches of critical theory — including both queer theory and critical race theory — are inconsistent with each other and cannot withstand scrutiny. Race, for instance, which has virtually no biological basis, is radically essentialized (trans-racialism is therefore impossible), while gender, which has a stronger claim to a biological basis however mediated by culture, is radically de-essentialized (trans-genderism is therefore a matter of self-identification). But humanists either cannot see these inconsistencies or will not point them out. A collapse of humanistic standards and an epidemic of moral cowardice made wokeness in academia possible, not vice-versa — much as anti-humanism and moral cowardice in the Republican Party made Donald Trump possible. That collapse has deep roots.

    Like Trumpism, wokeness is not infrequently compared to a religious cult, and with reason — but if wokeness is a religion, then it is one with a distinctive understanding of the relationship between the human and the divine, of original sin, and of the place of doubt in faith. The Church of Wokeness has no notion of all human beings having been made in God’s image. There is no common humanity to hold us all together; there is only a relentlessly atomizing impulse to discover our own uniqueness, or the bulldozing of individuality by sub-group identities. Hence the Church of Wokeness does not understand original sin to afflict all human beings qua human beings, but only those belonging to particular groups. For those in the wrong identity groups, there is no hope of divine grace or of humanistic self-transcendence through inter-subjective understanding; there is only the purchase of indulgences from the high priests of DEI. Thus indoctrinated, members of the Church of Wokeness oscillate wildly between the two extremes that humanism navigates: on the one hand, absolute certainty in their own virtue; on the other hand, self-abnegating certainty in the impossibility of grace. If the Church of the Humanities had been stronger, it would have denounced the Church of Wokeness as a breakaway sect, but its own faith had grown so weak that it could not recognize the sectarianism.

    The historical profession has participated in, perhaps even led, the humanities’ turn away from the liberal-democratic politics of scholarly humanism. Its alternative politics can be understood as illiberal politics or as anti-politics, which are functionally similar. On the one hand, the historical profession today indulges in narcissistic, imperialistic presentism, replacing an “I-thou” relationship between the present and past with an “I-it” relationship. A good example of this tendency may be found in one of the statements by the American Historical Association (AHA), prompted by the controversy over the 1619 Project, in which the AHA declared that “knowledge of the past exists to serve the needs of the living.” On the other hand, the historical profession invokes its technocratic credentials to deny that it is behaving politically, while adopting a militaristic bunker mentality of being under attack by outside forces. The bunker mentality in turn justifies an ever greater reluctance to find enemies to the left and ever more intellectually dishonest recourse to the camouflage of technocracy. A good example of this tendency appeared in the previous sentence of the same AHA statement, which declared that “educators must provide an accurate view of the past” and that “professional educators,” not “elected officials,” should decide what constitutes accuracy. There is a certain tension, shall we say, between those two sentences.

    That tension points to the flaws in the prevailing understanding of the role of critical theory in the culture wars. Contra the right, critical theory is not the problem with wokeness, at least not in any straightforward way. In fact, the problem could just as easily be described as an absence of critical theory: people who reflexively invoke their disciplinary credentials (“follow the PhDs!”) to defend against attacks from populists are not people who take Foucault’s defense of subjugated knowledges as seriously as they claim. Indeed, the anti-Foucauldian behavior of the woke left in academia (and other sense-making institutions) is why so many on the right have turned to critical theory to attack wokeness. For instance, concepts put forward by thinkers on the new right — for instance, the “Cathedral” of Curtis Yarvin (a.k.a. Mencius Moldbug) and the “Iron Prison” of Alamariu, which describe a distributed set of disciplinary technocratic institutions — are Foucauldian to their core. Sometimes critics of wokeness on the right honestly acknowledge their debt to critical theory, like those White House advisors to Trump who, as Geoff Shullenberger has shown, did graduate work on the subject. At other times, these critics plagiarize, à la Ron DeSantis, denouncing critical theory even as they draw on its insights into the working of informal cultural, as distinct from formal political, power. The woke left does not call out this plagiarism, despite its crocodile tears over right-wing violations of scholarly standards, because the appearance of total polarity serves its interests no less than those of the MAGA movement. The fundamental problem with wokeness in academia is not that it is left-wing, but that it is anti-scholarly

    All the pathologies of the woke turn — or rather the anti-scholarly turn — in the humanities were on display in l’affaire James Sweet. To recap: in August 2022, Sweet, the president of the AHA and a historian of slavery, used his monthly column in the AHA’s newsletter to suggest, by way of analyzing contemporary public debates over the history of slavery, that the profession’s rampant presentism might not serve its long-term interests or honor its fiduciary obligations to the public. His energetic attempts to bend over backwards so as to avoid offending his woke colleagues made his column rather milquetoast but, predictably, his exaggerated sensitivities availed him not at all, and the usual mob reaction ensued. On “academic Twitter” (a contradiction in terms), he was accused of being racist, of hurting his black colleagues, and of carrying water for the right. Within forty-eight hours he issued an apology, which he insists did not constitute a retraction. (He smoked but he didn’t inhale.) Sweet’s sin, in the eyes of his critics, was that he had broken faith with wokeness. MAGA has its RINOs (Republican in Name Only); wokeness has its WINOs (Woke in Name Only). Religions don’t like heretics, but they hate apostates, who, unlike heretics, do not have the excuse of never having known any better. The Sweet affair demonstrated the inversion of the substantive and procedural commitments at the heart of historical study. Instead of a virtuous feedback loop between humanism and proceduralism, we now have a vicious feedback loop between anti-humanism and anti-proceduralism. The essential connection between method and tolerance has been erased. This degradation of the humanities is driven by the conviction that our issues today are so much more important than whatever happened in the past that we are justified in turning historical subjects into historical objects — making them playthings of whatever contemporary political, social, or other agenda we seek to advance.

    This behavior is professionally idiotic and civically tragic. When historians and humanists pooh-pooh their almost invariably left-wing violations of scholarly rules as misdemeanors compared to the felonies of the right, they betray a bizarre and unfounded lack of confidence in the importance of what they do. What is more important than educating the young? What is more important than safeguarding our generational right to be treated with respect by future generations? What is more important than preserving the treasures of the civilization that makes our livelihoods possible? What is more important than protecting the largest database of human behavior we have from cynical instrumentalization? Have we not read 1984?

    One of the crucial ingredients of tyranny in the present is control of historical knowledge — indeed, it is difficult to imagine a tyrant who lacks such control, lest the past afford politically threatening visions of how society should be more justly structured. From the tyrant’s perspective, the past is no less potent a rival power center than an opposition political party or an independent judiciary. Why did Stalin erase the victims of purges from photographs? Why does Putin claim that Ukraine has always been Russian? Tyrants weaponize the past in order to crush their opponents in the present. How unutterably self-defeating, how deep a betrayal of their civic duty, for historians to legitimize such weaponization by engaging in it themselves for their own preferred ends! It is an abuse of power. Like tyrants, we are insisting on a right to discipline others while refusing to discipline ourselves. Expertise is meaningless if it is not limited. If we do not respect the limits of our expertise, why should anyone respect our expertise?

    It cannot be a mere coincidence that as the historical profession has so largely given up on its commitment to scholarly humanism and scholarly proceduralism, so many Americans across the political spectrum have given up on civic humanism and liberal-democratic proceduralism.

    The rising tide of illiberalism on both the hard left and the hard right is characterized by an ends-justify-the-means mentality — a willingness to break the rules in order to secure the outcome they want. This is the political analogue of the narcissistic anti-proceduralism, the rejection of method in favor of ideology, in the historical profession. Just as it is incompatible with humanistic scholarship, so it is incompatible with liberal democracy, which is based on the proceduralist commitment that outcomes reached through procedural violations, however morally appealing their substance may be, are illegitimate.

    In liberal-democratic politics as in scholarship, the commitment to procedure has a moral basis. Essentially, it lifts the golden rule — do unto others as you would have them do unto you — to the level of a whole nation. Being enraged at someone is not a sufficient justification to strip them of their right to due process, any more than someone else being enraged at you is sufficient justification to strip you of your right to due process. The substantive moral commitment which grounds proceduralism, as it does the golden rule, is the belief in shared human dignity. That humanistic conviction is why proceduralism prohibits us from violating the rights of our fellow citizens. We may not like them, but we recognize that their humanity has no weaker a claim on rights than ours. Proceduralism thus goes hand-in-hand with humanism.

    But the feedback loop between them is now moving in reverse. In politics, as in the historical profession, anti-humanism and anti-proceduralism are feeding each other.

    On the one hand, across the political spectrum, there is a rampant reliance on caricatures, a refusal to see individuals in their three-dimensional human complexity. The hard right lumps everyone it dislikes into “woke mobs,” including those who are neither woke nor mobbish. Meanwhile the hard left sees everyone it disagrees with as white supremacists, transphobes, and so on, seeing no daylight between, say, those who call for the “eradication” of transgenderism and those who would limit the participation of trans-men in women’s sports but at the same time believe that transgenderism is natural and that trans people should have full civil rights. Both the hard right and the hard left are intolerant of pluralism and diversity; both are incapable of grappling with nuance and complexity; both are dehumanizing and inhumane. That dehumanization encourages violations of rules, because why bother respecting due process for someone less than fully human. On the other hand, equally across the political spectrum, there is a growing willingness to break the rules. The ur-example, of course, remains the January 6 assault on the Capitol. But there are plenty of more mundane examples, such as attempts to abolish the filibuster and to pass huge spending bills by abusing reconciliation. A nice illustration of the politically protean nature of the rule-breaking impulse was supplied by The New York Times’ publication of a plea from two law professors on the left “to reclaim America from constitutionalism” — “why justify our politics by the Constitution?” they impatiently asked — and its publication two weeks later of an article about interest on the right in calling a new constitutional convention. Not following the rules makes it easier to dehumanize people, because we no longer have to slow down and try to understand them in all their complex subjectivity.

    This mental laziness is excused by a sort of fatalism about the possibility and the effects of empathy. We differ so fundamentally from our opponents, the epistemologists of extremism claim, that we cannot possibly understand them, and we pollute ourselves by trying. Were the historical profession today not itself so fatalistic, it would stand as a stinging rebuke to this fatalism. It is ludicrous to think that the imaginative distance between a Trump supporter and a Biden supporter is greater than the imaginative distance between either of them and a medieval peasant. The historical profession is premised on the idea that, through imagination disciplined by historical evidence, it is possible for a historian in the twenty-first century, who almost certainly believes that the condition of one’s birth should not determine one’s station in life, to understand how the world looked to someone in the thirteenth century, who saw a society of ranks and privileges as a natural order. It is equally ludicrous to think that there is anyone more evil today than Hitler, Stalin, and the other monsters with whom historians routinely empathize without turning into mass murderers themselves. Historians who deny the possibility and desirability of inter-subjective understanding not only fly in the face of this professional premise but also set a terrible example for all Americans. 

    The effects of historians’ failure to insist on the possibility and importance of inter-subjective understanding are particularly clear in the realm of fiscal and environmental policy. As historians’ confidence in this understanding has weakened, so too has their confidence in its possibility across generations. This weakening affects cuts in multiple temporal directions. With no sense of obligation to preserve an inheritance from the past, the present has no sense of obligation to pass on an inheritance to the future. Can its voracious consumption of fiscal and environmental resources, both of which will perilously reduce the freedom of action for future generations, be unconnected to the presentism of the profession most obliged to be anti-presentist?

    It is vital for historians to reckon with the flaws of their profession as an institution, not only for their own sake but for the sake of the nation that supports their institution, and to reflect on the ways that they have fed and been fed by the most inhumane and dehumanizing impulses in American life today. It is true that there are forces outside the historical profession that want to destroy it, for reasons that I vigorously disagree with — for instance, for the reason that studying the past is not “useful,” with “usefulness” defined in a narrow market-based sense. In reality, there is not much that is more “useful” when it comes to educating free citizens in a liberal democracy than studying the past. Its “utility” is overwhelming. Yet it is also the case that the historical profession has not cared for this “utility” and has not been doing the job properly, and so it has sacrificed the moral high ground to resist the misguided and sometimes malicious calls to defund it.

    The historical profession cannot survive without honesty, and it cannot have honesty if it engages in “enemy thinking,” to borrow Martin Luther King Jr.’s phrase, about everyone who criticizes it, especially from the right. Put differently, the profession may be in the process of being murdered, but it is also in the process of committing suicide — a characterization true of a number of important institutions in American life.

    Scholarly standards, like liberal-democratic standards, exist to protect us from our worst instincts and to encourage us to live up to our highest potential as human beings. As historians and as Americans, we can justify breaking the rules and violating the standards however we wish, but the justification can only ever be a variation on what Milton called the tyrant’s plea of necessity, that the ends justify the means. In historical scholarship and in liberal democracy, the means justify the ends. When we forget this, we imperil not only the humanities but humaneness itself.

    It is a pathology of the modern United States that Americans require a national-security justification to do almost anything; they clothe everything they do, from the war on poverty to the war on drugs, in militarized language. Obviously they should renew their commitment to rigorous humanism and a liberal democracy because it is the right thing to do, not because it is a national security issue. But it is also a national security issue.

    The loss of capacity for methodologically rigorous humanistic thought has implications not only for liberal democracy in the United States but also for its position in the world. It is ironic and tragic that the United States has experienced this loss even as it has become de rigueur to narrate the turn of the century as a transition from the “end of history” to the “return of history.” History has certainly returned (or rather never went away). Yet a sense of history has not returned with it.

    It isn’t the 1950s anymore. The United States no longer bestrides a world digging out of the rubble of World War II. The Soviet Union no longer exists, but the United States faces a much more potent challenger to its position atop the global power rankings in China, which has not only the military prowess of the Soviet Union but also far greater economic strength. The United States cannot fritter away its national unity without geopolitical consequence. The principal beneficiary of socio-political dysfunction in the United States and in the Western alliance is, of course, China. By neglecting the humanities, which play a crucial role in nurturing a sense of liberal-democratic unity in a pluralistic nation and alliance, the United States is giving a strategic gift to China.

    Since the pertinence of humanistic scholarship to American foreign policy is not obvious, let me explain. Strategy requires a particular kind of thinking. Such thinking will be a condition of American strength in the era of great power rivalry that has now begun. Yet the neglect of intellectual rigor, the decline of its prestige in our culture, will inevitably damage the United States’ ability to formulate its strategy amid all the danger and competition. Michael Ignatieff’s recent warning in these pages about the importance of understanding what thinking is applies powerfully to strategy:

    We are confused about what thinking is. To think is not to process information. We have impoverished our understanding of thinking by analogizing it to what our machines do. What we do is not processing. It is not computation. It is not data analysis. It is a distinctively, incorrigibly human activity that is a complex combination of conscious and unconscious, rational and intuitive, logical and emotional reflection. It is so complex that neither neurologists nor philosophers have found a way to model it, and the engineers of artificial intelligence are still struggling to replicate some of the simplest forms of pattern recognition that human cognition does so effortlessly. We must beware that in our attempt to make computers think like us we do not end up thinking like them.

    American policymakers — particularly in the US Navy, which would play the lead role in any conflict with China — think too much like computers. When all you have is STEM, everything looks like an engineering problem with a technical or technological solution. The Navy has reduced the competition with China to a combat problem and is searching for a technological silver bullet with sufficient “lethality” (an insipid term that is to the Pentagon what “disruption” is to Silicon Valley). How else to explain the Navy’s failure to articulate how victory in combat (“kinetic”) operations against the PLA Navy would advance the strategic end of compelling China to change its behavior? How else to explain its asinine expectation, as noted by Matthew Suarez, that it can leave the tasks of trade protection and interdiction, which have preoccupied the navies of great powers in virtually every maritime war in history, to the tiny navies of “allies and partners”? A war with China would massively disrupt the global economy, and the US Navy will not operate in a hermetically sealed cocoon of combat operations. The American people and neutral stakeholders will besiege it with demands for protection.

    The impulse to turn human beings into engineering problems also manifests itself in the instrumentalization of the humanities in the fields of war studies and strategic studies. “Scholars” in these fields, unlike actual scholars in the humanities, are more interested in using findings from the humanities to identify “lessons,” discover “principles,” and build models abstracted from the particular human (usually historical) contexts to which they belong. In effect, this approach turns the humanities into an instrumental technology. Since the emphasis is on instrumentalization rather than on understanding, the bar for expertise in these fields is low; today’s “experts” on economic warfare are yesterday’s experts on cyberwar, who were the previous day’s experts on Islamic terrorism, who before that were Kremlinologists. (There are exceptions, of course, but they prove rather than disprove the rule.) Human beings are not engineering problems. As John Lewis Gaddis put it, they are molecules with minds of their own. In war, as Clausewitz observed, the will is directed at an animate object that reacts. Hence the formulation of strategy requires the ability to interpret the behavior of other human beings. Data alone won’t cut it.

    Shortages of manpower and material may be excused. Not so shortages of brainpower. The historian Marc Bloch, in reflecting on the reasons for France’s shocking fall to the Nazis in 1940, wrote that “the German triumph was, essentially, a triumph of intellect — and it is that which makes it so peculiarly serious.” Instead of studying history rigorously, with as much interest in change as in continuity, the French studied it selectively. Bloch recalled a lecture on Napoleonic tactics given in 1910 by Ferdinand Foch, the future Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in World War I, in which Foch “exhibited them as models to be followed irrespective of any changes that might have taken place in the world since Napoleon’s time.” And this type of intellectual shallowness was not limited to the military. “As a nation,” Bloch wrote, “we had been content with incomplete knowledge and imperfectly thought-out ideas,” adding that “such an attitude is not a good preparation for military success.” Rather, “this mental laziness” led to “a gloomy mood of self-satisfaction.” Bloch, who in World War II joined the French resistance and was tortured and executed by the Gestapo in 1944 (Strange Defeat was published posthumously), castigated the government for having abdicated its ultimate responsibility for French security: “nothing shed a cruder light on the spinelessness of Government than its capitulation to the technicians.”

    The great historian’s analysis was correct. Those who seek the causes of the French defeat in the technical realm — especially in the realm of armor — merely capitulate again to the technicians. The French actually had more and better tanks than the Germans. What they did not have was an effective way of using them: they made decisions more slowly than the tanks could move. The reason for this slowness was that French command-and-control was highly centralized. As the historian Eugenia Kiesling has shown, the reason for the centralization was that the French army’s reserves lacked the training to be entrusted with decision-making responsibility. The reason for this lack of training was mutual distrust between the army and the political left. At the same time, French businesses, on the grounds of liberal property rights, resisted government attempts to prepare the economy for war in time of peace. In short, the proximate cause of the French defeat was that their military could not match the speed of German decision-making; the ultimate cause was the nation’s failure to overcome its bitter divisions in the face of an existential threat. This is a social, political, psychological, and economic story, which is the stuff of the humanities. It is not the stuff of STEM, which can get us no farther than the technical nuts-and-bolts of French and German tanks, or of our own missiles.

    Bloch’s heroism is itself a testimony to the role of historical and humanistic understanding in determining the fate of a society. His post-mortem of a gloomily self-satisfied nation riven by internal tensions in the face of a determined competitor should serve as a warning today. The United States is so self-absorbed that it forgets about the outside world. Steadily we make ourselves weak and irrelevant. The threat of China is growing larger while Americans fantasize about national divorce. If we are broken, it is because we broke ourselves. Yet the sciences cannot fix social and political dysfunction. Only the humanities can; but first they must fix or be fixed themselves.

    Experiments of Living Constitutionalism: A Manifesto

    In constitutional law, there are a lot of isms. 

    Textualism claims that the Constitution’s text is binding. The central idea is that judges are bound by the written words of the founding document. (Reasonable textualists acknowledge that the text is often ambiguous. What, for example, is meant by “the freedom of speech”? That is far from obvious.)

    Originalism, which is on the ascendancy on the current Supreme Court, insists that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with its original public meaning — its meaning at the time of its ratification in the late eighteenth century, and after the Civil War for the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. (Reasonable originalists acknowledge that the original public meaning is often ambiguous. What was the original understanding of the constitutional provision granting “executive power” to the president? That is not obvious.)

    Living constitutionalism claims that the meaning of the Constitution evolves over time, which means that the document might require states to recognize same-sex marriage now, even if it did not require that before. (Reasonable living constitutionalists acknowledge that judges can go in terrible directions. From American history, you can take your pick.) 

    Thayerism — so named after the great Harvard law professor James Bradley Thayer — claims that judges should uphold legislation unless it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. (Reasonable Thayerians acknowledge that under their approach, school segregation would probably have to be upheld, and freedom of speech would be far less robust than it now is. They respond that if you believe in democracy, you should accept judicial restraint, and take the bitter with the sweet.)

    Minimalism contends that judges should avoid abstract theories and go case-by-case, interpreting the Constitution with close reference to the particular facts. (Reasonable minimalists acknowledge that their approach leaves a lot of uncertainty, and also that in some cases they will have to get more theoretical than they would like.)

    In view of the proliferation of isms in the domain of constitutional law, there is strong reason to hesitate before proposing yet another. Still, I have one to offer. I do so because it has yet to be identified; because reasonable arguments can be made on its behalf; and because it helps to organize and to illuminate numerous constitutional developments over the last decades. Those developments are otherwise puzzling and unmotivated. At the same time, the approach I sketch suggests a future path for constitutional law that is unlikely to be taken, at least in the United States — but that we would do well to visualize. Constitutional law is full of surprises, and some of the surprises are good ones. In any case, theories of constitutional interpretation sometimes spread through the public, even if they do not get traction in the courts.

    Here is the proposal, for your consideration: Experiments of Living Constitutionalism. 

    The central idea is that the Constitution should be interpreted to allow both individuals and groups to experiment with different ways of living, whether we are speaking of religious practices, family arrangements, sex, romance, marriage, child-rearing, schooling, or work. Experiments of Living Constitutionalism prizes individual dignity. It emphasizes the importance of learning. It cherishes diversity and plurality; it opposes (what it sees as) authoritarianism in all its forms. It is emphatically liberal in character — liberal in its emphasis on freedom and agency, especially with respect to things that people care most about.

    The operative phrase — experiments of living — comes from John Stuart Mill, who said this in On Liberty in 1859:

    That mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most part, are only half-truths; that unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable than at present of recognizing all sides of the truth, are principles applicable to men’s modes of action, not less than to their opinions. As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so it is that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person’s own character, but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.

    Experiments of Living Constitutionalists insist on the importance of allowing and encouraging “varieties of character” and on the value of “different modes of life.” It does so in part because it values the dignity and separateness of every individual. It does so in part because it sees experiments of living as essential to social as well as individual progress. For those who embrace Experiments of Living Constitutionalism, experiments of living also contribute to the common good. If each of us is able to see what each of us has tried, and is free to experiment, we will have more options to consider; all of us will be able to learn from every one of us. Failed experiments of living may be nothing to celebrate, but they are sources of knowledge and experience and they contribute to both individual and social progress. 

    As its name (inadvertently!) suggests, Experiments of Living Constitutionalism is a form of living constitutionalism. Its advocates firmly reject originalism. They do not believe that the Constitution should be frozen in time. They do not think that it should be understood in accordance with its original public meaning. If the Supreme Court allows people to experiment with certain forms of speech (blasphemous speech, sexually explicit speech, potentially dangerous speech), it might be going well beyond the original meaning. Nonetheless, Experiments of Living Constitutionalists claim that their preferred approach has deep roots in Anglo-American traditions, and that it can be understood in a way that is faithful to the text of the Constitution. Experiments of Living Constitutionalists value longstanding principles and aspirations in our political tradition, and they try to build on them, even if they do not think that the meaning of the Constitution is forever fixed. 

    Those who favor Experiments of Living Constitutionalism prize freedom of speech. Indeed, they might prize this freedom most of all. They celebrate Justice Robert Jackson’s powerful words in 1943: “Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.” They are drawn to Jackson’s suggestion: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” For that reason, they would protect political speech of diverse kinds. They would also protect art, literature, film, an d all the arts believing that all of these are crucial to consideration of experiments of living.

    To be sure, Experiments of Living Constitutionalists do not believe that the first amendment is “an absolute.” They know that some speech contributes little or nothing to experiments of living, and they know that some speech imposes serious and immediate harm. They do not think it is a legitimate experiment of living for someone to say, “Your money or your life.” They would allow restrictions on bribery, perjury, and fraud, and they would permit restrictions on speech when there is a clear and present danger. They are not at all clear how much the Constitution should protect commercial advertising; they fear that the current Court’s keen interest in protecting such advertising is a misadventure. But they are broadly comfortable with existing First Amendment doctrine, which is fiercely protective of free speech, and they would resist efforts to authorize any kind of censorship. 

    In the same vein, those who favor Experiments of Living Constitutionalism prize freedom of religion. They would allow a plurality of faiths to flourish. They would vigorously protect people of faith, agnostics, and atheists. They would not be reluctant to stand in the way of federal or state efforts to impose secular values, even widely held ones, on people whose religious traditions are inconsistent with those values. (If the Catholic Church does not want to perform or recognize same-sex marriages, that is its right.) Experiments of Living Constitutionalists are especially enthusiastic about freedom of association, whether we are speaking of civic associations, political associations, book clubs, or associations of any other kind. They would be strongly inclined to protect contemporary rights of privacy, including the right to use contraceptives, the right to live with members of one’s family, the right to engage in consensual sexual relations of any kind and the right to same-sex marriage. For those who embrace Experiments of Living Constitutionalism, the focus on sexual privacy is not a mistake, a coincidence, or some kind of indulgence. It is entirely appropriate and something to be celebrated, for sex is a domain in which “individuality should assert itself.” 

    Since Experiments of Living Constitutionalists prize individual agency, they take the right to choose abortion seriously. Still, they greatly struggle with this particular issue. For them, it is not an easy question; the moral issue is difficult. (My experiment of living does not allow me to hurt you.) In the end, they might not commit themselves to a right to choose, because of the importance and the value of protecting unborn life. Following Mill, Experiments of Living Constitutionalists enthusiastically agree that the state might interfere with freedom when there is harm to others. 

    Experiments of Living Constitutionalism is a great friend to federalism, seeing the diversity of the states as an engine for the creation of experiments of living. Mississippi need not take the same path as Massachusetts. Local norms and cultures deserve protection (unless they squelch, through their governments, experiments of living). Those who embrace Experiments of Living Constitutionalism embrace Justice Brandeis’ idea of “laboratories of democracy”; they will strongly resist national efforts to override particular values and approaches that are prized by citizens of (for example) California, Georgia, or Wyoming. 

    At the same time, they will be open-minded on separation of powers questions. The commitment to Experiments of Living Constitutionalism does not entail a particular approach to grants of power and discretion to administrative agencies such as the Department of Education, the Environmental Protection Agency, or the Federal Communication Commission. But Experiments of Living Constitutionalists approach separation of powers issues with Mill’s cautionary note in mind: “Where, not the person’s own character, but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.”

    At this point, you might have numerous questions and concerns. What is the pedigree of the Experiments of Living Constitution? Where on earth does it come from? What are its limits? Justice Holmes famously wrote, “The Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.” Does the U.S. Constitution enact Mr. John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty? Wouldn’t that be absurd? Why should anyone embrace an effort to understand an eighteenth-century American document by reference to the thinking of a British philosopher over half a century later?

    Those who support the Experiments of Living Constitution agree that such questions must be taken seriously, but they think that they can answer them. They point to the distinctive form of liberal republicanism that defined and launched the U.S. Constitution. In brief: liberal republicanism is liberal insofar as it emphasizes the agency and the dignity of all of us; it is republican insofar as it sees government as an engine for collective deliberation about the public good. Experiments of Living Constitutionalists claim continuity with liberal republicanism. They add that to a greater or lesser degree, Mill was essentially summarizing and elaborating principles that predated and informed the American founding. 

    Experiments of Living Constitutionalists insist in particular that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, ratified in the aftermath of the Civil War, are animated by a commitment to individual freedom that fits comfortably with their preferred approach. In their view, the idea of experiments of living has a long tradition behind it; Montesquieu and Locke can be seen as having defended versions of that idea, as can Madison, Hamilton, and Jefferson. Mill was hardly writing on a clean slate. The idea of experiments of living is anything but a concoction, or a bolt from the blue. In American constitutional law, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. spoke directly in the terms of Experiments of Living Constitutionalism in his great dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, decided in 1919:

    But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country. 

    Skeptics might ask how Experiments of Living Constitutionalism relates to our existing Constitution, and whether it promises, or threatens, to produce radical reforms. Would government paternalism, understood as the displacement of individual choices by officials who think they know best, be out of bounds? Would motorcycle helmet laws be out of bounds? Would there be a constitutional right to use illegal drugs? Would there be a right to polygamous marriages? To incestuous marriages? To pornography? Which Experiments of Living lack constitutional protection? These are fair and challenging questions. In response, defenders of Experiments of Living Constitutionalism have four things to say.

    First, defenders of Experiments of Living Constitutionalism are not fanatics, and they need not embrace everything that Mill says about liberty. Certainly they need not go so far as to accept Mill’s Harm Principle (which forbids regulation unless it is justified as a way of preventing harm to others). You can believe in Experiments of Living Constitutionalism without thinking that government paternalism, even of the coercive sort, is always out of bounds. Experiments of Living Constitutionalists should have no trouble with laws that require people to buckle their seatbelts, to wear helmets while riding motorcycles, or to save money for retirement (as through Social Security). They can accept cigarette taxes, even if the goal of such taxes is to prevent people from harming themselves. Nor would they have much interest in the view that the Constitution protects a right to polygamous marriages, incestuous marriages, or child pornography. 

    One reason is that in some of these cases individual choices clearly impose harm to others (consider child pornography). If your experiment injures someone else, you had better stop experimenting. And even when people are not harming others, Experiments of Living Constitutionalists insist, as Mill did not, on the importance of distinguishing between genuine experiments of living that are fundamental to people’s lives (as when people choose to live together in lieu of marriage, or follow a religious conviction of their own) and choices that clearly lack that character (as when people decide to not to buckle their seatbelts, or not so save for retirement). To be sure, there might be some hard line-drawing problems here.

    Second, Experiments of Living Constitutionalists emphasize that far from being radical, their approach helps to clarify and support a great deal of existing law. Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has vigorously protected freedom of speech, including not only political speech but also literature, art, cinema, and much more. (The Court is largely following Holmes.) In the process, it has also protected a great deal of sexually explicit speech. So, too, freedom of association enjoys broad protection. So does religious liberty. As noted, the justices have ruled that sexual privacy qualifies for protection under the due process clause. It is not simple to produce an account that explains and supports all these disparate rulings. Experiments of Living Constitutionalism can provide such an account. 

    Third, defenders of Experiments of Living Constitutionalism are willing to be respectful of precedent, whether or not they agree with it. They may not agree, for example, with the Court’s ruling that the Constitution does not protect the right to physician-assisted suicide. But like almost everyone else, they do not think it appropriate to overrule decisions simply because they believe that they were wrong. You can accept Experiment of Living Constitutionalism while also thinking that any legal system on earth needs to respect stare decisis, so as to prevent instability and perhaps even a form of constitutional chaos. A legal system cannot operate if today’s decision is in tomorrow’s garbage heap. 

    Fourth, those who embrace Experiments of Living Constitutionalism would give careful attention to the decisions of democratic processes. They are liberals, after all, and liberals are democrats, even if there are real limits on what democracies can do. Experiments of Living Constitutionalists will have to make some difficult choices here, but if Congress or a state legislature has made a reasonable decision, supporters of Experiments of Living Constitutionalism might well be cautious before rejecting it. You can believe in experiments of living without being a fanatic. Everything depends on the details — on the kind of liberty that is at stake, and on the strength of the argument for interfering with it. To this extent, Experiments of Living Constitutionalists might be willing to make common cause with minimalists.

    How shall we choose between Experiments of Living Constitutionalism and other approaches to constitutional interpretation? Should we reject it in favor of originalism? Any answer to that question would have to offer criteria of selection, which are urgently needed. I suggest that the only possible answer is another question: What would make our constitutional order better rather than worse? That is an admittedly daunting question, but there is no alternative to asking it. It is the only game in town. The Constitution does not contain the instructions for its own interpretation. It does not have an originalism clause; it does not say, “This document shall be interpreted in accordance with its original public meaning.” In fact it does not specify any theory of interpretation. The choice of such a theory is inevitably our own. 

    Some originalists seem to think that their preferred approach follows from the very idea of interpretation, but it really does not. In the end, originalism has to be justified on the grounds that it would make our system better. Many alternative approaches, including Experiments of Living Constitutionalism, can fall within the domain of interpretation, so long as they operate by reference to and within the space of the Constitution itself. It is hopeless to defend a contested theory of interpretation by citing the founding document and pounding the table. The only way to defend such a theory, or to evaluate it, is to ask what it would do for the institutions and rights under which the American people live. Where else can we possibly turn?

    It might be tempting to respond that the choice of a theory of interpretation cannot possibly depend on the results that it yields. One might think that that choice has to be made on the basis of some commitment that might seem higher or deeper, or more fundamental. If we focus on results, and choose a theory of interpretation on the basis of results, perhaps we are biased, or unforgivably “result-oriented,” and engaged in some kind of special pleading. The problem with such a response is that it rests on an illusion of compulsion. Among the reasonable candidates, judges (and others) are not compelled to adopt a particular theory of interpretation; they must make a choice. One last time: To do that, judges (and others) are required to ask about what would make our constitutional order better rather than worse. 

    Here is an answer to that question: Experiments of Living Constitutionalism. 

     

    The Tranquil Gaze of Benito Pérez Galdós

    I consider Javier Cercas one of the best writers in the Spanish language, and I believe that, after oblivion has buried his contemporaries, at least three of his extraordinary books — Soldiers of Salamis, The Anatomy of a Moment, and The Imposter — will still have readers who turn to them to learn what our disordered present was like. He is also a man of courage. He loves his homeland of Catalonia, and his articles inveighing against the secessionist demagoguery of the Catalan separatists are persuasive and incontestable.

    In an urbane debate some time back with Antonio Muñoz Molina on the subject of the nineteenth-century Spanish novelist Benito Pérez Galdós, Cercas admitted that he didn’t care for the prose of the author of Fortunata and Jacinta. As my grandfather Pedro used to say, entre gustos y colores, no han escrito los autores, which roughly translated is the old adage that there is no accounting for taste. Everyone has a right to his opinion, and writers do too, but to make such a declaration on the centenary of Pérez Galdós’ death, when everyone else was lauding and commemorating him, was certainly a provocation. 

    I don’t care for Proust. For years this embarrassed me, and I kept it under wraps. Not anymore. I confess I read him lethargically; I struggled to get through his interminable novel and its long sentences, its author’s fussiness and frivolity. His small, selfish world repelled me, not to mention those cork-lined walls meant to buffer him from the distracting noise of the outside world, which I love so much. Had I been a reader for Gallimard when Proust submitted the manuscript of his first volume, I fear I would have advised against publication, as did André Gide. (He regretted this error for the rest of his life.) All this is to say that, in the polemic in question, I took the side of Muñoz Molina, in opposition to my friend Javier Cercas.

    A few months later, in a column in El País entitled “The Merit of Galdós,” Cercas was far more generous and, I believe, accurate, in his treatment of the writer. He admitted that in the immense vacuum in Spanish literature that followed Don Quixote, Pérez Galdós had embarked upon “a literary project of unprecedented ambition and breadth in an attempt to consolidate a novelistic tradition conspicuously absent in Spain.” And he affirmed that neither Pio Baroja’s Memoirs of a Man of Action nor Ramon Maria del Valle-Inclán’s The Carlist War were conceivable without the National Episodes, the extraordinary corpus of forty-six historical novels about Spain that Peréz Galdós produced between 1872 and 1912. I could not agree more.

    It is unjust to say, as many did in his day, that Benito Pérez Galdós was a bad writer. He was not a genius, but he was the best Spanish writer of the nineteenth century, the most ambitious, and probably the first professional writer that the language had. In those days, whether in Spain or Latin America, it was impossible for a writer to live from royalties. (Many journalists, instead of receiving a salary, wrote solely for the purpose of making themselves known.) Pérez Galdós had a prosperous family that admired him and kept him afloat for a long time, letting him exercise his vocation, granting him the independence that he needed to write freely. His novels and his essays were brought out by different publishers (sometimes even by himself) under contracts that he did not always believe were honored. And yet he became famous, and soon set to writing the National Episodes.

    For a long time, I wanted to read Pérez Galdós from beginning to end — as a student I had read Fortunata and Jacinta, of course, but I was ignorant of his work as a whole — and it struck me that the coronavirus pandemic would provide a fine occasion to do so. After eighteen months, having finished the plays, the novels, and the National Episodes, I was impressed by the tranquil, wounded world that he invented. I have yet to read all his essays and articles: they represent an immense labor, and I am still making my way through them. I doubt that more than a few scholars have tackled them all. The reason for this is simple: Pérez Galdós was not a great thinker, like Ortega y Gasset or Unamuno, and though he did compose a few interesting essays, the better part of his journalistic work has been rightly unremarked upon, being transient and superficial. There is little point in devoting so much time to literature of so little weight, even if there are a few nuggets of value in the lot.

    Pérez Galdós was born in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, or the Canary Islands, on May 10, 1843, the son of Lieutenant Colonel Sebastián Pérez, the military leader of the island and a landholder who devoted much of his time to his assorted businesses. Benito was the youngest of ten siblings, and his mother, Dolores de Galdós, a woman of great character, was known to wear the pants in the family. It was she who decided that Benito, apparently in love with a cousin she disapproved of, should go to Madrid at the age of twenty to study law. Yolanda Arencibia, a great promoter of Galdós and the author of what is far and away the best (and most voluminous) biography of him, has tried to determine whether his love affair with his cousin Sisita was the true cause of his departure from Las Palmas. But she ran up against a wall. In that family, secrets were not to be broached.

    Pérez Galdós used his first vacation period in Madrid to return to his home island and see her. But, according to Arencibia, Sisita was soon to depart for Cuba — she was a native of its most beautiful colonial city, Trinidad — to marry the landowner Eduardo Duque, who would give her a son, Sebastián, who lived only a few years. After the death of her first husband, Sisita married a relative, Pablo de Galdós, but died at the young age of twenty-eight of a postpartum infection, which in those days was known as puerperal fever. Some believe that Pérez Galdós was forevermore in love with her and remained single to honor her memory, but this is pure speculation, as neither he nor those close to him ever addressed the subject directly or allowed pertinent details to come to light.

    Obedient to his mother, Benito attended the Complutense University in Madrid, but soon became disenchanted with the law. Journalism was more attractive to him, and he devoted a great deal of time to it — and to bohemian Madrid, the vitality in its coffee houses full of painters, scribblers, reporters, and politicians, which he abundantly described in his writings. He turned increasingly toward literature, starting with theater, his first passion, writing comedies in verse and prose. According to his own account, none of them made it to the stage, and one day he burned them all. He would return to the genre years later.

    He loved Madrid extravagantly, more than any other writer before or after. He was the most faithful and refined connoisseur of its streets and dive bars, its shops and boarding houses, its salons and gossip mills, its human types, its customs and professions and businesses, the errors in spoken Spanish common to its less cultured citizens, and, of course, its history. As an example of the depth of Pérez Galdós’ love for and acquaintance with Madrid, it suffices to read the first two chapters of Prim, one of the best of the National Episodes; the streets and their residents seem to come to life as though touched by a magic wand — the author’s prose — as the character of Santiago Ibero, a fervent young admirer of General Prim, prepares the two men’s vertiginous escape to Mexico. The same novel includes also a wonderful description of the Atheneum, where Pérez Galdós studied and read voluminously; the passage is splendid for its prose and its measured summary of Spanish politics in April 1862. The writer’s vision is tranquil, patient, serene, and diligently portrays a world immobilized by religion, which possesses the virtue (or the fault?) of holding it in an almost painterly stasis, but which at other times is its tragedy, its doom.

    The hostility that Pérez Galdós awakened in his country in the years when he was writing his novels, his plays, and the National Episodes now strikes us as hard to believe. Of course he had his supporters, but his adversaries were apparently more numerous. It was said that his books “stank of pork stew,” that he wrote vulgarly and inelegantly. Famously, in 1924 in his play Bohemian Lights, Valle-Inclán insulted Pérez Galdós and his naturalist style with the nickname garbancero, or “the chickpea man,” which he was never able to live down. This animosity became particularly evident in 1912, in the widespread opposition to the then-seventy-nine-year-old writer’s nomination for the Nobel Prize in Literature, which had been proposed by some five hundred writers, journalists, and artists with the support of the Spanish government. The Swedish Academy is said to have received more petitions against his candidacy than for it, with the objections coming principally from far-right Catholic circles that saw in him a republican and an extreme freethinker. No man is a prophet in his own country, and in the Spain of the time, dominated by narrow and sectarian Catholicism, Pérez Galdós was considered a fiercely anticlerical liberal. This was never quite true: his liberalism and his republicanism were scrupulously tolerant. With typical logic and clarity, the poet and writer Andrés Trapiello said of the conspiracy against Galdós, “It was the triumph of Spanish mange and meanness in the face of liberal principles.”

    In his works, Pérez Galdós described primarily the middle classes — or so it is said; but he did not ignore the aristocracy or the humbler fringes of society. As a writer he climbed up and down the social ladder at will, and one of the late Episodes, entitled A Coterie of Imps, begins with a splendid description of Madrid at its poorest, “one of its most destitute and hideous streets, the one called Rodas, which rises and falls over the hill between Embajadores and the Rastro,” where a village woman, Lucila Ansúrez, lives. She has taken refuge with Captain Bartolomé Gracián, a man she loves who is being persecuted by the powers that be.

    Photographs depict the huge crowds in Madrid that accompanied Pérez Galdós’ mortal remains to the Almudena Cemetery on January 5, 1920. According to the press, at least thirty thousand people came to pay homage to him in death. What was the source of this popularity? Above all, the National Episodes. He did what Balzac, Dickens, and Zola had done for their countries, and what he admired them for doing: telling, in fiction, the history and the social reality of their nations. Though as an artist he did not surpass the first two (with some of his novels he may have exceeded Zola, only three years his elder), his Episodes exist in the same line, and convert the lived past into literature, putting within reach of the broader public an even-handed, pleasurable, wise, and well-written version of the nineteenth century, with living characters and solid reportage — and this was a decisive period for Spain, encompassing the French invasion, the independence struggles against Napoleon’s armies, the reactionary absolutism of Ferdinand the Seventh, the invasion of Morocco, the Carlist Wars (a series of nineteenth-century conflicts over the legitimate heir to the Spanish throne which laid the ground for the legitimist and traditionalist forces of twentieth-century Spanish fascism), the short-lived First Republic, and finally, the Bourbon Restoration. Unlike other European countries such as Germany, France, and England, Spain cannot be said to have experienced the industrial revolution, and much of its time was wasted in these years in anachronistic wars of religion, which left it fatally backward after centuries as the supreme power on the continent.

    Pérez Galdós’ merit lies not only in documenting this period in his novels, but also in his way of doing so: with objectivity, with a comprehending and generous spirit, without taking sides ideologically, putting the ethical above the political, separating idealism from fanaticism, seeing the generosity and the misery in the hearts of both sides of the debates of the time. This is what stands out most when we read the plays, the novels, and the Episodes: a writer struggling to remain fair and impartial. His approach seems to freeze the Spain of his time in a sure objective gaze, immobilizing his subject to give a more faithful account of its nature.

    This is the furthest thing imaginable from the obstinate, peremptory caricature of Galdós that we have come to know. He was a civil man, a liberal who in his old age supported the Republic; but more than a politician, and a representative in the Cortes, he was a decent and thoughtful man. When narrating a tumultuous period in Spain’s history, he strove to do so equitably and with detachment, singling out the good from the bad and recognizing the presence of both in friends as well as foes. The exception to this, perhaps, was his view of the frivolity of the upper and middle classes, particularly at the time of the Restoration; about this he was often implacable. Yet the general absence of moral censure confers an air of justice upon the National Episodes, from Trafalgar to Cánovas, and brings his readers very close to the writer.

    He wrote as he did because he was a man of substance — muy buena gente, as we say in Peru. Not all writers are like that; some are quite the opposite. The differences in temperament have nothing to do with differences in talent. Pérez Galdós’ temperament was enriched by a spirit of fair-mindedness that made him lovable and credible. His remarkable composure gave his tales a certain stillness easily confused with immobility, as if his narratives were photographs.

    Something similar was the case in his private life. He was a lifelong bachelor, but his biographers have noted the presence of three long-term lovers and many other fleeting ones. The first, Lorenza Cobián González, a humble Asturian who gave birth to his daughter María (whom he recognized and made his sole heir), was illiterate, and he taught her to read and to write. His affair with the writer Emilia Pardo Bazán, a woman of passion (except when she wrote her novels), was rather torrid. “I will crush you,” she says to him in one of their letters. This may not have been only poetic license: this feminist writer appears to have been a devilish libertine in her private life. The last of the three was an apprentice actress, a good deal younger than him, named Concepción Morell Nicolau. Pérez Galdós supported her career in the theater, and to all appearances he behaved very badly toward her. It must be said that she was a difficult woman, and something of a cadger. Their breakup, which involved numerous friends, was drawn-out but diplomatic. 

    His great defect as a writer was his pre-Flaubertian idiom: his failure to grasp that the first character that the novelist invents is the narrator, whether he realizes it or not. This is true whether the narrator is omniscient or implicated in the action of the story; as a figure, it is he (or she) who grants independence and autonomy to the fictional creation. Despite his vast literary production, this is something that Pérez Galdós never grasped. And so the omniscience of his characters is of the classical sort, and his Gabriel Araceli and Salvador Monsalud have an impossible awareness of the thoughts and the feelings of other characters, in this way detracting from the realism of the novels. As the narrator of the Episodes and other novels, Pérez Galdós — in Amadeo I, for example, from the fifth series of the Episodes, where he appears under the name of Tito Liviano, a caricature of Titus Livius — attributes this awareness of the contents of other minds to historians and eyewitnesses or, still worse, to fantastical occurrences narrated in the realist mode, which gives an unnatural and artificial air to the otherwise naturalistic works in question.

    In the later volumes The First Republic and From Carthage to Sagunto, which tell of the chaos and disorder of the First Republic in Spain — with constant crises in the ministries, the siege of Cartagena during the Cantonal War, the threats of putsches, and the Civil War against the Carlists — the historian Tito Liviano, shyster, dwarf, and tireless fornicator, will fall in love with a teacher, Floriana. She will turn out to be a nymph and will drag the historian into a subterranean passageway full of magical surprises, such as monumental bulls that serve as mounts for the delicate feminine figures populating underground Madrid. This is, of course, an imaginary recreation of ancient Greece — a dream. It interrupts the plot arbitrarily, introducing an obtrusive and far from convincing element of fantasy. With time, such embellishments vanished from the Episodes, but attentive readers must make their peace with such backsliding into the fictional styles of the past, aware that Flaubert had already put forward a revolutionary conception of the narrator as a central, if invisible, character in the narrative — an idea that he worked out in the letters he wrote almost daily to Louise Colet as he fashioned and re-fashioned Madame Bovary.

    In From Carthage to Sagunto, the second-to-last of the Episodes, there is a description of the siege of Cuenca by the Carlist army at the orders of a woman on horseback, María das Neves, wife of Alfonso of the House of Bourbon. Here reality mingles with the diabolical in ferocious battles, beheadings, pillages of indescribable cruelty and savagery. It is proof that at times the mild Pérez Galdós’ narrative may be wild and brutal, but this is an exception. In general his tales proceed serenely, in quiet prose that moves with unruffled steps.

    In 1887, Fortunata and Jacinta, the novel that his critics and his posterity consider Pérez Galdós’ masterpiece, was published in four volumes. It originally had a subtitle, suppressed in certain editions: Two Stories of Married Women. He devoted two years — interrupted by a trip to France and Germany — to the composition of this ambitious tale, which many regard as the great Spanish novel of the nineteenth century. Others feel that this accolade should go to La Regenta by Leopoldo Alas, which appeared in two volumes in 1884-1885, but such a debate is rather absurd, given the eternal difficulties of fully describing the achievement of two first-rate novels representative of the entire era of the Spanish nineteenth century. The nineteenth century has generally been considered the zenith of the European novel, characterized by such crowning glories as Les Misérables, War and Peace, The Brothers Karamazov, and the works of Dickens and Balzac, of which Pérez Galdós was an enthusiastic admirer. All debates aside, Fortunata and Jacinta is without a doubt Pérez Galdós’ most significant and ambitious novel.

    Of particular importance in this chef-d’oeuvre is his perspective on Madrid, where the main episodes of the story take place. Fortunata and Jacinta elaborates a comprehensive vision of the city, describing its streets, its squares, its buildings, and especially its cafes, integrating them brilliantly into the action, and encompassing all of the city’s social strata, from the cream of the aristocracy to the middle classes and the very poor in a totalizing vision distinct from, but in no way inferior to, that presented in other works. I have now read this massive work three times, and the story has captivated me every time, from the first words to the last, demanding an absorption and commitment characteristic of the finest novels that I have known. 

    Its story is quite simple, but Galdos’ way of telling it is not: there is a wealth of subtlety and detail, and a deftness in its prose, both in the descriptions and the dialogues, not present in anything Galdós wrote before or after. Here again the story is told in the first person by a narrator apparently well-informed about the matters at hand, but eventually this artifice vanishes, and without the reader realizing it the narrator-as-party-to-the-events is displaced by a more conventional omniscient narrator. Like virtually all nineteenth-century novels, Fortunata and Jacinta tells the story of a romantic passion. Where it differs from its counterparts is in the duration of the passion recounted, and in the humble young woman who embodies it and who experiences passionate love — by which I mean a total surrender to a kind of love that becomes the essence and purpose of an entire life, a kind of religion — long before the Surrealist invention of the idea of l’amour fou.

    Fortunata lives this in the flesh, and in her abandonment displays a generosity without limits, until her devotion to her lover becomes the core of her existence. She gives herself completely to the young and wealthy Juanito Santa Cruz, making him her reason for living and the lodestar of her heart. Despite the obstacles and the neglect that she endures, her love will never flag, not for a single day, convinced as she is that he is everything for her. In her pledge, she does not expect reciprocity; her constancy, her stubbornness, attest to what is, in the end, her own obsession; and she is prepared to suffer humiliation and disgrace from friends and family. In a way, she meets a triumphant end, departing this world as events follow the very course that she had foreseen.

    A village woman — her proclamation that “I’m village through-and-through” has become a prominent theme in critical discussions of the novel — Fortunata is illiterate when she first meets Juanito. He is at once attracted by her beauty and repulsed by the sight of her eating a raw egg, which we must imagine dripping through her fingers. The girl lives hand-to-mouth in Cava Baja (where a plaque was recently placed in memory of her on the centenary of Galdós’ death).

    Fortunata’s epic passion is a bit difficult to explain — but is an explanation of love even possible? — because, though he is handsome and elegant, Juanito Santa Cruz hasn’t much to offer. He is a social parasite, sponging off the fortune of his parents, Baldomero and Barbarita, who toil and save their whole life as cloth wholesalers, while he lives an epicene life of leisure, devoted to his conquests and his frivolous entertainments. In the course of the novel Juanito frequently leaves Fortunata for one of his paramours, and each time she just goes on with her life. She confesses to taking lovers herself — “eight or so,” she guesses — but they mean nothing to her, and she has no doubt that she will drop them as soon as Juanito appears, because he is the one true love of her life. She is happy with him, especially in the beginning, when he sets her up in an apartment where he can visit her alone, but soon he will abandon her. They will have a child before death takes her away. Fortunata’s love is total, composed of countless sacrifices, while Juanito’s is superficial and transitory, and has room for other affairs. And even for his wife Jacinta: their honeymoon in Burgos, Zaragoza, Barcelona, Valencia, and Seville is recounted in the first chapters of the book. 

    Jacinta, the other heroine of the novel, is a graceful young woman whose life is shadowed by tragedy. She loves children, but she cannot have any. The pain of this lack will follow her until she comes to care for the newborn Juan Evaristo, Juanito and Fortunata’s son. Just before dying, Fortunata leaves the boy in Jacinta’s hands for her to raise as her own. This is a great boon to Jacinta, who had taken Fortunata to be her moral superior, following her conviction that a woman incapable of giving her husband offspring had no right to be his legitimate spouse.

    This is a brief synopsis of the central thread of the novel, which is otherwise densely peopled in a Dickensian way, with representative figures from every social class in nineteenth-century Madrid appearing and reappearing. Their ranks include a proud and unforgettable woman, Mauricia the Hard, so-called for her zealous, irascible character and her physical resemblance to Napoleon. She is one of Pérez Galdós’ finest and most striking creations, and whenever she shows up, she showers her companions with violence and rhetorical excess. Mauricia is a woman of humble origins, perpetually at war with the rich and noble. No one can tame or cow this natural born anarchist who, apart from being a rebel by nature, is subject to fits of genuine madness, one of which leads the nuns of the convent of Micaela — where penitent Catholic women go to be reeducated — to expel her.

    No less notable is Maximiliano, whom Fortunata marries but does not love, knowing that she will deceive him whenever Juanito Santa Cruz comes calling. An ugly, sickly boy of scant education, he is bowled over by Fortunata, falls deeply in love with her, and is ready to do anything for her, marrying her and pushing her toward the Christian ideal of goodness, with no success to speak of. Later, in desperation, the poor devil goes mad, raving, dreaming of murder, inventing a personal religion designed to free all humankind from the demons that torment it. 

    Apart from its descriptions of representative types, the pages of Fortunata and Jacinta abound in detailed and historically accurate descriptions of Madrid in the second half of the nineteenth century, with fine-grained illustrations of almost every street, neighborhood, and house, as well as the political and social life of the city and the customs governing it. Particularly significant here is the portrayal of its cafes, which were centers for the literary world and for society; great attention is devoted to them in the third section of the novel, when we meet Juan Pablo, one of Maximilian’s brothers and yet another marionette in the story, who wiles away his days in them. The author gives the impression at times of omniscience, as if nothing that occurred in the Madrid of the time escaped his vision, which brings together all sorts of incidents and experiences, minor and major. His empathy seems infinite, and he knows and explains everything with precision and concision.

    Though the prose is exemplary throughout, the dialogues are superior to the descriptions, apart from those occasions when Galdós indulges his old vice of aping the malformed expressions of the less cultured. Often he manages to do so with grace and good humor, wishing to gently point out the errors and malapropisms of those whose grasp of language is less than firm, with an attitude less disrespectful than amused; but at times the attempt falls flat. Some have praised Galdós’ enthusiasm for documenting the jargon of certain of his characters, such as José Izquierdo, who receives the nickname “Plato” in the novel. But unless a writer aims for a thoroughgoing reconstruction of spoken language, this way of letting characters speak in uncultured argot seems like caricature, and contemptuous of them — the work of a condescending but entertained middle-class gentleman who delights in the barbarisms of country folk, with their lexical infractions and their mangling of words whose meaning they do not know.

    What Pérez Galdós does is not re-creation: there is no labor of literary correction in his solecisms. His novels simply reproduce the speech of these people as he hears it. In this way, he does indeed ridicule his uneducated characters, who talk as they do because they know no grammar, and whose twisted speech serves only to divert an audience of people of the better sort. This is very different from, say, Faulkner, whose novels, situated in the heart of Mississippi, recreate the speech of poor whites and blacks without caricature. He can do this because his novels and stories involve a true act of literary reconstruction, whereas Pérez Galdós, the documentarian novelist, is a mere collector of expressions that distort proper and well-spoken Spanish.

    Such disruptions are thankfully kept to a minimum in this great novel, as is the fustian prose of some of his other works. Everything is subordinated to the story itself, and the characters rarely depart from the frame of action proper to them, pushing the novel forward at a slow and steady pace. Even the secondary characters fulfill very precise functions. Consider the magnificently rendered Placido Estupiñá, the eternal chaperone of ladies out doing their shopping — we would call him a walker — with his almost clinical need to talk and be heard. Without such people, the novel would not be what it is. Another unforgettable creature is Doña Guillermina — the saintess, as she is known — a woman of aristocratic origins who has dedicated her life to doing good, that is to say, to squeezing every wealthy person she knows for funds for a building under construction where wayward youth will be put on the right track. In her spare time, she goes around offering counsel and aid to victims of poverty. Generous and selfless, she gives her life to the cause of helping others, doing good in the Christian sense of the term.

    The novel is rich with evidence of its author’s human sensitivities — for example, in a chapter called “A Visit to the Slums,” we have this, in Agnes Moncy Gullon’s translation, about the defeated Izquierdo: 

    The most peculiar thing is that in his sadness he heard a sweet voice whispering: “You’re good for something….Don’t let yourself be dragged down….” But he couldn’t be persuaded. “If a man could tell me,” he thought to himself, “what the hell this mess of a man is good for, I’d love ‘im to death, love ‘im more than my own father.” The unfortunate man was, like many other beings who spend most of their life out of place, drifting, drifting, without ever stopping in the square on the chessboard that fate has marked for them. Some die never reaching it.

    But “Plato” finally finds his place and achieves success as a model for contemporary historical painters. And Pérez Galdós comments: “There is no human being, no matter how despicable he may have been, who cannot stand out in something.”

    Or consider the fineness of this passage about the inner volatility of Fortunata:

    During the first few days she went through hours of intense melancholy in which her conscience, together with her memory, vividly presented to her all the wrong things she had ever done, particularly getting married and committing adultery only a few hours later. But suddenly, without a clue as to how or why, everything turned inside out in the unknown depths of her soul, and her acts seemed clean, and clear, and firm. She judged herself and found that she was guiltless, innocent of all the evil that had ensued, as if she had acted on impulses dictated to her by some strange, superior entity…..Her conscience spun on an axis that showed her first the white side, then the black. At times this abrupt rotation depended on a word, a whimsical thought that flew into her head like a bird whisking across the immensity of the sky. Fortunata stopped thinking of herself as an evil monster and suddenly felt like an innocent, unfortunate creature. A leaf falling from an already withered stalk and landing silently on the rug could cause the change, or the neighbor’s canary starting to sing, or an unidentified carriage rumbling noisily down the street.

    There is a general mood or atmosphere in Fortunata and Jacinta that reveals the character of its author: comprehending, tolerant, always looking to understand rather than to judge the conduct of others, the moral sphere they move in, their beliefs, fixations, and obsessions, softening their defects while emphasizing their virtues. And so, despite the horrors that it recounts, the novel is no more pessimistic or dark than life itself. Notwithstanding the hopelessness and the pain that appear in its pages, Fortunata and Jacinta portrays existence as full of light, comprising more happiness than sorrow. The author’s temperament seeps into the characters — all of them, with the exception of Mauricia the Hard — who remain optimistic about life throughout the harsh situations that they find themselves in. This is one of the great merits of the book, and of Pérez Galdós’ novels, plays, and essays in general.

    The description of Spanish society that emerges here is one of decadence in comparison with the European nations which, at the time, were undergoing an industrialization that would change the nature of capitalism, raising incomes and promoting workers’ rights even as Spain was left behind, its antiquated economy still the fruit of agrarian exploitation and a commerce that depended on inherited wealth, state-backed speculation, or — in the case of Torquemada, who will appear briefly here but will take a starring role in future novels — outright usury. Missing out on the industrial revolution that would propel its neighbors toward the future, Spain remained mired in a gargantuan bureaucracy packed with well-connected layabouts who only showed up to their respective ministries on payday. Spain’s decadence, which many trace to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, truly took root in the nineteenth century, as Pérez Galdós’ vast novel shows. In it, he points out, among much else, the antiquated nature of Spain’s political system, its social anachronisms, how far the political and economic elite have strayed from the common people who form the crux of the novel, and the country’s underdevelopment in relation to many of its European neighbors.

    In such circumstances, it was inevitable that the venerable Spanish Empire would cease to stand at the head of Europe, as it had for centuries, becoming — and this, perhaps, is the central lesson to be drawn from the political and social standpoint that dominates Fortunata and Jacinta — a backward picturesque land, a reminder to European artists and travelers of “beautiful and ancient” customs, with bullfights, flamenco, and Andalusian bandits: an exotic vision of Old Europe appropriate for literary fictions, such as Prosper Mérimée’s Carmen, which was read far and wide. 

    Oddly, the critics were silent when Fortunata and Jacinta appeared. This stung Pérez Galdós, who complained in a letter to his friend Leopoldo Alas: “By then I had forgotten ever having written such a work, given the dreadful silence that befalls every product of the imagination here that is not La Gran Vía,” referring to the main thoroughfare, the Broadway, of Madrid. Time, however, put paid to that silence, so much so that the sole rival to Fortunata and Jacinta in the scholarly study of Spanish literature is Don Quixote itself.

    Was Pérez Galdós a great writer? He was. It would be too much to compare him artistically to Cervantes, nor was rivaling Cervantes his ambition; but in the nineteenth century, and even into the beginning of the twentieth, none among his compatriots had the dedication, the inventiveness, the enthusiasm, the powers of observation, and the literary gifts of Pérez Galdós. Not to mention his stamina and his persistence: not one of his contemporaries has left behind a body of work as monumental as his. 

    It is true that, with the exception of Valle-Inclán and Azorín (the nom de plume of Jose Martinez Ruiz), there were no great writers in Spain during this period, but this dearth in no way undermines Pérez Galdós’ achievement. Even if, like all writers, he had his low points, these only draw one’s attention to the grandeur of his successes, particularly in his best novels and plays. That said, he was not an innovative writer, one who opened roads through which other writers could discover their voice. He was, rather, a hugely talented follower of the great serial novelists of France and England in the nineteenth century. Pérez Galdós would not have existed without Balzac, Zola, Hugo, Dumas, or Dickens, whose Pickwick Papers he translated into Spanish.

    As I have noted, the most surprising and unexpected defect attributable to him is not having assimilated Flaubert’s lessons about the function of the narrator in the novel. This limitation makes many of Pérez Galdós’ novels stretch on too long. In presenting himself as the narrator, he must append an autobiographical thread that runs on and on and on; and at times he forgets his own comments about the sources of the story that he is telling.

    He was uneven, as most writers are, particularly as he refused to rework his texts, preferring superficial corrections and the hasty deletion or insertion of the odd word. The fate of his manuscripts was to be published or put aside; there was no middle point, no question of extended reconsideration and revision. And yet he produced a series of classics: Fortunata and Jacinta, Misericordia, Doña Perfecta, Torquemada at the Stake, Our Friend Manso, and others that even today can be read and admired. And he was no less accomplished a playwright, even if his theater, too, followed his rhythm of alternating masterpieces with works that may be entertaining but are of little or no consequence. It does a write no dishonor to boast of great successes and great failures. Few escape this curse; most hit the mark sometimes and sometimes miss it wildly. In truth, it takes only a single instance of greatness to mark one’s place in the history of literature. And Pérez Galdós managed it several times over.

    Nor ought Pérez Galdós be judged like other authors of his era. With the National Episodes, his art turned in a specifically historical and pedagogical direction that none of his contemporaries followed, and it is to his enormous credit that he brought many significant historical events into the grasp of the broader public in the manner of Hugo or Dumas. He did so with verve, and this makes the best of the Episodes stand tall over many of his other writings. He helped to create an integrated society in which people from different regions, with different customs, came to feel themselves heirs to a common past. Pérez Galdós was the only Spanish writer of his time to contribute to the sense of homeland. In doing so, he carried on the legacy of Cervantes, whose great book has been read and reread by virtually all who have the good fortune to read and write in Spanish, making us all legatees of a common origin, a community epitomizing the greatest virtues of the Spanish and Latin American people, not to mention some of their more visible vices. The solitary Pérez Galdós helped to cement this brotherhood across the seas.

    His polemics regularly hit the mark. Spain’s great problem was its strictness, the implacable character of the Catholic Church with its grim prohibitions and intolerable prejudices. Unlike others in his time, Pérez Galdós seems not to have been a dyed-in-the-wool rebel, let alone a revolutionary. He could even be called a believer in the modern mold, well-versed in the teachings of the church but unable as a matter of liberal principle to accept its intolerance or its high-handed interventions in private and public life. Often his work proposed solutions to social matters that are out of place in a novel or a play — for the rich to redistribute their fortunes to the poor, for example. These critical interpolations speak well of him, even if his solutions themselves were extraordinarily unrealistic.

    Pérez Galdós was typical of the liberals of his time, who had no interest whatsoever in economic realities and proposed solutions to social ills that invariably hinged somehow on religion, and to this degree were divorced from matters as they actually stood. Spain was not the country that would produce the most profound and rigorous notions concerning the elimination of poverty. It did not dream of the equality of opportunity that distinguishes the most advanced societies from the rest. In this regard, British, American, and Austrian economists contributed more than any French or Spanish writer. Pérez Galdós was ahead of his time, though, in being an “engaged” writer, clearly disturbed by the problems of his era and bold enough to plunge before any of his colleagues into the marrow of his country’s tremendous flaw: namely, the immense material difference between the poor and the rich, which he examined in numerous writings. 

    He traveled widely in Europe, and of course across Spain, gathering material for his National Episodes, and he knew a few languages — Italian, a smattering of French and English. He wasn’t much of a reader of foreign literature, and he failed to notice, or to see the significance of, the revolution in the novel initiated by Flaubert that would produce — passing through Joyce on the one hand and the great Russians on the other — something utterly different from and superior to what the genre had been before. He lived until 1920, but there are no traces of modernism in his work. We must read Pérez Galdós as a representative more of the classic novel than of the modern. 

    His limitations are those of the country in which he lived more or less his whole life. He never seriously considered leaving Spain or writing about realities beyond its borders. In his most fertile years as a writer, Spain was isolated from the literary world, and this is reflected in Galdós’ work, in the limitations of his style and his themes. His preoccupation with Spanish history and Spanish tribulations are the source of his reputation, but they show also a certain narrowness, and even symptoms of provincialism. 

    His rejection or ignorance of literary experimentation, of the avant-garde that existed, for example, in Paris, limited the diffusion of his work outside his country. He did contribute to the daily La Prensa in Buenos Aires, and he published a few articles elsewhere in Latin America, but what leapt inevitably to his eyes, what he read every day in the paper at home, what he talked about with his friends, was Spain, and it was natural that this would come to dominate his literary production.

    Yet all this is not to say that he was a conventional writer. Pérez Galdós wrote against the grain, he was calm but not complacent, and he endured attacks from all sides, some of them quite brutal. Years would pass before their intensity would wane, making him a respectable figure and, eventually, a source of pride, someone who would bring honor to Spaniards everywhere. I do not doubt that, among the thousands who attended his funeral, there were many who had attacked him in his younger days. And I do not doubt that some of them regretted it.

    Good People: The New Discipline

    “But Mark, you don’t seem to understand, these are good people. These are all good people.” 

    My interlocutor was a long-time administrator at my university, and an accomplished scholar. In his genial way he was trying to set my straight on some important facts. I had just learned that there would be a new aspect to our annual reports. We would be asked to tell our overlords how each one of our activities contributes to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion.

    Teaching? How did it advance DEI? Scholarship? How did it help speed DEI on its way? If you get an honor or an award, you are to say how it contributed to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. Outside consulting: did it do any DEI duty? And what does the university mean by Diversity, by Equity, by Inclusion? The university doesn’t say. There are no official definitions out there to consider. 

    So I had a lot to tell my friend about administrative interference with academic freedom. I didn’t want the university deans and DEI enforcers setting the agenda for my teaching or my scholarship, or for anyone else’s. At the same time, I couldn’t really argue with my friend’s observation: the people in the dean’s office and the DEI enclaves are decent sorts. I like them. Was asking us to apply DEI standards to every aspect of our work a radical piece of over-reach? I think it was, and is: I fought against it at its inception and still do. 

    But I also see the move as part of a larger pattern of enforcing discipline, and that pattern may be more important than any single program or initiative. The good people who came up with this notion are — without knowing it, I suspect — softly tyrannizing us. They are also softly tyrannizing themselves. And what they are up to isn’t only a university matter. It is happening in corporations, medical centers, primary and secondary schools, foundations, and NGOs. Surveillance and discipline, carried out almost exclusively by good people, are becoming pervasive. In this case, the terms employed in that discipline were, ostensibly, progressive. The fact that most faculty members call themselves liberals or progressives makes the exercise more palatable to them. It makes it all seem virtuous. But it’s possible that the terms in play mean less than the process of ever-tightening scrutiny and control that is becoming a part of almost every enterprise that is administered by the good people of the world. They are “squeezing our shoes,” to borrow a phrase from David Foster Wallace, and getting their own shoes squeezed in the bargain. 

    The deans are good people, the DEI office is full of good people, the HR building’s no doubt populated by decent characters. And all these people are not ideologues. OK, some of them are virtue exhibitionists who put those In-Our-Family-We-Believe-That signs in front of their houses. And some get all misty when they say the word “black,” but probably not many, and even those who do have their virtues.

    Reactionaries think that a major plot, a real conspiracy, is afoot in the universities, and in the corporations too, to turn everyone into a lockstep leftist. There’s a tablespoon of truth in that. But I think that indoctrination to an ideology may not be the main issue here, not quite. People tune out professional droners. They make stuff up to fill in the Diversity square on the application. They mock the literal-minded hacks who spew institution-speak into the air like sterile seeds. When questioned they obtain services from the consulting firm of Duck and Hide. Subtly, quietly, you can evade the ideological indoctrination. But that is not the end of it. There is a dimension to institutional life now that is probably more consequential (and more pernicious), and that you cannot evade. You must participate in this part of the endeavor, as both subject and object.

    “I hate the builders of dungeons in the air.” 

    That is Ralph Waldo Emerson gently venting his disapproval at knee-jerk pessimists. He is not enamored of those who build castles in the air either, but Emerson, who has a predilection for hope, has no time for the born and bred nay-sayers. I have for some time put Michel Foucault in the category of the airy dungeon builders. He is the pessimist’s pessimist, the well-known theorist who sees no hope, or very, very little. Foucault believes that the world has changed markedly since, say, the early twentieth century, and that we are now beset with a different and relatively novel kind of oppression. It is an oppression, one might say, administered by “good people.” 

    In his person, Foucault was a bit of an enigma. His photos display a man with a shaved dome, techy glasses that give him something of a fiendish face, and an x-ray glare. He comes off as the post-human anchorite of scholarship, a creature of sub-basement archives, yellowing manuscripts, and discarded record books. He looks like an unforgiving android. In person, however, matters seem to have been different. His friend Simeon Wade, who wrote Foucault in California, clearly adores Foucault, but is also prone to candor. The master, he says, was giggly, naïve, especially about sex; and rather scared of women and girls.

    Me? I have greatly admired his major work, Discipline and Punish, though the admiration has faded a bit over time, and generally I find his programmatic pessimism distasteful. The problem is that, however distasteful Foucault’s vision is, just now it is coming true. Something has changed to make Foucault’s vision far more applicable than it was when he published his work thirty and forty years ago. Foucault knows the good people — in academia, in business, in the foundations, in the museums — a good deal better than they know themselves.

    My libertarian friends, my one-time hippie friends, seethe at the imposition of the DEI regulations, the diversity workshops, the mandatory displays of righteousness in which nothing is righted. They hate it. They see a lot of it as moral exhibitionism and pointless pseudo-reform. The formidable Marxist writer Adolph Reed has observed that the effect of the recent “racial reckoning” in America is to diversify the top ten percent income earners. And maybe he’s right. The black kid who didn’t get a breakfast before the reckoning is probably still not getting a breakfast. My friends see the new dispensation as purely gestural, as a protracted pantomime, shoe-squeezing to no purpose at all. I sympathize with their view, but I part company in my growing conviction that it’s more than a pantomime, quite a bit more.

    How does power work? In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries we thought we knew. Freud knew, Marx knew, the American revolutionaries knew. Power comes from the top down. Power come from the king, the nobles, the bourgeoisie. Or alternately, power comes from the punitive super-ego, the agency within the psyche that tyrannizes the individual with impossible demands, then punishes him for not fulfilling them. The super-ego stands metaphorically atop the hapless ego — power from above.

    But maybe things have changed. In an interview in 1979 called “Truth and Power,” Foucault declares that we still need to cut the off the king’s head — in political theory that still has not been done. His remark doesn’t mean exactly what it seems to mean. He is not thinking of doing away with top-down power, he is telling us that we need to forget that kind of power, because it is obsolete. There is no more taking the king to the guillotine, no further need to storm the Bastille.

    Instead, we find ourselves within a web of power whose influence is everywhere and whose center is nowhere. And who administers this power? Not the king, or the duke. And not even — this will matter in what’s coming — the president. Power is now administered by everyone in what we might call an administrative position. The ones who design, vet, and disseminate the mandatory work surveys; the ones who have a hand, or just a finger, in getting the annual reports out to the workforce, whether a faculty or a corporate population; they are the ones who evaluate the students for intelligence, grade them for performance, collect data on their likes and dislikes. These administrators of power include marketing people and advertising people and public relations people — all the people who count and characterize, and whose work manages to shape the lives of their subjects.

    All these people — most of whom are no doubt good people — are watched and counted and measured in turn. Do some have more disciplinary power than others? Do some have more surveillance power? Maybe — but it probably doesn’t really feel that way to any individual. They are just doing their jobs. A certain amount of such bureaucratic calculation and observation is critical to the functioning of a mass society, certainly. Yet I think the collective effect of these jobs done by good people is more discipline. The collective effect is less freedom. One is observed more. One is judged more. 

    The goodness of these good people is of a rather limited sort. When I was a boy, getting a Catholic education at the Sacred Hearts Church in Malden, Massachusetts, I learned that there were two kinds of sins. First there were sins of commission. These were bad deeds that you enacted and told the priest about at confession. “I lied”; “I cheated”; “I stole.” But there were also sins of omission. You missed mass; you neglected to be kind to an aging parent or grandparent; you didn’t share what you had. It seems to me that most “good people” now excel at avoiding sins of commission. They don’t drink to excess. They don’t have affairs. They don’t cheat (much) on their taxes. They never use the terrifying “n-word,” and are reluctant even to say “Negro,” lest someone somehow might take offense. But I think you’ll find sins of omission among them in plenty: turning their backs on a maligned friend; not standing up against administrative over-reach at work; not saying the necessary, unpopular word. In our on-line culture it is easy to be busted for stepping forward at the right-wrong time. Good people tend to avoid doing so. Could you achieve grace by simply avoiding sins of commission? The word at Sacred Hearts church was that you could not.

    When you read Foucault’s interview, it seems like he must have been speaking during the flourishing of Internet culture. For there is no device that augments discipline in the way that the Internet does. Here’s another form — fill it in, get it back fast — repeat ad nauseam. But this is not the case. Foucault seems to have taken his teacher Derrida’s view of signification, a web without a center, and applied it to social control. One is inclined to say that Foucault simply got lucky in securing his prophetic status — but intuition does count in intellectual life and Foucault, who seemed to be about as non-intuitive a person in everyday life as one can imagine, simply nailed it. We may have thought that we had assimilated all of Foucault’s thinking, but the truth is that reality has now caught up with him, to the extent that he is fully relevant, and painfully so, again.

    Does everyone exert discipline? Does everyone not only exist in the web but also do the work of the web? I think there is a simple answer to this important question. The answer is no. If you went to college and have a job, you probably do the work of the web. If you didn’t go to college, you may do web work with your small business, but probably you don’t. If you did not attend college and if you do not sit down every day at a computer to do your web work, then you are probably an object of discipline and surveillance, but not a frequent practitioner. (You probably also voted for Trump, but more on that anon.) Those who work the web are also its objects—that goes without saying. The observers are observed.

    What are the terms of observation — what are the terms of discipline? I think we can confidently say that they have grown exponentially since Foucault’s time, but what he saw and said still has its validity. Michael Walzer once observed that much of Foucault’s work can be considered as an elaborate pun on the word “discipline.” In its first sense, discipline means controlling people; it means determining the shapes of their lives: where they can live and how, where they can go and where they cannot. It means getting them to show up and sit with their legs beneath their desks and to pay attention. But it also means letting them know who and what they are and getting them to believe it.

    That’s where the second denotation of discipline comes in. Those branches of knowledge that we broadly call the human sciences — sociology, medical science, criminology, psychology, the study of sexuality, certain varieties of historical scholarship, and the rest — are all about establishing norms. The criminologist will tell you who the delinquent is, and how the criminal comes to be; the psychologist will offer portraits of aberrant behavior; the sociologist will tell you how relatively socialized people behave in groups. These definitions and characterizations have a couple of dimensions: they are subtly prescriptive in that by telling us what unorthodox behavior is and how it comes into existence, they also tell us what orthodox or normative behavior can and should be. The disciplines help to discipline. They also point a scientific or pseudo-scientific finger at the outsiders. They stigmatize the ones who cannot or will not conform.

    Foucault, who is claimed as a paragon of gay liberation, would detest the process by which one becomes identical with one’s sexual practices. Sexuality is not identity. Or to put it better, affirming someone’s sexual identity, even one’s own, as a central aspect of human essence is a form of coercive discipline. All forms of identity that draw on the intellectual disciplines are at the very least suspect, and some are outright anathema. 

    In Foucault’s day, the chief means of extending discipline was through institutions. You were shaped and sized by the school, the church, the prison, the military, the government, and they did an effective enough job of it. Now power disseminates itself also through the Internet. It’s much harder to run, much harder to hide. You’ve got to fill out those forms, take that test, be the objective of a given assessment. Internet discipline can be far more effective, comprehensive, and unavoidable than pre-Internet discipline ever was. And the powers who are not really powers, the good people, can demand much more of you (and have more demanded of themselves in turn). My annual report used to consist in a typed page. Now it is about fifteen electronic pages. I will now be rated on a scale of one to ten in nine different categories. And I, as a professor, abide in one of the freest jobs there is.

    It will become more confined and confining over time, for those who are paid to enforce discipline must justify their positions by making ever more disciplinary demands. If they simple left matters as they were, the computers would do their work, and they would be replaceable. In time, discipline will make its way into every interstice of life, for that is the logic of network power. The regulations for sexuality within institutions, say, will become more comprehensive, detailed, and bizarre. A preview of coming attractions can be found in my own university’s rules about sado-masochistic sex undertaken by members of our community. “When parties consent to BDSM 3, or other forms of kink, non-consent may be shown by the use of a safe word, whereas actions and words that may signal non-consent in non-kink situations, such as force or violence, may be deemed signals of consent.” No, I did not make it up. And yes, the combination of liberal tolerance for apparent erotic extravagance and disciplinary control by the institution are emblematic of the present, and of things to come. There is virtually nothing that the Internet and the good people, acting in consort, cannot observe, discipline, and attempt to control.

    And yet these new developments will seem liberal, even liberating. The fact that the idiom of the corporation is now rhetorically progressive — Diversity! Equity! Inclusion! — is not without meaning. The enlightened words blur and confuse our perception of what is really going on — the incontrovertible fact of using these terms to exert not freedom but discipline. Someday the terms may be Family, Flag, and Faith. That, too, will matter. The diffused structure of contemporary power is compatible with many worldviews, or with none at all. What will matter more is the use of these terms to measure, evaluate, and “understand” people. What will matter will be the power of discipline, to curtail freedom.

    Perhaps you truly think that Nike and Apple and Google deeply care about progressive policies. You are wrong. What they care about is gaining control over their workforce and making as much money as possible. If the terms of art were Family and Flag, they would pretend to endorse them, too. The employees in HR and some of the idealistic young may think that they are doing social good in the world. They are wrong. They are using the terms of liberation to bring more and more free people closer to mental serfdom. Some day they will awaken in a cage of their own devising, so harshly confining that even they, drunk on their own virtue, will have to notice how their lives are the lives of snails tucked in their shells. By that time, there may not be anything to do about it. They will be the once willing slaves of the new super-rich; they will be the principals of their own subjection, the masters of their own enslaved selves. 

    My neighbor a little less than a half mile down the road has a Confederate flag fastened to the side of his house. The flag is so old and worn now that it is hard to identify, but I have seen it there from the start, even before the election of Trump. My neighbor drives a pick-up truck, a little rusty, with his dog, an agreeable mutt, riding shotgun, hanging his tongue out the window to taste the air. I walk along our dirt road sometimes, and I see him, and we talk. He hates the government; he hates Washington; he hates what America has come to. We agree on nothing — I’m Bernie 2016, 2020, 2024 and ‘28 if his lips are still moving — so we disagree on a good deal.

    When he drives slowly, careful not to fill my face with road dust, I see the lines that he has painted on the back of his truck by hand: “Don’t let goddam liberals, run your fucken life.” My neighbor doesn’t have email, he doesn’t use a cell phone as far as I know, and he wouldn’t be likely to pump anything approximating personal information into a computer. Still, he knows what we all do: he is on the grid, under discipline, an object of power. When he tells the world not to let liberals run your life, he means what he says. Don’t listen to Biden and Ocasio-Cortez and don’t take cues from the bien pensant gang at the university. What he wants, it seems, is to reclaim the country.

    If so, he’s not alone. Many people on what is called the right want to recapture the center of power and get things straightened out. Trump may have been on the way to doing that, they think, but he probably didn’t have quite enough time. What we need now is to repossess the center of power. We tried to do it on the sixth of January—or at least half-way tried—and it just slipped through our hands. Soon, soon, we’ll possess the palace, and all will be well, or at least a whole lot better.

    Some people, maybe my neighbor included, want to see the January 6 attack on the Capitol as something akin to the storming of the Bastille. They see it as an attempt to reclaim a node of illegitimate power — in fact, it is the node of illegitimate power, akin to Pandemonium, the palace that Satan built in Milton’s hell. The rebels, or pseudo-rebels, seem to believe that they are living in the eighteenth or nineteenth century, when you could depose the king or the czar and achieve real freedom. They think that replacing one chief executive with another will transform their lives and make them free — free from the chickenshit liberals who are always finding new ways to deploy their computers and their techniques of discipline and surveillance to run and ruin the lives of ordinary people. I am far from saying that it does not matter who the president of the United States is, but it may not matter nearly as much as the characters waving Trump flags, wearing MAGA hats, and fuming about the stolen election imagine.

    In truth, there is no center of power to take possession of. If Trump wins the next election, the forces of discipline, which are deployed by no one, in the interest of no one, will continue to compound themselves. The college-educated will get to push more of the buttons, but they too will be subjects of discipline, constantly evaluated, scrutinized, regimented, and regulated. At least they will feel as though they possess some power and some dignity. The non-college group, by contrast, will stroke many fewer keys and see that their lives are being run, though they will think they are being run by those goddam liberals, not by the disciplinary regime. They will not recognize the power that expands for its own sake and functions, finally, for nothing and no one. Its only interest is its own blind growth. And they will continue with a pre-Foucauldian sense of how power works, as will the college-created crowd, though they will probably think less about it, feeling as though they are in some measure in charge, and being well remunerated for it. If you jockey the computer, you are enslaved by the matrix; and if you do not computer jockey you are also enslaved, though you may have a more developed sense that something is way off.

    In The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, Shoshana Zuboff shows how corporations have not only collected data from us all but used that data to influence and shape our behavior. And they have done so, according to Zuboff, in search of profit. Maybe so. But it seems to me that the constant exercise of disciplinary power beyond a certain point profits no one. Rather, disciplinary power expands with what seems a will of its own. Socialism, communism, communitarianism, environmentalism, what have you: no alternative to capitalism would inevitably unseat disciplinary power.

    Journalists spent a lot of time trying to figure out what the people who stormed the Capitol had in common. Education — yes, but not much college; more or less of rural and suburban origins. But there was something else, too, something that I find illuminating. Many of them, perhaps half, had experienced financial troubles. They had lost a house, gone bankrupt, had the loan company’s wolf at their door. Now in America, given the power grid, you cannot run and hide from debt. If you owe, you will pay, or you will pay for not paying. Your interest and fees will compound and compound. You will be chased from post to pillar and back, and the stringent bankruptcy laws will keep you in play. You may not go to debtors’ prison, but other forms of confinement will find you. Once the machines are onto you, once they have all your account information, they will never let up. And this is so especially if you are maladroit online.

    The explosion of conspiracy theories on the right may be a loud literalization of the feeling that something is out to get us — that it is invisible and weird and knows where you live. Run afoul of the disciplinary regime in its financial guise and you are righteously screwed. The good people will have you in their power, though of course the good people are out oppressing each other to beat the band. The stolen election trope restores a sense of assurance about who the enemy is and what might be done about it. This sense of assurance is spectacularly false.

    Now is the time for a set of bracing solutions to the ever-clenching disciplinary web that we live in. I haven’t got any. Still, I do have a prediction that is not entirely pessimistic. In time, people will begin to sense that there is something rotten in the disciplinary regime — that power is growing and growing and serving nothing but itself. They may never become articulate about this perception—they may experience it on a gut level and that’s all. But slowly the cultural weather will shift. Those who spend all day on their computers will begin to be derided as dupes. Walking down the street fooling with your iPhone will mark you out as a clown. People will leave the glowing, sterile silver world of their computers for the green world out their windows. They will spend a day, then a week, then a month, barely stroking a key. They will find better things to do. And the dragon will begin to starve for want of what feeds it, which is our time, and our willingness to watch and be watched.

    This will not happen tomorrow, but I believe it will happen. During the height of the plague many people left their jobs, skipped their appointments with the physician and the shrink, stopped answering their phones, fumbled, accidentally on purpose, their Zoom accounts, and without knowing it consciously said no to discipline. Some of those people simply never came back. Soon, but alas not too soon, many of the rest of us may well be joining them.

    Large Empty Bowl

    sitting in the bower
    after lunch with
    my sadness 

    like unto Magdalene
    our defectiveness known all around
    the town 

    (a passion for extravagant apology)
    (flimsy promise to do better from now on) 

    I knew the crowd had stones
    heating the hollows of their hands

    (the teacher has always shown me
    the underlying structure of

    a situation, though often
    years after I no longer cared, was
    no longer there, at all)

    stone and bread are alike
    in the hands of the just

    bread and stone the same

    Two Concepts of God

    For Moshe Idel

    Since the very inception of their discipline, scholars of Kabbalah, or Jewish mysticism, have tried to define the object of their study based on its supposed relationship to myth. Gershom Scholem viewed the rise of Kabbalah in the Middle Ages as the return — with a vengeance — of myth. After having been repressed by Biblical and rabbinic traditions, it reemerged, cloaked in mystery and veiled in esotericism, to insinuate itself into the heart of Judaism, from which it would dictate the future of Jewish thought and history. Another school of thought, led by Moshe Idel and Yehuda Liebes, has denied that myth had ever been absent from Judaism, and has traced lines of continuity from the kabbalistic mythos to elements already present in the canonical texts of ancient Judaism. Whatever the precise relationship between myth and Kabbalah, medieval Jewish philosophy has been presented in no uncertain terms as Kabbalah’s nemesis. Under the influence of Maimonides, who defined much of its agenda, Jewish philosophy sought to purify God of any trace of anthropomorphism and to systematically eradicate any mythic elements from Jewish tradition. According to this account, then, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw the rise of two movements with diametrically opposed relationships to myth: Kabbalah and Jewish philosophy. The kabbalists are said to have had the upper hand because they tapped into the primordial wellsprings of myth and irrigated every corner of Jewish existence from it, while the philosophers uprooted Judaism from its source of vitality and turned it into an alienated and abstract religious culture.

    Scholem conceived of this contest as a medieval precursor of the great cultural clash between Romanticism and the Enlightenment in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The conceptual framework that he used to analyze Kabbalah borrowed considerably from the way Romanticism imagined itself in relation to the Enlightenment — that is, as a more authentic and exciting alternative to the aridities of reason. In this way, a broad cultural conflict from modernity was projected backward onto medieval Judaism and considered to be the key to elucidating its driving forces.

    This historical account has become the dominant way of thinking about Kabbalah, even as the debate over the connection between kabbalistic myth and earlier strands of Jewish thought continues. There is no question that its broad outlines are well grounded in the sources and that it has contributed greatly to our understanding of Jewish intellectual and cultural history. But it is not the whole story. It seems to me worthwhile to present another way of thinking about these issues, an alternative conceptual framework that will help us get a fuller view of the Kabbalistic phenomenon itself, and will situate Kabbalah’s relationship to medieval Jewish philosophy in a different and added context. Indeed, the implications of this different view extend beyond the confines of Jewish religion to the more universal and fundamental question of how we may think about the nature of divinity itself. 

    I would like to propose a contrast between two conceptions of the deity: God as a personality and God as a being. Each one provides utterly different ways of accounting for existence and for the religious posture. When categorizing the two medieval Jewish movements according to this criterion, a surprising result emerges: philosophy and Kabbalah, hitherto regarded as spiritual and intellectual opposites, turn out to be part of the same massive conceptual and religious shift. Together they reject the notion of God as a personality for that of God as being. To put it another way, they replace God with the Godhead. One may have personal relations with God, but not with the Godhead, which in Kabbalah is a multifaced and dynamic structure, a system of divine reality.

    In the biblical tradition, God is a relational subject who enters into a covenant with the Israelites. The history of this people, with all its ups and downs, is interpreted in terms of the straining and strengthening of a complicated relationship between the divine personality and Israel, which is marked by love and tested by betrayal. (The Biblical conception of God as a personality was most richly explored by the late Yohanan Muffs.) Similarly, for all its vastness and its multiplicity of genres, rabbinic literature everywhere exhibits the same basic perception of God as a personality entangled in a web of relationships with humans and the Jewish people. Not only does the biblical anthropomorphic conception of God not trouble the Sages, but they broaden and deepen it. 

    A midrash in Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael, an ancient collection of rabbinical commentaries on the Book of Exodus that was redacted in the third century CE, helps to highlight the monumental disparity between the concerns of the ancient rabbis and those of their medieval successors. It concerns verse twenty-one in chapter thirteen, “The Lord would go in front of them by day [in a pillar of cloud, and by night in a pillar of fire],” about which it remarks:

    Is it possible to say this? But it already says, “Do I not fill heaven and earth — declares the Lord” (Jer. 23:24); and it is written, “And one called to the other and said, ‘Holy, Holy, Holy [is the Lord of Hosts], His glory fills the entire earth’” (Isa. 6:3); and it says, “Behold, the glory of the God of Israel came from the way of the east; and His voice was like the sound of many waters; and the earth was illuminated by His glory” (Ezek. 43:2). What is the meaning of “The Lord would go in front of them by day”? 

    Rabbi [Yehuda Ha-Nasi, or Judah the Prince] said: Sometimes the Emperor Antoninus would hold court on the dais until it grew dark, and his sons would remain with him. After leaving the dais, he would hold the lantern and light the way for his sons. Imperial dignitaries would approach him and say, “Let us hold the lantern and light the way for your sons.” But he would say to them, “No. It’s not that I have no one to hold the lantern and light the way for my sons, but that I am showing you how dear my children are so that you accord them honor.” Thus did the Holy One show the nations of the world how dear Israel is, so that they would accord them honor.

    At first glance, this midrash seems troubled by the kind of metaphysical problem that exercised medieval Bible commentators: How can a deity who fills the entire world be constricted to a cloud or a fire? In the twelfth century, Abraham Ibn Ezra sought to defuse the problem by claiming that God was not actually within the cloud or the fire, and that Scripture only makes it seem so because those phenomena are manifestations of His power. 

    A closer look, however, reveals that Rabbi Yehuda’s parable about the Roman emperor — the ancient Jewish tradition frequently compares divinity to kingship — is addressing another question altogether. Instead of wondering how an infinite deity can be confined to a finite physical space, the midrash wants to know why almighty God decided to lead the Israelites in a pillar of cloud and fire, when He could have sent any of his hosts of messengers to do His bidding or gone forth Himself in all His resplendent glory. Rabbi Yehuda answers that God, like the Emperor Antoninus, chose to show His children the way Himself, not because He had no capable agents but to demonstrate His burning love for His children. And if he had brought His royal retinue, the message would have been lost on the overawed observers. 

    To elucidate the parable, let us consider a more contemporary story. A country is hosting a foreign president, and instead of booking him a presidential suite at its most luxurious hotel, it puts him up in a hostel. The resulting scandal about the country’s treatment of the president does not broach any questions of metaphysics; it’s not as if they tried to defy the laws of nature and squeeze the president into a matchbox. It is, rather, the unseemliness of it that makes headlines. As far as the above midrash is concerned, God can obviously manifest Himself in any way that He deems fit, even in a pillar of cloud or fire. It is asking instead about the appropriateness of the chosen form. One would think that a god whose glory permeates the cosmos would make more of an impression. This is the difficulty that Rabbi Yehuda’s parable addresses.

    Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael raises a similar question about God’s revelation to Moses through the burning bush. Again, the Sages desire to know why God would reveal Himself to Moses through a homely, prickly bush in the wilderness instead of in a more grandiose display befitting His majesty. One of the answers given is that God wanted to convey that He, too, suffered the pain of slavery experienced by the Israelites, like a bird caught in a thorny thicket:

    Moses was tending the flock… And the angel of the Lord appeared to him in a blazing fire out of the midst of a bush” (Ex. 3:1—2). Rabbi Shimon b. Yohai says: Why did the Holy One reveal Himself from on high and speak to Moses out of the midst of a bush? Just as this bush is more brutal than every other tree, so that a bird which enters it cannot escape intact, having been cut to pieces, so too the slavery of Egypt is more brutal for God than every other slavery. 

    A different interpretation: “Out of the midst of a bush” (Ex. 3:2). 

    Rabbi Yehoshua says: Why did the Holy One reveal Himself from on high and speak to Moses out of the midst of a bush? For whenever Israel is in distress, it as is if He is distressed, as it says, “In all their troubles He was troubled” (Isa. 63:9). […] And thus would R. Yehoshua say: Come see how great are the mercies and beneficences of the Holy One upon Israel! They went down to Egypt, and the Shekhina (divine presence) was with them, as it says, “I will go down with you to Egypt” (Gen. 46:4); they went up [from Egypt], and the Shekhina was with them, as it says, “and I will bring you back up” (ibid.); they went down to the sea, and the Shekhina was with them, as it says, “And the angel of God traveled” (Ex. 14:19); they came to the wilderness, and the Shekhina was with them, as it says, “and in the wilderness, where you saw how the Lord your God carried you” (Deut. 1:31); until they came to the Temple. They experience suffering, and He, as it were, experiences the suffering with them, “out of the midst of a bush”; they experience relief, and He experiences relief with them, as it says, “To behold the prosperity of Your chosen ones, to rejoice in the gladness of Your nation, to glory in Your inheritance” (Ps. 106:5).

    This midrash contains one of the important innovations in the anthropomorphic religious thinking of the Sages: God suffers when the Jewish people suffer. Attuned to the nuances of divine self-revelation across Scripture, the midrash discerns in the unusual appearance of God in a scrubland bush an expression of divine empathy for the Israelite plight.

    The Bible maps the relationship between God and humans onto a few hierarchical human relationships: father and son, husband and wife, judge and accused, king and subject. The Sages then contribute new relational categories to this anthropomorphic foundation, including teacher and disciple, homeowner and laborer, patron and client. These capture and accentuate subtleties in the religious relations. Even more so: while in Scripture, God is the more powerful figure in the hierarchy and Israel the less, at times the Midrash brazenly reverses the balance of power in its human analogies, so that Israel or a human is the master, husband, or judge and God the servant, wife, or accused. In addition, the midrashic imagination does not limit itself to the Bible’s verticality. It envisions horizontal relationships that are non-hierarchical and intensely intimate, such as exist between twins or friends. The sheer creativity of the ancient sages is not evidenced, then, by exegetical acrobatics to minimize God’s anthropomorphism, but by the endeavor to look exhaustively at all relations between human beings to better grasp and give meaning to the religious relationship with God. 

    This core religious sensibility of the Bible and the Midrash, which perceives God as a relational subject, met fierce opposition in the Middle Ages. The Maimonidean philosophical concept of God denounced as idolatrous any attribution to God of emotional states and personal characteristics. In this account, God’s transcendence defies any analogy to the human realm, a transcendence that reaches its height in the denial of the capacity of language altogether to serve as a proper medium for the attainment of any knowledge concerning God. This philosophical conception of God, which was tremendously influential among Jewish thinkers (and non-Jewish thinkers too, such as Aquinas) had the effect of usurping a robustly personal God with an austerely metaphysical God. Dramatic narrative was replaced by abiding ontology. What has not been sufficiently documented, and what I will try show below, is that the dramatic shift from God-as-personality to God-as-being was also the hallmark of medieval Kabbalah. This is true, to borrow Moshe Idel’s broad characterizations, both of ecstatic-prophetic Kabbalah and theosophical-theurgical Kabbalah.

    Ecstatic-prophetic Kabbalah focuses on the development and use of mystical techniques to attain unification with God. As Idel has shown, the pinnacle of this kabbalistic striving is the experience of unio mystica, the absolute assimilation of the individual into the Godhead, to the point of ontological identity. The aspiring mystic achieves this by shedding his individuality and personality, by turning the ego (ani) into naught (ayin). (The Hebrew words are anagrams of each other.) In the Kabbalah of Nahmanides in the thirteenth century in Catalonia, union with God depends on a complete negation of the human will, because the will is what individualizes a human as a being separate from God. In other traditions, the negation of the ego is achieved by completely emptying the consciousness of certain particularizing elements. And to match the mystic who strips himself of all personal qualities, the deity with whom he merges is not personality but an all-encompassing being. The crowning attainment of the ecstatic kabbalist is the dissolution of the ontological distance between humans and God, the very space necessary for interpersonal relations to exist. For this reason, in his moment of spiritual ecstasy, as he is enveloped by God, the mystic does not — cannot — interact with God in any human sense. 

    These mystical traditions that reject the conception of God as a personality clothe their longing for union with God in the traditional notion of devekut, or “cleaving” to God — but this never before meant a nullification of the self or a complete melding with the divine being. In Scripture and in classical rabbinical literature, cleaving to God entails limitless devotion to the word of God and following in His footsteps. Drawing close to God, for the Sages, means being on the most intimate terms with God, but it certainly does not mean overcoming the ontological gulf that separates humanity and divinity. Note how the Midrash interprets the verse in Numbers about the human who drew as close as humanly possible to God:

    “Not so with My servant Moses; he is trusted throughout My household. With him I speak mouth to mouth, in a vision and not in riddles, and he beholds the likeness of the Lord.” (Num. 12:7—8) Rabbi Pinhas said in the name of Rabbi Hoshaya: “And he beholds the likeness of the Lord” — it is comparable to a king who reveals himself to a member of his household in his linen garment. 

    Moses’s extraordinary closeness to God is expressed in the language of familiarity and intimacy. He is like a member of a royal household who is privy to see the king in his undershirt, divested of the trappings of royalty and with his guard down. But the kabbalistic notion of cleaving, in which one cannot tell where the mystic ends and God begins, does not allow for intimacy, because intimacy is something that exists between distinct persons. (Many centuries later this preference for being over personality was reversed by Martin Buber in his dialogical account of human interaction with the divine.) The fact that the ultimate religious attainment for these kabbalists has changed from intimacy with God to losing oneself in Him perfectly encapsulates the reconceptualization of the divine personality as an apersonal being. 

    A similar and no less significant transition occurs in theosophical-theurgic Kabbalah. This school of mystical thought introduces two new fundamental ideas about God, both of which end up effacing the divine personality. The first is a dualistic conception of God: the hidden and unknowable deus absconditus, and the manifest divine potencies emanated from the former’s innermost depths. The concealed dimension of the Godhead, which is termed “Absolute Privation” (ha-afisa ha-mucḥletet) in Nahmanidean Kabbalah and “the Infinite” (Ein-Sof) in other kabbalistic thought, is utterly apersonal and has no characteristics. It is being so pristine and pure that the particularizations of language and the categorizations of cognition slip right off it. It is important to stress that this aspect of the Godhead, which scholars generally identify with Maimonides’ philosophically purified God, is nowhere to be found in rabbinic literature. The ancient sages consider God a personality through and through; they posited no apersonal dimension in His being.

    A fine illustration of this significant gap between the rabbinic Midrash and the understandings of the Middle Ages can be seen in their respective interpretations of the very first words of the Bible: “In the beginning (be-reshit), God created” (Gen. 1:1). One would expect God’s book to begin with a reference to Himself: God created, in the beginning,…. So why, the question is asked, doesn’t God appear first? According to the kabbalists, this semantic ordering signifies that the true Creator God, the hidden dimension of the divine Naught, cannot be expressed in language. Out of this infinite Nothingness the sefirot, the elements of the godhead, emerge, and the first word of the verse, be-reshit, is actually an allusion to the first knowable sefirah called Chokhma, or Wisdom. The rest of the words in the verse allude to the other sefirot according to their order of descending emanation and increasing particularization. A critical step in transforming God from a personality to a being is the positing of a hidden, unfathomably pure existent of sui generis oneness, which serves as the primordial substrate of all existence. Yet the Midrash, by contrast, knowing nothing of this divine schematic, uses this as yet another opportunity to glean insight into the divine personality: 

    “In the beginning, God created” (Gen. 1:1). Rabbi Yudan in the name of Aquilas: It is befitting to call such a one “God.” The common practice is for a king of flesh-and-blood to have his praise proclaimed throughout the city without having built them public works or baths. 

    Shimon ben Azzai says: “You have increased Your humility for me” (2 Sam. 22:36). Flesh and blood mention their name and then their praise: so-and-so followed by their title. But the Holy One does not. Only after creating the needs of His world does He mention His name: “In the beginning [created]” and after that “God.” 

    The Sages do not read the absence of God’s name from the opening of the verse as an ontological statement about any Absolute Privation that grounds the rest of the Godhead and the universe. They take it instead as a reflection of God’s humility — of an aspect of the divine personality. In stark contrast to the self-important emperors, God declares His primacy only after doing something for humankind. 

    The effacement of the divine personality can also be seen in the manifest aspects of the Godhead, which brings us to the second major innovative doctrine of theosophical Kabbalah: the emergence from the divine Naught of a complex of divine potencies variously called attributes, existents, utterances, or, most familiarly, sefirot. These potencies are the manifest aspect of the Godhead and mediate between the hidden dimension of the Godhead, on the one hand, and the universe and humans, on the other. In this picture, the complexity of God’s qualities and attributes found in Scripture and rabbinic literature are reconceived as distinct existents or hypostases. God is remolded into the Godhead, a being that elaborates itself into particularity via a process of emanation, and the potencies that emerge therefrom form a complex, quasi-organic association with one another. 

    The ancient rabbis coined many epithets for God that signify qualities of the divine personality, but they have been transformed in kabbalistic literature into the discrete entities of the Godhead. The names that the rabbis created — for example, Gevura, signifying God’s omnipotence, and the feminine name Shekhina, signifying God’s immanence — did not refer to separate dimensions that exist side by side within the Godhead. The Shekhina in Rabbinic literature is not an ontological dimension forming part of the totality of the divine structure; it is God’s name. And therefore, when the rabbis describe the Shekhina going into exile with the Jews, they mean that God accompanied them. For the kabbalists, however, the Shekhina going into exile meant that the “lowest” sefira was pulled away from the rest of the divine structure. The Shekhina in rabbinic literature is not God’s female companion; it is God’s totality perceived as feminine. By externalizing God’s qualities and names into discreet dimensions emanating from the divine naught, the kabbalist deconstructed the divine personality into a schematized system of ten nodes of divinity that can be visually represented, often in the form of a kabbalistic tree. 

    It bears noting that despite this fixed order and arrangement, the sefirot remain dynamic and in flux, because the manifest part of the Godhead yearns to return to its concealed source. The configuration of the sefirot exists as a fragile unity and separation. This dynamism of the kabbalistic Godhead is incompatible with Maimonides’s Unmoved Mover, a perfect and disengaged deity of the Aristotelian kind, and its internal multiplicity runs counter to the strict and simple unity of God insisted upon by Maimonideans. And yet, in spite of these tremendous theological differences, both Kabbalah and medieval Jewish philosophy fundamentally consider God as being. By depersonalizing God, the two medieval movements catalyzed a transformation in the religious consciousness that would remake the face of Judaism. 

    Theosophical Kabbalah gained sufficient traction because it endowed Jewish rituals with theurgic meaning. The precarious unity of the divine configuration must constantly be maintained, in order for the sefirot to be properly nourished by the divine efflux that emerges from the depths of Naught, and to transmit it thence to the entire universe. Safeguarding the balance and unity of this multifaced system is entrusted to humans. Performing positive commandments unifies the divine structure, and transgressing negative commandments disunifies it. This notion, which scholars term theurgy, views the observance of the commandments as fulfilling a divine need. While the religious act can still fulfill the goals delineated in rabbinic literature, such as improving human nature or appeasing God, the theurgic explanation attributes to the doer a causal effect on the foundations of all existence. The rabbinic explanation of commandments takes for granted that there are two persons, the one giving orders and the one carrying them out, whereas the theurgic reason is distinctly impersonal, it is not a relational activity but rather a casual act on a complex being on a dynamic and manyfold entity.

    And so the doctrine of theurgy further drove a wedge between the old and new conceptions of God. Consider the rabbinic and kabbalistic interpretations of Moses’s role in the Israelites’ battle against Amalek. The Biblical verses report:

    Whenever Moses held up his hand, Israel prevailed; but whenever he let down his hand, Amalek prevailed. But Moses’s hands grew heavy, so they took a stone and put it under him and he sat on it, while Aaron and Hur, one on each side, supported his hands; thus his hands remained steady until the sun set. (Ex. 17:11—12)

    The Mishna — the earliest codified work of rabbinical teachings which was edited in the end second century CE rejects this straightforwardly magical account of the event and raises an incredulous objection: 

    “Whenever Moses held up his hand etc.” Do the hands of Moses make or break a battle? Rather, it tells you that whenever Israel would look upward and make their hearts subservient to their Father in Heaven, they would prevail, and if not, they would fall. 

    According to this mishna, when Moses lifted his arms heavenward, it signaled that the people were rededicating themselves to God and looking to Him for salvation. This reading explicitly rejects any causal explanation — magical or otherwise. Turning to and pleading with one’s Father in Heaven is, of course, a deeply interpersonal act. 

    In kabbalistic thought, though, matters are reversed. In his Biblical commentary, Nahmanides doubles down on the causal explanation: 

    By way of truth, he raised ten fingers to the Height of Heaven to allude to the ten sefirot, in order to make it cleave to the Faith that fights for Israel. This explains the matter of the uplifted palms during the priestly blessing and its secret. 

    By raising his hands, Moses was not praying. He was performing an ontological action and influencing the configuration of the Godhead: he induced the cleaving of the sefirot to “Faith,” another name of Shekhina, the lowest sefira that is most prone to detachment from the rest of the configuration. When Moses lifted his hands, he caused a unification of the upper sefirot with the Shekhina, which was doing battle for Israel, so as to energize it with the divine efflux. The impact of his action was felt cosmically, not humanly. The phrase “by way of truth,” in Nahmanides, denotes an esoteric kabbalistic reading. According to Nahmanides, the same theurgic technique lies behind the commandment for the Kohen, or Jewish priest, to raise his hands during the priestly blessing, as is still commonly done in traditional synagogues. Thus, an interaction between the sons and their Father turns into the metaphysical operation of a technician cranking up the power of the divine machine.

    There is perhaps no better example of this change in the meaning of the religious act than prayer. In the history of Judaism specifically, and of world religions more generally, prayer is the ultimate relational encounter between humans and God, an intimate moment pregnant with vast interpersonal potential. The supplicant’s attitude towards God can vary widely based on their perceived relationship with God and their life circumstances. Prayer can be a humble entreaty, a cry of despair, a brazen demand, a fierce protest, and much more. 

    When the kabbalists turn prayer into a theurgic act, demanding a heightened focus on each word to intend it to act on a specific sefira, they strip this encounter of its dialogical and relational quality. When one examines the massive collection of kabbalistic prayers with their manifold techniques and “intentions,” one is left to wonder, where is the son pleading with his Father? There is indeed a good reason why one of the earliest critiques of Kabbalah, penned in fourteenth-century Spain by the renowned jurist Rabbi Isaac b. Sheshet, touches on prayer: 

    I have also informed you that my teacher, Rabbi Peretz Ha-Kohen, would neither speak about nor give prominence to the sefirot. I also heard him say that Rabbi Shimshon of Chinon, who was the greatest rabbi of his generation, … would say, “I pray with a mindset of a child.” That is, to the exclusion of the kabbalists, who pray one time to this sefira and another time to that one.

    Now, Shimshon of Chinon was not a Maimonidean philosopher who considered kabbalistic prayer an unconscionable contradiction to God’s absolute unity. He was an exceptional jurist and legal authority from Talmudist circles (known as Tosafists) in France, for whom Maimonidean philosophy was as foreign as kabbalistic doctrine. His objection to such complex and technical prayer “intentions” is that they remove the personal quality from the prayer setting; the abstract hyper-awareness that they require necessarily stanches any natural outpouring of emotion. While the kabbalist intently sends off every word to its appropriate supernal destination, Shimshon prefers to pray with the blissful innocence of a child. 

    This analysis of the shift from God as personality to God as being within the two central streams of Kabbalah offers a new perspective on the meaning of Jewish mysticism. Like any general observation, however, it overlooks the sheer diversity of kabbalistic thought. The ascription of a personality to God was part of the fabric of the canonical Jewish tradition that the kabbalists inherited. The concise, systematic character of Nahmanidean Kabbalah is worlds apart from the sprawling and dynamic Kabbalah of the Zoharic literature. And yet, even in the sections in the Zohar (the canonical medieval work of Jewish mysticism composed in Spain in the thirteenth century but attributed to Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai of the second century CE) known as the Idrot, which are considered the most anthropomorphic texts in Zoharic literature, the effacement of the divine personality is apparent. 

    The idrot provide a detailed depiction of God’s facial physiognomy. They zoom in on the divine skull, forehead, eyes, nose, mouth, cheeks, facial hair, and beard. It is important to note that the depiction of God in a human form shows a strong lack of any aversion to an embodied vision of the divine, but such a vision is common in Kabbalah. Yet what marks God as a personality is not having a body, but being a relational subject with a complex emotional life. A body does not necessarily imply a personality. An early medieval text called the Shiur Komah, orDimensions of [His] Stature,” records the fantastically large measurements of God’s body. (“The soles of his feet cover the whole universe….”) The author is clearly in awe of the vast dimensions of the deity, but one sees little evidence of any personal connection to this entity. What relationship can there be with a body that spans light years in the vast emptiness of space? 

    In the Idra Rabba, or theGreat Assembly,” a mystical text incorporated into the Zohar, the gigantic face of Arikh Anpin, or the Long Countenance, pours down mercy unceasingly, and yet it is a completely static face. A face with no facial muscles; white eyes with no pupils, no eyebrows, no eyelids. Can one humanize a shining face that never changes its expression? Can one engage it? The divine face has an iconic, inanimate quality to it. Compare this to the simple meaning of the second verse of the priestly blessing, that God should illuminate His countenance for His people (Num. 6:25). The hope is that God’s countenance will glow radiantly for His people, in the way that someone’s face lights up when they meet or are reminded of someone they love. But the divine face of Arikh Anpin in the Idra is always shining — without intention or interruption, without prior prompting or pleading. This “face” has far more in common with the Sun than with anything living. 

    In the Idrot, God’s interiority is translated into external existents. The Thirteen Attributes of Mercy said to be aspects of Arikh Anpin are attributed to various regions of the divine beard. Whereas human compassion and empathy are psychological and emotional states that move a person to help someone else, divine compassion and kindness in the Idra are a liquid essence that flows from the divine skull down through the strands of the wondrous beard to sustain all of existence. The elite kabbalists who have convened in this “great assembly” do not relate to this immutable and unmoved divine countenance as the face of a person. For them, it comprises yet another collection of divine facets in need of mystical rectification. They are a maintenance crew whose job it is to ensure that the conduits of the divine efflux are in good working order, that the strands of hair have no split ends, so to speak. 

    Unlike Arikh Anpin, Ze‘er Anpin, (or the “Lesser Countenance”) can change, but its range is severely restricted to only two states: fury and grace. The default setting is the red face of fury, but when it is mixed with the whiteness of grace that flows from Arikh Anpin, the face changes. Be that as it may, the members of the mystical assembly still do not address Ze‘er Anpin directly. They work theurgically to try to align Ze‘er Anpin with Arikh Anpin, so that it can receive the divine efflux that will dilute the anger. 

    Even this anthropomorphic God is not a personal God. Without a doubt, the Idrot represent one of the most imaginative products of the medieval kabbalistic imagination, and there is no denying that they humanize aspects of the Godhead. But it is hard to shake the feeling that the Idrot grafted an apersonal Neoplatonic worldview, in which a monad emanates existence to a multiplicity, onto the received biblical-rabbinic tradition of God as a personality. They turned the subjectivity of an engaged God into an objective metaphysical structure and process.

    Later stages of Jewish mysticism also exhibit this turn towards God as a being in their thinking about God’s presence — what scholars call immanence. A person’s presence is acknowledged by his attentive care or sensed by his physical proximity. In rabbinical literature, the Shekhina ascends or descends, moves away or draws close. But when God is depersonalized, His presence means something completely different: the embeddedness of the divine entity, or aspects thereof, in our world. This can be expressed in varying degrees of ontological blending. Some doctrines talk about divine “sparks” captive in or sustaining our reality, while others, especially those espoused in the modern era by Habad Hasidism and Rabbi Abraham Isaac Hacohen Kook, posit a greater and somewhat pantheistic identity between the Godhead and reality. For our purposes here, there is little difference between pantheism (the doctrine that God and the universe are the same) and panentheism (the doctrine that the universe exists in God but that God is still greater than it), for in both the Godhead is an entity, a “thing,” thoroughly entwined with the universe, such that there is no place devoid of His existence. Such a presence does not entail attentiveness or proximity. It is for this reason that in these systems of thought the theurgic religious act is aimed at being in touch with the segments of the Godhead enmeshed in this world for one of two purposes: to collect them and to gather them, so as to make the fragmented divine entity whole again, or to cleave to the divine realm through the contact with its spark within mundane world. This is a conceptual revolution in and of itself, but it generates new types of religious experience and action that are inconceivable under a personal God. This is not a God one addresses or quarrels with.

    The transition from God to Godhead, from a personality to an array of potencies, became more and more elaborate with time, to the point that one could only attempt to navigate what had become a divine labyrinth with immense erudition in kabbalistic lore. The God to whom one could turn as a son or servant had been lost in the mammoth engines of Lurianic Kabbalah in the sixteenth century and later; its God was a kind of secret to be rediscovered. Yehuda Liebes has argued that the esoteric religious doctrine of Shabbetai Zvi, the false messiah of the seventeenth century, was that there is in fact a personal God who can be communicated with directly, and with whom he claimed to be in unique intimate relationship. His secret theology sought to rehabilitate the personal God known to any elementary school pupil who is versed in the Jewish tradition. The disappearance of this personal God into an esoteric teaching has been due to the rise of Lurianic Kabbalah, and in response to it Shabbetai Zvi tried to resurrect the personal God. As Liebes says: 

    Understanding the meaning of Shabbetai Zevi’s behavior requires us to delve into the essence of his Mystery of the Godhead. Rather than limited ability, his conscious opposition to the technical and impersonal style adopted by Lurianic Kabbala — in which an advanced, multifaceted machine had replaced the personal God — guided Shabbetai Zevi. Replacing the Lurianic machine with a personal God led Shabbetai Zevi to abandon Lurianic devotional prayer and pray “as someone who prays to His King,” as attested by his fellow student R. Moses Pinheiro. 

    The romance of Shabbetai Zevi, the manic mystical messiah who traumatized his people when he converted to Islam, deserves to include the poignant fact that he sought to replace the vast systems of doctrine about the Godhead with the experience of a personal God like the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. 

    It would appear, then, that conventional view of Kabbalah as the reinvigoration of myth, which has significantly contributed to our understanding of Kabbalah, somewhat obscures a monumental shift in Jewish religious consciousness. The shift is away from the Biblical and Rabbinic religious consciousness, and it took place in both principal types of Kabbalah. The distinction between philosophy and Kabbalah is not to be located in their respective relationship to God as a personality. Both movements perceived God first and foremost as a being rather than as a relational subject; the great difference between them focused on what kind of a being God is. Of course, each one’s concept of God was informed by the epistemological methods that they considered valid: philosophy relied on strict logical reasoning, while Kabbalah was nourished by visions and mystical speculation. 

    In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the great Jewish esoteric movements emerged, and they all shared discomfort with the personalist perspective of the Bible and rabbinical literature. The source of this discomfort is in the rejection of the understanding of the fate of humans as a reflection of their lived relations with God. Personality was replaced by being as part of the dominance of the idea of nature, an idea that perceives causal structures as the ground of being and as the guide to human action. The search for the specific causal model was shared by all the major Jewish schools of thought that burst onto the scene in the Middle Ages: Kabbalah, philosophy, and astrology (of the variety propounded by Abraham Ibn Ezra). They favored different causal models, including the Neoplatonic, Aristotelian, and Hermetic-astral, but they all shared the same basic account of nature, causality, and a divine entity. Each in their own way effaced God’s personhood. 

    The deeper one probes into the most esoteric strata of these doctrines, the more one finds that God’s personal features are shed and God turns into the Godhead. If the contest between Jerusalem and Athens is between a personal God and a natural causality, then Athens won the hearts and minds of the great medieval Jewish esotericists. The only figures to remain faithful to Biblical and Midrashic traditions were those who did not propound esoteric lore, who in their interpretation of the canonical Jewish texts did not identify a realm of hidden secrets which they have the spiritual privilege to uncover. Rashi is a perfect example. Throughout his renowned commentary on the Bible, God’s personhood is plainly evident. No wonder that it was one of his disciples’ disciples, Shimshon of Chinon, who would pray like a child — with wonder, with petulant demands, with ordinary intention behind the words — to show that the master-bearers of the secrets had it wrong.